

## Record of Inclusion and Coding Decisions

Dataset on Rebel Group Formation in Africa (1997-2015)

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The associated dataset and codebook are available at:

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/DDDCFJ>

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The aim of this document is to provide information about the conflict context for each country-period coded, and transparency on decisions about which groups were included in the dataset. It also includes detail and sources used for some variable codings, especially codings on variables prone to weak evidence. While we of course sought consistency in applying coding criteria, coders differed in style and extent of detail recorded across groups and variables, which is reflected in this document. It is organized by country and includes for each country a summary of the conflict environment from 1997-2015, as well as an assessment of whether the primary researcher and coder for that country suspects that additional rebel groups formed in each country period despite insufficient information for inclusion.

Listed groups below are those identified in an actor column of the ACLED dataset from 1997 to 2015 and those we identified using additional sources. See the codebook for a detailed discussion of our research process and inclusion criteria. The “AKA” for each group here lists other names we identified for what we determined to be the same group. An asterisk (\*) following a rebel group name below indicates a group included in our dataset but not referenced as an actor in ACLED. In rare cases where a group appears to have changed its name from Name X to Name Y and only Name Y is listed as an actor in ACLED, the group *does not* receive an asterisk – however, they are counted as included in ACLED in the dataset.

**Blue highlighting** of a rebel group name below indicates a group ultimately **excluded** from the dataset for the listed country. (It may be included under another country.)

**Yellow highlighting** indicates a group was ultimately **included** in our dataset for this country.

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## Algeria

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**Narrative Summary:** Throughout our period of interest, Algeria has not seen many new groups form, but there has been a significant amount of violence. Most of the violence in Algeria against the state is perpetrated by extreme Islamist groups. These groups emerged in the mid 1990's during a civil war caused by the cancellation of elections in 1992 that an Islamic party was poised to win. Groups such as GIA formed during these years, and later splintered into groups such as MUJAO, GSPC/AQIM, and GSL; however, all these groups were excluded from our dataset because they either formed before 1997 or they are splinters. Other than Islamist groups, the only group to have fought the state in our period of interest, MSJ, was fighting on behalf of southern Algerians who have far fewer economic opportunities and rights compared to the rest of the country.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** The probability of additional, unidentified groups in Algeria is listed as Medium because it was difficult to learn much about the formation of one armed group we identified – Mouvement des Fils du Sahara pour la Justice Islamique (MSJI). We ultimately excluded it, but it is possible that with better information we would have determined that it met our criteria for a rebel group. Other than MSJI, most of the groups in Algeria appear to be well documented because they are well-known Islamist groups, so it is unlikely that there are additional unidentified groups.

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### Al Mulathamun

AKA: El Moulathamoune; Those Who Signed in Blood

This group was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar after he splintered from AQIM in 2012 due to disagreements with some AQIM leaders.<sup>1</sup> This group is not counted in our dataset because it is a splinter group of AQIM.

### Al -Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

This group is the renamed GSPC after its alliance with Al-Qaeda in 2006.<sup>2</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is the same as GSPC and it is controlled by a mother group (Al-Qaeda). However, it should be noted that AQIM is responsible for a great deal of violence in Algeria during our period of interest.

### Alliance Democratique du 23Mai pour le Changement (ADC)

AKA: Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change; May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change; 23 May Democratic Alliance for Change; Democratic Alliance for Change May 23

This group is excluded from our dataset in Algeria because it is a rebel group in Mali. For more information, see ADC in Mali.

### Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC)

AKA: Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change

This group is excluded from our dataset in Algeria, because it is an armed group in Mali. For more information, see ATNMC in Mali.

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<sup>1</sup>“Al Mourabitoun,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-mourabitoun>.

<sup>2</sup> Sage, Andre Le., and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Strategic Forum No. 268. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2011.

### **Ansar Dine**

AKA: Harakat Ansar Al-Dine; Ansar Al-Dine; Ansar Al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Ansar ud-Dine; Defenders of the Faith

This group is excluded from our dataset in Algeria, because it is a rebel group in Mali.  
For more information, see Ansar Dine in Mali.

### **Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie (CNCD)**

AKA: National Coordination for Change and Democracy

This group was a coalition of opposition groups, including some political parties, that called for weekly peaceful protests to challenge the authoritarian government in Algeria in 2011.<sup>3</sup> Although these protests at times turned violent, CNCD advocated for peaceful demonstrations. Because CNCD did not make plans to violently challenge the state, and there are numerous political parties in the CNCD, this group is ultimately excluded from our dataset.

### **El-Farouk Brigade**

This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a part of AQIM.<sup>4</sup>

### **Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)**

AKA: National Liberation Front

This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a political party.<sup>5</sup>

### **Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)**

AKA: Islamic Salvation Front; Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS); Islamic Salvation Army

This group was an Islamic political party that was poised to win the 1992 elections in Algeria. However, before FIS could win, the government cancelled the elections.<sup>6</sup> Shortly thereafter, FIS endorsed violence against the government and formed a military wing, the Islamic Salvation Army.<sup>7</sup> However, both the FIS and AIS are excluded from our dataset because they formed before 1997.

### **Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)**

AKA: Armed Islamic Group

This group is excluded from our dataset because it formed before 1997.<sup>8</sup> However, it should be noted that GIA is responsible for the majority of violence in Algeria recorded in ACLED up until 2004, including numerous attacks on civilians.

### **Groupe Salafiste Libre (GSL)**

AKA: Free Salafist Group

This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a splinter of GSPC.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Lahcen Achy, "Why Did Protests in Algeria Fail to Gain Momentum?," *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/31/why-did-protests-in-algeria-fail-to-gain-momentum/>.

<sup>4</sup> "Top Qaeda Member Surrenders in Algeria: Security Forces," *Agence France Presse*, May 31, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020100531e65v005hb&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>5</sup> "Africa: Algeria," *CIA World Factbook*, accessed June 11, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html>.

<sup>6</sup> "AIS," *UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, accessed June 11, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/537/0>.

<sup>7</sup> "AIS."

<sup>8</sup> "Groupe Islamique Arme," *Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation*, accessed June 11, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/groupe-islamique-arme>.

<sup>9</sup> Sara Daly, "The Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat: A Dossier," *Jamestown*, May 5, 2005, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-algerian-salafist-group-for-call-and-combat-a-dossier/>.

### Groupe Salafite pour le Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)

AKA: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat

This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a splinter group of GIA.<sup>10</sup>

### Groupes de Légitime Défense (GLD)

AKA: Legitimate Defence Groups; Legitimate Defence Groups Militia

This group is a pro-government militia funded by the state.<sup>11</sup> Due to the fact that they are not challenging the authority of the state and are state actors, this group is excluded from our dataset.

### Ibadite Sect Militia

The only reference to this militia in ACLED is civilian on civilian violence.<sup>12</sup> No other evidence could be found regarding this militia. Because this group does not target the state, it is excluded from our dataset.

### Jund Al-Khilafah (JAK)

AKA: Jund Al-Khilafah- Algeria; JAK-A; Soldiers of the Caliphate; Soldiers of the Caliphate-Algeria

This group was formed in September 2014 after two AQIM leaders broke from the group and declared allegiance to the Islamic State. The group's only confirmed attack was the kidnapping of a French national on September 21, 2014, and his subsequent beheading on September 24, 2014.<sup>13</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset for numerous reasons. First, it is likely it is a splinter group of Al-Qaeda. Second, its only confirmed attack targeted a civilian, not a government official. Third, this attack was carried out at the direction of the Islamic State,<sup>14</sup> and the Islamic State has control over JAK, making it a sub-group controlled by a mother group.<sup>15</sup>

### Knights of Change

This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a Mauritanian armed group targeting the Mauritanian government.<sup>16</sup>

### Malekite Sect Militia

The only reference of this militia in ACLED is civilian on civilian violence.<sup>17</sup> No other evidence could be found regarding this militia. Because this group does not target the state, it is excluded from our dataset.

### \*Mouvement des Enfants du Sud pour la Justice (MSJ)

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<sup>10</sup> "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb."

<sup>11</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 - Algeria," Refworld, 2004, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4988067cc.html>.

<sup>12</sup> ACLED Event 3320ALG

<sup>13</sup> Meziane Abane, "The Secret Story of the Southern Children's Movement," El-Watan, March 28, 2014, <https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/lhistoire-secrete-du-mouvement-des-enfants-du-sud-28-03-2014>.

\*Exact date taken from ACLED

<sup>14</sup> SITE Staff, "Jund Al-Khilafah in Algeria Beheads French Hostage in Video," September 24, 2014, <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/entry/289-jund-al-khilafah-in-algeria-beheads-french-hostage-in-video>.

<sup>15</sup> Joscelyn, "Islamic State Claims Rare Attack in Algeria."

<sup>16</sup> "Islamism In North Africa IV: The Islamist Challenge in Mauritania: Threat Or Scapegoat?," Crisis Group, May 11, 2005, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/mauritania/political-transition-mauritania-results-and-prospects-0>.

<sup>17</sup> ACLED Event 3320ALG

AKA: MESJ; Movement of the Children of the South for Justice; Movement of Southern Children for Justice; The Southern Children's Justice Movement

This group started as a youth movement in 2004 in Ouargla, Algeria.<sup>18</sup> Led by Mohamad Lamine Bencheneb and Abdelsslam Tarmoune, the group demanded more economic opportunities and wealth distribution for poverty-stricken southern Algeria;<sup>19</sup> the group also demanded a pathway for a federation in the south.<sup>20</sup> However, shortly after the movement began, the Algerian government violently put it down and arrested many of its leaders and members.<sup>21</sup> Both Bencheneb and Tarmoune had no prior history of armed struggle, the former a previous mathematics student in the West<sup>22</sup> and the latter viewed as a leader amongst Southern Algerians and their quest for development and liberties.<sup>23</sup> In 2006, some members decided to take up arms against the state to achieve the demands that were squashed in 2004.<sup>24</sup> Some sources speculate that the group decided to take up arms in 2006 because Abdelsslam Tarmoune was denied the chance to run in local elections.<sup>25</sup> Although MSJ existed before 2006, it is only considered a rebel group once it decided to take up arms in 2006, and thus the date of formation and name date variables are coded as 2006.

On November 10, 2007, MSJ launched its first attack-- firing missiles at a military plane that was taking off at the Djanet airport.<sup>26</sup> There are conflicting reports on whether or not Tarmoune planned the armed struggle in Djanet,<sup>27</sup> or the Tassili n'Ajjer mountain range;<sup>28</sup> nevertheless, it is clear that the group was in southern Algeria. Following the attack, MSJ and the Algerian government committed to an agreement in 2008 in which MSJ put down their arms.

This confusion surrounding the location of group formation impacted the coding of many variables. Had there been concrete evidence that the group formed in Djanet, it would be clear that the planning was inside the target country. However, due to the possibility that the group formed in the Tassili n'Ajjer mountain range, which crosses over into Libya, Niger, and Mali, many location variables were coded as "unknown." Nevertheless, it is clear that Tarmoune and the group were in Tassili n'Ajjer and therefore the "rural" variable is coded as a 1. As mentioned

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<sup>18</sup> Mark Muhannad Ayyash and Ratiba Hadj-Moussa, *Protests and Generations: Legacies and Emergences in the Middle East, North Africa and the Mediterranean* (Boston, United States: Brill, 2017), 217.

<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=4848161>.

<sup>19</sup> "Algeria's South: Trouble's Bellwether," Crisis Group, November 21, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/algeria-s-south-trouble-s-bellwether>.

<sup>20</sup> Ayyash and Hadj-Moussa, *Protests and Generations*, 217.

<sup>21</sup> Ayyash and Hadj-Moussa, 217.

<sup>22</sup> "Algerian Paper Publishes Summary of Book on Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Life, Record," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, October 25, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020141025eaap003h1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Tristin Hopper and Stewart Bell, "Terrorist Suspects Were School Friends: Reports; Accused Algeria Gas Plant Bombers from London," *National Post*, April 2, 2013, National edition, sec. Canada,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=FINP000020130402e9420001g&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>23</sup> Malek Bashir, "Algérie : Termoun, de La Contestation Sociale à l'islamisme Armé," *Middle East Eye* édition française, January 11, 2018, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/algerie-termoun-de-la-contestation-sociale-lislamisme-arme>.

<sup>24</sup> Meziane Abane, "The Secret Story of the Southern Children's Movement," *El-Watan*, March 28, 2014, <https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/lhistoire-secrete-du-mouvement-des-enfants-du-sud-28-03-2014>.

<sup>25</sup> Bashir, "Algérie."

<sup>26</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara," *El-Watan*, June 27, 2014, <https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/nouvelles-negociations-la-semaine-prochaine-a-djanet-avec-les-enfants-du-sahara-27-06-2014>.

\*Exact date taken from ACLED

<sup>27</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara."

<sup>28</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara."

above, these mountains border many different countries and therefore the planning inside/border variables are coded as unknown.<sup>29</sup>

Nonetheless, MSJ relaunched their armed struggle in 2012, after the promises in the 2008 agreement were not fulfilled,<sup>30</sup> arrest warrants were issued for a number of MSJ members,<sup>31</sup> and Abdelsslam Tarmoune was once again denied the right to run in local elections.<sup>32</sup> MSJ continued to launch attacks in the Illizi province in southern Algeria, where the city of Djanet is located.<sup>33</sup> Multiple sources indicate that MSJ was stationed in the Tassili n'Ajjer mountain range during the post-2010 rebellion.<sup>34</sup> The large attack variables are coded as not applicable because there was no evidence indicated MSJ committed a large attack; furthermore, given the relative stability of Algeria during this time a large attack would have been documented in the media. MSJ surrendered to the government for the final time in June 2014.<sup>35</sup>

It should be noted that in 2012, Mohamad Bencheneb broke away from the group to form an Islamist group, Mouvement des Fils du Sahara pour la Justice Islamique, that would form very close connections with AQIM splinters;<sup>36</sup> however, Tarmoune remained loyal to solely fighting for the rights of southern Algerians.<sup>37</sup>

It is clear that MSJ hid in the Tassili n'Ajjer mountain range post 2012, but it is unknown if they were technically in Libyan territory, and therefore the "viable\_hide" variable is coded as unknown.

Second, it is possible that MSJ acquired resources from Libyan rebels due to their proximity with the Libyan border, and the fact that its breakaway group (led by Bencheneb) made use of these funds.<sup>38</sup> However, this would not have occurred within the first year of group formation because the anti-Gaddafi revolution had not begun. Therefore, the "other" and "none" variables for sources of funding are coded as "0" and "1" respectively.

Third, MSJ is coded as "1" for the "clandestine" variable because not only is there a gap of 1 year before group formation and first attack, but it is also unlikely the group planned to tell many people of their plans given that their peaceful movement was violently put down by the state in 2004.

Fourth, MSJ is coded as "1" for "goal\_autonomy" because as noted above, one of the demands of the group was a pathway for a federation in the south.

Fifth, MSJ was coded as being viable due to relaunching their armed struggle in 2012.

Sixth, SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation (Event ID 6150182). Since the event location is listed as "nationwide," contestation variables are coded as 1. No Type 2 events occurred during this time.

Last, MSJ appears to be one of the "Unidentified Armed Groups" in ACLED due to numerous attacks in the Illizi province, as well as some of those attacks citing Libyan armed men; there were many Libyan fighters in the MSJ breakaway group, which Tarmoun absorbed after Bencheneb's death.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara | El Watan."

<sup>30</sup> "Sons of Sahara Movement Breaks Away from Northern Mali Islamist Group - ProQuest," May 9, 2013, [https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1349648685?accountid=11243&rfr\\_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo](https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1349648685?accountid=11243&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo).

<sup>31</sup> "Sons of Sahara Movement Breaks Away from Northern Mali Islamist Group - ProQuest."

<sup>32</sup> Abane, "The Secret Story of the Southern Children's Movement."

<sup>33</sup> Bashir, "Algérie."

<sup>34</sup> "Sons of Sahara Movement Breaks Away from Northern Mali Islamist Group - ProQuest."

<sup>35</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara."

<sup>36</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara."

<sup>37</sup> Abane, "The Secret Story of the Southern Children's Movement."

<sup>38</sup> "Algeria Avoids Criticism of Libya, Tunisia over Gas Site Attack - ProQuest," January 23, 2013, [https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1272122805?accountid=11243&rfr\\_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo](https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1272122805?accountid=11243&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo).

<sup>39</sup> "Sons of Sahara Movement Breaks Away from Northern Mali Islamist Group - ProQuest."

### Mouvement des Fils du Sahara pour la Justice Islamique (MSJI)

AKA: Saharan Sons for Islamic Justice Movement; Movement of the Sons of the Sahara for Islamic Justice; Saharan Children's Movement for Islamic Justice Fils du Sahara Pour la Justice Islamique (FSJI)

This group was on the borderline of inclusion and exclusion, and we have excluded it from our dataset.

Reasons we considered for inclusion: This group was led by Mohamad Lamine Bencheneb, the former leader of MSJ; In 2012, Bencheneb left to form MSJI.<sup>40</sup> There is no clear evidence to suggest that Bencheneb took with him members of MSJ to form this group, and there is evidence that many of the southern Algerians that were a part of MSJ did not support Bencheneb's Islamist rhetoric, but rather supported Abdelsselam Tarmoune;<sup>41</sup> If indeed Bencheneb left MSJ by himself and started MSJI with new recruits, the new group would not constitute a splinter and could be considered for inclusion in our dataset.

Reasons considered for exclusion: Just as there is no clear evidence to suggest Bencheneb defected from MSJ with many former members, there is also no clear evidence to suggest that he left alone. However, there is one source that says many members of MSJ disappeared and started to recruit, subsequently adding Islamic to its title.<sup>42</sup> This would be evidence of a splinter, but the source is ambiguous as to whether or not Bencheneb disappeared to form MSJI, or Tarmoune disappeared to prepare for his post-2012 rebellion; moreover, the source is unclear as to when these members disappeared, but they date it as post-2007. Furthermore, some sources suggest that Bencheneb started his group right after his departure from MSJ to garner more support from AQIM;<sup>43</sup> if Bencheneb was able to present a "group" to AQIM, it is likely that this meant the group consisted of not just Bencheneb, but rather other members that he may have recruited from MSJ. If Bencheneb left MSJ with members to form MSJI, this would constitute a splinter and would be excluded from our dataset.

Moreover, there is lots of evidence that suggest after Bencheneb left MSJ, he joined Al-Qaeda<sup>44</sup> or Al-Qaeda splinters such as the "Signed in Blood" group<sup>45</sup> or MUJAO<sup>46</sup> led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Furthermore, Bencheneb is said to have held leadership positions in these roles, either through being an emir of AQIM,<sup>47</sup> or a top businessman for Belmokhtar's group.<sup>48</sup> If Bencheneb did leave MSJ by himself, it is probable then that he received most of his members for MSJI either from AQIM, AQIM splinters, or due to help from those two groups. While this would not automatically exclude MSJI from our dataset, the fact that there were no attacks that MSJI carried out alone (i.e. not in conjunction with AQIM or splinters), could suggest that MSJI is merely an extension of AQIM or splinters, or that MSJI was created by a mother group and controlled by the mother group as well. Both factors would exclude MSJI from our dataset.

Although this was a very close call for inclusion/exclusion, we opted for exclusion because we judged that the reasons for exclusion were more convincing than the reasons for inclusion.

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<sup>40</sup> Abane, "The Secret Story of the Southern Children's Movement."

<sup>41</sup> Abane.

<sup>42</sup> Bashir, "Algérie."

<sup>43</sup> "New Negotiations next Week in Djanet with the Children of the Sahara."

<sup>44</sup> Karim Djaad, "Prise d'otages d'In Amenas : Récit d'une Opération Kamikaze – Jeune Afrique," JeuneAfrique, February 1, 2013, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/138486/politique/prise-d-otages-d-in-amenas-r-cit-d-une-op-ration-kamikaze/>.

<sup>45</sup> Tim Lister and Paul Cruickshank, "'Sons of the Sahara' -- Just One Group in Algerian Gas Plant Attack," CNN, January 24, 2013, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/24/world/africa/sons-of-the-sahara/index.html>.

<sup>46</sup> "Sons of Sahara Movement Breaks Away from Northern Mali Islamist Group - ProQuest."

<sup>47</sup> "Pourquoi Alger a Été Contraint d'user de La Force," L'Humanité, January 21, 2013, <https://www.humanite.fr/monde/pourquoi-alger-ete-contraint-d-user-de-la-force-513307>.

<sup>48</sup> Djaad, "Prise d'otages d'In Amenas."



### Movement National pour la Liberation de L'Azawad (MNLA)

AKA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad; National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad

This group is excluded from our dataset in Algeria, because it is a rebel group in Mali. For more information, see MNLA in Mali.

### Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de L'Oust (MUJAO)

AKA: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa

MUJAO formed after members and leaders of AQIM split from the group due to internal dissent and possible ideological differences.<sup>49</sup> This group is not included in our dataset because it is a splinter group of AQIM.

### Patriots Militia

AKA: PATRIOTS

This group refers to pro-government civilian militias that are armed by the government.<sup>50</sup> Due to the fact that they are not challenging the authority of the state and are pro-state actors, this group is excluded from our dataset.

### Polisario Front

This group is an armed group fighting the Moroccan government for territorial control of the Western Sahara.<sup>51</sup> Due to the fact that it is not challenging the Algerian government, this group is excluded from our dataset in Algeria.

### Rabita Al-Islamiyya li Al-Da'wa wa Al-Jihad (LIDD)

AKA: The Islamic League for Propagation and Holy Struggle; The Islamic League for Preaching and Holy Struggle

This group is excluded from our dataset because it formed before 1997.<sup>52</sup>

### Timizart Brigade

The only reference to this group in ACLED was that its leader, Aamour Bouayache, was killed by military forces. The only source found that references the Timizart Brigade and Bouayache note that Bouayache was the second Emir that was killed in one month, along with Said Badache.<sup>53</sup> Badache was a known Emir of AQIM,<sup>54</sup> and therefore Bouayache presumably is as well. Due to lack of evidence regarding the Timizart Brigade (including no reference to any specific attacks), as well as evidence pointing towards this group being a faction of Al-Qaeda, the Timizart Brigade was ultimately excluded from our dataset.

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<sup>49</sup> "MUJAO."

<sup>50</sup> The Economist, "Mayors and Their Patriots," ProQuest, April 25, 1998, <https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/224081977?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&accountid=11243>.

<sup>51</sup> "Western Sahara Profile," *BBC News*, May 14, 2018, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14115273>.

<sup>52</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," *Middle East Journal* 54, no. 4 (2000): 572–91, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329544>.

<sup>53</sup> "Killed Algerian Gunman Identified," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, April 26, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020130426e94q004bl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>54</sup> "AQLIM Emir Killed in Clashes with Army in Northern Algeria," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, March 28, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020130328e93s003h1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

## Angola

**Narrative Summary:** Angola saw significant rebel activity, primarily associated with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), in the final years of its decades-long civil war which ended in 2002 but has been relatively peaceful since then. In a separate conflict in Angola's oil-rich Cabinda enclave, secessionists' intermittent attacks continued even after a 2006 ceasefire between the government and one of the major factions of the rebel Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** More than 98 percent of ACLED's events during the 1997-2015 time period were during the final years of the civil war (1997-2002), with most of them directly related to the conflict and associated with UNITA. Because of the high number of events associated with named groups, primarily UNITA and the various Cabinda rebel factions, less than 4 percent of all ACLED events included an unidentified armed group. Because the civil war and the Cabinda conflict both began long before 1997, all of the named rebel groups began prior to our period of interest or were splinters of a pre-1997 group. There is little evidence for new rebel groups among the unidentified ACLED events since 2002, which include landmine deaths, attacks against opposition figures, and violence related to the Cabinda conflict. GTD's most recent Angolan event took place in 1999, and SCAD's events do not suggest additional, unidentified rebel activity. Despite Angola's heavy rebel activity, no groups met the criteria for our dataset, primarily due to our 1997 start year.

Most of the Angolan named groups in ACLED were formed before 1997, including the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Angola Democratic and Progress Support Party (PAPDA), and the Party for Democracy and Progress of Angola (PADEPA).<sup>55</sup> Of the Cabinda enclave's secessionist rebel groups, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), FLEC-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC), FLEC's Renouvada faction (FLEC-Renouvada), and the Democratic Front of Cabinda (FDC) also formed before 1997 or were splinters of the original FLEC.<sup>56</sup> Among Congolese rebel groups, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the RCD's Goma and Kisangani factions were excluded because their primary focus was on challenging the DRC state, and the Katangan Tigers were excluded because they long predated our 1997 start date.<sup>57</sup>

### FLEC-PM: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Military Position)

[2931ANG, 2932ANG, 2010 attack on the Togolese national soccer team and its Angolan police escort]: Some media reports suggested that FLEC-PM Secretary General Rodrigues Mingas's public announcement on January 8, 2010, that his faction of FLEC was responsible for that day's attack on the Togolese soccer team was the first public mention of the group.<sup>58</sup> However FLEC-PM was involved in the 1990 kidnapping of Chevron pilot Brent Swan, though that group may

<sup>55</sup> "Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2008, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Popular-Movement-for-the-Liberation-of-Angola>; "Angola: Political Parties," GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., accessed February 25, 2017; "UNITA," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2008, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNITA>; Inge Amundsen and Markus Weimer, "Opposition Parties and the 2008 Parliamentary Elections in Angola," Working paper, CMI Working Papers (Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2008), 14, <https://www.cmi.no/publications/3103-opposition-parties-and-the-upcoming-2008>.

<sup>56</sup> "Profile: Cabinda Separatists," *Al Jazeera*, January 9, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/01/2010194414660644.html>.

<sup>57</sup> MAK, "Angolan Policemen, Ex-Congolese Rebels Killed in Firefight," *Agence France Presse*, September 7, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020040907e097008sr&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Howard French, "2 Sides Prepare to Battle over Congo's Capital," *New York Times*, August 17, 1998.

<sup>58</sup> Brendan Seery, "Oil Shouts Loudest in Cabinda," *The Star*, January 18, 2010, E1 edition, sec. LOR.

have later changed its name to FLEC-Renovada; if true, then the FLEC-PM of 2010 was indeed a newer splinter group.<sup>59</sup> Either as a splinter group or due to a pre-1997 founding, FLEC-PM is excluded.

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<sup>59</sup> “Accused Kidnapper of American Brought to U.S.,” *Reuters News*, July 16, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020020716dy7g00xyn&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Immigration and Refugee Board Research Directorate Canada, “Angola: Information on an Anti-Government Group Called Frente Liberacion d’Enclave Cabinda (FLEC) for the Period 1991-1995; on the Size of the Group, on Whether It Is Affiliated with Any Other Group, and on the Treatment of Group Members by the Government” (Refworld, November 1, 1995), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac5010.html>.

## Benin

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**Narrative Summary:** Benin has been a stable, functioning multi-party democracy since 1991. Violence is relatively rare, and there have been no major coup attempts or rebellions. There are no named groups in ACLED for Benin. There were two alleged plots to kill or overthrow President Boni Yayi by business magnate Patrice Talon (now president, elected in 2016 in free and fair elections) and his associates. However, these events/groups have been excluded for reasons explained below.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** medium

**Explanation:** As discussed below, there is at least one group that may have met our criteria but was excluded due to lack of information. It is possible that there are gaps in ACLED for Benin. However, I think it is unlikely that additional rebellions happened that were not reported on, given the low levels of violence noise (it would stand out because overall levels of violence are low), and because Benin has been a stable democracy during this period.

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There are no named groups of interest in ACLED

**Unidentified armed group, Cotonou, 2007** – In March 2007, an armed group fired at the presidential convoy as he travelled on the campaign trail. No articles definitively identify the attackers. Although there was some speculation that the attackers were armed bandits unaware of their victims' identities, state security forces believed the assailants were disgruntled Beninese mafia.<sup>60</sup> It appears the group was small: only five gunmen were identified and only six arrested.<sup>61</sup> Excluded due to lack of information, although this may be a qualifying group.

### **\*Poison Plot Group, 2012**

AKAs: referred to in many ways because they didn't have a name

In 2012, a group attempted to poison President Boni Yayi. The accusations seem plausible, with an FBI investigation confirming the toxicity of substances possessed by arrestees.<sup>62</sup> Several people were accused and arrested (or had warrants authorized therefor), including the president's personal doctor, Ibrahim Mama Cisse; the president's niece, Zoubérath Kora-Séké; former minister of trade Soumanou Moujaïdou (Moudjaïdou); cotton magnate Patrice Talon; Talon's associate Oivier Boko; a presidential bodyguard, Bachirou Adjani; and an army colonel, Pamphile Zomahoun. Several actors, including Cisse and Kora-Séké, were promised pay for their role in the plot, which Talon allegedly masterminded. Most reports seem to indicate that the plot was thwarted before the poisoning began because Kora-Séké told family members about the plans.<sup>63</sup> It appears that Zoubérath Kora-Séké may have met with Talon during a trip to

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<sup>60</sup> Falila Gbadamassi, "Bénin : Le Président Boni Yayi Échappe À Un Assassinat," *Afrik.com*, March 16, 2007, <http://www.afrik.com/article11372.html>; The Daily Telegraph, "Benin President's Convoy Ambushed," *Press Reader*, March 17, 2007, <https://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-daily-telegraph/20070317/282093452283467>.

<sup>61</sup> "Arrests after Benin President Attacked," IOL, March 20, 2007, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/arrests-after-benin-president-attacked-319658>.

<sup>62</sup> Xinhua, "Benin President Was Poison Target, FBI Says," *Africa Review*, April 30, 2013, <http://www.africareview.com/news/FBI-says-Benin-president-was-poisoning-target/979180-1762694-o206eh/index.html>.

<sup>63</sup> Bate Felix, "Benin Says Doctor, Niece Tried to Poison President," *Reuters*, October 23, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-benin-president-poison-idUSBRE89M00120121023>; Sapa-AFP, "Benin President's Bodyguard Detained in Poison Plot," *Times LIVE*, November 8, 2012, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2012/11/08/Benin-presidents-bodyguard-detained-in-poison-plot>; "Benin President Pardons 'poison-Plot' Businessman Who Fled to France," RFI, May 15, 2014, <http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20140515-benin-president-pardons-poison-plot-businessman-who-fled-france>.

Brussels on 17 OCT, at which point he convinced her to poison Boni Yayi.<sup>64</sup> Talon had been in Paris for some weeks prior, and remained there at the time the plot was uncovered.<sup>65</sup>

October is thus indicated as the formed date. However, Talon had likely already decided to target Boni Yayi before this meeting, thus certainty remains at 0. The group was outed (did not go public by choice), so no name date is listed as never occurred. The success of the poison obviously relied on secrecy, so clandestine is coded as 1. It seems that most of the initial planning was from abroad, given the alleged meeting in Brussels and the fact that Talon was abroad. In addition, it appears the poison originated abroad and was smuggled into the country by Moujaïdou.<sup>66</sup> The planning likely took place in Paris and/or Brussels.

The plot may have been retaliation for a recent decision regarding cotton and port contracts.<sup>67</sup>

This case blurs the line between officials and non-state actors, but is included because the majority of named participants, as well as the apparent leader of the plot, were not currently employed by the state. It is excluded because there was no evidence that this was an organized group; no organizational structure could be discerned.

**\*Coups attempt, 2013** – In 2013, Benin allegedly uncovered a coup attempt linked to the 2012 poison plot. Again, the group of perpetrators was small, with only two arrests made (army colonel Pamphile Zomahoun and businessman Johannes Dagnon, cousin and close associate of Talon).<sup>68</sup> Excluded because it is only two people, and half are state actors.

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<sup>64</sup> “Benin Uncovers ‘plot to Poison’ President,” Al Jazeera, October 23, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012102223330826716.html>.

<sup>65</sup> Léonce Gamaï, “Affaire Présumée Tentative de Coup d’Etat Au Bénin : Les Derniers Développements,” *La Nouvelle Tribune*, March 3, 2013, <http://www.lanouvelletribune.info/benin/13739-affaire-presumee-tentative-de-coup-d-etat-au-benin>; “Benin President Pardons ‘Poison-Plot’ Businessman Who Fled to France.”

<sup>66</sup> Felix, “Benin Says Doctor, Niece Tried to Poison President.”

<sup>67</sup> “Benin Uncovers ‘plot to Poison’ President”; Sapa-AFP, “Benin President’s Bodyguard Detained in Poison Plot.”

<sup>68</sup> Vincent Duhem, “Le Bénin Annonce Avoir Déjoué Une Nouvelle Tentative de Coup d’État,” *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), March 4, 2013, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/171985/politique/le-b-nin-annonce-avoir-d-jou-une-nouvelle-tentative-de-coup-d-tat/>; AP, “Benin Authorities Thwart Coup Attempt, Arrest 2,” US News & World Report, March 3, 2013, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2013/03/04/benin-authorities-thwart-coup-attempt-arrest-2>; Gamaï, “Affaire Présumée Tentative de Coup d’Etat Au Bénin”; Serge-David Zoueme and Pauline Bax, “Benin Authorities Say Second Coup Attempt Foiled in Five Months,” *Bloomberg*, March 4, 2013, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-04/benin-authorities-say-second-coup-attempt-foiled-in-five-months>.

## Botswana

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**Narrative Summary:** Botswana has been a generally peaceful and stable country since independence in 1966. There have been no major coup attempts or rebellions. There is only one named group in ACLED for Botswana, with no additional groups in GTD or SCAD.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** The only group in ACLED was the Rally for Congolese Democracy (CRD), which was involved in DRC-related negotiations held in Botswana but was neither a Botswanan rebel group nor staged any attacks in the country. None of the remaining 6 ACLED events associated with unidentified armed groups nor any of the SCAD events (mostly labor strikes) indicated organized rebel activity. GTD contains no events since 1995. Botswana is a generally open and democratic society, and it is unlikely that there are significant gaps in the data hiding the existence of any rebel groups formed since 1997.

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There were no Botswanan groups of interest in ACLED, and we did not identify additional potential groups for inclusion.

**Narrative Summary:** *Burkina Faso, like other countries in the region, has experienced a fair amount of internal violence related to ethnic/land conflict. Additionally, Blaise Compaoré orchestrated a successful coup in 1987 and remained president until he himself was ousted in 2014 after attempting to stay in power through an unpopular constitutional amendment. He and his government made habitual accusations and indictments of coup-plotters between 1997 and 2014, but he ultimately fled the country and left an interim military regime in charge.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** *Moderate*

**Explanation:** *The 2014 coup, as well as other alleged failed attempts at regime change, came from internal state and military actors. Although there was popular uprising and support for the coup, any organizational force behind it came largely from within opposition parties which, at least officially, held government positions and power. There is little evidence of any true outside group attempting to violently challenge the authority of Compaoré's government. However, the probability of unidentified groups is not "low" given the lack of available reporting and weak state infrastructure in the Northern Sahel region of Burkina Faso, on the border with Mali. Both ACLED and the GTD have many unnamed groups and actors committing violence in Burkina Faso, some of which is directed at government persons and institutions. Although it looks like a majority of "unattributed violence" in the region is connected to Malian rebel groups, there is not enough evidence to completely rule out any formed or failed groups focused specifically on Burkina Faso.*

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### Bissa Ethnic Militia

The only violence recorded by this group in ACLED is related to a rural land dispute (event 196BFO) so this group is excluded from our data set.

### Fula Ethnic Militia

The only violence recorded by this group in ACLED is related to a rural land dispute (event 82BFO, 104BFO, 105BFO, e.g.), so this group is excluded from our data set.

### Bwaba Ethnic Militia

The only incident recorded for this group in ACLED is ethnically motivated violence (event 167BFO), and this 2011 event is likely connected to evidence of recent ethnic conflict in northern Burkina Faso related to Islamist and rebel groups from Mali. Given the lack of evidence for any motivation to violence for the Bwaba beyond ethnic/land disputes, and evidence pointing to rebellion activities being conducted by groups originating from other countries, this group is excluded from our data set.<sup>69</sup>

### Lobi Ethnic Militia

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<sup>69</sup> Melissa McLaughlin, "Ethnic Violence Is Rising In Burkina Faso Along With Violent Extremism," The Organization for World Peace, March 10, 2019, <https://theowp.org/ethnic-violence-is-rising-in-burkina-faso-along-with-violent-extremism/>.

All registered violence for this group in ACLED is with the Fula ethnic militia over cross-national land disputes (event 82BFO, 104BFO, 105BFO, e.g.), so for this reason this group is excluded from our data base.

#### **Tenkodogo Communal Militia**

Although this group is named in ACLED, the only violence attributed to this group is in-group fighting (event 213BFO) . No other evidence suggests any violence committed by this group within the time frame being examined so they are excluded from our data set.

#### **Gourmantche Ethnic Militia**

The only incident for which this group is named in the ACLED database is related to ongoing ethnic tensions with the Fula ethnic militia (event 82BFO), so this group can be excluded from our database.

#### **National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)**

Although this group is considered a rebel group for this research's purposes within the country of Mali, and there is evidence of violent activity by this group in Burkina Faso according to the ACLED database, the ultimate political goals of the group are not to challenge the authority of the state within the defined territory of Burkina Faso, so this group is excluded from our database for Burkina Faso.<sup>70</sup> For more information, see the MNLA entry in the Mali country section.

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<sup>70</sup> May Ying Welsh, "Making Sense of Mali's Armed Groups," Al Jazeera, January 17, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html>.



**Nomenclature notes:** The Burundian military was known as known as the *Forces armées burundaises (FAB)* from independence until 2004; it was then renamed *Force de défense nationale (FDN)*.

**Narrative Summary:** With a similar ethnic composition to Rwanda, Burundi has likewise experienced ongoing ethnic tension and related violence for decades. Previously ruled by a Tutsi monarchy, Burundi held its first democratic elections in 1993. A Hutu candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, won and became president, but Tutsi soldiers assassinated him after only a few months. The assassination plunged the country into civil war and unleashed a genocide of the Burundian Tutsi population. Several Burundian rebel groups emerged during this period, but they predate our period of interest. 2005 marked the end of the civil war and the election of Hutu president Pierre Nkurunziza. Since then, each round of elections has produced spikes in violence. In 2010, the opposition boycotted the election, citing fraud and intimidation by the regime; a wave of violence followed. In April 2015, Nkurunziza announced he would seek a controversial third term. The announcement triggered a coup attempt in May and sparked another wave of violence.

Several factors have shaped patterns of violence in Burundi during our period of interest. First, following the civil war, the Burundian military underwent integration and special attempts at professionalization that were largely considered a success. It received foreign support for training and participated in international peacekeeping missions including AMISOM. Relative to the neighboring DRC, for instance, Burundi's military is professional and effective. However, Nkurunziza's bid at a third term has fractured the military, producing infighting and defections among a professionalized force.<sup>71</sup> Second, Burundi borders some of the least stable regions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which provides haven for Burundian rebel group. The Burundian capital Bujumbura lies only about ten miles from the border – the result being that rebel groups hiding in eastern DRC have been able to mount attacks in and near the capital.

Because of these factors, rebel group activity in Burundi follows different patterns than in other nearby countries, especially DRC. For instance, grenade attacks and targeted assassinations are more common than ambushes, and the *modus operandi* of attacks often suggests professional military tactics.<sup>72</sup> In addition, rebel groups tend to operate clandestinely more often, and the perpetrators of numerous attacks have never been identified (see special notes below).

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** high

**Explanation:** Many attacks go unidentified in Burundi. Moreover, at least one reliable source indicated that there may have been at least six rebel groups that formed between 2010 and 2012, and we did not capture nearly that many groups during that period. However, of over half a dozen alleged groups emerging from 2015 to 2017, fewer than half qualified for inclusion; it may have likewise been the case that most 2010-2012 groups did not cross our radar because they never conducted or planned any confirmed violence. In addition, the unclaimed attacks may represent ongoing factionalism within the military and thus originate in groups that do not meet our non-state actor criteria. Without speaking to a local expert or conducting additional fieldwork, it is difficult to say. I think there is a decent probability we have missed at least one qualifying group.

**Special Note on Large Attacks:** As stated above, many attacks in Burundi are not claimed. However, we feel confident in coding that large attacks never occurred for most if not all of the groups included. Analysis of ACLED events reveals only 134 events with 25 or more fatalities. Among these attacks, the only named actor included in our dataset is FOREBU (3476BUI, 3477BUI, 3481BUI), but these fatalities were mostly

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<sup>71</sup> "Burundi: The Army in Crisis" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 5, 2017), <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/247-burundi-the-army-in-crisis.pdf>; Nina Wilén, Gérard Birantamije, and David Ambrosetti, "The Burundian Army's Trajectory to Professionalization and Depoliticization, and Back Again," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 12, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 120–35, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2017.1418173>.

<sup>72</sup> "Burundi: The Army in Crisis," 3.

state-imposed (see FOREBU below). There were only seven large attacks involving unidentified actors (77BUI, 80BUI, 150BUI, 171BUI, 304BUI, 320BUI). Most of these events are from 1997-1998, with one in 2002. Hence, these attacks did not occur while most of our groups were operational. We may have incorrectly coded “never occurred” for large attack on certain groups (1) if ACLED simply did not contain information on a large attack, which we find unlikely given that such large attacks are mostly likely to attract media attention, (2) if the large attack as misattributed, which we also rate as unlikely, or (3) the group was active and conducted the attack after 2015. This is most likely for groups such as FOREBU and RED-Tabara.

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#### Amizero y’Abarundi

This group is a coalition of opposition political parties.<sup>73</sup> It is tagged in only one ACLED event (3251BUI), which was spontaneous violence. Excluded.

#### Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD)

AKAs: National Council for the Defense of Democracy, Forces for the defense of Democracy, National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the defense of Democracy; sometimes CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) to distinguish from CNDD-Nyangoma (see below)

CNDD-FDD predates our period of interest.<sup>74</sup> FDD is the armed wing; CNDD is the political wing.<sup>75</sup>

#### \*Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Nyangoma (CNDD-Nyangoma)

AKAs: Sometimes merely CNDD; see CNDD-FDD for variations of CNDD

CNDD-Nyangoma (sometimes merely CNDD) is a political party and rebel group that separated from CNDD-FDD in 1998.<sup>76</sup>

#### Imbonerakure

AKAs: CNDD-FDD-Imbonerakure, National Council for the Defence of Democracy (Imbonerakure Faction), Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie-Imbonerakure

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<sup>73</sup> “Burundi Parliament Opens after Disputed Poll, Opposition Takes Seats,” *Reuters*, July 27, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN0Q11V820150727>; Bella Lucia Nininahazwe, “Burundi: Amizero Y’abarundi Coalition MPs Demand Fair Treatment,” *Iwacu (Bujumbura)*, August 10, 2017, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201708100148.html>.

<sup>74</sup> Willy Nindorera, “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle,” trans. Nancy Du Plessis, Berghof Transitions Series (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2012), 15, [http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions\\_Series/transitions10\\_burundi.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions10_burundi.pdf); Richard Barltrop, “The Negotiation of Security Issues in the Burundi Peace Talks,” Country Study: Negotiating Disarmament (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, March 2008), 10–11, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/95072/HD%20Centre%20NegDis%20Burundi%20Country%20Study%20PDF.pdf>; Alison Dilworth, “Burundi -- The CNDD - FDD (Nkurunziza) and the Use of Child Soldiers” (Forum on armed groups and the involvement of children in armed conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2006), 2, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/22734/case\\_study\\_Burundi\\_CNDD-FDD.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/22734/case_study_Burundi_CNDD-FDD.pdf); Stef Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error,” *Africa Spectrum* 44, no. 3 (2009): 70; Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More than a Remake,” *African Affairs* 98, no. 391 (1999): 242; “‘We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You’: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi” (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2010), 1, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0510webwcover\\_2.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0510webwcover_2.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> “Burundi: The Gatumba Massacre” (Human Rights Watch, September 7, 2004), 5, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0904.pdf>.

<sup>76</sup> Nindorera, “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle,” 16; “‘We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You’: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi,” 1.

The Imbonerakure is youth wing of the CNDD-FDD. It is not listed separately from CNDD-FDD because it was set up by the party and consists primarily of former, demobilized CNDD-FDD combatants.<sup>77</sup>

#### **Forces nationales de libération (FNL)**

AKAs: Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu, PALIPEHUTU (political wing wing), Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, Forces nationales pour la libération du peuple hutu, National Forces of Liberation, National Forces for the Liberation of the Hutu People, PALIPEHUTU-FNL, Front pour la libération nationale, FROLINA, FLN, Front for National Liberation

The FNL was the armed wing of PALIPEHUTU. PALIPEHUTU was established in 1980, while its armed wing the FNL was established later (dates vary). In 1991, the armed wing split from the political wing; the former was then called PALIPEHUTU-FNL, while the latter was merely PALIPEHUTU, then renamed Party for the Liberation of People-Agakiza.<sup>78</sup> Predates our period of interest.

#### **Front pour la libération nationale (FROLINA)**

AKAs: FLN, Front for National Liberation

Seems to be just another name for FNL (see above), predates our period of interest.<sup>79</sup>

#### **FNL-N: National Forces of Liberation (Nkurunziza Faction)**

This group is only in one ACLED event (1830BUI), and I think it was a mis-tag; Pierre Nkurunziza is a leader of the CNDD-FDD, not the FNL.

#### **FNL-R: National Forces of Liberation (Rwasa Faction)**

– Rwasa has been the leader of FNL since 2001. In August 2002, the Higher Revolutionary Council of the FNL sacked Rwasa in an attempt to join the peace process, but the bulk of the organizations seems to have remained loyal to Rwasa. By DEC 2002,

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<sup>77</sup> “‘We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You’: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi,” 12–13; “Burundi: CNDD-FDD Keeps Country under Iron Grip, but Opposition Must Now Participate in Politics – By Kris Berwouts,” *African Arguments* (blog), July 17, 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/17/burundi-by-kris-berwouts/>; Elsa Buchanan, “Burundi: Who Are the Feared Imbonerakure Youth?,” *International Business Times UK*, June 3, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-who-are-feared-imbonerakure-youth-1504301>; “Who Are the Imbonerakure and Is Burundi Unravelling?,” *IRIN*, April 28, 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/101418/who-are-imbonerakure-and-burundi-unravelling>.

<sup>78</sup> “Palipehutu-FNL,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed August 24, 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/432>; Jean-Baptiste Nkurunziza and Obi Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition,” *IRIN*, June 7, 2016, <http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/07/briefing-%E2%80%93-who%E2%80%99s-who-burundi%E2%80%99s-armed-opposition>; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Burundi: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-PALIPEHUTU (Parti Pour La Libération Du Peuple Hutu), Including the Date of Its Creation, Founders, Its Involvement in Human Rights Abuses and Its Links with the Rebels Hutus and How Its Members Are Treated by the Actual Government,” *Refworld*, June 1, 2000, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c74.html>; Meike Bömmel and Hares Sarwary, “Burundi (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) 1997-2008” (Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung, September 4, 2015), 1, [https://www.hsfrk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk\\_publicationen/Burundi-Palipehutu-FNL-1997-2008.pdf](https://www.hsfrk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publicationen/Burundi-Palipehutu-FNL-1997-2008.pdf); Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi,” 70; Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?,” *African Affairs* 105, no. 418 (2006): 117.

<sup>79</sup> Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Burundi: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-PALIPEHUTU (Parti Pour La Libération Du Peuple Hutu), Including the Date of Its Creation, Founders, Its Involvement in Human Rights Abuses and Its Links with the Rebels Hutus and How Its Members Are Treated by the Actual Government,” *Refworld*, June 1, 2000, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c74.html>; John Pike, “Front Pour La Liberation Nationale (FROLINA) Forces Armees Du Peuple (FAP),” *FAS*, December 5, 1999, <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/frolina.htm>.

governments and the media had begun to refer to Rwasa as the leader of the FNL again.<sup>80</sup> Excluded – temporary internal schism in an existing rebel group; not a new rebel group.

### Forces républicaines du Burundi (FOREBU)

AKAs: Republican Forces of Burundi, Forces populaires du Burundi (FPB), Popular Forces of Burundi

Most sources report that this group formed in DEC 2015.<sup>81</sup> However, it may have formed earlier and not been announced until DEC 2015. Burundian President Nkurunziza announced his intention to seek a third term on 25 APR 2015.<sup>82</sup> On 15 MAY 2015, Nkurunziza faced a coup attempt led by General Godefroid Niyombare. Although Niyombare had been sacked from his post as chief of intelligence in FEB 2015 for a leaked memo he authored arguing against a third term, the coup was still a military action.<sup>83</sup> However, generalized violence continued after the failed coup attempt, and I am fairly confident that some of this violence was carried out by elements that would become FOREBU (see 11 DEC 2015 attack below). It is not possible to pinpoint exactly when the group formed and met our criteria, except that we can be confident it was sometime between MAY and DEC 2015. The group publicly announced itself on 23 DEC 2015.<sup>84</sup> This is certainly within the first year of founding but could be more than three months after formation if the group actually formed closer to the coup.

The group announced from the outset that its goal was the ouster of Nkurunziza and maintaining the integrity of the Arusha Accords, among other goals.<sup>85</sup> Sources consistently report that FOREBU is composed mainly

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<sup>80</sup> Bömmel and Sarwary, “Burundi (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) 1997-2008,” 3; “Burundi: Two South African Soldiers Wounded in Mortar Bombardment,” *IRIN*, August 26, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208260505.html>; “Burundi: Hardline Hutu Rebel Group Sacks Leader, Might Negotiate,” *IRIN*, August 9, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208090384.html>; “Burundi: Government Discusses Draft Ceasefire Document With Second FDD Faction,” *IRIN*, August 21, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208210001.html>; “Burundi: ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ Signed With One Hutu Faction,” *IRIN*, August 26, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208260504.html>; “Burundi: Government, Main Rebel Group Sign Ceasefire Deal,” *IRIN*, December 3, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200212030192.html>; “Burundi: Billeting of Former Rebels to Begin This Week,” *IRIN*, December 4, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200212040166.html>.

<sup>81</sup> “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 5; “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One” (ACLED, May 2016), 8, <https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ACLED-Country-Report-Burundi-May-2016.pdf>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017)” (United Nations Security Council, August 16, 2017), para. 46, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/672/Rev.1](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/672/Rev.1).

<sup>82</sup> “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 2.

<sup>83</sup> “Expert: General Behind Burundi Coup Is Well Respected,” VOA, May 13, 2015, <https://www.voanews.com/a/burundi-coup-leader-niyombare/2766312.html>; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Burundi: The May 2015 Coup Attempt, Including Its Instigators, How It Unfolded, the Violent Incidents and the Outcome; the Treatment of the Coup Instigators by the Government (May 2015-October 2015),” Refworld, October 20, 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/568fc3474.html>.

<sup>84</sup> “Burundi: New Rebel Group Formed to Oust President,” *Al Jazeera*, December 23, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/burundi-rebel-group-formed-oust-president-151223133950081.html>; Conor Gaffey, “Burundi: Former Army Officer Announces New Opposition,” *Newsweek*, December 25, 2015, <https://www.newsweek.com/burundi-former-military-officer-announces-new-opposition-force-402947>.

<sup>85</sup> “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi” (Bujumbura: FIDH, November 2016), 148, [https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/burundi\\_report\\_english-2.pdf](https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/burundi_report_english-2.pdf); “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; “Burundi: New Rebel Group Formed to Oust President.”

of FDN and other security defectors.<sup>86</sup> They also recruited some members from Burundian refugee camps in eastern DRC.<sup>87</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for military under organizational history.

The planning base of FOREBU is not entirely clear, and I suspect there were multiple bases during the first year.

One report suggests that Bujumbura Rural province and the Rukoko Reserve served as bases; another source states that FOREBU “did not seek to establish foreign rear-bases as quickly as Tabara,” another emergent rebel group at that time.<sup>88</sup> However, other sources suggest FOREBU leaders were in exile from early on and that at least some FOREBU forces used eastern DRC (Uriva and Fizi territories) as an operational and planning base beginning as early as DEC 2015.<sup>89</sup> Since a greater number of reliable sources place bases in Eastern DRC, I have coded 1 for “planning\_border2”. Although attacks occur in Bujumbura Mairie (the capital city), no source suggested it as an operational base. All suggested sites are rural. Due to multiple bases being found, the “rural\_location” variable is coded as missing. To reflect uncertainty vis-à-vis the existence of bases in Bujumbura Rural and the Rukoko Reserve, I have coded missing for “planning\_inside”. It seems plausible that there were essentially multiple planning bases during the early FOREBU era. We should expect the information from the Eastern DRC to be more detailed because the UN Group of Experts on DRC sanctions ran investigations there, but its mandate does not cover within Burundi.

FOREBU appeared to be well-resourced from an early era. The most detailed source on FOREBU resources came more than one year after its formation (in AUG 2017), from the UN Group of Experts. The report indicated that many FOREBU combatants wear military uniforms and carry AK-47s; in addition, FOREBU possessed heavy weaponry including machine guns. FOREBU was also purchasing entire crops from Congolese farmers, rather than raiding for supplies as is common among DRC-based rebel groups. In fact, FOREBU receives supply shipments from across Lake Tanganyika. The Group concluded that “FOREBU might enjoy certain forms of external support.”<sup>90</sup> Although this report occurred more than one year after FOREBU’s formation, there is reason to suspect they had access to some of these resources within the first year. We know that at least some ex-FDN FOREBU leaders defected with non-trivial amounts of military equipment (see Lt. Col. Eduoard Nshimirimana); moreover, we know that FDN defectors in FOREBU remained in touch with current security personnel.<sup>91</sup> Finally, early FDN attacks made use of military equipment such as grenades.<sup>92</sup> I feel confident that the volume of equipment appropriated by FDN defectors meets our threshold to qualify for other under initial resources. (The FIDH account cited above suggests that Nshimirimana alone defected with ~40 AKs.) It is possible that FOREBU received other resources in the first year, although I am not confident enough to code those definitively. At least one account suggests that the Kabila regime was aiding FOREBU in the hope of fomenting insecurity as an excuse to delay elections, although it is unclear what evidence supports this

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<sup>86</sup> “Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 20, 2016), 18–19, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/235-burundi-a-dangerous-third-term.pdf>; “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 6; “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 148; Jordan Anderson, “Burundi’s Newest, Biggest Rebel Group,” *African Arguments* (blog), October 3, 2017, <http://africanarguments.org/2017/10/03/burundi-newest-biggest-rebel-group/>.

<sup>87</sup> Anderson, “Burundi’s Newest, Biggest Rebel Group”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017),” para. 46.

<sup>88</sup> “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 146, 148; Christoph Vogel, “Guest Blog: Putting the Kamanyola Killings into Perspective,” *Congo Research Group* (blog), October 3, 2017, <http://congoresearchgroup.org/guest-blog-putting-the-kamanyola-killings-into-perspective/>.

<sup>89</sup> “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 6; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017),” para. 46; “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 146; Vogel, “Guest Blog.”

<sup>90</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017),” paras. 48–49.

<sup>91</sup> “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 5; “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 148.

<sup>92</sup> “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition.”



allegation.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, we know that FOREBU cohabitated with Congolese rebel groups, possibly within the first year.<sup>94</sup> However, because no evidence is strongly suggestive of foreign government support or mineral wealth in the first year, I code only “other” as 1.

The first attack attributed to FOREBU occurred on 11 DEC 2015. FOREBU was not announced until 23 DEC, and most contemporaneous accounts list assailants as unidentified. However, several sources retrospectively attribute the attack to FOREBU or contemporaneously associated the attack with forces under Niyombare (i.e. forces that would become known as FOREBU).<sup>95</sup> The attack was clearly coordinated, having occurred simultaneously at multiple military sites in and around the capital. Most accounts focus on government retaliation against civilians immediately following the attack,<sup>96</sup> but Reuters places the rebel-inflicted death toll at eight (four military, for police).<sup>97</sup> I have coded this as the first attack. The other earliest recorded attacks occurred on 5 FEB 2016 when FOREBU claimed responsibility for an attack on a police station that killed four Imbonerakure members in the Musaga neighborhood of Bujumbura.<sup>98</sup> (Not to be confused with the 6 FEB grenade attack that also resulted in four deaths.<sup>99</sup>) Several sources allege that FOREBU carried out and claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on 6 FEB 2016 that deliberately targeted civilians.<sup>100</sup> However, I think this was an attribution error: grenade attacks occurred in Bujumbura on 5 FEB and 6 FEB with identical death tolls, and FOREBU claimed the attack on 5 FEB which targeted security personnel, but the attacks were often reported together and the attribution may have been muddled. I found no original source which affiliated the 6 FEB attack, which seems to have targeted civilians, to FOREBU.<sup>101</sup> I did not find record of an attack firmly attributed to FOREBU that targeted civilians. However, I do not feel confident in asserting that FOREBU has never directly targeted civilians. As HRW writes, “Armed opposition groups are believed to be behind a number of grenade attacks in various areas of Bujumbura, though they rarely claim responsibility. Some of these attacks appear indiscriminate, killing or injuring many passers-by.”<sup>102</sup> While it’s fair to say that assailants often seem comfortable with significant collateral damage, many attacks that might initially seem to

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<sup>93</sup> Anderson, “Burundi’s Newest, Biggest Rebel Group.”

<sup>94</sup> Vogel, “Guest Blog”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017),” para. 50.

<sup>95</sup> “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 31, 147; “The Church Targeted by Burundi Authorities,” *La Croix*, May 3, 2016, <https://international.la-croix.com/news/the-church-targeted-by-burundi-authorities/3106>; “Death Toll from Day of Clashes in Burundi Capital Rises to Nearly 90,” *Reuters*, December 13, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-unrest/death-toll-from-day-of-clashes-in-burundi-capital-rises-to-nearly-90-idUSKBN0TV08D20151213>; “Treasury Sanctions Three Individuals for Contributing to the Ongoing Violence in Burundi” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 2, 2016), <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j10473.aspx>. ACLED also attributes the attack to FOREBU.

<sup>96</sup> “Burundi: Abductions, Killings, Spread Fear,” *Human Rights Watch*, February 25, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/25/burundi-abductions-killings-spread-fear>.

<sup>97</sup> “Death Toll from Day of Clashes in Burundi Capital Rises to Nearly 90.”

<sup>98</sup> “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; “Burundi: Au Moins Quatre Imbonerakure Tués à Bujumbura Par Des Rebelles (Habitants),” *Agence France Presse*, February 6, 2016, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/acbec5dc-fd7e-4ef3-84e3-8b8a5a690cd5/?context=1516831>.

<sup>99</sup> “Burundi Grenade Attacks Kill Four, Including a Child,” *Reuters*, February 7, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-attacks/burundi-grenade-attacks-kill-four-including-a-child-idUSKCN0VG0NX>.

<sup>100</sup> “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; “Burundi: Abductions, Killings, Spread Fear.”

<sup>101</sup> Elsa Buchanan, “Burundi: Dozens Dead and Hundreds Injured in Latest Grenade Attacks ‘linked to Rebels’ Says MSF,” *International Business Times UK*, February 25, 2016, <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-dozens-dead-hundreds-injured-latest-grenade-attacks-linked-rebels-says-msf-1545890>; “Burundi Grenade Attack Leaves 4 Dead,” *Africanews*, February 7, 2016, <http://www.africanews.com/2016/02/07/burundi-grenade-attack-leaves-4-dead/>; “Burundi Grenade Attacks Kill Four, Including a Child.”

<sup>102</sup> “Burundi: Abductions, Killings, Spread Fear.”

target civilians actually have political targets.<sup>103</sup> It is practically impossible to determine whether FOREBU has ever deliberately targeted civilians, so I have coded all civilian attack variables as missing. I code large attack as never occurred (see special note).

Confirmed initial leaders of FOREBU include:

- General Godefroid Niyombare – leader of the May 2015 attempted coup, ethnic Hutu, former head of the National Intelligence Service who was sacked in FEB 2015 for voicing opposition to Nkurunziza seeking a third term, formerly chief-of-staff of FDN and Burundian ambassador to Kenya, former CNDD-FDD commander<sup>104</sup>
- Colonel Eduard (Edward) Nshimirimana – communications officer who defected from FDN with forty soldiers<sup>105</sup>
- General Philbert Habarugura – former FDN<sup>106</sup>
- Colonel Gilles Ndiwokubwayo<sup>107</sup>
- Edward Nibigira – former police commissioner<sup>108</sup>

As such, I have coded for current security, leaders of current government (ambassador), and former rebels (CNDD-FDD) under initial leadership.

Sources indicate that Tutsi are overrepresented in the group because they tend to be targeted by the regime and hence defect more often, but the group is multi-ethnic and includes Hutu leadership (see above).<sup>109</sup> I encountered other reports of Hutu/former CNDD-FDD (predominantly Hutu) leadership as well, but couldn't confirm either way if they were in the first year.<sup>110</sup>

I coded never occurred for large attack and missing for civilian attack (see special notes in Burundi introduction). Although FOREBU was still an active rebel group in 2019, the surveyed sources did not mention any FOREBU attacks against Burundian state targets more than three years after its founding and so does not meet the

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<sup>103</sup> “Ten Injured as Grenade Attack Hits Burundi Nightclub,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, January 2, 2016, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/947cbc44-3dfc-4ec7-99b1-f323aecf1dcc/?context=1516831>; “Senior Burundian Army Officer Killed Bar in Bujumbura,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 1, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/731036c0-64b7-47e8-900c-a37e2697594c/?context=1516831>; Clement Manirabarusha, “Family of Three Killed in Grenade Attack in Burundi Crisis,” *Reuters*, September 15, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-violence/family-of-three-killed-in-grenade-attack-in-burundi-crisis-idUSKCN11L1RP>.

<sup>104</sup> “Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term,” 19; “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 26, 107; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; Elsa Buchanan, “Burundi: Coup Leader General Godefroid Niyombare Becomes Head of Forebu Rebels,” *International Business Times UK*, January 21, 2016, <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-coup-leader-general-godefroid-niyombare-becomes-head-forebu-rebels-1539320>; Anderson, “Burundi’s Newest, Biggest Rebel Group.”

<sup>105</sup> “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 5; “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 148; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017),” para. 46.

<sup>106</sup> “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; Buchanan, “Burundi: Coup Leader General Godefroid Niyombare Becomes Head of Forebu Rebels.”

<sup>107</sup> “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; Buchanan, “Burundi: Coup Leader General Godefroid Niyombare Becomes Head of Forebu Rebels.”

<sup>108</sup> Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; Buchanan, “Burundi: Coup Leader General Godefroid Niyombare Becomes Head of Forebu Rebels.”

<sup>109</sup> “Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term,” 19; Anderson, “Burundi’s Newest, Biggest Rebel Group.”

<sup>110</sup> Anderson, “Burundi’s Newest, Biggest Rebel Group”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2360 (2017),” para. 47.

viability criteria.<sup>111</sup> The group, based in DRC's South Kivu state, was implicated in attacks on DRC civilians more than three years after its founding.<sup>112</sup>

I coded 1 for riots (SCAD events 5160195, 5160203, 3160205, 5160238 among others) and 0 for protest (SCAD event 5160182 was pro-state).

### Forces populaires du Burundi (FPB)

AKAs: Popular Forces of Burundi

This is a rebranding/splinter of FOREBU (see above).<sup>113</sup>

### \*Front national burundais (FRONABU)

AKAs: National Burundian Front, Front national burundais-Tabara, FRONABU-Tabara, Front national pour la révolution au Burundi, National Front for the Revolution in Burundi, Front du peuple murundi-Abatabazi (see below), FPM-Abatabazi, Front du peuple murundi, FPM, FPM/ADN, FPM-Abatabazi/ADN

The information on this group is sketchy. There is certainly a group that called itself FRONABU that targeted the government and conducted at least one attack. However, it is not clear whether all groups claiming to be FRONABU-Tabara were actually part of the same organization or were simply claiming the name.

Sources agreed that FRONABU appeared circa 2011, following the 2010 elections that were boycotted by Burundian opposition.<sup>114</sup> ACLED tagged FRONABU in an event on 30 MAY 2011 (2897BUI), but the event has no description, and I was unable to locate the source. However, at least one other source suggests that the group announced itself in MAY (again no details), so I have coded MAY 2011 as the name date.<sup>115</sup> This means the group was likely publicly named within a year, although within three months is less clear.

The earliest reference that I found came from 5 JUL 2011, when several outlets published stories on FRONABU attacks occurring on 4 JUL 2011. Individuals attacked two police posts on bridges in the capital Bujumbura, shooting and throwing grenades but failing to inflict any casualties. The assailants distributed leaflets identifying themselves as members of FRONABU-Tabara and made clear that their goal was to fight the Nkurunziza regime.<sup>116</sup> The government identified several assailants as FDN defectors. The AFP

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<sup>111</sup> International Crisis Group, "Running Out of Options in Burundi," Africa Report (Addis Ababa/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 20, 2019), 1 (note 2), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/278-running-out-options-burundi>.

<sup>112</sup> "Crises dans Hauts Plateaux du Sud-Kivu, entre les faits et les manipulations médiatiques," *AllAfrica*, August 5, 2020, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWSF0020200805eg85002et&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>113</sup> Anderson, "Burundi's Newest, Biggest Rebel Group"; Nadine Muhorakeye, "Les rebelles burundais du Forebu changent de nom et nomment à leur tête un ancien haut gradé," *JeuneAfrique.com*, August 30, 2017, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/469175/politique/les-rebelles-burundais-du-forebu-changent-de-nom-et-nomment-a-leur-tete-un-ancien-haut-grade/>.

<sup>114</sup> Thierry Vircoulon, "Will Burundi Miss Out on Democratic Consolidation?," *International Crisis Group* (blog), July 22, 2011, <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/burundi/2011/07/22/will-burundi-miss-out-on-democratic-consolidation/>; "Burundi, le retour de la rébellion," *France 24*, December 2, 2011, <https://www.france24.com/fr/20111202-burundi-ombre-guerre-groupes-armes-rebellion-tutsi-hutu-president-nkurunziza-reporter>; Ernest Nkuzimana, "The Dilemma of Leadership and Democracy in Africa: A Reflection on General Elections in Burundi" (Dissertation, Westerville, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2014), 102, [https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10413/12549/Nkuzimana\\_Ernest\\_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10413/12549/Nkuzimana_Ernest_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y); Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *War and Peace in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Springer, 2017), 21; "You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living": The Escalation of Political Violence in Burundi" (Human Rights Watch, May 2012), 65, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0512ForUpload\\_1.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0512ForUpload_1.pdf).

<sup>115</sup> Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber, and Klaas van Walraven, *Africa Yearbook Volume 8: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2011* (BRILL, 2012), 300.

<sup>116</sup> Sabien Make Heimer, "Armed Attackers in Burundian Capital Claim Political Fight," *IHS Global Insight*, July 6, 2011, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/49fc5155-43b5-4b15-a63f-8d2646fbf96c/?context=1516831>; "Armed Group Attacks Burundian Capital," *Agence France Presse -- English*, July 5, 2011,



indicated that FRONABU had previously claimed attacks but provided no additional details.<sup>117</sup> Based on this information, I code the following:

- The group probably formed sometime in late 2010 (elections were on 28 JUL 2010) or in the first half of 2011, with the latter seeming more likely based on descriptions given. I code 2011 as the founding date with no certainty.
- Given the distribution of leaflets and the prior claiming of attacks, it is likely that the group did not name itself under duress (despite assailants of the 4 JUL attacks being arrested).
- Goal is coded as takeover (see additional information below).

The rest of the information I have on FRONABU-Tabara I am less confident in, mainly because it comes from ostensibly official FRONABU online posts and a UN report that conflict with each other. A FRONABU-Tabara Facebook page post from 30 NOV 2011 boasts about a forthcoming France24 documentary that allegedly meets with Burundian armed resistance and demonstrates the existence of FRONABU.<sup>118</sup> However, the United Nations claims that the individual interviewed in the documentary, who is allegedly FRONABU leader “General” Moïse Rukundo, was actually a member of another Congolese rebel group.<sup>119</sup> (However, the UN evidently misidentified Burundian opposition member Alexis Sinduhije in an earlier report.<sup>120</sup>) Thus, it seems that either the internet posts are not linked to the actual rebel group or that at least some of the UN information is inaccurate. I present the information in both below. Further conflicting, the UN report identifies members as exclusively Tutsi, whereas the group’s posts claim that it includes Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa members.<sup>121</sup>

A United Nations report from June 2012 suggested that FRONABU maintained operational bases in the hills over Uvira (eastern DRC); the group claimed to be a prayer group and consisted of only Burundian Tutsi.<sup>122</sup> The United Nations also reports that the group had clear links to Alexis Sinduhije, prominent leader of Burundian opposition party MSD.<sup>123</sup> MSD claims to have lost hundreds of members, killed in government crackdowns on the opposition following the controversial 2010 elections – perhaps giving motive for armed rebellion, although Alexis Sinduhije did not have record of violent resistance at that point and was in fact praised internationally for his journalistic and political work.<sup>124</sup> However, Sinduhije has been linked with more confidence to more recent rebel group RED-Tabara (see below). Finally, the UN reports that Sinduhije attempted to rally FNL fighters to join his cause seem to dovetail with rumors in Burundi at the time that FRONABU is a new name for an emergent rebel movement that hasn’t gained acceptance

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<https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e53fc2a4-303c-4a5f-873e-fc0f0f57c5b0/?context=1516831>; Also mentioned in Vircoulon, “Will Burundi Miss Out on Democratic Consolidation?”

<sup>117</sup> “Armed Group Attacks Burundian Capital.”

<sup>118</sup> “FRONABU-TABARA - Home,” accessed August 22, 2018, [https://www.facebook.com/pg/FRONABU-TABARA-182128745201650/posts/?ref=page\\_internal](https://www.facebook.com/pg/FRONABU-TABARA-182128745201650/posts/?ref=page_internal).

<sup>119</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)” (United Nations Security Council, June 21, 2012), 9, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202012%20348.pdf>.

<sup>120</sup> Farah Stockman, “Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe,” *Boston Globe*, February 21, 2016, sec. Opinion, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/02/21/burundi-when-icon-peace-turns-war/m5xSA7rLxO8P5ZjaQIkiuJ/story.html>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)” (United Nations Security Council, December 2, 2011), 200, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/738](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/738).

<sup>121</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 30–31; “FRONABU-TABARA - Home.”

<sup>122</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 30–31.

<sup>123</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 32–33.

<sup>124</sup> Stockman, “Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe.”

yet.<sup>125</sup> (Alternatively, the group was rumored to consist of disgruntled former security forces, which dovetails more nicely with the AFP account of the 4 JUL attack above.<sup>126</sup>)

The online posts seem to mainly give more credence to the goal of FRONABU as ouster of the Nkurunziza regime, repeatedly calling the regime illegitimate and calling for armed resistance.<sup>127</sup> The spokesperson identified on these statements is David Ntwari, although I found no further information on him. In addition, Facebook page contains no posts after DEC 2011, which corroborates further lack of recorded activity I found.<sup>128</sup> (Another sourced called the rebellion brief.<sup>129</sup>)

Based on this information, I have coded:

- Missing for political party and for military under organizational history, as certain evidence is suggestive of these organizational histories, but I am not especially confident in either.
- 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_border” – both UN and ostensibly FRONABU sources (the France24 documentary) place FRONABU in Eastern DRC, although it is possible that both sources are wrong. Recall, the attacks occurred in Bujumbura.
- None for initial resources – no evidence of any.
- Missing for all initial leadership variables – no leaders were confirmed and we have no personal histories.
- Not viable -- no evidence of continued activity in 2014 or later, even considering FPM-Abatabazi (although see RED-Tabara).
- I coded first small attack as missing, since we do not know about the previously claimed attacks that AFP mentions.

In addition, I code never for large attack and missing for civilian attack (see special notes in Burundi introduction). Even accounting for attacks under the label FPM-Abatabazi, I found no fatality counts of 25 or more. Counts on the Cibitoke attacks vary, but all fall well below this threshold.<sup>130</sup>

I code 1 for protest based on SCAD events 5160133, 5160145, and 5160148.

#### Front du peuple murundi-Abatabazi (FPM-Abatabazi)

AKAs: Front du peuple murundi, FPM, FPM/ADN, FPM-Abatabazi/ADN, FRONABU (see above for additional FRONABU variants)

There seems to be a lot of false information out there about this group. However, I believe there is sufficient evidence for us to exclude this group as a splinter/revival/continuation. Several sources, including the UN Group of Experts and the Observatoire de l'action gouvernementale (a coalition of Burundian NGOs that

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<sup>125</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 32–33; “The Political Scene: Government Denies Existence of Two New Rebel Groups,” *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Reports*, February 1, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/bc718d5a-1017-405a-8bd1-40bd21b5be2b/?context=1516831>.

<sup>126</sup> “The Political Scene: Government Denies Existence of Two New Rebel Groups.”

<sup>127</sup> David Ntwari, “COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE FRONABU-TABARA,” *Actualités du Burundi*, September 22, 2011, <http://burundinews.free.fr/actualites/communiquedefronabugatumba.html>; David Ntwari, “Communiqué de Presse Du Front National Pour La Révolution Au Burundi, FRONABU-TABARA,” *Arib.Info*, October 23, 2011, [http://www.arib.info/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4211&Itemid=63](http://www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4211&Itemid=63).

<sup>128</sup> “FRONABU-TABARA - Home.”

<sup>129</sup> Khadiagala, *War and Peace in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, 12.

<sup>130</sup> “L’armée Burundaise et Le FPM-Abatabazi Poursuivent Leurs Combats En Province de Cibitoke,” *Xinhua News Agency - French*, October 24, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e65a0945-5745-4acd-acb3-1d822867d0a3/?context=1516831>; Charles Onyango-Obbo, “New Rebel Group Attacks Burundi,” *The East African*, November 3, 2012, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/New-rebel-group-attacks-Burundi/4552908-1610480-112kn6nz/index.html>; AFP, “Rebel Group Claims Responsibility for Burundi Attacks,” *Daily Nation*, October 24, 2012, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Rebel-group-claims-responsibility-for-attacks/1066-1594408-3mqb92z/index.html>.

monitor government activity) claim that FPM-Abatabazi is a reincarnation of FRONABU (see above).<sup>131</sup> At first, I was skeptical of this narrative for several reasons. First, the United Nations, *within the same document*, refers separately to FRONABU/FPM and a “previously unknown armed movement” called FPM-Abatabazi.<sup>132</sup> Second, there are alternative rumors about the FPM-Abatabazi’s origins, including that it consists of former FNL, CNDP, UPR, or CNDD-FDD, or that it was created in 2006.<sup>133</sup> Third, FRONABU (and FPM also) is allegedly backed by Alexis Sinduhije,<sup>134</sup> but FPM-Abatabazi is reportedly the military of the Alliance divine pour la nation (ADN) led by Guillaume Georges Majambere.<sup>135</sup> I couldn’t find anything linking these two individuals aside from their supposed ties to the group, which seemed odd.

FPM and FPM-Abatabazi are the same group. “Abatabazi” merely means saviors or liberators<sup>136</sup> – it is not the name of a faction, as ACLED suggests. There is no evidence of a second group. In a later document, the UN Group of experts attributes the 22 OCT 2012 attacks in Cibitoke – generally attributed to “FPM-

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<sup>131</sup> “BURUNDI: Tensions Autour de Lat Question <<des Terres et Autres Biens>> et Confrontation Entre Le Pouvoir et l’Opposition” (Bujumbura: Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale, 2012), 106, [http://oag.bi/IMG/pdf/Rapport\\_d\\_observation\\_de\\_la\\_gouvernance\\_juillet-novembre\\_2012\\_document\\_du\\_9\\_janvier\\_2013\\_A5.pdf](http://oag.bi/IMG/pdf/Rapport_d_observation_de_la_gouvernance_juillet-novembre_2012_document_du_9_janvier_2013_A5.pdf); “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)” (United Nations Security Council, November 15, 2012), paras. 114–115, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/843](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/843).

<sup>132</sup> “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi” (United Nations Security Council, January 18, 2013), paras. 8, 10, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/36](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/36).

<sup>133</sup> “BURUNDI: Tensions Autour de Lat Question <<des Terres et Autres Biens>> et Confrontation Entre Le Pouvoir et l’Opposition,” 106; Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, *Peace, Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa* (CODESRIA, 2017), 270, [https://books.google.com/books?id=d1dDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA270&lpg=PA270&dq=Front+du+peuple+murundi&source=bl&ots=MBW4Fq\\_hZZ&sig=uBc6fTyNXXQV4dm2x7PFtXBxbZY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiv-Ny-ylbdAhWNAwKHUzpBDUQ6AEwBnoECAEQAAQ#v=onepage&q=Front%20du%20peuple%20murundi&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=d1dDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA270&lpg=PA270&dq=Front+du+peuple+murundi&source=bl&ots=MBW4Fq_hZZ&sig=uBc6fTyNXXQV4dm2x7PFtXBxbZY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiv-Ny-ylbdAhWNAwKHUzpBDUQ6AEwBnoECAEQAAQ#v=onepage&q=Front%20du%20peuple%20murundi&f=false); Onyango-Obbo, “New Rebel Group Attacks Burundi.”

<sup>134</sup> Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber, and Klaas van Walraven, *Africa Yearbook Volume 9: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2012* (BRILL, 2013), 294, [https://books.google.com/books?id=AF9AAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA294&lpg=PA294&dq=fpm+abatabazi+burundi&source=bl&ots=7v8d3JMriK&sig=CehEIXz2Cz1z\\_fPTE\\_AuXDG-8FE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2nd-S04bdAhVmslQKHQKvA8U4ChDoATABegQICRAB#v=onepage&q=fpm%20abatabazi%20burundi&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=AF9AAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA294&lpg=PA294&dq=fpm+abatabazi+burundi&source=bl&ots=7v8d3JMriK&sig=CehEIXz2Cz1z_fPTE_AuXDG-8FE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2nd-S04bdAhVmslQKHQKvA8U4ChDoATABegQICRAB#v=onepage&q=fpm%20abatabazi%20burundi&f=false); “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 115.

<sup>135</sup> “Guillaume Georges Majambere,” LinkedIn, accessed August 24, 2018, <https://www.linkedin.com/in/guillaume-georges-majambere-80755911b/>; “Abatabazi: Site du Mouvement Politico-Militaire ADN-BURUNDI,” Abatabazi, accessed August 24, 2018, <https://abatabazi.wordpress.com/>; Georges Nikiza, “Burundi: New Rebel Group Strikes in Burundi,” *ThinkAfricaPress*, November 27, 2012, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201211271534.html>; “L’armée Burundaise et Le FPM-Abatabazi Poursuivent Leurs Combats En Province de Cibitoke”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 114; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)” (United Nations Security Council, January 23, 2014), 142, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/42](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/42); “BURUNDI: Tensions Autour de Lat Question <<des Terres et Autres Biens>> et Confrontation Entre Le Pouvoir et l’Opposition,” 106.

<sup>136</sup> Nikiza, “Burundi: New Rebel Group Strikes in Burundi”; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” para. 10.

Abatabazi”<sup>137</sup> – to a previously referenced FPM or FPM/ADN, implying that these are the same group.<sup>138</sup> The smoking gun linking FPM-Abatabazi to FRONABU, however, is an overlap in leadership: previous FRONABU statements were signed by one David Ntwari, and the deputy commander in the Cibitoke attacks was Ntwari Israel – which I believe are likely the same individual.<sup>139</sup>

As we are not including this group, I will not assess its links to Alexis Sinduhije or the ADN party (although I do harbor some doubts).

Excluded – continuation of a previous rebel group.

#### \*Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara)

AKAs: Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi, Resistance for a State of Law, RED, Tabara, possibly FRONABU (see above for variants, see below for explanation)

There is a possibility that this group is a revival of FRONABU-Tabara (see above). However, I have reason to suspect that it does not meet our criteria for a revival and instead should be classified as a new rebel group (especially bearing in mind that our codebook dictates coding ambiguous cases as new rebel groups).

Evidence to consider includes:

- Like FRONABU, it has been linked to Alexis Sinduhije and MSD (see discussion below). However, even if both organizations are linked to MSD, that does not mean they necessarily qualify as the same organization through our criteria, which requires that the majority of the 2014 group leadership and membership overlapped with the 2011 group.
- The first public document of RED-Tabara, released on Twitter on 22 JAN 2016, claims that the organization was founded on 24 APR 2011.<sup>140</sup> However, it makes no reference to any activity conducted in the interim nor to any leadership that can enable us to tie the 2011 group/activity to the 2014/2015 group/activity. There would be motive to claim the organization is older than it actually is to increase its appeal and prestige.
- None of the references to RED-Tabara’s history as FRONABU-Tabara reference the FPM-Abatabazi era (see above).
- The UN lists FRONABU-Tabara as an alternative name for the organization and says that the group has been operating in eastern DRC since at least 2011.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> “BURUNDI: Tensions Autour de La Question <<des Terres et Autres Biens>> et Confrontation Entre Le Pouvoir et l’Opposition,” 106; Nikiza, “Burundi: New Rebel Group Strikes in Burundi”; AFP, “Rebel Group Claims Responsibility for Burundi Attacks”; Onyango-Obbo, “New Rebel Group Attacks Burundi”; “Burundi : Un Nouveau Groupe Armée Revendique l’attaque de Cibitoke,” *Xinhua News Agency - French*, October 23, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e9f39a63-5b57-4d81-988e-e26dbfb784ae/?context=1516831>; Gus Selassie, “New Armed Group Claims Attack in Northwest Burundi,” *IHS Global Insight*, October 25, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/0ec52b56-95a9-49de-8d79-b5b66590db35/?context=1516831>; “L’armée Burundaise et Le FPM-Abatabazi Poursuivent Leurs Combats En Province de Cibitoke.”

<sup>138</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)” (United Nations Security Council, July 19, 2013), para. 117, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433).

<sup>139</sup> Ntwari, “COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE FRONABU-TABARA”; Ntwari, “Communiqué de Presse Du Front National Pour La Révolution Au Burundi, FRONABU-TABARA”; AFP, “Rebel Group Claims Responsibility for Burundi Attacks.”

<sup>140</sup> R. E. D. Tabara, “Historique du mouvement RED TABARA <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1RFM8iLIQ8uVG55cTNXSzE2bDg/view?usp=sharing> ... Tweet No 1,” Tweet, @Red\_Tabara (blog), January 22, 2016, [https://twitter.com/Red\\_Tabara/status/690643894871158789](https://twitter.com/Red_Tabara/status/690643894871158789).

<sup>141</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)” (United Nations Security Council, May 23, 2016), para. 33, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/466](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/466).

- In its first operation in over three years, conducted in DEC 14, all the combatants were reportedly new recruits. The maximum length any of them had served with RED-Tabara was five months.<sup>142</sup>

FRONABU-Tabara/FPM-Abatabazi was comprised of seasoned combat veterans.<sup>143</sup>

I suspect that after years of inactivity, FRONABU-Tabara/FPM-Abatabazi was essentially defunct, and MSD affiliates built a new organization that they tied to the old organization to increase credibility and prestige as a rebel group. There may have been overlap in leadership (although no named leaders were tied to both groups), but I doubt there was any considerable overlap in membership. There is no explanation of FRONABU-Tabara/RED-Tabara activity, including non-violent activity such as recruitment or training, between late 2011 and late 2014. However, to reflect the possibility that this group is a revival, I downgraded certainty to 2.

Many sources indicate that RED-Tabara emerged as a rebel group in late 2015/early 2016, in the wake of turmoil caused by Nkurunziza seeking a third term.<sup>144</sup> However, careful research suggests that a group named RED-Tabara emerged earlier, in mid to late 2014, and operated clandestinely. Again, it is difficult to confirm whether the 2014 instance of RED-Tabara meets our criteria to be considered the same rebel group as the 2015-2016 instance of RED-Tabara. Nonetheless, there is more evidence connecting the 2014 and 2015 groups than connecting the 2011 and 2014 groups. A UN report suggests that after a failed attack in DEC 2014-JAN 2015 (see below), which cost RED-Tabara nearly 200 members, remaining Tabara elements were “reinforced” with new recruits in early 2015 (no previous military training), and then with additional new members (FDN and security defectors) after the May 2015 coup.<sup>145</sup> In other words, there is evidence of continuity between the 2014 and 2015 groups, whereas there is a large gap with no activity of any kind between the 2011 and 2014 groups.

Unlike with the earlier group FRONABU, there is pretty firm evidence linking RED-Tabara to the MSD and Alexis Sinduhije; sources consistently report the connection, many calling RED-Tabara the armed wing of the MSD.<sup>146</sup> UN investigators report that some people involved with or near the camp refer to the rebel group simply as MSD.<sup>147</sup> Sinduhije himself has denied supporting RED-Tabara, saying he may inspire the group but does not fund it. However, the U.S. government has identified him as “a particularly active supporter of armed rebellion in Burundi,” linking him to assassination attempts and attacks on government targets. As a result, the US has issued sanctions against Sinduhije.<sup>148</sup> This information on

<sup>142</sup> Dieudonne Hakizimana and Christian Bigirimana, “Cow Herders during the Day, Rebels at Night,” trans. Diane Uwimana, IWACU English News, February 4, 2015, <http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/cow-herders-during-the-day-rebels-at-night/>; “Burundi: 14 Prisonniers Rebelles de Cibitoke Transférés à Bubanza | Les Nouvelles Du Burundi - Burundi Africa Generation,” *Burundi Africa Generation* (blog), February 14, 2015, <https://burundi-agnews.org/justice/burundi-14-prisonniers-rebelles-de-cibitoke-transferes-a-bubanza/>; “La Justice Lève Un Coin Du Voile Sur Les Récentes Attaques Armées Contre Le Nord Du Burundi,” *PANAPRESS - Pan African News Agency*, January 19, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/9d93f2e6-2b3b-48f1-888c-4fc54c32565a/?context=1516831>.

<sup>143</sup> “BURUNDI: Tensions Autour de La Question <<des Terres et Autres Biens>> et Confrontation Entre Le Pouvoir et l’Opposition,” 107 See also history of FRONABU-Tabara/FPM-Abatabazi.

<sup>144</sup> “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 5; “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; Fréjus Quenum, “Nouveau Mouvement Armé Au Burundi,” *Deutsche Welle*, January 18, 2016, <https://www.dw.com/fr/nouveau-mouvement-arm%C3%A9-au-burundi/a-18986214>.

<sup>145</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” para. 36.

<sup>146</sup> “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 6; “Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term,” 19; “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 148; Stockman, “Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” para. 33.

<sup>147</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” para. 33.

<sup>148</sup> Stockman, “Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe.”

MSD leadership links also dovetails with reports that RED-Tabara leaders are all in exile, as is Alexis Sinduhije (see below).<sup>149</sup>

According to the United Nations, RED-Tabara's "biggest operation" occurred starting in late DEC 2014.<sup>150</sup> We have gathered the following information regarding the attack:

- Several sources corroborate that on the night of 29-30 DEC 2014, between 150 and 200 rebels crossed from eastern DRC into Cibitoke province.
- At the time, the assailants refused to reveal the group's identity, but the UN retrospectively identifies the group as RED-Tabara.
- The group was led by "Lt. Col." Joseph Kaziri (AKA Yussuf, Youssof), an FDN defector who had previously harbored in a private radio station and a human rights association in Bujumbura.
- Members reported that their leaders never went into the field with them, except Yussuf, who came to train them.
- The rebels said they were based in Mutarule (a village between Uvira and Bukavu in South Kivu, DRC), where Congolese locals had a hard time identifying them because they all had day jobs (like being cow herders) and trained only by night. Mutarule is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a 1.
- Sources report that the rebels were all new recruits and mostly quite young, with the longest affiliation being only five months. However, they were also all Burundian.
- The aims of the group were variously reported as securing a base in Cibitoke to carry out further missions, to target Imbonerakure, and to disrupt/prevent the upcoming electoral campaign.
- Evidently, they succeeded in killing 2 FDN and 2 civilians (no further details) before most rebels were captured or killed.<sup>151</sup>

This event predates what many sources cite as the finding of RED-Tabara, but there are several elements of evidence that are suggestive of a relationship between the Cibitoke rebel group and MSD.

- First, as mentioned above, none of the leaders of the group had been present in eastern DRC and the identity of the leaders was not revealed – which seems logical if Alexis Sinduhije and MSD colleagues wanted to maintain their international reputation.
- Second, Yussuf's time spent at a radio station and human rights organization in Bujumbura fits nicely with Sinduhije's personal history.<sup>152</sup>
- Third, the timing also seems logical in the context of other MSD-related events. Earlier in 2014, the Burundian police stormed MSD headquarters, shooting and arresting members after a series of escalations. MSD members had taken two police officers hostage (but ultimately released them) after police surrounded the compound, with police alleging that MSD joggers had staged an illegal protest earlier that day. Sinduhije managed to escape the headquarters but afterwards remained in exile in Uganda, as the regime issued a warrant for his arrest.<sup>153</sup> MSD had faced increasing harassment from

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<sup>149</sup> "Burundi: The Army in Crisis," 6.

<sup>150</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 35.

<sup>151</sup> All above information contained within "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 35; Hakizimana and Bigirimana, "Cow Herders during the Day, Rebels at Night"; Alida Sabiteka, "Burundi : Kaziri Joseph"Yussuf", chef du groupe de rebelles qui a attaqué CIBITOKE," IGIHE, January 20, 2015, <http://fr.igihe.net/securite/burundi-kaziri-joseph-yussuf-chef-du-groupe-de>; "La Justice Lève Un Coin Du Voile Sur Les Récentes Attaques Armées Contre Le Nord Du Burundi"; "Burundi: 14 Prisonniers Rebelles de Cibitoke Transférés à Bubanza | Les Nouvelles Du Burundi - Burundi Africa Generation."

<sup>152</sup> Stockman, "Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe."

<sup>153</sup> Peter Frick-Wright, "How Jogging in Burundi Became an Act of War," Outside Online, March 18, 2016, <https://www.outsideonline.com/2062806/worlds-most-dangerous-running-club-burundi>; Stockman, "Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe"; "Burundi: Locked Down: A Shrinking

the regime in 2014.<sup>154</sup> In addition, Sinduhije had called for MSD youth to defend themselves against Imbonerakure attacks; the two groups had violently clashed that year.<sup>155</sup> Around the same time, rumors began circulating that Nkurunziza would seek a third term.<sup>156</sup>

It is easy to imagine a scenario wherein Sinduhije and colleagues, forced in exile mid-2014, became so frustrated with the situation that they turned to violence. RED-Tabara tweeted a Thomas Jefferson quote that read, “When injustice becomes law, resistance becomes duty” – an interesting quotation, especially given that Sinduhije had studied at Harvard.<sup>157</sup> It would have been easy to recruit MSD youth for an armed rebellion. All of this evidence is merely suggestive, but it means the narrative of MSD involvement at this earlier stage of RED-Tabara make sense.

As a result of this information, I coded the founding date of RED-Tabara as AUG 2014 with low certainty (reflecting the five month maximum tenure of rebel recruits). I coded 29 DEC 2014 as the first small attack. In addition, I coded 1 for clandestine, given that (1) assailants implied that their military training had been concealed, and (2) assailants refused to reveal the name of the group and its leadership. Finally, accounts of this attack and additional (albeit later) accounts suggest that RED-Tabara’s base was in rural eastern DRC.<sup>158</sup> As such, I coded 1 for rural and 1 for planning border.

As best I can tell, RED-Tabara was not publicly known until JAN 2016. The earliest record of the group I found was several articles on 12 JAN 2016; one of these articles suggests the group was revealed in a UN fact-finding mission memo, but I was unable to locate this document.<sup>159</sup> The RED-Tabara twitter account was also launched in JAN 2016, producing its first tweet on 22 JAN 2016.<sup>160</sup> Based on this information, RED-Tabara did not name/announce itself until more than a year after its founding. It does not seem to have been named under duress (no references to captured members).

At least one account of the DEC 2014 attack suggests that RED-Tabara had the goal of taking power by force.<sup>161</sup> There is other suggestive evidence that the group’s goal was takeover: its ties to the MSD, whose goal is to contest the CNDD-FDD in power (see above on ties), and subsequent statements, which also articulate its relationship to the current regime.<sup>162</sup>

RED-Tabara reportedly began securing weapons from operations against FARDC and FDN and through FDN defectors. The UN documented weapons shipments to RED-Tabara in eastern DRC in the second half of 2015, although the source of the weapons was not clear.<sup>163</sup> There were rumors by JAN 2016 that Rwanda

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of Political Space” (London: Amnesty International, 2014), 10–11, <https://www.amnesty.ca/sites/amnesty/files/burundlockeddownfinal.pdf>; Jean-Claude Abalo, “Alexis Sinduhije Dément Être à La Tête d’une Rébellion Au Burundi,” *Deutsche Welle*, January 13, 2016, <https://www.dw.com/fr/alexis-sinduhije-d%C3%A9ment-%C3%AAtre-%C3%A0-la-t%C3%AAtte-dune-r%C3%A9bellion-au-burundi/a-18974921>.

<sup>154</sup> “Burundi: Locked Down: A Shrinking of Political Space.”

<sup>155</sup> “Burundi: Locked Down: A Shrinking of Political Space.”

<sup>156</sup> Frick-Wright, “How Jogging in Burundi Became an Act of War.”

<sup>157</sup> Stockman, “Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe.”

<sup>158</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” para. 34; Vogel, “Guest Blog.”

<sup>159</sup> “Burundi: Les Craintes de l’ONU Face Aux Différents Scenarii Possibles,” *RFI*, January 12, 2016, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ba9494bf-d4de-4d10-a4d7-15c57cadda6c/?context=1516831>; Alain Saint Robespierre, “Le Mémo Apocalyptique de Ladsous,” *L’Observateur Paalga*, January 12, 2016, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8780815c-5cc1-48af-a179-b11f968e54a8/?context=1516831>.

<sup>160</sup> Tabara, “Historique du mouvement RED TABARA

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1RfM8iLIQ8uVG55cTNXSzE2bDg/view?usp=sharing> ... Tweet No 1.”

<sup>161</sup> “La Justice Lève Un Coin Du Voile Sur Les Récentes Attaques Armées Contre Le Nord Du Burundi.”

<sup>162</sup> Tabara, “Historique du mouvement RED TABARA

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1RfM8iLIQ8uVG55cTNXSzE2bDg/view?usp=sharing> ... Tweet No 1.”

<sup>163</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” paras. 37–41.

may have been supporting Burundian rebel groups including RED-Tabara.<sup>164</sup> However, none of this information likely suggests external support for Tabara within the first year (approximately beginning AUG 2014-beginning AUG 2015). Reports of the DEC 2014 attacks do not describe the type of weaponry the assailants possessed, meaning we are not sure how well-equipped they were. I have coded none under initial resources, although it is conceivable that I am wrong. The movement may have been financed using MSD resources or personal wealth of MSD members.

Based on information above discussing possible ties to MSD, I have coded party under organizational history.

This narrative is consistent with accounts suggesting large youth membership or many new recruits in RED-Tabara.<sup>165</sup> Although some sources suggest there are many FDN defectors in RED-Tabara, other evidence suggests that FDN defectors did not join RED-Tabara in large numbers until after MAY 2015, suggesting they were not a large part of the original membership.<sup>166</sup> Finally, several sources suggest former rebels of other movements (including AND, ADC-Ikibiri, and FNL) joined RED-Tabara, although we don't know how much of the membership they comprised – and evidence suggests not much (recall DEC 2014 attack).<sup>167</sup>

I coded never occurred for large attack and missing for civilian attack (see special notes in Burundi introduction).

Based on the information on Joseph Kaziri, I coded 1 for current security under initial leadership. However, I left the rest as missing given that we never learned the names of initial leadership. By 2016, the head of RED-Tabara was clearly identified as Major General Biremba Melchiade, a Hutu, former law student, and MSD member.<sup>168</sup> However, it's unclear whether he was affiliated with the group within the first year.

RED-Tabara's Twitter account has not posted since 2016.<sup>169</sup> Several reports from eastern DRC indicate that RED-Tabara was engaging alongside Congolese rebel groups in JUL and AUG 2018, but our criteria for viable indicate that attacks must be on the *target government* or occur on the *target government's* territory, i.e. such attacks would not qualify. Details on engagement in DRC are not forthcoming, although an interview with a local media group in South Kivu suggested that groups like RED-Tabara and FOREBU still launch cross-border attacks from time to time.<sup>170</sup> In addition, unclaimed grenade attacks in areas near the border and in the capital continued, although most (but not all) seemed no discernable political targets.

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<sup>164</sup> "In the Name of Arusha: Defiant in Nervous Burundi," *The East African*, January 16, 2016, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4e931efd-4bb4-47cb-9ca3-123f62dc656e/?context=1516831>.

<sup>165</sup> "Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One," 12; "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 34; Stockman, "Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe."

<sup>166</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 36; In addition, one source notes that FOREBU was the only new group that was composed mainly of FDN defectors, i.e. RED-Tabara was not mostly FDN "Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi," 148.

<sup>167</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 36; "Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One," 12.

<sup>168</sup> "Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi," 107, 148; "Resistance for a State of Law in Burundi (Résistance Pour Un Etat de Droit Au Burundi, RED-Tabara)," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed August 22, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/red-tabara.htm>; Stockman, "Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe."

<sup>169</sup> R. E. D. Tabara, "ATTENTION - DES MESSAGES D'INTOX SUR LE RED TABARA SUR LES RÉSEAUX SOCIAUX. NE TOMBEZ PAS DANS LE PIÈGE!!! #BURUNDI #REDTABARA," Tweet, @Red\_Tabara (blog), September 16, 2016, [https://twitter.com/Red\\_Tabara/status/777034748040404992](https://twitter.com/Red_Tabara/status/777034748040404992).

<sup>170</sup> "Burundi Rebel Group Reportedly Involved in DR Congo Clashes," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 20, 2018, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/53a4e9ad-cb68-4b5a-8e3e-390fb1136e80/?context=1516831>; Bob Barry, "RDC : Les Maï-Maï Appuyés Des Combattants Burundais Sèment La Terreur," *Deutsche Welle*, July 5, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/fr/rdc-les-ma%C3%AF-ma%C3%AF-appuy%C3%A9s-des-combattants-burundais-s%C3%A8ment-la-terreur/a-44536634>.



Some were in Cibitoke, where there have previously been RED-Tabara attacks.<sup>171</sup> In October and November 2019, RED-Tabara forces launched attacks on Burundian security forces in northwestern Burundi.<sup>172</sup> The group is viable by our criteria.

I coded 1 for protest based on SCAD events 5160169<sup>173</sup> and 5160172.<sup>174</sup> There were no Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation events in the locality of group formation, Mutarule, in the year prior to group formation. It should be noted that Mutarule is in the DR Congo, so group formation occurred outside of Burundi. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU)

AKAs: Front for Democracy in Burundi

FRODEBU is a Burundian political party founded in 1992.<sup>175</sup> I found one VOA report from 1996 indicating that FRODEBU planned to join the rebels, but apparently nothing ever came of it.<sup>176</sup> Beyond this report, the only references I found to FRODEBU and violence were: (1) reports that FRODEBU members were the victims of violence,<sup>177</sup> (2) reports of FRODEBU members engaging in spontaneous election violence,<sup>178</sup> and (3) reports of FRODEBU leaders inciting violence from 1993 to 1996 (no further details given, seems not to be direct sponsorship of violence, but it predates our period of interest

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<sup>171</sup> Niyirora, “Grenade Blast Kills 2 in Eastern Burundi”; Niyirora, “Grenade Blast Kills 2, Injures 35 in Northern Burundi: Police”; Niyirora, “Grenade Explosion Kills 1, Injures 6 in NW Burundi”; “Four Injured in Two Separate Grenade Attacks in Burundian Capital: Police,” *Xinhua General News Service*, December 7, 2017, sec. World News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4ae39df9-d830-4ee6-9984-a7df2c45e453/?context=1516831>; “Human Rights; Human Rights Watch - ‘2015 Crisis Continued Through 2017’”; “Five Hurt by Grenade Attack in Burundi’s Capital”; On previous attacks in Cibitoke, see DEC 2014 attack above, also “Country Report: Burundi Crisis Year One,” 8; “Resistance for a State of Law in Burundi (Résistance Pour Un Etat de Droit Au Burundi, RED-Tabara);” Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition.”

<sup>172</sup> “Burundi Army Clashes with Rebels in Eastern DR Congo,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, April 27, 2020, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020200427eg4r001md&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “In the News: Killings, Arrests as Elections Draw near in Burundi,” *The New Humanitarian*, February 26, 2020, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IRINASE020200227eg2q00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Belligerence of Kampala and Kigali Backfires,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, November 1, 2019, sec. CORRIDORS OF POWER, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020191114efb100001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>173</sup> Frick-Wright, “How Jogging in Burundi Became an Act of War.”

<sup>174</sup> “Burundian Police Bar Opposition Party from Holding Meeting in Capital,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, July 13, 2014, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8bfef300-be9b-4cb5-8cfb-a53ea03d4658/?context=1516831>.

<sup>175</sup> “‘We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You’: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi,” 1; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Responses to Information Requests: BDI104297: Burundi: Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), Including Treatment of Its Members and Their Families by Government Authorities (November 2004-February 2013)” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 8, 2013), 1, <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/04/BDI104297.E.pdf>.

<sup>176</sup> “Burundi: Leaders of FRODEBU to Join Rebels,” ReliefWeb, September 8, 1996, <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-leaders-frodebu-join-rebels>.

<sup>177</sup> See for instance “Burundi: Investigate Attacks on Opposition,” Human Rights Watch, March 11, 2008, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/11/burundi-investigate-attacks-opposition>; “‘We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You’: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi”; “Burundi: Events of 2009,” Human Rights Watch, January 20, 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/burundi>.

<sup>178</sup> “‘We’ll Tie You Up and Shoot You’: Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi,” 30–31; “Burundi: Stop Pre-Election Violence, Hold Perpetrators Accountable,” Human Rights Watch, April 14, 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/14/burundi-stop-pre-election-violence-hold-perpetrators-accountable>; “World Report 2011: Burundi,” Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2011, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/burundi>.

anyhow).<sup>179</sup> A FRODEBU member was arrested for killing Antoine Baransekerera, but the killing was actually carried out by an FNL member.<sup>180</sup> Excluded.

#### South African Protection Support Detachment

AKAs: South African Protection Service Detachment, South Africa Protection Support  
South African state force deployed in advance of peacekeeping mission in 2002. Excluded.<sup>181</sup>

#### Hutu Rebels

As best I could tell, this was not actually an organized group but just a term that ACLED used to refer to any otherwise unidentified Hutu assailants. It is essentially as useful as “unidentified armed group”. Excluded.

#### Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie (MSD)

AKAs: Movement for Solidarity and Democracy

An opposition political party. All ACLED events in which they are tagged are either spontaneous violence (2947BUI, 2953BUI, 2966BUI, 2968BUI, 2983BUI)<sup>182</sup>, had MSD victims (2945BUI, 2966BUI, 2968BUI, 2954BUI, 2961BUI, 1993BUI, 3281BUI, 3287BUI, 3341BUI, 3375BUI, 3389BUI),<sup>183</sup> or were a strategic development (2973BUI). I found no evidence of planned MSD violence after 2015 either. However, MSD has been linked to several rebel groups (see FRONABU-Tabara and RED-Tabara above). Excluded.

#### Ndombolo Militia

AKAs: none

This group was tagged in only one ACLED event (3055BUI). I was not able to locate any original documentation on the incident. However, the ACLED description says the group was linked to the Imbonerakure (see above) and attacked a man accused of being pro-FNL (see above), both of which suggest that the group is pro-state.

#### Nyagishubi communal militia

AKAs: none

Tagged in one ACLED event (2699BUI). Communal violence following witchcraft accusations – not political.<sup>184</sup>

#### Nyanza Lac communal militia

AKAs: none

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<sup>179</sup> “Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace” (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2009), 91, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover\\_3.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_3.pdf).

<sup>180</sup> “Burundi: Events of 2009.”

<sup>181</sup> “South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Missions,” Occasional Paper Series (Durban: ACCORD, 2007), 24–25, [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5487~v~South\\_Africa\\_8217s\\_Peacekeeping\\_Role\\_in\\_Burundi\\_Challenges\\_and\\_Opportunities\\_for\\_Future\\_Peace\\_Missions.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5487~v~South_Africa_8217s_Peacekeeping_Role_in_Burundi_Challenges_and_Opportunities_for_Future_Peace_Missions.pdf); Institute for Security Studies, “A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration - A Case Study from Burundi,” ReliefWeb, August 1, 2006, <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/technical-analysis-disarmament-demobilisation-and-reintegration-case-study-burundi>; “SANDF to Train Burundi Unit,” *News24*, December 7, 2002, <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/SANDF-to-train-Burundi-unit-20021207>.

<sup>182</sup> Frick-Wright, “How Jogging in Burundi Became an Act of War”; Stockman, “Burundi: Alexis Sinduhije, Once an Icon of Peace, Turns to War - The Boston Globe.”

<sup>183</sup> “Burundi - Burundi: Deux Jeunes Militants de l’opposition Assassinés à Cibitoke,” *RFI*, July 14, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/562486a5-75e1-4c36-8639-281b5e7e6160/?context=1516831>.

<sup>184</sup> “Four Killed in Burundi in Witchcraft Row,” *Agence France Presse -- English*, September 12, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3a2f9052-f013-4817-814e-afcefc17f47/?context=1516831>.

Tagged in one ACLED event (991BUI). I could not locate original documentation on the incident, but the ACLED description suggests they are pro-state (joined with government forces to track down rebels).

#### **Union pour la paix et la démocratie-Zigamibanga (UPD-Zigamibanga)**

AKAs: Union pour la paix et le développement-Zigamibanga, Union pour la paix et la démocratie, Union pour la paix et le développement, Union for Peace and Democracy, Union for Peace and Development  
This is a political party. It is tagged in three ACLED events. One event seems to be spontaneous violence (2777BUI), although I could not locate original documentation on the incident. The other two have victims, not perpetrators, from UPD-Zigamibanga (3163BUI, 3355BUI). Excluded – no evidence of planned violence.

#### **Gardiens de la paix**

AKAs: Peace Guardians, Guardians of the Peace, Young Peace Guards, Peace Guards, abajeunes  
This was a government-organized (i.e. pro-government) militia from the civil war era.<sup>185</sup>  
Excluded – does not challenge the authority of the state.

#### **Gatumba Communal Militia**

AKAs: none  
Tagged in two ACLED events (3024BUI and 3025BUI). Based on ACLED descriptions, the events seem to have been spontaneous violence owing to a land dispute. I was unable to locate original documentation on the incident. Excluded – no evidence of planned violence.

#### **Rukaramu Communal Militia**

AKAs: none  
Tagged in two ACLED events (3024BUI and 3025BUI). Based on ACLED descriptions, the events seem to have been spontaneous violence owing to a land dispute. I was unable to locate original documentation on the incident. Excluded – no evidence of planned violence.

**Interahamwe Militia** – See the entry in the Rwanda country section.

#### **\*Force pour la restauration de la démocratie-Abanyagihugu (FRD-Abanyagihugu)**

AKAs: Forces pour la restauration de la démocratie-Abanyagihugu, Force pour la restauration de la démocratie, Forces pour la restauration de la démocratie, Front de la restauration de la démocratie, FRD-Ingabo z'Abanyagihugu, Force for the Restoration of Democracy, Forces for the Restoration of Democracy, Front for the Restoration of Democracy, Force for the Restoration of Democracy in Burundi, FRD

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<sup>185</sup> Child Soldiers International, "Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 - Burundi," Refworld, 2004, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4988066f2.html>; "Burundi: To Protect the People: The Government-Sponsored 'Self-Defense' Program in Burundi" (Human Rights Watch, December 2001), 2, 6, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/burundi/burundi1201.pdf>; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Burundi : une organisation appelée « Gardiens de la paix » qui feraient partie de l'armée burundaise, y compris ses activités, notamment à Kamenge dans la ville de Bujumbura (2001 - février 2003)," Refworld, February 5, 2003, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4d5923.html>; Pauline Simonet, "Le Recyclage Des Miliciens," *RFI*, February 18, 2003, [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/038/article\\_20882.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/038/article_20882.asp); "Burundi: Suffering in Silence: Civilians in Continuing Combat in Bujumbura Rural," Briefing Paper (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, June 2004), 13, 14, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/burundi/2004/burundi0604.pdf>; "ONUB Forces and the National Security Forces Are Working Together to Secure the Country for the Elections," Press Release (Bujumbura: United Nations Operation in Burundi, June 23, 2005), 2, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/pr79e.pdf>.

This group is not included in ACLED. Most coverage of the group in media focuses on journalist Hassan Ruvakuki, who was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment for interviewing the group's leader.<sup>186</sup> The other reason the group may be missing is that it was not publicly named until *after* its only known attack (see below). However, I have identified what I believe to be the attack in ACLED (2910BUI), and FNL is tagged as the perpetrator. It's not clear to me why the FNL was tagged; although I was not able to locate the AFP article that ACLED cites, I found no mention of the FNL in other reporting on the attack. It may have been mis-tagged.

Sources agree that FRD launched an attack from Tanzania into Cankuzo province in eastern Burundi in NOV 2011.<sup>187</sup> Security forces repulsed the attack and captured several members.<sup>188</sup> It may have also been responsible for attacks in Cankuzo and Ruyigi provinces, but I have not been able to identify any specifics.<sup>189</sup> Once source describes the Cankuzo attack as "deadly," while another said the attack left "scores of people dead".<sup>190</sup> However, as best I can tell, the only fatalities occurred among the attackers, not among victims; about fifteen assailants died (reports vary).<sup>191</sup> I believe I found original reporting on the incident, which indicates that the attack occurred in Kigamba town, Cankuzo province on 21 NOV 2011. The target of the attack was not mentioned.<sup>192</sup> This account conflicts with at least one follow up report on FRD, which placed the attack in Cankuzo town.<sup>193</sup> However, the date matches at least one retrospective report that linked the attack to FRD.<sup>194</sup> In addition, a UN Group of Experts report indicates that FRD launched a failed attack on police posts in Cankuzo province in DEC 2011, during which the government claims to have killed 57 assailants and captured 20.<sup>195</sup> Several details on the UN account conflict with the above reports (date, death toll), so it seems this may be a different attack. Based on this information, I have coded 21 NOV 2011 as small attack date.

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<sup>186</sup> Patrick Nduwimana, "Burundi Court Cuts Journalist Prison Term over Gun Attack," *Reuters*, January 8, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-justice/burundi-court-cuts-journalist-prison-term-over-gun-attack-idUSBRE9070JF20130108>; "Burundi: Universal Periodic Review Submission July 2012," Human Rights Watch, July 10, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/10/burundi-universal-periodic-review-submission-july-2012>; "Burundi Reporter Sentence Reduced," *BBC News*, January 8, 2013, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20944774>; "Burundi: RFI Reporter Jailed for Life in Terror Trial," *Radio France Internationale*, June 27, 2012, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201206270821.html>; Fatma Elshhati, "Burundian Journalist Sentenced to Life," *International Press Institute* (blog), June 23, 2012, <https://ipi.media/burundian-journalist-sentenced-to-life/>.

<sup>187</sup> "Burundi: Bye-Bye Arusha?" (International Crisis Group, October 25, 2012), 3, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha-french.pdf>; "Burundi Executed Rebel Leader: Rights Group," *Agence France Presse -- English*, June 6, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/d1b59046-1faf-47fa-91d9-8f188786d952/?context=1516831>; IRIN, "A New Rebellion?," ReliefWeb, November 30, 2011, <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/new-rebellion>; Elshhati, "Burundian Journalist Sentenced to Life"; Nduwimana, "Burundi Court Cuts Journalist Prison Term over Gun Attack"; "Burundi: RFI Reporter Jailed for Life in Terror Trial."

<sup>188</sup> "Burundi: Bye-Bye Arusha?," 3.

<sup>189</sup> IRIN, "A New Rebellion?"; Elshhati, "Burundian Journalist Sentenced to Life."

<sup>190</sup> "Burundi: RFI Reporter Jailed for Life in Terror Trial"; Elshhati, "Burundian Journalist Sentenced to Life."

<sup>191</sup> "Burundi : les Forces de l'ordre Tuent 18 Hommes Armés à Cankuzo," *Xinhua News Agency - French*, November 21, 2011, sec. Actualité internationale, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/945df429-7e4a-4a00-a1b1-612b941440d9/?context=1516831>; "Burundi Reporter Sentence Reduced."

<sup>192</sup> "Burundi : les Forces de l'ordre Tuent 18 Hommes Armés à Cankuzo."

<sup>193</sup> "Burundi: RFI Reporter Jailed for Life in Terror Trial."

<sup>194</sup> IRIN, "A New Rebellion?"

<sup>195</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 34.

The group declared itself through a public statement on 22 NOV 2011, which I have coded as the name date.<sup>196</sup> In addition, its leader gave an interview on Radio Publique Africaine on 25 NOV 2011.<sup>197</sup> Because the group declared itself the day after its initial attack (and may have then claimed the attack, although I can't find a copy of the statement), it's not clear whether the group ever sought to operate clandestinely. I coded missing for clandestine. Several sources, including the FRD's Facebook page, state the goal of the group as regime change, so I have coded goal as takeover.<sup>198</sup> I found no information about when the group actually formed. Although Facebook posts are signed from Ruyigi, the UN Group of Experts confirmed that FRD launched attacks from Tanzania and that the "high command" resided in Tanzania.<sup>199</sup> Evidently by mid-2012, at least some of FRD was based in DRC.<sup>200</sup> This account matches later reports that several FRD leaders were killed or captured in clashes in eastern DRC during MAY 2012. Either way, I have coded 1 for planning\_border.

Named leadership of FRD includes:

- Pierre Claver Kabirigi (AKA Carmel or Mukono) – former Burundian police officer<sup>201</sup>
- Jean-Petit Nduwimana (AKA Jean Petty Nduwimana) –former leader in CNDD-FDD rebellion, integrated into FDN in 2004, became chief of staff of the intelligence services, defected in 2008, UPD party member<sup>202</sup>
- Major Kevin Ndaishimye – no personal history given<sup>203</sup>
- Captain Idi Shabani Morisho – no personal history given<sup>204</sup>

Based on this information I have coded 1 for former rebel and 1 for current security under initial leadership. I have no indications of leadership ethnicity. Because I found nothing suggesting an organization history for group membership, I coded 1 for no prior org. There is no evidence of substantial initial resources.

I found no record of this group after 2012, and thus have coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ. Moreover, there is no evidence that a large attack ever occurred – I found no evidence that the group ever succeeded in inflicting casualties. Since targets weren't clear and we may have missed attacks, I code missing for civilian attack.

I code 1 for protest based on SCAD events 5160133, 5160145, and 5160148.

#### \***Militants-Combattants (MC)**

AKAs: Militants-Combatants, Militant Combatants

<sup>196</sup> "Frd Abanyagihugu," Facebook, accessed August 27, 2018, <https://www.facebook.com/frd.abanyagihugu.1>; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 34; "Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis" (International Crisis Group, March 21, 2012), 17, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f6af75c2.pdf>.

<sup>197</sup> IRIN, "A New Rebellion?"

<sup>198</sup> "Frd Abanyagihugu"; IRIN, "A New Rebellion?"

<sup>199</sup> "Frd Abanyagihugu"; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," paras. 34–35.

<sup>200</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 35.

<sup>201</sup> "Burundi: Bye-Bye Arusha?," 3; "Burundi Executed Rebel Leader: Rights Group"; IRIN, "A New Rebellion?"; "Frd Abanyagihugu"; Elshhati, "Burundian Journalist Sentenced to Life"; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 34.

<sup>202</sup> "Burundi Executed Rebel Leader: Rights Group"; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 34.

<sup>203</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 35.

<sup>204</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 35.

These were informal militias who supported FNL rebels but were not formally integrated into the FNL command structure. It sounds like they operated like true militias, i.e. members were not full-time combatants.<sup>205</sup> It's possible that some of these may have formed formal organizations, but we would not be able to identify them. Excluded – not formally organized.

**\*Parti libérateur du peuple burundais (PALIPE-AGAKIZA)**

AKAs: Party for the Liberation of the Burundian People

Demobilization accounts indicate that this was an armed group.<sup>206</sup> However, it seems to have been a rebranding or splinter of PALIPEHUTU/FNL (see above).<sup>207</sup> Excluded – splinter.

**\*Forces Nationales de Libération-Icanzo (FNL-Icanzo)**

AKAs: National Liberation Forces-Icanzo, see above for variants of FNL

This was an FNL dissident faction lead by Alain Mugarabona.<sup>208</sup> Excluded – splinter.

**\*Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA)**

AKAs: Union for National Progress, Union nationale pour le progrès, National Union for Progress, Unité pour le Progrès National, Unity for National Progress

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<sup>205</sup> “World Report 2010: Rights Trends in Burundi,” Human Rights Watch, January 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/burundi>; “Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared,” Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: Multi-Country Demobilization and Integration Program (IBRD), October 2007), 2, [http://tdrp.net/mdrp/PDFs/MDRP\\_Working\\_Paper3.pdf](http://tdrp.net/mdrp/PDFs/MDRP_Working_Paper3.pdf).

<sup>206</sup> “Burundi; Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Burundi,” *African Union*, July 4, 2004, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/93ab73fc-f95f-431c-8963-0954caddb3e5/?context=1516831>; “Excerpt from Report by Burundi News Agency ABP,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 3, 2004, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/b1a3877f-518d-4d2d-9533-fc930847dc73/?context=1516831>; “Burundi; Govt Resumes Military Cooperation With Belgium,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, March 30, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f95e375e-b46d-448c-8d93-88d2ed578e9c/?context=1516831>.

<sup>207</sup> “Burundi; Rebel Leader’s Return a Boon for Peace,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, June 12, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4c64f6e6-da58-41d6-adb2-f25871ee2cf7/?context=1516831>; “Burundi: Political Parties Hold Various Meetings to Prepare for Elections,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, March 1, 2004, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f8724d35-90e2-414f-ab46-ac224d4aedd1/?context=1516831>; KARATASI PARTI LIBERATEUR DU PEUPLE BURUNDAIS: PALIPE-AGAKIZA:ETIENNE, “Manifeste Du Parti Libérateur Du Peuple Burundais-PALIPE- AGAKIZA,” *Http://Www.Grandslacs.Net/*, February 28, 2004, 4, <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/4458>.

<sup>208</sup> “Former Rebel FNL Faction Becomes Political Party,” *IRIN*, December 22, 2003, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/47768/burundi-former-rebel-fnl-faction-becomes-political-party>; René Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 176, [https://books.google.com/books?id=0NN0z6C-Bc0C&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=FNL+Icanzo&source=bl&ots=AKb\\_0wIPTQ&sig=toZYzk0kMv5kDKfBXXkDAG9-noA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwifker1m5DdAhXiIQKHUHCjQ4ChDoATABegQICRAB#v=onepage&q=FN](https://books.google.com/books?id=0NN0z6C-Bc0C&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=FNL+Icanzo&source=bl&ots=AKb_0wIPTQ&sig=toZYzk0kMv5kDKfBXXkDAG9-noA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwifker1m5DdAhXiIQKHUHCjQ4ChDoATABegQICRAB#v=onepage&q=FN) L%20Icanzo&f=false; “Dubious Coup: Opposition Leaders Are Rounded up after Claims of a Plot to Kill the President,” *Africa Confidential*, September 8, 2006, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/1864/Dubious\\_coup](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/1864/Dubious_coup); “Burundi: Transitional Government (2001 - 2005),” *African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project*, April 2010, <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/buroverview9.htm>; Tom Lansford, ed., *Political Handbook of the World 2015* (CQ Press, 2015), <https://books.google.com/books?id=yNgfBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1107&lpg=PT1107&dq=Mohamed-Moussa+Dhaffane+CPSK&source=bl&ots=bHfgzV0a1K&sig=Gbn-2HRrbzwqyJyDF5IYKEjBM8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj116uB2cTSAhXE5SYKHW1kBXYQ6AEIKTAC#v=onepage&q=Mohamed-Moussa%20Dhaffane%20CPSK&f=false>.



UPRONA is a Burundian political party that ruled from independence to 1993.<sup>209</sup> It now has several factions. It is traditionally dominated by Tutsi.<sup>210</sup> Pierre Buyoya, who had links to UPRONA, led a coup d'état in 1996 from which UPRONA benefited, but this bout of violence predates our period of interest.<sup>211</sup> I found no evidence of qualifying activity by UPRONA following 1996, although there are some indications of electoral violence/calls for self-defense.<sup>212</sup> Excluded – no evidence of planned violence during period of interest.

**\*Mouvement de la Résistance Populaire-Abarundi (MRP-Abarundi)**

AKAs: Mouvement de la Résistance Populaire, MRP, Popular Resistance Movement, Popular Resistance Movement-Abarundi, PRM-Abarundi, Patriot Revolutionary Movement, Mouvement Révolutionnaire du Patriote, PRM/A

This group appeared with the release of a statement on 18 DEC 2015.<sup>213</sup> There's also a Facebook page called PRM Abarundi, but PRM stands for Patriot Revolutionary Movement and the posts occur from MAY-SEPT 2015. Nonetheless, it appears this is the same group, as several of the posts are signed "Gen. Didier Nyambariza," who also signed later statements as military leader.<sup>214</sup> The group has subsequently released additional statements.<sup>215</sup> Its Twitter account has several times posted pictures of the group supposedly

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<sup>209</sup> Ian O. Smith, "Will the Election Boycott in Burundi Succeed?," *Washington Post*, July 1, 2015, sec. Monkey Cage, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/01/will-the-election-boycott-in-burundi-succeed/>; Tom Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2012* (SAGE, 2012), 211, <https://books.google.com/books?id=d33MfEFXvW8C&pg=PA320&lpg=PA320&dq=MRC+congo&source=bl&ots=CvYrqxBuk&sig=83DO6LsxAlJrR36PPeFeV1ECrCc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjQoMK93oLVAhUCOSYKHVL0C9cQ6AEIQjAG#v=onepage&q=MRC%20congo&f=false>; "Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi," Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/closing-doors/narrowing-democratic-space-burundi>.

<sup>210</sup> "Political Parties," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed August 28, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/burundi/political-parties.htm>; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Burundi: Situation of Members of the Tutsi Ethnic Group, Including Members of the Union for National Progress (Union Nationale Pour Le Progrès, UPRONA); the Measures Taken by the Tutsi Government to Ensure Their Protection against Extremist Hutu Militias (April 2002-May 2005)," Responses to Information Requests (RIRs) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, May 19, 2005), <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/04/BDI100039.FE.pdf>; "Closing Doors?"; "We'll Tie You Up and Shoot You': Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi."

<sup>211</sup> Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2012*, 211; Barltrop, "The Negotiation of Security Issues in the Burundi Peace Talks," 11–12.

<sup>212</sup> "We'll Tie You Up and Shoot You': Lack of Accountability for Political Violence in Burundi"; Minority Rights Group, "Breaking the Cycle of Violence," ReliefWeb, July 1, 1996, <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/breaking-cycle-violence>.

<sup>213</sup> Nkurunziza and Anyadike, "Briefing – Who's Who in Burundi's Armed Opposition"; "Communiqué du PRM-Abarundi sur la détérioration de la situation au Burundi," *Agence Bujumbura News* (blog), December 18, 2015, <https://agencebujanews.wordpress.com/2015/12/18/communique-du-prm-abarundi-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-au-burundi/>.

<sup>214</sup> "Prm Abarundi," Facebook, accessed August 28, 2018, <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009696698732&lst=535583597%3A100009696698732%3A1535481215>.

<sup>215</sup> Bujumbura News, "Le Mouvement Armée MRP Réagit Face à La Résolution CS ONU 2279 (2016)," *Agence Bujumbura News* (blog), April 8, 2016, <https://agencebujanews.blogspot.com/2016/04/le-mouvement-armee-mrp-reagit-face-la.html>; "Les Dix Points Du Programme Politique Du PRM-ABARUNDI (Communiqué de Presse)," *Agence Bujumbura News* (blog), June 29, 2016, <https://agencebujanews.blogspot.com/2016/06/les-dix-points-du-programme-politique.html>; "Communiqué de Presse No. 2406/2016/MRP/Assassins Du SNR En Afrique de l'est," accessed August 28, 2018, <https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CmMV5LnXEAAiKQs.jpg>; "MRP-ABARUNDI: 'Non à La Division Des Mouvements Armés !' (Communiqué)," *Agence Bujumbura News* (blog), August 8, 2016, <https://agencebujanews.blogspot.com/2016/08/mrp-abarundi-non-la-division-des.html>; "Le PRM-ABARUNDI

training, but it would be quite easy to use pre-existing images.<sup>216</sup> IRIN suggested that the group trains in rural South Kivu, DRC.<sup>217</sup> This group has a more developed presence than most groups that we have excluded as paper or briefcase rebellions, but I still found no evidence that it had actually engaged in violence or made concrete plans to do so. Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

#### **\*Union des Patriotes pour la Révolution (UPR)**

AKAs: Union of Patriots for the Revolution, possibly Union des patriotes pour la révolution - Forces révolutionnaires (Union of Patriots for the Revolution-Revolutionary Forces)

UPR announced itself as an armed movement on 11 FEB 2016.<sup>218</sup> It may have been mentioned once before, in a January RFI article. However, the name is slightly different (Union des patriotes pour la révolution - Forces révolutionnaires), the leader name given does not match any known leadership announced subsequently for UPR, and it sounds like the RFI group may have been Congolese.<sup>219</sup> I also found two subsequent statements, neither of which indicated violence or planned violence.<sup>220</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or concrete plans for violence.

#### **\*Force de libération de la démocratie au Burundi (FLDB)**

AKAs: Burundi Democracy Liberation Force, BDLF

This group evidently announced itself in MAY 2016 on social media, but I could find no record of the announcement or subsequent records of the group.<sup>221</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

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s'indigne de l'extradition illégale des leaders du FPB," *Agence BUJUMBURA News* (blog), October 24, 2017, <https://mybujumburanews.wordpress.com/2017/10/24/le-prm-abarundi-sindigne-de-letradition-illegale-des-leaders-du-fpb/>; Additional statements can be found at "Groupes Armés - University of Antwerp," Great Lakes of Africa Centre -- University of Antwerp, accessed August 28, 2018, <https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/projects/centre-des-grands-lacs-afrique/droit-pouvoir-paix-burundi/conflit-2015-17/groupes-arm-s/>.

<sup>216</sup> "PRM-ABARUNDI," Twitter, accessed August 28, 2018, <https://twitter.com/mrpabarundi?lang=de>.

<sup>217</sup> Nkurunziza and Anyadike, "Briefing – Who's Who in Burundi's Armed Opposition."

<sup>218</sup> Nkurunziza and Anyadike; tomas van acker, "#Burundi la surenchère des rébellions...pic.twitter.com/MzqzjtLtYw," Tweet, @tomasvanacker (blog), February 11, 2016, <https://twitter.com/tomasvanacker/status/697877480720437248>; "Une Autre Rébellion Voit Le Jour," Net Press, February 12, 2016, <http://www.netpress.bi/spip.php?article7090>; "Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term," 19; "Le Burundi Risque La 'Somalisation' Après Le Refus d'une Force Africaine de Paix," *Horn Future* (blog), February 16, 2016, <http://hornfuture.com/francais/le-burundi-risque-la-somalisation-apres-le-refus-dune-force-africaine-de-paix/>; "Burundi: Une Nouvelle Rébellion Se Propose de 'Mettre Fin' Au Régime de Nkurunziza," AA Français, February 12, 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/burundi-une-nouvelle-rebellion-se-propose-de-mettre-fin-au-regime-de-nkurunziza/520010>.

<sup>219</sup> "RDC: le Burundais Egide Mwéméro bientôt devant la justice militaire? - RFI," RFI Afrique, accessed August 28, 2018, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160113-rdc-congo-burundais-rpa-egide-mwemero-justice-militaire>.

<sup>220</sup> Vincent Gahungu, "Communiqué de Presse No. 42/UPR/BE/CNCNT Sur La Resolution Du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU No. 2279 (2016)," April 5, 2016, <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/conflit/groupesarm/UPR050416.pdf>; Victor Ndayaharanire, "Communiqué No 003/UPR/BE/CC/CNCNT Du 18 Juin 2016," June 18, 2016, <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/conflit/groupesarm/UPR180616.pdf>; Issa NDIRURWANKO, "Le Mouvement UPR Appelle à l'union Patriotique Pour Chasser Nkurunziza," Imburi Phare, April 5, 2016, <http://radiopsaumes.com/imburi/index.php/actualites/1942-le-mouvement-upr-appelle-a-l-union-patriotique-pour-chasser-nkurunziza>.

<sup>221</sup> "Rapport final détaillé de la Commission d'enquête sur le Burundi" (Human Rights Council, September 18, 2017), paras. 100, 193, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A\\_HRC\\_36\\_CRP.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_36_CRP.pdf); Nkurunziza and Anyadike, "Briefing – Who's Who in Burundi's Armed Opposition"; "Peace Operations Estimate -- Burundi Crisis (2015-Present)" (Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), 28 2017), 12, [http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/\(170328\)%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Stability%20Operations%20Institute%20Burundi%20Situation%20Estimate.pdf](http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/(170328)%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Stability%20Operations%20Institute%20Burundi%20Situation%20Estimate.pdf).



### \*Mouvement patriotique chrétien (MPC)

AKAs: Christian Patriotic Movement

Several sources state that this group identified itself in MAY 2016, but I could find no other record of it.<sup>222</sup>

Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

### \*Malibu-Front patriotique du salut (Malibu-FPS)

AKAs: Front patriotique du salut, FPS, Mouvements allies pour la liberation du Burundi, MALIBU, Patriotic Front of Salvation, Patriotic Salvation Front, Allied Movements for the Liberation of Burundi, Malibu-Patriotic Front of Salvation, Malibu-Patriotic Salvation Front

This group announced itself via press release on 15 JAN 2017. FPS claims to have originated from a “fusion” of armed movements targeting the Bujumbura regime, although which movements is not indicated. MALIBU is the political arm, FPS the military arm.<sup>223</sup>

Unlike MRP-Abarundi, FPS did actually claim an attack. On 24 JAN 2017, the group claimed via Twitter and a press statement that its members had conducted an attack on Mukoni military camp in Muyinga province around 2AM on the night of 24 JAN 2017. During this attack, it claims to have reached the camp’s arms depot where it commandeered 27 high caliber weapons and communications equipment. It also claims to have wounded ten and killed two among the soldiers stationed at the camp.<sup>224</sup> However, accounts of the attack are disputed. The Muyinga governor asserts that an armed group attacked the camp, whereas a military spokesperson brushed off the incident as a small band of thieves attacking an army patrol near the camp.<sup>225</sup> Reporting on the incident, the non-governmental organization FIDH was unable to confirm whether Malibu-FPS exists and whether it conducted the attack.<sup>226</sup> While FPS would have motive to claim an attack it did not conduct, the FDN also had motive to lie about the nature of the attack: first, it has often downplayed armed rebellions; second, it used the attack to launch a crackdown on an alleged insurrection in the armed forces, arresting fifteen soldiers in the following days and several civilians including Burundian Red Cross workers.<sup>227</sup> Neither story is implausible in the Burundian context, and there seems to be no way to independently confirm whether Malibu-FPS actually exists and conducted the attacks.

Rhetoric used in the group’s press statements make clear that the aim of the group is takeover, employing vocabulary such as:

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<sup>222</sup> Nkurunziza and Anyadike, “Briefing – Who’s Who in Burundi’s Armed Opposition”; “Peace Operations Estimate -- Burundi Crisis (2015-Present),” 12; “Rapport final détaillé de la Commission d’enquête sur le Burundi,” paras. 100, 193.

<sup>223</sup> Georges Ndizeye Karegeye, “Communiqué No. 001/15/01/2017 Portant Sur Les Negotiations d’Arusha Du 16 Janvier 2017” (MALIBU-FPS, January 15, 2017), <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/conflit/groupearm/160117.pdf>.

<sup>224</sup> MALIBU-FPS, “Attaque très tôt ce matin du camp militaire de Mukoni (Muyinga) par le Front Nord du Front Patriotique du Salut (MALIBU). Bilan à suivre ...,” Tweet, @FpsMalibu7 (blog), January 24, 2017, <https://twitter.com/FpsMalibu7/status/823812315321614338>; Georges Ndizeye Karegeye, “Communiqué No. 002/24/01/2017 Portant Sur Les Attaques Du Camp Militaire de Mukoni à Muyinga de Ce 24 Janvier 2017” (MALIBU-FPS, January 24, 2017), <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/conflit/groupearm/160117.pdf>; “Intensification d’exécutions, de tortures et de détentions de militaires tutsi” (FIDH, February 9, 2017), <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/intensification-d-ex-cutions-de-tortures-et-de-d-tentions-de-militaires-tutsi>; “Qui Croire Dans Les Informations Sur l’attaque de Muyinga ?,” Net Press, January 25, 2017, <http://www.netpress.bi/spip.php?article7531>; “Rapport final détaillé de la Commission d’enquête sur le Burundi,” para. 193.

<sup>225</sup> “Intensification d’exécutions, de tortures et de détentions de militaires tutsi”; Egide Nikiza, “« Pas d’attaque du camp Mukoni »,” IWACU, January 24, 2017, <http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/pas-dattaque-du-camp-mukoni/>; “Qui Croire Dans Les Informations Sur l’attaque de Muyinga ?”

<sup>226</sup> “Intensification d’exécutions, de tortures et de détentions de militaires tutsi.”

<sup>227</sup> “Intensification d’exécutions, de tortures et de détentions de militaires tutsi.”

- “...nous ayons pris les armes pour chaser le pouvoir sanguinaire et répressif de Bujumbura...” [we took up arms to expel the bloodthirsty and repressive power from Bujumbura]
- “...libérer les pays de la dictature du parti CNDD-FDD...” [to liberate the country from the CNDD-FDD dictatorship]

The leadership and origins of the group remain less clear. The only named leader is Georges Ndizeye Karegeye, who signed all the group’s statements as Secretary-General of Malibu. The only other record I found of Georges Ndizeye Karegeye was from earlier in JAN 2017, when UPR (see above) released a statement slamming him for claiming to be UPR secretary-general when he was not even a member of the movement. Rather, UPR claimed that Karegeye was working for the intelligence service.<sup>228</sup> Curiously, the ten points outlined in FPS’ political program released later that month match exactly the ten points in the political program of the MRP-Abarundi (see above), although the only names given in association with MRP-Abarundi and FPS do not match.<sup>229</sup> The two movements may or may not be linked, or Karegeye may have plagiarized the political program of MRP-Abarundi (would not be surprising given his apparent history). However, even if MRP-Abarundi is linked to FPS, this would not disqualify the latter from inclusion since MRP-Abarundi is excluded. Nonetheless, I have downgraded the certainty on this group to only a 1 because (1) little else is known about the rebel group, including its mysterious origins; (2) accounts of its only attack are contested; and (3) its secretary-general was previously decried for fraud in claiming leadership of an armed rebellion. However, it is also possible that the PRD release represents a rift in PRD leadership, after which Karegeye left to form his own group. Either way, the PRD connection indicates that the group likely formed in JAN 2017 and likely was publicly named in the first month of existence.

There was no indication given as to where FPS was likely based. Muyinga is near the border with Tanzania, so FPS may have been based in rural Burundi or rural Tanzania. There is no indication of any initial resources.

There are no indications of subsequent attacks by the group. I code never occurred for large attack and missing for civ\_attack (see special notes in introduction). There is no evidence that the group was attacking state or civilian targets more than three years after its founding. It did not become viable.

SCAD recorded a protest of sufficient in the year preceding JAN 2017 (SCAD events 5160302) to qualify as contestation.

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<sup>228</sup> “L’UPR dément les déclarations et la représentativité de Georges Ndizeye Karegeye,” *Agence BUJUMBURA News* (blog), January 7, 2017, <https://bujumburanewsblog.wordpress.com/2017/01/07/lupr-dement-les-declarations-et-la-representativite-georges-ndizeye-karegeye/>.

<sup>229</sup> MRP-Abarundi program: “Burundi - Agence BUJUMBURA News,” June 29, 2016; Malibu-FPS program: Georges Ndizeye Karegeye, “Communiqué No. 003/28/01/2017 Portant Sur l’orientation Ideologique et Politique Des Mouvements Alliés Pour La Libération Du Burundi” (MALIBU-FPS, January 28, 2017), <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/conflict/groupesarm/160117.pdf>.

## Cameroon

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**Narrative Summary:** *Most prominent in Cameroon is the Ambazonia crisis stemmed from Anglophone Cameroonians' claims of being oppressed and not being represented. Thus, the bulk of rebel violence in Cameroon is concentrated within the Anglophone regions of the country. More recent rebel formations in the Ambazonian conflict are excluded as they occurred after 2015. In addition, rebel groups that spill into Cameroon from the CAR and Nigeria are excluded for this country. However, violence relevant to this dataset stems from the Bakassi conflict driven by the transfer of the Bakassi region from Nigeria to Cameroon decreed by the ICJ in 2002 and completed in 2008. Though decided in court, citizens of the Bakassi territory fear the heavy-handedness of the Cameroonian government and their treatment of Anglophone citizens. This has led to general violence and a lack of consensus as to whether they wish to secede and exist autonomously or to return back to Nigeria. However, the Bakassi conflict intertwines with the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria resulting in some cases where the delineation of whether they are a Nigerian or Cameroonian rebel group was difficult to ascertain.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *Outside research did not find gaps in ACLED. Deciding whether a group should be coded for Nigeria or Cameroon concerning the Bakassi conflict could have created a situation where there could have been additional groups.*

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### \*Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC)

This group that formed in 1995 did not begin as a rebel group but rather a political group seeking international approval to secede from Cameroon.<sup>230</sup> Starting in 1997 supporters of the organization were committing acts of violence against the Cameroonian state.<sup>231</sup> However, since these attacks were not commissioned or orchestrated by the SCNC itself, the group considered non-violent and therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>232</sup>

### \*Southern Cameroons People's Organisation (SCAPO)

Seeking secession from Cameroon and the formation of the Republic of Ambazonia. However, they are non-violent and function through political and legal channels.<sup>233</sup> Therefore, they are excluded from this dataset.

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<sup>230</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea." Refworld. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>.

<sup>231</sup> Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of. "March 1997 Incidents in the North-West Province [CMR36066.E]," January 31, 2001. Cameroon. <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1056299.html>.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Cameroon: Information on the Takeover of the Buea Radio Station in December 1999 by the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC)." Refworld. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dedfea04.html>.; Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>.

<sup>232</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dedfea04.html>, Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>.

<sup>233</sup> "UNPO: Southern Cameroons: The Banjul Communiqué." Accessed August 3, 2020.

<https://unpo.org/content/view/2534/145/>.; Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dedfea04.html>.; Opio, Azore, and Francis Tim Mbom. "Rebels Declare 'Independence' of Bakassi." *All Africa*. August 1, 2008. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080801e4810003s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

## \*Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination (BMSD)

AKA: BAMOSD

Militant group seeking independence from Cameroon and Nigeria.<sup>234</sup> Formed and declared independence in 2006.<sup>235</sup> Turned violent starting in 2008.<sup>236</sup> Supported by MEND in Nigeria and SCAPO in southern Cameroon (Ambazonia).<sup>237</sup> Though militant they seem to have only approached secession by issuing declarations and threatening violence periodically since 2006.<sup>238</sup> As well, despite the fact that they are allied with MEND, who has carried out several acts of violence, no information can be found on BMSD commissioned attacks. As at least one attack (or intent to commit an attack) cannot be established, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>239</sup>

## Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF)

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<sup>234</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Nigeria/Cameroon: The Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination (BAMOSD), Including Its President and Other High-Ranking Officials from 2002 to 2003; Its Mission and Methods of Action; Whether It Has Ties to Violent Organizations or Whether It Is Directly Involved in Violent Acts; the Main Events in Which It Participated from 2002 to 2008; Description of the Membership Card." Refworld. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd24a0b2.html>.

<sup>235</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Nigeria/Cameroon." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd24a0b2.html>, Up Station Mountain Club. "Rebels Declare 'Independence' Of Bakassi." Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.postnewsline.com/2008/07/rebels-declare.html>.

<sup>236</sup> "Rebels Declare 'Independence' Of Bakassi." <https://www.postnewsline.com/2008/07/rebels-declare.html>.

<sup>237</sup> "Rebels Declare 'Independence' Of Bakassi." <https://www.postnewsline.com/2008/07/rebels-declare.html>.

<sup>238</sup> "Rebels Declare 'Independence' Of Bakassi." <https://www.postnewsline.com/2008/07/rebels-declare.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Nigeria/Cameroon." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd24a0b2.html>; Whitehead, Eleanor. "Separation Anxiety." *All Africa*. November 29, 2013.

[http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131129e9bt001c3&cat=a&ep=ASE](http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131129e9bt001c3&cat=a&ep=ASE;); OLUWAFUNMINIYI, RAHEEM. "We Must Go On With One Nigeria [Opinion]." *All Africa*. May 21, 2012. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120522e851000if&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Opio, Azore, and Francis Tim Mbom. "Rebels Declare 'Independence' of Bakassi." *All Africa*. August 1, 2008.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080801e4810003s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>239</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Nigeria/Cameroon." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd24a0b2.html>; "Rebels Declare 'Independence' Of Bakassi." <https://www.postnewsline.com/2008/07/rebels-declare.html>.

Carried out a kidnapping in October 2008 to force the Cameroonian government to speak with them concerning their demands for independence.<sup>240</sup> They carried out further attacks against policemen and soldiers in December 2009, February 2011, July 2011, etc.<sup>241</sup> The AMC was also formed from the BFF.<sup>242</sup>

Ebi Dari and General A. G. Basuo are both listed as leaders of the NDDSC and the BFF.<sup>243</sup> All attacks that the BFF have claimed responsibility for were carried out alongside the NDDSC.<sup>244</sup> Further research uncovered that the BFF functions within the NDDSC institution as they are not recorded as carrying out any acts independent of them.<sup>245</sup> The goal of the NDDSC is a unified state made up of the Niger Delta from Nigeria along with Bakassi and Ambazonia territory. As a result, the initial attack by the BFF in October 2008 appears to be the Cameroonian portion of the NDDSC's greater plan of attacks against both Nigeria and Cameroon.<sup>246</sup> Ultimately, there is not enough separation between the NDDSC and the BFF in order to distinguish the BFF as an independent rebel group. Therefore, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> "Oil Crew Kidnapped off Cameroon," October 31, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7701628.stm>; France 24. "Seven Chinese Nationals Kidnapped near Disputed Bakassi Peninsula," March 13, 2010.

<https://www.france24.com/en/20100313-seven-chinese-nationals-kidnapped-near-disputed-bakassi-peninsula>;

France 24. "Pirates Say Hostages Will Be Held Indefinitely, but Not Killed," November 1, 2008.

<https://www.france24.com/en/20081101-pirates-say-hostages-will-be-held-indefinitely-but-not-killed-cameroon>;

Oyibos OnLine. "Hostages 'Healthy': Cameroon Rebels," November 11, 2008.

<http://www.oyibosonline.com/hostages-healthy-cameroon-rebels/>; News24. "Pirates Kill Greek Captain." Accessed

August 3, 2020. <https://www.news24.com/News24/Pirates-kill-Greek-captain-20090126>; Trend.Az. "Bakassi

Militia Free French Oil Hostages in Cameroon," November 12, 2008. <https://en.trend.az/world/other/1343075.html>.

<sup>241</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>; Jamestown. "Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea." Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://jamestown.org/program/cameroon-rebels-threaten-security-in-oil-rich-gulf-of-guinea/>.

<sup>242</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>; "Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea."

<https://jamestown.org/program/cameroon-rebels-threaten-security-in-oil-rich-gulf-of-guinea/>.

<sup>243</sup> "UPDATE 2-Bakassi Militia Says Hostage Killed in Rescue Bid." *Reuters*, November 5, 2008.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/cameroon-kidnap-idUSL555356920081105>.

<sup>244</sup> "Hostages 'Healthy.'" <http://www.oyibosonline.com/hostages-healthy-cameroon-rebels/>.

<sup>245</sup> "Hostages 'Healthy.'" <http://www.oyibosonline.com/hostages-healthy-cameroon-rebels/>; L'Express.fr. "Les otages libérés contre des prisonniers?" November 12, 2008. [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/les-otages-liberes-contre-des-prisonniers\\_700096.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/les-otages-liberes-contre-des-prisonniers_700096.html).

<sup>246</sup> "Hostages 'Healthy.'" <http://www.oyibosonline.com/hostages-healthy-cameroon-rebels/>.

<sup>247</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>; "Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea."

<https://jamestown.org/program/cameroon-rebels-threaten-security-in-oil-rich-gulf-of-guinea/>; "Seven Chinese

Nationals Kidnapped near Disputed Bakassi Peninsula." <https://www.france24.com/en/20100313-seven-chinese-nationals-kidnapped-near-disputed-bakassi-peninsula>;

"Pirates Say Hostages Will Be Held Indefinitely, but Not Killed." <https://www.france24.com/en/20081101-pirates-say-hostages-will-be-held-indefinitely-but-not-killed-cameroon>.

"Hostages 'Healthy.'" <http://www.oyibosonline.com/hostages-healthy-cameroon-rebels/>;

<https://www.ouest-france.fr/bakassi-des-bandits-ou-des-rebelles-250460>; "UPDATE 2-Bakassi Militia Says

Hostage Killed in Rescue Bid." <https://www.reuters.com/article/cameroon-kidnap/update-2-bakassi-militia-says-hostage-killed-in-rescue-bid-idUSL555356920081105?feedType=RSS&feedName=rbssEnergyNews&rpc=22>;

Bolak Funtah, Mark. "Security Crises in Cameroon Coastal Towns: Bakassi Freedom Fighters' Reactions to

International Decision Over the Bakassi Peninsula." In *Crossing the Line in Africa: Reconsidering and Unlimiting*

*the Limits of Borders within a Contemporary Value*. Edited by Canute Ambe. Ngwa. Langaa Rpcig, 2019. "Les

otages libérés contre des prisonniers?" [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/les-otages-liberes-contre-des-prisonniers\\_700096.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/les-otages-liberes-contre-des-prisonniers_700096.html);

"Pirates Kill Greek Captain." <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Pirates-kill-Greek->

## Liberators of the Southern Cameroon

They claimed responsibility for a November 2007 attack on Cameroon soldiers in Bakassi killing 21 on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2007.<sup>248</sup> This attack is the only time that this group has ever been mentioned and the date they took responsibility will be coded as their named date. In this area of Bakassi locals strongly oppose the transfer of their territory to Cameroon and consider themselves to still be Nigerian.<sup>249</sup> The attackers were also wearing Nigerian army uniforms though Nigeria claims none of their soldiers were members of this group.<sup>250</sup> Their delay in taking responsibility and allowing speculation to grow contributes to the coding of 1 for clandestine. The November 2007 attack will be coded as their first small attack with a date sometime in the week of November 12<sup>th</sup>.<sup>251</sup>

Though an official start date cannot be found, since the group formed in relation to the transfer of Bakassi territory from Nigeria to Cameroon, it is inferred that they formed during the times when conversation on transferring the territory flared up (2002/2006/before 2008). Since the start date was coded as uncertain the contestation variables were also coded as uncertain. Their goal seems to be secession or autonomy; however, since they never explicitly stated this, their goal variables are coded as 0. The population of the entire Bakassi region was placed at 150,000-300,000.

Other information on this group could not be found so many of the variables are coded as missing. Since at least 2 attacks in one year cannot be found they are coded as non-viable.<sup>252</sup>

Because the formation day, month, and year are unknown, the contestation variables variables are also unknown.

## \*Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL)

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[captain-20090126](https://en.trend.az/world/other/1343075.html); “Bakassi Militia Free French Oil Hostages in Cameroon.” <https://en.trend.az/world/other/1343075.html>; JeuneAfrique.com. “Cameroun : le sort des « apatrides » de Bakassi réveille l’instabilité de la presqu’île – Jeune Afrique,” August 24, 2012. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/174600/politique/cameroun-le-sort-des-apatrides-de-bakassi-r-veille-l-instabilite-de-la-presqu-le/>; “UPDATE 2-Bakassi Militia Says Hostage Killed in Rescue Bid.” <https://www.reuters.com/article/cameroon-kidnap/update-2-bakassi-militia-says-hostage-killed-in-rescue-bid-idUSL555356920081105?feedType=RSS&feedName=rbssEnergyNews&rpc=22>; “Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta.” *International Crisis Group*, no. 60 (April 30, 2009): 20. <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49f9aec92.pdf>; “Analysis: Cameroon Oil Violence on Rise.” Accessed August 3, 2020. [https://www.terraviva.com/reports/Analysis\\_Cameroon\\_oil\\_violence\\_on\\_rise\\_999.html](https://www.terraviva.com/reports/Analysis_Cameroon_oil_violence_on_rise_999.html); 07h30, Le 12 novembre 2008 à. “Cameroun : les otages ont bien été échangés.” *leparisien.fr*, November 12, 2008. <https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/cameroun-les-otages-ont-bien-ete-echanges-12-11-2008-307225.php>.  
<sup>248</sup> “Bakassi - Where Cameroon Is Already in Control.” *All Africa*. November 20, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071120e3bk000xk&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Uneze, Amby. “We Attacked 21 Cameroonian Soldiers, Says Group.” *All Africa*. November 18, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071118e3bi000e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>249</sup> “Bakassi - Where Cameroon Is Already in Control.” *All Africa*. November 20, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071120e3bk000xk&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>250</sup> Uneze, Amby. “We Attacked 21 Cameroonian Soldiers, Says Group.” *All Africa*. November 18, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071118e3bi000e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>251</sup> “Bakassi - Where Cameroon Is Already in Control.” *All Africa*. November 20, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071120e3bk000xk&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>252</sup> “Cameroon Profile.” *BBC News*, October 22, 2018, sec. Africa. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13148483>; Refugees, “Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea.” <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4dafc2.html>.



Organization underneath the Southern Cameroons National Council. Supporters may carry out attacks on police, but they are not orchestrated by the group itself. Given its lack of direct violence it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>253</sup>

#### **Movement for the Liberation of the Cameroonian People (MLCP)**

Rebel group in north of Cameroon. They have so far only been associated with threats of violence but no specific attacks (126CAO). Follow up research on this group, with additional information from local sources would be desirable. Due to a lack of information, they are excluded from this dataset.

#### **Cameroonian People's Liberation Army (ALPC)**

This group is tied to only one ACLED event (170CAO) pertaining to the blockage of a bridge on September 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011 that also involved an exchange of fire with police. Officials attempted to report that the event was the lone work of Bertin Kisob, who was disgruntled at the fact that he was barred from running for president against President Paul Biya.<sup>254</sup> However, at least 8 people were arrested in connection to the shootout on the bridge.<sup>255</sup> Since their actions were centered around an election rather than challenging the state itself they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>256</sup>

#### **Africa Marine Commando (AMC)**

Group of freedom fighters in the Bakassi area formed in 2010. Its first attack took place on March 12, 2010. They had carried out 5 ACLED-recorded attacks in total by the end of 2015. It is a faction of the BFF which excludes it from this dataset.<sup>257</sup>

#### **Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)**

Rebel group often assisting Bakassi rebel groups. Located in Nigeria and therefore excluded for this country.<sup>258</sup> For more information, see MEND's separate entry in the Nigerian country section.

#### **Boko Haram - Jamaatu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Dawatai wal-Jihad**

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<sup>253</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Cameroon: The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL); Organizational Structures; Leaders; Activities; Membership Cards; Treatment of Their Members by Government Authorities." Refworld. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4829b55cc.html>.

<sup>254</sup> "Political Leader Owns up to Cameroon Shootings." *APANEWS*. September 30, 2011.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENE020110930e79u000p3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>255</sup> "Political Leader Owns up to Cameroon Shootings." *APANEWS*. September 30, 2011.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENE020110930e79u000p3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>256</sup> News24. "Man Claims Cameroon Shootings." Accessed August 3, 2020.

<https://www.news24.com/News24/Man-claims-Cameroon-shootings-20110930>.

<sup>257</sup> "Seven Chinese Nationals Kidnapped near Disputed Bakassi Peninsula."

<https://www.france24.com/en/20100313-seven-chinese-nationals-kidnapped-near-disputed-bakassi-peninsula>;

"GTD Search Results." Accessed August 3, 2020.

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=6&search=cameroon&count=100&expanded=no&chartype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table>; "Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea." <https://jamestown.org/program/cameroon-rebels-threaten-security-in-oil-rich-gulf-of-guinea/>; Refugees, "Refworld | Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4d4fc2.html>.

<sup>258</sup> "Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)." Accessed August 3, 2020.

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mend.htm>.



Nigerian rebel faction that has been the source of a lot of violence in Cameroon. Excluded for this country. For more information see Boko Haram's separate entry in the Nigerian country section.

#### **Boko Haram - Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah**

Nigerian rebel faction that has been the source of frequent violence in Cameroon. Excluded for this country. For more information, see Boko Haram's separate entry in the Nigerian country section.

#### **Democratic Front for the People of the Central African Republic (FDPC)**

CAR rebels whose violence has spilled into Cameroon at times. Excluded for this country. For more information, see FDPC's separate entry in the CAR country section.

#### **Anti-Balaka**

CAR rebel group whose violence spills into Cameroon. Excluded for this country. For more information, see Anti-Balaka's separate entry in the CAR country section.

#### **Séléka**

CAR rebel group whose violence often spills into Cameroon. Excluded for this country. For more information see Séléka's separate entry in the CAR country section.

#### **NDDSC: NIGER DELTA DEFENCE AND SECURITY COUNCIL**

This group is led by Ebi Dari and A.G. Dasuo. The majority of attacks by NDDSC are in response to the August 14, 2008 land transfer of the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon. NDDSC, and many others in the Bakassi Peninsula, reject the transfer and fear that Cameroon has and will continue to unjustly rule the people of the Bakassi Peninsula.<sup>259</sup> The group's first attack came on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2008 when they "targeted a political delegation and mutilated a deputy sub regional commander."<sup>260</sup> Although little is known about this group, one source cites that it has been in existence since at least 2002 and has claimed to have over 1,000 fighters.<sup>261</sup> In late July, NDDSC formed an alliance with the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), in order to strengthen opposition to the impending August 14<sup>th</sup> land transfer.<sup>262</sup>

It should be noted that many variables are coded as missing/unknown for NDDSC, most notably the variables surrounding group formation. Since the date of formation is unknown, many other variables such as the contestation variables and viability variables are also coded as unknown. However, it should also be noted that there were significant contestation events in Cameroon during the mid-2000s (some revolving around elections or lack of essential resources).

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<sup>259</sup> "Diplomatic Security Daily," Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Secretary of State, November 3, 2008), [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE116943\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE116943_a.html).

<sup>260</sup> "Diplomatic Security Daily."

<sup>261</sup> "Diplomatic Security Daily."

<sup>262</sup> "Diplomatic Security Daily."

Although there are no direct sources that point to NDDSC using oil to fund their operations, the Bakassi Peninsula is oil-rich and therefore it is in the realm of possibility that NDDSC was trying to seize oil during some of its operations.<sup>263</sup>

Last, although little is known about this group, multiple government, news, and academic sources note the existence of this group and some of its attacks, and therefore we were fairly certain it was a rebel group and included it.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> McGregor, “Cameroon Rebels Threaten Security in Oil-Rich Gulf of Guinea.” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 43. The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/cameroon-rebels-threaten-security-in-oil-rich-gulf-of-guinea/>

<sup>264</sup> In addition to the above footnotes, see for example, Ani Akpan “Nigeria to leave oil-rich Bakassi, security tight” August 13, 2008. Reuters.com, and “Bakassi’s displaced in flux, peninsula vulnerable” *The New Humanitarian* (formerly IRIN News), October 14, 2008.

## Central African Republic (CAR)

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**Note:** I refer to the national military of the Central African Republic, called *les Forces Armées Centrafricaines*, as *FACA* throughout.

**Narrative Summary:** The Central African Republic has remained highly politically volatile throughout its history. It has experienced only one peaceful transition of power since its independence from France in 1960. When our period of analysis opens in 1997, Ange-Félix Patassé was president. Although there was unrest under his regime, most of it was military mutinies. In 2001, former president Kolingba attempted a coup. While investigating this coup attempt, Patassé tried to arrest his army chief-of-staff François Bozizé, a move that backfired spectacularly. FACA remaining loyal to Bozizé staged an insurrection in the capital but were repulsed and fled Bangui. From Chad and northwestern CAR, they mounted attacks again and took Bangui in 2003, proclaiming Bozizé the president. Insecurity and dissatisfaction with Bozizé led to the Central African Bush War. The first stage of the Bush War lasted from about 2004 to 2008, at which point many armed groups signed agreements with the government and demobilized. In the second stage, armed groups re-emerged and eventually formed the Séléka coalition in 2012, which seized Bangui in 2013. Séléka was predominantly Muslim, whereas most of CAR is Christian/animist. As a result of Séléka abuses, the Christian rebel group anti-Balaka emerged. Both Séléka and anti-Balaka conducted widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity. An environment of insecurity has persisted ever since.

Important characteristics of CAR include that state authority, when it exists, has often not reached far beyond the capital. The northeast and northwest especially remained breeding grounds for rebel groups. Many of these rebel groups originated as self-defense groups formed in response to generalized insecurity. In addition, the proliferation of rebel groups has included splinter groups and merged groups/coalitions, many of which do not meet our criteria for inclusion. Notable groups that have been excluded on these grounds include Séléka, CPJP-F, CPSK, and UPC. Other groups have been excluded because we have been unable to document violence or planned violence; these groups are often referred to as “briefcase rebellions.”

Among groups that were included, the generalized climate of violence meant that it was often difficult to tie attacks to a specific group. Some groups’ names are very similar, causing events to sometimes be misattributed. Furthermore, many incidents of violence may go unreported and casualty counts tend to underestimate violence. As a result, small attacks, large attacks, and initial civilian attacks for any one group were often difficult to pinpoint.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** medium

**Explanation:** With state security forces so weak, there seems to be little incentive to hide rebel groups. However, several factors may contribute to groups remaining unidentified: (1) During the early stages of the Bush War, Bozizé denied existence of a rebellion and attributed the violence to “bandits.” Although rebel groups did not purposefully hide their activities, they were not accurately reported. (2) The “noise” created by high levels of generalized violence would make it possible for a group to conduct attacks without creating an identifiable pattern of violence, especially in the northeast and northwest. (3) Owing to the especially poor infrastructure within CAR, reliable reporting on events for about the first ten years of our period of analysis either do not exist or are not accessible electronically.

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### Foreign Rebel Forces in CAR

**Movement for Liberation of Congo (MLC)** – MLC and its armed wing, Armée de Libération du Congo (ALC) operated in the Central African Republic during 2002-2003. Their forces were invited into the country by then-president Patassé to aid in putting down a coup/rebellion. Although their presence in CAR was

generally marked by terror and abuse, they do not constitute a rebel group.<sup>265</sup> ACLED records several other incidents involving MLC in CAR, mostly opportunistic crime such as looting and incidence of rape along the border, but no systematic attempts to challenge the state. In 2009, ACLED recorded rebel forces patrolling the border to prevent MLC fighters from entering the country to assist Patassé, but no engagements with MLC were recorded in CAR territory. However, this rebel group is recorded under the DRC.

**Popular Front for Recovery (FPR)** – ACLED lists a group called Patriotic Forces of Resistance, but I think ACLED has a nomenclature issue here. Searching in both English and French, I could only find references to groups by this name in Mali and in DRC, but many of the events involving FPR in CAR took place in the middle of the country, far from borders. Moreover, these groups did not seem to be active in CAR. One of the ACLED events references Abdel Kader Baba-Laddé; he leads a Chadian group called Front Populaire pour le Redressement (Popular Front for Recovery), also abbreviated FPR. This group was actually active in CAR during a period that matches ACLED's events. It began operations in 2008, and seems to have operated predominantly in CAR, but both CAR and Chadian forces fought it together. It seems that its demands were aimed at the Chadian government.<sup>266</sup> Although they fought in CAR for several years, the fighters were eventually repatriated to Chad and Abdel Kader Baba-Laddé received a position in the Chadian government.<sup>267</sup> This rebel group is recorded under Chad.

### *State Forces in CAR*

**Military Forces of CAR (2003-2013) Bozizé Faction** – I'm not sure why this would be differentiated, as Bozizé was president during this era and theoretically had control of all military forces.

**Ex-Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (Ex-FACA)** – Michel Djotodia, who took over as president after the ouster of Bozizé in 2013, disbanded the FACA in March 2013. However, remnants of the military continued to engage after this time.<sup>268</sup> FACA was officially reformed in February 2014.<sup>269</sup> Ex-FACA in general were not an organized group, but many ex-FACA participated in groups such as anti-Balaka.

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<sup>265</sup> John Aglionby, "ICC Finds Jean-Pierre Bemba Guilty in Central African Republic Rampage," Financial Times, March 21, 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/068a1b74-ef95-11e5-a609-e9f2438ee05b>; "ICC Finds Congolese Politician Guilty of Central African War Crimes," The East African, March 21, 2016, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ICC-convicts-Congolese-politician-of-Central-African-war-crimes/2558-3127288-r0dt2d/index.html>; The Hague Justice Portal, "Situation in the Central African Republic » The Hague Justice Portal," The Hague Justice Portal, accessed March 1, 2017, <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6176>; "Mouvement de Liberation Congolais (MLC)," GlobalSecurity.org, March 7, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mlc.htm>.

<sup>266</sup> "Boost for Peace as Rebel Group Disbands," IRIN, October 9, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2012/10/09/boost-peace-rebel-group-disbands>; IRIN, "Military Offensive in Central African Republic Adds to Humanitarian Crisis," *The Guardian*, March 7, 2012, sec. Global development, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/mar/07/central-african-republic-humanitarian-crisis>.

<sup>267</sup> "Les Combattants de l'ex-Rébellion Tchadienne Rapatriés Par La République Centrafricaine - RFI," RFI Afrique, October 9, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121009-combattants-ex-rebellion-tchadienne-rapatries-leur-pays-republique-centrafricaine-ladde-fpr>; "Tchad: Ndjamena Accuse Baba Laddé de Vouloir Reprendre La Lutte Armée - RFI," RFI Afrique, November 1, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131031-tchad-ndjamena-accuse-baba-ladde-vouloir-reprendre-lutte-armee>.

<sup>268</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR," IRIN, September 17, 2014, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/100623/armed-groups-car>.

<sup>269</sup> "Who Are the Anti-Balaka of CAR?," IRIN, February 12, 2014, <http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2014/02/12/who-are-anti-balaka-car>.

**Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR)** – Cameroonian state force.<sup>270</sup>

### *Central African Groups (pre-2003)*

**Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC)** – This is a political party that first contested elections in 1993.<sup>271</sup> Is not directly associated with violent activities.<sup>272</sup> Most ACLED events it was tagged in were spontaneous and/or election violence (69CEN, 70CEN, 85CEN). MLPC was also tagged in an attack on the defense minister on 12 APR 1997, but I'm not sure why – we found only three articles on the event (including what appears to be the BBC Monitoring piece that ACLED cites), but none of them mention MLPC.<sup>273</sup>

### **Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC)**

AKAs: Central African Democratic Rally (CADR)

Political party founded in 1987.<sup>274</sup> Kolingba's party. The party did not back the 2001 coup attempt even though Kolingba did. It is not considered especially militant.<sup>275</sup> Most ACLED events in which it was tagged are spontaneous and/or election violence (69CEN, 70CEN, 85CEN, 86CEN). ACLED tagged RDC in events in Kembe and Dimbi on 23 NOV 1999, wherein armed men took over two towns in eastern CAR. Evidently the two towns were strongholds of former President Andre Kolingba, who was a runner up in the September presidential election. The article does not mention the RDC specifically, so I was not sure why it had been tagged.<sup>276</sup> Another article indicates that RDC members were actually victims; seven members of RDC were killed including a vice-president of the youth movement. It's unclear what triggered the violence.<sup>277</sup> However, there was no indication that RDC instigated the violence. Excluded – no evidence of violence/planned violence.

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<sup>270</sup> "Rapid Intervention Military Unit Strays from Its Mission," IRIN, August 29, 2008,

<http://www.irinnews.org/report/80065/cameroon-rapid-intervention-military-unit-strays-its-mission>.

<sup>271</sup> "Central African Republic - Authoritarian Rule under Kolingba," Encyclopædia Britannica, April 19, 2016, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic/Authoritarian-rule-under-Kolingba>; Freedom House, "Central African Republic | Country Report | Freedom in the World | 2012," Freedom House, 2012, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/central-african-republic>.

<sup>272</sup> Andreas Mehler, "Rebels and Parties: The Impact of Armed Insurgency on Representation in the Central African Republic," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 122.

<sup>273</sup> "Defence Minister Escapes Armed Attack.," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, April 15, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010929dt4f004pl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Central African Republic Minister Target of Kidnap Bid," *Agence France-Presse*, April 13, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011005dt4d00dck&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Hyacinthe Djaye, "Shots Fired at Central African Republic Minister.," *Reuters News*, April 13, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011002dt4d07grr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>274</sup> "Elections in the Central African Republic," African Elections Database, March 20, 2011, <http://africanelections.tripod.com/cf.html>; Landry Roselin Asseni Ngboh Anguin'mbi, "Et Si Le Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC), Parti Du Feu Président, Le Général d'Armée André Kolingba Repasse à l'affaire En 2014 Avec Emile Gros Raymond NAKOMBO?," Sangô Ti Béafrica, August 7, 2013, <http://sango-tibeafrica.over-blog.com/et-si-le-rassemblement-d%C3%A9mocratique-centrafricain-rdc-parti-du-feu-pr%C3%A9sident-le-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-d-arm%C3%A9e-andr%C3%A9-kolingba-repasse-%C3%A0-l-affaire-en>.

<sup>275</sup> Mehler, "Rebels and Parties," 123.

<sup>276</sup> JOSEPH BENAMMSE, "Central African Republic: Armed Men Have Seized Towns," *Associated Press Newswires*, November 23, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010825dvbn0280e&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>277</sup> IRIN, "IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-up 47 Covering the Period 20-26 November 1999," Text, ReliefWeb, November 26, 1999, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/irin-cea-weekly-round-47-covering-period-20-26-november-1999>.

## Patriots Militia

AKAs: many, never officially named

This organization was never formally christened and thus has many names. The organizing principle is that the forces were loyal to former army chief-of-staff François Bozizé. Bozizé was sacked on 26 OCT 2001 owing to his alleged participation in the 2001 Kolingba coup attempt.<sup>278</sup> On 2 NOV, the government attempted to arrest Bozizé, triggering five days of fighting between FACA loyal to Bozizé and FACA loyal to Patassé in Bangui.<sup>279</sup> Accounts from this fighting suggest that Bozizé loyalists attempted to capture the Patassé residence.<sup>280</sup> However, we considered Bozizé loyalists to be state actors attempting a coup at this stage; thus, the group is not included until Bozizé loyalists abandoned their FACA posts in Bangui.

Bozizé and his loyalists fled on 7 NOV.<sup>281</sup> Despite claims that they were fighting for self-defense and equivocation from Bozizé, reports on fighting from NOV indicate use of offensive tactics, such as ambushes, and attempts to capture towns.<sup>282</sup> Thus, we find it appropriate to characterize it as a rebellion at

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<sup>278</sup> Richard Bradshaw and Juan Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), lx,  
[https://books.google.com/books?id=aSxIDAAQBAJ&pg=PR73&lpg=PR73&dq=Justin+Hasan+FDC&source=bl&ots=eojk\\_cNZZR&sig=j7-MQ\\_r2mQ\\_R0hy6FQ2MQHlgOEY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwji3J\\_RrprTAhXGTCYKHZIOBp0Q6AEIKTA D#v=onepage&q=Justin%20Hasan%20FDC&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=aSxIDAAQBAJ&pg=PR73&lpg=PR73&dq=Justin+Hasan+FDC&source=bl&ots=eojk_cNZZR&sig=j7-MQ_r2mQ_R0hy6FQ2MQHlgOEY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwji3J_RrprTAhXGTCYKHZIOBp0Q6AEIKTA D#v=onepage&q=Justin%20Hasan%20FDC&f=false); “Curfew Lifted Nearly One Year After Failed Coup,” *Africa News Service*, May 10, 2002,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020020510dy5a00fxd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Central African Republic: Patasse And Deby of Chad Meet, Announce Accord,” *IRIN*, April 11, 2002,  
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200204110689.html>; “Regional Efforts Underway to Calm Tensions,” *All Africa*, November 28, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021113dxb004tv&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Central African Republic: President Warns Would-Be ‘Putschists And Terrorists,’” *IRIN*, November 16, 2001,  
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200111160262.html>.

<sup>279</sup> “Artillery Fire Resumes in Tense Central African Capital [Corrected 11/ 07/01],” *Agence France-Presse*, November 7, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011107dxb7007vo&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Sudan: State of Emergency After Southern Darfur Tribal Clashes,” *IRIN*, May 22, 2002,  
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200205220489.html>; “Central African Republic: Patasse And Deby of Chad Meet, Announce Accord”; “Regional Efforts Underway to Calm Tensions.”; “Bangui Tense as Shooting Heard on Fifth Day of Army Revolt [Corrected 11/06/01],” *Agence France-Presse*, November 6, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011106dxb6006si&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>280</sup> “Central African Republic: Fighting Erupts in Capital,” *IRIN*, November 5, 2001,  
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200111050410.html>; “Militants Attack Presidential Residence in Central African Republic,” *Xinhua News Agency*, November 4, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=xnews00020011105dxb40000f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “President’s Villa Attacked,” *The Guardian*, November 6, 2001.

<sup>281</sup> “AFP World News Summary for Wednesday, November 7 (since 0900 GMT),” *Agence France-Presse*, November 7, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011107dxb700anj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>282</sup> “Former Army Chief Says State Using Chadian Rebels against His Men,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, November 26, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020011126dxbq004bl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Former Army Chief Central African Republic,” *Associated Press Newswires*, November 25, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020011125dxbp00pyb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; JOSEPH BENAMSSE, “Rebel Soldiers Ambush Government Troops in Central African Republic,” *Associated Press Newswires*, December 3, 2001,  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020011203dxc300se9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Central



this stage. As such, I have listed the founding date as the day after they fled Bangui (8 NOV 2002) with certainty lowered to 2 for month. Owing to the fighting in Bangui, the group was never clandestine. I have thus coded the name date as the same as the formed date. Because the original core group was FACA loyal to Bozizé, I have coded military for organizational history and also coded current security for initial leadership.

The earliest specific information on engagement between Bozizé forces and FACA/government forces that I could find following 7 NOV was from 22 NOV. At this time, heavy fighting occurred in Kaga-Banduro. Rebels has also captured the towns of Kabo and Batangafo on 19 NOV, but apparently without a fight.<sup>283</sup> As such, I coded 22 NOV 2002 as the first small attack. Often, reliable or consistent casualty counts were unavailable. However, no accounts of these clashes place the deaths over twenty-five.

On 10 NOV, Bozizé and some of his fighters crossed into Chad, where they were disarmed and granted asylum, sheltering in Sahr.<sup>284</sup> (Sahr's population was reported at just over 100k in 2012, so it likely fell below 100k in 2001.) Bozizé maintained that some of his fighters remained behind in northern CAR.<sup>285</sup> Other reports indicate that some of these forces may have returned to CAR later in November to conduct attacks, while additional Bozizé loyalists also crossed into Chad in late November.<sup>286</sup> It is thus difficult to determine exactly where initial "planning" occurred, but it likely occurred on both the CAR side and Chad side of the border. Both locations result in "rural" coding as 1, and 1 for "planning\_inside."

Following fighting in late NOV and early DEC, the main exchanges along the border seemed to be between CAR government forces and Chadian government forces. Bozizé's forces engaged again in early AUG 2002,

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African Rebels Retreat to Chad.," *Reuters News*, November 28, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011128dxbs03ni4&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Soldier Dead, 12 Injured in Central African Republic Clashes," *Agence France-Presse*, November 27, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011127dxbr00ctm&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Central African Republic Judicial Commission Drops Case against Rebel Army Commander," *Associated Press Newswires*, December 25, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020011225dxc00o2q&cat=a&ep=ASE>; JOSEPH BENAMSSE, "Central African Republic President Rejects Negotiations with Rebel Leader," *Associated Press Newswires*, December 8, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020011208dxc800odt&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Central African Republic Summit Planned for Monday in Gabon," *Agence France-Presse*, November 29, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011129dxbt00b45&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC-UNREST Former Central African Army Chief Flees to Chad, Surrenders," *EFE News Service*, November 10, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=wefe000020020619dxba00jbc&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Chad, Central African Republic Bolster Defenses.," *Reuters News*, December 21, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011221dxcl00z6z&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>283</sup> "Former Army Chief Central African Republic."

<sup>284</sup> "Regional Efforts Underway to Calm Tensions.," Ali Abba Kaya, "Bozize Denies Plotting Coup against Central African President [Corrected 11/13/01]," *Agence France-Presse*, November 13, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011113dxbd008yp&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Central African Rebels Retreat to Chad.," "Government Forces Reportedly Drive Back, Disarm Rebels.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, November 29, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020011129dxbt00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Chad Disarms Troops Loyal to Renegade Central African General," *Agence France-Presse*, December 14, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011214dxce00709&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>285</sup> "Former Army Chief Bozize Urges Patasse to Resign.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 13, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020020813dy8d0073l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; BENAMSSE, "Central African Republic President Rejects Negotiations with Rebel Leader."

<sup>286</sup> "Central African Republic Summit Planned for Monday in Gabon."



but again, death tolls remained below twenty-five when reported.<sup>287</sup> Where death tolls were report in subsequent events, they also remained below twenty-five. This includes rebel attacks on the capital in OCT 2002, where only one estimate put death tolls over twenty-five. Most tallies from this fight reflect incidental civilian casualties, as fighting occurred in heavily populated areas; they should not be interpreted as rebel-imposed combat deaths.<sup>288</sup>

On 17 MAR 2003, the militia took the capital, Bangui, in a coup. Early reports indicate thirteen dead, with subsequent reports indicating at least fifty dead. However, many of these deaths seem to be related to the looting that followed the coup, and should not be characterized as rebel-inflicted combat deaths for our purposes.<sup>289</sup> As such, large attack is coded as never occurs.

Abuse of civilians was widespread, but I found only one instance in which the militia specifically targeted and killed civilians: the summary execution of a cleric, a radio station personnel, and the radio station's two watchmen in Bossangoa on 13 DEC 2002.<sup>290</sup>

Patassé and his government often blamed Chad for materially backing the regime. Chad denied supporting Bozizé. Tensions between CAR and Chad remained high throughout this time. While CAR accused Chad of aiding Bozizé, Chad accused CAR of harboring and commissioning Chadian rebels in CAR state forces, especially Abdoulaye Miskine.<sup>291</sup> Evidence in this regard:

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<sup>287</sup> "Central Africa: Regional Commission to Investigate Border Problems," *IRIN*, August 16, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208160561.html>; "Bangui Accuses Chad Army of Entering Its Territory [Corrected 08/27/ 02]," *Agence France-Presse*, August 27, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020020827dy8r00at1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "CAR, Chad, Sudan Summit Postponed Due to Border Attack.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 7, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020020807dy87004mp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>288</sup> Jean-Lambert Ngouandji, "Planes Bomb Rebels in Central African Capital.," *Reuters News*, October 27, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021027dyar00ct9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "DR Congo Rebel Leader Bemba 'without Any Doubt' Involved in Latest CAR Fighting.," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 28, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020021028dyas0038p&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Preliminary Civilian Toll - 22 Dead, 98 Wounded, Says CAR Government.," *All Africa*, November 2, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021102dyb2003e9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Govt Troops Recapture Rebel Areas of Central African Capital [Corrected 10/30/02]," *Agence France-Presse*, October 30, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020021030dyau00a19&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>289</sup> "US Condemns Coup in Central African Republic, May Suspend Aid," *Agence France-Presse*, March 18, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020030318dz3i00ccw&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "New Leader Consolidates Power, France Sends Troops.," *All Africa*, March 18, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020030319dz3i002hf&cat=a&ep=ASE>; JOSEPH BENAMSSE, "Looters Raid U.N. Food Warehouse after Fighting in Central African Republic Capital," *Associated Press Newswires*, March 19, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020030319dz3j00xhs&cat=a&ep=ASE>; JOSEPH BENAMSSE, "Central African Rebel Leader Disarms," *AP Online*, March 21, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=asp0000020030321dz3i006hd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>290</sup> "Rebels Carry out Summary Executions in Central Africa: Church," *Agence France-Presse*, December 13, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020021213dyed009ao&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "CAR - Rebels Kill Priest in North - Thousands ...," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 13, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020021213dyed001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Program Summary of Radio France Internationale News 1230 Gmt 17 Dec 02.," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 17, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020021217dych009kh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>291</sup> "Chad Denies Providing Military Assistance to Rebel CAR Leader.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 20, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020011220dxck0066a&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Central African Republic: Premier Says Chadian Troops in 17-Km Cross-Border Incursion," *IRIN*, August 28, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208280074.html>; "Central African Republic: Regional Joint Commission to Investigate Tense Border Area," *IRIN*, August 22, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208220495.html>.

- The Chadian ambassador was summoned to the foreign ministry in DEC 2001 after evidently being heard saying that “the Chadian army would fight on Bozizé’s side.”<sup>292</sup>
- Chad clearly treated Bozizé as a VIP, lodging him in a government guest house in Sahr and granting him direct meetings with Chadian Prime Minister Magoum Yamassoum.<sup>293</sup>
- Chad shrugged off responsibility for attacks that occurred when Bozizé forces crossed back into CAR and attacked state forces, seeming to have turned a blind eye.<sup>294</sup>
- After Bozizé was exiled to France, he somehow managed to slip back into Chad using a false passport to direct the OCT 2002 attacks on Bangui – showing either immense incompetence on the part of Chadian customs officials or a deliberate support by the Chadian regime.<sup>295</sup>
- During the OCT 2002 assault on the capital, rebels were well-armed used what appeared to be ten Chadian military trucks.<sup>296</sup>
- Patassé’s spokesman was held in captivity by the militia during and following the OCT 2002 assault on Bangui. He reported that the rebels were well-armed, possessing ample light and heavy weaponry including rocket launchers. The Chadians in the militia were not in fatigues, and he thus believed them not to be military personnel.<sup>297</sup>
- Later specific evidence indicates that Deby placed personnel from his elite presidential guard at Bozizé’s disposal for this MAR 2003 offensive on Bangui; Bozizé also received other material support from Joseph Kabila (DRC) and Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo-Brazzaville).<sup>298</sup>

While it is difficult or impossible to know for sure, existing evidence makes it seem highly plausible that Bozizé’s forces received material support from Chad during their first year of existence.

The goal of the militia is coded as takeover. Although Bozizé equivocated on his and the militia’s goals during interviews, the following can be taken as evidence:

- During the initial fighting in Bangui (NOV 2001), Bozizé loyalists attacked or tried to attack the Patassé residence.<sup>299</sup>
- In OCT 2002, the militia again attacked the capital. Bozizé said the goal was to “impose dialogue” with Patassé or, failing that, “we shall quite simply ask for his departure with a

<sup>292</sup> “Central African Army Reinforces Border with Chad,” *Agence France-Presse*, December 21, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011221dxc1009vl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Chadian Army in North of Central Africa: Bangui [Corrected 12/21/01],” *Agence France-Presse*, December 21, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011221dxc100aht&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>293</sup> Kaya, “Bozize Denies Plotting Coup against Central African President [Corrected 11/13/01].”

<sup>294</sup> “Chadian Government Spokesman Urges Negotiated Solution to CAR Conflict,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 14, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020020814dy8e002bd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>295</sup> “Central African Capital Tense on Fifth Day of Clashes [Corrected 10/ 29/02],” *Agence France-Presse*, October 29, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020021029dyat00cnx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>296</sup> “Ex-Army Chief Bozize Reportedly Leaves Ndjamen for Paris,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 29, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020021029dyat0066a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>297</sup> “Presidential Spokesman Ndouba Says Rebels Well Armed, Chadians among Them,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 4, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020021204dyc40053d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>298</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State” (International Crisis Group, December 13, 2007), <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/central-african-republic-anatomy-of-a-phantom-state.pdf>.

<sup>299</sup> “Central African Republic: Fighting Erupts in Capital”; “Mililitants Attack Presidential Residence in Central African Republic.”; “President’s Villa Attacked.”

view to carrying out a transition...<sup>300</sup> During this fighting, the militia attempted to capture the presidential residence and the national radio station.<sup>301</sup>

For viability variables, I have coded 1 for viable, 88 for viable\_civ, and 0 for hide, as the group successfully took over the country. I coded 0 for merge, as the group never merged.

### *Central African Groups (2003-2008)*

**Kwa Na Kwa Party** – originated as a coalition of political parties supporting Bozizé's run for president in 2004, despite his promise not to run when he took over in 2003. In 2009, some parties of the coalition merged to form a single party.<sup>302</sup> Unclear whether they commit violence or if they operate merely as a political party – it would appear just a party.

### **Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie (APRD)**

AKAs: Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy, People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy, Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy

Human Rights Watch had the earliest formation date for APRD in April 2005.<sup>303</sup> Other sources make it clear that the APRD existed and was operating by June 2005: Amnesty reported attacks in Ouham and Ouham-Pende by a group loyal to Patassé; a retrospective piece by IRIN notes that the group that would become known as APRD started raiding the towns of Paoua, Markounda, and Boguila.<sup>304</sup> ACLED reported attacks by an unidentified armed group matching these descriptions. Since the group began attacks in June, I think it was plausible that it actually formed a bit earlier, i.e. in April, and have coded this as the formed date; however, I have adjusted the certainty downward to reflect conflicting reports.

ACLED also notes that the first time the group was identified in media was on 25 OCT 2005, although there was no evidence either way regarding whether it acted covertly. I thus coded clandestine as missing. I found no evidence of a large attack in either ACLED or other sources. HRW concluded after extensive fieldwork that the first incidence of APRD killing civilians occurred in JUNE 2006.<sup>305</sup>

The leadership of APRD consists largely of former military/security forces members from the Patassé regime, but local self-defense units have also been incorporated in membership.<sup>306</sup> As such, I coded military and self-defense for organizational history. Named leaders include former gendarme and Presidential Guard

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<sup>300</sup> "Central African Republic General in France Claims Rebellion Leadership.," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 27, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020021027dyar001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Exiled Central African Republic Army Chief Arrives in Chad," *Agence France-Presse*, October 27, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020021027dyar00dfe&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>301</sup> "DRCongo Rebel Leader Bemba 'without Any Doubt' Involved in Latest CAR Fighting.," JOSEPH BENAMSSE, "Rebel Forces Two Blocks from Presidential Residence; Some Guards Abandon Posts," *Associated Press Newswires*, October 29, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020021029dyat00wr1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>302</sup> Alex Leader, "Central African Republic's New President," *Stop Genocide Now* (blog), April 18, 2016, <https://stopgenocidenow.org/tag/kwa-na-kwa/>.

<sup>303</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians" (Human Rights Watch, September 2007), 38, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/car0907/car0907webwcover.pdf>.

<sup>304</sup> "RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE : Les Civils En Danger Dans Le Nord Incontrôlé" (Amnesty International, September 19, 2007), 3,

<https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjLnuv2qJrTAhXGRiYKHcjdBgYQFghUMAg&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amnesty.org%2Fdownload%2Fdocuments%2F60000%2Fafpr190032007fr.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHTpn-7QsOXU8EKov2k9wQM1veilA&bvm=bv.152180690,d.eWE>; "Central African Republic: Tens of Thousands of Villagers On the Run," *IRIN*, December 19, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200612190487.html>.

<sup>305</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 69.

<sup>306</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 41.

Commander Lieutenant Bedeya Ndjadder and former FACA Lieutenant Jean-Jacques Larmassoum, and former defense minister Jean-Jacques Démafouth.<sup>307</sup> I have thus coded former security for initial leadership. The group's connection to Patassé is debated, and it appears may have some indirect connections with Patassé through his associates or his party, the MLPC.<sup>308</sup> The Bozizé regime also accused Sudan of supporting the group (which Sudan denied).<sup>309</sup> However, HRW concluded that outside funding was unlikely owing to the decrepit state of APRD's forces.<sup>310</sup> I thus coded none for initial resources.

The APRD came into existence because of Patassé's exclusion from the election, but its main aim is to achieve security in the northwest, at risk of abuse by Bozizé's forces because Patassé is from there.<sup>311</sup> Others report that the group seems more focused on protecting its ethnic group than on exacting political demands.<sup>312</sup> FIDH reported in March 2006 (within a year of founding) that their "official objective" is ousting Bozizé and taking over.<sup>313</sup> This is taken at face, given that more direct evidence of aims does not appear electronically available. The main zones of operation are the Paoua-Boguila-Markounda area of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé provinces, and the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago-Kaga Bandoro area of Ouham and Nana-Grébizi provinces.<sup>314</sup> I have thus coded "rural Ouham" as 1 for "rural" and 1 for "planning inside".

This group is coded as 1 for viable, meeting the criteria because of ACLED events 589CEN, 592CEN, and 607CEN. However, it is worth noting that APRD barely qualified: these three attacks from 2008 were the last attacks that would make the group qualify; it appears to have shifted toward attacking civilians and then ceased operations shortly thereafter. It is coded 88 for viable\_civ and 0 for hide, splinter, and merge. SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and two instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to April 2005. However, none of these events occurred in Ouham, the prefecture in which group formation occurred. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Mouvement Patriotique pour la Restauration de la République Centrafricaine (MPRC)

AKAs: Patriotic Movement for the Restoration of the Central African Republic, Mouvement Populaire pour la Renaissance du Peuple Centrafricain (MPRPC), Patriotic Movement for the Rebirth of the CAR People, Patriotic Movement for the Rebirth of the Central African People, RPRC

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<sup>307</sup> "Central African Republic: Tens of Thousands of Villagers On the Run"; "Central African Republic: Civilians Flee Clashes in the North," *IRIN*, October 15, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200610150051.html>; "Centrafrique: Le Chef Rebelle Jean Jacques Larmassoum Condamné à La Peine de Perpétuité Par La Cour Criminelle," *Gabonews*, August 21, 2006, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200608210623.html>; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State"; Mehler, "Rebels and Parties," 127.

<sup>308</sup> "Central African Republic: Blame Game As Villages Burn," *IRIN*, December 19, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200612190362.html>; "Centrafrique: Le Chef Rebelle Jean Jacques Larmassoum Condamné à La Peine de Perpétuité Par La Cour Criminelle"; N. A., "Centrafrique: Patassé Au Banc Des Accusés," *Cameroon Tribune*, March 14, 2006, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200603140589.html>; Ndzinga Amougou, "Centrafrique: Menace à La Paix," *Cameroon Tribune*, March 14, 2006, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200603140573.html>; "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians"; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State."

<sup>309</sup> "Central African Republic: Blame Game As Villages Burn."

<sup>310</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 4.

<sup>311</sup> "Central African Republic: Blame Game As Villages Burn"; "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 38; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State."

<sup>312</sup> "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 24.

<sup>313</sup> "The Civilian Population in Northern Central African Republic Is in Great Danger," FIDH, March 1, 2006, <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/The-Civilian-Population-in>.

<sup>314</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians"; "Central African Republic: Aid Agencies Told to Suspend Activities in Paoua Town," *IRIN*, November 20, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200611200642.html>; "RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE : Les Civils En Danger Dans Le Nord Incontrôlé."

This group was hard to find for two reasons: (1) Several articles that reference MPRC explained that during early stages of rebellion in the northwest, the Bozizé regime refused to acknowledge it and instead chalked up attacks to bandits and robbers.<sup>315</sup> MPRC doesn't seem to have been active much longer after Bozizé openly acknowledged rebellion, which may explain why references were so hard to come by. (2) There is a Séléka splinter group that goes by a similar/the same name.

However, IRIN cites "generalized belief" that this was one of three main rebel groups operating during the early years of the Central African Bush War.<sup>316</sup> As such, I have coded name date as 2006, with low certainty. However, name times are coded as missing. Several sources, including the United Nations and ACLED, attribute the murder of Bossangoa's mayor on 7 MAR 2006 to this group.<sup>317</sup> It also seems to have been responsible for attacks in Paoua around 27 JAN 2006. Exact date and casualty counts vary: the government claims only a dozen rebel deaths, whereas independent reports put the toll as high as 104 total deaths.<sup>318</sup> Given the Bozizé regime's history of downplaying the rebellions at this point, it seems highly plausible that the Paoua attack meets our standards for a large attack and is recorded as such. Civ attack is left as unknown. I have coded the group's first small attack as occurring sometime in 2006 – given "generalized belief" that this was an operational rebel group, I find it highly likely that it conducted more than these two attacks we have knowledge of. Due to the 27 JAN 2006 attack, Paoua is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1."

Named leadership of this group includes Steve Guéret, of whom not much personal history is known.<sup>319</sup> Unfortunately, there is little information on the origins of this group, likely because the government denied its existence and because internet was likely not prevalent in CAR at the time. Goals and organizational history are thus left as missing.

This group is coded as 0 for viable and viable\_civ, as I could find no evidence of activity after 2006. As such, it is coded 88 for merge, splinter, and hide.

SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 election-related contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because this event occurred outside of the group formation district of Ouham-Pende, contestation\_local variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR)

<sup>315</sup> Didier Samson, "Centrafrique - Patassé Accusé d'instrumentaliser Les Coupeurs de Route," *Radio France Internationale*, March 13, 2006, [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/075/article\\_42429.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/075/article_42429.asp); "Central African Republic: CAR: Gov't Accuses Ex-President of Fomenting Rebellion," *IRIN*, March 13, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200603130284.html>; Amougou, "Centrafrique: Menace à La Paix."

<sup>316</sup> "Thousands of Civilians Flee as Army Fights Bandits," *IRIN*, February 7, 2006, <https://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/225385>.

<sup>317</sup> "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State"; "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and the Activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic" (United Nations Security Council, June 27, 2006), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAR%20S2006441.pdf>; Samson, "Centrafrique - Patassé Accusé d'instrumentaliser Les Coupeurs de Route"; "Central African Republic: CAR: Gov't Accuses Ex-President of Fomenting Rebellion"; Amougou, "Centrafrique: Menace à La Paix."

<sup>318</sup> "Central African Republic: CAR: Gov't Accuses Ex-President of Fomenting Rebellion"; Amougou, "Centrafrique: Menace à La Paix"; ACP, "Army Kills 10 in Bandit Raid in Central African Republic," *Agence France Presse*, February 5, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020060205e225009kh&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Central African Republic: Silent Crisis in Northwest Lingers," *IRIN*, June 7, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200606070065.html>.

<sup>319</sup> "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State"; "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and the Activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic"; Samson, "Centrafrique - Patassé Accusé d'instrumentaliser Les Coupeurs de Route."

AKAs: Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, Union of Democratic Forces for Unification

This group was created through the merging of three groups: (1) Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice, MLCJ, headed by Abakar Saboune; (2) Patriotic Action Group for the Liberation of Central Africa, GAPLC, headed by Michel Détodia (Djotodia); and (3) the Central African Democratic Front (FDC), headed by Justin Hasan, former major in Pataase's presidential guard.<sup>320</sup> However, I could find no evidence of specific acts or planned acts of violence for any of these groups prior to their merging into UFDR. As such, only UFDR is recorded.<sup>321</sup> The group's original reported purpose was to protest and correct ethnic bias and exclusion by the Bozizé regime.<sup>322</sup> (Recent local issues beginning under the Patassé regime had led ethnic Gula and others from the region to feel especially neglected by the Patassé and then Bozizé regimes.<sup>323</sup>) As such, I coded 0 for each of our goal variables.

Dates on founding vary, but a release from Saboune's MLCJ and a corroborating source place the formation on approximately 15 SEPT 2006.<sup>324</sup> Other sources corroborate the location of the meeting and the month.<sup>325</sup>

The first small attack appears to have occurred on 30 OCT 2006, when UFDR took the town of Birao. UFDR claimed the attack, indicating that it killed ten government troops. (Apparently media originally attributed the attack to UFR, but later determined UFDR were the perpetrators. The government claims it was foreigners from Sudan.)<sup>326</sup> 30 OCT is also the name date, as an AFP article states that the group was little known or not at all known ("jusque-là peu ou pas connus du tout") before claiming the attack; a Xinhua article makes a similar comment.<sup>327</sup>

Based on extensive fieldwork, Human Rights Watch documented UFDR violence against civilians, including summary executions, firing upon civilians fleeing fighting, and lethal looting and stealth. The earliest

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<sup>320</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 75; Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, lxxiii; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 28; "Central African Republic: Rebels Call for Dialogue After Capturing Key Town," *IRIN*, November 2, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200611020004.html>.

<sup>321</sup> Another source likewise suggests that while UFDR had precedent groups, it didn't become a "proper" rebel group until it unified. Yannick Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic" (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, November 2014), 81, [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20141124\\_CAR.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20141124_CAR.pdf).

<sup>322</sup> "Central African Republic: Tens of Thousands of Villagers On the Run"; "Central African Republic: Rebels Call for Dialogue After Capturing Key Town."

<sup>323</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 76–81; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 81–82; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 27.

<sup>324</sup> Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, lxxiii; "Le Capitaine Abakar Sabone Claque La Porte de l'UFDR," *Centrafrique Presse*, July 22, 2008, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-21430706.html>.

<sup>325</sup> "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 28; V. M., "Qu'est-Ce Vraiment Cette Séléka Qui Fit...," *La Nouvelle Centrafrique*, January 10, 2013, <http://la.nouvelle.centrafrique.overblog.com/qu-est-ce-vraiment-cette-séléka-qui-fit>.

<sup>326</sup> ACP, "La prise de Birao souligne l'instabilité du nord-est de la Centrafrique (PAPIER GENERAL)," *Agence France Presse*, October 31, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPFR00020061031e2av001yw&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Adrien Feniou, "Security Deteriorates as Rebels Capture Northern City in Central African Republic," *Global Insight Daily Analysis*, October 31, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020061031e2av0003b&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "LEAD 4 Bangui demande l'aide de Paris pour chasser les rebelles," *Reuters - Les actualités en français*, October 31, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=REUTFR0020061031e2av0002a&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Paris apporte son soutien au président centrafricain Bozizé," *Le Service en français de Xinhua*, October 31, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=XHFRNS0020061031e2av0050m&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "UPDATE 4-Central African Govt Asks France to Help Repel Rebels," *Reuters News*, October 31, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020061031e2av000zx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>327</sup> ACP, "La prise de Birao souligne l'instabilité du nord-est de la Centrafrique (PAPIER GENERAL)"; "Paris apporte son soutien au président centrafricain Bozizé."

incident they recorded was on 31 OCT 2006, when they shot fleeing civilians in Délembé, an ethnic Kara village.<sup>328</sup>

The organizational history of UFDR is complex. The group is rooted in local grievances of the north, and sources refer to the fighters as “overwhelmingly local.”<sup>329</sup> However, Chadian ex-libérateurs (people who fought under Bozizé’s patriots militia) may have had a significant presence in the organization, including in leadership.<sup>330</sup> Other reports suggest that the organization also grew on local self-defense groups, as well as armed gangs led by EU-trained and funded “park rangers” who were responsible for catching poachers. Such rangers often gained significant combat experience and became powerful locally.<sup>331</sup> However, a lack of clear information about any of these led me to code missing for other rebels, self-defense group, and no prior organization.

Initial named leadership of the UFRD includes: (1) Abakar Saboune (Sabone) – originally served as a security advisor for Patassé, but left him and joined Bozizé before the Patassé regime fell, citing killing of Muslims as a grievance.<sup>332</sup> He served as a libérateur and led the negotiations of the ex-libérateurs with the Bozizé regime to exact their promised pay.<sup>333</sup> He is Runga. (2) Michel Djotodia (Détodia) – spent 14 years in the USSR, born in Vakaga prefecture, ethnic Gula. Under Bozizé, he served as CAR consul in Nyala, where he built ties with Chadian rebels and Sudanese diamond traders who wanted CAR diamonds.<sup>334</sup> (3) Justin Hasan – a former major in Pataase’s presidential guard.<sup>335</sup> (4) Faki Ahmat (AKA Colonel Marabout) – he was a Chadian and former lieutenant in Miskine’s special security force under Patassé, which he left because it attacked Chadians.<sup>336</sup> (5) Zacharia (Zakaria) Damane – a former Gordil municipal councilor (unclear under which regime) and a former member of CAR-Sudan patrols.<sup>337</sup> In news coverage of the first attack on Birao, I found one article in which Abakar Saboune claims that Abdoulaye Miskine (alias Moustapha Maloum) was involved in the group, but I did not see this in other coverage (see FDPC for additional information on Miskine).<sup>338</sup>

Although it is by no means homogenous, most UFDR fighters are ethnic Gula.<sup>339</sup> However, the group also includes non-Gula Chadian ex-libérateurs, Patassé loyalists, and other disaffected Muslims/ethnic Arab Central Africans who feel abused by the regime.<sup>340</sup> UFDR’s base is in “the heart of Gula country.”<sup>341</sup> It was initially based in an area demarcated by the towns of Tiroungoulou, Gordil, Mele, and Boromota (in Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran and Haute-Kotto).<sup>342</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.

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<sup>328</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 90.

<sup>329</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 100.

<sup>330</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 73, 82; Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 81–82. See also information on MLCJ below.

<sup>331</sup> Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 81.

<sup>332</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 26.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid.; “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 82; “Central African Republic: Bozize Honours Payment Deal for Former Rebels,” *IRIN*, April 28, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404280421.html>; “Concernant Michel Djotodia, À Partir de Quand a-T-Il Été Un Sujet D’intérêt Pour Les Services Centrafricains ? Quelles Sont Les Informations Que Vous Receviez À L’époque ?,” *aBangui.com*, May 4, 2015, <http://news.abangui.com/h/26253.html>.

<sup>334</sup> “Central African Republic: ‘They Must All Leave or Die’” (Paris: FIDH, June 2014), 64, [https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport\\_rca\\_2014-uk-04.pdf](https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_rca_2014-uk-04.pdf).

<sup>335</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 75.

<sup>336</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 28.

<sup>337</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 28. It is not mentioned which regime he served under; however, probability says it was the Patassé regime.

<sup>338</sup> ACP, “La prise de Birao souligne l’instabilité du nord-est de la Centrafrique (PAPIER GENERAL).”

<sup>339</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 76.

<sup>340</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 82–83.

<sup>341</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 27.

<sup>342</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 28; “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 75; Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 82.



It appears that UFDR received some support from Sudan in their first year, with several sources indicating they hosted Sudanese military advisors, and one source also reporting that they received Sudanese supplies and training.<sup>343</sup> However, it seems that this support was not high enough to meet our thresholds. At some point, UFDR also captured diamond-mining areas and profited from their operation – but this seems to have come in 2008, over a year after formation (see information on CPJP below). As such, I have coded none for initial resources.

UFDR is coded 1 for viable and 1 for merge: UFDR joined the Séléka alliance, which succeeded in taking over the country.<sup>344</sup> However, I also code 1 for splinter, as MLJC later began to act independently (see ACLED) and FIRCA/FURCA is a rumored splinter (see below).

SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and two instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to September 2006. However, these events occurred in Bangui, which is outside of “Northern CAR” where the datasheet notes that group formation occurred. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### \* Front démocratique Centrafricain (FDC)

AKAs: Central African Democratic Front

This is ostensibly a rebel group headed by Justin Hasan (Hassan, Hassane), a former member of Patassé’s presidential guard.<sup>345</sup> However, I could find no record of violence or planned violence prior to its merging into the UFDR coalition (see above). As such, it is excluded.

#### \* Groupe d’action patriotique pour la libération de la Centrafrique (GAPLC)

AKAs: Patriotic Action Group for the Liberation of Central Africa

This is ostensibly a rebel group headed by Michel Djetodia (Djotodia).<sup>346</sup> However, I could find no record of violence or planned violence prior to its merging into the UFDR coalition (see above). As such, it is excluded.

#### Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ)

AKAs: Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice, Movement of Young Central African Liberators, Movement of Liberators of Young Central Africans for Justice (MJLC)

This group consists of Chadian ex-libérateurs who fought under Bozizé to overthrow the Patassé regime.

However, they were not incorporated into CAR state forces and did not receive promised compensation for their role in the overthrowing of Patassé. Ex-libérateurs launched violent protests against the Bozizé regime over these grievances in APR 2006, in which future MLCJ leader Abakar Saboune served as their lead negotiator. A settlement was reached and they were escorted, theoretically back to Chad, but many remained dissatisfied and remained in northern CAR to fight, at which point MLCJ emerged as a named

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<sup>343</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 100; “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 28.

<sup>344</sup> “Armed Groups in CAR.”

<sup>345</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 75; Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, lxxiii; “Centrafrique: La Rébellion Prête À Dialoguer Après La Prise de Birao,” *IRIN*, November 2, 2006, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200611020648.html>; Alain Nzilo, “Centrafrique: Concernant Michel Djotodia, À Partir de Quand a-T-Il Été Un Sujet D’intérêt Pour Les Services Centrafricains ? Quelles Sont Les Informations Que Vous Receviez À L’époque ?,” *Corbeau News Centrafrique*, May 4, 2015, <http://www.corbeaunews.ca/centrafrique-concernant-michel-djotodia-partir-de-quand-t-il-ete-un-sujet-dinteret-pour-les-services-centrafricains-queles-sont-les-informations-que-vous-receviez-lepoque/>.

<sup>346</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 75; Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, lxxiii; “Centrafrique: La Rébellion Prête À Dialoguer Après La Prise de Birao”; Nzilo, “Centrafrique: Concernant Michel Djotodia, À Partir de Quand a-T-Il Été Un Sujet D’intérêt Pour Les Services Centrafricains ? Quelles Sont Les Informations Que Vous Receviez À L’époque ?”

organization.<sup>347</sup> This group is excluded because it meets our definition of a splinter group: members and leadership were generally ex-libérateurs who had served under Bozizé.

One press release stated that the group began in 1998 (would predate Bozizé's Patriots militia), but I could find no additional evidence to corroborate this.<sup>348</sup> Theoretically, this group would have been mentioned during the fighting between Bozizé and the ex-libérateurs. However, I found no evidence that the group was actively committing violence prior to merging into UFDR; all violence they carried out independent of UFDR occurred after they broke away from this group. As such, it is excluded.

### Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR)

AKAs: Union of Republican Forces, Union des Forces Renouveau, l'Union des Forces du changement de Centrafrique

This group was founded by Lieutenant-Colonel Florian Ndjadder (Ndjadder Bedaya, Njadder).<sup>349</sup> Ndjadder comes from a prominent military family; he is son of a police general who was killed during a coup attempt under Patassé.<sup>350</sup> Ndjadder himself was in FACA until 2004.<sup>351</sup>

The group was evidently formed on 25 DEC 2005.<sup>352</sup> I'm not sure when it first named itself; but the earliest source I found was from FEB 2006, so it occurred in less than three months.<sup>353</sup> Articulation of goals in official statements is vague, but anti-Bozizé rhetoric is plentiful.<sup>354</sup> In addition, Ndjadder has called publicly for the removal of Bozizé.<sup>355</sup> Thus, goal is coded as takeover. Ndjadder claims that he had no contact with or support from Patassé, Kolingba, or Abdoulaye Miskine.<sup>356</sup>

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<sup>347</sup> "State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians," 82; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 26; "Central African Republic: Bozize Honours Payment Deal for Former Rebels"; ACP, "Six Dead, Minister Hurt in Clash between Central African Army and Ex-Rebels," *Agence France Presse*, April 18, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020040418e04i00bnh&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Concernant Michel Djotodia, À Partir de Quand a-T-Il Été Un Sujet D'intérêt Pour Les Services Centrafricains ?"

<sup>348</sup> "Le Capitaine Abakar Sabone Claqué La Porte de l'UFDR."

<sup>349</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR"; "Interview Verite Avec Le Lieutenant Florian Ndjadder Bedaya," LE BLOG DE CENTRAFRIQUE OPINION, April 29, 2006, <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-2573354.html>; Gabriella Ingerstad, "Willing and Able? Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-War States -- Insights from the Central African Republic" (Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), October 2012), [https://www.foi.se/download/18.7920f8c915921957088aad6/1484138020952/foir\\_3470.pdf](https://www.foi.se/download/18.7920f8c915921957088aad6/1484138020952/foir_3470.pdf); "L'HEURE DU BILAN DECLARATION DU SG DES FORCES REPUBLICAINES UFR," Skyrock, April 24, 2006, <http://centrafrique.skyrock.com/437510347-L-HEURE-DU-BILAN-DECLARATION-DU-SG-DES-FORCES-REPUBLICAINES-UFR.html>; "Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)Agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims" (FIDH, December 2008), <https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/RCA513a2009.pdf>.

<sup>350</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR"; Louisa Lombard, *State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic* (Zed Books Ltd., 2016), <https://books.google.fr/books?id=CvViDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT86&lpg=PT86&dq=UFR+Ndjadder+2005&source=bl&ots=v1lQCiqQOAH&sig=TMyl7EVhETPFtn4jNVawVCOgvl0&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzpar475zTAhVE5SYKHRRhBEc4ChDoAQgmMAA#v=onepage&q=UFR%20Ndjadder%202005&f=false>.

<sup>351</sup> "Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)Agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims."

<sup>352</sup> "L'HEURE DU BILAN DECLARATION DU SG DES FORCES REPUBLICAINES UFR"; Alwihda, "CENTRAFRIQUE - REBELLION ARMEE : COMMUNIQUE DE L'U.F.R.," *ALLIANCE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRES*, February 27, 2006, <http://alliance-democratie-progres.over-blog.com/article-2003145.html>.

<sup>353</sup> Alwihda, "CENTRAFRIQUE - REBELLION ARMEE."

<sup>354</sup> "L'HEURE DU BILAN DECLARATION DU SG DES FORCES REPUBLICAINES UFR"; Alwihda, "CENTRAFRIQUE - REBELLION ARMEE."

<sup>355</sup> Andreas Mehler, *Africa Yearbook Volume 3: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2006*, vol. 3 (BRILL, 2007), 208,

<https://books.google.fr/books?id=nPmvCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=UFR+Ndjadder+2005&source=bl&ots=4ho4xX8qx4&sig=D7gGrTTTDacUo7eAGNeK6zUNFhw&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwif79Wc65zTAhXBeSYKHYoPDSQQ6AEITDAH#v=onepage&q=UFR%20Ndjadder%202005&f=false>.

<sup>356</sup> "Interview Verite Avec Le Lieutenant Florian Ndjadder Bedaya."

I was hesitant to include this group at all because of uncertainty about whether it committed violence. In the three battles that I found specific reference to UFR engaging in, there was another group also named in attack reporting who had an actual history of committing violence. ACLED and one other source say UFR participated in the 30 OCT 2006 attack on Birao; however, ACLED also tagged UFDR and APRD in this attack, each of which seems more likely.<sup>357</sup> Another source says UFR carried out attacks on Gordil and Tiringoulou in late JUNE 2006.<sup>358</sup> Most sources attribute these attacks to Chadian rebels who crossed over into CAR, including ACLED.<sup>359</sup> However, some sources notes that it may actually have been a Central African rebel group that operates in the area. None of them name this CAR rebel group, so it may also be UFDR or APRD.<sup>360</sup> Bozizé does have a history of rebellion denial. If UFR is a real rebel group, it operates in rural northwestern CAR and seems to plan/operate mainly within CAR. Therefore, “rural” is coded as 1 and “planning\_inside” is coded as 1.

Beyond the lack of definitive evidence tying UFR to violent acts, I also came across the following discussion in one source:

Another example of using conventional rebellion as a means to political participation in ways supported by the good intentions crown is that Florian Ndjadder, scion of a prominent military family. Interveners and Central Africans alike new that Ndjadder’s Union of Republican Forces... did not exist in the form of a group of men ready to fight, but he was nevertheless included in the peace process because he both used the legitimate form of a rebellion and had the family history to seem a possible future threat.<sup>361</sup>

Essentially, UFR may have been a rebellion only in name. In addition to this evidence, all sources I found giving evidence as to the location of Ndjadder himself placed him physically outside CAR.<sup>362</sup> No other names are given for leadership or membership in the organization. Hence, the certainty on this group remains only a 1.

This group is coded as 0 for viable and for viable\_civ, as I could find no evidence of activity three years or more after formation.

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<sup>357</sup> “CENTRAFRIQUE - REBELLION : LA VILLE DE BIRAO SERAIT SOUS CONTRÔLE REBELLE,” *Le Candidat Emmanuel Olivier Gabirault*, October 31, 2006, <http://oliviergabirault.over-blog.com/article-4370199.html>.

<sup>358</sup> Mehler, *Africa Yearbook Volume 3*.

<sup>359</sup> “Central African Republic Denounces Chadian Rebel Attack,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 27, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020060627e26r0025t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Plusieurs morts dans un affrontement entre les rebelles tchadiens et les forces régulières sur le sol centrafricain,” *All Africa*, June 27, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWSF0020060627e26r000bd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Un soldat gabonais de la FOMUC blessé à l’issue d’une attaque des rebelles qui s’est soldée par 33 morts,” *All Africa*, July 2, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWSF0020060703e27200003&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Central Africa Says at Least 43 Died in Rebel Raid,” *Reuters News*, June 29, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020060629e26t001em&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Jean-Magloire Issa, “UPDATE 1-Chadian Rebels Attack Central African Republic,” *Reuters News*, June 27, 2006, 1, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020060627e26r000sg&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>360</sup> “33 Die in Army-Rebel Fighting,” *All Africa*, June 29, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020060629e26t000io&cat=a&ep=ASE>; JOSEPH BENAMMSE, “Official: Chad Rebels Attack inside Neighboring Central African Republic,” *Associated Press Newswires*, June 27, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020060627e26r001j0&cat=a&ep=ASE>; ACP, “Top Generals Fired in Central African Republic after Unrest,” *Agence France Presse*, July 5, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020060705e27500419&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>361</sup> Lombard, *State of Rebellion*.

<sup>362</sup> In DRC: “L’HEURE DU BILAN DECLARATION DU SG DES FORCES REPUBLICAINES UFR”; In “the diplomatic field” lobbying the AU, EU, and ICC: “Interview Verite Avec Le Lieutenant Florian Ndjadder Bedaya.”

SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation in the form of an electoral dispute riot, but because this occurred in Bangui, outside of the group formation region of northwestern CAR, contestation\_local variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation, but one pro-government march was recorded.

#### Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC)

AKAs: Democratic Front for the Central African People, Democratic Front for the People of the Central African Republic

This group has a complicated backstory. Abdoulaye Miskine is widely believed to be an alias for former Chadian rebel Martin Khoumtan-Madji (Koumtamadji).<sup>363</sup> While in Chad, Miskine served as an aide to Laokien Barde, the assassinated leader of the Chadian rebel group Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (Forces armées pour une république fédérale, FARF).<sup>364</sup> FARF signed a peace accord with the Chadian government in 1997, which was renewed in 1998.<sup>365</sup> It was around this time (in 1998), when Miskine is believed to have crossed into CAR.<sup>366</sup> Miskine resurfaced in 2001, when Patassé hired to head a presidential security unit that incorporated many Chadians in its membership and leadership.<sup>367</sup> Miskine's unit was tasked with fighting Bozizé's Patriots Militia.<sup>368</sup> Miskine's role greatly vexed Chad, who held him in contempt for targeting Chadian civilians in CAR and sought his extradition.<sup>369</sup> In a deal between CAR and Chad, Miskine was exiled to Togo prior to the fall of Patassé.<sup>370</sup> At some point, he returned to

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<sup>363</sup> "Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims," 16; "Central African Republic : Abdoulaye Miskine Released in Exchange for Hostages, Accommodation of Impunity," *FIDH*, August 24, 2014, <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/16738-central-african-republic-abdoulaye-miskine-released-in-exchange-for>; "Who's Who," accessed March 8, 2017, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/jean-pierre-bemba-gombo-whos-who/>; Taylor & Francis Group, *Europa World Year* (Taylor & Francis, 2004), 1050, [https://books.google.com/books?id=wGA4o-UhAfgC&pg=PA1050&lpg=PA1050&dq=Abdoulaye+miskine+chadian+rebel&source=bl&ots=FNub3jwx-e&sig=TOWfxFqfySpQ-VXTDuWiInMDGkw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJxc7w\\_5zTAhXBNiYKHbphBUMQ6AEIPTAH#v=onepage&q=Abdoulaye%20miskine%20chadian%20rebel&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=wGA4o-UhAfgC&pg=PA1050&lpg=PA1050&dq=Abdoulaye+miskine+chadian+rebel&source=bl&ots=FNub3jwx-e&sig=TOWfxFqfySpQ-VXTDuWiInMDGkw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJxc7w_5zTAhXBNiYKHbphBUMQ6AEIPTAH#v=onepage&q=Abdoulaye%20miskine%20chadian%20rebel&f=false).

<sup>364</sup> "Chad: Four Reported Killed in Cross-Border Attacks," *IRIN*, January 4, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200201040273.html>; "President Calls on Presidents of Chad, CAR to Resolve Crisis Peacefully," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 9, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcpr00020020809dy89007k9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>365</sup> "Chad: Four Reported Killed in Cross-Border Attacks."

<sup>366</sup> "Central African Republic: Regional Joint Commission to Investigate Tense Border Area"; "President Calls on Presidents of Chad, CAR to Resolve Crisis Peacefully."

<sup>367</sup> "Chadian Army in North of Central Africa"; "Central African Republic : Abdoulaye Miskine Released in Exchange for Hostages, Accommodation of Impunity."

<sup>368</sup> "Who's Who"; "Central African Republic: Bangui in Plea to Togolese Leader Over Patassé," *IRIN*, July 17, 2003, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200307170031.html>; Saïd Aït-Hatrit, "La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui," *Afrik.com*, December 4, 2006, <http://www.afrik.com/article10802.html>; Christian Panika, "Centrafrican Security Chief Discusses Clashes along Chad Border," *Agence France-Presse*, August 15, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020020815dy8f00ci1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>369</sup> "Central African Republic: Premier Says Chadian Troops in 17-Km Cross-Border Incursion"; "Chad Rebel Quits CAR," November 6, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2409783.stm>; "President Calls on Presidents of Chad, CAR to Resolve Crisis Peacefully."

<sup>370</sup> "Chad Rebel Quits CAR"; "Central African Republic: Calm Returns to Bangui As Rebels Retreat," *IRIN*, October 31, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200210310376.html>; "Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)Agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims"; Aït-Hatrit, "La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui."

CAR. He evidently founded FDPC in 2005, following the May election which Patassé was not allowed to contest.<sup>371</sup> As such, I have coded June 2006 as a founding date, with certainty downgraded.

This group was challenging to classify. Given that Miskine's CAR security unit was comprised largely of Chadian mercenaries, it seems plausible that it included former FARF compatriots, which may have later joined FDPC. However, FDPC is listed as an independent group for two reasons: (1) Some evidence links FDPC members back to the presidential security unit.<sup>372</sup> However, evidence that these individuals originally belonged to FARF is mixed. One source states that the members of the presidential security unit were "former fellows in the Chadian rebel movement," but does not indicate whether that meant the rebel movement at large or FARF specifically (other rebel groups were active, too).<sup>373</sup> One source specifically mentions that the Chadian mercenaries had "links to the former dictator Hissène Habré, to Goukouni Oueddeye, to CODO (Chadian rebels during Hissène Habré's regime)," it omits any reference to FARF.<sup>374</sup> (2) The gaps between each of these organizations is significant (three years from FARF to the security unit, three years from the security unit to FDPC, totaling eight years from rebel group FARF to rebel group FDPC), FDPC will not be considered a splinter or revival of FARF. FDPC is included and coded independently. However, its certainty is downgraded to 2.

By 2008, FDPC was reported to consist of fewer than 20 fighters.<sup>375</sup> Some sources have questioned the extent of FDPC's representation in the field. However, the same source indicates that FDPC did, in fact, conduct attacks.<sup>376</sup> While small, FDPC is not a briefcase rebellion.

FDPC's earliest appearance in ACLED is in 2002, which makes no sense as Miskine was still head of the presidential security unit at that point. Following the fall of Bozizé, the group's first appearance is on 26 SEPT 2005; since I found no earlier mention of the group, this is taken as its name date. Given that the group formed at an unknown date after the election, which occurred in MAY, it is unclear whether FDPC was named within the first three months; however, it was certainly named within the first year. There was evidence either way on whether the group initially operated clandestinely.

There are references to Miskine's group partaking in several battles, including the killing of FACA lieutenant Dogo in MAY 2006 near Birao, the attack on Birao in DEC 2006 that was countered with French Mirage F1 air raids, and attacks in the northeast in OCT and NOV 2006, and an attack in Paoua on 14-15 JAN 2007.<sup>377</sup> However, additional information on their roles in these attacks, including the number of people the FDPC killed is not forthcoming. I also suspect there are additional attacks, as FDPC formed a year before the first of the aforementioned attacks. As such, I have listed all attack dates as missing. Because

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<sup>371</sup> "Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)Agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims," 16; "Who's Who"; Tom Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014* (New York: CQ Press, 2014), 252, [https://books.google.com/books?id=iC\\_VBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA877&lpg=PA877&dq=AREMA+madagascar+1976&source=bl&ots=S7QXQEFXSx&sig=QBJY30H4ytQSKBofWHZK\\_oiX-z8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwio37mrsOXSAhWDOSYKHbqsBwsQ6AEIOTAG#v=onepage&q=AREMA%20madagascar%201976&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=iC_VBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA877&lpg=PA877&dq=AREMA+madagascar+1976&source=bl&ots=S7QXQEFXSx&sig=QBJY30H4ytQSKBofWHZK_oiX-z8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwio37mrsOXSAhWDOSYKHbqsBwsQ6AEIOTAG#v=onepage&q=AREMA%20madagascar%201976&f=false); Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, 279.

<sup>372</sup> When asked how FDPC obtained resources, Miskine responded that, "When Bozize took power, my men hid weapons and vehicles in the bush," which implies that "his men" were working for him before the fall of Bozize, i.e. were part of the presidential security unit. Aït-Hatrit, "La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui"; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 14.

<sup>373</sup> "President Calls on Presidents of Chad, CAR to Resolve Crisis Peacefully."

<sup>374</sup> "War Crimes in the Central African Republic: 'When the Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers'" (FIDH, February 2003), 36, [https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH\\_Report\\_WarCrimes\\_in\\_CAR\\_English\\_Feb2003.pdf](https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_Report_WarCrimes_in_CAR_English_Feb2003.pdf); "Former Army Chief Says State Using Chadian Rebels against His Men."

<sup>375</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 84.

<sup>376</sup> "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 24.

<sup>377</sup> "Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)Agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims," 16; Aït-Hatrit, "La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui"; Ndzinga Amougou, "Centrafrique: Les Contours Du Dialogue," *Cameroon Tribune*, February 5, 2007, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200702051352.html>; "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State," 24.

of the location of the May 2006 attack (only attack within 1 year of formation” and subsequent attacks in the same area I have coded Birao as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1 for and 1 for “planning inside”. Miskine’s presidential security unit was accused of war crimes including the execution of over 100 Chadians living in PK 13 of Bangui.<sup>378</sup> While I was not able to find individual reference to specific attacks on civilians within the first year, Miskine stated that he “cannot deny all charges” of FDPC attacks on civilians when asked in an interview in DEC 2006.<sup>379</sup> Given the evidence tying FDPC members to the presidential security unit and the quote in the interview (given just after initial year of formation), I find it highly likely that attacks on civilians occurred within the three months or year. Since I have no records of specific attacks, however, I have left civilian attack variables as missing.

FDPC’s goal has variously been stated as the “destitution of Bozizé” or taking Bangui and overthrowing Bozizé since its foundation.<sup>380</sup>

Given the group’s apparent links to the presidential security unit, a 1 is coded for military under organizational history and for initial leaders from former security forces. In addition, a 1 is coded for initial leaders from former rebels (FARF).

In regard to FDPC resources, I found one source saying the group was backed by Libya.<sup>381</sup> It is likely that FDPC has some ties to Libya, especially given the latter’s role in training and equipping Miskine’s presidential security unit.<sup>382</sup> However, since it was a single source that came well after the group’s formation, and as no specific details were given, I have marked none for initial resources here.

Miskine called himself the chief of staff of UFDR.<sup>383</sup> This has led some sources to suggest that FDPC is a splinter group. However, FDPC was active before the formation of UFDR. Moreover, the UFDR has denied that Miskine has any links to their organization.<sup>384</sup>

FDPC barely qualifies as viable: it initiated an attack on a military base in Kabo on 26 NOV 2012 (956CEN). In addition, it clashed with FPR in Vafio on 26 DEC 2011 (920CEN) – it is not clear which group initiated this battle, but we have erred toward inclusion.<sup>385</sup>

SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation in the form of an electoral dispute riot, but because this occurred in Bangui, outside of the group formation district of Vakaga, contestation\_local variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation, but one pro-government march was recorded.

### Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP)

AKAs: Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace

Most sources (and the sources with the most specific information) place this group’s founding on 26 OCT 2008.<sup>386</sup> However, the group’s first public declaration was not until 7 JAN 2009; this declaration states

<sup>378</sup> “War Crimes in the Central African Republic: ‘When the Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers,’” 36–46.

<sup>379</sup> Aït-Hatrit, “La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui.”

<sup>380</sup> “Central African Republic: Déjà-vu: Peace (Dis)Agreements That Are Detrimental to Victims,” 16; Aït-Hatrit, “La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui.”

<sup>381</sup> “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 24.

<sup>382</sup> “Central African Republic : Abdoulaye Miskine Released in Exchange for Hostages, Accommodation of Impunity.”

<sup>383</sup> Aït-Hatrit, “La Rébellion Centrafricaine Souhaite Toujours Prendre Bangui.”

<sup>384</sup> “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” 103.

<sup>385</sup> “Central African Republic: UN Highlights ‘Security Vacuum’ As Northern Clashes Continue,” *IRIN*, January 11, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201201111075.html>.

<sup>386</sup> “Central African Republic: ‘They Must All Leave or Die,’” 64; “République Centrafricaine : Un Pays Aux Mains Des Criminels de Guerre de La Séléka” (FIDH: Paris, September 2013), 7, [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rapport\\_d\\_enque\\_te\\_rca\\_ld.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rapport_d_enque_te_rca_ld.pdf); “Bangui : Un Regard Rétrospectif Sur La Convention Des Patriotes Pour La Justice et La Paix (CPJP),” *RJDH-CENTRAFRIQUE*, June



that the group initially operated clandestinely.<sup>387</sup> This explains why some sources cite JAN 2009 as the founding date.<sup>388</sup>

The group's opening declaration demanded the resignation of Bozizé and was filled with anti-Bozizé rhetoric, including stating that he was no longer worth to be president and should have been removed by the inclusive political dialogue process.<sup>389</sup> As such, goal is coded as takeover.

Some sources characterize this group as a splinter of UFDR, but this characterization is inaccurate. The history of the organization is more complex. Ethnic tensions between Gula and Runga predate both the UFDR and CPJP. By 2008, the Gula-dominated UFDR had begun pushing operations into predominantly ethnic Runga areas and aimed to capture Runga-controlled diamond mines around Bria. According to one source, these events caused local riots.<sup>390</sup> CPJP formed at this point to fight against UFDR to protect Runga interests.<sup>391</sup> It is true that some CPJP members first belonged to UFDR, including Charles Massi, but they do not constitute the majority of CPJP.<sup>392</sup> Members are mostly Runga, including from Chad and Sudan.<sup>393</sup> There are some non-Runga members, but there are not Gula members.<sup>394</sup> CPJP's main areas of operation are Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, especially N'Délé, and Vakaga prefecture.<sup>395</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for "rural" and 1 for "planning\_inside".

Initial leadership included: (1) Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane (Daffane) – previously chairman of the CAR Red Cross.<sup>396</sup> (2) Charles Massi – former minister of mines under Patassé, and had also served as a minister in some post under Bozizé.<sup>397</sup> Massi served briefly in the leadership of UFDR, but left it for CPJP.<sup>398</sup> (3) Nourredine Adam – joined at the end of 2008.<sup>399</sup> Graduated from Cairo Police Academy, received training from Israel special forces, served on protection detail of Sheikh Zayed in Abu Dhabi, and then

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13, 2012, <https://reseaudesjournalistesrca.wordpress.com/2012/06/13/bangui-un-regard-retrospectif-sur-la-convention-des-patriotes-pour-la-justice-et-la-paix-cpjp/>; M., "Qu'est-Ce Vraiment Cette Séléka Qui Fit..."; "1993 - 2013 : Vingt Ans D'instabilité Politique En Centrafrique," *France 24*, December 27, 2012, <http://www.france24.com/fr/20121227-centrafrique-chronologie-dates-principaux-evenements-bozize-rebellion-arm%C3%A9e-Séléka>.

<sup>387</sup> Askabiol, "1ère DECLARATION OFFICIELLE DE LA CPJP," CPJP-Centrafrique, June 2, 2009, <http://cpjp.centrafrique.over-blog.org/article-32163825.html>.

<sup>388</sup> Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 252.

<sup>389</sup> Askabiol, "1ère DECLARATION OFFICIELLE DE LA CPJP."

<sup>390</sup> "Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic" (International Crisis Group, December 16, 2010), 18, <http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30425/1/Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.pdf?1>.

<sup>391</sup> "I Can Still Smell the Dead": The Forgotten Human Rights Crisis in the Central African Republic," *Human Rights Watch*, September 18, 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/18/i-can-still-smell-dead/forgotten-human-rights-crisis-central-african-republic>; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 82; "Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic," 18; "Bangui : Un Regard Rétrospectif Sur La Convention Des Patriotes Pour La Justice et La Paix (CPJP)"; "République Centrafricaine : Un Pays Aux Mains Des Criminels de Guerre de La Séléka," 7.

<sup>392</sup> "Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic," 18.

<sup>393</sup> "République Centrafricaine : Un Pays Aux Mains Des Criminels de Guerre de La Séléka," 7; "Central African Republic: 'They Must All Leave or Die,'" 64.

<sup>394</sup> "Central African Republic: 'They Must All Leave or Die,'" 64.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid.; "Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic," 18; "République Centrafricaine : Un Pays Aux Mains Des Criminels de Guerre de La Séléka"; "Bangui : Un Regard Rétrospectif Sur La Convention Des Patriotes Pour La Justice et La Paix (CPJP)"; "I Can Still Smell the Dead."

<sup>396</sup> "Central African Republic: Sibut Flood Victims Get Aid," *IRIN*, October 6, 2003, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200310060069.html>.

<sup>397</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 82; "Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic," 18.

<sup>398</sup> "Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic," 18; Brice Blondel, "Peace and Insecurity: CAR's Paradoxes," ReliefWeb, May 21, 2008, <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/peace-and-insecurity-cars-paradoxes>.

<sup>399</sup> "Central African Republic: 'They Must All Leave or Die,'" 64.



ran a private security form in the Emirates. Returned to CAR to join CPJP.<sup>400</sup> (4) Abdoulaye Hissene (Hissène, Issène) – a diamond collector and trader, apparently not previously involved in any rebel groups.<sup>401</sup> (5) Mahamat Saleh – background in diamond trading<sup>402</sup> (6) Abdoulaye Youssouf – a diamond miner/collector who had previously served as Sam Ouandja’s second deputy mayor, but lost his post when the regime changed in 2003. He joined UFDR, but then quit and joined CPJP in protest over UFDR’s ethnic targeting.<sup>403</sup> (7) Issa Israel (8) Bevarrah Lala – his association with the organization is debated, as he claims to speak on its behalf but lives abroad; his role has been denied by other members. Was former minister of education who fell out with Bozizé.<sup>404</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for former government leaders, current government leaders, and current rebels under initial leadership.

This group receives support from the Runga diaspora in Chad and Sudan.<sup>405</sup> Although I found no sources stating it outright, it seems highly likely this group drew financial support from diamond mining. In addition to the diamond trade background of its leadership, reports indicate that it offered Runga youth \$20-\$200 to work in diamond mines.<sup>406</sup>

One source indicated that CPJP attacks on government positions began in DEC 2008, although it gives no more specific information.<sup>407</sup> As such, I have coded DEC 2008 as the small attack date. According to ACLED, the first large attack was 10 APR 2011 at Kede.

An Amnesty International report indicates that “CPJP attacks on civilians and government forces appear to have escalated after the disappearance and alleged death of its leader, Charles Massi, in January 2010,” implying that attacks on civilians began at least in 2009 or earlier. However, all individual accounts they reported on were after JAN 2010, so I couldn’t place it more specifically.<sup>408</sup> As such, I have coded civilian attack variables as missing.

I have coded 1 for viable, as a splinter group of CPJP called CPJP-Fondamental (CPJP-Fundamental) was an important member of Séléka, which succeeded in taking over the country.<sup>409</sup>

### Forces pour l’unification de la République Centrafricaine (FIRCA, FURCA)

AKAs: Forces for the Unification of the Central African Republic, Union Force in the Central African Republic

<sup>400</sup> François Soudan, “Centrafrique : Nouredine Adam, Général de Fortune,” *JeuneAfrique.com*, April 26, 2013, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/137594/politique/centrafrique-nouredine-adam-g-n-ral-de-fortune/>.

<sup>401</sup> Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 82; “Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,” 18.

<sup>402</sup> Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 82.

<sup>403</sup> “Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,” 18.

<sup>404</sup> “Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,” 18.

<sup>405</sup> “Central African Republic: ‘They Must All Leave or Die,’” 64.

<sup>406</sup> “Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,” 18.

<sup>407</sup> “Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,” 18.

<sup>408</sup> “Central African Republic: Action Needed to End Decades of Abuse” (London: Amnesty International, 2011), 9, [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6469~v~Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_\\_Action\\_Needed\\_to\\_End\\_Decades\\_of\\_Abuse.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6469~v~Central_African_Republic__Action_Needed_to_End_Decades_of_Abuse.pdf).

<sup>409</sup> “Armed Groups in CAR.”

This group is very frequently reported as a splinter group from UFDR.<sup>410</sup> That sounds likely, with FURCA's leader Oumar Younous reportedly having ties to Michel Djotodia and the MLCJ.<sup>411</sup> In fighting between FURCA and UFDR at Am Dafok, Zakaria Damane referred to his own forces as "loyalists," implying that FURCA is a disloyal faction.<sup>412</sup> One source from MLCJ suggests that the group doesn't even exist.<sup>413</sup> Sounds like internal turmoil in UFDR to me.

**Zaraguinas** – This group is an interesting case. "Zaraguinas" is a term used to refer to bandits. Although they do not operate for political aims, they have repeatedly engaged state forces and have been considered the largest threat posed to the country. UNICEF reports that Zaraguinas have displaced 100,000 in the Central African Republic. They do not have a centrally organized leadership, but do operate in organized groups of ten to fifteen men. The men include former Bozizé supporter, members of political rebel groups, defectors from neighboring states' militaries, and local men. Evidently, the term first started being used in the 1980s, but reporting seems to indicate a serious uptick in activities during the Central African Bush war, particularly around 2007-2009. IRIN reports that Zaraguinas indicate a "blurring of lines between bandits and rebel groups."<sup>414</sup> We have excluded this group, as their engagement with state forces were incidental and the group appears to be better described as a criminal network.

**Redeemed Patriots Former Liberators (PRL)** – According to ACLED, this group carried out a single attack on October 30, 2004. I could not find record of it online, but it seems like the kind of group we would want to include. Insufficient information

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<sup>410</sup> Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber, and Klaas Van Walraven, *Africa Yearbook Volume 5: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara In 2008* (BRILL, 2009), 206, [https://books.google.com/books?id=xOVYchAfCYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Africa+yearbook+2009&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjAtaLcr5\\_TAhVE4SYKHSaAQ0Q6AEIHjAB#v=onepage&q=UFDR&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=xOVYchAfCYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Africa+yearbook+2009&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjAtaLcr5_TAhVE4SYKHSaAQ0Q6AEIHjAB#v=onepage&q=UFDR&f=false); World Bank, "Central African Republic: Economic Revitalization and Reconciliation through Local Initiatives Project," Text, ReliefWeb, November 4, 2010, <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-economic-revitalization-and-reconciliation>; L'Avenir Quotidien, "La RCA Dans Une Situation Similaire Que La Rdc," Centrafrique Presse, October 2, 2008, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-23363966.html>; "CAR Adopts Amnesty Law for Peace," BBC News, September 30, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7643936.stm>; "Bulletin d'Information Humanitaire République Centrafricaine (RCA) 29 septembre - 06 octobre 2008," Text, ReliefWeb, October 6, 2008, <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/bulletin-dinformation-humanitaire-r%C3%A9publique-centrafricaine-rca-29-0>; "Rebels Seize Control of Village," News24, September 29, 2008, <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Rebels-seize-control-of-village-20080929>; "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and the Activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in That Country" (United Nations Security Council, November 26, 2008), para. 15, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAR%20S2008733.pdf>.

<sup>411</sup> "Central African Republic: UN Blacklists Diamond Firm for Illegal Trading," *Deutsche Welle (Bonn)*, August 21, 2015, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201508210253.html>; "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: CFI.006 Oumar Younous," United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, accessed May 11, 2017, <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/oumar-younous>.

<sup>412</sup> "Centrafrique - Sécurité : Une Localité de l'est de La Centrafrique Attaquée Par La FURCA," Le candidat Emmanuel Olivier Gabirault, accessed May 11, 2017, <http://oliviergabirault.over-blog.com/article-24626961.html>.

<sup>413</sup> Centrafrique-Presse.com, "Mouvement Des Libérateurs Centrafricains Pour La Justice (MLCJ)," Centrafrique Presse, November 14, 2008, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-24754786.html>.

<sup>414</sup> "Open Season for Bandits," IRIN, March 31, 2008, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/77530/car-open-season-bandits>; UNICEF, "UNICEF Central African Republic," UNICEF, accessed March 3, 2017, [https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries\\_1746.html](https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries_1746.html); "Central African Republic (CAR): Country Summary," Country Summaries (Human Rights Watch, January 2009), [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related\\_material/car.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/car.pdf); Amnesty International, "Central African Republic: Civilians in Peril in the Wild North" (London: Amnesty International, September 19, 2007), <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46f0d1872.pdf>.

### *Central African Groups (post-2008 → 2013 Coup)*

**Séléka Rebel Coalition** – A rebel coalition formed in late 2012 whose members include the Patriotic Convention for the Country's Salvation (CPSK), the Conventions of Patriots for Justice and Peace-Fundamental (CPJP-Fundamental), and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR).<sup>415</sup> Excluded because it is a coalition.

#### **\*Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix-Fondamentale (CPJP-Fondamentale)**

AKAs: Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace-Fundamental (CPJP-Fundamental)

A splinter group from CPJP, led by Nourredine Adam.<sup>416</sup> This group is excluded because it broke off another rebel group, as indicated by name and leadership.

**Koras Youth Militia** – Only involved in one ACLED event. The event said the group was commissioned by the military and attacked a man suspected of working with rebels, so I think they would be considered state forces. Exclude.

#### **\* Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Kodro (CPSK)**

AKAs: Patriotic Convention for the Country's Salvation, Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country

This group was founded in June 2012 and is led by General Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane.<sup>417</sup> Dhaffane was a former leader of CPJP, but left to form his own group.<sup>418</sup> In his speech at the founding convention, Dhaffane said he left CPJP and took loyal members with him to found the new movement.<sup>419</sup> This is a splinter group, and is excluded.

#### **\* Alliance pour la Renaissance et la Refondation (A2R)**

AKAs: Alliance for Rebirth and Refoundation

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<sup>415</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR"; "Central African Republic: Avoiding Another Battle of Bangui," *International Crisis Group*, January 2, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201301021345.html>; Francis Kpatindé, "Centrafrique : Pour Qui Roule La Seleka?," RFI Afrique, December 29, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121229-centrafrique-roule-seleka-bozize-faca-cpjp>.

<sup>416</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR"; United Nations Department of Public Information, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: CFI.002 Nourredine Adam," United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, May 13, 2014, <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/individual/nourredine-adam>; "Central African Republic: Human Rights Reports: Central African Republic," *United States Department of State (Washington, DC)*, April 23, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304231132.html>; "République Centrafricaine: Les Dissidents de La CPJP Revendiquent Les Attaques de Damara et Sibut," RFI Afrique, September 17, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120917-republique-centrafricaine-dissidents-cpjp-attaques-damara-sibut-bozize-ha>.

<sup>417</sup> Kpatindé, "Centrafrique : Pour Qui Roule La Seleka?"; Tom Lansford, ed., *Political Handbook of the World 2015* (New York: CQ Press, 2015), <https://books.google.com/books?id=yNGfBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT3784&lpg=PT3784&dq=i+love+madagascar+party&source=bl&ots=bHg8qX0cWI&sig=mYSwWt-aFQMxTcljOfM3ofGBjE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi0koXopeXSAhVHWSYKHVMVB24Q6AEIUjAN#v=onepage&q=i%20love%20madagascar%20party&f=false>; CPSK, "Communiqué Final de l'Assemblée Constituante de La CPSK," Le blog de Dhaffane, June 21, 2012, <http://dhaffane.over-blog.com/article-communique-final-de-l-assemblee-constituante-de-la-cpsk-107502691.html>; "I Can Still Smell the Dead."

<sup>418</sup> Kpatindé, "Centrafrique : Pour Qui Roule La Seleka?"; "Centrafrique: Mohamed Dhaffane, Un Ex-Ministre Ambitieux," RFI Afrique, July 2, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130702-rca-ex-ministre-mohamed-dhaffane-tentative-destabilisation>; "I Can Still Smell the Dead."

<sup>419</sup> "CPSK : Dhaffane Claque La Porte de La CPJP et Crée La « Convention Patriotique Du Salut Du Kodro »,," L'Hirondelle, June 27, 2012, <http://lhirondelle-lejournal.over-blog.com/article-cpsk-dhaffane-claque-la-porte-de-la-cpjp-et-cree-la-convention-patriotique-du-salut-du-kodro-107485279.html>.

A clandestine group of military officers who had been waiting for the right moment to act. It joined the Séléka coalition.<sup>420</sup> This group is excluded because it was state actors (entirely within the military).

#### \*Coalition Citoyenne d'Opposition aux Rebellions Armées (COCORA)

AKAs: Citizen Coalition of Opposition to Armed Rebellions

This group can best be described as a youth self-defense movement or youth militia.<sup>421</sup> It was formed December 22, 2012, as Séléka was approaching the capital, with the goal of bolstering Bangui's security.<sup>422</sup> Bozizé gave the group his blessing and may have even ordered or sponsored the group's formation.<sup>423</sup> COCORA's founder, Levi Yakété, was former counselor to Bozizé on youth issues.<sup>424</sup> It was through this organization that Yakété earned his reputation as an inciter of violence, having purportedly distributed machetes, which China had donated to CAR for use by peasants, to youths in the militia.<sup>425</sup> Actions taken by the group include erecting barricades throughout the city, arresting "suspicious" persons, and demonstrating outside the French embassy for France's failure to protect Bozizé.<sup>426</sup> The group's actions spiraled out of control, and COCORA became more known for sowing terror than bolstering security.<sup>427</sup> At times, it became clear Yakété had little control over operations.<sup>428</sup> At one point, it apparently issued an

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<sup>420</sup> Kpatindé, "Centrafrique : Pour Qui Roule La Séléka?"; Tom Lansford, ed., *Political Handbook of the World 2015* (CQ Press, 2015),

<https://books.google.com/books?id=yNgfBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1107&lpg=PT1107&dq=Mohamed-Moussa+Dhaffane+CPSK&source=bl&ots=bHfgzV0a1K&sig=Gbn-2HRrbzwyqyJyDF5IYKEjBM8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj116uB2cTSAhXE5SYKHW1kBXyQ6AEIKTAC#v=onepage&q=Mohamed-Moussa%20Dhaffane%20CPSK&f=false>; "I Can Still Smell the Dead."

<sup>421</sup> "Personnalités sanctionnées, les raisons d'un choix," *All Africa*, May 11, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWSF0020140511ea5b0000k&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic"; "En RCA, La Cocora Annonce Qu'elle va Durcir Son Action - RFI," RFI Afrique, March 3, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130303-rca-cocora-action-demission-centrafrique-gouvernement-centrafrique-bozize-zuma>.

<sup>422</sup> "Personnalités sanctionnées, les raisons d'un choix"; "En RCA, La Cocora Annonce Qu'elle va Durcir Son Action - RFI"; Basile Rebene, "Levi Yakété Crée La Coalition Citoyenne d'opposition Aux Rebellions Armées (Cocora)," Agence Centrafricaine de Presse, accessed April 27, 2017, [http://www.acap.cf/Levi-Yakete-cree-la-coalition-citoyenne-d-opposition-aux-rebellions-armees-Cocora\\_a5086.html](http://www.acap.cf/Levi-Yakete-cree-la-coalition-citoyenne-d-opposition-aux-rebellions-armees-Cocora_a5086.html).

<sup>423</sup> "Personnalités sanctionnées, les raisons d'un choix"; Fred Krock, "Centrafrique : Des Milices Civiles Sèment La Terreur," *Afrik.com*, January 4, 2013, <http://www.afrik.com/centrafrique-des-milices-civiles-sement-la-terreur>; "C.Africa Minister Accuses Rebels of Pursuing Offensive," *Agence France Presse*, January 23, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020130123e91n004pu&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Chadian Paper Condemns Silence of CAR Authorities on Killing of Muslims," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 5, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020140305ea35001md&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>424</sup> "Personnalités sanctionnées, les raisons d'un choix."

<sup>425</sup> "Les Cris d'orfraie de Lévi Yakété," *Centrafrique Presse*, May 11, 2014, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/05/les-cris-d-orfraie-de-levi-yakete.html>.

<sup>426</sup> "En RCA, La Cocora Annonce Qu'elle va Durcir Son Action - RFI"; Francis Kpatindé, "Côte d'Ivoire, Centrafrique : Même Issue? - RFI," RFI Afrique, January 27, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130127-centrafrique-tourne-film-ivoirien-bozize-seleka-gbagbo>.

<sup>427</sup> Krock, "Centrafrique : Des Milices Civiles Sèment La Terreur"; Patrick FORT, "Bozize Supporters Erect Anti-Rebel Roadblocks in Bangui," *Agence France Presse*, January 2, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020130102e912005mv&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Bangui : Vers Un Démantèlement Des Barrières Des Milices de Cocora," *RJDH-CENTRAFRIQUE* (blog), January 7, 2013, <https://reseaudesjournalistesrca.wordpress.com/2013/01/07/bangui-vers-un-demantelement-des-barrieres-des-milices-de-cocora/>.

<sup>428</sup> "Bangui : Des Jeunes Refusent de Démanteler Les Barrières," *RJDH-CENTRAFRIQUE* (blog), January 9, 2013, <http://rjdh.org/bangui-des-jeunes-refusent-de-demanteler-les-barrieres/>.

ultimatum to the regime to stop Séléka's advance or step down, but was even so portrayed as pro-Bozizé.<sup>429</sup> Many of COCORA's members went on to join the anti-Balaka.<sup>430</sup>

I excluded this group for two reasons: (1) To the extent that any organizational control/planning existed, it seemed to be pro-Bozizé and sponsored/supported by the state, not directed against its authority. The obvious exception was the ultimatum although, again, COCORA was still portrayed as pro-Bozizé and never seems to have actually planned violence against the state. (2) I think that even calling this group an organization might be generous – a lot of the action seems to have been state-enabled hysteria, opportunistic and/or mob violence.

#### **\*Coalition pour les Actions Citoyennes (COAC)**

AKAs: Coalition for Citizen Action

This organization is very similar to COCORA, but was meant to be more disciplined. It was formed on 6 JAN 2013 by Steve Yambété.<sup>431</sup> Like COCORA, many members went on to join anti-Balaka.<sup>432</sup> This group is much harder to find reference to, and I'm not sure that it amounted to much of anything.

#### **Central African Groups (post-2013 coup)**

##### **\*Mouvement Populaire pour la Renaissance du Peuple Centrafricain (MRPRC)**

AKAs: Patriotic Movement for the Rebirth of the Central African People (MRPRC)

The third splinter faction of ex-Séléka, this group formed in November 21, 2014 and includes a military and political wing. The former is led by General Joseph Zoundeko. There are conflicting reports over who led the latter, with some indicating Gontrann Djonoaba (former minister of mines and nephew of Mihcel Djotodia) and others Herbert Gotran Djono Ahaba (former minister of public works). Other former ex-Séléka leaders have explicitly distanced themselves from this group, which they see as inimical to the peace process. Formed from previous Force republicaine nouvelle? State aims include unity of the Central African State, not partition.<sup>433</sup>

##### **Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC)**

AKAs: Union for Peace in the Central African Republic

The first splinter group formed from ex-Séléka, this group formed on October 25, 2014. The military wing is led by Ali Darassa/Djarass/Darrass, and the political wing by Habil Awa. Claims it was against partition, but other say the goal was to protect the Peul ethnic group. Several articles also note its shift from a purely armed group to an apparently more presentable political group over time.<sup>434</sup>

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<sup>429</sup> "En RCA, La Cocora Annonce Qu'elle va Durcir Son Action - RFI."

<sup>430</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic."

<sup>431</sup> "Centrafrique: COAC Remplace COCORA Pour La Sécurité," *Journal de Bangui*, January 8, 2013, <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=3864>.

<sup>432</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic."

<sup>433</sup> Chen Liang, "Centrafrique : Les Ex-Séléka Créent Le Rassemblement Patriotique Pour Le Renouveau de La Centrafrique," *French.China.org.cn*, November 22, 2014, [http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2014-11/22/content\\_34121473.htm](http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2014-11/22/content_34121473.htm); Alain Nzilo, "Séléka: Vient de Naître, Le Rassemblement Patriotique Pour Le Renouveau de Centrafrique (RPRC)," *Corbeau News Centrafrique* (blog), November 21, 2014, <http://www.corbeaunews.ca/seleka-vient-naître-rassemblement-patriotique-renouveau-centrafrique-rprc/>; Central African Press Agency, "Le RPRC, Une Initiative de Herbert-Gotran Djono-Ahaba, Pour Pacifier et Développer La République Centrafricaine," *aBangui.com*, June 18, 2015, <http://news.aBangui.com/h/28317.html>.

<sup>434</sup> Nzilo, "Séléka: Vient de Naître, Le Rassemblement Patriotique Pour Le Renouveau de Centrafrique (RPRC)"; Abdoulaye Ngamende, "L'UPC : Histoire d'une Politisation En Cours... Par Abdoulaye NGAMENDE," *Centrafrique Presse*, February 8, 2016, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2016/02/l-upc-histoire-d-une-politisation-en-cours-par-abdoulaye-ngamende.html>; "Séléka : Une Faction Dissidente Ouverte « à Tout Le



### Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC)

AKAs: Popular Front for the Rebirth of Central African Republic, Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic, Poular Front for the Rebirth of Central Africa, Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa

Rebel group formed from ex-Séléka, led by Noureddine Adam.<sup>435</sup> State aims include secession from CAR.<sup>436</sup>

**Séléka Militia (PRGF Faction)** – I found only one explanation of this, a news article which state PRGF was an acronym for the Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance.<sup>437</sup> It is not the acronym in either French or English, so it must be a vernacular language. I could find no other explanation.

### Révolution et Justice (RJ)

AKAs: Revolution and Justice, Revolutionary Justice, National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy, Comité national pour la restauration de la démocratie (CNRD); Union of Central African Armed Forces for the Restoration of Democracy, Union des forces armées centrafricaines pour la restauration de la démocratie (UFACARD); Special Forces of Revolutionary Justice (FSRJ)—armed wing of RJ<sup>438</sup>

This group is sometimes reported as a revival of the APRD, a group that was disbanded and demobilized in 2011-2012.<sup>439</sup> However, there are reasons to doubt that this is merely a reawakening of the APRD group. In particular, the two main founders of the movement have no previous association with APRD: (1) Armel Sayo (AKAs Armel Ningatoloum Sayo, Commandant Sayo, Armel Bedaya) was a former FACA commander in charge of Patassé's security.<sup>440</sup> He was previously associated with UFR of the Séléka

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Monde »,” *Lecentrafricain News* (blog), November 5, 2014,

<https://lecentrafricain.wordpress.com/2014/11/05/seleka-une-faction-dissidente-ouverte-a-tout-le-monde/>; TAKA PARLER, “L’Union Pour La Paix En Centrafrique (UPC) a Entamé Une Transition Inédite. Souvent Discredités Dans La Presse, Le Mouvement et Son Chef de File, Le Général Ali Darrass, Montrent à Présent Un Autre Visage. Alors, Intéressons-Nous de plus Près Aux Actes et Aux Perspectives Que Propose l’UPC.”, *Taka Parler* (blog), February 15, 2016, <http://takaparlenews.over-blog.com/2016/02/l-union-pour-la-paix-en-centrafrique-upc-a-entame-une-transition-inedite-souvent-discredites-dans-la-presse-le-mouvement-et-son-chef>.

<sup>435</sup> Vincent Duhem, “Centrafrique : Que Faire Face Au Retour de Noureddine Adam ?,” *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), June 10, 2016, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/332094/politique/centrafrique-faire-face-retour-de-noured-dine-adam/>.

<sup>436</sup> Elsa Buchanan, “Central African Republic: Who Is Rebel Leader Noureddine Adam Who Declared His State Autonomous?,” *International Business Times UK*, December 15, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/central-african-republic-who-rebel-leader-noured-dine-adam-who-declared-his-state-autonomous-1533471>; Beth Muthoni, “Muslim Seleka Rebel Splinter Declare Autonomous State In The North East Central African Republic,” *Strategic Intelligence Service*, December 16, 2015, <http://intelligencebriefs.com/muslim-seleka-rebels-splinter-declare-autonomous-state-in-the-north-east-central-african-republic/>; Ole Tangen, “Rebel Leader Declares Autonomous State in Northern CAR,” *Deutsche Welle*, December 16, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/rebel-leader-declares-autonomous-state-in-northern-car/a-18923211>.

<sup>437</sup> AfricaNews, “CAR: Group of Ex-Seleka Rebels Claims to Have Captured LRA Leader,” *AfricaNews*, February 8, 2016, <http://www.africanews.com/2016/02/08/central-africa-ex-seleka-rebel-group-claim-to-have-captured-a-leader-of-lra/>.

<sup>438</sup> Djamil Ahmat, “Centrafrique : ‘Révolution et Justice’ Dément Être Un Groupe Rebelle,” *Alwihda Info*, January 13, 2014, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Revolution-et-Justice-dement-etre-un-groupe-rebelle\\_a9413.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Revolution-et-Justice-dement-etre-un-groupe-rebelle_a9413.html); “Vidéo. Naissance d’un Nouveau Mouvement Rebelle En Centrafrique,” *CameroonVoice.com*, January 3, 2014, <http://cameroonvoice.com/news/article-news-13738.html>.

<sup>439</sup> “Armed Groups in CAR”; “Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence” (London: International Crisis Group, September 21, 2015), 6, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/230-central-african-republic-the-roots-of-violence.pdf>.

<sup>440</sup> “Central African Republic: Time For Accountability” (London: Amnesty International, 2014), 15, [https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/car\\_-\\_amnesty\\_international\\_report\\_-\\_time\\_for\\_accountability\\_july\\_2014.pdf](https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/car_-_amnesty_international_report_-_time_for_accountability_july_2014.pdf); Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 75; “Letter Dated 28 October 2014 from



coalition, reportedly having close ties with Florian Ndjadder.<sup>441</sup> (2) François Toussaint (AKA General Ngoy) is a Belgian national, mercenary, and fugitive who appears unassociated with any previous CAR rebel groups.<sup>442</sup> Moreover, reports indicate that RJ recruits from a variety of groups/places, including former Patassé presidential guard, local youths and village self-defense groups, anti-Balaka, and Baba-Laddé's FPR.<sup>443</sup> Finally, the group is rumored to have had links with the former Bozizé regime (whereas APRD fought against Bozizé in the Central African Bush War).<sup>444</sup>

Because of the balance of recruits is not known (self-defense vs. former APRD vs. anti-Balaka vs. former presidential guard), I have coded self-defense, other rebels, military, and no prior organization as missing under organizational history. I am not confident enough to assert that at least one third of membership came from any of these sources (a coding of "1"), but I am also not confident enough to rule it out (a coding of "0").

It is true that APRD is represented in RJ. RJ includes former APRD, including in leadership, which includes self-proclaimed Colonels Waluba Espilodja (former APRD officer, Sayo's deputy) and Luther Betuban, a FACA sergeant from Bouar and possible former APRD (some sources don't mention this); and self-proclaimed Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Belanga, possibly former APRD (some sources don't mention this).<sup>445</sup> Sources vary on the extent to which RJ is tied to APRD, and it is likely impossible to know the overall balance of the composition using only secondary sources. Because the group may fit our categorization of revival/splinter, this groups certainty rating is dropped to a two. Because this information and the personal histories of Armely Sayo and Toussaint, I have coded former security and former rebels under initial leadership.

According to detailed UN reporting based on interviews with Sayo and Toussaint, the two agreed to form RJ in OCT 2013 in Cameroon. This is listed as the formed date. They crossed back into CAR on 1 NOV 2013 and founded training camps near Paoua.<sup>446</sup> Other sources also site Paoua as their base of operations in Ouham and Ouham-Pendé.<sup>447</sup> Based on the camps, and the fact that RJ appears to have consisted only of Sayo and Toussaint in Cameroon, Paoua is considered the planning location. Thus, the "rural" variable is coded as 1. Attacks began in DEC 2013 (coded as small attack date), which is also when Sayo formally

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the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (United Nations Security Council, October 29, 2014), para. 100, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/762](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/762).

<sup>441</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 75.

<sup>442</sup> "Letter Dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," para. 100; "La Belgique confirme l'extradition du mercenaire François Toussaint," *All Africa*, December 18, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWSF0020141218eaci000q0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>443</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR"; Sylvestre Sokambi, "Centrafrique : Armel Sayo Destitué à La Tête Du Mouvement RJ Par La Base," *RJDH-CENTRAFRIQUE* (blog), April 29, 2016, <http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-armel-sayo-destitue-a-tete-mouvement-rj-base/>; "Central African Republic: Time For Accountability," 15; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 75.

<sup>444</sup> "Ex-CAR Leader's Supporters Planning Return to Power - Radio," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 18, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130518e95i002bd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>445</sup> "Letter Dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," para. 101; "Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence," 6.

<sup>446</sup> "Letter Dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," paras. 100–105.

<sup>447</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR"; "Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence," 6; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 75.

announced the organization.<sup>448</sup> Toussaint claims the group's first large attack was on Beboura on 24 DEC 2013, in which RJ killed 45 Séléka.<sup>449</sup>

RJ has an antecedent group in the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy (Comité national pour la restauration de la démocratie, CNRD), a group formed by Sayo after leaving Séléka in March 2013. In APR, he announced the Union of Central African Armed Forces for the Restoration of Democracy (Union des forces armées centrafricaines pour la restauration de la démocratie, UFACARD), which also included Miskine's FDPC and FACA.<sup>450</sup> Although some reports mention CNRD reinforcing FDPC with fighters, neither CNRD nor UFACARD are reported to have planned or committed any violence. Some sources mention CNRD or UFACARD as "early names" for RJ.

During an interview for CNRD, Armel Sayo said the groups goal was removing Séléka from power and installing a new transition.<sup>451</sup> It is reasonable to assume this goal continued with RJ, especially as IRIN reports that RJ's initial goal was to oust Michel Djotodia from the presidency.<sup>452</sup> As such, goal is coded as takeover.

One source mentions that many of the local recruits from self-defense groups are ethnic Sara-Kaba.<sup>453</sup> However, not much is known of ethnicity of leadership and other members.

I have left civilian attack dates as missing: although I could not find specific information on civilian attacks, I am not confident that they did not occur.

Given that ACLED does not extend to three years after RJ's founding, I had to search for information for the viability variables independently. Based on articles I found from late 2016 and early 2017, it appears that RJ still exists and conducts attacks on civilians. It sometimes acts in alliance with other groups, but remains independent.<sup>454</sup>

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation location of Ouham-Pende, contestation\_local variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. The coder notes that there was a high level of contestation against active rebel groups, specifically Seleka.

### Mouvement de marche populaire pour la démocratie centrafricaine (MMRDC)

AKAs: Movement of Popular Walk for the Central African Republic Democracy

This group attacked the village of Obo on May 24, 2013, having not previously declared themselves. The group had approximately thirty to forty members (reports differ on exactly how many). Although reports

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<sup>448</sup> "Letter Dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," paras. 100–105; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 75; 236TV, *Une Nouvelle Rébellion En RCA : Révolution et Justice*, accessed May 5, 2017, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\\_continue=1&v=7ybPTiMffLM](https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=7ybPTiMffLM).

<sup>449</sup> "Letter Dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," paras. 100–105.

<sup>450</sup> "Centrafrique: ARMEL SAYO PARLE AUX CENTRAFRICAINS," *Afrique News Info* (blog), June 20, 2013, <https://afriquenewsinfo.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/centrafriquearmel-sayo-parle-au-centrafricain/>.

<sup>451</sup> "Centrafrique: ARMEL SAYO PARLE AUX CENTRAFRICAINS."

<sup>452</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR."

<sup>453</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR."

<sup>454</sup> "Bishop: Central African Republic Missions Attacked for Economic Reasons," *Crux* (blog), April 14, 2017, <https://cruxnow.com/global-church/2017/04/14/bishop-central-african-republic-missions-attacked-economic-reasons/>; "Centrafrique: Incursion d'un Groupe Armé à Ngaoundaye, Dans Le Nord-Ouest," *Radio France Internationale*, April 6, 2017, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201704060258.html>; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Central African Republic: 2016 Country Report on Human Rights Practices," Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 3, 2017), <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/af/265236.htm>; "Centrafrique: Rapport Des Nations Unies Sur La Situation Des Droits de l'homme Du 01 Juin 2015 Au 31 Mars 2016," *MINUSCA*, December 14, 2016, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201612141009.html>.

consistently identify them as foreigners, origins vary and include DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan.<sup>455</sup> Because none of them were Central African and all were from neighboring countries but the only attack occurred in Central African Republic, I am unsure of the planning location and have left locational variables as missing. Led by Christian Mbomboli, MMRDC espoused the goal of using Obo as a forward base in a campaign to take the capital, Bangui.<sup>456</sup> Their attack evidently targeted Obo's town hall and market.<sup>457</sup> Because it targeted the market, we can assume the group was targeting civilians. Following their defeat and capture, these members were repatriated to their countries of origin with the support of the Red Cross.<sup>458</sup> The name date is listed as the day of the attack, 24 MAY 2013, and 1 is coded for name\_duress, given that it was only publicly named following capture by state forces.

Given that all members were captured and the group disbanded, and that searches returned no results, this group is coded as 0 for viable and viable\_civ.

### Alliance Africaine Anti-Jihadiste (AAAJ)

AKAs: Anti-Jihadist African Alliance

Formation was announced on May 5, 2013. An alliance of organizations fighting against Séléka, which it calls Islamist. Members include MADGECC, UBBB, FLISM, PZO, and ROY. In addition, the release asked FRD, FDPC, NDRC, and APRD to join.<sup>459</sup>

**Anti-Balaka** – This group was one of the toughest cases to code. Ultimately, we decided to include anti-Balaka as a single, unified group. For semantic clarity, I refer to operational sub-groups within this organization as units, rather than groups (which suggests independent operation). We code anti-Balaka as a single group for the following reasons:

- 1) *Several pre-existing, named groups that supposedly merged to form anti-Balaka do not constitute true rebel groups, or at least would not have before joining anti-Balaka.* There is no evidence that FROCCA, MOREPOL, MRPRC, and APC ever committed or planned to commit violence. To the extent that COCORA and COAC were organized, they did not challenge the state prior to the formation of anti-Balaka. For additional details, see individual discussions of each of these groups below.
- 2) *The actions of anti-Balaka were coordinated enough to suggest a single organization, at least during the early stages.* Early attacks near Bossangoa suggest coordination: on 6 SEPT 2013, anti-Balaka units conducted three separate attacks (in Zéré, Ouham-Bac, and Bodora) simultaneously or near-simultaneously.<sup>460</sup> Likewise, during the attack on Bangui on 5 DEC 2013, anti-Balaka units “were able to launch attacks in many places at the same time in the capital,” indicating coordination.<sup>461</sup> The December attack on Bangui occurred far from anti-

<sup>455</sup> Cyril Bensimon, “Centrafrique: L’enquête Se Poursuit Sur l’attaque de La Ville d’Obo,” *Radio France Internationale*, June 4, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201306040199.html>; “Centrafrique : Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Attaque Une Ville,” *Le Journal Du Développement*, no. 37 (May 27, 2013), <http://www.lejournaldudeveloppement.com/pdfs/caflf-LE-JOURNAL-DU-DEVELOPPEMENT--37.pdf>; Xinhua, “Centrafrique : La Ville d’Obo Attaquée Par Une Bande Armée,” *Centrafrique Presse*, May 24, 2013, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/centrafrique-la-ville-d-obo-attaque%C3%A9e-par-une-bande-arm%C3%A9e>; Xinhua, “RCA: Les Assaillants Sur La Ville d’Obo Transférés Aux Leurs Pays d’origine,” *french.people.com.cn*, June 28, 2013, <http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8303458.html>.

<sup>456</sup> “Centrafrique : Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Attaque Une Ville”; Xinhua, “Centrafrique : La Ville d’Obo Attaquée Par Une Bande Armée.”

<sup>457</sup> “Centrafrique : Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Attaque Une Ville.”

<sup>458</sup> Xinhua, “RCA: Les Assaillants Sur La Ville d’Obo Transférés Aux Leurs Pays d’origine.”

<sup>459</sup> “Les forces du FDPC d’Abdoulaye Miskine appellent à se rejoindre l’Alliance [press release],” *All Africa*, May 6, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWSF0020130506e956000xq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>460</sup> “‘They Came To Kill’: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic” (Human Rights Watch, December 18, 2013), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/18/they-came-kill/escalating-atrocities-central-african-republic>.

<sup>461</sup> “Central African Republic: Time For Accountability,” 16.

Balaka's original operating base near Bossangoa, and it is difficult to know the extent to which Bossangoa operations and Bangui operations were coordinated. The only evidence either way was an interview in which an anti-Balaka leader reveals that his units [from the Bossangoa area] travelled to Bangui to participate in the December attacks.<sup>462</sup> With this limited evidence, we inferred that anti-Balaka units in Bossangoa and Bangui coordinated or planned together; however, this is an area where additional information would be ideal. Finally, IRIN also points out coordination among anti-Balaka units, noting that there appears to be no infighting among anti-Balaka.<sup>463</sup> For additional evidence of coordination, see discussion of former FACA involvement in anti-Balaka below.

- 3) *While discernable factions did emerge within anti-Balaka, they came several months after initial attacks.* Notably, one source delineates factions headed by Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Joachim Kokaté/Sébastien Wenezoui.<sup>464</sup> However, these divisions did not emerge until spring 2014.<sup>465</sup>

The caveat in this classification is that not everyone who calls themselves anti-Balaka is actually connected to the organization. For instance, former Bozizé officials have attempted to claim leadership of anti-Balaka. There are also many individuals who join in anti-Balaka action for individual attacks, but are not truly members of the organization. Finally and most importantly, this caveat also means that some groups which call themselves anti-Balaka may actually constitute independent organizations. Indeed, there is some evidence that such groups exist: for instance, after anti-Balaka signed the Brazzaville ceasefire, a group claiming to be anti-Balaka conducted an attack in Batafango; anti-Balaka leadership denied affiliation with the perpetrators.<sup>466</sup> These independent groups are not included in our analysis, as their identification and coding would be impractical if not impossible given limited available information about them.

The term anti-Balaka originated prior to Séléka's emergence and seizure of power. The term originally referred to local self-defense groups that President Bozizé commissioned circa 2009, with the goal of fighting banditry in areas of the country that his forces could not secure.<sup>467</sup> These groups were especially prevalent around Bossangoa, Bozoum, and Bocoranga (i.e. Oham and Ouham-Pendé prefectures). In some cases, they even received support (usually ammunition) from the Bozizé regime.<sup>468</sup>

It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when these self-defense groups transformed into a rebel group, but there is more information on *how* the change occurred. Several sources document how three different groups came together to create the anti-Balaka rebel group: (1) the original self-defense groups, discussed above; (2) former state security forces, discussed further below; and (3) bandits and/or youth who joined at later stages.<sup>469</sup>

Former state security forces played an especially important role in anti-Balaka's transformation from discrete self-defense groups into a unified rebel group. On 27 July 2013, Michel Djotodia disbanded FACA.<sup>470</sup> This

<sup>462</sup> "Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee," Human Rights Watch, February 12, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>.

<sup>463</sup> "Who Are the Anti-Balaka of CAR?"

<sup>464</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic."

<sup>465</sup> "RCA: Nouvelles Divisions à La Tête Du Mouvement Anti-Balaka - RFI," RFI Afrique, May 18, 2014, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140518-rca-nouvelles-divisions-tete-mouvement-anti-balaka>.

<sup>466</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 47.

<sup>467</sup> "Central African Republic: Time For Accountability," 16; Emily Mellgard, "What Is the Antibalaka?," Centre on Religion & Geopolitics, September 7, 2016, <http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/anti-balaka/what-antibalaka>; "They Came To Kill": Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic"; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 44.

<sup>468</sup> Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 44.

<sup>469</sup> "Central African Republic: Time For Accountability," 16; Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," 44–45.

<sup>470</sup> Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, 42.

event seems to have triggered or at least accelerated ex-FACA joining forces with anti-Balaka.<sup>471</sup> Many anti-Balaka still use their FACA ranks when speaking publicly, wear FACA uniforms, and even use FACA barracks.<sup>472</sup> They use assault rifles and automatic weapons, believed to have been acquired from FACA.<sup>473</sup> Moreover, several detained anti-Balaka leaders have been identified as former FACA soldiers.<sup>474</sup>

Several sources indicate that former FACA are probably responsible for the command structure of anti-Balaka. HRW describes the command and control structure as “clear”:

In every region visited by Human Rights Watch during four research missions since November, local anti-balaka fighters immediately took Human Rights Watch to their leaders when asked to do so, and each anti-balaka group had its own base, military leader, secretary-general, and spokesperson. The anti-balaka movement also has a national spokesperson and military coordinator in Bangui...<sup>475</sup>

Amnesty outlines the command structure as hierarchical, with each unit operating in a defined geographic area and reporting to a more senior commander. It describes the command structure as “sophisticated,” and probably organized by former FACA.<sup>476</sup> Another source writes that “initially... the movement must have had some central command and control evidently given to it by former FACA, Gendarmerie, and Bozizé’s Presidential Guards. At that time the movement carried out some very well coordinated and prepared attacks.”<sup>477</sup>

During early reporting, there was much confusion over who anti-Balaka were. However, I have not coded this group as clandestine. As the quotation for HRW above shows, researchers were immediately directed to anti-Balaka leadership; there were no attempts to shield them from media exposure.

Knowing that disbanded FACA played an important role in organizing anti-Balaka into a rebel group, the transformation likely occurred in mid-summer 2013. In accounts based on extensive fieldwork, HRW’s earliest reported attack occurred on 31 AUG (coded as both small and civilian attack). Anti-Balaka killed a Mbororo cattle herder. When Séléka forces attempted to recover the body, anti-Balaka ambushed them, driving them out of the village of Boubou.<sup>478</sup> One source indicates that some attacks on Séléka forces pre-date the initial 31 AUG attack that I recorded, but I could not find additional information these attacks.<sup>479</sup> The first large attack came on 6 SEPT, when anti-Balaka killed at least 56 Muslim traders and herders in Zéré.<sup>480</sup> Originally, anti-Balaka’s stronghold was in Ouham prefecture, especially around Bossangoa, but it spread quickly.<sup>481</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside” (although the primary planning location may have shifted to Bangui within the first year).

Although the original anti-Balaka self-defense groups included Muslims, Christians, and animists, the anti-Balaka rebel group does not have Muslims among its ranks. They are predominantly Christian.<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>471</sup> Mellgard, “What Is the Antibalaka?”

<sup>472</sup> “Central African Republic: Time For Accountability,” 17.

<sup>473</sup> “‘They Came To Kill’: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic.”

<sup>474</sup> “Central African Republic: Time For Accountability,” 17.

<sup>475</sup> “Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee.”

<sup>476</sup> “Central African Republic: Time For Accountability,” 17.

<sup>477</sup> Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 46.

<sup>478</sup> “‘They Came To Kill’: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic.”

<sup>479</sup> Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 44.

<sup>480</sup> “‘They Came To Kill’: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic.”

<sup>481</sup> “‘They Came To Kill’: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic”; Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 44, 46.

<sup>482</sup> “Central African Republic: War Crimes by Ex-Seleka Rebels,” Human Rights Watch, November 24, 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/24/central-african-republic-war-crimes-ex-seleka-rebels>; Mellgard, “What Is the Antibalaka?”; “‘They Came To Kill’: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic”; Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” 44.

While the presence of anti-Balaka rebels has always been clear, more specific information on their organization and goals was unknown during early stages of rebellion.<sup>483</sup> It was not the style of early anti-Balaka leaders to make public pronouncements claiming attacks. Another result of anti-Balaka's shroud of mystery, the group has no official statement of goals. We do know that anti-Balaka seems to have organized in response to Séléka abuses and has targeted Séléka, whom they deem as "foreigners."<sup>484</sup> In addition, anti-Balaka have attacked AU and French peacekeeping troops in CAR.<sup>485</sup> Finally, victims of anti-Balaka attacks have reported use of language indicating genocidal intent against Muslims.<sup>486</sup>

Although no longer acting as a single group, anti-Balaka units are still active. They have attacked MINUSCA several times in 2016-2017, and they are currently allied with FPRC in territorial battles against the UPC. As such, anti-Balaka is coded as 1 for viable.<sup>487</sup>

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation district of Ouham, contestation\_local variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. The coder notes that there was a high level of contestation against active rebel groups, specifically Seleka.

#### **Parti Centrafricain pour l'Unité et le Développement (PCUD)**

AKAs: Central African Party for Unity and Development

A political party formed by the anti-Balaka so they can contest elections. Formation of the party came with orders from the top to lay down arms.<sup>488</sup>

#### **\*Front pour la Libération et l'Indépendance de la Sangha-Mbaéré (FLISM)**

AKAs: Front for the Liberation and Independence of Sangha-Mbaéré

A militant group that announced its formation on April 18, 2013, whose aim is independence for a Republic of Sangha-Mbaéré in southwest CAR.<sup>489</sup> It released a communique regarding the founding of their group on

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<sup>483</sup> "Who Are the Anti-Balaka of CAR?"

<sup>484</sup> Ty McCormick, "One Day, We Will Start a Big War," *Foreign Policy* (blog), accessed May 8, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/28/one-day-we-will-start-a-big-war-central-african-republic-un-violence/>; "Central African Republic: Executions by Rebel Group," Human Rights Watch, February 16, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/16/central-african-republic-executions-rebel-group>; "Central African Republic: War Crimes by Ex-Seleka Rebels"; "They Came To Kill": Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic."

<sup>485</sup> "Central African Republic: Time For Accountability," 15.

<sup>486</sup> "They Came To Kill": Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic."

<sup>487</sup> UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Zeid Alarmed by Increasing Violence, Killings, in Central African Republic," Text, ReliefWeb, May 16, 2017, <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/zeid-alarmed-increasing-violence-killings-central-african-republic>; "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016)" (United Nations Security Council, December 5, 2016), [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2016\\_1032.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_1032.pdf); Philip Kleinfeld, "Central African Republic: What's Gone Wrong?," IRIN, February 24, 2017, <https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/24/central-african-republic-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong>; Philip Kleinfeld, "Central African Republic Rebels Turn on Each Other as Violence Flares," IRIN, May 18, 2017, <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/05/18/central-african-republic-rebels-turn-each-other-violence-flares>; "Central African Republic: Armed Groups Target Civilians," Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/02/central-african-republic-armed-groups-target-civilians>.

<sup>488</sup> Flynn Daniel, "Central African Militia Says to Lay down Arms, Become Political Party," *Reuters*, November 30, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-militia-idUSKCN0JE0J820141130>; Al Jazeera, "Anti-Balaka Group to Lay down Arms in CAR," Al Jazeera, November 20, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/11/anti-balaka-group-lay-down-arms-car-20141130152911116208.html>.

<sup>489</sup> "Profile: Front for the Liberation and Independence of the Sangha-Mbaéré (FLISM)," *WorldWideConflicts* (blog), April 26, 2013, <https://worldwideconflicts.wordpress.com/2013/04/26/profile-front-for-the-liberation-and->



18 APR 2013, stating their goal of secession and what towns they planned to capture. The communique was in present tense, indicating that the group never intended to be covert.<sup>490</sup> Evidently, the group's members are Pygmy and Bantu.<sup>491</sup> The group's communiqués claim it captured several towns.<sup>492</sup> However, I could find no references to violence or planned violence outside of the group's own communiqués (including ACLED events of similar description); as such, the group is excluded.

#### \* Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R)

AKAs: Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation

3R operates in the Kouï area of Ouham- Pendé.<sup>493</sup> It is made up largely of Muslim cattle herders, and seems to have no alliance or connections with Séléka.<sup>494</sup> It emerged in late 2015 (HRW specifies November in a video).<sup>495</sup> The group originally met peacefully with locals to discuss 3R's purpose, claiming it was to protect minority Peuhl from anti-Balaka attacks.<sup>496</sup> As such, it is clear that the organization never operated clandestinely. The CAR government is absent in this region, and MINUSCA is present but unable to secure the area, leaving anti-Balaka to operate with impunity, roaming the area openly armed.<sup>497</sup> 3R claims that it wants the national authorities to resume governance of the area, but will refuse to disarm as long as anti-Balaka in the area remain armed.<sup>498</sup> One HRW indicated that the goal of protecting ethnic

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independence-of-the-sangha-mbaere-flism/; Djamil Ahmat, "Centrafrique : La Rébellion FLISM Commence La Guerre Contre Les 'Islamistes Seleka' (Communiqué)," Alwihda Info, April 25, 2013, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-La-rebellion-FLISM-commence-la-guerre-contre-les-islamistes-Seleka-communique\\_a7283.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-La-rebellion-FLISM-commence-la-guerre-contre-les-islamistes-Seleka-communique_a7283.html).

<sup>490</sup> Djamil Ahmat, "RCA : Création Du Front Pour La Libération et l'Indépendance de La Sangha-Mbaéré (FLISM)," Alwihda Info, April 20, 2013, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Creation-du-Front-pour-la-Liberation-et-l-Independance-de-la-Sangha-Mbaere-FLISM\\_a7265.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Creation-du-Front-pour-la-Liberation-et-l-Independance-de-la-Sangha-Mbaere-FLISM_a7265.html).

<sup>491</sup> Ai Bangui, "Centrafrique: Les Forces Du FDPC d'Abdoulaye Miskine Appelées à Rejoindre l'Alliance," *Africa Info*, May 6, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201305062177.html>.

<sup>492</sup> Ahmat, "Centrafrique."

<sup>493</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group," Human Rights Watch, December 20, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/20/central-african-republic-mayhem-new-group>; Laurent Larcher, "The Battle of Ouaka in Central African Republic - La Croix International," La Croix International, February 27, 2017, <https://international.la-croix.com/news/the-battle-of-ouaka-in-central-african-republic/4756>; Azad Essa, "Newly Formed 3R Rebel Group Inflicts Horrors in CAR: UN," Al Jazeera, December 23, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/newly-formed-3r-rebel-group-inflicts-horrors-car-161223035217671.html>; Herve Serefio, "Centrafrique: Le Chef Rebelle Camerounais Le Général SIDIKI Sème La Psychose Dans La Préfecture de l'Ouham-Pende," *Diaspora Magazine*, September 26, 2016, [http://www.diaspora-magazine.com/Centrafrique-Le-chef-rebelle-camerounais-le-general-SIDIKI-seme-la-psychose-dans-la-prefecture-de-l-Ouham-Pende\\_a1432.html](http://www.diaspora-magazine.com/Centrafrique-Le-chef-rebelle-camerounais-le-general-SIDIKI-seme-la-psychose-dans-la-prefecture-de-l-Ouham-Pende_a1432.html); Alain Nzilo, "Centrafrique: L'asseau Sur Boccaranga, Les Soldats Congolais de La MINUSCA Ont Mis En Déroute Les Rebelles Des 3R.," *Corbeau News Centrafrique* (blog), October 27, 2016, <http://www.corbeaunews.ca/centrafrique-lasseau-sur-boccaranga-les-soldats-congolais-de-la-minusca-ont-mis-en-deroute-les-rebelles-des-3r/>; Bienvenue Marina Moulou-Gnatho, "Centrafrique : Le Mouvement Armé 3R Accusé de Renforcer Ses Dispositifs Dans Le Nord," *RJDH* (blog), January 12, 2017, <http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-mouvement-arme-3r-accuse-de-renforcer-dispositifs-nord/>.

<sup>494</sup> Essa, "Newly Formed 3R Rebel Group Inflicts Horrors in CAR."

<sup>495</sup> Essa, "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group"; Human Rights Watch, *New Rebel Group 3R Emerges in Central African Republic*, 2016, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\\_continue=2&v=8VWa6hkMADI](https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=8VWa6hkMADI).

<sup>496</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group"; Larcher, "The Battle of Ouaka in Central African Republic - La Croix International"; "RCA: Rencontre Exclusive Avec Sidiki Abass, Chef Du Groupe Armé 3R - RFI," RFI Afrique, April 28, 2017, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170428-rca-rencontre-exclusive-sidiki-abass-chef-groupe-arme-3r>.

<sup>497</sup> Essa, "Newly Formed 3R Rebel Group Inflicts Horrors in CAR"; "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group."

<sup>498</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group."

Peuhl is a ruse; the group is really driven by either Cameroonians or Central Africans who want to profit from the crisis.<sup>499</sup>

3R's relations with local villagers went south as the group began to attack villages accused of harboring anti-Balaka. HRW reports that 3R has attacked at least 13 villages in the Kouï sub-prefecture since NOV 2015. In the earliest recorded attack (no date), 3R killed the village chief in Boumari (coded as small and civilian attack, as there was no indication that the chief held significant political power). Additional attacks include unspecified attacks in APR and MAY 2016, an attack on De Gualle on 27 SEPT 2016 that killed at least 17 civilians, and the killing of at least 50 civilians in Bocaranga and Kouï sub-prefectures from 21 to 27 NOV 2016. However, HRW was unable to document all attacks due to security concerns.<sup>500</sup> A local source also reports 3R massacred 100 people in Dankouri village on 19 SEPT 2016 (large attack), and another local source reports that 3R made advances toward Bocaranga as early as OCT 2016.<sup>501</sup> In some cases, anti-Balaka were present in the attacked villages, but fled quickly leaving civilians to bear the brunt of the attack.<sup>502</sup>

Leadership includes Sidiki (Siddiki) Abass, the lead commander who is a Cameroonian claiming to be the half-brother of CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera; Bashir (no family name given), the spokesperson; and Patrick Gombado, the general secretary.<sup>503</sup>

The group does not appear to have any significant resources, apparently selling cows to buy black market weapons.<sup>504</sup> Anti-Balaka claims that they have received reinforcements from Cameroon.<sup>505</sup>

After suspending its participation in CAR's peace process, 3R forces attacked both civilians and government forces in June 2019.<sup>506</sup> It is coded as viable.

Kouï is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1." In this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation.

SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 election-related contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because this event occurred outside of the group formation district of Ouham-Pende, contestation\_local variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### **\*Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain/Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC/MPCA)**

AKAs: Central African Patriotic Movement/Patriotic Movement for Central Africa

A splinter from ex-Séléka FRPC in July 2015, apparently breaking with FRPC owing to its lack of commitment to the peace process, originally calling itself a political party.<sup>507</sup> Apparently at some point it formed a

<sup>499</sup> Essa, "Newly Formed 3R Rebel Group Inflicts Horrors in CAR."

<sup>500</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group."

<sup>501</sup> Serefio, "Centrafrique: Le Chef Rebelle Camerounais Le Général SIDIKI Sème La Psychose Dans La Préfecture de l'Ouham-Pende"; Nzilo, "Centrafrique: L'aseau Sur Boccaranga, Les Soldats Congolais de La MINUSCA Ont Mis En Déroute Les Rebelles Des 3R."

<sup>502</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group."

<sup>503</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group"; Nzilo, "Centrafrique: L'aseau Sur Boccaranga, Les Soldats Congolais de La MINUSCA Ont Mis En Déroute Les Rebelles Des 3R."; Serefio, "Centrafrique: Le Chef Rebelle Camerounais Le Général SIDIKI Sème La Psychose Dans La Préfecture de l'Ouham-Pende."

<sup>504</sup> "Central African Republic: Mayhem by New Group."

<sup>505</sup> Marina Moulou-Gnatho, "Centrafrique : Le Mouvement Armé 3R Accusé de Renforcer Ses Dispositifs Dans Le Nord."

<sup>506</sup> "UN Troops Launch Operation against CAR's 3R Rebels," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 18, 2020, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020200618eg6i000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>507</sup> "Communiqué de Presse Du Mouvement Patriotique Pour La Centrafrique," *Afrique News Info* (blog), August 4, 2015, <https://afriquenewsinfo.wordpress.com/2015/08/04/centrafriquecommuniqué-de-presse-du-mouvement-patriotique-pour-la-centrafrique/>; Daniel Nguerelessio, "Un Nouveau Parti Politique Des Ex-Séléka Naît à Kaga-Bandoro," *RJDH* (blog), August 3, 2015, <http://rjdh.org/un-nouveau-parti-politique-des-ex-seleka-nait-a-kaga-bandoro/>.

military wing that began collaborating with FRPC to commit violence in northeast CAR, causing the political wing to denounce and expel leaders of the military wing.<sup>508</sup> Purported to have joined the unnamed alliance between ex-Séléka factions, although press releases from MPC deny this.<sup>509</sup>

#### \* Forces Révolutionnaires pour la Démocratie (FRD)

AKAs: Revolutionary Forces for Democracy, Republican Front for Democracy, Front Républicain pour la Démocratie

This group is led by François Nelson Ndjadder.<sup>510</sup> It is excluded because it is a splinter group from Séléka. Its Ndjadder had served as spokesperson for Séléka (also described as spokesman for the CPSK faction of Séléka).<sup>511</sup> By his own words, he left Séléka/CPSK and took loyal followers with him.<sup>512</sup> Several sources refer to it as a splinter group or say it consists of re-deployed Séléka.<sup>513</sup>

#### \*Mouvement d'Auto-Défense des Gbayas de l'Eglise du Christianisme Céleste (MADGECC)

AKAs: Self-Defense Movement of Gbayas and the Church of Celestial Christianity

According to its founding statement, MADGECC formed because locals were targeted because they share Bozizé's ethnicity and religion. It claimed to be purely a self-defense movement to prevent atrocities and attacks. Its spokesperson is Célestin Ferran. The statement was made from Carnot.<sup>514</sup> In a later statement,

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<sup>508</sup> Laurent Larcher, "Centrafrique : conflit entre milices pour contrôler Bambari," *La Croix*, February 26, 2017, sec. Monde, <http://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/En-Centrafrique-conflit-entre-milices-pour-contrôle-Bambari-2017-02-26-1200827633>; Alain Nzilo, "Centrafrique : Al-Khatim et Idriss Albachar Exclut de MPC Par Le Bureau Politique," *Corbeau News Centrafrique* (blog), January 16, 2017, <http://www.corbeaunews.ca/centrafrique-al-khatim-et-idriss-albachar-exclus-de-mpc-par-le-bureau-politique/>; MUNISCA, "Rapport Special Sur Les Incidents de Kaga-Bandoro" (MUNISCA), accessed March 7, 2017,

[https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport\\_minusca\\_violences\\_kaga.pdf](https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_minusca_violences_kaga.pdf); RFI, "RCA: Au Moins 30 Morts Lors de Violences à Kaga-Bandoro," RFI Afrique, October 13, 2016, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161013-rca-moins-25-morts-lors-violences-kaga-bandoro>; RFI, "RCA: Le MPC d'al-Khatim Dément Être à l'origine Des Violences à Kaga-Bandoro," RFI Afrique, October 14, 2016, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161014-rca-le-mpc-al-khatim-dement-etre-origine-violences-kaga-bandoro>.

<sup>509</sup> MPC, "COMMUNIQUE Du MOUVEMENT PATRIOTIQUE POUR LE CENTRAFRIQUE (MPC)," *La Nouvelle Centrafrique* (blog), May 30, 2016, <http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/2016/05/30/communique-du-mouvement-patriotique-pour-le-centrafrique-mpc/>.

<sup>510</sup> Bangui, "Centrafrique: Les Forces Du FDPC d'Abdoulaye Miskine Appelés à Rejoindre l'Alliance."

<sup>511</sup> "Central African Republic: Central African Rebels Enter Capital," *Deutsche Welle*, March 25, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201303250021.html>; Tendai Marima, "Central African Republic: Rebel Surge Shatters Fragile Peace," *ThinkAfricaPress*, March 25, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201303250009.html>; Francis Kpatindé, "RCA : La Revanche Des Héritiers - RFI," RFI Afrique, December 31, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121231-rca-revanche-heritiers-bozize-massi-ndjadder-bangui>; Lyès Menacer, "Afrique Centrale: Bozizé Vit-Il Ses Derniers Jours à La Tête de La Centrafrique ?," *La Tribune*, January 2, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201301020616.html>; "Centrafrique: Deux Nouvelles Villes Tombent Aux Mains Des Rebelles - RFI," RFI Afrique, January 5, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130105-centrafrique-deux-nouvelles-villes-tombent-mains-rebelles-seleka-bozize>.

<sup>512</sup> Djamil Ahmat, "Nelson Ndjadder, Je Suis Le Président Du FRD, Mouvement Politico-Militaire En Centrafrique," *Alwihda Info*, October 1, 2014, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Nelson-Ndjadder-je-suis-le-president-du-FRD-mouvement-politico-militaire-en-centrafrique\\_a12863.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Nelson-Ndjadder-je-suis-le-president-du-FRD-mouvement-politico-militaire-en-centrafrique_a12863.html).

<sup>513</sup> Bangui, "Centrafrique: Les Forces Du FDPC d'Abdoulaye Miskine Appelés À Rejoindre l'Alliance"; "Séléka Fighters Attacked by Forces Loyal to Ex-CAR Leader - Chadian Paper," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 13, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130913e99d002gx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>514</sup> "RCA : L'ethnie de Bozizé Annonce La Création d'un Mouvement d'auto-Défense Contre La Séléka," *Centrafrique Presse*, April 20, 2013, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/rca-l-ethnie-de-bozize-C3%A9-annonce-la-cr%C3%A9ation-d-un-mouvement-d-auto-d%C3%A9fense-contre-la-s%C3%A9leka-C3%A9>.

the group says it participated in the creation of/joined the anti-Balaka and is actively fighting Séléka.<sup>515</sup> However, I could find no external reference to violence or planned violence. As such, it is excluded.

**\*Union des Bandas de Bambari et Bria (UBBB)**

AKAs: Union of Bandas from Bambari and Bria

I could find no reference to this group besides their joining the AAAJ (see above).

**\*Patriotes Zandes d'Obo**

AKAs: Zande Patriots of Obo

I could find no reference to this group besides their joining the AAAJ (see above).

**\*Rassemblement Oubanguien Yakoma (ROY)**

AKAs: none

I could find no reference to this group besides their joining the AAAJ (see above).

**\* Union des Forces Républicaine-Fondamentale**

AKAs: Union of Republican Forces-Fundamental

This group split off from Union of Republican Forces in 2010, led by Askin Nzenge Landa.<sup>516</sup> As such, it is excluded.

**\*Mouvement de résistance pour la défense de la patrie (MRDP)**

AKAs: Resistance Movement for the Defense of the Fatherland

This group was established on 4 AUG 2016 in Bambari, Ouaka prefecture.<sup>517</sup> It was never clandestine, having published its founding statement. Named leadership includes Seraphin Komeya and William Ndjapou; the UN also reports that local anti-Balaka leader Gaëtan Bouadé seems to have been involved the group's formation and maintains ties, even while publicly disassociating himself from the group.<sup>518</sup>

It is apparently a youth organization with both a civil and military wing.<sup>519</sup> The group's aims include securing the local population from ex-Séléka attacks and achieving the removal of MINUSCA from the area, claiming that it has colluded with ex-Séléka.<sup>520</sup> On 3 SEPT 2016, it led a local march or demonstration based on

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<sup>515</sup> "RCA : Dissolution de l'Alliance Africaine Anti Jihadiste, Co-Fondateur Des Anti-Balaka," Alwihda Info, May 9, 2014, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Dissolution-de-l-Alliance-Africaine-Anti-Jihadiste-co-fondateur-des-Anti-Balaka\\_a11137.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Dissolution-de-l-Alliance-Africaine-Anti-Jihadiste-co-fondateur-des-Anti-Balaka_a11137.html).

<sup>516</sup> "Armed Groups in CAR."

<sup>517</sup> "Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (United Nations Security Council, December 5, 2016), para. 138, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2016\\_1032.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_1032.pdf); "Déclaration Du Mouvement de Résistance Pour La Défense de La Patrie (M.R.D.P).," Centrafrique Presse Info, August 19, 2016, <http://www.centrafrique-presse.info/site/info-dossier-9692.html>.

<sup>518</sup> "Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," paras. 139–142; TAKA PARLER, "LE MRDP DÉSIGNE SON PORTE PAROLE," Taka Parler, September 13, 2016, <http://takaparlnews.over-blog.com/2016/09/le-mrdp-designe-son-porte-parole.html>.

<sup>519</sup> TAKA PARLER, "LE MRDP DÉSIGNE SON PORTE PAROLE."

<sup>520</sup> "Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council," paras. 138, 141–2; "WEEKLY BRIEFING 1-7 September 2016" (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service), accessed May 10, 2017,

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WEEKLY%20BRIEFING%207%20September%202016.pdf>; ANDJIOYO, "Radio Ndeke Luka - Bambari : Une Marche Pour L'Amélioration Des Conditions Sécuritaires," September 3, 2016, <http://www.radiondekelukaka.org/securite/item/26363-bambari-une-marche-pour-l->

these aims.<sup>521</sup> On 4 SEPT 2016, it issued an ultimatum giving MINUSCA 30 days to arrest Ali Darassa.<sup>522</sup> On 4 OCT 2016, the group announced it would take action.<sup>523</sup> It later claimed the 13 OCT attack on a UN peacekeeping convoy traveling on the road between Grimari and Bambari.<sup>524</sup> One civilian died in the attack, but it was incidental – he/she had been traveling in the convoy.<sup>525</sup> Its leader, Seraphin Komeya, also reportedly helped organize anti-MINUSCA demonstrations in Bangui on 26 OCT 2016.<sup>526</sup> No additional reports on the group surfaced following these events. Due to its forming and operating in Bambari, Bambari satisfies the “rural” variable as a 1.

While the group did not conduct a violent attack until OCT, there is evidence that it planned to partake in violent challenge of authorities from the beginning. Notably, the group said it would not participate in DDR because it requires weapons and ammunition to achieve its goals. It also criticized anti-Balaka for being too weak militarily.<sup>527</sup> Finally, as mentioned above, it had a military wing.

The Enough Project reported that, as of July 2017, “the group has nearly disappeared” with “most of its combatants joining other local anti-Balaka groups.”<sup>528</sup> The group did not become viable.

SCAD reported two riots of sufficient size, targeting the National Assembly president (4820306) and a UN peacekeeper (4820313), to count as contestation in the year preceding August 2016.

#### \*Front pour le retour de l'ordre constitutionnel en Centrafrique, FROCCA

AKAs: Front for the Return of Constitutional Order in CAR, Front pour le retour à la légalité constitutionnelle en Centrafrique

This group is often referred to as a core group in anti-Balaka.<sup>529</sup> However, the only evidence I could find of its existence were statements issued from France by Bozizé and his close associates, including Lin Banoukepa and Levi Yakété.<sup>530</sup> They attempted to make alliances with other armed groups, but were

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amélioration-des-conditions-sécuritaires.html; “Déclaration Du Mouvement de Résistance Pour La Défense de La Patrie (M.R.D.P).”; “Mémorandum Du MRDP Bambari Ouaka,” Centrafrique Presse, September 14, 2016, <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2016/09/memorandum-du-mrdp-bambari-ouaka.html>.

<sup>521</sup> ANDJIOYO, “Radio Ndeke Luka - Bambari”; “Mémorandum Du MRDP Bambari Ouaka.”

<sup>522</sup> “Mémorandum Du MRDP Bambari Ouaka”; “Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” para. 141.

<sup>523</sup> “Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” para. 141.

<sup>524</sup> “Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” para. 141; “Central African Republic: UN Mission Condemns ‘Cowardly’ Attacks Peacekeepers,” *UN News Service*, October 18, 2016, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201610180692.html>; Jean Kassongo, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bandits’ Attacks Target Peacekeepers,” *CAJ News Agency (Johannesburg)*, October 18, 2016, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201610180638.html>.

<sup>525</sup> Kassongo, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bandits’ Attacks Target Peacekeepers.”

<sup>526</sup> “Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” para. 142.

<sup>527</sup> “Letter Dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2262 (2016) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” paras. 138–9.

<sup>528</sup> Nathalia Dukhan, “Splintered Warfare: Alliances, Affiliations, and Agendas of Armed Factions and Politico-Military Groups in the Central African Republic” (Washington, DC: The Enough Project, August 10, 2017), 15, <https://enoughproject.org/reports/splintered-warfare-central-african-republic>.

<sup>529</sup> Tendai Marima, “Will the Post-Djotodia Era Usher in Peace or Increased Volatility in the CAR? [Analysis],” *All Africa*, January 16, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140116ea1g000gq&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Weyns et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic.”

<sup>530</sup> Marima, “Will the Post-Djotodia Era Usher in Peace or Increased Volatility in the CAR?”; Ghislaine Dupont, “François Bozizé Sur RFI: «Si l’occasion Se Présente, Je Souhaite Reprendre Le Pouvoir» - RFI,” RFI Afrique,



rebuffed.<sup>531</sup> Several articles support the notion that this is a briefcase rebellion that attempts to maintain the influence of Bozizé, but has no actual sway on events in CAR – including one with a French diplomat (anonymous).<sup>532</sup>

#### **\*Mouvement Révolutionnaire Populaire pour la Libération (MOREPOL)**

AKAs: Popular Revolutionary Movement for Liberation

This group leadership was claimed by Lévy Yakité in a statement which he wrote.<sup>533</sup> It was created in exile in Cameroon.<sup>534</sup> The group has been referred to as a “mystery”.<sup>535</sup> I could find no external reference to substantiate violence or planned violence.

#### **\*Mouvement de Résistance Populaire pour la Refondation de Centrafrique (MRPRC)**

AKAs: People’s Resistance Movement for Reforming of the Central African Republic

The named leadership of this group includes Levi Yakété (LevyYakété, Levi Yakite). It appears to have formed in December 2013.<sup>536</sup> The group is supposedly made up of defected FACA and vigilantes.<sup>537</sup> The United Nations detailed that he has ordered the arrest of Séléka, called for attacks on people disloyal to Bozizé, and “recruiting you militiamen to attack those hostile to the regime with machetes.”<sup>538</sup> However, this last act in particular seems to have occurred more during his leadership of COCORA (see above). Moreover, Yakété seems to have gone into exile in Paris and, although he visited Cameroon and Benin, seems to never have returned to CAR, dying in Paris in 2014.<sup>539</sup> I had a hard time finding reference to this group

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August 10, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130810-francois-bozize-centrafrique-reprendre-pouvoir-seleka-djotodia-rca>; “Centrafrique : Le FROCCA de Bozizé Propose Un Plan de Sortie de Crise,” Alwihda Info, January 11, 2014, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Le-FROCCA-de-Bozize-propose-un-plan-de-sortie-de-crise\\_a9436.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Le-FROCCA-de-Bozize-propose-un-plan-de-sortie-de-crise_a9436.html); “Bozize Movement Says It Is Behind Attacks in CAR Capital,” VOA, December 5, 2013, <http://www.voanews.com/a/bozize-movement-says-it-is-behind-attacks-in-car-capital/1804363.html>; Afriquenews, “Centrafrique : Le FROCCA de Bozizé Réagit Suite Aux Événements de BOY-RABE,” Alwihda Info, August 22, 2013, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Le-FROCCA-de-Bozize-reagit-suite-aux-evenements-de-BOY-RABE\\_a8016.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Le-FROCCA-de-Bozize-reagit-suite-aux-evenements-de-BOY-RABE_a8016.html); “Centrafrique : Le FROCCA de Bozizé Conteste l’ouverture d’une Enquête Par Le Tchad,” Alwihda Info, December 30, 2013, [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Le-FROCCA-de-Bozize-conteste-l-ouverture-d-une-enquete-par-le-Tchad\\_a9247.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Le-FROCCA-de-Bozize-conteste-l-ouverture-d-une-enquete-par-le-Tchad_a9247.html); “Recrutement Des Combattants Du FROCCA de Bozizé Au Domicile d’un de Ses Lieutenant à Yaoundé,” Centrafrique Presse Info, August 14, 2013, [http://www.centrafrique-presse.info/site/info-annonce\\_et\\_divers-3253.html](http://www.centrafrique-presse.info/site/info-annonce_et_divers-3253.html).

<sup>531</sup> “Central African Republic Rebel Chief Pledges to Lay down Arms,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 13, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020141213eacd0018i&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Séléka Fighters Attacked by Forces Loyal to Ex-CAR Leader - Chadian Paper.”

<sup>532</sup> Anne LE COZ, “Centrafrique: six mois après sa chute, un retour de Bozizé jugé improbable,” *Agence France Presse*, September 11, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPFR00020130911e99b00410&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “L’ex-président centrafricain Bozizé a quitté la France,” *Reuters - Les actualités en français*, October 10, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=REUTFR00020131010e9aa00041&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>533</sup> “Lévi YAKETE Préoccupés Par La Dégradation Aggravée de La Situation Sécuritaire, Économique et Sociale de La RCA,” *lesinfos.over-blog.com*, June 14, 2013, <http://lesinfos.over-blog.com/l%C3%A9vi-yakete-pr%C3%A9occup%C3%A9s-par-la-d%C3%A9gradation-aggrav%C3%A9e-de-la-situation-s%C3%A9curitaire-%C3%A9conomique-et-sociale-de-la-rca>.

<sup>534</sup> “Nouvelle Rébellion En RCA Made in Cameroun,” *Le Citoyen*, June 18, 2013, 16ème Année, No. 4107 edition, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/pressedujour18juin2013.pdf>.

<sup>535</sup> Pacôme Pabandji, “Centrafrique: Un Mouvement Révolutionnaire En Gestation?,” *Journal de Bangui*, June 20, 2013, <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=4795>.

<sup>536</sup> Marima, “Will the Post-Djotodia Era Usher in Peace or Increased Volatility in the CAR?,” “SCA/1/14(08)” (United Nations Security Council, May 9, 2014), <https://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/327962.pdf>.

<sup>537</sup> Marima, “Will the Post-Djotodia Era Usher in Peace or Increased Volatility in the CAR?”

<sup>538</sup> “SCA/1/14(08).”

<sup>539</sup> “SCA/1/14(08); “France: Mort de Levy Yakété, Proche de François Bozizé - RFI,” RFI Afrique, November 17, 2014, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20141117-france-mort-levy-yakete-proche-francois-bozize>.



outside of UN documents, and found no references to specific engagements. Moreover, the UN justification of sanctions says that, “In September 2013, he tried to *regain control* over operations led by pro-Bozizé fighters...” [emphasis added].<sup>540</sup> It seems to me that MOREPOL is similar to FROCCA, a group existing in name to make it appear as if characters from the old regime are exerting control – briefcase rebellion. Excluded.

#### \* Association des Paysans Centrafricains (APC)

AKAs: Association of Central African Farmers, Association des Paysans de Centrafrique, ACP, Mouvement Kité, Révolution Siriri

This organization is sometimes referred to as a core group within anti-Balaka, along with FROCCA (see above).<sup>541</sup> APC originated as an NGO or communitarian organization with a humanitarian mission of aiding populations affected by Séléka. It was founded in early 2012 (likely late February or early March by the date of this article) by Pascal Bida Koyagbé, CEO of the Lanala Oil Company, after one of his workers was killed by Séléka-related violence. It distributed goods including soap, palm oil, and clothing.<sup>542</sup> Over time it appeared to become more political, claiming to lobby on behalf of peasants and issuing an ultimatum to Séléka to step down or APC would “take their responsibilities” (meaning unclear, no clarified).<sup>543</sup> Following the fall of Bozizé in 2013, Koyagbé launched Mouvement Kité as a political part affiliated with APC; he retained leadership of both organizations.<sup>544</sup> Mouvement Kité espouses a development-oriented platform, on which Koyagbé attempted to run for president in 2015 (excluded on a technicality).<sup>545</sup> In January 2014, the APC posted a video declaring the establishment of Révolution Siriri, an armed movement. No additional details were given.<sup>546</sup> One local paper picked up the

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<sup>540</sup> “SCA/1/14(08).”

<sup>541</sup> Tendai Marima, “Rebels, Anti-Rebels and Refugees in the Central African Republic [Analysis],” *All Africa*, November 6, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131106e9b6000v4&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Central African Republic: Roots of the Conflict and Actors,” *Conflict Observer Project* (blog), October 29, 2014, <http://cscubb.ro/cop/central-african-republic-roots-of-the-conflict-and-actors/>.

<sup>542</sup> Fred Krock, “Centrafrique : Une Association Pour Aider Les Populations Menacées Par Le Séléka,” *Afrik.com*, March 3, 2013, <http://www.afrik.com/centrafrique-une-association-pour-aider-les-populations-menacees-par-le-seleka>.

<sup>543</sup> “Centrafrique: LES PAYSANS DE CENTRAFRIQUE LANCENT UN ULTIMATUM A LA SELEKA,” *Afrique News Info* (blog), February 16, 2013, <https://afriquenewsinfo.wordpress.com/2013/02/16/8677/>; “Seleka: L’ultimatum Des Paysans de Centrafrique,” *Journal de Bangui*, February 14, 2013, <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=4088>.

<sup>544</sup> Kite Mouvement, “Centrafrique: « La France Viole Notre Avenir »,” *Africa Info*, June 15, 2015, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201506150929.html>; Johnny Yannick Nalimo, “Centrafrique: Bida Koyagbé - « Nous Condamnons Fermement Les Déviances Criminelles Des Antibalakas » En RCA,” *Le Potentiel*, April 3, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201404031446.html>; “CENTRAFRIQUE : Le Mouvement ‘KITE’, Une Idéologie d’avenir Par Excellence,” Sango Ti Kodro, May 17, 2016, <http://sango-ti-kodro.over-blog.com/2016/05/opinion-le-mouvement-kite-une-ideologie-d-avenir-par-excellence.html>; François Kongbangué, “Le Mouvement Kité, Une Autre Rébellion En Centrafrique ?,” *La Nouvelle Tribune*, accessed April 27, 2017, <https://lanouvelletribune.info/archives/societe/13-news/interviews/15933-le-mouvement-kite-une-autre-version-de-rebellion-en-centrafrique>.

<sup>545</sup> “CENTRAFRIQUE : Que Nous Propose Réellement La Révolution Ti Bomengo? - Sango Ti Kodro,” Sango Ti Kodro, December 27, 2016, <http://sango-ti-kodro.over-blog.com/2016/12/centrafrique-que-nous-propose-reellement-revolution-ti-bomengo.html>; Herve Serefio, “Centrafrique : Le Mouvement Kité Clarifie l’invalidation Du Dossier de Son Candidat à La Présidentielle,” *Diaspora Magazine*, December 18, 2015, [http://www.diaspora-magazine.com/Centrafrique-Le-Mouvement-Kite-clarifie-l-invalidation-du-dossier-de-son-candidat-a-la-presidentielle\\_a1063.html](http://www.diaspora-magazine.com/Centrafrique-Le-Mouvement-Kite-clarifie-l-invalidation-du-dossier-de-son-candidat-a-la-presidentielle_a1063.html).

<sup>546</sup> AFP, *Centrafrique : Des Paysans Prennent Les Armes Contre Djotodia*, accessed April 27, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROV7xf0C96E>.

announcement, but I could find no additional reference to this initiative.<sup>547</sup> Révolution Siriri had a blog, but it only had three posts, but none mentioned combat.<sup>548</sup> After the announcement, I found no additional references to Révolution Siriri.

Although there may be some crossover in individuals, there is serious reason to doubt that this group formed a core part of anti-Balaka; no one mentioning this had any details or evidence of their collaboration. The group certainly seems more politically than militantly oriented. There is no external reference to specific violence or planned violence on the part of APC or affiliated organizations. Moreover, Pascal Bida Koyagbéle has personally condemned the anti-Balaka and their acts.<sup>549</sup> As such, this group is excluded.

### *Could not find*

**National Convention for Justice (CNJ)** – Could not find reference outside ACLED, and only two events in ACLED. I'm wondering if this is supposed to be CPJP

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<sup>547</sup> “Centrafrique: Une Association Des Paysans Veut Prendre Les Armes Contre Djotodia,” *Journal de Bangui*, January 8, 2014, <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=5893>.

<sup>548</sup> Association des Paysans de Centrafrique, “Revolution Siriri,” Revolution Siriri, accessed April 27, 2017, <http://revolutionsiriri.over-blog.com/archive/2014-01/>.

<sup>549</sup> Nalimo, “Centrafrique: Bida Koyagbéle - « Nous Condamnons Ferment Les Dérives Criminelles Des Antibalakas » En RCA.”

**Nomenclature Note:** For this section C.A.R refers to the Central African Republic while CAR refers to the Conseil d'Action Révolutionnaire rebel coalition.

**Narrative Summary:** Groups who violently challenged the regime of former President Hissène Habré (1982-1990) are not included in this dataset because of their pre-1997 formation. Of the rebel groups from that time, current President Idriss Déby's Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS; Patriotic Salvation Movement) succeeded in overthrowing Habré and replacing him with Déby in 1990. Since then, rebel violence relevant to this dataset has been in response to Déby's authoritarian regime. Many of the rebel groups originate from neglected regions and ethnic groups of Chad that receive fewer resources and opportunities than the capital region of N'Djamena and Déby's Zaghawa ethnic group. Areas of conflict are primarily in the Chad's eastern, southern, and northern regions. Déby had a longstanding conflict with former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir due to their mutual proxy warfare which led to Sudan commissioning several rebel coalitions near its shared border with Chad (eastern Chad/western Sudan). Libya has commissioned some rebel groups along their border with Chad (northern Chad/southern Libya). Violence has also flared up since 2005 when Déby abolished term limits and continues to flare up around presidential election years as Déby refuses to step down or adopt more democratic practices. Since a handful of larger rebel coalitions dominate the eastern regions of Chad, a common practice for new rebel leaders and groups is to declare themselves a rebel group and then, shortly after, join a larger, preexisting rebel coalition. For the sake of this dataset these coalitions are not included unless their constituent groups were not previously rebel groups by the dataset criteria. Another common occurrence is for elite members of a rebel group to reach agreements with the Déby regime and receive lucrative positions in the government or recognition legitimization for their political party. This causes members not included in the benefits of the peace agreements to create splinter groups. These splinter groups do not meet this dataset's inclusion criteria.

Chadian rebel groups have often formed coalitions to increase their power and chances for survival. Due to this trend, several rebel groups such as the Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et la Paix (ANDP) formed but joined a coalition within the first month of their existence sometimes before carrying out an attack on their own. In these cases, the coder analyzed the activities of the coalition they joined and the groups participation in them to determine whether they had stated goals of violence and planned out attacks. In cases such as the Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR) certain existing rebel coalitions merged with other rebel coalitions. Both the smaller coalitions and the larger rebel coalitions resulting from these mergers are excluded from the dataset as mergers rather than original rebel groups, and, rather than becoming unified organizations, the coalitions' constituent groups retained a large degree of operational independence. The coder reviewed the constituent groups of the smaller coalitions to determine whether they fit the dataset's inclusion criteria.

Since splintering and forming coalitions are common practices for Chadian rebel leaders, determining which groups met the inclusion criteria as original rebel group formations was a challenge. For example, the leader of the Concorde Nationale du Tchad/Tchadienne (CNT) had been a member, leader, and founder of several other groups and coalitions before creating the CNT. In cases such as this, the coder used the surveyed sources to analyze the origins of other leaders and members of the group to determine whether this new group was a splinter, an older group operating under a new name, or a new independent group.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** ACLED and GTD only documented the activities of larger rebel coalitions which meant outside research was highly necessary to find information on the possibly includable groups that make up these rebel coalitions. There were a handful of groups and coalitions formed from mergers of smaller groups about which the surveyed sources provided very little information. If more information on these smaller

*groups could be found, the coder estimates that there is a possibility that they would have been included in this dataset – which could have produced about 15 more rebel groups.*

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#### **\*Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR)**

AKAs: CCMSR

Although formed in 2016, their first attack wasn't until August 11, 2018.<sup>550</sup> Their aim is to overthrow the current president of Chad - Idriss Deby.<sup>551</sup> They claim to have some 4,500 fighters largely made up of former rebels from the Darfur region and former political allies of ex-President Habre who is in a Senegalese prison for war crimes.<sup>552</sup> The group's former leader is Mahamat Hassane Boulmaye from the BEG region of Chad. He was previously a member of UFDD.<sup>553</sup>

Hassane Boulmaye was the leader of CCSMR until his arrest in 2017. Therefore, though the group's first attack was not till 2018, they had established leadership prior to 2017.

They are currently based in Libya near the Chadian border.

It is excluded as a faction of FACT as well as for a start date after 2015.<sup>554</sup>

#### **\*Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT)**

AKAs: Front for Change and Concord in Chad

This rebel group formed in early 2016 and announced themselves in April 2016. Their formation occurred after 2015, this dataset's cut-off year, and they are also a faction of UFDD. Therefore, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>555</sup>

#### **\*Forces Alliées pour le Changement au Tchad (FACT)**

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<sup>550</sup> "Fighters from New Rebel Group Attack Chad Soldiers at Libya Border." *Reuters*, August 24, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-security-idUSKCN1L91UC>; "Fighters from New Rebel Group Attack Chad Soldiers at Libya Border." <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-security-idUSKCN1L91UC>; McGregor. "War in the Tibesti Mountains – Libyan-Based Rebels Return to Chad | Aberfoyle International Security." Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4308>.

<sup>551</sup> McGregor. "War in the Tibesti Mountains – Libyan-Based Rebels Return to Chad | Aberfoyle International Security." Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4308>.

<sup>552</sup> "Fighters from New Rebel Group Attack Chad Soldiers at Libya Border." *Reuters*, August 24, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-security-idUSKCN1L91UC>; "Fighters from New Rebel Group Attack Chad Soldiers at Libya Border." <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-security-idUSKCN1L91UC>.

<sup>553</sup> "Chad: Defusing Tensions in the Sahel," n.d., 36. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1119746/download>.

<sup>554</sup> "Fighters from New Rebel Group Attack Chad Soldiers at Libya Border." *Reuters*, August 24, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-security-idUSKCN1L91UC>; "Fighters from New Rebel Group Attack Chad Soldiers at Libya Border." <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-security-idUSKCN1L91UC>; "Chad: Defusing Tensions in the Sahel," n.d., 36. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1119746/download>; McGregor. "War in the Tibesti Mountains – Libyan-Based Rebels Return to Chad | Aberfoyle International Security." Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4308>.

<sup>555</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Treatment of Revolutionary Movement Sympathizers by Authorities along the Border with Libya (2011-November 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c8da034.html>.

AKAs: Allied Forces for Change in Chad

This short-lasting coalition of rebel groups formed in May 2005 from the schism of the UFDD. They are excluded for not being an original rebel group.<sup>556</sup>

#### \*Freedom Eagles of Africa

Conducted a kidnapping of French humanitarian aid workers in 2009 because of the pardon of other French aid workers that had abducted and flown Chadian children illegally to Europe. Based in Sudan but directs their violence towards Chad. As this was the only documented attack by the group, and their main target was a foreign agency rather than the authority of the state, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>557</sup>

#### Alliance Nationale (AN)

AKAs: National Alliance

This coalition of rebel groups commissioned by Khartoum formed on February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2008. They are led by General Mahamat Nouri. They are not an original group and are therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>558</sup>

#### Alliance Nationale de la Résistance (ANR)

AKAs: National Resistance Alliance; National Resistance Army

A coalition of the following five rebel groups created and commissioned by Khartoum in November 1995. Given the start year and its status as a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>559</sup>

- 1) ANTD
- 2) FNT
- 3) FARF
- 4) CDR
- 5) FAIDT

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<sup>556</sup> Haggat, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 265. ; "Le Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT)." Division

Information Documentations Recherches (DIDR) - OFPRA, March 1, 2018.

[https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/15.didr\\_tchad\\_le\\_front\\_pour\\_lalternance\\_et\\_la\\_concorde\\_a\\_u\\_tchad\\_fact\\_ofpra\\_01032018.pdf](https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/15.didr_tchad_le_front_pour_lalternance_et_la_concorde_a_u_tchad_fact_ofpra_01032018.pdf).

<sup>557</sup> "Darfur Kidnappers Say Freed Western Aid Workers." *Reuters*, April 29, 2009.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-kidnap-us-idUSTRE53S7E520090429>.

<sup>558</sup> "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Haggat, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 244.

<sup>559</sup> Waldar. "L'histoire télescopique des mouvement rebelles tchadiens." WALDARI WA AKHBAARA. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://waldar.over-blog.com/article-19410712.html>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>.

#### \*ANR – du colonel Mahamat Garfa

They were a coalition of ANR splinter rebel groups led by Mahamat Garfa. As a coalition of rebel groups, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>560</sup>

#### \*ANTD

They were part of the ANR coalition that formed in November 1995. No further information can be found as to their existence, but they would have formed prior to 1995. As this is prior to 1997 they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>561</sup>

#### \*Front d'Action pour l'Indépendance et la Démocratie au Tchad (FAIDT)

AKAs: Action Front for Independence and Democracy in Chad

Their leader was Hissène Lamine. The group was born out of the October 1991 persecutions perpetrated against the Hadjeray people. Given its pre-1997 formation this group is excluded from the dataset.<sup>562</sup>

#### \*Alliance des Démocrates Résistants (ADR)

AKAs: Alliance of the Democratic Resistant

This group was formed on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1999 in Benin (against the Chadian government) by three established movements: the SLT (of Younous Ibédou Awad), the MNST (of Mahamat Saleh Alim), and the MPRT (of Idriss Seïf).<sup>563</sup> Eventually Bichara Moussa's militant group also joined this coalition.<sup>564</sup> ADR's leaders were Néné Ehemir Torna and Hisseine Ahmat.<sup>565</sup> Ahmat was also receiving commands from Younous Ibedou Awad/Awat who was in the U.S.<sup>566</sup> Between 2004 and 2006 the group received more members from former Chadian soldiers under Déby who were dissatisfied with their lack of recognition and support.<sup>567</sup> In March 2006 the group joined forces with FUCD to launch an attack on

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<sup>560</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 201.

<sup>561</sup> Group, Taylor & Francis. *Europa World Year*. Taylor & Francis, 2004, 1074.

<sup>562</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 127.

<sup>563</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>.

<sup>564</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>.

<sup>565</sup> Toïngar Ésaïe. *Idriss Déby and the Darfur Conflict*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014, 138.

<sup>566</sup> OPINION, CENTRAFRIQUE. "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." LE BLOG DE CENTRAFRIQUE OPINION. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.

<sup>567</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101-103.



N'Djamena.<sup>568</sup> Their attempt to unseat Déby and his government was ultimately thwarted by the French who sent resources to help him stay in power.<sup>569</sup> On October 25<sup>th</sup> the group signed the Syrte Peace Agreement with the Chadian government to not attack or fight near refugee camps bordering Sudan.<sup>570</sup>

The group joined the Union des Forces pour le Changement et la Démocratie (UFGD) on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2008. On April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2008 ADR's then interim president, Néné Ehemir Torna, denounced Déby's government as the perpetrators of an attack on a school to silence dissenters.<sup>571</sup> On April 14<sup>th</sup>, 2009 the group legally joined the Chadian government following a peace agreement.<sup>572</sup> A faction of this group did not go back to N'Djamena and instead functions from Nigeria.<sup>573</sup>

As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group they are excluded from this dataset.

#### \*Sentier Lumineux Tchadien (SLT)

AKAs: Chadian Light Trail

This group officially formed on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1998 by Younous Ibédou Awad but its creation had begun in 1996. At the time Awad was in exile from Chad in Benin. He eventually moved to the U.S where he served as SLT's representative in Soubiane's North American CDDC (Coalition pour la Défense des Droits Constitutionnels). Directly prior to creating this group, Awad had been the founder and leader of ANDP. He had merged the ANDP into a coalition with RAFAD and others a month after its creation. He left that coalition a few months later and formed the SLT after several disagreements between the main base of the ANDP and other rebel leaders of the groups forming the RAFAD. "SLT" is likely a rebranding of the original ANDP that had begun forming in 1996. On October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1999 Awad joined the SLT into a coalition with the MNST, MPRT, and rebel forces commanded by Bichara Moussa to form the ADR. Given the fact that they had begun to form prior to 1997, and most of their membership came from the ANDP, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>574</sup>

#### Mouvement National et Social Tchadien (MNST)

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<sup>568</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101-103.

<sup>569</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101-103.

<sup>570</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101-103.

<sup>571</sup> "Tchad: L'Alliance Des Démocrates Résistants (ADR) Intègre l'UFGD." [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-communique-de-l-Alliance-des-Democrates-Resistants-ADR\\_a577.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-communique-de-l-Alliance-des-Democrates-Resistants-ADR_a577.html).

<sup>572</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101-103.

<sup>573</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101-103.

<sup>574</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101; 196.

#### AKAs: National and Social Chadian Movement

This rebel group was led by Mahamat Saleh Alim with an unknown start date. In 1999 they formed helped form the ADR rebel coalition in Benin against the Chadian state along with the SLT and MPRT. No further key information can be found on them which excludes them from this dataset.<sup>575</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### Mouvement Populaire Révolutionnaire Tchadien (MPRT)

##### AKAs: Popular Chadian Revolutionary Movement

This rebel group was led by Idriss Seïf with an unknown start date. In 1999 they helped form the ADR rebel coalition in Benin against the Chadian state along with the SLT and PNST. No further key information can be found on them which excludes them from this dataset.<sup>576</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### \*Rassemblement Démocratique Tchadien (RDT)

##### AKAs: Rassemblement Démocratique du Tchad; Chadian Democratic Gathering

RDT began as a political party on May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1992 and participated in the 1997 elections.<sup>577</sup> Its president was Dr. Djembeté le Soromian. Djembeté went into political exile from 2001-2007 in the C.A.R (2001-2003) and then Norway (2003-2007).<sup>578</sup> On October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2007 the group signed the Syrte Peace Agreement with the Chadian government to not fight near refugee camps bordering Sudan.<sup>579</sup> RDT was then ultimately reinstalled as a political party and Djembeté returned from exile.<sup>580</sup>

The group was listed as a political party until Soromian went into exile in 2001.<sup>581</sup> They then don't appear again in the surveyed sources until they sign the peace agreement in 2007 after which they were reinstated

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<sup>575</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101; 194.

<sup>576</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 101; 195.

<sup>577</sup> Nohlen, Dieter. *Elections in Africa: a Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004, 88; 230.

<sup>578</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; "Mort d'un Leader Politique Tchadien, Le RDT Présente Ses Condoléances." Accessed August 4, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Mort-d-un-leader-politique-tchadien-le-RDT-presente-ses-condoleances\\_a4926.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Mort-d-un-leader-politique-tchadien-le-RDT-presente-ses-condoleances_a4926.html).

<sup>579</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Hagggar, *Tchad: Les Partis Politiques*, p.103.

<sup>580</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Hagggar, *Tchad: Les Partis Politiques*, p.103., "Mort d'un Leader Politique Tchadien, Le RDT Présente Ses Condoléances." Accessed August 4, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Mort-d-un-leader-politique-tchadien-le-RDT-presente-ses-condoleances\\_a4926.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Mort-d-un-leader-politique-tchadien-le-RDT-presente-ses-condoleances_a4926.html); Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>.

<sup>581</sup> Nohlen, Dieter. *Elections in Africa: a Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004, 88; 230.

as a political party.<sup>582</sup> Though they signed the peace agreement it is still not certain that this group was one of the active perpetrators. Thus, the certainty that they were a rebel group is coded as 1. As well, either Soromian was exiled for plotting against the state, the government fabricated the story to oust him, or his exile caused him to form the rebel group. Given this the formed year is coded as 2001 without certainty.

The first time they are named as a rebel group is during their signing of the Syrte Peace Agreement.<sup>583</sup> There is no information as to whether they ever announced themselves as a rebel group on their own. They may have been a member of the FUC/FUCD like the other signatories of the peace agreement which would explain why there is no information on their independent actions as a rebel group. However, the FUC did not form until December 2005 so the RDT had between 2001-2005 to name themselves as a rebel group before joining the FUC. Since they did not their named year, month, and day are coded as the day of the peace agreement.

While the group emerged from their former political party it is uncertain what other resources they used to establish themselves (military members, etc.). Thus, they are coded “1” for ‘party’ and uncertain for the other origin variables.

In SCAD there was a spontaneous violent riot in Chad from November 20<sup>th</sup>–21<sup>st</sup>, 2000. Thus, riot is coded as 1.

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 4 event that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as January 1, 2001). However, this event did not have military or government actors. The “op\_planning\_location” variable is unknown so contestation variables are also unknown.

#### **\*Union des Peuples Tchadiens pour la Reconstruction Nationale (UPTRN)**

AKAs: Union of Chadian People for National Reconstruction

The UPTRN was initially a political party formed on May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1992 and led by Abakar Oumar.<sup>584</sup> UPTRN became a rebel group in 2006 but became a political party again and rejoined the government after signing the Syrte Peace Agreement on October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2007 to not fight near refugee camps bordering

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<sup>582</sup> Refugees, “Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l’Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad.” <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>.

<sup>583</sup> Refugees, “Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l’Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad.” <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>.

<sup>584</sup> OPINION, “LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES.” <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Refugees, “Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l’Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad.” <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, “Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad.” <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 103.; Banks, Arthur S., Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller. *Political Handbook of the World 1998*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, 174., “Options Politiques et Axes Programmatiques des Partis Politiques Tchadiens.” Institut Electoral pour une Démocratie Durable en Afrique. 39. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/cha2012parties.pdf>.

Sudan.<sup>585</sup> Its leaders were Abakar Oumar Mahamat and Abdoulaye Saleh- both who were important members of the group when it existed as a political party.<sup>586</sup>

They are recorded as being a rebel group in 2006 which is the same year as Déby's contested third term win in May after he abolished term limits in 2005.<sup>587</sup> Their formed date is coded as May 2006 with certainty only for the year. The fact that they were a political party could also mean they began discussing ideas to form as a rebel group while in the urban setting of N'Djamena though this is uncertain.

Aside from their forming out of their initial political party, information on them doesn't reappear until they signed the Syrte Peace Agreement.<sup>588</sup> Thus, their named year is the year in which they were publicly recorded as a rebel group (2006), but other aspects of their operation is coded as uncertain. Additionally, since one of the main goals of the Syrte agreement was to get the relevant rebel groups to stop attacking refugee camps and the surrounding areas then it is likely that they committed attacks against civilians in the one year and five months of their existence though the dates are uncertain.<sup>589</sup> UPTRN's mention along with the RDT as receiving immunity for the crimes they committed near Gozbeida through an earlier October 2007 peace agreement further supports this.<sup>590</sup>

In SCAD there was a spontaneous violent riot from May 4<sup>th</sup> – 6<sup>th</sup>, 2005. Thus, the riot variable is coded as 1.

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 2 event with military/ government actors that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as May 1, 2006). However, the "op\_planning\_location" variable is unknown so the contestation variables are also unknown. There is no mention of UPTRN in the ACLED so the variable "ACLED" is coded 0.

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<sup>585</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 103; 196.

<sup>586</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 103; 196., Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, 174. ; "Options Politiques et Axes Programmatiques des Partis Politiques Tchadiens." Institut Electoral pour une Démocratie Durable en Afrique. 39. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/cha2012parties.pdf>.

<sup>587</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 196.

<sup>588</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; Banks, Arthur S., Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller. *Political Handbook of the World 1998*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, 174.

<sup>589</sup> Refugees, "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad."

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>.

<sup>590</sup> "Chadian Opposition Leaders Return Home from Benin after Signing Peace Deal." *BBC Monitoring Africa*. October 12, 2007.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020071012e3ac001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

### \*Conseil d'Action Révolutionnaire (CAR)

AKAs: Council of Revolutionary Action

A fusion between Volcan de la Liberté and several other smaller rebel groups (MoSaNaT, RFUTD, FPR, FST, neoCDR, and CNT) founded in March 2007 and led by Albissaty Saleh Allazam- the leader of Volcan de la Liberté. As of January 2012, many of the groups listed had left the CAR except for the FPR and other smaller groups. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>591</sup>

### \*Volcan de la Liberté

AKAs: Volcano of Liberty

The group's founder and president was Dr. Albissaty S. Allazam, who had previously been the spokesperson for the FUC and then the president of the Conseil d'Action Révolutionnaire (CAR) coalition that the group became a part of in March 2007.<sup>592</sup> The FUC formed in December 2005 but defected to the government and had other members regroup with the FDD in Sudan in October 2007. Dr. Allazam was still the FUC spokesperson as of July 2006 when the FUC was ambushed by government forces.<sup>593</sup> He left the FUC to form Volcan de la Liberté and by September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2007 he had assumed his role as president of the CAR rebel coalition.<sup>594</sup> The CAR coalition consisted of his group along with MoSaNaT, RFUTD, FPR, FST, neoCDR, and the CNT.<sup>595</sup> Prior to joining the FUC he lived in exile

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<sup>591</sup> Hagggar, *Tchad: Les Partis Politiques*, p.104-105 ; 238, Tchadactuel. "Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.; Centrafrique-Presse.com. "Cas Baba laddé : Communiqué du Conseil d'Action Révolutionnaire (CAR) du Tchad." centrafrique-presse. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-cas-baba-ladde-communique-du-conseil-d-action-revolutionnaire-car-du-tchad-97836353.html>.

<sup>592</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104.; "Chadian Army Clashes with Rebels near Sudan Border - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan." Accessed August 4, 2020. [https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=16504](https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=16504).; Favre, Johanne. "Insécurités. Une interprétation environnementale de la violence au Ouaddaï (Tchad oriental)," n.d., 237. <https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00406684/document>.

<sup>593</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104.; "Chadian Army Clashes with Rebels near Sudan Border - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan." Accessed August 4, 2020. [https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=16504](https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=16504).

<sup>594</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104.; Tchadactuel. "Dr. Albissaty S. Allazam, opposant armé tchadien:"De la nécessité d'une conférence internationale sur le Tchad au Sénégal"- Le Matin." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=173>.

<sup>595</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104., "Coordination militaire unifiée." <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.



outside of Chad in places such as Cotonou, Benin.<sup>596</sup> They controlled a large zone of territory incorporating Haraze Amdjirema, Tissi, etc.<sup>597</sup>

On March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007 he released a statement discussing the previous CNT negotiations with the government to say that he would continue the fight for peace with dignity.<sup>598</sup> He then joined the group to the CMU that was revamped in December 2007 after the breakup of the FUC-RaFAD coalition.<sup>599</sup> Since he left the FUC to form Volcan de la Liberté, and subsequently the CAR, it is safe to assume that the group formed sometime between July 2006 and March 2007 (when the CAR formed).<sup>600</sup>

Allazam was arrested by the Chadian government between March 21 and 23, 2015.<sup>601</sup>

Their start date is coded as August 2006 with no certainty. Their named date is coded as the March 2007 as that is when they publicly appeared as part of the CAR.<sup>602</sup> There is a possibility that they chose to be clandestine until they were able to form a larger rebel coalition for protection and legitimacy. However, there isn't enough information of the group prior to the formation of the CAR to concretely infer this. While there is not a lot of information on the group independently there is a lot of information on the groups and coalitions that did receive foreign resources. Since neither this group nor the CAR/CMU are noted as receiving this support, they are coded as not receiving any. There is also more information on the group's contribution to the formation of the CAR and the activities of their leader, but not a lot of information on the group's activities both independently and as part of the coalition. As a result, many of

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<sup>596</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104.; Tchadactuel. "Dr. Albissaty S. Allazam, opposant armé tchadien: "De la nécessité d'une conférence internationale sur le Tchad au Sénégal"- Le Matin." Accessed August 4, 2020.

<http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=173>; Chari, Blog. "Solidaire au Dr Albissaty Saleh Allazam." Le blog de Chari Bag. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://chari.over-blog.com/article-34911715.html>; Akhbach. "Interview avec le Dr Albissaty Saleh Allazam, porte-parole de la Coordination Militaire Unifiée (CMU)." SITE DU FSR. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://fsrtchad.over-blog.com/article-28560601.html>.

<sup>597</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>598</sup> Tchadactuel. "Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse." Accessed August 26, 2020.

<http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.

<sup>599</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104.

<sup>600</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 104.; "Chadian Army Clashes with Rebels near Sudan Border - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan." Accessed August 4, 2020. [https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=16504](https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=16504); "Tchad. La condamnation de quatre activistes est une violation de l'exercice du droit à la liberté d'expression." Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2016/04/tchad-la-condamnation-de-quatre-activistes-est-une-violation-de-exercice-du-droit-la-libert-d-expression/>; "Coordination militaire unifiée." <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>; Favre, Johanne. "Insécurité. Une interprétation environnementale de la violence au Ouaddaï (Tchad oriental)," n.d., 237. <https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00406684/document>; Tchadactuel. "Dr. Albissaty S. Allazam, opposant armé tchadien: "De la nécessité d'une conférence internationale sur le Tchad au Sénégal"- Le Matin." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=173>; Chari, Blog. "Solidaire au Dr Albissaty Saleh Allazam." Le blog de Chari Bag. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://chari.over-blog.com/article-34911715.html>; Akhbach. "Interview avec le Dr Albissaty Saleh Allazam, porte-parole de la Coordination Militaire Unifiée (CMU)." SITE DU FSR. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://fsrtchad.over-blog.com/article-28560601.html>.

<sup>601</sup> "Tchad. La condamnation de quatre activistes est une violation de l'exercice du droit à la liberté d'expression." Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2016/04/tchad-la-condamnation-de-quatre-activistes-est-une-violation-de-exercice-du-droit-la-libert-d-expression/>.

<sup>602</sup> "Coordination militaire unifiée." <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.



the variables on the group's first activities had to be coded as uncertain. Its goal\_take variable is also coded as 1 based on the expressed goals of its leader and the coalitions it joined/helped form since no public statement of its own can be found.<sup>603</sup> The group continues to operate (as of 2019) in a comparatively reduced capacity possibly while hiding in the neighboring C.A.R but no information can be found on if they commit at least two attack a year. Thus, their viability is coded as uncertain. they are coded as viable but uncertain.

In SCAD there was an organized demonstration on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2006. Thus, the protest variable is coded as 1.

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 2 and type 1 event that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as August 1, 2006). The "op\_planning\_location" variable is unknown so contestation variables are also unknown. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED so the variable "ACLED" is coded as 0.

### \*Front du Salut du Tchad (FST)

AKAs: Salvation Front of Chad

The FST's president was Colonel Mahamat Hassan Inghaz (alias = Kokis).<sup>604</sup> It was known for its membership in the CAR rebel coalition along with MOSANAT, RFUTD, Volcan de la Liberté, FPR, neoCDR, and the CNT.<sup>605</sup>

By April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2006 FST held control of the city called Haraz Mangueigne along with the MPRD in southeastern Chad on the Chadian border with the Central African Republic before joining the FUC (meaning FST had formed prior to joining the FUC in July 2006).<sup>606</sup> This region is inhabited by the Hémats who are Arab nomads and ethnically similar to the Salamats (inhabitants of the Salamat region which incorporates the Haraz Department). The ethnic makeup of the FST is unclear as is whether they are homogenous with the territory they operate in.

The first ACLED-recorded violent event in the Salamat region occurred on March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2002 (73CHA) when of an unidentified armed group of fighters on horseback destroyed and looted a village. The next ACLED-recorded violent event in that region on April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2006 (220CHA) was the first mention of FUC/FUCD and UFCD presence in the area. Since the FST formed sometime before they joined the FUC they could have been the unidentified rebel group in the Salat region in 2002. Therefore, the 2002 attack is identified as FUC's first civilian attack, and the Salamat region is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable for FST.

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<sup>603</sup> Tchadactuel. "Dr. Albissaty S. Allazam, opposant armé tchadien:"De la nécessité d'une conférence internationale sur le Tchad au Sénégal"- Le Matin." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=173>.

<sup>604</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.

<sup>605</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124. ; "Coordination militaire unifiée." <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.

<sup>606</sup> WEBMASTER. "TCHAD - REBELLION : LE REGIME D'IDRISS DEBY ITNO FACE A UNE REBELLION DE PLUS EN PLUS DETERMINEE." ALLIANCE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRES. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://alliance-democratie-progres.over-blog.com/article-2352215.html>.

By early July 2006 their leader was commanding FUC forces under attack by government forces. During that time, they had moved north of their previous location and were operating near Adé, a town in southeast Chad bordering Sudan.<sup>607</sup>

He then joined the FST to the RAFD-CNT rebel coalition late 2006 (September/December) while he served as the head commanding militant for a joint cooperative mission to try and take N'Djamena after Déby won another 5-year presidential term.<sup>608</sup> They joined the CAR rebel coalition in March 2007 before becoming a part of the CMU that reformed in December 2007 after previously being a part of the FUC-RaFAD rebel coalition.<sup>609</sup>

Though no individual statement on the group's goals can be found, the statements and actions of the CAR rebel coalition was used to code their goal\_take as 1. Information on Inghaz's background as a colonel cannot be found which means all the leadership variable are coded as uncertain except for former/current gov. This same logic is used to mark the history of the org as possibly deriving from the military or another rebel group as uncertain, but the others as 0, since more information couldn't be found on how Inghaz recruited members.

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD; the contestation variables are coded as 0 and 88.

According to the SCAD, there were no events that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as February 1, 2002). There is no mention of the group in the ACLED so the variable "ACLED" is coded as 0.

#### \*Mouvement Panafricain pour la Démocratie et la Justice (MPDJ)

AKAs: Panafrican Movement for Democracy and Justice

Formed in August 2012 by Mahamat Abdoulaye who was the former president of the political party Mouvement pour la Paix et le Développement du Tchad (MPDT) before his arrest in 2009 and exile to Dakar, Senegal. They formed an alliance with the UFC in 2014. Prior to this alliance they had been non-violent and only sent out written condemnations from their headquarters in Dakar. Since they have not carried out any attacks on their own, they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>610</sup>

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<sup>607</sup> "Chadian Army Clashes with Rebels near Sudan Border - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan." [https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=16504](https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=16504).

<sup>608</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124.; "Coordination militaire unifiée." <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.; JeuneAfrique.com. "Déby, les rebelles et les parrains – Jeune Afrique," December 4, 2006. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/130269/archives-thematique/d-by-les-rebelles-et-les-parrains/>.

<sup>609</sup> Akhbach, "Interview avec le Dr Albissaty Saleh Allazam, porte-parole de la Coordination Militaire Unifiée (CMU)." <http://fsrtchad.over-blog.com/article-28560601.html>.; Pommerol, Patrice Jullien de. *Dictionnaire Arabe Tchadien-Français: Suivi D'un Index Français-Arabe Et D'un Index Des Racines Arabes*. Paris: Karthala, 1999.

<sup>610</sup> Responses to Information Requests, § Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2016). <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/957256/download>.; Mak. "mpdj." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.makaila.fr/tag/mpdj/>.; Ahmat, Djamil. "Tchad: Mahamat Abdoulaye s'oppose à l'envoi des troupes tchadiennes au Mali." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International. Accessed August 4, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Mahamat-Abdoulaye-s-oppose-a-l-envoi-des-troupes-tchadiennes-au-Mali\\_a6505.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Mahamat-Abdoulaye-s-oppose-a-l-envoi-des-troupes-tchadiennes-au-Mali_a6505.html).; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld |

### \*l'Union des Forces pour le Changement (UFC)

AKAs: Comité Politique d'Action et de Liaison (CPAL) ; Union of Forces for Change ; Political Action and Liaison Committee

The UFC, a coalition of five groups formed on December 7<sup>th</sup>, 1999, was initially called CPAL but changed its name soon after. It is also allied with the MPDJ, who operated against Chad from Dakar, Senegal. As a coalition, this group is excluded from this dataset.<sup>611</sup>

### \*Front Démocratique Populaire (FDP)

AKAs: Popular Democratic Front

FDP's president, Dr. Mamouth Nahor N'gawara, formed the group on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1997 as a violent armed group fighting in the south of Chad.<sup>612</sup> Its cited objective was to create a civic nation based on citizenship and democracy.<sup>613</sup> It set up military bases along the Chadian border with the Central African Republic and is considered one of the rare groups to fight in the south of Chad who did not want federalism or the secession of Southern Chad.<sup>614</sup> Due to the uncertainty as to when these military bases were set up, as well as known attacks occurring after a year of group formation, the "rural" variable is coded as unknown. There are no relevant contestation events in SCAD in the year leading up to their formation.

N'gawara had been a part of militant organizations such as GMC since the 1970s.<sup>615</sup> Thus, the former\_rebels variable is coded 1.

In an effort to denounce the Déby regime FDP kidnapped four French citizens in the Manda national park near Sarh (Moyen-Chari) in February of 1998.<sup>616</sup> While this event does not appear in ACLED, there was a

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Chad: Movement for Peace and Development in Chad (Mouvement Pour La Paix et Le Développement Du Tchad, MPDT), Including Its Structure, Objectives, Leaders and Activities; Its Membership Cards; Current Situation of the Former Leader of the Party, Mahamat Abdoulaye; Treatment of Party Members by Authorities (2014-January 2015)." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020.; OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57f7a2404.html>.

<sup>611</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.; Responses to Information Requests. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/957256/download>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 203.

<sup>612</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 132.; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013, 4. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>613</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 132.

<sup>614</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 132.

<sup>615</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 132.

<sup>616</sup> The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013, 9. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

raid that occurred in Moyen-Chari in July 1997 (5CHA) that may be attributed to the FDP. The government's response to their kidnapping led N'gawara to go into exile in the C.A.R and then France, where he continued the organization by allying with other rebel leaders in exile.<sup>617</sup> It is likely FDP fighters continued clandestine attacks after this government backlash; they did not again claim responsibility for attacks until 2008-2009 despite the fact that unidentified attacks continued in Moyen-Chari. The first of these attacks against Chadian military forces was an August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2002 attack that left 22 dead.

FDP joined the UFC rebel coalition from an unknown date but left on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2008 and then aligned with the Libreville group until 2010.<sup>618</sup> N'gawara returned to Chad from Sudan and started the process to disband the group in December 2009 and join the Déby government by signing a peace agreement.<sup>619</sup> N'gawara is now the Minister of Public Health in Chad.<sup>620</sup>

According to the SCAD, there were no events that occurred in the year prior to group formation (November 12, 1997). There is no mention of the group in the ACLED so the variable "ACLED" is coded as 0.

#### \*Front Démocratique pour la Paix (FDP)

AKAs: Democratic Front for Peace

This coalition group formed in 2008 but soon disbanded. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>621</sup>

#### Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (FPRN)

AKAs: Popular Front for the National Renaissance (PFNR); Popular Front for National Resistance

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<sup>617</sup> Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 132-133.; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013, 9.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>618</sup> Debos, Marielle. *Le Métier Des Armes Au Tchad: Le Gouvernement De Lentre-Guerres*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2013., "CHAD: Children and Armed Conflict." Accessed August 4, 2020.

<https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/chad-children-and-armed-conflict.html>.; "Tchad : Le Front Démocratique Populaire (FDP) Démissionne de l'UFC." Accessed August 4, 2020.

[https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Le-Front-Democratique-Populaire-FDP-demissionne-de-l-UFC\\_a1226.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Le-Front-Democratique-Populaire-FDP-demissionne-de-l-UFC_a1226.html).

<sup>619</sup> Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*.

Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 133.; Mak. "Dr Nahor Mamouth change de fusil d'épaule." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-dr-nahor-mamouth-change-de-fusil-d-e-paule-37818485.html>.; "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.

<sup>620</sup> Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 133. ; "Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation." Accessed August 27, 2020.

<https://realagenda.wordpress.com/tag/bill-melinda-gates-foundation/>.

<sup>621</sup> Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*.

Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 266.

Created in 2004 after the demise of the ANR.<sup>622</sup> The FPRN's president was Adoum Yacoub, but Adam Mahamat Musa "Bazooka," formerly of the ANR, was also a prominent leader in the group.<sup>623</sup> The group is primarily based in the Southeast of Chad near Tissi but do not receive support from Sudan.<sup>624</sup> The FPRN is the fusion of the FNT of Alio Abdoulaye Ibrahim and the MDJS of Bataillon Adoum Yacoub Kougou.<sup>625</sup> In 2010 the group signed a peace agreement with the government after losing a battle in April 2010 and joined the Chadian military.<sup>626</sup> As a merged group formed from two rebel groups that are only excluded due to their start date, the FPRN is excluded from this dataset.

#### \*Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice Sociale (MDJS)

AKAs: Movement for Democracy and Social Justice

Created by Adoum Yacoub Kougou after he left the MDD in 1995 Since the group started forming prior to 1997 it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>627</sup>

#### \*Mouvement pour l'Unité et la République (MUR)

AKAs : Movement for Unity and the Republic

Led by Gaïleth Gattoul Bourkoumandah, Dr. Mamouth Nahor N'gawara, and Alio Abdoulaye Ibrahim, the MUR formed in 2000 as a breakaway faction of the MDD. Though the MDD joined the Chadian government, it did so in 2009, well after the split with MUR, so the MUR didn't form as a faction due to their "mother" rebel group joining the government. As a faction that does not meet our criteria they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>628</sup>

#### \*Action pour le Changement du Tchad (ACT)

AKAs: Action for the Change of Chad

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<sup>622</sup> Tchadactuel. "COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE : Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (FPRN)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5007>.

<sup>623</sup> Tchadactuel. "COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE : Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (FPRN)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5007>; OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.

<sup>624</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, 4. February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>; Hancock, Stephanie. "Rag-Tag Insurgents Join the Fray in Eastern Chad." *Reuters*, December 7, 2007. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL07102688>.

<sup>625</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 144-146.

<sup>626</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.

<sup>627</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 144.

<sup>628</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Europa Europa Publications. *Africa South of the Sahara*, 2003. Edited by Katharine Murison. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2002, 210.



ACT's leader was Abdelaziz Khoulamallah who had been in political exile in France, Canada, and Sudan since around 1998.<sup>629</sup> The group was active around 2004-2006 during its time in the CNT.<sup>630</sup> Khoulamallah and ACT joined the AN rebel coalition after the latter's February 2008 formation.<sup>631</sup> It is unknown when they left the AN to join the UFDD/F, but on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2009 the group subsequently cut ties with the UFDD/F as well.<sup>632</sup> On March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010 they changed course and joined the Déby government.<sup>633</sup> Since the AN operated in Wadi Sira and the UFDD operated in the Sila region (both adjacent to each other), the coder infers that ACT operated around those two regions as well. However, due to there being no concrete start date, the rural variable is coded as unknown. However, no information on them before 2006 has been found either. As a result, they are included in this dataset with high certainty of being a rebel group but low certainty on their start date.<sup>634</sup>

Since Khoulamallah possibly formed this group anywhere between 1998-2004 the start year, month, and day are marked as uncertain. With lacking evidence as to whether the group formed prior to 2004 and remained clandestine, their clandestine variable is also marked as missing. While information about the group's existence began around 2006, the group's alignment with the AN in February 2008 was the first time the group publicly named itself. For leadership, Khoulamallah was the only reference point for which some information could be found. He was exiled from Déby's government in 1998.<sup>635</sup> Since Déby had overthrown the previous regime in 1990 it is possible that either Khoulamallah was a part of the

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<sup>629</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124.; Hansen, Ketil Fred. "A Democratic Dictator's Success: How Chad's President Deby Defeated the Military Opposition in Three Years (2008–2011)." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 4 (October 2013): 583–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2013.840974>; KONE, Evariste D. "Tchad : le Général Abdelaziz Koulamallah « tombe » à N'Djamena." Evariste D. KONE. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://grat.over-blog.com/article-tchad-le-general-abdelaziz-koulamallah-tombe-a-n-djamena-47743927.html>.

<sup>630</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124.

<sup>631</sup> Mak. "Tchad: réaction de l'UFDD au Général Koullamallah." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-26651480.html>.

<sup>632</sup> Mak. "Tchad: réaction de l'UFDD au Général Koullamallah." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-26651480.html>.

<sup>633</sup> Alfa. "Tchad: L'opposant Khoulamalah regagne N'djamena." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International. Accessed August 27, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-L-opposant-Khoulamalah-regagne-N-djamena\\_a3126.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-L-opposant-Khoulamalah-regagne-N-djamena_a3126.html); Hansen, Ketil Fred. "A Democratic Dictator's Success: How Chad's President Deby Defeated the Military Opposition in Three Years (2008–2011)." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 4 (October 2013): 583–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2013.840974>; KONE, Evariste D. "Tchad : le Général Abdelaziz Koulamallah « tombe » à N'Djamena." Evariste D. KONE. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://grat.over-blog.com/article-tchad-le-general-abdelaziz-koulamallah-tombe-a-n-djamena-47743927.html>.

<sup>634</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124.; Alfa. "Tchad: L'opposant Khoulamalah regagne N'djamena." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International. Accessed August 27, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-L-opposant-Khoulamalah-regagne-N-djamena\\_a3126.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-L-opposant-Khoulamalah-regagne-N-djamena_a3126.html); Mak. "Tchad: réaction de l'UFDD au Général Koullamallah." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-26651480.html>; Hansen, Ketil Fred. "A Democratic Dictator's Success: How Chad's President Deby Defeated the Military Opposition in Three Years (2008–2011)." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 4 (October 2013): 583–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2013.840974>; KONE, Evariste D. "Tchad : le Général Abdelaziz Koulamallah « tombe » à N'Djamena." Evariste D. KONE. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://grat.over-blog.com/article-tchad-le-general-abdelaziz-koulamallah-tombe-a-n-djamena-47743927.html>.

<sup>635</sup> Alfa. "Tchad: L'opposant Khoulamalah regagne N'djamena." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International. Accessed August 27, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-L-opposant-Khoulamalah-regagne-N-djamena\\_a3126.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-L-opposant-Khoulamalah-regagne-N-djamena_a3126.html).



previous regime and for whatever reason it took till 1998 for Déby to banish him, or Kholamallah had been a part of Déby's new regime and was ultimately banished. Since evidence to clarify this cannot be found the leadership variable pertaining to security and gov. are marked as uncertain. Since the group formed with their leader and others possibly around the Wadi Sira and Sila regions their rural variable is coded as 88 using the inference that they were not all in the same physical space and would have had to use other mediums to communicate.

Because the formation date and the "op\_planning\_location" variable is unknown, contestation variables are also unknown. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED so the variable "ACLED" is coded as 0.

#### \*Mouvement d'Action pour le Changement au Tchad (MACT)

AKAs: Movement of Action for Change in Chad

This politico-military rebel group was formed during a meeting of "patriots" from June 7-10 2011 in Tibesti.<sup>636</sup> Mr. Ali Ordjo Hemchi was designated their president.<sup>637</sup> An active member of the group in exile in the U.S, Abdallah Chidi Djorkodei, and Hemchi were former influential leaders of the UFDD during their eastern rebellion around 2006-2008.<sup>638</sup> André Ngarbatem was named as MACT's head of communications with Europe, and Jebren Ahmed Issa was named as in charge of the group's representation in the Middle East.<sup>639</sup> Information on Ngarbatem and Issa's background could not be found. Therefore, leadership variables were coded using Hemchi and Djorkodei's background as former rebel members while the others are left as missing. Since they had left the UFDD in 2008 it is inferred that they did not use some of the coalition's infrastructure to organize the MACT. As a result, no\_prior\_org is coded as 1.<sup>640</sup> There was no identifiable location of operational planning within a year of group formation and therefore the "rural" variable is coded as unknown.

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<sup>636</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

<sup>637</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.; Tchadactuel. "COMMUNIQUÉ Relatif à la création du Mouvement d'Action pour le Changement au Tchad (MACT)," December 6, 2012. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=7763>.

<sup>638</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

<sup>639</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.; Ambenatna. "Tchad / Rébellion : le MACT installe sa cellule de communication en Europe." AMBENATNA INFOS, December 10, 2012. <http://ambenatna.over-blog.com/article-tchad-rebellion-le-mact-installe-sa-cellule-de-communication-en-europe-113332510.html>.

<sup>640</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad;

Their declared goal is to overthrow the Déby regime and transition to democratic governance.<sup>641</sup> They also released statements on December 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup>, 2012 concerning their reasons for forming and other ultimate objectives.<sup>642</sup> Therefore, December 6<sup>th</sup>, 2012 will be coded as their named date.

In December 2012 the Collectif des Jeunes Patriotes Tchadiens pour la Démocratie et la Paix (CJPTDP) announced its complete support to the MACT along with youth forces.<sup>643</sup> In May 2013, 3 Chadian senior military leaders defected in the Biltine province- central eastern Chad- and took 5 vehicles and weapons with them to join the MACT.<sup>644</sup> Since these events did not occur within the first year of the group's formation they will not be coded as a part of their organizational history.

In September 2015, there were reports that the group was planning ways to take over N'Djamena; however, no action was taken on these plans.<sup>645</sup>

In 2017, Déby took different steps, such as marrying a woman from his Amdjaress home region in order to improve relations with Hemchi's Borgat clan in the Ennedi region, to reduce the rebel group's activities.<sup>646</sup> Since detailed information on the group's attacks were already difficult to find, the groups viability is also coded as missing.

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Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

<sup>641</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.; Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of. "Responses to Information Requests," June 5, 2018. <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca:443/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=456708&pls=1>.; "Responses to Information Requests." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, January 5, 2016. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/988761/download>.; Le Tchadanthropus-tribune. "Le Tchadanthropus-tribune | Tchad : Communiqué relatif à la création du Mouvement d'Action pour le Changement au Tchad (MACT)," December 6, 2012. <https://www.letchadanthropus-tribune.com/tchad-communique-relatif-a-la-creation-du-mouvement-daction-pour-le-changement-au-tchad-mact>.

<sup>642</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.; Le Tchadanthropus-tribune. "Le Tchadanthropus-tribune | Tchad : Communiqué relatif à la création du Mouvement d'Action pour le Changement au Tchad (MACT)," December 6, 2012. <https://www.letchadanthropus-tribune.com/tchad-communique-relatif-a-la-creation-du-mouvement-daction-pour-le-changement-au-tchad-mact>.

<sup>643</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

<sup>644</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

<sup>645</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

<sup>646</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d'action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016)." Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD; the contestation variables are coded as 0 and 88.

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 2 event that occurred in the country in the year prior to group formation (June 7, 2011). The “op\_planning\_location” variable is unknown so contestation variables are also unknown. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED so the variable “ACLED” is coded as 0.

#### **\*Collectif des Jeunes Patriotes Tchadiens pour la Démocratie et la Paix (CJPTDP)**

AKAs: Collective of Young Chadian Patriots for Democracy and Peace

Mahamat M.K and François D.N were identified as the coordinators who created the group after April 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011. They are only documented with staging protests against Déby. However, they aligned themselves with the MACT in December 2012. Since CJPTDP hasn't planned out any attacks on their own, the group is excluded from this dataset.<sup>647</sup>

#### **\*Action Tchadienne pour l'Unité et le Socialisme (ACTUS) – Djimadoun**

AKAs: Chadian Action for Unity and Socialism – Djimadoun

ACTUS's leader was Dr. Ley-Ngardigal Djimadoun. A faction of this group created by Dr. Fidel Mounkar joined the CPDC and became a political party. Since the faction joined the government in 1992 then this groups start date is prior to 1997 which excludes them from this dataset.<sup>648</sup>

#### **\*Action Tchadienne pour l'Unité et le Socialisme (ACTUS) -Moungar**

AKAs: Chadian Action for Unity and Socialism

This group's leader and creator is Dr. Abdelkerim Fidel Moungar. It broke away from the original ACTUS to join the CPDC and become a political party on October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1992. Given that they joined the

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August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.; Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of. “Responses to Information Requests,” June 5, 2018. <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca:443/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=456708&pls=1>.; “Responses to Information Requests.” Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, January 5, 2016. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/988761/download>.; Tchadactuel. “COMMUNIQUÉ Relatif à la création du Mouvement d’Action pour le Changement au Tchad (MACT),” December 6, 2012. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=7763>.

<sup>647</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Information on the Mouvement d’action Pour Le Changement Au Tchad (MACT), Including Ideology, Activities, and Structure within and Outside Chad; Treatment of Members, Leaders and Their Families, by Authorities (2012-December 2016).” Refworld. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d380c34.html>.;

Ndouné; “Appel à manifester contre le couronnement de l’impoture électorale de DEBY.” Le site Ndouné. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://ndjamena-matin.over-blog.com/article-appel-a-manifester-contre-le-couronnement-de-l-impoture-electorale-de-deby-80104217.html>.; “(5) Collectif Des Jeunes Patriotes Tchadiens Pour La Démocratie et La Paix | Facebook.” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/Collectif-des-Jeunes-Patriotes-Tchadiens-pour-la-D%C3%A9mocratie-et-la-Paix-107540862666006/>.

<sup>648</sup> OPINION, “LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES.” <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.

government in 1992 it is safe to assume that they formed prior to 1997. The other part of ACTUS that remained a rebel group would also be excluded for this reason.<sup>649</sup>

#### \*Convention Populaire de la Résistance (CPR)

AKAs: Popular Convention of the Resistance

A politico-military rebel group whose president was Dr. Abdel Aziz Kodok. It formed in 2001 from former CNR members. No further information on the exact ratio of old CNR members to new members can be found. Since the CNR was still active as of 2005 it is safe to assume that they are a splinter rather than a reemergence of the group. As a splinter they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>650</sup>

#### \*Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et la Justice (ANDJ)

AKAs: National Alliance for Democracy and Justice

ANSJ's leader is Mahamat Chérif Jako.<sup>651</sup> On June 19<sup>th</sup>, 2006 they released a statement as to their thoughts on the illegitimacy of the Déby regime and their contribution to the fight for democracy.<sup>652</sup> They were briefly a part of the FUC- which formed December 25<sup>th</sup>, 2005- before joining the UFDD by November 2007 where Jako was in charge of Arab communications.<sup>653</sup> They are not in the list of rebel groups that initially formed the FUC which means they formed sometime before December 2005 but by their June 2006 public statement prior to joining the FUC and subsequently the UFDD. Since the FUC initially operated near Bitkine, this location will also be used in coding "rural" for ANDJ.

The FUC carried out an attack in Bitkine in 2006 (224CHA). Since the ANDJ was a member of this coalition this event will be coded for their first large and civilian attacks with low certainty since there is limited information on the groups actions prior to when they joined the FUC. There is not a lot of information on casualties from this attack other than that the FUC launched an attack against government forces and civilians in order to take control of the area. The ANDJ was still active as of a statement they released in 2010.<sup>654</sup>

Given their alignments with rebel coalitions like the FUC and UFDD there is certainty that they are a rebel group. Their start date is coded as 2005 with no certainty as there is only an uncertain window of

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<sup>649</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 17; 29.

<sup>650</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Seddon, David. *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*: Taylor & Francis, 2013.

Europa Publications. *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. Edited by Katharine Murison. London: Routledge, 2004, 236.

<sup>651</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 191.

<sup>652</sup> ANDJ. "TCHAD: message de l'ANDJ." MEDDA, June 19, 2006. <http://medda.over-blog.com/article-3056756.html>.

<sup>653</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 191.; Yacoub, Ahmat. "Tchad/France/Soudan: Le jeu de cache-cache." Libertés sans Frontières. Accessed August 27, 2020. [https://www.editoweb.eu/libertesansfrontieres/Tchad-France-Soudan-Le-jeu-de-cache-cache\\_a2.html](https://www.editoweb.eu/libertesansfrontieres/Tchad-France-Soudan-Le-jeu-de-cache-cache_a2.html).

<sup>654</sup> Mak. "Mahamat Youssouf Alhassana répond au Dr Chérif Djako." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante. Accessed August 27, 2020. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-mahamat-youssouf-alhassana-repond-au-dr-cherif-djako-56202334.html>.

time around the formation of the FUC and their public statement to use as reference. However, the first time they publicly named themselves was through their statement in June 2006.<sup>655</sup> This is coded as their named date and the contents of their statement was used to code the goal\_take variable. Since they were not named amongst the rebel groups that received resources from Sudan nor the C.A.R the are coded as receiving no foreign support, however the lack of information on the group meant that other forms of funding were marked as uncertain. More detailed information on Jako cannot be found so leadership variables were marked as uncertain. However, the Bitkine area is not ethnically homogenous so ethnic\_same was coded as 0. Along with sources that the group is still active, the UFDD committed several attacks in 2008 and continue to commit attacks from their new base in southern Libya till today. As a result, this group is coded as viable since the coalition they were a part of committed at least two attacks 3 years after their formation (~2008).

In SCAD there was a spontaneous violent riot from October 30<sup>th</sup> – November 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004. Thus, the riot variable is coded as 1.

According to the SCAD, there were no events with military/ government actors that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as January 1, 2005). There is no mention of the group in the ACLED so the variable “ACLED” is coded as 0.

#### Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT/1<sup>ère</sup> armée)

AKAs: National Liberation Front of Chad

Its leader was Mahamat Abba Seïd who formed the group in 1979. Given a start year before 1997 the group is excluded from this dataset.<sup>656</sup>

#### \*Front de Libération National du Tchad / Conseil Provisoire de la Révolution (FROLINAT/CPR)

AKAs: FROLINAT/FAP (previously)

The group’s leaders are Goukouni Weddeye and Youssouf Abakar. The first leader was Mahamat Abba Seïd. Mahamat Nouri served as a commander in the group before its split in 1987 and his transition to becoming the head of the UFDD. FROLINAT/CPR formed from the demise of the FROLINAT/FAP in 1977. Given their start year they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>657</sup>

#### \*Front Uni pour une Alternance Démocratique au Tchad (FU/ADT)

AKAs: United Front for a Democratic Alternation in Chad

<sup>655</sup> ANDJ. “TCHAD: message de l’ANDJ.” MEDDA, June 19, 2006. <http://medda.over-blog.com/article-3056756.html>.

<sup>656</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 150-151.

<sup>657</sup> OPINION, “LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES.” <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; “Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008.” Saferaccess, May 30, 2008, 8; 15. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 146-148; “Key Events in Chad since Independence.” Agence France Presse. August 11, 2020. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020200811eg8b00cqd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



FU/ADT's leader was Jean Prosper Boulada. The group was active as of 2003. Aside from its name being mentioned on two lists of rebel groups in Chad, the surveyed sources provided no further information on the group's start date or operations. As a result, it is excluded from this dataset for lack of information.<sup>658</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### \*Mouvement pour le Changement au Tchad (MCT)

AKAs: Movement for Change in Chad

MCT's president was Hassan Fadoul Kittir, a close ally of Déby before he was caught in a counterfeit money scheme in Argentina. No further information can be found about the groups existence or start date. As a result, it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>659</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### Mouvement pour la Paix, la Reconstruction et le Développement (MPRD)

AKAs: Movement for Peace, Reconstruction, and Development; Movement for Peace, Reconciliation, Progress (MPRP)

The MPRD publicly launched in November 2005 by their leader Colonel Djibrine Dasset, one of the original fighters in Déby's Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) to overthrow the Habré government in 1990, and thus one of the founding members of the MPS as the ruling political party.<sup>660</sup> Military members defected and joined him after the failed coup attempt in May 2004.<sup>661</sup> More military members would later defect and join this group in response to the abolition of presidential term limits in mid-2005.<sup>662</sup> The MPRD's first attack took place the night of November 13-14, 2005 when they attacked the camp of the National Guard in N'Djamena and the camp for military formation in Koundoul, just outside N'Djamena, before returning to the South of Chad (179CHA).<sup>663</sup> Evidence of the group taking responsibility for this

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<sup>658</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Toingar Ésaïe. *Idriss Déby and the Darfur Conflict*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014.

<sup>659</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.

<sup>660</sup> Mehedi, Oumar. "Décès du Colonel Djibrine Dasset." *Tchadactuel* (blog). Accessed August 13, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=6046>; OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>661</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.

<sup>662</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.

<sup>663</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.



attack does not appear until 2011.<sup>664</sup> However, evidence of their existence begins from April 4th, 2006 which will be their coded named date.<sup>665</sup> Since formation and planning would have to have occurred before their first attack, it is more likely that they began forming after the failed coup attempt. Thus, their start date is coded as June 2004. Given Dassert's previous work in the MPS (both the rebel group and the political party) and the previous positions of the defected soldiers, current\_security, former\_rebels, and leaders\_currentgovt are all coded as 1.

The group stated their reasons for taking up arms as a desire to create a harmonious and diverse Chad with Islamo-Christian unity.<sup>666</sup> Their immediate objectives are to: install a verified pluralistic and transparent democracy, reestablish internal and international peace, create an army that trained to not mix justice and politics, and establish good governance.<sup>667</sup>

They received support from many militants of the Chadian diaspora in Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Canada, and the USA.<sup>668</sup> They also had good relations with Adoum Yacoub Koukou who was the head of the FPRN and operated in the triangle zone of the RCA and the UFC/MUR of Gailéth Gattoul Bourkoumandah.<sup>669</sup>

They controlled Southern Chad (Niellim of Korbol in Moyen-Chari, the Bousso region in Chari-Baguirmi, and the Melfi in Guéra- all near Tissi) until their leader was captured by Chadian government forces on January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2010.<sup>670</sup> Southern Chad not less densely populated and does not have any major cities, so they are coded as 1 for the "rural" variable. Dassert died on April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2012, but the group continues under the leadership of the group's Former Vice President Djédouboum Sadoum.<sup>671</sup> However,

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<sup>664</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>665</sup> A.D.P, WEBMASTER. "TCHAD - REBELLION : LE REGIME D'IDRISS DEBY ITNO FACE A UNE REBELLION DE PLUS EN PLUS DETERMINEE." ALLIANCE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRES, April 4, 2006. <http://alliance-democratie-progres.over-blog.com/article-2352215.html>.

<sup>666</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.

<sup>667</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.

<sup>668</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.

<sup>669</sup> Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.

<sup>670</sup> Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.; "CHAD: Children and Armed Conflict." Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/chad-children-and-armed-conflict.html>.

<sup>671</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 173-176.; "CHAD: Children and Armed Conflict." Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/chad-children-and-armed-conflict.html>; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

since sources cannot be found on specific attacks they carried out aside from the November 2005 attack, their viability variables are coded as missing.

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD; the contestation variables are coded as 0 and 88.

According to the SCAD, there were no type 1, 2, 3, or 4 events that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as June 1, 2004). The “op\_planning\_location” variable is unknown so the contestation variables are unknown.

#### \*Résistance Armée contre les Forces Anti-Démocrates (RAFAD)

AKAs: Armed Resistance against the Anti-Democratic Forces

The RAFAD’s president and founder was Adoum Moussa Seïf. The group eventually became the head of an expanded RAFAD coalition between the original RAFAD, the ANDP, the FDPS and the ARD. The agreement that formed this coalition was called “The Declarations of Boum Kébir” and was signed on November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1997 in Cotonou, Benin. As there is not much information on the original RAFAD, and the coalition was formed in 1997, it can be assumed that the original RAFAD was formed prior to this year which would exclude them from this dataset.<sup>672</sup>

#### \*Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et la Paix (ANDP)

AKAs: National Alliance for Democracy and Peace

The founder and leader Younous Ibédou Awad created the group in October 1997 after having been exiled to Benin since 1996. They then formed a coalition with RAFAD on November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1997. Awad had abandoned this group by 1998 when he formed the SLT. However, it is likely that he formed the SLT from this group. Since planning began after he was exiled in 1996, the group is excluded from this dataset.<sup>673</sup>

#### \*Telssi Renaissance Nationale (TRN)

AKAs: Telssi National Renaissance

TRN’s president was Colonel Michel M’baïlemal, previously been a member of rebel groups from the 1990s such as the CSNPD and FARF.<sup>674</sup> His arrest in 1999 prompted him to start plans for a new rebel group. They initially lived clandestinely as civilians in villages along the Chad-C.A.R border but would take up arms to carry out ambushes. In 2006 the group was situated in central Chad near towns such as

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<sup>672</sup> OPINION, “LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES.” <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 176-177.

<sup>673</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 101.

<sup>674</sup> OPINION, “LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES.” <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; A.D.P, WEBMASTER. “TCHAD - REBELLION : LE REGIME D’IDRISS DEBY ITNO FACE A UNE REBELLION DE PLUS EN PLUS DETERMINEE.” ALLIANCE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRES, April 4, 2006. <http://alliance-democratie-progres.over-blog.com/article-2352215.html>.

Bessao, Bam, and Domkassa where the oil fields lie.<sup>675</sup> Their menace against this important state resource was inferred by the coder as supportive of their goals in the absence of a public statement.

By late 2009 M'baïlema was working with the leader of the FDP to join them in negotiations to disband and become a part of the Déby government.<sup>676</sup>

Though the month and day are uncertain, 1999 is coded as the groups start date. Similarly, the group's name\_year is coded as 2006 with no certainty as this is only the year when more information on them became more available. No information can be found as to whether they released an official statement of their intentions within their first year, thus goal\_take is coded as uncertain while goal\_secession and goal\_autonomy is coded as 0. No concrete information could be found on their origins or possible forms of support but they are not on amongst the rebel groups/coalitions that received support from either Libya or Sudan so foreign\_govt is coded 0. Since they were operating clandestinely and attacking small villages in Southern Chad (an already sparsely dense area) they are coded 1 for rural. Despite sources attributing them with the attacks on small villages, no information on concrete dates or casualties could be found. Thus, the large, small, and civilian attack variables are coded as uncertain. Given the group's negotiations with the government and lack of information on them carrying out specific attacks, they are coded as not viable.

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED.

#### \*La Coalition/Coordination pour la Défense des Droits Constitutionnels (CDDC)

AKAs: The Coalition/Coordination for the Defense of Constitutional Rights

A coalition movement made up of multiple rebel groups and led by Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane. Its first official meeting was March 27-29, 2005, but it had met on March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2004. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group, the CDDC is excluded from this dataset.<sup>677</sup>

#### \*Union des Forces Nationales Tchadiennes (UFNT)

AKAs: Union of Chadian Forces

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<sup>675</sup> A.D.P, WEBMASTER. "TCHAD - REBELLION : LE REGIME D'IDRISS DEBY ITNO FACE A UNE REBELLION DE PLUS EN PLUS DETERMINEE." ALLIANCE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRES, April 4, 2006. <http://alliance-democratie-progres.over-blog.com/article-2352215.html>.

<sup>676</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Mak. "Dr Nahor Mamouth change de fusil d'épaule." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, October 19, 2009. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-dr-nahor-mamouth-change-de-fusil-d-epaule-37818485.html>; A.D.P, WEBMASTER. "TCHAD - REBELLION : LE REGIME D'IDRISS DEBY ITNO FACE A UNE REBELLION DE PLUS EN PLUS DETERMINEE." ALLIANCE POUR LA DEMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRES, April 4, 2006. <http://alliance-democratie-progres.over-blog.com/article-2352215.html>; Debos, Marielle. *Le Métier Des Armes Au Tchad: Le Gouvernement De Lentre-Guerres*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2013.

<sup>677</sup> OPINION, "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Akhbach. "Coalition pour la Défense de la Démocratie et des Droits Constitutionnels (CDDC)." SITE DU FSR, February 28, 2009. <http://fsrtchad.over-blog.com/article-28472853.html>; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 215.

Carried out an attack in 2007. No other information found beyond this including a start date. UFNT is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>678</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

### Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC)

AKAs: United Front for Change; Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique au Tchad (FUCD); United Front for Democratic Change in Chad (UFDC)

The FUC formed on December 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005.<sup>679</sup> It carried out an assault on N'Djamena meant to topple the government leading up to the May 3<sup>rd</sup> elections on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2006 but were driven back by French forces.<sup>680</sup> On October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2007, they signed the Syrte Peace Agreement with the Chadian government to not attack or fight around refugee camps bordering Sudan.<sup>681</sup> They regrouped in Sudan under the FDD in late 2007 after a series of defeats by Chadian security forces.<sup>682</sup> The FUC had been formerly allied with the RFC but eventually joined UFDC.<sup>683</sup> They signed another peace agreement with the government in

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<sup>678</sup> "National Counterterrorism Center: 2007 Report on Terrorism." National Counterterrorism Center, April 30, 2008, 84.

<sup>679</sup> "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf).

<sup>680</sup> "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>681</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatoire Pour La Protection Des Défenseurs Des Droits de l'Homme, Rapport Annuel 2007 - Tchad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/486e051b35.html>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders Annual Report 2007 - Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4864666f37.html>; "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>682</sup> "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>683</sup> The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

2009 and joined the Chadian military.<sup>684</sup> They are excluded from this dataset as a rebel coalition made up of 8 groups operating near N'Djamena and eastern Chad:<sup>685</sup>

1. RDL [Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté (Rally for Democracy and Freedom)]
2. SCUD [Socle pour le Changement, l'Unité nationale et la Démocratie (Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy)]
3. CNT [Concorde Nationale du Tchad (Chadian National Concord Movement)]
4. FNTR (Front Nationale pour le Tchad Rénové, National Front for the Renewal of Chad)
5. CNR (Conseil National pour le Redressement, National Council for Recovery)
6. FRRRT (Force pour le Ratissage, le Regroupement et le Redressement du Tchad, Force for the Cleansing, Reunification and Resurgence of Chad)
7. Groupe du 8 Décembre
8. FIDL

### Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté (RDL)

AKAs: Rally for Democracy and Freedom

This majority ethnically Tama rebel group (along with some Arabs and Gimrs) is comprised of deserters of the Chadian military and Chadian exiles in Sudan.<sup>686</sup> Its founder and leader is Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim, who was previously a member of ANR and brought some of their members with him.<sup>687</sup>

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<sup>684</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad," February 9, 2011.

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF99B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chad%20S2011%2064.pdf>; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>685</sup> "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008.

[https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsisinformationkitfinalversion.pdf>;

HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>686</sup> "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; "They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007.

<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; "« Ils Sont Venus Pour Nous Tuer » Attaques de Milices et Agressions Ethniques Contre Les Civils à l'est Du Tchad : Contexte." Accessed August 28, 2020.

<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/2007/chad0107/6.htm>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>687</sup> "They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; "« Ils Sont Venus Pour Nous Tuer » Attaques de Milices et Agressions Ethniques Contre Les Civils à l'est Du Tchad : Contexte." Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/2007/chad0107/6.htm>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.



RDL's spokesperson is Abdullahi Abdel Karim.<sup>688</sup> Some of RDL's members were military personnel who deserted in protest of Déby's abolition of term limits in mid-2005.<sup>689</sup>

The RDL officially formed in 2005 but joined the FUC/FUCD on December 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 after a failed attack on December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2005 with SCUD in Adré which resulted in 200 rebels, 5 soldiers, and 3 civilian casualties.<sup>690</sup> RDL then carried out an attack on N'Djamena in April 2006. They were militarily assisted with weapons and ammunition by the Sudanese government once they were a part of the FUC/FUCD.<sup>691</sup> Abdelkerim used the name RDL for his group of defected rebels in opposition to the former ANR leader's signing of a peace agreement and formation of a political party in 2003.<sup>692</sup> Since they are a splinter due to their "mother" group joining the government they are included in this dataset.

As a part of the FUC/FUCD the RDL signed a peace agreement with the government in 2006 and Nour Abdelkerim was appointed as Defence Minister.<sup>693</sup> He was dismissed in 2007 because it was discovered that he had not fully instructed the FUC to dissolve and that FUC had continued fighting including with the 2008 coalition attack on N'Djamena.<sup>694</sup> Some of the still operating rebels may be from the original RDL.<sup>695</sup>

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<sup>688</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>689</sup> "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>690</sup> "CHAD: Alleged Coup Attempt." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43, no. 3 (2006): 16563A-16565C. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2006.00260.x>; "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; "« Ils Sont Venus Pour Nous Tuer » Attaques de Milices et Agressions Ethniques Contre Les Civils à l'est Du Tchad : Contexte." Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/2007/chad0107/6.htm>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.; Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. *A Guide to Intra-State Wars: an Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014*. Los Angeles: SAGE Reference/CQ Press, 2016.

<sup>691</sup> "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>692</sup> "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>693</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>694</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.; Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. *A Guide to Intra-State Wars: an Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014*. Los Angeles: SAGE Reference/CQ Press, 2016.

<sup>695</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.; "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; "CHAD: Alleged Coup Attempt." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43, no. 3 (2006): 16563A-16565C. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2006.00260.x>; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. *A Guide to Intra-State Wars: an Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014*. Los Angeles: SAGE Reference/CQ Press, 2016.; "« Ils Sont Venus Pour Nous Tuer » Attaques de Milices et Agressions Ethniques Contre Les Civils à l'est Du Tchad : Contexte." Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/2007/chad0107/6.htm>.



As RDL was created in response to the 2003 ANR peace agreement this will be coded as the year the group began forming despite the fact that they became “official” (named) in 2005.<sup>696</sup> With a 2003 start date rather than 2005, the support the received from Sudan as a part of the FUC/FUCD would not have been within their first year. Due to the prevalence of violence from Sudanese Janjaweed violence in Adré, attacks that go unclaimed in that area are often attributed to the Janjaweed. As the RDL did not name themselves until they took responsibility for their larger December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2005 attack, it is possible that they were clandestine prior to this resulting in some of their violence being assigned as the Janjaweed. Therefore, they are coded 1 for the clandestine variable.

There isn’t much concrete information on where this group began planning their formation. Some army deserters fled into Sudan, but the towns of Dar Tama and Adré where the group has been sighted are also along the border with Sudan.<sup>697</sup> It is possible that either the group formed in Sudan and crossed the border to commit violence in Chad, or they formed in Dar Tama and traveled a few towns over to commit their December 18<sup>th</sup> attack on Adré. Since military forces drove the rebels back into Sudan during the Adré conflict and the military deserters that helped form the group were in Sudan, the coder was inclined to code this group’s location of operational planning along the border in Sudan.<sup>698</sup> However, since most of the coder’s inclinations are based off of the December 18<sup>th</sup> attack, which occurred more than a year after group formation, the “rural” variable is coded as missing.

It is not clear if the FUC members who continued fighting after their 2006 peace agreement were primarily from the RDL. Since the RDL was the main group that helped form the FUC/FUCD, they are coded as not viable from the time that they signed the peace agreement.<sup>699</sup> Though some members of the FUC still engage in attacks, they are no longer prominent and more than one attack a year cannot be established.

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD.

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 2 event that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as January 1, 2003). However, it did not have military/ government actors. Thus, the contestation variables are coded as 0. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED.

### Socle pour le Changement, l'Unité nationale et la Démocratie (SCUD)

AKAs: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy

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<sup>696</sup> ““They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups,” January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

<sup>697</sup> “71. Chad (1960-Present).” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>698</sup> “71. Chad (1960-Present).” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.; “« Ils Sont Venus Pour Nous Tuer » Attaques de Milices et Agressions Ethniques Contre Les Civils à l’est Du Tchad : Contexte.” Accessed August 28, 2020.

<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/2007/chad0107/6.htm>.; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.; Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. *A Guide to Intra-State Wars: an Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014*. Los Angeles: SAGE Reference/CQ Press, 2016.

<sup>699</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2016-2017*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2017, 2019-2020.

This ethnically Zaghawa rebel group officially formed from about 600 Chadian army deserters in October 2005.<sup>700</sup> Many members had participated in a failed coup attempt in May 2004 before they deserted and fled to eastern Chad and Darfur.<sup>701</sup> Some military members also deserted the government and joined SCUD in response to Déby's abolition of term limits in mid-2005.<sup>702</sup> SCUD's start date is coded May 2004 for when the initial military deserters fled to eastern Chad/western Sudan.<sup>703</sup> The "rural" variable is subsequently coded as a "1."

SCUD received military support in the form of weapons and ammunition from the Sudanese government.<sup>704</sup> Yaya Dillo Djerou, a nephew of the Erdimi brothers and previous member of Déby's MPS party, was identified as the group's leader and he is ethnically Bideyat Zaghawa.<sup>705</sup> SCUD fighters

<sup>700</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (Socle Pour Le Changement, l'Unité et La Démocratie, SCUD); How, Why and When It Was Started; the Group's Founders; Whether Any of the Founders Have Been to Canada; Rebel Activities and Major Events in Which the Group Has Been Involved (2005 - March 2009)." Refworld, March 26, 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02a28.html>; "Responses to Information Requests (RIRs)." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, March 26, 2009. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/871476/download>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2018-2019*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2019.; "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; "CHAD: Alleged Coup Attempt." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43, no. 3 (2006): 16563A-16565C. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2006.00260.x>; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>701</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (Socle Pour Le Changement, l'Unité et La Démocratie, SCUD); How, Why and When It Was Started; the Group's Founders; Whether Any of the Founders Have Been to Canada; Rebel Activities and Major Events in Which the Group Has Been Involved (2005 - March 2009)." Refworld, March 26, 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02a28.html>; "Responses to Information Requests (RIRs)." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, March 26, 2009. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/871476/download>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2018-2019*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2019.; "CHAD: Alleged Coup Attempt." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43, no. 3 (2006): 16563A-16565C. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2006.00260.x>.

<sup>702</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (Socle Pour Le Changement, l'Unité et La Démocratie, SCUD); How, Why and When It Was Started; the Group's Founders; Whether Any of the Founders Have Been to Canada; Rebel Activities and Major Events in Which the Group Has Been Involved (2005 - March 2009)." Refworld, March 26, 2009.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02a28.html>; "Responses to Information Requests (RIRs)." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, March 26, 2009. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/871476/download>.

<sup>703</sup> "CHAD 2013: THE IMPOSSIBLE REHABILITATION OF A NOTORIOUS DICTATOR." Paris, December 15, 2013. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>704</sup> "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>705</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (Socle Pour Le Changement, l'Unité et La Démocratie, SCUD); How, Why and When It Was Started; the Group's Founders; Whether Any of the Founders Have Been to Canada; Rebel Activities and Major Events in Which the Group Has Been Involved (2005 - March 2009)." Refworld, March 26, 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02a28.html>; "Responses to Information Requests (RIRs)." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, March 26, 2009. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/871476/download>; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); "CHAD 2013: THE IMPOSSIBLE REHABILITATION OF A NOTORIOUS DICTATOR." Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>; "CHAD: Alleged Coup Attempt." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43, no. 3 (2006): 16563A-

attacked the town of Guéréda on December 7, 2005, resulting in the deaths of 10 individuals.<sup>706</sup> This is also the first time they are named. It is not clear whether the casualties were civilians, rebels, or soldiers. This event is coded as the group's first small attack and first attack on civilians. SCUD conducted a joint attack with the RDL on the city of Adre from bases in western Sudan on December 18-19, 2005, resulting in the deaths of about 200 rebels, five government soldiers, and three civilians.<sup>707</sup>

On March 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006 SCUD forces carried out a large-scale attack in Hadjer Marfain (south of Adré near the Sudanese border) in which they either killed or took prisoner 230 government soldiers (213-215CHA). The group then turned that area in the mountain into one of their command posts.<sup>708</sup> This event is coded as its first large attack.

SCUD helped form the FUC/FUCD rebel coalition, along with the RDL and other rebel groups, on December 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 but soon switched to the RAFD coalition in 2006 instead after the FUC joined the government.<sup>709</sup> Their violent attacks and alignments with coalitions with democratic goals formed the basis for coding goal\_take as 1.<sup>710</sup>

In November 2007, Djerou defected and joined the Chadian military while taking his troops in SCUD with him.<sup>711</sup> The remaining members of the group continued their operations as members of different groups.<sup>712</sup>

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD.

According to the SCAD, there were no type 1, 2, 3, or 4 events that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as May 1, 2004). There is mention of the group in the ACLED.

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16565C. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2006.00260.x>; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>706</sup> "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>707</sup> "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>708</sup> "CHAD: Alleged Coup Attempt." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 43, no. 3 (2006): 16563A-16565C. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2006.00260.x>.

<sup>709</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (Socle Pour Le Changement, l'Unité et La Démocratie, SCUD); How, Why and When It Was Started; the Group's Founders; Whether Any of the Founders Have Been to Canada; Rebel Activities and Major Events in Which the Group Has Been Involved (2005 - March 2009)." Refworld, March 26, 2009.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02a28.html>; "Responses to Information Requests (RIRs)." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, March 26, 2009. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/871476/download>; Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2018-2019*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2019; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008.

[https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad: Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.

<sup>710</sup> "Responses to Information Requests (RIRs)." Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, March 26, 2009. <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/871476/download>.

<sup>711</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>712</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

## Concorde Nationale du Tchad/Tchadienne (CNT)

AKAs: Chadian National Concord Movement

Founded in 2004 (and issuing its first public statement in 2006) CNT became the main Chadian Arab rebel group while they were active.<sup>713</sup> Its first attack took place in July 2004 in southern Chad near Salamat in Haraz Mangueigne along the border with the C.A.R.<sup>714</sup> CNT's leader and founder was Hasan Saleh al-Gaddam/Algadam (nom de guerre = Al-Jineidi/Aldjineidi) who trained at the Tripoli military academy in Libya and was formerly a member of the CDR in the 1970s.<sup>715</sup> He was arrested by the Sudanese government for the group's rebel operation in July 2004 but he became vice-president of the FUC after his 2005 release.<sup>716</sup> Haraz Mangueigne is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a 1. In this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation.

In March of 2006 Aldjineidi declared that the group did not form to rally against the regime in N'Djamena or to participate in separate negotiations to benefit themselves but to accept a general idea that an inclusive dialogue is possible with a solution that keeps Déby in power. Though this was one of the first statements made by the group, CNT had a military arm, joined forces with other militant coalitions, and had already-- and continued to-- carry out attacks. Because even after the group publicly named itself, it still sought to appear non-violent, CNT was likely also clandestine prior to its named date.

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<sup>713</sup> "'They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.; Tubiana, Jérôme. "Why Chad Isn't Darfur and Darfur Isn't Rwanda." *London Review of Books*, December 17, 2009. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n24/jerome-tubiana/why-chad-isn-t-darfur-and-darfur-isn-t-rwanda>.; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>714</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.

<sup>715</sup> "'They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.; Tubiana, Jérôme. "Why Chad Isn't Darfur and Darfur Isn't Rwanda." *London Review of Books*, December 17, 2009. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n24/jerome-tubiana/why-chad-isn-t-darfur-and-darfur-isn-t-rwanda>.; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.; Tchadactuel. "Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.; "The Global Intelligence Files - [Africa] CHAD - Good Article on Militant Groups Operating in Chad," 2007. [https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/50/5039439\\_-africa-chad-good-article-on-militant-groups-operating-in.html](https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/50/5039439_-africa-chad-good-article-on-militant-groups-operating-in.html).

<sup>716</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.



Aldjineidi joined the CNT to the FUC in April 2006 but moved his group to the RAFD coalition in July 2006.<sup>717</sup> Within RAFD the CNT joined its military units together under the name Haut Commandement Militaire Unifié (HCMU).<sup>718</sup> In November 2006 CNT forces engaged in violent fighting with the Chadian army in Dar Tama in the Guéréda area.<sup>719</sup> In the same month, they advanced and attacked the towns of Am Zoer and Biltine.<sup>720</sup> On January 29<sup>th</sup>, 2007 with the RAFD they attacked a joint FUC Chadian military post near N'Djamena (FUC had begun supporting the government by December 2006) killing 30 FUC and military soldiers.<sup>721</sup> They carried out an attack against civilians in Dogdore on April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007.<sup>722</sup> However, on March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2007 they attacked the villages of Tiero and Marena along with the Janjaweed, killing 200-400 civilians and militiamen, which will be coded as the group's first civilian attack.<sup>723</sup> On April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2007, the military retook the Dogdore area and pushed the CNT back into Sudan, though the CNT also killed 8 military soldiers during the clash.<sup>724</sup> The CNT was then a part of the CAR coalition in 2007 made up of themselves along with MOSANAT, RFUTD, Volcan de la Liberté, FPR, FST, and the neoCDR.<sup>725</sup>

During CNT's time in the CAR rebel coalition, Aldjineidi signed a peace agreement and joined the Chadian government on October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2007.<sup>726</sup> The other groups aligned with them resumed their rebel

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<sup>717</sup> "'They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>718</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>719</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>720</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>721</sup> AAK. "Intercommunal Clashes in Eastern Chad 'Kill 30.'" *Agence France Presse*. January 31, 2007.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020070131e31v003vr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>722</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>723</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>724</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>725</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.; Tchadactuel. "Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.

<sup>726</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.; Tubiana, Jérôme. "Why Chad Isn't Darfur and Darfur Isn't Rwanda." *London Review of Books*, December 17, 2009. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n24/jerome-tubiana/why-chad-isn-t-darfur-and-darfur-isn-t-rwanda>.; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

activity, but the CNT helped the Chadian military reclaim former CNT territory in Tissi and Daguessa in December of 2007.<sup>727</sup> After this, Aldjineidi received a cabinet position on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2009.<sup>728</sup> The CNT became a legitimate political party in the Chadian government on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010.<sup>729</sup> The members who did not wish to join the government continued their operation under the leadership of Hamid Saleh Abdelkader.<sup>730</sup> Since only one attack on a state target can be found for this group in 2007, they are coded as non-viable.<sup>731</sup>

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to July 2004 could be found in SCAD. There is mention of the group in the ACLED.

#### \*Le Parti d'Action Républicaine (PAR)

AKAs: The Republican Action Party; Force D'Action Armée Républicaine (PAR/FAAR)

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<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>727</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>728</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme. "Why Chad Isn't Darfur and Darfur Isn't Rwanda." *London Review of Books*, December 17, 2009. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n24/jerome-tubiana/why-chad-isn-t-darfur-and-darfur-isn-t-rwanda>; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>729</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>730</sup> Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125.

<sup>731</sup> "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme. "Why Chad Isn't Darfur and Darfur Isn't Rwanda." *London Review of Books*, December 17, 2009. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n24/jerome-tubiana/why-chad-isn-t-darfur-and-darfur-isn-t-rwanda>; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 122-125; Tchadactuel. "Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse." Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.



The PAR's leader was Gourbal Djiddi Nokour who created the group on December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2005.<sup>732</sup> Nokour was in exile and temporarily living in Canada.<sup>733</sup> Other leaders also resided in exile and coordinated with each other virtually.<sup>734</sup> The nature of their exile and any possible positions they held in the government or with other rebel groups could not be found; thus, the leadership variables are coded as missing. Nokour released a letter on May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2008 explaining the criminality of the Déby regime and France's participation in its crimes.<sup>735</sup> He signed this letter as the president of the PAR which is the first time in the surveyed sources that the group was publicly named.<sup>736</sup> He then released an interview he participated in that highlighted his organization, its beliefs, and what its members were fighting for on September 17<sup>th</sup>, 2008.<sup>737</sup> He called for the installation of democracy, justice, and development in Chad.<sup>738</sup> In establishing "true democracy" he stated the group would function without any outside help because "power exists with the masses of the Chadian people" (though he called Niger an important partner in the "struggle for democracy").<sup>739</sup> He also released a statement of their alignment with the UFDD/R on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2009.<sup>740</sup>

<sup>732</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124, 195.; TchadConvergence. "Un mouvement politico-militaire tchadien accuse les forces de Khalifa Haftar d'avoir assassiné son chef," April 22, 2020. <https://www.tchadpages.com/un-mouvement-politico-militaire-tchadien-accuse-les-forces-de-khalifa-haftar-davoir-assassine-son-chef/>; Info, Alwihda. "Lettre de M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, January 18, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour\\_a3787.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour_a3787.html); Info, Alwihda. "M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : « Les fils du Tchad doivent enlever de leur cœur la haine tribale »." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, February 2, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale\\_a3875.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale_a3875.html).

<sup>733</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124, 195.; Ambenatna. "Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : l'opprobre du Kanem." AMBENATNA INFOS, September 30, 2008. <http://ambenatna.over-blog.com/article-23268621.html>.

<sup>734</sup> Mak. "Tchad: M.Gourbal Nakour, leader du P.A.R. interview à lire." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, August 21, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-22142414.html>; Ambenatna. "Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : l'opprobre du Kanem." AMBENATNA INFOS, September 30, 2008. <http://ambenatna.over-blog.com/article-23268621.html>.

<sup>735</sup> Kelley, Hamid, and Gourbal Djiddi. "Gourbal Djiddi : Un drôle d'opposant." WALDARI WA AKHBAARA, May 24, 2008. <http://waldar.over-blog.com/article-19837065.html>.

<sup>736</sup> Kelley, Hamid, and Gourbal Djiddi. "Gourbal Djiddi : Un drôle d'opposant." WALDARI WA AKHBAARA, May 24, 2008. <http://waldar.over-blog.com/article-19837065.html>.

<sup>737</sup> *Entretien Avec PF Du P.A.R TCHD Gourbal D. Nokour Part1*, 2008. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb\\_ah\\_EwkZo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb_ah_EwkZo); Mak. "Tchad: M.Gourbal Nakour, leader du P.A.R. interview à lire." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, August 21, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-22142414.html>; Ambenatna. "Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : l'opprobre du Kanem." AMBENATNA INFOS, September 30, 2008. <http://ambenatna.over-blog.com/article-23268621.html>.

<sup>738</sup> *Entretien Avec PF Du P.A.R TCHD Gourbal D. Nokour Part1*, 2008. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb\\_ah\\_EwkZo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb_ah_EwkZo); Info, Alwihda. "Lettre de M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, January 18, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour\\_a3787.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour_a3787.html); Info, Alwihda. "M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : « Les fils du Tchad doivent enlever de leur cœur la haine tribale »." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, February 2, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale\\_a3875.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale_a3875.html).

<sup>739</sup> *Entretien Avec PF Du P.A.R TCHD Gourbal D. Nokour Part1*, 2008. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb\\_ah\\_EwkZo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb_ah_EwkZo); Info, Alwihda. "M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : « Les fils du Tchad doivent enlever de leur cœur la haine tribale »." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, February 2, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale\\_a3875.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale_a3875.html); Mak. "Tchad: M.Gourbal Nakour, leader du P.A.R. interview à lire." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, August 21, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-22142414.html>.

<sup>740</sup> Djamil. "Tchad : Le PAR apporte son soutien à l'UFDD/R, 'Une force non négligeable.'" Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, March 23, 2009. <https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Le-PAR-apporte->

On January 18<sup>th</sup>, 2011, Nokour released a statement that the PAR and joint FAAR (their military arm) are committed to only using proportional amounts of force in their fight for democracy against the Déby regime.<sup>741</sup>

The military arm of their organization is based near Lake Chad in the Kanem region near N'Djamena.<sup>742</sup> Information on attacks that they have taken credit for cannot be found. However, there was an attack against civilians on April 7<sup>th</sup>, 2007 in Kanem which was attributed to possible Janjaweed violence (362CHA). This does not make sense, however, since the Janjaweed strike from Sudan in eastern Chad, yet Kanem is in western Chad along the Niger border. Since the PAR was the only rebel group based in Kanem at that time, the coder identified this attack as the group's first attack against civilians, though with low certainty.<sup>743</sup>

The group briefly joined the government in 2010 but took up arms again in 2011.<sup>744</sup> Nokour left for Libya in 2014 to join the forces of Maréchal Khalifa Haftar after their 2011 revolution.<sup>745</sup> This also coincides with the dominant presence of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. Haftar would later kill Nokour on April 18<sup>th</sup>, 2020.<sup>746</sup> It is unclear if the group was still active after 2014. Since no information can be found on whether they (or the UFDD/R once they joined) committed at least 2 attacks in one year starting from 2008 they are coded as non-viable.

## Front Démocratique pour le Renouveau (FDR)

AKAs: Democratic Front for Renewal

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[son-soutien-a-l-UFDD-R-Une-force-non-negligeable\\_a2364.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale_a3875.html); Info, Alwihda. "M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : « Les fils du Tchad doivent enlever de leur cœur la haine tribale »." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, February 2, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale\\_a3875.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale_a3875.html); Mak. "Tchad: M.Gourbal Nakour, leader du P.A.R. interview à lire." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, August 21, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-22142414.html>.

<sup>741</sup> Info, Alwihda. "Lettre de M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, January 18, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour\\_a3787.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour_a3787.html); Info, Alwihda. "M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : « Les fils du Tchad doivent enlever de leur cœur la haine tribale »." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, February 2, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale\\_a3875.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour-Les-fils-du-Tchad-doivent-enlever-de-leur-coeur-la-haine-tribale_a3875.html).

<sup>742</sup> Mak. "Tchad: M.Gourbal Nakour, leader du P.A.R. interview à lire." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, August 21, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-22142414.html>; Ambenatna. "Gourbal Djiddi Nokour : l'opprobre du Kanem." AMBENATNA INFOS, September 30, 2008. <http://ambenatna.over-blog.com/article-23268621.html>.

<sup>743</sup> Mak. "Tchad: M.Gourbal Nakour, leader du P.A.R. interview à lire." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, August 21, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-22142414.html>.

<sup>744</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 124, 195.; Info, Alwihda. "Lettre de M. Gourbal Djiddi Nokour." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International, January 18, 2011. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour\\_a3787.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Lettre-de-M-Gourbal-Djiddi-Nokour_a3787.html).

<sup>745</sup> TchadConvergence. "Un mouvement politico-militaire tchadien accuse les forces de Khalifa Haftar d'avoir assassiné son chef," April 22, 2020. <https://www.tchadpages.com/un-mouvement-politico-militaire-tchadien-accuse-les-forces-de-khalifa-haftar-davoir-assassine-son-chef/>.

<sup>746</sup> TchadConvergence. "Un mouvement politico-militaire tchadien accuse les forces de Khalifa Haftar d'avoir assassiné son chef," April 22, 2020. <https://www.tchadpages.com/un-mouvement-politico-militaire-tchadien-accuse-les-forces-de-khalifa-haftar-davoir-assassine-son-chef/>.

The FDR signed a peace agreement with the Niger government in N'Djamena in 1998. As a rebel group in Niger, the group is excluded for Chad.<sup>747</sup>

### Forces des Organisations Nationales pour l'Alternance et les Libertés Tchadienne (FONALT)

AKAs: Forces of National Organizations for Alternation and Chadian Liberty

FONALT's leader was Colonel Abdoulaye Issaka Sarwa who had previously been a part of Déby's Republican Guard.<sup>748</sup> He formed the group on December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2001 after being released from 2 months of "captivity" with 10 other former government officials where he claimed to have "suffered injustices and humiliation" at the hands of the Chadian state due to a suspected coup attempt.<sup>749</sup> Once released Sarwa went into exile in Benin via Cameroon and began organizing this rebel group from there.<sup>750</sup> Given the lack of a shared space in forming the group, the rural variable is coded as 88. The rebel group was based in Tissi- in southeast Chad- to have easy access to resources from the C.A.R and Sudan for launching operations.<sup>751</sup> However, due to uncertainty surrounding when the rebel group set up its bases in Tissi, relative to within one year of group formation, the rural variable is coded as unknown. The nature of these resources and whether they were supplied by those foreign governments is not clear. Though Sarwa's previous experiences were in the Chadian military, it is unknown if any of the other 10 officials imprisoned with him also helped form FONALT, or if at least a third of this group derived from the military. Therefore, the military variable is coded as unknown while the other organizational variables are coded as 0.

On November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2002 FONALT announced that they had killed 116 military officials in east and southeastern Chad.<sup>752</sup> According to ACLED (87CHA), they killed 16 soldiers and lost 2 rebels over a period of 2 days when they attacked the military on November 14<sup>th</sup> somewhere between Adré and Guéréda. Since the record in ACLED gives a more exact location and time period, 16 casualties for this specific attack will be used in coding their first small attack. November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2002 will be used as their named date as it was the first instance in which they publicly announced their existence and took credit for an attack.

With the ANR on October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2002, they killed 87 soldiers near Adré. This attack is coded as their first large attack.<sup>753</sup>

They had joined the ANR on March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002 but separated from them when ANR's leader, Mahamat Garfa, used a January 2003 peace agreement with Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, to get a lucrative

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<sup>747</sup> Walther, Olivier J. "Wars and Conflicts in the Sahara-Sahel." West African Papers. Paris: OECD Publishing, September 2017, 23.; "PA-X: Peace Agreements Database," August 21, 1998.  
<https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1521/>.

<sup>748</sup> "RFI - Tchad - La Rébellion Harcèle Le Pouvoir." Accessed August 17, 2020.

[http://www1.rfi.fr/actu/fr/articles/035/article\\_22953.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actu/fr/articles/035/article_22953.asp); Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139-140.

<sup>749</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139.

<sup>750</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139.

<sup>751</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139-140.

<sup>752</sup> Djonabaye, Dieudonne. "RFI - Tchad - La rébellion harcèle le pouvoir." Sido: rfi, November 19, 2002.

[http://www1.rfi.fr/actu/fr/articles/035/article\\_22953.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actu/fr/articles/035/article_22953.asp); Europa Publications. *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. London: Routledge, 2003, 225, 235.

<sup>753</sup> Europa Publications. *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. London: Routledge, 2003, 225, 235.

position in the Chadian government.<sup>754</sup> Though Sarwa rejected this deal, he later tried to make one of his own with the government.<sup>755</sup> However, he was arrested on September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2004 and imprisoned for 3 years.<sup>756</sup> Since his release on January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2008, rebel activities from the FONALT have dissipated though they are accused of attacking civilians in eastern Chad. Since they did not conduct at least two attacks in one year starting in 2004 they are coded as non-viable.<sup>757</sup>

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation could be found in SCAD. There is mention of the group in the ACLED.

### Rassemblement des forces démocratiques (RAFD)

AKAs: Rally of Democratic Forces (RADF); Rassemblement des Forces pour la Changement (RFC); Rally of Forces for Change; Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques du Tchad (RFD); Rally of Democratic Forces of Chad

Formed in 2006 by two brothers, cousins of President Déby, who left SCUD. One of the brothers, Timan Erdimi (aka: Timane Erdimi) is the group's current leader. They operated in eastern Chad and the suburbs of N'Djamena. RAFD are a coalition of several deserter rebel groups such as:<sup>758</sup>

- 1) SCUD
- 2) RNDP
- 3) RND
- 4) CNT

### \*Le Commandement Militaire Unifié (CMU)

AKAs: The Unified Military Command;

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<sup>754</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139-140.

<sup>755</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139-140.

<sup>756</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139-140.

<sup>757</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 139-140.; Europa Publications. *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. London: Routledge, 2003, 225, 235.; Djonabaye, Dieudonne. "RFI - Tchad - La rébellion harcèle le pouvoir." Sido: rfi, November 19, 2002. [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/035/article\\_22953.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/035/article_22953.asp).

<sup>758</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World, 2018-2019*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, CQ Press, 2019.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (Socle Pour Le Changement, l'Unité et La Démocratie, SCUD); How, Why and When It Was Started; the Group's Founders; Whether Any of the Founders Have Been to Canada; Rebel Activities and Major Events in Which the Group Has Been Involved (2005 - March 2009)." Refworld, March 26, 2009.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02a28.html>.; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf).

A coalition group made up of the UFDD, RFC, and UFDD/F. They were created on December 12<sup>th</sup>, 2007 by the respective leaders of those groups (Gl. Nouri, A. Aboud, and Timan Erdimi).<sup>759</sup>

#### \*Rassemblement national démocratique (RND)

AKAs: National Democratic Rally

Formed by Adouma Hassaballah Jedareb, ex-member of the FPRN and FUC. Given that the FUC broke up in 2007, the RND must have formed after that year. Jedareb took numerous Ouaddaïan combatants with him to form the group. RND became one of the two main groups in UFDD. A splinter of them, the RNDP, also became a part of the UFDD. No other information can be found on the group's origins and start date. Since Jedareb initially formed the group with Ouaddaïan combatants from the previous group he was in, the RND is a splinter and therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>760</sup>

#### \*Union des forces pour le progrès et la Démocratie (UFPD)

AKAs: Union of Forces for Progress and Democracy; Force pour la Démocratie et le Développement (FDD); Force for Democracy and Development

One of the main constituent groups of the UFDD rebel coalition.<sup>761</sup> The UFPD was formed in July 2006 by the former Chadian Defense Minister and ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mahamat Nouri, who left his post on May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2006 after Déby won a contested second term and abolished term limits.<sup>762</sup> He offered men along the Chadian-Sudanese border US \$250 to join the new rebel group he was creating after

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<sup>759</sup> Mak. "Tchad : Le Commandement Militaire Unifié(CMU), fiction ou réalité ?" Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, February 16, 2008. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-16704492.html>; JeuneAfrique.com. "Ce jour-là : le 15 février 2008, Idriss Déby Itno décrète l'état d'urgence après la bataille de N'Djamena – Jeune Afrique," February 15, 2018. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/530290/politique/ce-jour-la-le-15-fevrier-2008-idriss-deby-itno-decrete-letat-durgence-apres-la-bataille-de-ndjamena/>; Info, Alwihda. "Tchad: Interview exclusive du porte-parole du commandement militaire unifié à Al Wihda Presse Internationale." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International. Accessed August 28, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Interview-exclusive-du-porte-parole-du-commandement-militaire-unifie-a-Al-Wihda-Presse-Internationale\\_a111.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-Interview-exclusive-du-porte-parole-du-commandement-militaire-unifie-a-Al-Wihda-Presse-Internationale_a111.html).

<sup>760</sup> HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme, and Emily Walmsley. *The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the "Darfurization" of Chad: Myths and Reality*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf>.

<sup>761</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

<sup>762</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; "Chad - Ex-Defence Minister Joins Rebels, Opposition Says Vote Illegitimate - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," May 7, 2006. [https://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id\\_article=15519](https://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15519); May, Roy, and Simon Massey. "Chad: Politics and Security." Writenet, March 2007, 4.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20070612230327/http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/46384cde2.pdf>.



leaving Saudi Arabia.<sup>763</sup> The backgrounds of these new members could not be found as to whether they were simply civilians or former rebels. Given this, all organizational variables are coded as 0 except other\_rebels which is coded as missing. Information on other leaders besides Nouri also could not be found. The area along the border with Sudan is ethnically diverse. The “rural” variable is coded as a 1 due to Nouri’s early recruitment and apparent operational planning activity along the rural Chadian-Sudanese border.

Nouri soon formed alliances with other groups to create the UFDD officially on October 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006 which is also the first time the UFPD was publicly named.<sup>764</sup> Given the UFDD’s message advocating for democracy, this is used to code UFPD’s goal\_take as 1.<sup>765</sup> Prior to this announcement, however, UFPD fighters attacked and took control of Goz Beida on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006 (267CHA) but did not take credit until the announcement of the UFDD coalition.<sup>766</sup> This is coded as the group’s first attack against civilians and the group’s delayed naming supports the inference that UFPD meant to be clandestine prior to naming itself publicly. On October 29<sup>th</sup>, 2006, UFPD forces killed 4 soldiers in Hadjer Meram (284CHA). This is coded as the group’s first small attack against a state target. They then killed 25 soldiers while losing 83 of their own in Biltine in late November/early December 2006 (305CHA). This is coded as their first large attack.

While functioning within the UFDD with other rebel groups, UFPD received military support from Sudan.<sup>767</sup> Though this support came within their first year of formation, the foreign\_govt variable is coded as 0 because the support came because they formed a coalition rather than as a direct initial part of their formation.<sup>768</sup> After the UFDD disbanded in 2007, Nouri continued UFPD operations under the UFDD

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<sup>763</sup> IRIN News. “UN Warns Humanitarian Pull out Possible.” The New Humanitarian, May 16, 2006.

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2006/05/16/un-warns-humanitarian-pull-out-possible>.

<sup>764</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

<sup>765</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.

<sup>766</sup> “Goz Beida et Am Timan Investis Par Des Rebelles - L’Observateur N°395 Du 25 Octobre 2006 - Presse Tchadienne,” October 29, 2006.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20071021074325/http://www.tchadactuel.com/presse.php?2006%2F10%2F29%2F336-goz-beida-et-am-timan-investis-par-des-rebelles>.

<sup>767</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.

<sup>768</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.



name.<sup>769</sup> They signed a peace agreement with the government in 2009 (under the UFDD name) and joined the Chadian military.<sup>770</sup>

[*Side note on UFPD vs. FDD*: The FDD is listed as having been created by Mahamat Nouri and being one of the founding members of the UFDD.<sup>771</sup> However, Nouri was said to have been creating the UFPD at the same time and using them to help found the UFDD. There are far more sources on the UFPD than there are on the FDD.<sup>772</sup> As a result, the following explanations are possible:

- Nouri simultaneously created two groups at the same time. This scenario doesn't seem likely as he left Saudi Arabia for the Sudanese side of the Chadian border to incentivize Chadians to join his new rebel group. It wouldn't be logical to use resources to form two different rebel groups at the same time instead of forming one larger one.

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<sup>769</sup> "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Jeune Afrique. "Les Rebelles Se Déchirent | Jeuneafrique.Com - Le Premier Site d'info...", April 30, 2007. <http://archive.is/t3WL>; "Chad Rebels Say Divergence over Leadership behind Assault Failure - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," February 18, 2008. <https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26016>.

<sup>770</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; "Chad - Ex-Defence Minister Joins Rebels, Opposition Says Vote Illegitimate - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," May 7, 2006. [https://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id\\_article=15519](https://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15519); IRIN News. "UN Warns Humanitarian Pull out Possible." The New Humanitarian, May 16, 2006.

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2006/05/16/un-warns-humanitarian-pull-out-possible>; May, Roy, and Simon Massey. "Chad: Politics and Security." Writenet, March 2007.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20070612230327/http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/46384cde2.pdf>; "Goz Beida et Am Timan Investis Par Des Rebelles - L'Observateur N°395 Du 25 Octobre 2006 - Presse Tchadienne," October 29, 2006.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20071021074325/http://www.tchadactuel.com/presse.php?2006%2F10%2F29%2F336-goz-beida-et-am-timan-investis-par-des-rebelles>; Jeune Afrique. "Les Rebelles Se Déchirent | Jeuneafrique.Com - Le Premier Site d'info...", April 30, 2007. <http://archive.is/t3WL>; "Chad Rebels Say Divergence over Leadership behind Assault Failure - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," February 18, 2008.

<https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26016>; "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.

<sup>771</sup> "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | 'They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad." Refworld. Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45a4dd8b2.html>; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008.

[https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf).

<sup>772</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; "Chad - Ex-Defence Minister Joins Rebels, Opposition Says Vote Illegitimate - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," May 7, 2006. [https://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id\\_article=15519](https://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15519); May, Roy, and Simon Massey. "Chad: Politics and Security." Writenet, March 2007, 4.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20070612230327/http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/46384cde2.pdf>.

- The two names (UFPD & FDD) refer to the same group. Prior to the formation of the UFDD there is no information on the FDD. After the UFDD disbanded, the FDD reemerged as an independent rebel group and they gained a swarm of new members from defected FUC rebels after the FUC joined the government. It is possible that the breakup of the UFDD caused certain sources to refer to the remaining base of the UFDD as the FDD (removing the ‘united’ portion of their name) when in reality the UFPD was the base of the UFDD.
- The FDD was a separate rebel group but with the little information available on it they were associated with Nouri since he was the leader of the UFDD when the FDD joined. Thus, when the UFDD dissolved the FDD reemerges as a separate group, returned to Sudan, and accepted defected FUC rebels in 2007.

In analyzing all these options and the locations and operations of the UFPD and FDD, the coder concluded that the UFPD and the FDD are two names referring to the same group. It seems unlikely that Nouri would have wasted resources simultaneously creating two groups yet the UFPD and the FDD were both functioning in the same area of Sudan along the Chadian border. More evidence of the UFPD before the UFDD exists than after, and the FDD only emerges in relation to the UFDD and its demise.<sup>773</sup> This means that when Nouri began forming the group, it was called the UFPD. After the UFDD dissolved, the group was referred to as the FDD which caused the FDD to be added to the list of groups that made up the UFDD, but the FDD and the UFPD are one and the same led by Nouri.]

According to the SCAD, there was a type 1 event and a type 2 event that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as July 1, 2006). However, the type 2 event occurred in Ndjamena, which is not in the vicinity of the “op\_planning\_location” of the Chadian-Sudanese border. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED.

#### Alliance Nationale pour le Changement Démocratique (ANCD)

AKAs: National Alliance for Democratic Change

General Mahamat Nouri Allatchi formed the group on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2010 as a rebel coalition to rival the UFR after he and Timan Erdimi were removed by other rebel leaders in the coalition for their inability to get along. He was expelled from Sudan along with Erdimi, Tahir Guinassou, and Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb following another peace agreement between Chad and Sudan leaders. They all were sent in exile to Qatar. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group ANCD is excluded from this dataset.<sup>774</sup>

<sup>773</sup> “‘They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups,” January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | ‘They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad.” Refworld. Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45a4dd8b2.html>; “Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008.” Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf).

<sup>774</sup> “Alliance Nationale Pour Le Changement Démocratique/ National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD),” March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 260.; HSBA. “Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology,” March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

### \*Rassemblement National Démocratique et Populaire (RNDP)

AKAs: National Democratic and Popular Gathering

This name is initially associated with a political party created on February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1982 by Minister of Justice M. Kassire. The group as a rebel group was formed on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006 by Dr. Bachar Assed Mohamed Aguid from the original RND.<sup>775</sup> The RNDP are made up of smaller armed movements, political organisations, public associations, and independent actors.<sup>776</sup> Its goal is to “liberate Chad from their dictator, assure security in and outside the country, bring peace and stability, and create a basis for a real democracy and a lawful state to bring real development to Chad.”<sup>777</sup> Initially, they joined with the UFDD coalition before that coalition dissolved in 2007.<sup>778</sup> They then joined with the RAFD coalition to form a new rebel coalition under the acronym RFC.<sup>779</sup> Since the RNDP is a splinter of the RND and are made up of other smaller groups that cannot be identified they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>780</sup>

### \*Rassemblement populaire pour la Justice (RPJ)

AKAs: Popular Rally for Justice; le Groupe du 8 Décembre; the Group from December 8<sup>th</sup>

The “Groupe du 8 Décembre” carried out an attack near Adré in December of 2005 alongside the RDL.<sup>781</sup> They received that name because at the time they had not named themselves and taken credit for the attack. Since there is not enough information on the number of casualties, this will be coded as this

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<sup>775</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme, and Emily Walmsley. *The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf>.

<sup>776</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 183-185.

<sup>777</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 183-185.

<sup>778</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 183-185.

<sup>779</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme, and Emily Walmsley. *The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 183-185.

<sup>780</sup> HSBA. “Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions,” February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme, and Emily Walmsley. *The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 183-185.; Kelley, Michael P. *State in Disarray: Conditions of Chads Survival*. Taylor & Francis, 2019, 191, 219.

<sup>781</sup> Human Rights Watch (Organization). *“They Came Here to Kill Us” Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad*. Human Rights Watch, 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/01/09/they-came-here-kill-us/militia-attacks-and-ethnic-targeting-civilians-eastern>; ““They Came Here to Kill Us”: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups,” January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

group's first small attack. From that attack the official RPJ rebel group was created in January 2006 by Abakar Tollimi (aka. Tolli), a high-level government defector that had become one of Déby's private counsel in 2004 but left the position to rally against Déby in 2005.<sup>782</sup> However, the group still referred to themselves as the "Groupe du 8 Décembre" when it joined the FUC. The group eventually took credit for the December 2005 attack after naming themselves sometime in 2006 when joining the UFDD.<sup>783</sup> Adré is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a 1. In this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation.

Tollimi's stated objectives were to get rid of the existing dictatorship due to the lack of democracy.<sup>784</sup> The majority of the group was made up of the Borogat-Zaghawa ethnic group, and they were based in Eastern Chad.<sup>785</sup> The area around Adré was used to code the rural variable.

Initially, Tollimi did not want to join any coalition in which he would have to share power with those he may disagree with.<sup>786</sup> However, when the Sudanese government called together different rebel leaders in late January 2006 to Darfur and offered support if they were able to create one unified rebel coalition, Tollimi joined them and included the RPJ as a part of the new FUC coalition.<sup>787</sup>

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<sup>782</sup> "Au Tchad, Idriss Déby nomme le premier gouvernement de la IV<sup>e</sup> République." *Le Monde.fr*, May 8, 2018. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/05/08/au-tchad-idriss-deby-nomme-le-premier-gouvernement-de-la-ive-republique\\_5295985\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/05/08/au-tchad-idriss-deby-nomme-le-premier-gouvernement-de-la-ive-republique_5295985_3212.html); OPINION, CENTRAFRIQUE. "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." LE BLOG DE CENTRAFRIQUE OPINION. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>783</sup> Human Rights Watch (Organization). "They Came Here to Kill Us" Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Human Rights Watch, 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/01/09/they-came-here-kill-us/militia-attacks-and-ethnic-targeting-civilians-eastern>; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.

<sup>784</sup> "Au Tchad, Idriss Déby nomme le premier gouvernement de la IV<sup>e</sup> République." *Le Monde.fr*, May 8, 2018. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/05/08/au-tchad-idriss-deby-nomme-le-premier-gouvernement-de-la-ive-republique\\_5295985\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/05/08/au-tchad-idriss-deby-nomme-le-premier-gouvernement-de-la-ive-republique_5295985_3212.html); Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>785</sup> Human Rights Watch (Organization). "They Came Here to Kill Us" Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Human Rights Watch, 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/01/09/they-came-here-kill-us/militia-attacks-and-ethnic-targeting-civilians-eastern>; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.

<sup>786</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>787</sup> Human Rights Watch (Organization). "They Came Here to Kill Us" Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Human Rights Watch, 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/01/09/they-came-here-kill-us/militia-attacks-and-ethnic-targeting-civilians-eastern>; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.



The FUC joint attack on N'Djamena on April 13, 2006, that saw about 30 soldiers and 370 rebels killed, and subsequent defections from the RPJ left the RPJ weakened.<sup>788</sup> This attack is coded as the group's first large attack. There is no record of RPJ attacking civilians either independently or as part of the various coalitions it joined. Since there is substantial evidence on other attacks they carried out, the civilian attack variable is coded as never occurring.

Despite Sudanese demands for a unified rebel coalition, Mahamat Nouri Allatchi created the UFDD coalition and Tollimi moved his group from the FUC to this new rebel coalition on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006.<sup>789</sup> In the UFDD, Tollimi was given the position of Secretary General.<sup>790</sup> He would then use his group to help create the CMU rebel coalition on December 12, 2007, the AN coalition on February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2008, to join the UFR on January 18<sup>th</sup>, 2009, and then to help create the CNRD rebel coalition on September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2010.<sup>791</sup> The CNRD became a recognized political party in March 2017, and Tollimi became a political exile in Paris.<sup>792</sup> He was arrested along with other former and current rebel leaders for crimes against humanity on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2019.<sup>793</sup>

#### \*Force pour le Ratissage, le Regroupement et le Redressement du Tchad (FRRRT)

AKAs: Force for the Cleansing, Reunification and Resurgence of Chad

The FRRRT became the first group of the FUC coalition to sign a peace agreement with the Déby government in 2006.<sup>794</sup> Their former general was Yaya Batit Ali, previously the leader of the PUND/DDT

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<sup>788</sup> Staff, Daily Star. "Chad Breaks off Diplomatic Ties with Sudan after Rebel Attacks; President Threatens to Expel Darfur Refugees from His Country." *Daily Star*. April 15, 2006, sec. POLITICS.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DSTAR00020060414e24f0000r&cat=a&ep=ASE>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>789</sup> Human Rights Watch (Organization). "They Came Here to Kill Us" *Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad*. Human Rights Watch, 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/01/09/they-came-here-kill-us/militia-attacks-and-ethnic-targeting-civilians-eastern>.; HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>.; "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad : Glossary of Chadian Rebel Groups," January 2007. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/12.htm>.

<sup>790</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>791</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>792</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>793</sup> France Bleu. "Un célèbre opposant au Président tchadien Idriss Déby interpellé en Mayenne et soupçonné de crimes contre l'humanité," June 17, 2019. <https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/international/un-celebre-opposant-au-president-tchadien-idriss-deby-interpelle-en-mayenne-et-soupconne-de-crimes-1560803616>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 185-187.

<sup>794</sup> Kodmadjingar, André. "D'anciens rebelles appellent l'État tchadien à respecter les accords de paix." VOA, September 10, 2017. <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/d-anciens-rebelles-appellent-l-etat-tchadien-a-respecter-les-accords-de-paix/4022651.html>.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Leadership of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni Pour Le Changement, FUC) in 2005-2006; the Signatories to the Peace Agreement with the Government; the Positions They Were Offered in the Government; FUC Members

(Parti d'Union Nationale pour la Démocratie, le Dialogue et le Développement du Tchad) opposition political party that formed in 1993.<sup>795</sup> He was still the party's leader in 1999 when he was arrested for his political activities; therefore, it is safe to assume that he formed the FRRRT sometime after his pardon and release in April of 1999.<sup>796</sup> It is unknown if at least 1/3 of this rebel group came from its former political party. Because of this, the party variable is coded as uncertain in the group's organizational history. Information on the group's activities between 1999 and the time it joined the FUC cannot be found. However, since the FUC carried out two attacks in 2006 in Bitkine and in N'djamena (224CHA; 242CHA), the FRRRT is coded as viable. Currently, the FRRRT is a part of the Chadian government and no longer active as a militant group given the peace agreement they signed in 2006.<sup>797</sup> Detailed information on them can only be found from after they joined the FUC in late December 2005. Despite an inability to find more information this group is included given its participation in the FUC rebel coalition and its democratic goals in taking up arms against the Déby government.<sup>798</sup>

According to the SCAD, there were no events listed that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as April 1, 1999). There is no mention of the group in the ACLED.

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Who Joined Splinter Groups, Also Known as the United Front for Change (FUC).” Refworld, April 29, 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02e3c.html>; Maliactu. “D’anciens Rebelles Appellent l’État Tchadien à Respecter Les Accords de Paix – Maliactu.Info,” September 10, 2017. <http://maliactu.info/afrique/danciens-rebelles-appellent-letat-tchadien-respecter-les-accords-de-paix>.

<sup>795</sup> Kodmadjingar, André. “D’anciens rebelles appellent l’État tchadien à respecter les accords de paix.” VOA, September 10, 2017. <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/d-anciens-rebelles-appellent-l-etat-tchadien-a-respecter-les-accords-de-paix/4022651.html>; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 22, 193.

<sup>796</sup> Department of State. “COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999--VOLUME I,” April 2000. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-106JPRT63935/html/CPRT-106JPRT63935-Volumel.htm>; Yorongar, Ngarleji. “Human Rights of Parliamentarians: 164th Council Session.” Brussels: Inter-Parliamentary Union, April 16, 1999. <http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/164/chd01.htm>.

<sup>797</sup> Kodmadjingar, André. “D’anciens rebelles appellent l’État tchadien à respecter les accords de paix.” VOA, September 10, 2017. <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/d-anciens-rebelles-appellent-l-etat-tchadien-a-respecter-les-accords-de-paix/4022651.html>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Leadership of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni Pour Le Changement, FUC) in 2005-2006; the Signatories to the Peace Agreement with the Government; the Positions They Were Offered in the Government; FUC Members Who Joined Splinter Groups, Also Known as the United Front for Change (FUC).” Refworld, April 29, 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02e3c.html>; Maliactu. “D’anciens Rebelles Appellent l’État Tchadien à Respecter Les Accords de Paix – Maliactu.Info,” September 10, 2017. <http://maliactu.info/afrique/danciens-rebelles-appellent-letat-tchadien-respecter-les-accords-de-paix>.

<sup>798</sup> Kodmadjingar, André. “D’anciens rebelles appellent l’État tchadien à respecter les accords de paix.” VOA, September 10, 2017. <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/d-anciens-rebelles-appellent-l-etat-tchadien-a-respecter-les-accords-de-paix/4022651.html>; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 22, 193.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Leadership of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni Pour Le Changement, FUC) in 2005-2006; the Signatories to the Peace Agreement with the Government; the Positions They Were Offered in the Government; FUC Members Who Joined Splinter Groups, Also Known as the United Front for Change (FUC).” Refworld, April 29, 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02e3c.html>; Maliactu. “D’anciens Rebelles Appellent l’État Tchadien à Respecter Les Accords de Paix – Maliactu.Info,” September 10, 2017. <http://maliactu.info/afrique/danciens-rebelles-appellent-letat-tchadien-respecter-les-accords-de-paix>; Department of State. “COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999--VOLUME I,” April 2000. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-106JPRT63935/html/CPRT-106JPRT63935-Volumel.htm>; Yorongar, Ngarleji. “Human Rights of Parliamentarians: 164th Council Session.” Brussels: Inter-Parliamentary Union, April 16, 1999. <http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/164/chd01.htm>.



#### \*FIDL

FIDL was one of the member groups of the FUC coalition. No further information on its origins or operations can be found- including its full name. The group is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>799</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### \*Front pour l'Instauration de la Démocratie et des Libertés (FIDEL)

AKAs: Front for the Establishment of Democracy and Peace

This rebel coalition joining the ADR of Younous Ibédou Awad and the UPTRN of Abakar Oumar Mahamat together formed in 2006 but quickly dissolved. Its president was Mahamat Ibrahim. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group, is excluded from this dataset.<sup>800</sup>

#### Union des Forces Démocratique (UFD)

AKAs: Union of Democratic Forces

The UFD was originally a political party that participated in the 1992 elections, but its leader Dr. Nahor Ngawara Mahmoud rebelled.<sup>801</sup> The UFD-PR, a new political party, led by Gali Gatta Ngothe, emerged at some point before 1997.<sup>802</sup> The original UFD remains a rebel group and is now headed by Doctor Mahmoud Nahor. Since the original UFD political party only participated in the 1992 elections and a new version of the political party emerged around 1997, it is safe to assume that Mahmoud rebelled and turned the UFD into a rebel group prior to 1997 which would exclude the group from this dataset.<sup>803</sup>

#### \*Idriss Miskine Group

This rebel group was responsible for a bomb attack on an airplane in N'Djamena in 1984. This means it formed prior to 1997 and are excluded from this dataset.<sup>804</sup>

#### \*FACDM

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<sup>799</sup> "Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad." Human Rights Watch, February 2006.

<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/chad0206/chad0206.pdf>.

<sup>800</sup> OPINION, CENTRAFRIQUE. "LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES." LE BLOG DE CENTRAFRIQUE OPINION. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>.; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 265.

<sup>801</sup> Banks, Arthur S., Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller. *Political Handbook of the World 1998*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, 174.; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 28.

<sup>802</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 28.

<sup>803</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 28.; Banks, Arthur S., Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller. *Political Handbook of the World 1998*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, 174.

<https://www.refworld.org/country/COI,IRBC,QUERYRESPONSE,TCD,45f147aa11,0.html>

<https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/cha2002parties2.htm>

<sup>804</sup> "Incident Summary for GTDID: 198403100004." Accessed August 29, 2020.

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198403100004>.

This group carried out an attack on a business in February of 1985. FACDM's full name could not be found. This means it formed prior to 1997 and is excluded from this dataset.<sup>805</sup>

#### \*Comité National de Redressement (CNR)

AKAs: Conseil National de Redressement du Tchad (CNRT); National Recovery Committee; National Recovery Council of Chad

Dr. Bichara Idriss Hagggar formed the CNR in 1992, and the group was still active as of 2005. The pre-1997 start date excludes the CNR from this dataset.<sup>806</sup>

#### \*Le Mouvement Volcan

AKAs: The Volcano Movement

A rebel group created in 1975. One of their prominent members, Ahmat Acyl, left to form the CDR in 1979. The group is excluded from this dataset because of the pre-1997 start date.<sup>807</sup>

#### Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire (CDR)

AKAs: "New Vulcan Army"; neoCDR- Oumar & Makaye; Revolutionary Democratic Council

This group was originally formed by Açyl Ahmat Akhbach in 1979. Akhbach became the minister of foreign affairs for the GUNT (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale du Tchad) on June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1982 and left the CDR. The group has been under the leadership of Acheikh Ibn Oumar and Abdelwahid Aboud Makaye since 1982 when Akhbach died. Under this new leadership, CDR joined the FUC but broke away from them and subsequently joined the UFDD in 2006. In 2009, they signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the Chadian military. Given that the group never disbanded between the period of leadership change, their start year is 1979 which excludes them from this dataset.<sup>808</sup>

#### \*Le Groupe Mahamat Camara (GMC)

AKAs: The Mahamat Camara Group

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<sup>805</sup> "Incident Summary for GTDID: 198502080005." Accessed August 29, 2020.

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198502080005>.

<sup>806</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: The Conseil National de Redressement Du Tchad (National Council of Chadian Recovery, CNR), Particularly Its Activities in Chad, as Well as the Treatment of Its Members and Sympathizers by Government Authorities (December 2005)." Refworld, December 7, 2005. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f147aa3e.html>.

<sup>807</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 106.; Kelley, Michael P. *State in Disarray: Conditions of Chads Survival*. Taylor & Francis, 2019, 221.; De Russel, Dominique Soulas. "Une analyse politique du problème tchadien: Présentation critique des thèses du Dr. Sidick et de son mouvement." *Africa Spectrum* 15, no. 3 (1980): 295–308. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40174006>.

<sup>808</sup> Human Rights Watch (Organization). "They Came Here to Kill Us" Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Human Rights Watch, 2007.; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 105-111.; "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.

The GMC was created in 1976 by Acheikh Ibn-Oumar and others. The group is excluded due to its start year.<sup>809</sup>

#### **\*Conseil de la Révolution (CR)**

AKAs: Council of the Revolution

The CR was created sometime before 1978 and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>810</sup>

#### **\*Forces Armées Populaires (FAP)**

AKAs: Popular Armed Forces

This group was created sometime before 1978 and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>811</sup>

#### **\*Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution (UNIR)**

AKAs: Forces Armées du Nord; National Union for Independence and Revolution; Northern Armed Forces

This northern rebel group became the ruling political party of Hissène Habré. It formed sometime before 1984 when Habré succeeded in taking over the government and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>812</sup>

#### **\*Conseil National pour le Changement et la Démocratie (CNCD)**

AKAs: National Council for Change and Democracy

Acheikh Ibn-Oumar, who had experience with several other rebel groups such as the FROLINAT, GUNT, the CDR, UFDD, UFDD/F, and the UFR, helped found this rebel coalition in 2011. The group disbanded in 2014, and Oumar returned to the government in November 2018. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>813</sup>

#### **Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD)**

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<sup>809</sup> Liberté. "Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh et le Groupe Mahamat Camara ou GMC." LIBEREZ IBNI OUMAR, August 13, 2009. <http://prisonniers-politiques.over-blog.com/article-34856637.html>.

<sup>810</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 110.

<sup>811</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 110.

<sup>812</sup> Lanne, B. "Le Sud, l'État et la Révolution," p. 42-43, October 28, 1984. <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/016030.pdf>.

<sup>813</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Acheikh Ibn Oumar, Whereabouts, Activities and Family Members; School and Work Background." Refworld, August 23, 2000. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad7ac.html>; RFI. "Tchad: l'ex-chef de la diplomatie Acheikh Ibn Oumar de retour d'exil," November 5, 2018. <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20181105-tchad-ex-chef-diplomatie-acheikh-ibn-oumar-retour-exil>.

This group eventually became a political party in the government after a peace deal and the extra-judicial execution of its leader Ketté Nodji Moïse. CSNPD originally formed in the early 1990s and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>814</sup>

#### **\*Convention Tchadienne pour la Paix et le Développement (CTPD)**

AKAs: Chadian Convention for Peace and Development

The CTPD became a political party in the government on March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2008 with leader Laoukein. No information on the origins and operations of its rebel activity prior to becoming a political party can be found. The group is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>815</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### **Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF)**

AKAs: Armed Forces for the Federal Republic

The FARF formed in the early 1990s but joined the government after a peace agreement in 1998. The group is therefore excluded from this dataset for its pre-1997 start date.<sup>816</sup>

#### **\*Forces Armées Tchadiennes (FAT)**

AKAs: Chadian Armed Forces

Former armed forces of the government of Chad under President Félix Malloum. It became an independent armed rebel group in 1979 and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>817</sup>

#### **\*Front National Tchadien (FNT)**

AKAs : Front de libération du Ouaddai ; Chadian National Front ; Ouaddai Liberation Front (FLO)

The group formed in the early 1980s and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>818</sup>

#### **Front Nationale pour le Tchad Rénové (FNTR)**

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<sup>814</sup> “UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program.” Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/448/0;> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 18.

<sup>815</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 18.

<sup>816</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Whether the Armed Forces for the Federal Republic (FARF - Forces Armées Pour La République Fédérale) Is Still Active and If so, Its Activities.” Refworld. Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4beaf10.html>.

<sup>817</sup> Debos, Marielle. “Chapitre V. La milicianisation décrétée des forces régulières.” *Les Afriques*, 2013, 163–93. <https://www.cairn.info/le-metier-des-armes-au-tchad--9782811106263-page-163.htm>.

<sup>818</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Chadian National Front - FNT (Front National Tchadien), Date of Creation, Treatment of Its Members, Names, Present Location and Status of Its Leaders and Their Goals; Relationship between the FNT and the Renewed National Front of Chad - FNTR (Front National Tchadien Rénové).” Refworld, September 25, 2000. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4beaf14.html>.

AKAs: National Front for the Renewal of Chad

Dissident faction of the FNT that formed in 1996. The FNTR joined the FUC coalition when it formed in late December 2005. Due to its start year and status as a splinter, the group is excluded from this dataset.<sup>819</sup>

### Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR)

AKAs: Popular Front for Renewal

Its leader was General Abdel Kader Baba Laddé (real name: Mahamat Abdel Kader) who had been a gendarme.<sup>820</sup> He formed this rebel group in 1998 after a conflict at Chari Baguirmi (southern Chad) between the local Peul population and deputies that Déby sent.<sup>821</sup> Its stated goals were to fight against the Déby regime and defend the often marginalized Foulbé nomads.<sup>822</sup> Laddé was influenced to rebel by the government's bad treatment of the Chadian population in general and the members of his Peul community in particular.<sup>823</sup> The backgrounds of these Peul members and any organizational history that may have contributed to the group's formation is unknown. Furthermore, since there is no explicit mention of the group in Chari Baguirmi within a year of group formation, as well as known attacks coming after a year of group formation, the "rural" variable is coded as missing. The FPR is a hybrid politico-military rebel group made up of those referred to by Déby as "thieves and bandits."<sup>824</sup>

No relevant contestation events in the year leading up to their formation were found.

On November 21<sup>st</sup>, 2001 they claimed to have killed 9 army officers and wounded 43 others in an ambush in Eastern Chad near the Sudanese border (70CHA) though the government denied that such an attack took place. This will be coded as their first small attack with no certainty.

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<sup>819</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Leadership of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni Pour Le Changement, FUC) in 2005-2006; the Signatories to the Peace Agreement with the Government; the Positions They Were Offered in the Government; FUC Members Who Joined Splinter Groups, Also Known as the United Front for Change (FUC)." Refworld. Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b20f02e3c.html>;

Debos, Marielle. *Living by the Gun in Chad: Combatants, Impunity and State Formation*. Translated by Andrew Brown. London: Zed Books, 2016, 65, 72.

<sup>820</sup> Centrafrique, Corbeaunews. "Tchad : qui est Baba Laddé, l'ex-chef rebelle tchadien gracié ce jour par le Président Idriss Deby ? - Corbeau News Centrafrique Corbeau News Centrafrique." *Corbeau News Centrafrique* (blog), August 11, 2020. <https://corbeaunews-centrafrique.com/tchad-qui-est-baba-ladde-lex-chef-rebelle-tchadien-gracie-ce-jour-par-le-president-idriss-deby/>; Walther, Olivier J. "Wars and Conflicts in the Sahara-Sahel." *West African Papers*. Paris: OECD Publishing, September 2017.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>821</sup> Centrafrique, Corbeaunews. "Tchad : qui est Baba Laddé, l'ex-chef rebelle tchadien gracié ce jour par le Président Idriss Deby ? - Corbeau News Centrafrique Corbeau News Centrafrique." *Corbeau News Centrafrique* (blog), August 11, 2020. <https://corbeaunews-centrafrique.com/tchad-qui-est-baba-ladde-lex-chef-rebelle-tchadien-gracie-ce-jour-par-le-president-idriss-deby/>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>822</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>823</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>824</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

After 2008 the group was located in the Méridionale zone close to the North-West border of the C.A.R (Southern Chad).<sup>825</sup>

They signed a mutual aid agreement with the C.A.R. rebel group, APRD, to police their joint region, and Northern Cameroon, against the “Zaraguinas.”<sup>826</sup> They quickly separated due to Laddé’s refusal to sign a “demobilization, disarmament, and reinsertion” (DDR) agreement of peace with the APRD.<sup>827</sup> As a result, the two groups became the de facto occupying force of the respective territories (Chadian side vs. C.A.R side of the Méridionale zone) and clashed often over control of the zone.<sup>828</sup>

In October 2009 Laddé asked the Chadian government for a pardon if he disbanded the rebel group as a means to decrease violence from the Bangui-supported APRD rebel group as Bangui and N’Djamena had close relations.<sup>829</sup> After a series of times signing an agreement, escaping, and then signing a new agreement, Laddé officially turned the group into a political party on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2012 and joined the N’Djamena government on January 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013.<sup>830</sup> At least 2 attacks in one year since 2002 could not be found for this group; thus, they are coded as non-viable.

According to the SCAD, there were no events listed that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as January 1, 1998). There is no mention of the group in the ACLED.

#### \*Le Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad (MOSANAT)

This group formed in 1989 with Boda Maldoun as its leader.<sup>831</sup> Now its president is Karim Bory Issa with vice presidents Dr. Younouss Atim Idriss and M’Bairam M’berambaye Obe. MOSANAT is headquartered in Djemeze Alhamra.<sup>832</sup> It was were part of a coalition with, RFUTD, Volcan de la Liberté, FPR, FST, neoCDR, and the CNT before the CNT defected to the government in 2007.<sup>833</sup> The group

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<sup>825</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.; “CHAD 2013: THE IMPOSSIBLE REHABILITATION OF A NOTORIOUS DICTATOR.” Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>826</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>827</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>828</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.; “CHAD 2013: THE IMPOSSIBLE REHABILITATION OF A NOTORIOUS DICTATOR.” Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>829</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.

<sup>830</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 140-143.; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Freedom in the World 2012 - Chad.” Refworld. Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4fcc9538c.html>.

<sup>831</sup> “UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program.” Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/444/0>.

<sup>832</sup> Mak. “Tchad: protocole d’accord de fusion MOSANAT-RFUTD/F.” Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 15, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-protocole-d-accord-de-fusion-mosanat-refutd-f-52324429.html>; Mak. “Tchad: RESOLUTION 001/MOSANAT/2010.” Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 16, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-resolution-001-mosanat-2010-52353897.html>.

<sup>833</sup> Tchadactuel. “Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse,” March 1, 2007. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.



merged with the RFUTD/F on June 19<sup>th</sup>, 2010 but continue to operate under its own name.<sup>834</sup> Its initial goal was to overthrow the Habré regime, and it now focuses on toppling the Déby regime. Though there was a brief period of time between 1990 and 1991 before the group decided to continue operations against Déby after the fall of Habré, there is no record it they disbanded and only less than a year had passed. As a result, its formation year remains 1989, and thus the group is excluded from this dataset.

#### **\*MOSANAT/R**

Created by Djibrine Assali Hamdallah when he defected from MOSANAT in early 2010. As a splinter it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>835</sup>

#### **\*Mouvement National du Salut du Peuple (MONASAP)**

AKAs: National Movement of the Salvation of the People

This coalition of rebel groups made up of eight rebel factions was created on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2010 by Djibrine Assali Hamdallah in Sudan against the N'Djamena government after he defected from MOSANAT and created MOSANAT/R. As a coalition and an unoriginal group, it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>836</sup>

#### **\*Rassemblement des Fils Unis du Tchad pour le Développement (RFUTD)**

AKAs: Gathering of the United Sons of Chad for Development

The RFUTD was in a coordinated unified military coalition, the CAR, with, MoSaNaT, Volcan de la Liberté, FPR, FST, neoCDR, and the CNT before the CNT defected to the government in 2007. Since the CAR formed around 2006/7, the RFUTD would have formed sometime before those years. No other information about this group's origins or operations can be found to verify that it meets the other criteria for the dataset. As a result, it is excluded due to a lack of information.<sup>837</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### **\*Rassemblement des Fils Unis du Tchad pour le Développement/Fondamental (RFUTD/F)**

AKAs: Rally of United Sons of Chad for Development/Fundamental

This group merged with the MOSANAT on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2010 and operated under the MOSANAT name. Its stated objective is to topple the Déby regime. It is likely a splinter of the RFUTD which means it would have formed after 2007. However, no other information about this group's origins or operations can be

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<sup>834</sup> Mak. "Tchad: protocole d'accord de fusion MOSANAT-RFUTD/F." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 15, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-protocole-d-accord-de-fusion-mosanat-refutd-f-52324429.html>.; Mak. "Tchad: RESOLUTION 001/MOSANAT/2010." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 16, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-resolution-001-mosanat-2010-52353897.html>.

<sup>835</sup> Mak. "Tchad: le MOSANAT prend acte du retrait de M. Djibrine Assali." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 13, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-le-mosanat-prend-acte-du-retrait-de-m-djibrine-assali-52168027.html>.

<sup>836</sup> Mak. "Tchad: le MOSANAT prend acte du retrait de M. Djibrine Assali." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 13, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-le-mosanat-prend-acte-du-retrait-de-m-djibrine-assali-52168027.html>.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 167-168.

<sup>837</sup> Walther, Olivier J. "Wars and Conflicts in the Sahara-Sahel." West African Papers. Paris: OECD Publishing, September 2017, 23.; Tchadactuel. "Coordination militaire unifiée : Communiqué de presse," March 1, 2007. <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=5037>.

found. As a result, it is excluded due to a lack of information.<sup>838</sup> Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

#### **\*Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT)**

AKAs: Government of the National Union of Transition

This was a former transitional government turned rebel group threatening the state after being driven from power. It formed in the 1980s and is therefore excluded from this dataset.<sup>839</sup>

#### **Boko Haram- Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad**

Violence from this Nigerian rebel group often spills into Chad. It is excluded from this dataset for this country. See the Boko Haram group entry in the Nigeria country section for more information.

#### **The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)**

Sudanese rebel group whose violence often spills into Chad. President Déby also openly commissioned JEM to disrupt the Sudanese state due to tensions between the two countries. As a Sudanese rebel group, it is excluded from this dataset for this country. See the JEM group entry in the Sudan country section for more information.

#### **Janjaweed**

Janjaweed refers to Darfuri Arab militias currently operating in support of the Sudanese state. Their violence often spills into Chad. They are excluded from this dataset for this country. See the Janjaweed group entry in the Sudan country section for more information.

#### **\*Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MDD)**

AKAs: Movement for Democracy and Development

Faction rebel group formed in 1991. They legally became a political party in the government after a peace agreement on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2009. Due to their start year they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>840</sup>

#### **Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT)**

AKAs: Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad

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<sup>838</sup> Mak. "Tchad: protocole d'accord de fusion MOSANAT-RFUTD/F." Makaila, plume combattante et indépendante, June 15, 2010. <http://www.makaila.fr/article-tchad-protocole-d-accord-de-fusion-mosanat-refutd-f-52324429.html>.

<sup>839</sup> Azevedo, Mario, and Samuel Decalo. *Historical Dictionary of Chad*. Lanham (Md.): Rowman & Littlefield, 2018, 71-72, 246-247.

<sup>840</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Peace Accord Signed on 30 September 1996 in the Town of Zinder, Niger, between the Government of Chad and the Mouvement Pour La Démocratie et Le Développement (MDD); on the Factions of the MDD That Have Signed the Accord; on Whether the Accord Was Effective; and on Whether a General Amnesty for Its Members Was Implemented." Refworld, April 1, 1999. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab5f98.html>.; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 19, 155-156.

Formed on October 12<sup>th</sup>, 1998 by defected state official Youssouf Togoïmi who is ethnically Goran (same as the Toubou people who make up the majority in the Tibesti area) and a former politician.<sup>841</sup> Kette Nodji Moise was also one of the group's leaders, and his previous experience as a leader in the CSNPD rebel group means former\_rebel is coded as 1.<sup>842</sup> His ethnicity is unknown though he may be Doba since the CSNPD was based in their region.<sup>843</sup> Since the two leaders that could be found come from different backgrounds, and it is unknown the background of other members – no information on any prior organizational affiliations could be identified despite searching for it extensively – this group is coded as not benefitting from any pre-existing organizational structures.

Togoïmi described the MDJT as being a “reaction against the tyranny, nepotism, antinational politics, and the resentful attitude of Déby”.<sup>844</sup> The group's objectives are gaining power and creating a “secular, free, and democratic Chad”.<sup>845</sup> No relevant contestation events leading up to their formation were found in SCAD so their contestation variables are coded as 0.

This rebel group was initially based in the mountains of Tibesti, where Togoïmi is from, and became the main rebel group in the north (coded as 1 for the “rural” variable).<sup>846</sup> Initially it was made up of about a thousand men and began harassing government forces through armed disturbances.<sup>847</sup> The Libyan government also provided them military assistance beginning in 1998.<sup>848</sup> The group's first recorded attack was against Chadian government troops in the Oumou region on November 2, 1999, resulting in the

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<sup>841</sup> Afrique Express. “Youssouf Togoïmi MDJT,” February 10, 2002.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20051230181806/http://www.afrique-express.com/archive/CENTRALE/tchad/tchadbios/256youssouftogoimi.htm>; University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. “71. Chad (1960-Present).” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; Encyclopedia Britannica. “Chad - Continuing Conflict.” Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad>; OPINION, CENTRAFRIQUE. “LA LISTE DES MOUVEMENTS POLITICO-MILITAIRES.” LE BLOG DE CENTRAFRIQUE OPINION. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://centrafrique.over-blog.com/article-3066129.html>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 159-164.; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. “Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa.” Paris, December 15, 2013. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>842</sup> Memoire Online. “Memoire Online - Les Rébellions Sous Le Régime d'Idriss Déby (1990-2008) - EugÃˆne Le-Yotha NGARTEBAYE.” Accessed August 18, 2020. [https://www.memoireonline.com/12/13/8311/m\\_Les-rebellions-sous-le-regime-d-Idriss-Deby-1990-200811.html](https://www.memoireonline.com/12/13/8311/m_Les-rebellions-sous-le-regime-d-Idriss-Deby-1990-200811.html).

<sup>843</sup> Memoire Online. “Memoire Online - Les Rébellions Sous Le Régime d'Idriss Déby (1990-2008) - EugÃˆne Le-Yotha NGARTEBAYE.” Accessed August 18, 2020. [https://www.memoireonline.com/12/13/8311/m\\_Les-rebellions-sous-le-regime-d-Idriss-Deby-1990-200811.html](https://www.memoireonline.com/12/13/8311/m_Les-rebellions-sous-le-regime-d-Idriss-Deby-1990-200811.html).

<sup>844</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 160.

<sup>845</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 160.

<sup>846</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. “71. Chad (1960-Present).” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 159-161.; Djonabaye, Dieudonne. “RFI - Tchad - La rébellion harcèle le pouvoir.” Sido: rfi, November 19, 2002. [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/035/article\\_22953.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/035/article_22953.asp).

<sup>847</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 160.

<sup>848</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. “71. Chad (1960-Present).” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

deaths of 8 government soldiers and 37 rebels.<sup>849</sup> However, MDJT had been carrying out smaller attacks since October 15<sup>th</sup>, 1998 that the group had not initially claimed responsibility for (27CHA). Because the November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1999 attack was the first time it was named in association to a violent event, this will be coded as their named date.<sup>850</sup> Its first small attack is coded as October 15<sup>th</sup>, 1998 (27CHA) and clandestine is coded '1'. There were a handful of smaller attacks that followed the November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1999 attack before MDJT fighters captured the town of Bardai in northern Chad on July 17, 2000, resulting in the deaths of about 250 government soldiers.<sup>851</sup> Prior to this more public attack, they killed 197 soldiers in Fada on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2000 (43CHA; 44CHA). This precursor to their major takeover of Bardai is coded as their first large attack. Subsequent smaller attacks followed this one with greater rebel than military casualties including the death of rebel leader Kette Nodji Moise (former leader of the CSNPD).<sup>852</sup> On March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2004, they kidnapped some fugitive members of the Algerian terrorist group GSPC (126CHA). Though they were non-combatants in the Chadian conflict, which would make them civilians, the intent was for ransom or trade rather than to kill so this will not be coded as a civilian attack. Thus, this group is coded as never committing a civilian attack.

Chadian government forces struck back weakening the group's efficacy.<sup>853</sup> The MDJT was also weakened by early disagreements from their outside coordinators in exile and the political direction of its members.<sup>854</sup> As a result of this, the core coordinators (including Togoïmi) resigned and left the group.<sup>855</sup> Togoïmi eventually returned as the head of the movement after a meeting was held from October 11-19, 2001 in Sebha, Libya.<sup>856</sup> The group signed a Libya-mediated peace agreement with the government on December 25<sup>th</sup>, 2001.<sup>857</sup> Togoïmi later died September 24<sup>th</sup>, 2002 from a landmine blast which caused the group to withdraw from their previous peace agreement and attack an airport on October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2002.<sup>858</sup>

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<sup>849</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>850</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>851</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>852</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>853</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 161.

<sup>854</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 161.

<sup>855</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 161.

<sup>856</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 161.

<sup>857</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 162.

<sup>858</sup> University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. "71. Chad (1960-Present)." Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 162.

The group's new coordinator was Choua Dazzi Salah Aboubakar.<sup>859</sup> From 2008 to 2009, the MDJT fought against government forces alongside the FSR, UFDD/R, MNR, and UFR.<sup>860</sup> In May of 2010, the group signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the Chadian military.<sup>861</sup> The MDJT reemerged around 2013 in the south of Libya led by Hissein Yaya Barka though there is no evidence that they attack sporadically across the border.<sup>862</sup> Since they carried out 2 attacks in 2002 (4 years after their formation) they are coded as viable (75CHA; 78CHA). According to the SCAD, there were no events listed that occurred in the year prior to group formation (October 12, 1998).

#### \*Front Uni pour la Démocratie et la Paix (FUDP)

AKAs: United Front for Democracy and Peace

The FUDP is a coalition group formed by dissidents of MDJT. Their union was finalized on June 21<sup>st</sup>, 2003 in Paris. The group is led by General Adoum Togoï Abo. As a rebel coalition and majority MDJT faction it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>863</sup>

#### \*Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS)

AKAs: Patriotic Movement of the Salvation

Formed in 1990 and transitioned to be the current ruling party of President Idriss Déby. Given the pre-1997 start date, the MPS are excluded from this dataset.<sup>864</sup>

#### \*Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)

They attempted a coup in 1991 and are thus excluded from this dataset.<sup>865</sup>

#### Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UFDD)

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<sup>859</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 163-164.

<sup>860</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 163-164.

<sup>861</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 163-164.; "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.; "CHAD: Children and Armed Conflict," April 23, 2011. <https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/chad-children-and-armed-conflict.html>.

<sup>862</sup> The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>863</sup> Lansford, Tom. *Political Handbook of the World 2016-2017*. CQ Press, 2017, 2019.; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 213.

<sup>864</sup> Alwihda, Info. "Tchad : le MPS définit les critères de sélection pour les élections législatives." Alwihda Info - Actualités TCHAD, Afrique, International. Accessed August 29, 2020. [https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-MPS-definit-les-criteres-de-selection-pour-les-elections-legislatives\\_a79704.html](https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-MPS-definit-les-criteres-de-selection-pour-les-elections-legislatives_a79704.html).; RFI. "Tchad: le parti au pouvoir se réunit en congrès pour mobiliser les troupes," November 3, 2019. <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20191103-tchad-congres-mps-mobilisation-elections>.; RFI. "Tchad: les appétits s'aiguisent avant le congrès du MPS, le parti au pouvoir," November 2, 2019. <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20191101-tchad-congres-parti-mps-ambitions>.

<sup>865</sup> "UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program." Accessed August 29, 2020. <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/449/0>.



AKAs: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development

Khartoum-supported coalition of Chadian rebels to threaten President Déby of Chad.<sup>866</sup> Formed on October 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006, and now mainly comprised of UFPD and RND.<sup>867</sup> The UFDD's leader is Mahamat Nouri Allatchi and its operated mainly in eastern Chad.<sup>868</sup> The UFDD coalition disbanded in May 2007, but the UFPD continued its individual operations using the UFDD name.

On the day the UFDD announced its formation (October 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006) its forces took control of Goz Beïda (269CHA), Dar Sila's capital in south-eastern Chad.<sup>869</sup> The next day, they took Am Timan (273CHA), the capital of the neighbouring Salamat region, before engaging the Chadian army on the UFDD's return to Sudan.<sup>870</sup> In late 2006 they raided Abéché- the capital of eastern Chad (275CHA).

As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group, the UFDD is excluded from this dataset. The coalition consisted of groups such as:<sup>871</sup>

1. UFPD/FDD
2. FUC
3. RND
4. CDR
5. RaFaT

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<sup>866</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008.  
[https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf).

<sup>867</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013.  
<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>868</sup> "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008.

[https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 225.; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013.  
<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>869</sup> PA. "Chad Blames Sudan for New Rebel Assault." *Agence France Presse*. October 25, 2006.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020061025e2ap003ml&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>870</sup> PA. "Chad Blames Sudan for New Rebel Assault." *Agence France Presse*. October 25, 2006.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020061025e2ap003ml&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>871</sup> HSBA. "Chadian Rebel Groups and Coalitions," February 2008.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-IB9.pdf>; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008.

[https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf); Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 225.; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013.  
<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.



## 6. RPJ

### \*L'Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement Fondamentale (UFDD/F)

AKAs: Union of Forces for Democracy and Fundamental Development

This is a rebel coalition that formed and left the UFDD in September 2006 and officially launched in May 2007. They are led by Abdelwahid Aboud Mackaye. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group, it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>872</sup>

### \*Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement Rénovée UFDD/R

AKAs: Union of Forces for Democracy and Renovated Development

This rebel coalition was created by Moussa Tamboulet and Ali Kedelaye Goukouni to counter the UFDD of General Nouri which they claimed was disorganized. The UFDD/R's members were predominantly of Kanem and Luc ethnic peoples of the UFDD. As the UFDD/R's leadership and membership was made up entirely of former UFDD members it is excluded from this dataset as a faction rebel group.<sup>873</sup>

### Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR)

AKAs: Union of Forces of the Resistance

Commissioned by Khartoum to antagonize the Chadian state, this group formed on December 15<sup>th</sup>, 2008 from alliances among eight rebel factions (UFCD, UFDD, RFC, etc.) after the breakup of the AN coalition.<sup>874</sup> Sudan supplied them with weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and fuel.<sup>875</sup> The group was led by

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<sup>872</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 229.; "Chad: Summary of Conflict Jan-Mar 2008." Saferaccess, May 30, 2008. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA\\_Chad\\_Summary\\_Jan\\_Mar\\_08.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20080530180303/http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/SA_Chad_Summary_Jan_Mar_08.pdf).

<sup>873</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 187-189.

<sup>874</sup> "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Chad: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (Union Des Forces Pour La Démocratie et Le Développement, UFDD), Including Origins, Structure, Ideology and Activities; Treatment of UFDD Members and Their Families by Authorities; Whether State Agents Harass or Abduct UFDD Members in Saudi Arabia or Members of Their Families (2006-October 2015)." Refworld, October 7, 2006. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57f79abd4.html>; Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 249.; HSBA. "Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology," March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>875</sup> "Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)." Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local->

Timan Hissein Erdimi along with other rebel leaders: Nouri, Soubiane, Adouma, Mackaye, Acheikh, Adoum Yacoub, and Khoulamallah.<sup>876</sup> From 2008 to 2009, the coalition fought against Chadian government forces alongside the FSR, MNR, UFDD/R, and MDJT.<sup>877</sup> In May of 2009, the UFR launched a raid south of Abéché but were defeated by the Chadian military.<sup>878</sup> In late 2009, the group signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the Chadian military.<sup>879</sup> It is excluded from this dataset as an unoriginal group initially consisting of the:

1. UFPD/FDD
2. CDR
3. RAFAD
4. RND
5. RPJ

#### \*Front pour le Salut de la République - Soubiane (FSR)

AKAs: Front for the Salvation of the Republic – Soubiane

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[and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf](#); University of Central Arkansas: Political Science. “71. Chad (1960-Present).” Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>.

<sup>876</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).”

Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

<sup>877</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*.

Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 249.; “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>;

The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. “Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa.” Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>.

<sup>878</sup> Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>;

“Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011.

<https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>;

The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. “Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa.” Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>;

HSBA. “Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology,” March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>879</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (Union Des Forces Pour La Démocratie et Le Développement, UFDD), Including Origins, Structure, Ideology and Activities; Treatment of UFDD Members and Their Families by Authorities; Whether State Agents Harass or Abduct UFDD Members in Saudi Arabia or Members of Their Families (2006-October 2015).” Refworld, October 7, 2006. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57f79abd4.html>;

Tubiana, Jérôme. *Laisser tomber les rebelles: Dimensions locales et régionales du rapprochement Tchad-Soudan*. Genève: Small Arms Survey, 2011.

<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131962/HSBA-SWP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement-french.pdf>;

HSBA. “Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology,” March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

The FSR is a faction of CNT organized on tribal bases with Arab dominant membership based in the Southeast of Chad near Tissi along the Chadian border with the C.A.R and Sudan.<sup>880</sup> Since it is a faction from a “mother” group that joined the government it is included in this dataset. Its leader, Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, formed the group in late 2007 after leaving the CNT which had signed a peace agreement on October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2007 and wishing to set up a military coordination with the FPRN.<sup>881</sup> With the CNT rebels that joined him their other\_rebels variable is coded as 1. Soubiane had also been a Chadian diplomat from 1999-2004.<sup>882</sup> Given Soubiane’s history as a diplomat and a CNT leader the leaders\_current and former\_rebels variables are coded as 1. Since the CNT had operated from Sudan, and the FSR allied with other Sudanese-based Chadian rebel groups, the group is coded as forming in a border country.<sup>883</sup> While the majority of the group is Arab, the dominant ethnicity in Tissi and Western Sudan is the Fur. “Near” Tissi is coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1.

Around December 7<sup>th</sup>, 2007 the FSR carried out a joint attack with the FPRN on the town of Tissi in which they killed 2 soldiers and wounded 60 others.<sup>884</sup> This was also the first time the FSR publicly named themselves in taking credit for the attack.<sup>885</sup> This date is coded as their first small attack and named date. After this attack, Soubiane publicly stated that that specific attack was in response to incoming UN peacekeepers; however, FSR forces also seized and attempted to seize territory within the first year of their formation and joined coalitions that overtly condemned Déby and called for democracy.<sup>886</sup> As a result, they are coded ‘1’ for goal\_take.

The FSR eventually joined the UFR rebel coalition when the latter formed in mid-December 2008.<sup>887</sup> The UFR was receiving military support from Sudan, but since this was not a direct part of FSR’s formation

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<sup>880</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.

<sup>881</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

<sup>882</sup> Coleman, Michael. “Chad Ambassador Recalled After Criticizing President for Trying to Prolong His Power.” *The Washington Diplomat*, April 2004.  
[https://web.archive.org/web/20111003011159/http://www.washingtondiplomat.com/04-04/a2\\_04\\_04.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20111003011159/http://www.washingtondiplomat.com/04-04/a2_04_04.html).

<sup>883</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

<sup>884</sup> “Rag-Tag Insurgents Join the Fray in Eastern Chad.” *Reuters*, December 7, 2007.  
<https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL07102688>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.

<sup>885</sup> “Rag-Tag Insurgents Join the Fray in Eastern Chad.” *Reuters*, December 7, 2007.  
<https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL07102688>.

<sup>886</sup> “Rag-Tag Insurgents Join the Fray in Eastern Chad.” *Reuters*, December 7, 2007.  
<https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL07102688>.

<sup>887</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

foreign\_govt is coded as 0. While a part of the UFR, the FSR only succeeded in carrying out attacks that reportedly killed 21 or less soldiers (491CHA). According to the surveyed sources, the group never carried out an attack targeting civilians. Thus, they are coded to have never carried out a large or civilian attack. When FSR let the UFR for the MN rebel coalition to make peace with the government in June 2009, some FSR members split off and formed an FSR faction that would continue under UFR Captain Ismaïl Moussa (Captain Moussa Ismaïl)- though FSR-Moussa would later leave the UFR in 2010 when the UFR also signed a peace agreement.<sup>888</sup>

The FSR fought against government forces from 2008-2009 alongside the UFDD/R, MNR, and the MDJT.<sup>889</sup> The group helped form the MN on June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009 likely to better their bargaining position as the whole coalition ultimately signed a peace agreement with the government in July of 2009 and joined the Chadian military.<sup>890</sup> Since it joined the government before it had operated for at least three years, it is coded as non-viable.<sup>891</sup>

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 2 and type 4 event that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as November 1, 2007). However, the “op\_planning\_location” variable is unknown, so the contestation variables are unknown.

#### \*Front pour le Salut de la République – Moussa (FSR)

AKAs: Front for the Salvation of the Republic

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[March-2011.pdf](#); Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.

<sup>888</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.

<sup>889</sup> The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. “Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa.” Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>; “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.

<sup>890</sup> Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.; “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>; HSBA. “Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology,” March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>891</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Haggag, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d'opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.; “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>;

HSBA. “Chad-Sudan Proxy War Chronology,” March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

Its leader was Captain Ismaïl Moussa (Captain Moussa Ismaïl) who formed the group after Soubiane attempted to remove the group from the UFR coalition to join the MN coalition engaging in a peace agreement with the government in June 2009.<sup>892</sup> As a faction rebel group created because the “mother” group joined the government, it is included in this dataset. June 2009 will be coded as its start date. On October 12<sup>th</sup>, 2009 the UFR released a statement naming the groups they were newly comprised of; the new FSR under Moussa appears on this list.<sup>893</sup> Thus, this date is used to code its named date.<sup>894</sup>

Moussa had been the director of armed operations for former president Goukouni Weddeye.<sup>895</sup> He then held several government positions such as a cabinet member to the Secretary of State to Foreign Affairs and then as First Secretary to the Chadian Ambassador in Libya.<sup>896</sup> He eventually joined the world of armed opposition groups in 1993.<sup>897</sup> Thus former\_security, leaders\_formergovt and former\_rebels are coded 1.

Like the original FSR, it is a majority Arab rebel group.<sup>898</sup> The same Fur dominated area in which they operated. As a part of the UFR it also received support from the Sudanese government.<sup>899</sup> Since the foreign support was a result of an alliance rather than a direct part of their formation, foreign\_govt is coded as 0. “Near Tissi” is used for the rural variable.

In 2010 the group left the UFR to join a newly formed rebel coalition- the ANCD.<sup>900</sup> Sometime before this change internal conflicts led Hussein Ibrahim Açyl to become its new president.<sup>901</sup> Other information on them cannot be found, however the ANCD which it joined is said to be active in the tri-border area cut off.<sup>902</sup> Since at least 2 attacks in one year from 2012 cannot be found it is coded as not viable.

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<sup>892</sup> “Alliance National Pour Le Changement Démocratique/National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD).” Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), March 2011.

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>; Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 152-154.

<sup>893</sup> Walдар. “Déclaration du Front pour le Salut de la République (FSR) section radicale.” WALDARI WA AKHBAARA. Accessed August 18, 2020. <http://waldar.over-blog.com/article-declaration-du-front-pour-le-salut-de-la-republique-fsr-section-radicale-37376145.html>.

<sup>894</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 153-155.

<sup>895</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 154.

<sup>896</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 154.

<sup>897</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 154.

<sup>898</sup> “UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program.” Accessed August 18, 2020. <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1069>.

<sup>899</sup> “UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program.” Accessed August 18, 2020. <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1069>.

<sup>900</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (Union Des Forces Pour La Démocratie et Le Développement, UFDD), Including Origins, Structure, Ideology and Activities; Treatment of UFDD Members and Their Families by Authorities; Whether State Agents Harass or Abduct UFDD Members in Saudi Arabia or Members of Their Families (2006-October 2015).” Refworld. Accessed August 18, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57f79abd4.html>.

<sup>901</sup> Hagggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 155.

<sup>902</sup> “Alliance Nationale Pour Le Changement Démocratique/ National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD),” March 2011. <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf>.



In SCAD there was an organized demonstration on May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2009. Thus, the protest variable is coded as 1.

According to the SCAD, there was only a type 1 event that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as June 1, 2009). The “op\_planning\_location” variable is labelled as “Near Tissi.” The type 1 event occurred in NDjamena so contestation variables are coded as 0. There is no mention of the group in the ACLED.

#### **\*Union des Forces pour le Changement et la Démocratie (UFCD)**

AKAs: Union of Forces for Change and Democracy

The UFCD was one of the 8 rebel groups/coalitions that made up the larger UFR coalition. The group formed on November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2006 and was led by [Adouma Hassaballah](#) Djadalrab. In 2009, the UFCD signed a peace agreement with the government and joined the Chadian military. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>903</sup>

#### **\*Coordination des Mouvements Armés et Politiques de l’Opposition Tchadienne (CMAP)**

AKAs: Coordination of Armed and Political Movements of the Chadian Opposition

CMAP is a coalition group led by Antoine Bangui Rombaye that formed on December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1999. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group CMAP is excluded from this dataset.<sup>904</sup>

#### **\*La Concorde Nationale de la Résistance pour la Démocratie (CNRD)**

AKAs: The National Concorde of the Resistance for Democracy

This rebel coalition formed in 2010 is led by Dr. Abakar Tollimi. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group it is excluded from this dataset.<sup>905</sup>

#### **\*Union pour le Triomphe de la République (UTR)**

AKAs: Union for the Triumph of the Republic

This rebel coalition formed in March 2004 but quickly dissolved. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group the UTR is excluded from this dataset.<sup>906</sup>

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<sup>903</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Chad: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (Union Des Forces Pour La Démocratie et Le Développement, UFDD), Including Origins, Structure, Ideology and Activities; Treatment of UFDD Members and Their Families by Authorities; Whether State Agents Harass or Abduct UFDD Members in Saudi Arabia or Members of Their Families (2006-October 2015).” Refworld, October 7, 2006. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57f79abd4.html>; Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 196.; “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad.” United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>.

<sup>904</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 205.

<sup>905</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 262.

<sup>906</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 264.



#### \*Forces pour le Rétablissement de la Démocratie et du Droit Constitutionnel (FRDDC)

AKAs: Forces for the Restoration of Democracy and Constitutional Rights

This rebel coalition formed in 2004 but quickly dissolved. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group the FRDDC is excluded from this dataset.<sup>907</sup>

#### \*Union des Mouvements pour la Concorde Nationale (UMCN)

AKAs: Union of Movements for the National Concorde

This rebel coalition formed in November 2006 but soon dissolved. As a coalition of rebel groups rather than an original group the UMCN is excluded from this dataset.<sup>908</sup>

#### \*Mouvement National (MN)

AKAs: National Movement

This coalition of rebel groups made up of the FSR-Soubiane, the MNR, UFDD/R, the UFDD-Hamid, and other smaller groups was created on June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009 by Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane in Sudan. They then signed a peace agreement together with the government in July 2009. As a coalition of rebel groups and coalitions rather than an original group the MN is excluded from this dataset.<sup>909</sup>

#### \*Mouvement National pour le Redressement (MNR)

AKAs: National Movement for Recovery

The MNR was led by Mahamat Ahmat Hamid and based around El-Geneina, Sinjara, and Wadi Mangai in Sudan.<sup>910</sup> However the “rural” variable is coded as unknown for two main reasons. First, the source is a retrospective source and the date when these bases were set up is unknown. Second, precise location of these bases is unknown, as the source says “around” El Geneina, Sinjara, and Wadi Mangai, which casts doubt as to whether the group was actually in these towns or in the surrounding, more rural, areas. The group was recruiting men and boys in 2007, and many joined in retaliation for family members being murdered by the Zaghawa (Déby’s ethnic group).<sup>911</sup> Its start date is coded as 2007 with minimal certainty. Information on their origins could not be found so many variables are coded as missing. The MNR joined the AN in November 2008 and fought in battles against government forces from 2008 to 2009 alongside

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<sup>907</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 265.

<sup>908</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 201.

<sup>909</sup> Haggar, Bichara Idriss. *TCHAD: Les partis politiques et les mouvements d’opposition armés de 1990 à 2012*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014, 164-165.; “CHAD: Children and Armed Conflict,” April 23, 2011. <https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/chad-children-and-armed-conflict.html>.

<sup>910</sup> AFP. “N’Djamena signe un accord de paix avec une coalition de rebelles – Jeune Afrique.” *JeuneAfrique.com* (blog), July 26, 2009. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/159029/politique/n-djamena-signe-un-accord-de-paix-avec-une-coalition-de-rebelles/>.

<sup>911</sup> Amnesty International. “A Compromised Future: Children Recruited by Armed Forces and Groups in Eastern Chad.” Amnesty International, 2011. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/afr200012011en.pdf>.

the FSR, UFDD/R, MDJT, and UFR.<sup>912</sup> Their participation in the AN and the AN's mission was used to infer the coding for goal\_take. After helping form the MN on June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009, they signed a peace agreement and joined the Chadian military in July of 2009.<sup>913</sup> Since it joined the government before it had operated for at least three years, it is coded as non-viable. Because its negotiations with the government also occurred before this three-year criterion, viable\_negotiate is coded as 0.

According to the SCAD, there were type 1, type 2, and type 4 events that occurred in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as January 1, 2007), but the "op\_planning\_location" variable is unknown so contestation variables are also unknown.

#### \*Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR)

AKAs : Union of Democratic Forces for Rallying

The UFDR is an umbrella rebel group made up of rebel groups from Chad and Sudan.<sup>914</sup> Of the group leaders Michel Detodia came from Sudan; Abakar Sabone and the military commander Faki Ahmat known as Colonel Marabout came from Chadian rebel groups.<sup>915</sup> The UFDR is excluded as an unoriginal umbrella rebel group.<sup>916</sup>

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<sup>912</sup> The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013.

<https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>; "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>; Ndouné. "Le Mouvement National pour le Redressement (MNR) a rejoint l'Alliance Nationale (AN)." Le Site Ndouné, November 9, 2008. <http://ndjamena-matin.over-blog.com/article-24561893.html>.

<sup>913</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad." United Nations Security Council, February 9, 2011. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2011/64>; The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle. "Chad 2013: The Impossible Rehabilitation of a Notorious Dictator: An Information Kit Prepared in the Framework of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa." Paris, December 15, 2013. <https://electionsafrique.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/131216chadcsispainformationkitfinalversion.pdf>; Amnesty International. "A Compromised Future: Children Recruited by Armed Forces and Groups in Eastern Chad." Amnesty International, 2011. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/afr200012011en.pdf>; AFP. "N'Djamena signe un accord de paix avec une coalition de rebelles – Jeune Afrique." *JeuneAfrique.com* (blog), July 26, 2009. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/159029/politique/n-djamena-signe-un-accord-de-paix-avec-une-coalition-de-rebelles/>.

<sup>914</sup> May, Roy, and Simon Massey. "Chad: Politics and Security." Writenet, March 2007, 23.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20070612230327/http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/46384cde2.pdf>.

<sup>915</sup> May, Roy, and Simon Massey. "Chad: Politics and Security." Writenet, March 2007, 23.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20070612230327/http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/46384cde2.pdf>.

<sup>916</sup> Amnesty International. "A Compromised Future: Children Recruited by Armed Forces and Groups in Eastern Chad." Amnesty International, 2011. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/afr200012011en.pdf>; May, Roy, and Simon Massey. "Chad: Politics and Security." Writenet, March 2007.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20070612230327/http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/46384cde2.pdf>.

**Nomenclature Notes:**

- (1) Myriad armed groups within the Democratic Republic of the Congo refer to themselves as *Mai Mai*. There are many spelling variations for *Mai Mai*, including *Mayi Mayi*, *Maï Maï*, *Mai-Mai*, *Mayi-Mayi*, *Maï-Maï*, etc. ACLED standardizes these as *Mayi Mayi Militia*, while I have standardized them as *Mai Mai*.
- (2) The armed forces of the DRC/Zaire have changed names several times within the period of interest and thus appear under several different names in our record of analysis. These variations include *Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ)* from 1971 to 1997, *Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)* from 1997 to 2004, and *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)* from 2004 to present.
- (3) The DRC has hosted a United Nations peacekeeping mission from 1999 to present. From 1999 until 2010, this mission was called the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC)*. From 2010 to present, this mission has been called the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO)*.
- (4) Ranks in rebel groups are often self-declared. I generally have not differentiated between self-proclaimed and FARDC-granted ranks in the record of analysis.
- (5) It is especially common for armed groups in the DRC to use multiple names. In addition, it is common for two or more operationally distinct groups to use the same names. At times, these variations have been difficult to distinguish. While we have done our best to capture these variations, it is possible or even likely that groups included in the Record of the Analysis use additional names.

**Narrative Summary:** The Democratic Republic of the Congo has remained unstable throughout our period of interest, particularly in the east (North and South Kivu, Orientale, and Katanga provinces). While Mobutu-era policies had caused bouts of ethnic fighting in eastern DRC in the early 1990s, the largest catalyst of conflict was regional destabilization following the Rwandan genocide. In 1997, a coalition backed by Rwanda and Uganda ousted Mobutu Sese Seko and installed Laurent-Désiré Kabila as president in the first Congo war. When Kabila asked his foreign backers to leave the country in 1998, Rwanda and Uganda organized a second coalition and again marched on Kinshasa in the second Congo war. While the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition hoped for a quick victory, Kabila staved off defeat by calling in foreign backers from Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. While the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition was never able to seize the capital, the Kabila regime has never managed to gain control over the eastern provinces. Conflict has ebbed and flowed in the following years, but true peace has never been achieved.

Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, at which point his son Joseph Kabila assumed power. For coding purposes, we considered transition from Laurent-Désiré to Joseph Kabila to represent continuity within a single regime. We have considered the Kinshasa-based regime only as legitimate government for coding purposes; for instance, an RCD-appointed governor does not count as a government official. Unlike in other countries, we have counted customary chiefs as political officials rather than as civilians; these chiefs often exercise power locally in the vacuum of national authority.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was among the most difficult countries to code within this project. First and foremost, large swaths of the country have never enjoyed functional government during our period of study. In many cases, groups qualified as rebel groups through fighting to control territory or fighting with other rebel groups that served as the de-facto government in an area, rather than fighting the Congolese government. In some cases, these rebel groups allied with the government to fight a local occupying force; these groups are still considered rebel groups where they formed independently from the

government and remain outside central government command and control structures. (Some armed groups, such as the FALL/FAL/LDF-Lemera, are excluded because they allied with the central government and remained under local government command and control.)

Many armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been excluded from our project for two main reasons. First, the DRC is awash with career rebels who frequently realign. Many major and minor rebel groups formed from other armed groups, often through splintering and occasionally through merging. Our inclusion criteria aim to account only for the start of new groups of people building a new organization; pieces of former organizations that remain largely intact are excluded. In addition, some groups integrate into FAC/FARDC and defect less than five years later, forming a group with a new name that is essentially a revival of a former group. For instance, major rebel groups RCD-Goma, RCD-K/ML, CNDP, M23, UPCP, FPC/Mai Mai Lafontaine, APCLS, UPC, PUSIC, FAPC, and M23 are all excluded as splinter or revival groups.

Second, the proliferation of rebel groups in the DRC means that government and media often do not view emergent groups as worthy of notice until they have reason to view them as threat, i.e. after a given group has already become powerful. As such, the origins and early attacks of many armed groups are not well-recorded, even for major groups. For instance, Henning Tamm/the Rift Valley Institute were the only source we found delving into the origins of major groups FNI and FRPI. In many cases, no such records were available, forcing us to exclude groups because we could not verify their origins or initial activities (for example, see Mai Mai Shetani below). We avoided defaulting to inclusion because of (a) the common nature of rebel groups simply re-naming themselves created a seemingly high risk that names of unfamiliar groups indicated new names for groups we had already recorded, rather than a unique group, and (b) the tendency of the Congolese government to invent “paper” or “briefcase” rebellions in order to diminish the relative bargaining power of prior rebel groups at the negotiating table.

The obscurement of origins and initial attacks is particularly common with what Jason Stearns has termed “franchise” rebel groups: groups that may share a name, ideology, and traditions, but operate independently.<sup>917</sup> Examples include Raia Mutomboki, Nyatura, and the Mai Mai. These groups are often lumped together in reporting despite operational uniqueness. In the case of the Mai Mai, these groups often do not even share ideology. Mai Mai originally referred to local groups who took up arms for self-defense or to fight perceived foreigners (e.g. Rwandans, Ugandans, Burundians, and/or Congolese Hutu or Tutsi). Mai Mai largely date back to the second Congo war, during which the Kabila regime provided them material support and sometimes tried unsuccessfully to control them. (Some Mai Mai formed earlier in the Masisi War era, circa 1993.) Individual Mai Mai groups gradually turned against the Kabila regime and began competing to control territory.<sup>918</sup> As a result of low returns of time investment, we placed a low

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<sup>917</sup> Jason Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), July 21, 2012, 11, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/07/who-are-raia-mutomboki.html>.

<sup>918</sup> For more general information on Mai Mai, see “The War within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo” (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 20, 2002), 16, <https://www.hrw.org/publications?country%5b0%5d=9469&page=2>; Jason Stearns, “North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), 33, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/north-kivu#.WSofFWjyvIV>; “Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest” (Human Rights Watch, May 1, 2000), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/drc/Drc005.htm#TopOfPage>; “Forced to Flee: Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaire” (Human Rights Watch, July 1996), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Zaire.htm>; For a case study, see the following sources discussing the evolution of Katangan Mai Mai, which were among the most well-documented I found: Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de L’Homme (ASADHO), Centre des Droits de L’Homme et du Droit Humanitaire (CDH), and Commission de Vulgarisation des Droits de l’Homme (CVDHO), “Nord-Katanga : Attaques Délibérées Contre La Population Civile,” October 2003, [https://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/bsvec1\\_Rap\\_final\\_Nord\\_Kat.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/bsvec1_Rap_final_Nord_Kat.pdf); Anneke Van Woudenberg to Kisimba Ngoy, “War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga,” July 21, 2006, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/drc/2006/katanga/pdfs/DRC%20Mai%20Mai%20Submission%20En.pdf>;

priority on investigation of Mai Mai groups and did not have the resources to carefully track many Mai Mai groups. For a full list of groups excluded due to insufficient information and/or time limitations, see below.

Many groups, Mai Mai and otherwise, originally did not qualify as rebel groups but evolved to meet our criteria. In particular, many groups started as highly decentralized, pro-government, and/or self-defense oriented. In such cases, we have done our best identify the turning point at which they fully met our criteria, although often several points in time could reasonably be identified as turning points.

Some noteworthy features of violence we observed in the DRC include the following:

- The extent to which the military serves as a catalyst of anti-government violence rather than a stabilizing force: *As one HRW report explains, “the Congolese army, the FARDC, is a single army only on paper.”*<sup>919</sup> *Rebel groups have successively integrated into FARDC and defected at will, often continuing to pursue their private interests while nominally integrated. As a result, FARDC units often cooperate with or support rebel groups, even if it is against the national interest. One United Nations report explains: “FARDC remains one of the main suppliers of weapons and ammunition of armed groups in the region... The lack of accounting procedures for weapons, low salaries, and other institutional weaknesses contribute to this problem. The capture of over 20 tons of arms by CNDP in Kikuku, Rutshuru territory, in December 2007 from the 15th FARDC brigade is one example.”*<sup>920</sup>
- The early and aggressive use of sexual violence in order to build group name recognition, especially on the international stage where negotiations often occur. For example, see Mai Mai Sheka (NDC) below.
- The frequency of external support and variety of funding mechanisms:
  - *All mining in the Kivus is alluvial, making it very easy for groups to profit from mineral trade. Armed groups and/or the military control the majority of mines in eastern DRC, with estimated annual profits for the region totaling in the hundreds of millions. Most common minerals are gold, tin ore (cassiterite), tantalum ore (coltan or columbite-tantalite), and tungsten ore (wolframite). There are also some diamonds, but not many. Modes of profit include direct operation of mining sites, forced labor/taxation at mining sites, taxation and/or extortion at minerals markets. Mineral resources, directly or indirectly, are the number one source of financing for armed groups.*<sup>921</sup>
  - *Because of regional dynamics, Rwanda and Uganda frequently launch and/or sponsor Congolese rebel groups, including during early stages, to act as local proxies in eastern Congo.*

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“DR Congo: Militia Leader Guilty in Landmark Trial,” Human Rights Watch, March 10, 2009,

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/10/dr-congo-militia-leader-guilty-landmark-trial>.

<sup>919</sup> “Democratic Republic of Congo: Civilians at Risk During Disarmament Operations” (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 29, 2004), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/drc1204/drc122804.pdf>.

<sup>920</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)” (United Nations Security Council, December 12, 2008), para. 102, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/773](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/773).

<sup>921</sup> Enough Project Team and Grassroots Reconciliation Group, “A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals” (Enough Project, April 2009), <http://enoughproject.org/files/Comprehensive-Approach.pdf>; “From Child Miner to Jewelry Store: The Six Steps of Congo’s Conflict Gold” (Enough Project, October 2012), <http://enoughproject.org/files/Conflict-Gold.pdf>; “Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1698 (2006)” (United Nations Security Council, July 18, 2007), para. 37, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/423](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/423); Holly Dranginis, “Grand Theft Global: Prosecuting the War Crime of Pillage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (Enough Project, January 2015), <http://enoughproject.org/files/GrandTheftGlobal-PillageReport-Dranginis-Enough-Jan2015.pdf>; Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo,” Working paper, January 17, 2017, <https://raulsanchezdelasierra.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/revised-manuscript.pdf>.

- *Armed groups are often funded, armed, or trained by governments and other rebel groups, including at early stages. Non-monetary and non-weaponry forms of support seem common, including cohabitation, loaning troops/temporary reinforcement, assistance in recruiting, and sheltering or granting safe haven. In addition, FARDC has provided individual rebel groups with thousands of dollars in cash to finance demobilization of armed groups, but there often seems to be no monitoring or accountability for use of such funds.*
- *Other sources of financing include timber; the diaspora; complex economic operations, including structured taxation of controlled territory and/or deals with economic elites; poaching; piracy on the Great Lakes; and stealing from other armed groups/the military.*
- *The difficulty of verifying perpetrators and details of violent events: In some cases, such as the early MLC attacks, I was left with the strong impression that reporters were not actually present on the battlefield, and instead were obtaining information second hand while based in major cities like Kinshasa, Bukavu, or Kisangani. Reporters often fail to independently verify casualty counts.<sup>922</sup> Moreover, HRW reports that the multitude of actors in eastern Congo mean that “victims and witnesses of attacks sometimes had difficulty identifying the perpetrators,” for instance, often failing to differentiate between Rwandan military and the RCD or between Mai Mai and Interahamwe.<sup>923</sup>*
- *Low casualty counts despite widespread violence: At first I believed reporting gaps led to the lack of coded large attacks, but I later ran across a Congo Siasa blog post confirming that high casualty counts are uncommon. For instance, Padiri Bulenda, a well-known Mai Mai general, said his troops’ highest ever casualty count for a single battle was only thirty.<sup>924</sup> These mirrored patterns I had seen in other war-torn countries, such as Central African Republic.*

***Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: high***

***Explanation:*** *As noted above, many groups that may qualify for inclusion have been excluded due to information and time limitations. In addition, I think it highly plausible that additional armed groups have been crowded out for the same reasons – violence is so common that threats are often undocumented until they reach a critical level. Despite the abundance of literature on conflict in DRC relative to other sub-Saharan countries, the documentation is still low relative to the magnitude of violence.*

**GROUPS WITH INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO VERIFY INCLUSION/CODE:**

- Mai Mai Kasindien (AKAs: Mai Mai Kasindi)
- Mai Mai Kirikicho Mirimba
- Local Defense Forces Busumbu
- Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense (AKAs: MPA, Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense-Nyatura, Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense/Nyatura, MPA-Nyatura, MPA/Nyatura, Self-Defense Movement, Popular Movement for Self-Defense)
- Mai Mai Luc Yabili
- Mai Mai Michigan
- Mai Mai Mongol

<sup>922</sup> Timo Mueller, “The Recent Fighting in Eastern Congo and Its Implications for Peace” (Washington, D.C.: Enough Project, August 7, 2013), 1–2, <https://enoughproject.org/files/FightingEasternCongoImplicationsforPeace.pdf>.

<sup>923</sup> “Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest.”

<sup>924</sup> Jason Stearns, “Why Are Congolese Such Bad Shots?,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), January 21, 2010, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/01/why-are-congolese-such-bad-shots.html>.



- Forces de défense nationale (AKAs: Mai Mai Akilo, Raia Mutomboki Akilo (possibly), FDN Wamaza (possibly))
- Mai Mai Mayele
- Forces armées de la république Mai-Mai du Congo (AKAs: FARMMC)

**Groups that require more time and information to research:** As noted above, we were not able to thoroughly investigate groups listed as Mayi Mayi Militia or Militia in ACLED. We have investigated some of these groups, but found it generated low yields to time investment and prioritized other named groups. In addition to these groups, we encountered the following named groups in the course of our research and did not have time to investigate them in depth:

- Mai Mai Shetani
- Mai Mai Sofeles
- Mai Mai Mulumba
- Mai Mai Mupekenya
- Mai Mai Assani Ngungu Ntamushobora
- Mai Mai Aoci
- Mai Mai Kapopo
- Mai Mai Fujo
- Mai Mai Karakara
- Mai Mai Vurondo
- Mai Mai Ruwenzori
- Mai Mai Gédéon (original) and related Katangese Mai Mai
- Mai Mai Makabe
- Mai Mai Moise
- Mai Mai Ngwena
- Mai Mai Bakanda
- Mai Mai Kirikicho Mirimba

**Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU)** Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) was in existence before 1997.<sup>925</sup> ADF and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda) appear to be used interchangeably, with the latter name alluding to the fact that remnants of the independent NALU organization were co-founders of ADF.<sup>926</sup>

**Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDLC)**

AKAs: Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération (AFDL), Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation (ADFL), Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFLC)

<sup>925</sup> Lindsay Scorgie, “The Allied Democratic Forces: Moving beyond the Popular Narratives,” *Al Jazeera*, July 27, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/201372215812878743.html>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 41; Sunguta West, “The Rise of ADF-NALU in Central Africa and Its Connections with al-Shabaab,” *Terrorism Monitor* 13, no. 1 (January 9, 2015), <https://jamestown.org/program/the-rise-of-adf-nalu-in-central-africa-and-its-connections-with-al-shabaab/>.

<sup>926</sup> West, “The Rise of ADF-NALU in Central Africa and Its Connections with al-Shabaab.”

Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation (elsewhere called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) was formed in 1996 to overthrow the Mobutu regime.<sup>927</sup>

**Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (ALIR)** – See Rwanda

AKAs: Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALiR

**Interahamwe Militia** – see Rwanda

**Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD)** – see Burundi

AKAs: National Council for the Defense of Democracy, Forces for the defense of Democracy

**Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie- Ndayikengurukiye** – see Burundi

AKAs: National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Ndayikengurukiye Faction (CNDD-N)

**Cobras Militia** –see Congo-Brazzaville

**Ninjas militia** –see Congo-Brazzaville

**LRA: Lord's Resistance Army** – see Uganda

**Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU)**

AKAs: Unified Lumumbist Party

An opposition political party. Human Rights Watch discussion of the group does not mention use of violence.<sup>928</sup> PALU was tagged in three ACLED incidents, none of which qualify the group for inclusion: one was spontaneous clashes with UDPS (5846DRC), one was spontaneous election-related violence (5911DRC), and one as inter-party violence denounced by PALU leadership (7826DRC).<sup>929</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence

**Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS)**

AKAs: Union for Democracy and Social Progress

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<sup>927</sup> “War, What Is It Good For?,” *Washington Post*, November 28, 2001, sec. International Spotlight: Democratic Republic of Congo, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/war.html>; Jason Stearns, “From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), 14, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23#.WS0JH2jyvIV>; Jason Stearns, “PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen, and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 20, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/pareco#.WS4LX2jyvIV>; Joanne Richards, “Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control,” Armed Actors Issue Brief (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2013), 4, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-AA-IB1-DDR-in-the-DRC.pdf>; Human Rights Watch and FIDH, “‘Attacked by All Sides’: Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire” (New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1997), 10, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/zaire2/zaire0397web.pdf>.

<sup>928</sup> “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo” (Human Rights Watch, December 1997), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/congo2/>.

<sup>929</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Tshikapa - Incidents Entre Militants de l'Udps et Du Palu Après La Visite de Muzito,” *Radio Okapi*, November 28, 2011, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201111280343.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Affrontements Entre Partisans de l'UDPS et Ceux Du PALU à Tshikapa, Un Mort,” *Radio Okapi*, November 26, 2011, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201111260207.html>; “Bandundu : Les Partisans Du Palu et de l'ADD s'affrontent à Gungu,” *Radio Okapi*, December 18, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/12/18/bandundu-les-partisans-du-palu-de-ladd-saffrontent-gungu>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Kinshasa - Echauffourées Au Siège National Du Palu,” *Radio Okapi*, December 2, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201312021664.html>; B.M.B., “Congo-Kinshasa: Incidents Avec Mort d'homme Au Siège Du Palu,” *Le Potentiel*, December 2, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201312022484.html>.

An opposition party. Human Rights Watch discussion of the group does not mention use of violence.<sup>930</sup> ACLED incidents in which UDPS is tagged are not of interest: election-related violence and/or spontaneous acts of violence (5846DRC/5845DRC, 5833DRC, 5888DRC/5886DRC, 5828DRC, 5882DRC, 5834DRC, 5833DRC, 5818DRC, 5823DRC), demonstrations that were dispersed (5527DRC, 5853DRC, 5901DRC), or other non-violent events undertaken by UDPS (5850DRC, 1887DRC). I followed up with several of these to confirm they were not of interest.<sup>931</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

#### Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD)

AKAs: Rally for Congolese Democracy, Congolese Rally for Democracy (CRD), Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), Congolese Coalition for Democracy, Forces de la liberté, Forces of Liberty, Armée nationale congolaise (armed wing), Congolese National Army, ANC

The initial RCD membership overlapped with the AFDL.<sup>932</sup> However, the AFDL succeeded in taking over the state in 1996. As such, RCD is coded as a new rebellion, having broken away from the state rather than from another rebel group. The RCD formed a clearly new and separate organization from the state. To the extent that state or military actors were involved, they either officially abandoned their positions or made clear their severed allegiance to the Kabila regime (see below on AUG 2 declarations, leadership). In addition, an early attack by the rebels in the capital Kinshasa was repulsed – this was not a coup.<sup>933</sup>

The RCD became publicly known on 2 AUG 1998, although it had no name at such time. It launched multiple attacks that day throughout the country: those in Kinshasa, Bukavu, and Goma were best recorded.<sup>934</sup> In Kinshasa, there was shelling and ongoing fighting between Banyamulenge soldiers and regular government forces at the Tshatshi barracks in Nyalieme commune, the area where the former Mobutu residence was and where Rwandan troops in the Congolese Armed Forces were recently housed before their expulsion.<sup>935</sup> The only source listing casualties claims that some 20 government forces were killed in the surprise attack.<sup>936</sup> In Bukavu, Banyamulenge soldiers reported took over several radio stations,

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<sup>930</sup> “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”; “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Elections in Sight: ‘Don’t Rock the Boat’” (Human Rights Watch, December 15, 2005), 11, <http://pantheon.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/drc1205/drc1205.pdf>.

<sup>931</sup> “Kamina: Le Gouverneur Du Katanga Appelle Au Calme Après Des Affrontements Entre Militants,” Radio Okapi, November 18, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/11/18/elections-katanga-le-gouverneur-appelle-au-calme-apres-des-affrontements-entre-militants-kamina>; “Kamina: Le Gouvernement Provincial, Le PPRD et l’UDPS Appellent Au Calme Après Accrochages Entre Militants,” Radio Okapi, November 18, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/11/18/kamina-le-gouvernement-provincial-le-pprd-ludps-appellent-au-calme-apres-accrochages-entre-militants>; “Campagne Électorale : Moïse Katumbi Appelle l’UDPS et l’Unafec à La Tolérance,” Radio Okapi, November 6, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/11/06/campagne-electorale-moise-katumbi-appelle-ludps-lunafec-la-tolerance>; “Les Militants de l’UDPS Accusés d’attaque Sur Le Siège Du PPRD à Lubumbashi,” Radio Okapi, November 7, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/11/07/les-militants-de-ludps-accuse-dattaque-sur-le-siege-du-pprd-lubumbashi>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Affrontements Entre Partisans et Opposants de Joseph Kabila,” *Radio France Internationale*, November 9, 2011, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201111091132.html>.

<sup>932</sup> François Ngolet, “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire,” *Africa Today* 47, no. 1 (2000): 78. I suspect there was also overlap in general membership, as FAC included integrated ADFL soldiers who had previously worked with the Rwandans and Ugandans in the First Congo War.

<sup>933</sup> Kamanga Mutond, “Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link,” *The Associated Press*, August 5, 1998, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/59af3156-befd-485f-80bd-24f612c49ceb/?context=1516831>.

<sup>934</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups,” Refworld, December 1, 1998, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7fb0.html>.

<sup>935</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Private Plane Hijacked In Congo,” *Panfrican News Agency*, August 4, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/79c8b19a-3c3b-4a18-9776-739caa443d39/?context=1516831>; “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo,” *Panfrican News Agency*, August 3, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/98aa00d0-8851-4c2a-8b3e-858e1efb08f0/?context=1516831>.

<sup>936</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo.”

declared that the current local authorities were “no longer recognized,” and freed some prisoners from the local jail.<sup>937</sup> Fighting in Bukavu reportedly included light, heavy, and automatic weapons fire.<sup>938</sup> Similar declarations were made over radio in Goma; some attribute them to FAC commander Birunga Kamanda and others to FAC 10<sup>th</sup> battalion commander Sylvian Mbuchi.<sup>939</sup> In addition, fighting was vaguely reported in Kindu and Uvira (possibly not until 3 AUG).<sup>940</sup> Since these attacks seemed to be coordinated surprise attacks (see below on Rwandan involvement), we counted them as a single attack and suspect that the death toll exceeded 25. (The Kinshasa attack is the only attack where we found an estimated death toll. It was twenty, and additional likely casualties from Bukavu and Goma must also be considered.) As such, I have coded 2 AUG 1998 as first large attack.

By 5 AUG, the rebels successfully controlled Bukavu and Goma.<sup>941</sup> Within the month of August, fighting spread further to Kitona (hijacked airplane incident on 4 AUG and subsequent fighting),<sup>942</sup> Kisangai (rebels captured 23 AUG),<sup>943</sup> Mungu-walu (about 40 kms south east of Watsa town),<sup>944</sup> Matadi and Boma,<sup>945</sup> Songololo (250 miles SW of Kinshasa),<sup>946</sup> Muanda (west coast), Kalemie (Shaba province), Bunia, Mahagi, Aru, and Ariwara.<sup>947</sup> (It is clear from reporting that accounts of the early RCD fighting was predominantly second-hand; journalists were not witness to the fighting directly.) However, other than the

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<sup>937</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo.”

<sup>938</sup> Ross Herbert, “Congo Kinshasa; Angola Link as Congo Fighting Erupts,” *Cape Argus*, August 5, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6ecdd38e-ac95-44dc-8252-d71a15bdf8a3/?context=1516831>; “Congo Kinshasa; Briefing on the Situation in Congo Kinshasa,” *UN High Commissioner for Refugees*, August 5, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/136ad490-d21c-4005-8c6c-c1d7ad3807b5/?context=1516831>.

<sup>939</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo”; “URGENT BC-Rwanda-Congo-Rebellion Agency: Eastern Congo in Open Rebellion a,” *Associated Press International*, August 3, 1998, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/78cfa040-20a6-48a3-9968-543f99f56213/?context=1516831>.

<sup>940</sup> Herbert, “Congo Kinshasa; Angola Link as Congo Fighting Erupts”; “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo”; “URGENT BC-Rwanda-Congo-Rebellion Agency: Eastern Congo in Open Rebellion a”; “Congo Kinshasa; Briefing on the Situation in Congo Kinshasa.”

<sup>941</sup> Herbert, “Congo Kinshasa; Angola Link as Congo Fighting Erupts”; Mutond, “Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link”; Patrick Smith, “Rebels Close in on Africa’s Trigger; Tutsis Are Making Gains on Congo’s Regime but Its Neighbours Could Hold the Decisive Card, Writes Patrick Smith,” *The Guardian*, August 8, 1998, sec. Foreign Page.

<sup>942</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Private Plane Hijacked In Congo”; “AM-Congo, Bgt ; Budget; Congo Rebels Say City Taken, Supply Base Lost; From Reuters-AP,” *The Canadian Press*, August 23, 1998, sec. Foreign General News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/43274fcc-a8d2-4472-8910-b39bcb9580d1/?context=1516831>; Lynne Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders,” *The Washington Post*, August 6, 1998, sec. A Section; Kamanga Mutond, “Alliance Unraveling into Violence in Congo,” *Associated Press International*, August 5, 1998, sec. International news, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/59739106-7d90-43de-9d77-0141e4f5f940/?context=1516831>; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups”; Herbert F. Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis, “RECONSTRUCTING THE CONGO,” *Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 1 (2004): 125; Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders.”

<sup>943</sup> Herbert, “Congo Kinshasa; Angola Link as Congo Fighting Erupts”; “AM-Congo, Bgt ; Budget; Congo Rebels Say City Taken, Supply Base Lost; From Reuters-AP”; Lara Santoro, “Carving Up Congo As World Stands By,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 7, 1998, sec. International; Mutond, “Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link”; Smith, “Rebels Close in on Africa’s Trigger; Tutsis Are Making Gains on Congo’s Regime but Its Neighbours Could Hold the Decisive Card, Writes Patrick Smith.”

<sup>944</sup> Emmy Allio, “Congo Kinshasa; Congo Rebels Take New Towns,” *New Vision (Kampala)*, August 18, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/7074dfd1-6f5a-4a3b-ab37-33f90c2dd539/?context=1516831>.

<sup>945</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Government In Control Of Western Congo,” *Panafrican News Agency*, August 10, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/b63abfc2-251c-4622-ad79-853fd28ddb63/?context=1516831>.

<sup>946</sup> Hrvoje Hranjski, “Congolese Rebels Announce New Leadership With BC-Congo, BC-Congo-Strange Rev,” *Associated Press International*, August 16, 1998, sec. International news, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f3289a20-8921-4fa3-a4e5-8ae659480a22/?context=1516831>.

<sup>947</sup> Allio, “Congo Kinshasa; Congo Rebels Take New Towns.”

initial attack in Kinshasa, I have not been able to find casualty counts for this fighting – likely a product of second-hand reporting. As such, I have left small attack as missing.

Reliable sources indicate that RCD began attacking civilians within its first month of operations. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada cites a source called *La Voix du CDH* as indicating that “365 people were killed,” what sounds to be civilians killed by as-yet named rebel forces, between 2 AUG and 8 AUG 1998 in Katanga, either because they did not support the rebels or in retaliation for detention of Tutsi/Banyamulenge in Kinshasa.<sup>948</sup> However, the original report seems to no longer be accessible. Similarly, HRW reports widespread rebel violence toward and targeted killing of civilians in Uvira from 4 to 7 AUG 1998; these victims were apparently targeted for opposition to the RCD. HRW also details later targeted killings of civilians.<sup>949</sup>

The group was formally christened as the RCD on 12 AUG 1998.<sup>950</sup> However, as explained above, the rebel group was publicly known before then.

A number of individuals are named as being part of RCD leadership, although it is not entirely clear the extent to which each of them was actually affiliated with the rebellion or whether they merely claimed affiliation for political expediency. These include: Emile Ilunga, a prominent Katangese politician and secessionist;<sup>951</sup> Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma, reportedly rebel coordinator, a veteran opposition politician who led the Forces of the Future party and had been briefly jailed under Kabila, a former UNESCO official, and not an ethnic Tutsi;<sup>952</sup> Jean-Pierre Ondekane, an oft-mentioned rebel commander;<sup>953</sup> Commander Birunga Kamanda, formerly a FAC commander in Goma;<sup>954</sup> Commander Sylvian Mbuchi, formerly the FAC 10<sup>th</sup> battalion commander in Goma;<sup>955</sup> Commander Sylvian Bikelenge;<sup>956</sup> and Bizima Kahara, former foreign minister under Kabila and an ethnic Tutsi.<sup>957</sup>

On 16 AUG, the political wing of the RCD was announced following a meeting in Goma. The RCD identified Ernest Wamba dia Wamba as its political leader; he had formerly been a professor of African philosophy at University of Dar-es-Salaam and was from Lower Congo. Other leadership included Moese Nyarigaba, vice chairman; Dr Jacques Depelchin, secretary general; Runda Bururu (AKA Lunda Bululu, Katanga), Katangan native and former prime minister under Mobutu; executive committee member; Kalala Shambuyi (Kasai), executive committee member and a former premier in the Mobutu regime, evidently also served under the Kabila regime, native of Katanga; Alexis Thambwe Mwamba (AKA Alex Tamgwe, Kindu), executive committee member, Maniema native, and former minister under Mobutu; and Mbusa

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<sup>948</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups.”

<sup>949</sup> “Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms” (Human Rights Watch, February 1, 1999), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/congo/>.

<sup>950</sup> “AM-Congo, Bgt ; See Photo KIN101, 103-104, 106; Budget; SUBS for KIGALI on Night News Budget; Rwanda, Congo Launch War of Words; From AP-Reuters,” *The Canadian Press*, August 12, 1998, sec. Foreign General News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/eb156350-d143-46d3-b032-8606f0c7e371/?context=1516831>; “Congo Kinshasa; HRW Condemns Civilian Killings By Congo Rebels,” *Human Rights Watch (New York)*, August 27, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/d348bf15-14e8-4000-8c20-528b7a60dff2/?context=1516831>.

<sup>951</sup> Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Congo Kinshasa; ‘Rwanda-Type’ Slaughter Could Come to DR Congo,” *The Monitor*, August 14, 1998, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/694b751c-525b-4462-bc0c-cd1f2b6537b0/?context=1516831>.

<sup>952</sup> Onyango-Obbo; Mutond, “Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link”; Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders”; Smith, “Rebels Close in on Africa’s Trigger; Tutsis Are Making Gains on Congo’s Regime but Its Neighbours Could Hold the Decisive Card, Writes Patrick Smith.”

<sup>953</sup> Hranjski, “Congolese Rebels Announce New Leadership With BC-Congo, BC-Congo-Strange Rev.”

<sup>954</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo.”

<sup>955</sup> “URGENT BC-Rwanda-Congo-Rebellion Agency: Eastern Congo in Open Rebellion a.”

<sup>956</sup> Smith, “Rebels Close in on Africa’s Trigger; Tutsis Are Making Gains on Congo’s Regime but Its Neighbours Could Hold the Decisive Card, Writes Patrick Smith.”

<sup>957</sup> Mutond, “Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link”; Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders.”

Nyamuizi (Bunia), executive committee member.<sup>958</sup> One source also names Tryphon Kin-Kiey, former Reuters correspondent and minister of information under Mobutu; Déogratias Bugera, a founding member and former secretary-general of the AFDL, and a minister under Kabila; Bizima Karaha, former AFDL and minister of foreign affairs under Kabila (see above); Moïse Nyarugabo, former AFDL member and Kabila's private secretary; Joseph Mudumbi, former Kabila official; Arthur Z'Ahidi Ngoma, native of Maniema (discussed above); and Emile Ilunga, former leader of the Katangese gendarmes (see above).<sup>959</sup> Based on this list, I have coded for current security (FAC commanders), former rebels (AFDL and Katangese gendarmes), leaders of a former government (Mobutu), and leaders of the current government (Kabila).

Public declarations of the RCD's goals indicate that it sought to take over the country. First, radio announcements in Goma and Bukavu on 2 AUG made the rebels' intent to take over clear.<sup>960</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for takeover under goals. In addition, I have coded 2 AUG as the name date. Although the RCD was not formally christened until several weeks later, it became publicly known as a rebel organization on this earlier date. On 12 AUG, the spokesperson for the rebel commander Jean-Pierre Ondekane again said the RCD's objectives were to end the dictatorship (of Kabila), to democratize the DRC, and to promote peace and security.<sup>961</sup>

Most rebelling troops were reported as Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi).<sup>962</sup> In addition, reports noted that within the first two days of fighting, all remaining Tutsi (Banyamulenge) members of Kabila's cabinet fled the country.<sup>963</sup>

Despite their ongoing denial of involvement, sources generally agree that Rwanda material support the RCD.<sup>964</sup> The Congolese government claimed that over 400 Rwanda troops were aiding the rebellion.<sup>965</sup> Beyond the DRC, the EU commissioner for humanitarian affairs called it an "outright invasion" by Rwanda, and analysts and diplomats claimed the high level of coordination underlying the "blitzkrieg" would have been impossible without Rwandan support.<sup>966</sup> An unnamed foreign diplomat in Kinshasa told reporters,

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<sup>958</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Kabila Flees To Lubumbashi," *New Vision (Kampala)*, August 17, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199808170022.html>; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups."

<sup>959</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups."

<sup>960</sup> See above, also Duke, "Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders."

<sup>961</sup> "AM-Congo, Bgt ; See Photo KIN101, 103-104, 106; Budget; SUBS for KIGALI on Night News Budget; Rwanda, Congo Launch War of Words; From AP-Reuters."

<sup>962</sup> Herbert, "Congo Kinshasa; Angola Link as Congo Fighting Erupts"; "Congo Kinshasa; Private Plane Hijacked In Congo"; Hranjski, "Congolese Rebels Announce New Leadership With BC-Congo, BC-Congo-Strange Rev"; "Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo"; Santoro, "Carving Up Congo As World Stands By"; Duke, "Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders"; Smith, "Rebels Close in on Africa's Trigger; Tutsis Are Making Gains on Congo's Regime but Its Neighbours Could Hold the Decisive Card, Writes Patrick Smith"; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups"; Weiss and Carayannis, "RECONSTRUCTING THE CONGO," 125; Ngolet, "African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire," 78; John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2001): 269.

<sup>963</sup> "Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo."

<sup>964</sup> Herbert, "Congo Kinshasa; Angola Link as Congo Fighting Erupts"; Onyango-Obbo, "Congo Kinshasa; 'Rwanda-Type' Slaughter Could Come to DR Congo"; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups"; "Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms"; Weiss and Carayannis, "RECONSTRUCTING THE CONGO," 124-25; Emizet F. Kisangani, "CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: A MOSAIC OF INSURGENT GROUPS," *International Journal on World Peace* 20, no. 3 (2003): 58; Ngolet, "African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire," 78; Stearns, "From CNDP to M23," 14.

<sup>965</sup> Mutond, "Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link."

<sup>966</sup> Santoro, "Carving Up Congo As World Stands By."



“We [foreign diplomats in Kinshasa] all believe the [Rwandan] government is involved.”<sup>967</sup> Evidently, at least 40 Rwandan army trucks had been seen crossing into the DRC on 5 AUG and a “large contingent” of Rwandan troops were present in Bukavu.<sup>968</sup> While recognizing that there were Rwandan troops present in the DRC, Paul Kagame denied their involvement in the new rebellion.<sup>969</sup> General belief was that the rebellion was a reaction to Kabila’s decision on 27 JUL 1998 to expel Rwandan military forces, previously his ally, from the DRC.<sup>970</sup> Earlier that month he had sacked his Rwandan Tutsi army chief of staff, James Kabari.<sup>971</sup> Given the coordination of several surprise attacks on 2 AUG 1998, it seems highly likely that the rebel organization formed covertly and began planning attacks sometime during the month of July as tensions rose. Despite the rising tensions, contemporaneous sources described how Congo was “stunned” by the attacks of a “mysterious revolt.”<sup>972</sup> As such, I have indicated JUL 1998 as the form date, and coded 1 for clandestine. I have also indicated that the group was likely named within its first month of existence.

Later reports also indicate that Uganda also supported the rebellion.<sup>973</sup> Uganda apparently admitted to providing support for the RCD but denied claims that it was involved in the RCD’s formation.<sup>974</sup>

It is unclear exactly where most of the initial planning activities for the RCD occurred. Given that most of the initial attacks occurred in Eastern DRC (Goma, Bukavu, Uriva, and Kindu) and due to the nature of the Rwandan involvement, I suspect most of the planning occurred in Eastern DRC. Rwanda was known to have an ongoing presence in the Eastern DRC at this time (see above). Given their high profile in the initial attacks and given likely ongoing Rwandan presence there, I think Goma and/or Bukavu may be the primary planning sites. I have coded 0 for “rural”, as both of these cities have populations over 300,000. However, it is possible we have misjudged the likely planning location and that primary planning did not even occur in the DRC.

Regarding the organizational history of the rank-and-file RCD, the RCD is frequently described as a coalition of disgruntled soldiers, members of the Kabila opposition, and former Mobutists.<sup>975</sup> However, I think that FAC soldiers dominated the organization’s original membership. Known leadership included many FAC military officers, defectors who it seems brought their troops with them.<sup>976</sup> Moreover, the membership is

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<sup>967</sup> Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders.”

<sup>968</sup> Santoro, “Carving Up Congo As World Stands By.”

<sup>969</sup> “Paul Kagame Reconnaît l’implication Des Troupes Rwandaises Au Congo,” *La Croix*, November 9, 1998, sec. BREVE.

<sup>970</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Private Plane Hijacked In Congo”; Santoro, “Carving Up Congo As World Stands By”; Santoro; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups”; “Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms”; Weiss and Carayannis, “RECONSTRUCTING THE CONGO,” 125; Stearns, “From CNDP to M23,” 14.

<sup>971</sup> Santoro, “Carving Up Congo As World Stands By.”

<sup>972</sup> Mutond, “Advancing Congo Rebels Deny Rwanda Link”; Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders.”

<sup>973</sup> Onyango-Obbo, “Congo Kinshasa; ‘Rwanda-Type’ Slaughter Could Come to DR Congo”; Kisangani, “CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO,” 58; Ngolet, “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire,” 78.

<sup>974</sup> “Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)” (International Court of Justice, December 19, 2005), paras. 32, 41, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/GLI%20ICJ%20DRC%20v%20Uganda.pdf>.

<sup>975</sup> Onyango-Obbo, “Congo Kinshasa; ‘Rwanda-Type’ Slaughter Could Come to DR Congo”; Hranjski, “Congolese Rebels Announce New Leadership With BC-Congo, BC-Congo-Strange Rev”; “Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms.”

<sup>976</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Government In Control Of Western Congo”; “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo”; “URGENT BC-Rwanda-Congo-Rebellion Agency: Eastern Congo in Open Rebellion a”; Duke, “Congo Political Figures Come Forward as Rebel Leaders”; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups.”

often described using words like “soldiers,” “forces,” “military,” etc., rather than merely rebels.<sup>977</sup> At early stages (within days of forming), the RCD reportedly had a clear military-style organization.<sup>978</sup> Finally, at least one retrospective source reports outright that FAC and retrained FAZ constituted the initial membership of the RCD.<sup>979</sup> As such, I have coded military for organizational history.

It appears the RCD gained access to mineral resources within the first year, in particular gold and coltan.

Although they did not mine it themselves, from November 1998 to April 1999, the RCD and Rwandan army looted 1,000-1,500 tons of coltan from SOMINKI stockpiles, transferring them to Kigali.<sup>980</sup> In addition, they also transferred some 2,000 to 3,000 tons of cassiterite.<sup>981</sup> In addition, RCD taxed and regulated ongoing mining, for example charging every mineral trading house an annual \$15,000 license fee.<sup>982</sup> The RCD certainly controlled major gold-mining areas within its first months of existence.<sup>983</sup> Some prominent gold industrialists were known members of the RCD, including Okimo CEO John Tibasima Mbogemu.<sup>984</sup> A United Nations report reviews other income-generating activities conducted by the RCD, including bank robbing.<sup>985</sup> As a result of this evidence, I have coded for oil/diamonds under initial resources.

Finally, I have coded viable for RCD. The RCD splintered quickly, but at least the RCD-Goma has remained active long enough to qualify as viable.<sup>986</sup>

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<sup>977</sup> “Congo Kinshasa; Private Plane Hijacked In Congo”; Hranjski, “Congolese Rebels Announce New Leadership With BC-Congo, BC-Congo-Strange Rev”; “Congo Kinshasa; Fighting In Kinshasa And Eastern Congo”; Smith, “Rebels Close in on Africa’s Trigger; Tutsis Are Making Gains on Congo’s Regime but Its Neighbours Could Hold the Decisive Card, Writes Patrick Smith”; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups.”

<sup>978</sup> Onyango-Obbo, “Congo Kinshasa; ‘Rwanda-Type’ Slaughter Could Come to DR Congo.”

<sup>979</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The August 1998 Rebellion and Affected Groups.”

<sup>980</sup> Artur Usanov et al., “Coltan, Congo and Conflict” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, June 5, 2013), 58, <https://books.google.com/books?id=en5eBAAQBAJ&pg=PA36&lpg=PA36&dq=august+2+1998+congo&source=bl&ots=ygR2OpoYyK&sig=m7jR1Wo-8ceufwWeYKwmCrOkdX8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwif6H06TVAhVKWj4KHdiqCl4Q6AEIVTAJ#v=onepage&q=august%202%201998%20congo&f=false>; “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (United Nations Security Council, April 12, 2001), paras. 32–33, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202001%20357.pdf>; Sara Geenen, *African Artisanal Mining from the Inside Out: Access, Norms and Power in Congo’s Gold Sector* (Routledge, 2015), 43, [https://books.google.com/books?id=c\\_NWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT66&lpg=PT66&dq=victor+ngezayo+MPC&source=bl&ots=QHDP4OCzX&sig=1OhUjwKfFoS1BT0HPv2sN5KzjG4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjH\\_Ts\\_tzXAhUD4GMKHSidAQIQ6AEIPzAE#v=onepage&q=victor%20ngezayo%20MPC&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=c_NWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT66&lpg=PT66&dq=victor+ngezayo+MPC&source=bl&ots=QHDP4OCzX&sig=1OhUjwKfFoS1BT0HPv2sN5KzjG4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjH_Ts_tzXAhUD4GMKHSidAQIQ6AEIPzAE#v=onepage&q=victor%20ngezayo%20MPC&f=false).

<sup>981</sup> “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” paras. 32–33.

<sup>982</sup> Usanov et al., “Coltan, Congo and Conflict,” 58.

<sup>983</sup> Europa Publications, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004* (Psychology Press, 2003), 278, <https://books.google.com/books?id=jj4J-AXGDaQC&pg=PA272&lpg=PA272&dq=rcd-national&source=bl&ots=JJugz9ngEw&sig=CPUUGMUeYn7nH0ZJN8rVJmKnusA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjErv38jcrUAhXKLSYKHfu9AOWQ6AEISzAG#v=onepage&q=rcd-national&f=false>; “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo” (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1, 2005), [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0505\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0505_0.pdf); Claude Kabemba, “Congo Gold,” Southern Africa Resource Watch, July 28, 2013, <http://www.sarwatch.org/content/illegal-gold-trade-drc>.

<sup>984</sup> Stefaan Marysse, *The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: The Pitfalls of Enforced Democracy and Globalization* (Springer, 2005), 167.

<sup>985</sup> “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

<sup>986</sup> IRIN, “DR Congo: Chronology 2002,” ReliefWeb, January 17, 2003, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-chronology-2002>; “SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS CAPTURE OF MOLIRO BY

I coded 1 for protest based on SCAD events 4900114 and 4900116.

SCAD includes two instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. One event was nonlocal, and the other (Event ID 4900116) is listed in SCAD as location unknown. Thus, contestation variables are coded as unknown. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but nonlocally. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. A high level of violent contestation against the newly-elected government occurred during this timeframe.

#### **\*Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National (RCD-National)**

AKAs: RCD-N, Congolese Rally for Democracy-National, Rally for Congolese Democracy-National

NOTE: shows up a lot in description column of ACLED, but always tagged as RCD for actor

This group was founded/led by Roger Lumbala.<sup>987</sup> The most detailed history of this group's origins comes from HRW: Lumbala was originally a member of RCD-Goma, but defected in FEB 2000, joining RCD-K/ML. He then defected with the RCD-K/ML unit that he commanded in Bafwasende to form RCD-N.<sup>988</sup> Other sources confirm that RCD-N is a splinter group, although vary on whether it broke off from RCD (RCD-Goma) or RCD-K/ML – probably because the fragmentation of RCD was fairly fluid/ongoing at that point.<sup>989</sup> Either way, RCD-N meets our criterion for a splinter group and is excluded.

#### **\*Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Populaire (RCD-Populaire)**

AKAs: RCD-P, Congolese Rally for Democracy-Populaire, Rally for Congolese Democracy-Populaire

I found this group in a Human Rights Watch report, but it appears to never really have gotten off the ground. It is not tagged at all in ACLED and mentions of the group are scant. HRW offers the most detailed account:

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RCD-GOMA,” Press Release (United Nations Security Council, March 19, 2002), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/sc7334.doc.htm>; “DR Congo: Joint RCD-Goma, Rwanda Military Operation ‘Underway’ in Sud Kivu,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, April 16, 2003, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/1fd52c62-d8af-47b6-8e4d-ce6d16e2f5c5/?context=1516831>; “Central African Republic; RCD-Goma Captures Lubero As Ceasefire Talks Continue,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, June 19, 2003, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ffa8ce08-0dd9-4d27-a5d7-d278cfbc7747/?context=1516831>; “Congo-Kinshasa; Residents Flee As RCD-Goma Fights Mayi-Mayi in East,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, June 10, 2002, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/a9dc235d-9a24-4e9c-b6df-d894be7dc824/?context=1516831>; “DR Congo: Former RCD-Goma General Allegedly behind Fresh Fighting in Southeast,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, August 6, 2003, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e57deedb-efab-4ca9-b7ff-91b7dce1e8b7/?context=1516831>. See also ACLED event numbers 1684DRC, 1685DRC, 1688DRC, 1695DRC, 1695DRC, 1782DRC, 1799DRC, 1805DRC, 1930DRC, 1932DRC, 1938DRC, 1942DRC, 1987DRC, etc.

<sup>987</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife” (Human Rights Watch, March 1, 2001), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/03/01/uganda-eastern-drc/fueling-political-and-ethnic-strife>; “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 11.

<sup>988</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife.”

<sup>989</sup> Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality* (Zed Books Ltd., 2010), [https://books.google.com/books?id=PvpiDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT143&lpg=PT143&dq=RCD-National+Lumbala&source=bl&ots=Naatlcv\\_-c&sig=55VcOwV9oJ2WDPur4rGkXe3NiKE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi8it-8jsrUAhVE1CYKHwGAEwQ6AEIMzAD#v=onepage&q=RCD-National%20Lumbala&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=PvpiDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT143&lpg=PT143&dq=RCD-National+Lumbala&source=bl&ots=Naatlcv_-c&sig=55VcOwV9oJ2WDPur4rGkXe3NiKE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi8it-8jsrUAhVE1CYKHwGAEwQ6AEIMzAD#v=onepage&q=RCD-National%20Lumbala&f=false); Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2015*, 2015; Europa Publications, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, 272; “Nigeria: DRC: Cracks Wide in Bunia-Based Group,” *IRIN*, November 23, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200011230033.html>; Emizet Francois Kisangani and Scott F. Bobb, *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Scarecrow Press, 2009), xlv, <https://books.google.com/books?id=FvAWPTaRvFYC&pg=PR45&lpg=PR45&dq=rcd-populaire&source=bl&ots=T6pwTj-Ryf&sig=cCsQFwIeqKyxo0dTwgr06YDsN1s&hl=en&sa=X&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwj6v6z1msrUAhWI7CYKHXI-OCA8Q6AEIODAE#v=onepage&q=rcd-populaire&f=false>.

RCD-Populaire was founded by North Kivu governor Nyonyi Bwanakawa and RCD founding member Poley Swako founded RCD-Populaire in NOV 2001. The group would limit its operations to Beni and Butembo territories. Its supporters traveled to Kampala for reconciliation talks that never occurred.<sup>990</sup> IRIN likewise mentions that it is an RCD faction based in Beni founded by Governor Nyoni Bwanakawa.<sup>991</sup> Another source describes the group as “short-lived”.<sup>992</sup> Excluded – splinter group, no evidence of violence or planned violence.

#### Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML)

AKAs: RCD-K-ML, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani (RCD-K, RCD-Kisangani, Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani, Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani), Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML, RCD-Mouvement de libération, Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement, Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement, RCD-LM), Armée populaire congolaise (Congolese Popular Army, APC)

This is the largest and most successful splinter movement from the original RCD. In May 1998, fissures within the RCD led to the expulsion of RCD’s then-president Ernest Wamba dia Wamba from the organization. Assisted by Rwanda, Wamba and his supporters relocated to Kisangani. The group fled Kisangani following Rwandan defeat of their Ugandan allies in the city, but re-established under the new name RCD-ML, based in Bunia, in September 1999.<sup>993</sup> The group’s history has led to many variations in what it’s called (see below). The group’s military wing is called the Armée populaire congolaise (APC).<sup>994</sup>

#### Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP)

AKAs: National Congress for the Defense of the People, Synergie nationale pour la paix et la concorde (National Synergy for Peace and Concord, SNPC), Armée nationale congolaise (Congolese National Army, ANC)

This group was led by Laurent Nkunda. It has a complex organizational history, and no single source offered a complete history of its formation. As such, I have attempted to create a coherent narrative drawing from multiple sources. Laurent Nkunda was a commander of two RCD-Goma brigades, the 81<sup>st</sup> and the 83<sup>rd</sup>.<sup>995</sup> When RCD was integrated into FARDC, Nkunda was named a general and commander of North Kivu province, but he refused to comply with integration. Some sources refer to this as refusal to integrate, while others say he defected from FARDC. This occurred circa AUG/SEPT 2003.<sup>996</sup> It appears that he took his two brigades with him.<sup>997</sup> In DEC 2003, Nkunda and others from RCD created the SNPC.<sup>998</sup> It appears that members met before then, starting in early 2003, but did not formalize the group until DEC.<sup>999</sup> SNPC was an ostensibly a political movement, as Nkunda hoped to secure additional defections

<sup>990</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife.”

<sup>991</sup> “Nigeria: DRC: Cracks Wide in Bunia-Based Group.”

<sup>992</sup> Kisangani and Bobb, *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, xlv.

<sup>993</sup> Stearns, “PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen, and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu,” 33; Henning Tamm, “FNI and FRPI: Local Resistance and Regional Alliances in North-Eastern Congo,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 15, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/fni-and-frpi#.WS8Ip2jyvIV>; Richards, “Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control”; “Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest”; “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife”; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC” (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 7, 2003), 15, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/DRC0703full.pdf>.

<sup>994</sup> “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 15.

<sup>995</sup> “Democratic Republic of Congo: Renewed Crisis in North Kivu” (Human Rights Watch, October 23, 2007), 10, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1007webcover.pdf>.

<sup>996</sup> Stearns, “From CNDP to M23,” 18–19; Stearns, “North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo,” 36; “Democratic Republic of Congo: Renewed Crisis in North Kivu,” 10.

<sup>997</sup> “Democratic Republic of Congo: Renewed Crisis in North Kivu,” 10, 21.

<sup>998</sup> Stearns, “From CNDP to M23,” 19; Stearns, “North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo,” 36.

<sup>999</sup> Stearns, “From CNDP to M23,” 19.

before launching a full-scale rebellion.<sup>1000</sup> However, Nkunda and his men conducted at least one attack during the SNPC era.<sup>1001</sup> In either 2005, Nkunda secured the defection of three additional RCD brigades and launched a full-scale rebellion under the new name CNDP.<sup>1002</sup> The two brigades Nkunda originally commanded, plus the additional three that defected, would explain the total of five brigades which the UN cites in S/2008/43.<sup>1003</sup>

Although SNPC also included Shi and Nande, the plurality of leaders were Tutsi (five of eleven).<sup>1004</sup> Most sources refer to CNDP as predominantly ethnic Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) from RCD.<sup>1005</sup>

CNDP claims it is a political movement, with a separate armed wing called Armée nationale congolaise (Congolese National Army, ANC).<sup>1006</sup> However, the armed wing of the RCD was also called the Armée nationale congolaise.<sup>1007</sup>

Excluded – meets criterion for splinter group

### March 23 Movement (M23)

AKAs: M23, M23 Movement, Armée révolutionnaire du Congo (Congolese Revolutionary Army, ARC)

This group is essentially a revival of Laurent Nkunda's CNDP spurred by perceived failure to meet terms of integration established in the treaty between CNDP and the government signed on 23 MAR 2009.<sup>1008</sup> It is made up primarily of former CNDP.<sup>1009</sup> Leadership also includes many familiar names from CNDP, especially Jean-Marie Lugerero (former CNDP representative to Kinshasa, M23 political coordinator), Bosco Ntaganda (CNDP military wing operations commander, prominent leader/founder of M23), and Colonel Sultani Makenga.<sup>1010</sup> In addition, its training camps were in the same locations as CNDP's and

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<sup>1000</sup> Stearns, 20.

<sup>1001</sup> Stearns, 21; Stearns, "North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo," 37; "D.R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu" (Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2004), 2, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/2004\\_DRCono\\_WarCrimesinBukavu.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/2004_DRCono_WarCrimesinBukavu.pdf).

<sup>1002</sup> Stearns, "From CNDP to M23," 20, 23–24; Stearns, "North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo," 38.

<sup>1003</sup> "Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007)" (United Nations Security Council, February 13, 2008), para. 54, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/43](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/43).

<sup>1004</sup> Stearns, "From CNDP to M23," 64.

<sup>1005</sup> Stearns, 11; "Democratic Republic of Congo: Renewed Crisis in North Kivu."

<sup>1006</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)," para. 19.

<sup>1007</sup> "Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo," Africa Briefing (Kinshasa/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 7, 2004), <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/pulling-back-from-the-brink-in-the-congo.pdf>.

<sup>1008</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," IRIN, October 31, 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc>; "DR Congo: Who Are the Various Rebel Groups at War?," France 24, August 22, 2012, <http://www.france24.com/en/20120822-democratic-republic-congo-various-rebel-groups-war-rwanda-uganda>.

<sup>1009</sup> Stearns, "From CNDP to M23," 45; "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "DR Congo"; "Congo: Key Minerals Smuggling Ring Is in Good Health in Goma – The Enough Project," *Enough Project* (blog), accessed June 4, 2017, <http://enoughproject.org/reports/congo-key-minerals-smuggling-ring-good-health-goma>; "Bosco's Rebellion and the Battle for Justice in Eastern Congo" (Enough Project, May 2012), <http://enoughproject.org/files/CongoTimeline.pdf>; Richards, "Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control"; "'Our School Became the Battlefield': Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo" (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 27, 2015), ii, 10, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report\\_pdf/drcschools1015\\_web.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/drcschools1015_web.pdf).

<sup>1010</sup> Stearns, "From CNDP to M23," 45; "Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007)," 54; "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "'Our School Became the Battlefield': Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," 10; Jason Stearns, "Col Makenga Joins Rebellion," *Congo Siasa* (blog), May 4, 2012, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/05/col-makenga-joins-rebellion.html>; "DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes," Human Rights Watch, September 11, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/11/dr-congo-m23-rebels-committing-war-crimes>;



and governance and operational structures were “reminiscent of the CNDP era.”<sup>1011</sup> On 20 OCT 2012, M23 renamed its armed wing Armée révolutionnaire du Congo (Congolese Revolutionary Army, ARC).<sup>1012</sup> According to some sources, Makenga and Ntaganda’s mutinies and defection from FARDC were initially separate.<sup>1013</sup> However, M23 was not declared until after they joined, and at any rate, both were former CNDP – this does not affect inclusion.<sup>1014</sup> In addition, some sources note the incorporation of former UPC and/or PARECO into M23.<sup>1015</sup> However, these associations did not deter me from excluding it. First, Bosco Ntaganda was both a UPC and CNDP member successively;<sup>1016</sup> it’s possible that others had such overlapping associations. But more importantly, discussions of M23 are focused overwhelmingly on CNDP (the UN report alone noted other groups), suggesting that CNDP made up the clear majority of M23.

**\*La Rwandophone** – This is a movement, not an organization.<sup>1017</sup>

#### **Mudundu 40 (M40)**

AKAs: Mundundu 40, Mudundo 40, Mundundo 40, Forces de Résistance et de la Défense du Kivu (FRDK) (political arm); sometimes 40 is written out in French (e.g. Mudundu quarante)

This group almost certainly meets our inclusion criteria, although I was not able to code many variables for it owing to a dearth of information and conflicting sources. Founding dates range from 1997 to 2002. It seems to have fizzled out and then revived repeatedly (integrated in 2002, disbanded in 2003, fought in Bukavu in 2004, additional later appearances).<sup>1018</sup> Because of what appears to be a collapse/revival cycle, I have put 1997 as the original founding date, but left a certainty of 0. The group does not appear in any of

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“Understanding Armed Group M23,” IRIN, June 22, 2012,

<http://www.irinnews.org/news/2012/06/22/understanding-armed-group-m23>; “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” 18–21.

<sup>1011</sup> Stearns, “From CNDP to M23,” 45–46.

<sup>1012</sup> Stearns, 46.

<sup>1013</sup> “Understanding Armed Group M23”; “DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes.”

<sup>1014</sup> Stearns, “From CNDP to M23,” 44.

<sup>1015</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 72; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 87.

<sup>1016</sup> “DR Congo: Suspected War Criminal Wanted (Human Rights Watch, 29-4-2008),” Human Rights Watch, April 29, 2008, <http://pantheon.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2008/04/29/congo18670.htm>.

<sup>1017</sup> Stearns, “North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo,” 37; “Democratic Republic of Congo: Civilians Attacked in North Kivu” (Human Rights Watch, July 13, 2005), 14, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0705.pdf>.

<sup>1018</sup> Denis Tull, *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo)*

(Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2005), 197,

[https://books.google.com/books?id=Lj\\_dSSKsx2MC&pg=PA197&lpg=PA197&dq=Mudundu+40&source=bl&ots=4S\\_HJ3XQPk&sig=NdwQ1ltZvS883TPqyPEdX5phJBc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHp\\_HHzczUAhUITCYKHR04ATEQ6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=Mudundu%2040&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=Lj_dSSKsx2MC&pg=PA197&lpg=PA197&dq=Mudundu+40&source=bl&ots=4S_HJ3XQPk&sig=NdwQ1ltZvS883TPqyPEdX5phJBc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHp_HHzczUAhUITCYKHR04ATEQ6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=Mudundu%2040&f=false); Sara Geenen and Klara Claessens, “Different Faces of Access Control in a Congolese Gold Mine,” *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* 1, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 255, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1180544>; Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*; “Congo-Kinshasa: Military Tribunal Imprisons Ex-Commander for Abusing Children,” *IRIN*, March 20, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200603200480.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Bashi Militia Group Attends ‘Inter-Kivu Dialogue,’” *IRIN*, September 25, 2001, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200109250223.html>; Arsène Mwaka Bwenge, “Les Milices Mayi-Mayi à l’Est de la République Démocratique Du Congo: Dynamique d’une Gouvernamentalité En Situation de Crise,” *African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine de Sociologie* 7, no. 2 (2003): 86; Philippe Kaganda Mulume-Oderhwa, “Mouvements de Résistance et Culture Politique Au Sud-Kivu. Mise En Évidence Des Fondements Idéologiques et Des Actions Revendicatrices,” *Memoire Online*, 2009, [http://www.memoireonline.com/03/12/5448/m\\_Mouvements-de-resistance-et-culture-politique-au-Sud-Kivu-Mise-en-evidence-des-fondements-ideolo19.html](http://www.memoireonline.com/03/12/5448/m_Mouvements-de-resistance-et-culture-politique-au-Sud-Kivu-Mise-en-evidence-des-fondements-ideolo19.html).



our media searches until 2002, and I have no information on specific attacks the group conducted until then. Sources consistently report that it emerged from the Bashi (Shi) community with the support of Bashi elites.<sup>1019</sup> Mudundu 40 was consistently reported as based in Walungu, South Kivu; as such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.<sup>1020</sup> Because it is so unclear when the group formed and because information is so scant and contradictory, I have left viability variables as missing.

Mudundu 40 did not seem consistently of one mind when it came to whose side it was on throughout the first and second Congo wars.<sup>1021</sup> This seems to be because its primary concern was preserving Bashi political power and influence; this included fighting for control of territory, especially mines.<sup>1022</sup> (As such, I have coded each goal as zero. I have also coded missing for oil\_diamonds under initial resources, as it is unclear when Mudundu 40 became involved in mining.) Mudundu 40 spun at least one splinter group.<sup>1023</sup> (However, all viable variables are coded as missing.) Leadership named is also inconsistently reported.<sup>1024</sup> I think reporting is scant for two reasons: (1) it formed early in our period of influence, when the internet was still emerging, and (2) it seems to have remained a small group. ACLED’s recorded attacks for this group do not appear until 2002.

I coded viability as missing because information on the group is so scant. I likewise coded contestation variables as missing, since the founding date is so unclear.

#### \*Mai Mai Kasindien

AKAs: Mai Mai Kasindi

Insufficient information. Several sources suggest that it predates our period of interest.<sup>1025</sup>

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<sup>1019</sup> Tull, *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa*, 197; Geenen and Claessens, “Different Faces of Access Control in a Congolese Gold Mine,” 255; “Congo-Kinshasa: Bashi Militia Group Attends ‘Inter-Kivu Dialogue’”; Philippe Kaganda Mulume-Oderhwa, “Mouvements de Résistance et Culture Politique Au Sud-Kivu. Mise En Évidence Des Fondements Idéologiques et Des Actions Revendicatrices.”

<sup>1020</sup> “Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007),” 64; “Congo-Kinshasa: Bashi Militia Group Attends ‘Inter-Kivu Dialogue’”; Philippe Kaganda Mulume-Oderhwa, “Mouvements de Résistance et Culture Politique Au Sud-Kivu. Mise En Évidence Des Fondements Idéologiques et Des Actions Revendicatrices.”

<sup>1021</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Bashi Militia Group Attends ‘Inter-Kivu Dialogue’”; Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*; “Africa: Pambazuka News 163,” *Fahamu (Oxford)*, July 1, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200407010789.html>; Geenen and Claessens, “Different Faces of Access Control in a Congolese Gold Mine,” 255; “15 Die in Bukavu Clashes,” IRIN, April 8, 2003, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2003/04/08/15-die-bukavu-clashes>; Tull, *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa*, 197.

<sup>1022</sup> Geenen and Claessens, “Different Faces of Access Control in a Congolese Gold Mine,” 255.

<sup>1023</sup> “Africa: Pambazuka News 163.”

<sup>1024</sup> “Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)” (United Nations Security Council, June 27, 2017), para. 41, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/348/Add.1](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/348/Add.1); Geenen and Claessens, “Different Faces of Access Control in a Congolese Gold Mine,” 255; Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*; “Africa: Pambazuka News 163”; Bwenge, “Les Milices Mayi-Mayi à l’Est de La République Démocratique Du Congo”; Philippe Kaganda Mulume-Oderhwa, “Mouvements de Résistance et Culture Politique Au Sud-Kivu. Mise En Évidence Des Fondements Idéologiques et Des Actions Revendicatrices.”

<sup>1025</sup> Richards, “Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control,” 4; Lebon Mulimbi, “Le Mouvement Mai-Mai Kirikicho Est Sous Les Murs et Sa Tentative d’intégration Dans l’armée Congolaise Est Toujours Un Echee” (Bunyakiri: Action pour la Protection des Droits Humains et de Developpement Communautaire, September 13, 2014), 2, [https://www.reseau-rafal.org/sites/reseau-rafal.org/files/membres/afrique\\_centrale/congo\\_rdc/APDHU/APDHU%20Kirikicho%20sept%2014.pdf](https://www.reseau-rafal.org/sites/reseau-rafal.org/files/membres/afrique_centrale/congo_rdc/APDHU/APDHU%20Kirikicho%20sept%2014.pdf).

\***Mai Mai Bangilima** – Bangilima appears to just be another term used to describe Mai Mai during the Masisi war era (early 1990s).<sup>1026</sup>

**Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)** – See Rwanda

AKAs: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Forces combattantes abacunguzi (Combatant Forces Abacunguzi, FOCA, FDLR-FOCA)

**Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie-Ubwinyunge (CNRD)** – see Rwanda

AKAs: Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie, CNRD-Ubwinyunge, National Council for Renewal and Democracy

**Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Mandevu (FDLR-Mandevu)** – see Rwanda

AKAs: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda-Mandevu

**Rassemblement uni pour la démocratie (RUD)** – see Rwanda

AKAs: Ralliement pour la unité et la démocratie, Ralliement uni pour la démocratie, Rassemblement pour la unité et la démocratie, United Rally for Democracy, Rally for Unity and Democracy, Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda-RUD (FDLR-RUD, FDLR/RUD), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda-United Rally for Democracy

**Front nationaliste pour la démocratie et la réconciliation au Rwanda-L'armée du roi (FRONADER)** – See Rwanda

AKAs: Nationalist Front for Democracy and Reconciliation in Rwanda-Army of the King

**Rassamblement populaire rwandais (RPR)** – See Rwanda

AKAs: Popular Rwandan Rally

**RPR-Inkeragutabara** – see Rwanda

**Congrès national pour la démocratie (CND)** – see Rwanda

AKAs: Nationa Congress for Democracy

**Rasta** – see Rwanda

AKAs: Rastas, FDLR/Rastas, FDLR-Rastas

**Mai Mai Hilaire**

AKAs: Union pour la Réhabilitation de la Démocratie du Congo (URDC), Union for the Rehabilitation of the Democracy of the Congo, Mouvement pour la restauration de la démocratie au Congo (see below), Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in the Congo, MRDC, Mai Mai Hilaire Kombi, Militia (Hilaire Kombi)

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<sup>1026</sup> Franck van Acker and Koen Vlassenroot, “Les «maï-maï» et les fonctions de la violence milicienne dans l’est du Congo, The Mai-Mai And The Function Of Militia Violence in Eastern Congo,” trans. Roland Marchal, *Politique africaine* 4, no. 84 (November 15, 2012): 108; Richard Black and Khalid Koser, *The End of the Refugee Cycle?: Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction* (Berghahn Books, 1999), 158, [https://books.google.fr/books?id=A81Y3FtySrIC&pg=PA158&lpg=PA158&dq=mai+mai+bangilima&source=bl&ots=qmAZZ-e\\_or&sig=vLRMV6D8LAbE07-tkqtYxL5B7il&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzJ395JDVAhWEWz4KHVigDe4Q6AEIMDAB#v=onepage&q=mai%20mai%20bangilima&f=false](https://books.google.fr/books?id=A81Y3FtySrIC&pg=PA158&lpg=PA158&dq=mai+mai+bangilima&source=bl&ots=qmAZZ-e_or&sig=vLRMV6D8LAbE07-tkqtYxL5B7il&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzJ395JDVAhWEWz4KHVigDe4Q6AEIMDAB#v=onepage&q=mai%20mai%20bangilima&f=false); “Republique Démocratique Du Congo : Ce Que Kabila Dissimule : Massacres de Civils et Impunité Au Congo” (New York: Human Rights Watch and Fédération International des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, October 1997), 12, [https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/19971000\\_rd\\_congo\\_conjoint\\_fidh\\_hwr\\_africa\\_ce\\_que\\_kabila\\_dissimule\\_fr.pdf](https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/19971000_rd_congo_conjoint_fidh_hwr_africa_ce_que_kabila_dissimule_fr.pdf).

Hilaire Paluku Kombi (alias Hilaire Kakule) defected from FARDC in JUN 2012.<sup>1027</sup> His named group, Union pour la Réhabilitation de la Démocratie du Congo, was declared on 20 OCT 2012.<sup>1028</sup> However, close examination reveals that, while not officially named, the armed group was already openly operating before the 20 OCT declaration. Hilaire reportedly declared his intent to “liberate” his native village in Kikuru on 28 JUL 2012.<sup>1029</sup> In an article on this event, civil society reported that he already commanded 280 “heavily armed” men.<sup>1030</sup> As such, I have listed JUL 2012 as a founding date with downgraded certainty. I have listed 28 JUL 2012 as the name date, as presence of the armed group was made known then. I coded both name\_time1 and name\_time2 as 0: we know that the group formed between Hilaire’s defection in JUN and his statement in JUL, so public naming must have occurred within three months of the group’s formation. In addition, the URDC spokesperson (Nyoro, see below) evidently gave an interview broadcasted over local radio in Butembo (Beni territory) on 7 OCT.<sup>1031</sup>

The first attack that I found occurred on 16 SEPT 2012, when Hilaire’s group engaged FARDC’s 1103<sup>rd</sup> regiment about sixty miles northwest of Butembo in North Kivu. The engagement lasted about six hours and caused the death of three rebels.<sup>1032</sup> There was one earlier attack on 8 AUG 2012 that was reported as unidentified.<sup>1033</sup> It may have been Hilaire’s group, but many other armed groups also operate in the area. As such I coded the 19 SEPT attack as the first small attack.

None of the subsequent attacks that I found had death tolls over twenty-five.<sup>1034</sup> As such, I have coded large attack as never occurred.

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<sup>1027</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” IRIN, October 31, 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc>; Ruben de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold: How M23 and Its Allies Are Infiltrating Congo’s Gold Trade” (Enough Project, October 2013), 7, <http://enoughproject.org/files/StrikingGold-M23-and-Allies-Infiltrating-Congo-Gold-Trade.pdf>; Caroline Hellyer, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering On the Dangerous - the Invisible Frontline in North Kivu,” *ThinkAfricaPress*, December 5, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201212070733.html>; “Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni,” Radio Okapi, October 20, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/10/20/beni-creation-dun-nouveau-mouvement-politico-militaire>; “Nord-Kivu : Un Officier Déserteur Des FARDC Promet d’attaquer Son Village Natal Pour Le « libérer »,” Radio Okapi, July 25, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/07/25/nord-kivu-officier-deserteur-des-fardc-promet-dattaquer-son-village-natal-pour-le-liberer>; “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 62.

<sup>1028</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 7; “Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni.”

<sup>1029</sup> “Nord-Kivu : Un Officier Déserteur Des FARDC Promet d’attaquer Son Village Natal Pour Le « libérer »”; de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 7.

<sup>1030</sup> “Nord-Kivu : Un Officier Déserteur Des FARDC Promet d’attaquer Son Village Natal Pour Le « libérer ».”

<sup>1031</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Nation Bans Broadcasts On Conflict in Eastern Congo,” *Committee to Protect Journalists* (New York), November 2, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201211020268.html>.

<sup>1032</sup> “Butembo : Les Miliciens Mai-Mai de Kombi Ont Perdu 3 Hommes Dans Un Accrochage Avec Les FARDC,” Radio Okapi, September 17, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/09/17/butembo-les-miliciens-des-mai-mai-de-kombi-ont-perdu-3-hommes-dans-accrochage-avec-les-fardc>; “DR Congo Military Kills Three Militiamen in Nord-Kivu Fighting,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, September 18, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/5a9065a8-5aa3-467d-ba18-e7a6fa1f2de9/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1033</sup> “Nord-Kivu - La Tentative Des Mai-Mai Pour s’emparer de Kasindi Repoussée,” *Le Potentiel*, August 8, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6c77db61-65fa-47f9-9ffe-8c451a115b19/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1034</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 8; “Nord-Kivu: Un Groupe Mai-Mai Occupe Mangurejipa, Selon La Société Locale,” Radio Okapi, March 22, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/03/22/nord-kivu-groupe-mai-mai-occupe-mangurejipa-selon-la-societe-locale>; “Nord-Kivu: La Milice d’Hilaire Kombi Revendique l’attaque Contre La Résidence Du Maire de Beni,” Radio Okapi, May 9, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/05/09/nord-kivu-la-milice-dhilaire-kombi-revendique-la-tentative-de-meurtre-contre-le-maire-de-beni>; “Nord-Kivu: Des Miliciens Mai-Mai Enlèvent 4 Militaires à Bilulu,” Radio Okapi, September 27, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/09/27/nord-kivu-des-miliciens-mai-mai-enlvent-4-militaires-bilulu>; “Nord-Kivu : Le Groupe Armé Fidèle à Hilaire Kombi Contrôle Cinq Villages à Beni,” Radio Okapi, April 10, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/04/10/nord-kivu-le-groupe-arme-fidele-hilaire-kombi-contrrole-cinq-villages-beni>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Violence Grows in Little-Reported Area,” *ThinkAfricaPress*,

Hilaire Kombi surrendered on 10 DEC 2013.<sup>1035</sup> However, at least some members of his group seem to have remained active in 2014 and early 2015.<sup>1036</sup> The Congo Research Group implicates Mai Mai Hilaire associates in a series of civilian massacres in Beni territory starting on 2 OCT 2014, which resulted in over 500 civilian casualties. These activities are usually attributed solely to ADF.<sup>1037</sup> (None of these attacks qualify the group for viable or viable\_civ.) Unfortunately, details of individual Mai Mai Hilaire participants in the massacres is unclear. Because it is unclear which individual members participated and if they did so in an organized capacity or on an individual basis, we have not included the Beni massacres as Mai Mai Hilaire attacks. It is possible that the first civilian attacks occurred before the Beni massacres. Several articles mention abuse of civilian populations, but I was not able to confirm any civilian deaths; it seemed these incidents were just extortion or abuse but not targeted killings.<sup>1038</sup> In addition, Mai Mai Hilaire may have been responsible for the kidnapping of three priests in Beni territory on 19 OCT 2012; however, this event was never firmly tied to Mai Mai Hilaire nor was it established that the priests were killed, as our criterion requires.<sup>1039</sup> Because of the above uncertainties, I have coded missing rather than never occurred for civilian attacks. I found no record of Mai Mai Hilaire activity after JUN 2015, and thus have coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ.

The exact locations of Mai Mai Hilaire's operational bases are variously reported and may have shifted over time/been found in several locations simultaneously. All of the locations mentioned seemed to be rural areas in Beni and Lubero territories, especially in mountainous areas and/or Virunga National Park. Most

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July 11, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/5053d1b6-d189-4936-b6d4-d437f2e5e6a6/?context=1516831>; "Militia Leader Surrenders in Eastern DR Congo," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 12, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ec31d81a-5002-4331-8b30-60045556cb08/?context=1516831>; "Mai-Mai Attack Highlights Challenges Facing New UN Force," *Economist Intelligence Unit*, May 20, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/20122bc8-8bae-4a56-ace2-d6805a342cad/?context=1516831>; "Nord-Kivu : Polémique Au Sujet Des Auteurs de l'attaque Contre La Ville de Beni," *Radio Okapi*, May 15, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/05/15/nord-kivu-polemique-au-sujet-des-auteurs-de-lattaque-contre-la-ville-de-beni>; "Mambasa : Les Commerçants Ont Perdu 5 Millions USD à La Suite Des Pillages, Selon La Fec," *Radio Okapi*, January 11, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/01/11/mambasa-les-commerçants-ont-perdu-5-millions-usd-la-suite-des-pillages>.

<sup>1035</sup> "Le Général Autoproclamé, Hilaire Kombi Du MRDC Se Rend Aux FARDC," *Agence Congolaise de Presse*, December 11, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f985a18b-e6d4-49de-be6e-ef4e7c852f54/?context=1516831>; "Guns Recovered, Militiamen Surrender After Leader's Killing," *All Africa*, May 19, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080519e45j001ca&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1036</sup> Fidel Bafilemba and Jasper Kubasek, "Attacks in Beni, Congo - Behind the Violence [Analysis]," *African Arguments*, February 12, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/898693db-8eb3-4d1c-a642-72f0332d92be/?context=1516831>; Tom Stackpole, "Suffocating Congo's War," *Foreign Policy*, February 7, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3de6e78f-4c70-4d2a-a12a-e04868e49208/?context=1516831>; Caroline Hellyer, "Congo/Uganda: High Profile Military Operations against ADF Will Not Rebuild Local Stability," *African Arguments*, October 16, 2014, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/a64f4e98-7bd7-4a70-840b-70a748c2dddb/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1037</sup> "Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?" (Congo Research Group, March 2016), 26–28, <http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Rapport-Beni-GEC-21-mars.pdf>.

<sup>1038</sup> "Butembo : Les Miliciens Maï-Maï de Kombi Ont Perdu 3 Hommes Dans Un Accrochage Avec Les FARDC"; "Nord-Kivu : Un Groupe Armé Menace de Prendre Beni, Selon La Société Civile," *Radio Okapi*, April 27, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/04/27/nord-kivu-groupe-arme-menace-de-prendre-beni-selon-la-societe-civile>.

<sup>1039</sup> Laurent Larcher, "What Happened to the Three Priests Kidnapped Two Years Ago in North Kivu?," *La Croix*, October 22, 2014, [https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=a7804926-34f3-4646-8728-233eb7ecf061&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5DDR-G431-F07W-H4BJ-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5DDR-G431-F07W-H4BJ-00000-00&pddoccontentcomponentid=275551&pddockey=sr5&ecomp=k7\\_k&earg=sr5&prid=e97f4635-2fcc-4fda-8fae-d20f8a2b1393](https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=a7804926-34f3-4646-8728-233eb7ecf061&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5DDR-G431-F07W-H4BJ-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5DDR-G431-F07W-H4BJ-00000-00&pddoccontentcomponentid=275551&pddockey=sr5&ecomp=k7_k&earg=sr5&prid=e97f4635-2fcc-4fda-8fae-d20f8a2b1393).

attack locations were in Lubero or Beni (North Kivu).<sup>1040</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.

Beyond Hilaire Kombi, other named leadership of Mai Mai Hilaire includes Colonel Werrason, Colonel Eric Kenzo (former UPCP), Colonel David Lusenge (FARDC deserter, Ugandan recruitment liaison), and Lt. Col. Tahanga Nyoro Kasereka (alias Jacques Tahanga Nyolo, former APC, FARDC deserter, spokesperson/M23 liaison).<sup>1041</sup> As such, I coded for current security, former rebels, and current rebels under initial leadership.

Hilaire Kombi was previously a member of the APC, RCD-K/ML’s armed wing. Apparently, many members of Mai Mai Hilaire were recruited from among demobilized APC.<sup>1042</sup> Mai Mai Hilaire formed because of and capitalized on former APC networks. Hilaire defected from FARDC at the urging of Mbusa Nyamwisi, an influential Congolese politician and former RCD-K/ML official.<sup>1043</sup> Nyamwisi directed Hilaire to an arms stash located at his home and facilitated his contact with other armed groups.<sup>1044</sup> Moreover, Nyamwisi and his affiliates recruited former RCD-K/ML and other youths to join Mai Mai Hilaire.<sup>1045</sup> While I have no specific statistics, I find it highly probable that Mai Mai Hilaire meets our one-third threshold to achieve other rebels (APC) as organizational history. RCD-K/ML was undergoing integration in 2004, after which point it no longer appears in ACLED.<sup>1046</sup> As such, Mai Mai Hilaire is too distant from APC to qualify as a revival (more than five years), but not too distant to qualify as other rebel under organizational history (less than ten years). There is not evidence that most of Mai Mai Hilaire’s members defected from FARDC along with Hilaire.

Mai Mai Hilaire often allies with or coordinates operations with current rebel groups, as well. The group has publically acknowledged its links with M23.<sup>1047</sup> Mai Mai Hilaire also coordinates with UPCP (commanded by Mai Mai Lafontaine), where Hilaire evidently briefly affiliated after defecting before launching his own group.<sup>1048</sup> Mai Mai Hilaire maintains contact with FOLC, commanded by Kava we Seli

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<sup>1040</sup> “Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni”; “Nord-Kivu : Un Officier Déserteur Des FARDC Promet d’attaquer Son Village Natal Pour Le « libérer »”; de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 8; “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 64.

<sup>1041</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” paras. 64–65, 68; “Nord-Kivu : Un Groupe Armé Menace de Prendre Beni, Selon La Société Civile”; Hellyer, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering On the Dangerous - the Invisible Frontline in North Kivu”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nation Bans Broadcasts On Conflict in Eastern Congo”; “Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d’expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l’intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki,” *Le Potentiel*, December 3, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201212030485.html>.

<sup>1042</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” paras. 63, 71; “Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni.”

<sup>1043</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 7.

<sup>1044</sup> “Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?,” 26; Hellyer, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering On the Dangerous - the Invisible Frontline in North Kivu”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Violence Grows in Little-Reported Area”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d’expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l’intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki.”

<sup>1045</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” paras. 63, 71.

<sup>1046</sup> “DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Program Update” (World Bank, September 2009), 2, [http://tdrp.net/mdrp/PDFs/DRC\\_Program\\_Update.pdf](http://tdrp.net/mdrp/PDFs/DRC_Program_Update.pdf).

<sup>1047</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 7; “Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni”; Hellyer, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering On the Dangerous - the Invisible Frontline in North Kivu”; “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” paras. 62, 68.

<sup>1048</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 69; “Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?,” 26.

(Kava we Selly, alias Bana Sultani Selly), another group linked to ex-RCD-K/ML.<sup>1049</sup> One article mentions collaboration with a group I had not encountered before, Union des Patriotes pour la Libération et le Développement du Congo (UPLD/C) under Major General Jean-Luc.<sup>1050</sup> Furthermore, Mai Mai Hilaire appears to have ties to the Ugandan group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).<sup>1051</sup> According to one source, Mai Mai Hilaire activity is sometimes wrongly attributed to ADF, as Mai Mai Hilaire operates within their zone of influence.<sup>1052</sup> Finally, Mai Mai Hilaire cooperates with Mai Mai Morgan (Mai Mai Simba), trading its gold and ivory for weapons from Morgan.<sup>1053</sup> On 6 JAN 2013, Mai Mai Hilaire teamed up with Mai Mai Morgan to attack Mambasa, causing \$5 million in damages.<sup>1054</sup> Morgan and Hilaire have worked together to traffic gold: in DEC 2012, they had 60 kg of gold (worth over \$300,000 at the time) and 1.5 tons of ivory smuggled into Uganda.<sup>1055</sup>

In addition to the joint operations with Morgan, Kombi smuggled three shipments of gold through Burundi in 2012. These three shipments plus one M23 shipment totaled 150 kg (worth over \$7 million at the time).<sup>1056</sup> Because of these and the joint Hilaire-Morgan shipments, I have coded 1 for oil\_diamonds under initial resources. All aforementioned shipments were in 2012, i.e. the first year of operation. Mai Mai Hilaire receives armaments from FARDC (by theft and by purchase), from M23, and from Ugandan smugglers.<sup>1057</sup> In addition, one source indicated that Mai Mai Hilaire received financial and material support from Uganda.<sup>1058</sup> However, I have not included this as an initial resource because I found no corroborating evidence and because volume was not specified.

In Hilaire's first statement from JUL 2012, his intended goal was to "liberate" his home village.<sup>1059</sup> In their christening statement on 20 OCT 2012, stated objectives included the rehabilitation of Congolese democracy and truthfulness at the ballot box.<sup>1060</sup> According to United Nations reports, URDC "represents the opposition local politicians and business people" to the Kinshasa government.<sup>1061</sup> As such, I have coded takeover as initial goal (instigate a change in the central government).

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<sup>1049</sup> "Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?," 26; "Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d'expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l'intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki."

<sup>1050</sup> "Nord-Kivu: Des Miliciens Mai-Mai Enlèvent 4 Militaires à Bilulu."

<sup>1051</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?," 26; Hellyer, "Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering On the Dangerous - the Invisible Frontline in North Kivu"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Une Ong Se Dit Préoccupée de l'insécurité à Beni et Butembo," *Radio Okapi*, July 31, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201207311229.html>.

<sup>1052</sup> "Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?," 26.

<sup>1053</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 70.

<sup>1054</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, "Striking Gold," 8; "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 70; "Un Groupe de Rebelles et de Miliciens de Morgan Occupent Mambasa," *Radio Okapi*, January 6, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/01/06/groupe-de-rebelles-de-miliciens-de-morgan-occupent-mambasa>; "Mambasa"; "Province Orientale : Les Commerçants Quittent Mambasa à Cause de l'insécurité," *Radio Okapi*, March 21, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/03/21/province-orientale-les-commerçants-quittent-mambasa-de-linsecurite>.

<sup>1055</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, "Striking Gold," 8.

<sup>1056</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, 8.

<sup>1057</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 64.

<sup>1058</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d'expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l'intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki."

<sup>1059</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, "Striking Gold," 8; "Nord-Kivu : Un Officier Déserteur Des FARDC Promet d'attaquer Son Village Natal Pour Le « libérer »."

<sup>1060</sup> "Nord-Kivu : URDC, Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé à Beni."

<sup>1061</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 63.



Multiple sources report that Mai Mai Hilaire is primarily ethnic Nande.<sup>1062</sup> This dovetails with its organizational history; RCD-K/ML was also primarily ethnic Nande.<sup>1063</sup>

I code 1 for protest (SCAD events 4900421 and 4900424, possibly others) and riot (SCAD events 4900425 and 4900426, possibly others).

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, two of which (Event ID 4900436) occurred in the group formation province of North Kivu. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but nonlocally. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. A high degree of election-related contestation occurred during this timeframe.

#### **\*Raia Mutomboki (Jean Musumbu)**

AKAs: Rahiya Mutomboki (Jean Musumbu)

NOTE: Raia Mutomboki is a franchise rebellion; this coding represents a specific sub-group of Raia Mutomboki. The franchise is included in ACLED as Mayi Mayi Militia (Raia Mutomboki).

The original Raia Mutomboki was not a splinter group.<sup>1064</sup> Although many sources indicate that Raia Mutomboki emerged in 2011, these groups were actually a revival of a movement that began with an original core group or groups in 2005.<sup>1065</sup> Unfortunately, information on this original group is not abundant. All information we used to code this group came from Jason Stearns via Congo Siasa or the Usalama Project's *Raia Mutomboki* report (authored by Stearns). The report utilizes firsthand knowledge but also draws on the United Nations weekly internal threat reports, to which I could not directly gain access myself. We coded a 3 for certainty – Jason Stearns was one source, and the internal UN reports a second source, and Vogel a third.

In terms of media presence, the earliest Raia Mutomboki appearance is in relation to the 2008 Goma conference; articles from this era mention only the group's participation and nothing more specific. The earliest of these articles appears on 10 JAN 2008 in *Le Phare*.<sup>1066</sup> Despite the group's prolonged absence from media, it was not clandestine. Stearns reports that the group formed "with the blessing of civil society and customary leaders in the area."<sup>1067</sup> Moreover, one Raia Mutomboki member reported that "Musumbu went from village to village in those early days, talking to local chiefs and spreading the word."<sup>1068</sup> As such, the name date is identical to the form date. The clandestine variables is coded as 0. Also because of this information, I have coded name date as identical to the founding date.

The original Raia Mutomboki mobilization occurred in southern Shabunda, especially in the Nkulu and Basitabiyale groupements. As such, "rural" is coded as 1 and "planning\_inside" is coded as 1. The group formed to counter FDLR presence in the area after Mai Mai demobilization/integration created a security vacuum in the area.<sup>1069</sup> An incident on 29 MAR 2005 in which FDLR ambushed a convoy of traders on its way to Kyoka, killing those who did not escape, including two women and four children, prompted the

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<sup>1062</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 62.

<sup>1063</sup> "Qui Sont Les Tueurs de Beni?," 25.

<sup>1064</sup> Jason K. Stearns and Christopher Vogel, "The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo" (New York: Center on International Cooperation, December 2015), 7.

<sup>1065</sup> "A Closer Look at the Raia Mutomboki," *Suluhu* (blog), August 11, 2013, <https://suluhu.org/2013/08/11/a-closer-look-at-the-raia-mutomboki/>. See also discussion below.

<sup>1066</sup> J.-Alain Kabongo, "Congo-Kinshasa: A Goma, La Rue Tour à Tour Critique et Indifférente," *Le Phare*, January 10, 2008, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200801100977.html>.

<sup>1067</sup> Stearns, "Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?"

<sup>1068</sup> Jason Stearns, "Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise," Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 16, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/raia-mutomboki#.WTF3DmjyIV>.

<sup>1069</sup> Stearns, 15.

formation of Raia Mutomboki.<sup>1070</sup> As such, the founding date is listed as APR 2005 with a certainty of 1. This original mobilization and group were led by Jean Musumbu. In a Congo Siasa blog post on 21 JUL 2012, Stearns wrote that Musumbu is “reportedly a former officer for the Mai Mai of General Padiri who integrated into the Congolese army in 2003, but became disillusioned and defected back to his home turf.”<sup>1071</sup> However, the later Usalama report, published in 2013, Stearns writes that Musumbu “did not have military experience.”<sup>1072</sup> I assume that Stearns’ later writing reflects increased accuracy upon further investigation; as such, I have coded initial leadership variables as zero across the board. However, it is worth noting that Jean Musumbu is reportedly a witchdoctor and Kimbanguist minister.<sup>1073</sup> The membership seems to have been comprised primarily of local youth, “many” of whom were former Mai Mai.<sup>1074</sup> It is difficult to know whether these Mai Mai were of a self-defense/pro-government or rebel nature. Given that it was early after the second Congolese War (when many Mai Mai were still pro-government), I have coded self-defense for organizational history.

Even at this stage, the Raia Mutomboki operated in a “franchise” model: either Jean Musumbu would travel to other villages and talk to the local chiefs, identifying a leader in each village, or youth would mobilize independently and send emissaries to Musumbu to collect dawa and amulets. In neither case did Musumbu establish authoritative command and control over these mobilized groups.<sup>1075</sup> However, I found not indication that various Raia Mutomboki franchises ever fought each other.

As I was not able to access MONUC’s internal threat reports, I do not have information on specific attacks. However, Stearns indicates that Raia Mutomboki appears fifteen times over late 2005 to early 2007, usually regarding battles with FDLR or FARDC. Not all these engagements were the original Musumbu group/franchise, but some were.<sup>1076</sup> By around early 2008, Raia Mutomboki had been successful in driving FDLR out of the area.<sup>1077</sup> As such, it is clear that Raia Mutomboki battled with FDLR, the dominant force in the area, to control territory. Moreover, to drive out FDLR, it would have needed to conduct offensive attacks. As such, I have coded it as a rebel group despite frequent reference to it as a defense group or parochial militia.

There is no evidence that the Raia Mutomboki received substantial support within the first year. In fact, Stearns reports that it was “armed only with spears, machetes, and bows”.<sup>1078</sup>

Regarding ethnicity, the initial Raia Mutomboki occurred in predominantly Rega areas. It drew heavily on Rega culture (dawa, initiation rights, decentralized structure/command mirroring Rega political structure).<sup>1079</sup> As discussed above, it recruited local youth. As such, I assume the original Raia Mutomboki was also predominantly Rega. There is strong reason to believe that this was a wholly Rega group (at least initially) emerging wholly Rega community.

Raia Mutomboki appeared in three Radio Okapi articles in 2009. However, these articles are highly ambiguous on who initiated and sometimes even on whether Raia Mutomboki was involved.<sup>1080</sup> As such, we have not

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<sup>1070</sup> Stearns, “Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise”;  
Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?”

<sup>1071</sup> Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?”

<sup>1072</sup> Stearns, 14.

<sup>1073</sup> Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?”; Stearns, “Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise,” 14.

<sup>1074</sup> Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?,” 14.

<sup>1075</sup> Stearns, 15–16; Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?”

<sup>1076</sup> Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?,” 15.

<sup>1077</sup> Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?”

<sup>1078</sup> Stearns, “Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise,” 15.

<sup>1079</sup> Stearns, 14, 16; Stearns, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?”

<sup>1080</sup> “Shabunda : accalmie à Itamba, après accrochages entre policiers et population,” Radio Okapi, October 30, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/10/30/shabunda-accalmie-a-itamba-apres-accrochages-entre-policiers-et-population>; “Shabunda : la population déserte le village de Kitindi,” Radio Okapi, November 23, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/23/shabunda-la-population-deserte-le-village-de-kitindi-2>;

coded them as viable. Groups named Raia Mutomboki also appeared later (in 2011 and later), but it is not clear that these were continuations of the original group.<sup>1081</sup>

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of South Kivu, contestation variables are coded as 0. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but was not local either. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### \*Raia Mutomboki (Mwami Alexandre)

AKAs: Rahiya Mutomboki (Mwami Alexandre)

NOTE: Raia Mutomboki is a franchise rebellion; this coding represents a specific sub-group of Raia Mutomboki.

The franchise is included in ACLED as Mayi Mayi Militia (Raia Mutomboki).

I have only one solid source on this group and it does not present detailed information, but we judged that the group should be included. This group was a copycat Raia Mutomboki, the legitimacy of which was evidently contested by Jean Musumbu. It was launched by Misaba Bwansolo, AKA Mwami Alexandre or Chief Alexandre. Alexandre was a former Mai Mai combatant under Padiri Bulenda during the Second Congolese war, so I have marked current security under initial leadership. I marked missing for current or former government leaders, as the title Mwami indicates that he has served as a traditional chief, although when is not clear. Alexandre launched the group in southern Shabunda in 2006. I assume that Alexandre was Rega, as the original Raia Mutomboki (under Jean Musumbu) were at the time. Furthermore, Alexandre quit the Mai Mai of Padiri Bulenda because he showed favoritism toward Tembo, which makes sense if Alexandre is Rega. Finally, later in the group's history, he worked with another Rega leader, Kyatend Dittman, to help revive the group. Alexandre was arrested approximately a year after launching the group for recruitment of child soldiers; I take this information as evidence of concrete plans to commit violence.

Apparently, the group was operational for a time as a revival in 2010, under the leadership of both Mwami Alexandre (escaped from prison) and Kyatend Dittman. During this period of activity, it operated in area surrounding Kitindi in southeastern Shabunda and was supported by Mwami Muligi V. Mwami Muligi V was arrested later that year, resulting in this group demobilizing. Only twelve members appeared for demobilization; apparently the group had not been very large.<sup>1082</sup>

One other source mentions the copycat Raia Mutomboki of Alexandre and Kyatend Dittman, but only in passing – it does not give any details.<sup>1083</sup>

One additional article appears after the publication of my main source naming the Raia Mutomboki of Colonel Alexandre. It indicates that Mwami Alexandre's armed group attacked police and took control of villages Kikamba and Penekusu (Shabunda territory) on 15 AUG and 20 AUG 2014 respectively. Evidently, Alexandre's group was working with the armed group of Charlequin (additional details regarding this group unknown). According to this article, Alexandre had spent some months in prison for abusing civilian populations, although when this occurred is unclear.<sup>1084</sup> Because of the information on these attacks and information regarding the 2010 revival, I have coded the group as viable. However, I have left missing for merge as the relationship between Alexandre's group and Charlequin's group is not clear. There is no evidence of any splinter groups.

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“Shabunda: la vie reprend progressivement Matili,” Radio Okapi, March 13, 2010,

<https://www.radiookapi.net/regions/sud-kivu/2010/03/13/shabunda-la-vie-reprend-progressivement-matili>.

<sup>1081</sup> Stearns, “Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise.”

<sup>1082</sup> Stearns, 18–19.

<sup>1083</sup> Georges Berghezan, “Groupes Armés Actifs En République Démocratique Du Congo : Situation Dans Le «Grand Kivu» Au 2ème Semestre 2013” (Brussels: Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la securite, November 2013), 13, [http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/Rapport\\_2013-11.pdf](http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/Rapport_2013-11.pdf).

<sup>1084</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Sud-Kivu - Des Miliciens Occupent 3 Localités de Shabunda,” *Radio Okapi*, August 21, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201408211576.html>.

Based on the given information about this group's operations in southern Shabunda, I have coded 1 for "rural." I coded 1 for "planning inside".

Because the date of formation in 2006 isn't known, I check all of 2005 for contestation events. I code 1 for protest (ACLED events 4900236, 4900246 among others) and for riots (SCAD events 4900277, 4900240, 4900245 among others).

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of South Kivu, contestation variables are coded as 0. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but was not local either. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### **\*Raia Mutomboki (revival groups)**

AKAs: Rahiya Mutomboki (revival groups)

NOTE: The franchise is included in ACLED as Mayi Mayi Militia (Raia Mutomboki).

Excluded – insufficient information to code individual revival groups, as it is not one cohesive organization.<sup>1085</sup>

#### **Mai Mai Sheka**

AKAs: Mai Mai Cheka, Mai Mai Tcheka, Nduma Défense du Congo, Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC), Nduma Defense of Congo (Cheka), NDC-C

NOTE: This group appears in ACLED under four names: Mayi Mayi Militia (Cheka), Nduma Defense of Congo (Cheka), Nduma Defense of Congo, and National Democratic Congress (a mis-tag, see below).

According to UN reports, this armed group originated as a criminal network that controlled the Bisie cassiterite mine in Walikale territory on behalf of the FARDC 85<sup>th</sup> Brigade, commanded by Colonel Sammy Matumo. In 2009, the 85<sup>th</sup> brigade was replaced but the 212<sup>th</sup> brigade as part of efforts to encourage CNDP integration into FARDC; the criminal network viewed this change as a threat to its continued operation of the mine and transformed into a rebel group. The group is commanded by Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, who has worked in the Bisie mine as part of the local diggers' cooperative (Coopérative minière de Mpama Bisie or COMIMPA) and as part of the mining company holding the rights at Bisie, Mineral Processing Congo. Sheka recruited deserters of the 85<sup>th</sup> brigade and of the FARDC military base at Birwue. Mai Mai Sheka's first three attacks were aimed at local mines at Obaye, Omate, and Bisie in JUN and AUG 2009.<sup>1086</sup> The same report explains that Sheka's uncle, Colonel Etienne Bindu, is FARDC deputy commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> military region. Bindu is from Walikale and has "a long history of investment and participation in the mineral trade" there. The UN report claims that Bindu "has supported Sheka since the movement's initial stages," communicating regularly with him and providing unspecified amounts of weapons, money, and uniforms obtained through Bindu's military position.<sup>1087</sup> On different occasions, Sheka identified various purposes for his group, none of which we have coding options for: resisting return of Congolese Tutsi refugees, "liberating" mines from FARDC.<sup>1088</sup> It appears that Sheka also received support from ex-CNDP and FDLR, although it is not clear if this was within the first year (reported in NOV 2010).<sup>1089</sup> Sheka is also believed to cooperate with his cousin, FARDC 212<sup>th</sup> brigade commander Colonel Yusuf Mboneza, who ensures areas are cleared before Mai Mai operations there (no

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<sup>1085</sup> For additional information, see Stearns, "Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise"; Stearns, "Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?"; "A Closer Look at the Raia Mutomboki."

<sup>1086</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)" (United Nations Security Council, November 29, 2010), 34–36, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/596](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/596).

<sup>1087</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 37.

<sup>1088</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 38.

<sup>1089</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," 39–40.

date given, reported in NOV 2010).<sup>1090</sup> The UN report did not discuss attacks on civilian populations, except attacks from 30 JUL to 2 AUG 2010 in which Sheka repeatedly order the use of rape because he “had been advised that the widespread use of rape would garner much greater attention for his armed group”.<sup>1091</sup> However, civilian attacks is limited to targeted killing of civilians by our criteria.

Other sources also corroborate the group’s founding in 2009 and its leadership under Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, a former minerals trader.<sup>1092</sup> The earliest mention I found of this group in the press was in the Congolese newspaper *Le Potential* on 21 AUG 2009.<sup>1093</sup>

Sources also report that the group is primarily ethnic Nyanga.<sup>1094</sup>

The earliest mention of attacks on civilians I found was from a UN report, which stated that Mai Mai Sheka “continued to commit crimes against civilian populations,” implying that these were not the first attacks. It specifically names MONUSCO-documented killing of 72 civilians in SEPT and OCT 2013.<sup>1095</sup> A later HRW report from 2015 indicate that Mai Mai Sheka had attacked civilians, although no specific incidents were discussed.<sup>1096</sup> The group was also implicated in the killing of civilians in 2016.<sup>1097</sup>

As a result of this information, I have coded the group as such:

- I coded the founding date as June 2009, with a certainty of 1. We know that it conducted its first attacks in June, so it probably formed shortly thereafter.
- I have coded clandestine as missing. Although it does not seem to have claimed attacks, there is no evidence that it attempted to cover its tracks.
- 0 for all goals – enumerated goals were not takeover, secession, or autonomy
- On organizational history, 1 for military (since FARDC is the only mentioned source of membership) and 1 for other\_org, as it started as a criminal gang working in collaboration with state forces (FARDC).
- 1 for “rural”, and 1 for “planning\_inside”, as they initially planned/operated in Walikale.
- For initial resource base, it seems likely that Mai Mai Sheka received substantial support from FARDC, and also potentially some financing through their control of the mine at Bisie. As such, I have coded oil/diamonds and other under initial resources.
- Since no casualty counts could be garnered for early attacks, I have coded small attack as JUN 2009. I code large attack as missing.
- I have also coded the first civilian attack as missing. However, I have tentatively coded `civ_attack_time` and `civ_attack_time2` as 0, since the first reports I found did not emerge until 2013, and since the earlier UN report specifically singled out rape but did not mention killing.
- I coded current security as missing, rather than 0, as it seems likely that FARDC deserters who joined Mai Mai Sheka held leadership positions in the first year, but none were named.

<sup>1090</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 42.

<sup>1091</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 41.

<sup>1092</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013; “‘Our School Became the Battlefield’: Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” iii.

<sup>1093</sup> Louis-Paul Eyenga Sana, “Congo-Kinshasa: Trois Mille Casques Bleus Attendus Pour Renforcer La Monuc,” *Le Potentiel*, August 21, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200908210550.html>.

<sup>1094</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 190; “‘Our School Became the Battlefield’: Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” iii.

<sup>1095</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 42.

<sup>1096</sup> “‘Our School Became the Battlefield’: Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” iii.

<sup>1097</sup> Conor Gaffey, “At Least 21 Killed in Ethnic Violence in Democratic Republic of Congo,” *Newsweek*, February 9, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.com/ethnic-violence-dr-congo-kills-least-21-un-424649>; Aaron Ross, “At Least 21 Hutus Killed in ‘alarming’ East Congo Violence: U.N.,” *Reuters*, February 8, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-violence-idUSKCN0VH1VL>.

- I coded 1 for viable, as Mai Mai Sheka forces (then called NDC) still battled with FDLR and other armed groups for control of territory, including initiating attacks and making territorial gains. Qualifying ACLED events from OCT 2013 to SEPT 2014: 7733DRC, 8157DRC, 8164DRC, 8253DRC, 8456DRC, 8699DRC, 8702DRC, 8715DRC, 8716DRC. There is at least one splinter group, discussed below.
- I coded 1 for protest (SCAD event 4900356) and rioting (4900357).

SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, and this event occurred in the group formation province of North Kivu. Two Type 2 events occurred, one of which also was in this province. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Nduma défense du Congo rénové (NDC-R)

AKAs: Nduma Defense of Congo-Renovated, NDC-Guidon, Nduma Defense of Congo (Guidon)

This is an internal faction or splinter of NDC, led by its former second in command, General Guidon Shimiray Mwissa.<sup>1098</sup> Excluded – meets criterion for splinter group.

#### Union des patriotes pour la défense des innocents (UPDI)

AKAs: Union pour la protection des innocents, Union of Patriots for Defense of the Innocents, Union for the Defense of the Innocents, Mayi Mayi Militia (Union of Patriots for the Defense of the Innocents) ; also may be referred to as NDC-Rénové, with which it may have merged

UPDI seems to have originated in NOV 2015. According to a UN report, it was created by an ethnic Kobo leader from Mesambo, Marungu Magua, whose family had a land conflict with an FDLR Colonel Kizito. The chief of Miriki, Gervais Paluku, supported its formation and helps it coordinate with FARDC. The report indicates that UPDI began attacking FDLR along the Bukumbirwa-Miriki road in NOV 2015, advancing to Buleusa by late NOV. In DEC 2015, the group moved to Irameso where it cohabited with NDC-Rénové. The report suggests that UPDI merged into NDC-R at that point, but I continued to find later reference to UPDI (see below). Finally, the report indicates that both UPDI and NDC-R had coordinated with FARDC. UPDI had been used as scouts/local intelligence by FARDC, while FARDC had supplied ammunition to UPDI and NDC-R.<sup>1099</sup>

A series of articles confirms that UPDI competes with FDLR and FDLR allies to control territory in Lubero and Walikale provinces; specific battles occurred in Beleusa, Kimaka, Kasiki, Luhofu, Mbwavinywa, Kanune, Mukeberwa, Miriki, Kyambuli, and other unnamed locations.<sup>1100</sup> As such, “rural” is coded as 1 and “planning\_inside” as 1.

<sup>1098</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” para. 76; Yannick Weyns, Lotte Hoex, and Ken Matthysen, “Analysis of the Interactive Map of Artisanal Mining in Eastern DR Congo: 2015 Update” (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, October 2016), 12, [http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Analysis-and-map-artisanal-mining-DR-Congo\\_v005-1.pdf](http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Analysis-and-map-artisanal-mining-DR-Congo_v005-1.pdf); Stearns and Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo,” 6.

<sup>1099</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” paras. 75, 78–80.

<sup>1100</sup> “How Armed Militia Groups Are Fueling Genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *Ventures Africa* (blog), November 28, 2016, <http://venturesafrica.com/armed-militia-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/>; Gaffey, “At Least 21 Killed in Ethnic Violence in Democratic Republic of Congo”; Ross, “At Least 21 Hutus Killed in ‘alarming’ East Congo Violence: U.N.”; “Ethnic Fighting in Congo Leaves 29 Dead,” *News.Com.Au — Australia’s #1 News Site* (blog), February 7, 2016, <http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/ethnic-fighting-in-congo-leaves-29-dead/news-story/f8a58cda7a1f766524d2a9584c67765c>; “Armed Group Kidnap 46 , Assassinate 16 Civilians,” *Vanguard News* (blog), December 30, 2015, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/armed-group-kidnap-46-assassinates-16-civilians/>; “7 Killed in Clashes between FDLR Rebels and Militia in DR Congo,” *News Ghana* (blog), November 17, 2015, <https://www.newsghana.com.gh/7-killed-in-clashes-between-fdlr-rebels-and-militia-in-dr-congo/>; “Lubero: Des Villages Se Vident Suite Aux Combats Entre Miliciens,” *Radio Okapi*, December 27, 2015, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2015/12/27/actualite/securite/lubero-des-villages-se-vident-suite-aux-combats-entre->



Sources also confirm that fighting began in NOV 2015, with the first article I found running on 15 NOV.<sup>1101</sup> This date is coded as the name date. It is also coded as the small attack date, but certainty is left at 2 to reflect that the date of the fighting itself was not confirmed. Clandestine variable is coded as 0, as the group was named along with its initial attacks.

It appears none of the aforementioned attacks met the threshold for large attack – one had a total toll of 29, but this includes deaths on both sides, so UPDI-inflicted casualties likely fell short of 25.<sup>1102</sup> As such, large attack is coded as never having occurred. The earliest reports I found of attacks on civilians (intending to kill) occurred in AUG 2016, i.e. within less than a year of fighting. It targeted ethnic Hutu.<sup>1103</sup>

Because the UN Report mentions that FARDC coordinated with UPDI and supplied it ammunition, but the extent of this support is not delineated, I have coded missing for other and none under initial resources.

While the UN Report describes UPDI as ethnic Kobo and Nande, other sources describe it as predominantly Nande without mention of ethnic Kobo.<sup>1104</sup>

I found no articulation of goals, so they are coded as zero. Since there was no evidence of organizational history, I coded it as 1 for no\_prior\_org. Finally, I have coded missing for initial leadership variables, as I did not encounter much named leadership and did not encounter personal histories for any named leadership.

Although UPDI was listed among North Kivu armed groups prepared to surrender to DRC security forces in May 2020, the surveyed sources do not include reports of any attacks on state or civilian targets more than three years after the group's November 2015 founding.<sup>1105</sup> The group is coded as not being viable.

I code 1 for protest (SCAD events 4900514 and 4900533).

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, one of which occurred in the group formation province of North Kivu. Several Type 2 events also occurred, with one in North Kivu as well. Many events during this window were election-related. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Mai Mai Kifuafua

AKAs: Mayi Mayi Militia (Kifuafua)

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miliciens; "Province Du Nord-Kivu: Les Combats Entre FDLR et May-May Font 10 Morts à Kanune | Groupe de Presse l'Avenir," December 14, 2015, <http://groupelevenir.org/province-du-nord-kivu-les-combats-entre-fdlr-et-may-may-font-10-morts-a-kanune/>; "RDC: Huit Morts Dans Des Combats Entre Groupes Armés Près de Lubero (Nord-Kivu)," RTBF Info, December 29, 2015, [https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/afrique/detail\\_rdc-huit-morts-dans-des-combats-entre-groupes-armes-pres-de-lubero-nord-kivu?id=9174233](https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/afrique/detail_rdc-huit-morts-dans-des-combats-entre-groupes-armes-pres-de-lubero-nord-kivu?id=9174233); "Congo-Kinshasa: Un Présumé Auteur Du Génocide Au Rwanda Arrêté à Goma," *Radio Okapi*, December 10, 2015, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201512101766.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Calme Précaire à Miriki Après l'attaque Des FDLR," *Radio Okapi*, January 9, 2016, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201601090123.html>.

<sup>1101</sup> "7 Killed in Clashes between FDLR Rebels and Militia in DR Congo"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Un Présumé Auteur Du Génocide Au Rwanda Arrêté à Goma."

<sup>1102</sup> "Ethnic Fighting in Congo Leaves 29 Dead."

<sup>1103</sup> Ross, "At Least 21 Hutus Killed in 'alarming' East Congo Violence: U.N."; Gaffey, "At Least 21 Killed in Ethnic Violence in Democratic Republic of Congo"; "How Armed Militia Groups Are Fueling Genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

<sup>1104</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 78; "How Armed Militia Groups Are Fueling Genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo"; Gaffey, "At Least 21 Killed in Ethnic Violence in Democratic Republic of Congo"; Ross, "At Least 21 Hutus Killed in 'alarming' East Congo Violence: U.N."

<sup>1105</sup> "Plus de 2.200 miliciens de 12 groupes armés du Nord-Kivu prêts à se rendre aux FARDC," *Agence Congolaise de Presse*, May 20, 2020, 2, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CONGPR0020200520eg5k0002z&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

There is not much reporting on this group's origins, but what I found most consistently was that Mai Mai Kifuafua formed in the early 1990s.<sup>1106</sup> However, the same sources say it was formed to fight the FDLR, which would not yet have formed in the early 1990s. It is possible they mean FDLR and its predecessors, which would have crossed into DRC starting in 1994. I found no other dates consistently reported. Two articles, both by Christoph Vogel, referred to Mai Mai Kifuafua as a splinter group of Raia Mutomboki.<sup>1107</sup> Jason Stearns explains that Mai Mai Kifuafua eventually joined the Raia Mutomboki (being first independent), and later changed their name to Raia Mutomboki – which make explain the discrepancy.<sup>1108</sup> Others refer to it as merely an ally rather than a splinter.<sup>1109</sup> With this information, I see three possibilities for this group: (1) it predates our period of interest, (2) it is a splinter group of Raia Mutomboki (I suspect this is unlikely), or (3) we do not have sufficient information on the origins of this group to code it. For any of these scenarios, Mai Mai Kifuafua is excluded.

#### \*Local Defense Forces Busumba

AKAs: Busumba Local Defense Forces

Sources agree that this group was established by Erasto Ntibaturama, but vary on the date: UN reports place formation of the militia in 1993, while IRIN and the Enough Project place formation in 2005.<sup>1110</sup> I found no additional information beyond these sources. Excluded – insufficient information to code, possibly predates period of interest.

#### Forces pour la défense du Congo (FDC)

AKAs: Force pour la défense du Congo, Front de défense du Congo, Forces de Défense Congolaise, Congolese Defense Forces. Force for the Defense of Congo, Forces for the Defense of Congo, Mai Mai FDC, Mai Mai Guides, Guides militia, Mai Mai militia (Guides), FDC-Guides

NOTE: Not to be confused with Front démocratique congolais, an opposition political party.

NOTE: This group appears in ACLED under Mayi Mayi Militia (Guides) and Forces for Congolese Defense.

<sup>1106</sup> “Scores Killed as Mai-Mai Target Kinyarwanda Speakers,” IRIN, June 12, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95626/drc-scores-killed-mai-mai-target-kinyarwanda-speakers>; Richards, “Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control,” 4; “Mayi-Mayi Alliance Pour La Resistance Democratique (ARD),” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed June 27, 2017, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mayi-mayi.htm>; Annyssa Bellal, *The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 163.

<sup>1107</sup> Christoph Vogel, “Congo-Kinshasa: Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?,” *ThinkAfricaPress*, July 17, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201307171427.html>; Christophe Vogel, “Africa: Eastern Congo’s Recent Troubles - Who Pulls the Strings, What Is At Stake, and Why Do Things Happen?,” *African Arguments*, September 6, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201309060251.html>.

<sup>1108</sup> Stearns, “Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise,” 20, 33.

<sup>1109</sup> “‘Our School Became the Battlefield’: Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” ii; “Congo-Kinshasa: DRC’s M23 Rebellion Under Pressure,” IRIN, November 17, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201211170252.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Briefing - Crisis in North Kivu,” IRIN, July 11, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207110507.html>.

<sup>1110</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 259; “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013; Engelbert Abel Rugeje and Sadiki Maeresera, “The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronized Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?,” *Journal of International Studies* 12 (2016): 71.

Several sources including a UN report suggest that this group emerged in 2012, but the same UN report attributes activity to the group as early as NOV 2011.<sup>1111</sup> Other sources likewise corroborate that FDC's violent activity dates back to 2011.<sup>1112</sup>

One source I found suggests that this group was created by ex-CNDP/future M23.<sup>1113</sup> According to UN reporting, the leader of the group is in fact an ex-CNDP, General Buto Luanda.<sup>1114</sup> In addition, Ntaganda bolstered the FDC with CNDP officers for at least one FDC operation.<sup>1115</sup> However, I have not classified this as a splinter group or revival of CNDP. First, FDC is consistently referred to as a local vigilante or self defense group.<sup>1116</sup> Membership is drawn from local youth who were dissatisfied with FDLR occupation of the area.<sup>1117</sup> Moreover, one report from the Rwandan government suggests that the group pre-dates the wave of activity in 2011-2012: it was originally a local self-defense militia engaged in ethnic disputes; later, during Operation Amani Leo (2010), it supplied local guides to FARDC.<sup>1118</sup> Other sources corroborate that group members had formerly served as guides for FARDC, which is perhaps the origin of its alternative name, Mai Mai Guides.<sup>1119</sup> (Alternatively, another source suggests that "FDC-Guides" was a splinter group off FDC, but it does not ultimately affect our coding; FDC would still qualify. This source states that members came from former guards to FARDC.<sup>1120</sup>) One article may suggest membership of

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<sup>1111</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," paras. 37, 47.

<sup>1112</sup> "Insécurité: Les Habitants de Waloa Yungu Désertent Leurs Villages," Radio Okapi, January 2, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/01/02/insecurite-les-habitants-de-waloa-yungu-desertent-leurs-villages>; "M23's Wider Influence: Mobilizing Militias, Stirring Ethnic Conflict," Text, ReliefWeb, September 6, 2012, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/m23%E2%80%99s-wider-influence-mobilizing-militias-stirring-ethnic-conflict>; Michael Deibert, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair* (Zed Books Ltd., 2013), <https://books.google.com/books?id=Et9iDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1966&lpg=PA1966&dq=guides+militia+congo+masisi+walikale&source=bl&ots=y3hiuegz-j&sig=DJ5mGnuS6I30eeEdu2q68HzHjJU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj3jrZ8rYHVAhXD6CYKHTVfDn44ChDoAQg4MAY#v=onepage&q=guides%20militia%20congo%20masisi%20walikale&f=false>; "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana" (Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, March 27, 2012), 17, [http://demobr.wanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/publication/Updates\\_on\\_Leadership\\_of\\_Rwandan\\_Armed\\_Groups\\_1\\_.pdf](http://demobr.wanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/publication/Updates_on_Leadership_of_Rwandan_Armed_Groups_1_.pdf).

<sup>1113</sup> "M23's Wider Influence."

<sup>1114</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," paras. 47–8.

<sup>1115</sup> "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 37.

<sup>1116</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Walikale: Nouveaux Affrontements Entre La Milice «Guides» et Les FDLR à Ntoto," Radio Okapi, January 6, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/01/06/walikale-nouveaux-affrontements-entre-la-milice-guides-fdlr-ntoto>; "DRC Armed Groups Spawned in Conflict," *Cape Times*, July 19, 2013, <https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20130719/281526518661959>; "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana," 17; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 47.

<sup>1117</sup> Pitshou Mulumba, "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Accrochages Entre FARDC et Mai-Mai Guides Font 10 Morts à Minova," *Le Potentiel*, January 9, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201201090147.html>.

<sup>1118</sup> "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana," 17–18.

<sup>1119</sup> "M23's Wider Influence."

<sup>1120</sup> Brooke Lauten and Melanie Kesmaecker-Wissing, "IDP's Decision-Making in the DRC: Defining a Framework to Support Resilience in Humanitarian Responses to Multiple Displacement" (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, April 2015), 18, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/20150430-af-drcongo-idps-decision-making-en.pdf>.

FARDC deserters within FDC (it is ambiguous).<sup>1121</sup> However, no articles tie rank-and-file membership of FDC to ex-CNDP. A Congolese government source suggested that FDC is actually just Mai Mai Sheka, but I found no evidence to corroborate this.<sup>1122</sup> One source stated that they cooperated with Mai Mai Sheka.<sup>1123</sup> Weighing this evidence, I believe that the leadership may have been ex-CNDP but rank-and-file members were locals, some of whom had likely served as local guides for FARDC during Amani Leo. Because of FDC's history, a 1 is coded for self-defense group. Because of Buto Luanda, a 1 is coded for former rebels under initial leadership.

Although often referred to as a self-defense or vigilante group, FDC began targeting FDLR and competing for control of territory in 2011 and 2012. FDC's first small attack was on 26 NOV 2011, when it killed five FDLR combatants including local FDLR community liaison officers.<sup>1124</sup> This is listed as small attack date. NOV 2011 is also listed as formation date. Although the group may have predated this attack, this is when it began targeting the occupying force FDLR and hence when it meets our criteria as a rebel group. Certainty of the date is adjusted downward to reflect conjecture as to when the attack was planned. The first deliberate targeting of civilians appears to have occurred on 11 MAY 2012, when it killed two men brewing traditional alcoholic beverages in fields near Ngote.<sup>1125</sup> This is likely within one year of the group's formation, but not within three months.

Articles describe subsequent attacks engaging FDLR and FARDC in eastern Walikale and western Masisi: Ntoto, Kimua, Kashala Labinkuse, Mashuho, Rwenga, Kiheri, Kiluko, Waloa Yungu, Waloa Uroba, Ufamandu, and Nyamaboko. No single attack qualifies as a large attack.<sup>1126</sup> Because of these reports, a 1 is coded for "rural" and 1 for "planning\_inside". In this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation.

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<sup>1121</sup> L. Cardoso, "Congo-Kinshasa: La Situation Sécuritaire Demeure «tendue et Imprévisible» Au Nord-Kivu," *Le Potentiel*, February 9, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201202090426.html>.

<sup>1122</sup> Dom, "Congo-Kinshasa: Mende s'explique," *Le Phare*, May 22, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205220188.html>.

<sup>1123</sup> "Nord-Kivu : Les Mai-Mai Cheka Contrôlent La Localité de Luvungi," *Radio Okapi*, April 29, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/04/29/nord-kivu-les-mai-mai-cheka-controlent-la-localite-de-luvungi>.

<sup>1124</sup> "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 37; "Insécurité: Les Habitants de Waloa Yungu Désertent Leurs Villages"; "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana," 18.

<sup>1125</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Des Mai-Mai FDC Tuent 2 Hommes à Masisi," *Le Potentiel*, November 13, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201211130494.html>.

<sup>1126</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 47; "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 37; Richard Lee, "Escalating Violence in Eastern Congo as Militias Take up Arms Again | Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA)," Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, January 26, 2012, <http://www.osisa.org/hrdb/drc/violence-escalating-eastern-congo>; Stephane Etinga, "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Près de Mille Déplacés En Situation Difficile à Ntoto," *Le Potentiel*, January 16, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201201160598.html>; "Walikale: Nouveaux Affrontements Entre La Milice «Guides» et Les FDLR à Ntoto"; Mulumba, "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Accrochages Entre FARDC et Mai-Mai Guides Font 10 Morts à Minova"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Près de Mille Déplacés sans Assistance Humanitaire à Ntoto," *Radio Okapi*, January 12, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201201120363.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Des Mai-Mai FDC Tuent 2 Hommes à Masisi"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Notables de Walikale et Masisi Interpellent Les Autorités de La RDC," *Radio Okapi*, January 6, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201201061255.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - La Société Civile Exige La Reprise Des Activités à l'Assemblée Provinciale," *Le Potentiel*, February 13, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201202130547.html>.

Although FDC does not claim its attacks, it seems to make no attempts to cover its tracks. Clandestine is coded as missing. The first article I found naming FDC for an attack was from Radio Okapi, ran on 2 JAN 2012.<sup>1127</sup>

According to a Rwandan government report, FDC receives support from FARDC, if perhaps in an unofficial capacity (details not given).<sup>1128</sup> This notion is plausible despite FDC engagements with FARDC, given that FDC members used to work for FARDC and that FARDC has a history of arming groups which other FARDC elements may be fighting. Both the Rwandan government report and a UN report suggest that former CNDP elements provide financial support, weapons, ammunition, training, protection, and additional fighters/advisers to FDC.<sup>1129</sup> The UN report indicates that FDC received support directly from the Rwandan military for a 2012 operation targeting FDLR General Sylvestre Mudacumura, including the loaning of four Rwandan commando officers; local sources and the FDLR confirmed FDC's direct involvement in this attack.<sup>1130</sup> Obviously, this support is excluded from the Rwandan report; however, Rwanda would have motive to use FDC as a proxy to target FDLR. The Rwandan support is not enough to meet our threshold for initial resources. It is unclear whether CNDP support or potential FARDC support reaches our thresholds. As such, I have coded missing for other under initial resources.

Several sources report that FDC is claiming to protect ethnic Hunde.<sup>1131</sup> All goal variables are coded as zero, since the main goal seems to be driving FDLR out of the area.

As far as I am aware, this group was inactive by NOV 2014. I have coded viable and viable\_civ as 0.

I code 1 for protest (SCAD events 4900421 and 4900424) and riot (SCAD event 4900425).

SCAD includes two instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 election-related contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of North Kivu, contestation variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### \*Union des patriotes congolais pour la paix (UPCP)

AKAs: Union of Congolese Patriots for Peace, possibly Forces populaires congolaise (see below for variants)

This group was difficult to pin down. Some sources list the name of the group as UPCP/FPC, while others list UPCP and FPC separately.<sup>1132</sup> One source refers to FPC as the armed wing of UPCP.<sup>1133</sup> In addition, some identify UPCP as though it were a subset or faction within PARECO.<sup>1134</sup> The most coherent narrative I

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<sup>1127</sup> "Insécurité: Les Habitants de Waloo Yungu Désertent Leurs Villages."

<sup>1128</sup> "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana," 18.

<sup>1129</sup> "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana," 18; "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 48; "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 37.

<sup>1130</sup> "Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 37.

<sup>1131</sup> "FARDC Hunting down APCLS in Masisi, and What about FDLR?," *Suluhu* (blog), March 4, 2014, <https://suluhu.org/2014/03/04/fardc-hunting-down-apcls-in-masisi-and-what-about-fdlr/>; "Update on the Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Operating in the DRC: The FDLR and RUD-Urunana," 17.

<sup>1132</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (United Nations Security Council, March 5, 2014), para. 63, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2014\\_157.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_157.pdf).

<sup>1133</sup> Anneke Verbraeken, "Congo-Kinshasa: Rebel Soldiers Gain Men and Might," *Radio Netherlands Worldwide*, June 27, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201206270850.html>.

<sup>1134</sup> "RDC: Des Rebelles FDLR et Maï-Maï Pareco Sévissent Au Sud de Lubero," Radio Okapi, March 10, 2016, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2016/03/10/actualite/societe/rdc-des-rebelles-fdlr-et-mai-mai-pareco-sevissent-au-sud-de-lubero/>; "Rwanda-DRC: M23 to Dissolve into UPCP to Topple Kabila — Rwandainfo\_ENG," *Rwandainfo\_ENG* (blog), accessed June 28, 2017, <http://rwandainfo.com/eng/rwanda-drc-m23-to-dissolve-into-upcp-to-topple-kabila/>.

found, which largely explains these discrepancies and unifies various accounts, is that UPCP formed as a coalition of two groups: (1) FPC, also known as Mai Mai Lafontaine, which was a splinter faction of PARECO, and (2) FARDC deserters led by Kahasha.<sup>1135</sup> This raises several questions regarding the inclusion of this group: (1) How coordinated were these two groups in reality? I question whether it was really a unified command and control, given that sometimes Lafontaine was listed as commander and sometimes Kahasha. IRIN describes UPCP as “loose” coalition.<sup>1136</sup> (2) What was the balance of representation within the coalition, i.e. did the majority of UPCP previously belong to FPC/Mai Mai Lafontaine? My best guess given available information is that more than half of UPCP came from FPC/Mai Mai Lafontaine. A UN report suggests that Kahasha defected with only thirty men, while IRIN lists the overall strength of UPCP at five to six hundred.<sup>1137</sup> Excluded based on merge criteria and insufficient information.

#### Forces populaires congolaise (FPC)

AKAs: PARECO-Lafontaine, Mai Mai Lafontaine, UPCP (see above)

Although the timing is a matter of debate, sources seem to agree that FPC is a rechristened PARECO splinter group led by Sikuli (Sikula) Lafontaine.<sup>1138</sup>

#### \*Conseil supérieur de la paix (CONSUP)

AKAs: Superior Council of Peace, Superior Peace Council

The only references I found to this group were in United Nations reports and articles listing amnesty grantees from 2014. S/2012/348 says the group was an attempt to reactivate former Mudundu 40 and Shi officers to spur a popular uprising, led by former FARDC Col. Bitho. Bitho had been in contact with Lt. Col. Kazarama of M23. Seventeen members of CONSUP and Bitho himself were arrested in FEB and APR 2012 respectively.<sup>1139</sup> This account dovetails with later articles identifying amnesty candidates, in which Bitho is presented as the leader of CONSUP.<sup>1140</sup> In the Addendum to S/2012/349, CONSUP is presented as a wider movement and Bitho is not mentioned. CONSUP involved former FRF and former CNDP

<sup>1135</sup> Steven Van Damme, *Commodities of War: Communities Speak out on the True Cost of Conflict in Eastern DRC* (Oxfam, 2012), 23; “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013; “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 126–127; Hellyer, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bordering On the Dangerous - the Invisible Frontline in North Kivu”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Les Groupes Armés Scellent Des Nouvelles Alliances Entre Eux,” allAfrica.fr, May 7, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205071673.html>.

<sup>1136</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013.

<sup>1137</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 126; “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013.

<sup>1138</sup> “Congo Siasa: Developments in North Kivu,” Congo Research Group, October 20, 2009, <http://congoresearchgroup.org/developments-in-north-kivu/>; Thomas Elbert, Maggie Schauer, et al., “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 2013), <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwim0b-cu-jUAhVCRCYKHffDCScQFgg2MAM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdocuments.worldbank.org%2Fcurated%2Fen%2F795261468258873034%2Ftext%2F860550WP0Box380LOGiCA0SGBV0DRC0Kivu.txt&usq=AFQjCNGon4WGkFNcy4boPodMLZB68gfXoA>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 266; Richards, “Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control,” 4–5.

<sup>1139</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 128.

<sup>1140</sup> Angelo Mobateli, “Congo-Kinshasa: 191 Ex-Rebelles Du M23 Parmi Les 272 Nouveaux Amnistiés,” *Le Potentiel*, September 3, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201409031679.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Mende L’a Confirmé - Amnistie 2ème Vague, Les 100 Personnes Libérées Sont Là !,” *La Prospérité*, May 2, 2014, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201405021560.html>.



attempting to spark rebellion through anticipated violent evolution of popular protest. CONSUP members were “detained before it could take action.”<sup>1141</sup> Either way, it seems the group never got underway. I could find evidence of neither concrete planning for individual attacks nor of violence committed. Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

#### **Mouvement d’action pour le changement (MAC)**

AKAs: Guides-MAC, Guides-Mouvement acquis au Changement, Guides-Mouvement d’action pour le changement, Action Movement for Change

Several sources indicate this is a splinter form FDC-Guides.<sup>1142</sup> This dovetails with other descriptions of MAC as ethnic Hunde former porters who fell out with Ntaganda.<sup>1143</sup> Excluded – splinter group.

#### **Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense (MPA)**

AKAs: Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense-Nyatura, Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense/Nyatura, MPA-Nyatura, MPA/Nyatura, Self-Defense Movement, Popular Movement for Self-Defense

Excluded – insufficient information

#### **Mai Mai Morgan**

AKAs: Mai Mai Lumumba, Mai Mai Morgan, Mai Mai Simba, Morgan Ekasambaza (ACLED)

For this group, I gave careful consideration as to whether it is merely a criminal gang or meets our requirement for a rebel group (controls territory, violence against the state in order to challenge its authority, political goals). Many Mai Mai Morgan attacks appear to be focused primarily on profit-seeking with incidental violence against the state when it inhibits these activities. However, I have chosen to include this group for four reasons: (1) Hunting/poaching and control of natural resources within the Réserve de Faune à Okapi (Okapi Wildlife Reserve, RFO) is an important local political issue, making profit-seeking behaviors within the reserve an inherently political act. Locals are not consulted in reserve management. They resent restrictions prohibiting hunting and mining within the reserve, which limit their economic activity. In addition, they believe the reserve generates financial resources that are not shared with the deeply impoverished local populations. For this reason, Mai Mai Morgan enjoys some popular support in the RFO area.<sup>1144</sup> (2) Mai Mai Morgan has deliberately targeted and killed park rangers and protected wildlife, outside the course of their profit-seeking operations. In particular, on 24-25 JUN 2012, Mai Mai Morgan attacked RFO’s Epulu headquarters. During this attack, they looted and burned RFO facilities, killed park rangers and their families, and slaughtered fourteen okapis in a protected zoo at the rangers’

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<sup>1141</sup> “Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 44–45.

<sup>1142</sup> “FARDC Hunting down APCLS in Masisi, and What about FDLR?”; “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2293 (2016)” (United Nations Security Council, December 28, 2016), 67, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1102](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1102).

<sup>1143</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013; Rugeje and Maeresera, “The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronized Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?,” 71.

<sup>1144</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC,” IRIN, January 23, 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/97314/rainforest-riches-curse-civilians-northeast-drc>; Pete Jones, “Gold and Poaching Bring Murder and Misery to Congolese Wildlife Reserve,” *The Guardian*, March 31, 2013, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/31/gold-poaching-murder-congo-wildlife>; Dan Fahey, “Guest Blog: The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi Killers or Self-Defense Forces?,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), September 6, 2012, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/09/guest-blog-mai-mai-lumumba.html>; Joost van Puijenbroek and Peer Schouten, “LE 6EME CHANTIER ? L’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE DE L’EXPLOITATION AURIFÈRE ARTISANALE ET LE SOUS-DÉVELOPPEMENT EN ITURI,” *L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs* 2012–2013 (June 2013): 238.

station, evidently for sport.<sup>1145</sup> Witnessed to the attack said its goal was to kill all the park rangers at the station. The park rangers were targeted because of the local policy issues discussed above.<sup>1146</sup> (3)

Although Mai Mai Morgan frequently targets civilians rather than obviously political targets, a UN report suggests that “armed groups systematically target civilians to control areas rich in natural resources,” citing Mai Mai Morgan as an example.<sup>1147</sup> In other words, the attacks of civilians are part of a deliberate attempt to control territory. (4) Mai Mai Morgan aimed to control territory, apparently controlling up to 90% of the RFO in 2012.<sup>1148</sup>

Mai Mai Morgan reportedly merged with a Mai Mai Simba commanded by Kasambaza to create a group called Mai Mai Lumumba in late FEB/early MAR 2012.<sup>1149</sup> However, I found no record of violence or planned violence by either group prior to the merge.<sup>1150</sup> As such, the “merged” group would be the first to meet our inclusion criteria. Eventually, relations between Morgan’s men and Kasambaza’s men soured and the group splintered, with Kasambaza’s men arresting Morgan and offering him to state authorities for \$10,000. However, I consider Kasambaza’s group a splinter and exclude it; moreover, I could find no evidence that Mai Mai Simba ever planned or conducted violence independently of Mai Mai Lumumba.<sup>1151</sup> As such, this entry is meant to cover the merged group (alternatively referred to as Mai Mai Morgan, Mai Mai Simba, or Mai Mai Lumumba) and the subsequent activities of Mai Mai Morgan without Kasambaza’s group. In addition, Morgan’s group appears to have further splintered into three groups (led by Mangaribi, Manu, and Maitre Jesus) following his death.<sup>1152</sup> These groups are likewise not included independently.

The founding date of the group is recorded as MAR 2012. This is when the constituent parts of the original Mai Mai Lumumba/Mai Mai Morgan came together, and is also reported as when FARDC first began engaging Morgan and his men.<sup>1153</sup> (This article seems to indicate that FARDC initiated these attacks, hence this is not coded as first attack.) The group was first named on 16 MAY 2012, following a series of attacks on Molende and two nearby villages, in which Mai Mai Morgan engaged FARDC and raped some seventy women. Twenty-six civilians died in these attacks, although it is not clear whether they were deliberately

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<sup>1145</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC”; Fahey, “Guest Blog: The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi Killers or Self-Defense Forces?”; “Ituri : Des Combattants Maï-Maï Contrôlent La Réserve de Faune à Okapi,” Radio Okapi, June 24, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/06/24/ituri-des-combattants-mai-mai-controntent-la-reserve-de-faune-okapi>; Jones, “Gold and Poaching Bring Murder and Misery to Congolese Wildlife Reserve.”

<sup>1146</sup> Jones, “Gold and Poaching Bring Murder and Misery to Congolese Wildlife Reserve.”

<sup>1147</sup> “Sexual Violence in Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General” (United Nations, March 14, 2013), para. 39, [https://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1366188714\\_n1325944-unga.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1366188714_n1325944-unga.pdf).

<sup>1148</sup> “Ituri: Le Gouvernement Contrôle plus de 60% de La Réserve de Faune à Okapi,” Radio Okapi, May 5, 2016, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2016/05/05/actualite/environnement/ituri-le-gouvernement-contrrole-plus-de-60-de-la-reserve-de-faune>.

<sup>1149</sup> Fahey, “Guest Blog: The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi Killers or Self-Defense Forces?”; “Sexual Violence in Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,” 9. This is sometimes referred to as an alliance rather than merged group, but the word choice would not affect our coding.

<sup>1150</sup> First article on violent activities of Morgan appears in JUN 2012. “Congo-Kinshasa: Province Orientale - L’ADG de l’ICCN Déploire l’attaque Des Miliciens Contre La Réserve à Okapis,” *Radio Okapi*, June 28, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201206281273.html> Likewise, Kasambaza’s group is only mentioned independently following the splintering (see below).

<sup>1151</sup> First and only article on Kasambaza appears following the splinter (on arrest of Morgan, AUG 2012). “Congo-Kinshasa: Le Chef Rebelle Morgan Aurait Été Capturé Par Des Maï-Maï Simba,” *Radio Okapi*, August 4, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208040422.html>.

<sup>1152</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2136 (2014)” (United Nations Security Council, January 12, 2015), para. 116, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/19](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/19).

<sup>1153</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC.”

targeted.<sup>1154</sup> Civilians were, however, clearly targeted in the attack on Epulu on 24 JUN 2012.<sup>1155</sup> As such, civilian attack date and civ\_attack\_time1 are coded as missing (first attack may have been in MAY or 24 JUN), and civ\_attack\_time2 is coded as one. I code 9 MAY 2012 as first small attack date with certainty 2, to reflect the timeline suggested in the 16 MAY article.

None of the subsequent attacks I found had death tolls exceeding twenty-five.<sup>1156</sup> There was once incident in which sixty people died in a landslide at a mine the group operated, but I did not count this, as it was not deliberate.<sup>1157</sup> Another article reports a death toll of twenty-six, but spread over a week in MAY 2012 in three different villages.<sup>1158</sup> As such, each individual attack likely did not meet our threshold. Finally, in a 6 JAN 2013 attack on Mambasa, forty-five Mai Mai died but only nine FARDC and six civilians.<sup>1159</sup> As such, the Mai Mai Morgan-inflicted death toll was only fifteen.

There was no evidence that the group was clandestine or not; clandestine is coded as missing.

Mai Mai Morgan operates primarily in the RFO area and Mambasa and Bafwasende territories in Orientale province.<sup>1160</sup> As such, “rural” is coded as 1 and “planning\_inside” is coded as 1.

Mai Mai Morgan garnered funding from several sources within the first year. According to UN reports, the group collects gold twice a week at mines in Pangoy (Pangoi) and Elota and sells “access rights” to individual pits.<sup>1161</sup> According to one source, Morgan controlled the mine at Pangoy as early as AUG 2012.<sup>1162</sup> Following a joint attack on Mambasa town with Mai Mai Hilaire Kombi, Morgan and Kombi over \$300,000 tons of gold in DEC 2012 – likely looted from Mambasa, as businessmen reported a \$5 million loss from the attack.<sup>1163</sup> In addition, Morgan was a known elephant poacher prior to forming an armed group, arrested for his poaching activities in 2005 and 2010.<sup>1164</sup> He and Kombi also sold 1.5k tons of ivory.<sup>1165</sup> FARDC and Hilaire Kombi been known to supply Morgan with weapons in exchange for ivory. As early as JUN 2012, they were equipped with about 85 AK-47s, two MAGs, a rocket-propelled grenade, a mortar, a satellite phone, and two backpack radios – likely obtained from FARDC or Mai Mai

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<sup>1154</sup> “Ituri : Les Hommes de Morgan Violent 70 Femmes En Huit Jours,” Radio Okapi, May 16, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/05/16/ituri-les-hommes-de-morgan-violent-70-femmes-en-huit-jours>.

<sup>1155</sup> Jones, “Gold and Poaching Bring Murder and Misery to Congolese Wildlife Reserve”; “Elephant Poacher Morgan Captured in D R Congo,” *Wildlife News* (blog), August 4, 2012, <http://wildlifeneews.co.uk/news/animal-news/elephant-poacher-morgan-captured-in-d-r-congo/>.

<sup>1156</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC”; “RDC : Les Hommes Du Chef Milicien Morgan Prélèvent Un Péage de 250 Dollars Dans La Réserve d’Epulu,” Radio Okapi, June 25, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/06/25/reserve-okapi-depulu-les-hommes-du-chef-milicien-morgan-prelevent-peage-de-250-dollars>; “Province Orientale : Des Hommes Du Chef Milicien Morgan Tuent 9 Militaires à Pangoy,” Radio Okapi, July 15, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/07/15/province-orientale-des-hommes-du-chef-milicien-morgan-tuent-9-militaires-pangoy>; “Ituri : Des Combats Entre Militaires et Miliciens Font 8 Morts à Badengaido,” Radio Okapi, February 20, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/02/20/ituri-des-combats-entre-militaires-miliciens-font-8-morts-badengaido>; “Un Groupe de Rebelles et de Miliciens de Morgan Occupent Mambasa”; “Ituri : Les Hommes de Morgan Violent 70 Femmes En Huit Jours,” 70; “Province Orientale: 10 Miliciens Simba de Morgan Arrêtés Par Les FARDC à Nia Nia,” Radio Okapi, February 24, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/en-bref/2013/02/24/province-orientale-10-miliciens-simba-de-morgan-arretes-par-les-fardc-nia-nia>.

<sup>1157</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC.”

<sup>1158</sup> “Ituri : Les Hommes de Morgan Violent 70 Femmes En Huit Jours.”

<sup>1159</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 73.

<sup>1160</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC”; “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 72.

<sup>1161</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 132.

<sup>1162</sup> “Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC.”

<sup>1163</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 8.

<sup>1164</sup> Fahey, “Guest Blog: The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi Killers or Self-Defense Forces?”

<sup>1165</sup> de Koning and Enough Team, “Striking Gold,” 8.

Hilaire.<sup>1166</sup> Hilaire also sends men to fight alongside Morgan and collaborates on attacks.<sup>1167</sup> As such, one is coded for oil\_diamonds and missing for other (unclear if FARDC or Mai Mai Hilaire individually meet our criteria) under initial resources.

According to one local source, Morgan is a former Mai Mai, although in what capacity is not clear.<sup>1168</sup> As such, former\_rebel and current\_security are coded as missing (Mai Mai could be either). Other major leaders in Mai Mai Morgan were JP (alias Docteur) and Manu, although not much is known of their personal histories.<sup>1169</sup> Mai Mai Morgan is often described as a gang of poachers.<sup>1170</sup> Likely some members were associated with Morgan before he started the armed group, although it's not clear how many. In addition, sources report some FARDC defectors in the group.<sup>1171</sup> It seems likely that it has some organizational history through poaching associations or FARDC, but since the balance of membership is not well-known, military, other, and no\_prior\_org are coded as missing rather than 0 or 1. The group is ethnically diverse, with representation from the Nande, Ndaka, Bakurmu, and Bapiri ethnic groups.<sup>1172</sup>

On 14 APR 2014, Morgan died following a failed attempt by FARDC to secure his surrender.<sup>1173</sup> Members of the group continued to operate following his death, although it seems they operate in several smaller groups. Attacks appear under the name Mai Mai Simba, and are sufficient to meet our criteria for viable (at least four attacks on FARDC and/or park wardens from JUN 2015 to APR 2016).<sup>1174</sup>

Under contestation, I coded 1 for protest (SCAD events 4900421 and 4900424) and riots (4900428 and 4900433). SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of Ituri, contestation variables are coded as 0. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but was not local either. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

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<sup>1166</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," 129–30; "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," 70.

<sup>1167</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 70.

<sup>1168</sup> "Ituri : Les Hommes de Morgan Violent 70 Femmes En Huit Jours."

<sup>1169</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 76.

<sup>1170</sup> "Rainforest Riches a Curse for Civilians in Northeast DRC"; Fahey, "Guest Blog: The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi Killers or Self-Defense Forces?"; "Sexual Violence in Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General," 9.

<sup>1171</sup> Fahey, "Guest Blog: The Mai-Mai Lumumba: Okapi Killers or Self-Defense Forces?"; Timo Mueller, "Questions Remain in The Death of Rebel Leader Morgan," *The Enough Project* (blog), April 23, 2014, <https://enoughproject.org/blog/questions-remain-in-death-congo-rebel-leader>; "Sexual Violence in Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General," 9.

<sup>1172</sup> Mueller, "Questions Remain in The Death of Rebel Leader Morgan."

<sup>1173</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2136 (2014)" (United Nations Security Council, June 25, 2014), para. 69, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/428](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/428); Mueller, "Questions Remain in The Death of Rebel Leader Morgan."

<sup>1174</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," para. 128; "Congo's Forgotten War: The Militia of Mambasa," IRIN, January 8, 2016, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/102342/congo%E2%80%99s-forgotten-war-militia-mambasa>; "Ituri: 12 Morts Dans Les Combats Entre FARDC et Maï-Maï Simba," Radio Okapi, April 19, 2016, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2016/04/19/actualite/securite/ituri-12-morts-dans-les-combats-entre-fardc-et-mai-mai-simba>; "Ituri: Les Maï-Maï Simba Abattent Deux FARDC à Penge," Radio Okapi, March 5, 2016, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2016/03/05/actualite/securite/ituri-les-mai-mai-simba-abattent-deux-fardc-penge>; "Ituri: Un Garde-Parc Tué Par Des Miliciens à Mambasa," Radio Okapi, November 14, 2015, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2015/11/14/actualite/securite/ituri-un-garde-parc-tue-par-des-miliciens-mambasa>; "Ituri: Une Position Des FARDC Attaquée Par Des Présumés Maï-Maï Simba à Talisa Lokele," Radio Okapi, June 4, 2015, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2015/06/04/ituri-une-position-des-fardc-attaquee-par-des-presumes-mai-mai-simba-talisa-lokele>.

This group is included in GTD under Mai Mai Simba Militia.

#### \*Mai Mai Luc

AKAs: Mai Mai Luc Yabili

There's not a lot of information on this group's formation – most articles date from 2009 or later, when the group was active in 2007 and 2008 and perhaps as early as 2003 or before. Just appears – no explanation of where it came from. Excluded – insufficient information.

#### Mai Mai Shetani

AKAs: Front Populaire pour la Démocratie (FPD); revival known as Alliance des forces armées de résistants patriotes, Mai Mai (Mai Mai Charles)

The leader of Mai Mai Shetani is Kakule Muhima, alias Shetani or Shetani Muhima. Shetani reappears as a warlord intermittently throughout the Congo wars and subsequent fighting. His first notable appearance was in connection to a massacre of 500 Hutu civilians in Makobola and Kambimba at the tail end of 1998; a Catholic missionary news service claimed that Shetani was a Rwandan-born officer who ordered the massacre.<sup>1175</sup> In his blog Congo Siasa, Jason Stearns suggests that the Lt. Col Shetani prominent in 2010 was apparently involved in the 1998 Kasika massacre; he indicates that Shetani is Munyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi).<sup>1176</sup> There are two discrepancies in these accounts: first, the Kasika massacre occurred earlier in 1998 and was a separate event from the Makobola massacre; second, Rwandan-born and Munyamulenge are not the same. Regarding the former, it may have been merely a mistake; regarding the second, Kinyarwanda speakers are often assumed to be Rwandan even if they are Banyamulenge. As such, I think these two sets of accounts provide fairly strong evidence of Shetani's personal history. Shetani appears again in 2008 leading PRM, Parti Résistant Mai Mai; the article indicates that he was well-known in the area.<sup>1177</sup> The UN report indicates that Colonel Shetani recruited child soldiers for PRM in 2009.<sup>1178</sup> PRM seems to have existed concurrently with FPD, however.<sup>1179</sup>

Shetani announced the birth of FPD in SEPT 2012.<sup>1180</sup> However, several sources indicate that FPD was active earlier than SEPT: one source indicates that it had been operational since 2011, an 11 OCT 2012 article states that FPD had controlled Ishsha “for some months now,” and a Congolese radio report picked up by

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<sup>1175</sup> IAN FISHER, “500 Are Massacred in Congo, Missionaries Report,” *New York Times*, January 6, 1999, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3327c4fa-26bf-43e8-a0dc-cc341a1a33d1/?context=1516831>; “500 Civilians Massacred by Rebels in DR Congo: Report,” *Agence France Presse -- English*, January 5, 1999, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3f0aa04c-d8d1-4fb5-af42-2ab97dd92814/?context=1516831>; Karl Vick, “Cause of Congo Killings Is Shrouded in Mystery,” *Washington Post*, January 8, 1999, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/9eadb923-5e36-4241-98e4-5c28cf22fb8d/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1176</sup> Jason Stearns, “The Pitfalls of Supporting the Congolese Army,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), October 27, 2010, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/10/pitfalls-of-supporting-congolese-army.html>.

<sup>1177</sup> “Nyamilima : La Présence Des Mai Mai Sème La Panique,” Radio Okapi, December 10, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/12/10/nyamilima-la-presence-des-mai-mai-seme-la-panique>.

<sup>1178</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008)” (United Nations Security Council, November 23, 2009), para. 331, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/603](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/603).

<sup>1179</sup> See for instance “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - 66 Miliciens Se Rendent à La Monusco,” *Le Potentiel*, February 22, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302221085.html>; “Democratic Republic of Hte Congo: 2014 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor” (Washington: United States Department of Labor, 2014), [https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/congo\\_democratic\\_republic.htm?viewType=Print&viewClass=Print#content](https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/congo_democratic_republic.htm?viewType=Print&viewClass=Print#content).

<sup>1180</sup> “Rutshuru : Naissance d'un Groupe Armé Qui Dit Combattre Le M23,” Radio Okapi, September 18, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/09/18/131897>.

BBC indicates that that Shetani's insurgency began in APR 2012.<sup>1181</sup> FPD initially cooperated with FARDC to fight FDLR, but later also fought with FDLR. Several sources indicate that the FPD was primarily ethnic Nande.<sup>1182</sup> A majority of the leadership of FPD's successor group, Mai Mai Charles, is ethnic Nande (four out of five named in the UN Panel of Experts report).<sup>1183</sup>

Excluded – incomplete information to assess whether this was truly a new, independent group.

**\*Mai Mai Michigan** – Excluded – insufficient information.

#### **Mai Mai Simba**

AKAs: Armée populaire de libération nationale congolaise-Lumumba

There were minor discrepancies on reporting of this group. Most sources date it back to the 1960s, describing it as one of the oldest armed groups in eastern Congo.<sup>1184</sup> A UN Report in 2008 said that the group was a signatory to the *Actes d'engagement* but had only minimal presence (but did seem to be operational). Alternatively, it may refer to Mai Mai Morgan. I think owing to the historical origins of the group, there may be copycat groups that use the same name. Excluded – original group predates period of interest.

**Forces nationales de libération (FNL)** – see Burundi

**Front national pour la révolution au Burundi (FRONABU)** – see Burundi

**Front du peuple murundi (FPM)** – see Burundi

**\*Mai Mai Mazembe** – I found this group because it was mentioned in a recent UN report.<sup>1185</sup> However, it started after 2015, and so is not contained in ACLED. Although initial investigations suggested this group may possibly meet our criteria, we have not coded it owing to resource/time limitations.

#### **Mai Mai Nyatura**

AKAs: Nyatura, Mayi Mayi Militia (Nyatura)

Our coding requires that we code each Nyatura faction independently since Nyatura operate as independent factions.<sup>1186</sup> Given that they must be coded separately, we have insufficient information to code individual groups.

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<sup>1181</sup> Berghezan, "Groupes Armés Actifs En République Démocratique Du Congo : Situation Dans Le «Grand Kivu» Au 2ème Semestre 2013," 19; Mélanie Gouby, "Congo-Kinshasa: Meet the Mai Mai - M23's New Enemy," *Radio Netherlands Worldwide*, October 12, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201210120290.html>; "Civil Society Groups Say Rebels Take Control of Areas in Northeastern DR Congo," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, October 7, 2012, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/96b6945e-20f1-4e33-9626-a09f1dbf9a50/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1182</sup> Berghezan, "Groupes Armés Actifs En République Démocratique Du Congo : Situation Dans Le «Grand Kivu» Au 2ème Semestre 2013," 19; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Le Chef Milicien Shetani Arrêté à Kiwanja," *Radio Okapi*, December 26, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201312260492.html>.

<sup>1183</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015)," paras. 81–89, Annex 34.

<sup>1184</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; Richards, "Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control," 4; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)," paras. 246–247; "Our School Became the Battlefield": Using Schools for Child Recruitment and Military Purposed in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," ii–iii.

<sup>1185</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2293 (2016)," para. 47.

<sup>1186</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2293 (2016)," paras. 44–47, Annex 21.



### \*Patriotes Résistants du Congo-Fort (PARECO-Fort)

AKAs: Nyatura. Also see PARECO (below) for name variations of PARECO

This group shows up quite infrequently. The two accounts of its origin that I found suggest that it broke off PARECO.<sup>1187</sup> An expert on DRC we consulted believed that the leadership came from PARECO, but it's difficult to discern membership; sounds like it could be mostly local. Excluded – splinter group. Could benefit from additional research.

### Forces des Défense des Intérêts du Peuple Congolais (FDIPC)

AKAs: Forces for the Defense of the Interests of Congolese People

According to IRIN, this group formed in APR 2013 with the goal of expelling M23 from Rutshuru territory.<sup>1188</sup>

However, both UN and HRW reports suggest that the group formed earlier, at some point in 2012, and allied with FARDC to fight M23.<sup>1189</sup> I have listed 2012 as the founding date. I think IRIN may cite APR 2013 as a founding date because the earliest FDIPC references I found were from APR 2013:

- In an article from 23 APR, its spokesperson commented on an attack in Rutshuru center (it was unclear who carried out this attack).<sup>1190</sup> I have coded this as the name date. As such, I have coded 0 for name\_time (APR 2013 is not within three months of 2012) and 1 for name\_time2 (since balance of probability says it likely formed after APR in 2012). Clandestine is coded as missing due to lack of information.
- On 25 APR, an article reported that FDIPC, a “new armed group,” had fought M23 at Rubare.<sup>1191</sup> It's unclear which group initiated the attack, but I have coded it as the first small attack. Otherwise, the first small attack would be on 19 JUL, when they attacked M23 at three locations, dislodging them from Kiyandoni ad Nkwenda.<sup>1192</sup>

I found mention of only one subsequent attack on 8 AUG, but it did not qualify as a large attack.<sup>1193</sup> I also found no reports of civilian attacks, despite HRW reporting on FDIPC-linked kidnappings.<sup>1194</sup> As such, I have coded both large attack and civilian attack as never occurred. Since all subsequent attacks and activities reported were in Rutshuru, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.

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<sup>1187</sup> Stearns, “PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen, and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu,” 42; Christoph Vogel, “Towards a Genealogy of Armed Actors in Eastern Congo,” *Suluhi* (blog), November 19, 2014, <https://suluhi.org/2014/11/19/towards-a-genealogy-of-armed-actors-in-eastern-congo/>.

<sup>1188</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013.

<sup>1189</sup> “DR Congo: Kidnappings Skyrocket in East,” Human Rights Watch, December 16, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/dr-congo-kidnappings-skyrocket-east>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119.

<sup>1190</sup> “Nord-Kivu: 6 Personnes Tuées à Rutshuru Par Des Hommes Armés,” Radio Okapi, April 23, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/04/23/nord-kivu-6-personnes-tuees-rutshuru-par-des-hommes-armes>; Matshi, “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Une Attaque Des Miliciens Nyatura Fait 6 Morts à Rutshuru,” *Le Potentiel*, April 24, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201304240488.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - 6 Personnes Tuées à Rutshuru Par Des Hommes Armés,” *Radio Okapi*, April 23, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201304240758.html>.

<sup>1191</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Le M23 Poursuit Les Recrutements Forcés Des Civils,” *Le Potentiel*, April 25, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201304250446.html>.

<sup>1192</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Le M23 Serait Délogé de Kinyandoni et Nkwenda,” *Radio Okapi*, July 19, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201307191443.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Le M23 Serait Délogé de Kinyandoni et Nkwenda,” *Le Potentiel*, July 20, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201307200278.html>.

<sup>1193</sup> “Confrontation Entre Le M23 et Les FDIPC,” *Congo Flash* (blog), August 8, 2013, <http://www.congoflash.com/confrontation-entre-le-m23-et-les-fdipc/>; *Le 08 Août: Affrontement Entre M23 et Fdipc Au Nord Kivu*, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAG78PKaCZg>.

<sup>1194</sup> “DR Congo: Kidnappings Skyrocket in East”; On kidnappings, see also “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Des Enseignants de Rutshuru Refusent de Donner Cours Après Un Enlèvement,” *Radio Okapi*, May 7, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201305070153.html>.

The most commonly named leader associated with FDIPC is its spokesman Jackson Habarurenge, although no details are given on his personal history.<sup>1195</sup> FDIPC was founded and temporarily commanded by Emmanuel “Jean” Biriko, alias Manoti, an ethnic Hutu; I likewise found no information on his personal background. Evidently, Manoti soon thereafter left the group in order to focus on charcoal production and kidnapping activities near Virunga National Park.<sup>1196</sup> He was later arrested in 2015 for kidnapping, and he identified FARDC commanders and the FDIPC leader (evidently a new one) as affiliates in kidnapping.<sup>1197</sup> FDIPC was allied with FARDC to drive the M23 out of Rutshuru.<sup>1198</sup> However, I found no evidence that FARDC had supplied or provided material or personnel support to FDIPC. As such, I have coded none for initial resources.

The only leader of known ethnicity was Hutu (Manoti, see above).<sup>1199</sup> In addition, IRIN reports that the group is predominantly Hutu.<sup>1200</sup> Several other sources call FDIPC a Nyatura, where Nyatura are predominantly Hutu.<sup>1201</sup> I coded no \_prior\_org for organizational history, as I found no evidence of ties to previous organizations despite searching extensively. Moreover, the spokesman for the FDIPC indicated that it was made up of local youths, i.e. likely not former combatants.<sup>1202</sup>

UN reports indicate that several FDIPC members launched their own armed groups following Manoti’s arrest.<sup>1203</sup> However, I found no further evidence of FDIPC activity or activity of any splinter groups. Instead, I found several sources indicating that FDIPC fighters demobilized in mass in NOV 2013.<sup>1204</sup> As such, I have coded viability as 0.

Because the date of formation in 2012 is unknown, I look for qualifying contestation events during 2011. I code 1 for protest (SCAD events 4900421 and 4900424) and riot (SCAD events 4900425 and 4900426).

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of North Kivu, contestation variables are coded as 0. No Type 2 events, national or local, occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. The coder notes that the formation date is loose, only specified as 2012, and significant local contestation action did occur during 2012 (Event ID 4900436), but not in 2011.

#### Forces œcuménique pour la libération du Congo (FOLC)

AKAs: Force œcuménique pour la libération du Congo, Ecumenical Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (EFLC), Mai Mai Kava wa Selly (see aliases for Kava wa Selly below)

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<sup>1195</sup> “Nord-Kivu: 6 Personnes Tuées à Rutshuru Par Des Hommes Armés”; *Le 08 Août*; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Des Enseignants de Rutshuru Refusent de Donner Cours Après Un Enlèvement.”

<sup>1196</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119.

<sup>1197</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Un Notable et Un Officier FARDC Cités Dans Le Réseau de « Manoti »,” *Radio Okapi*, April 24, 2015, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201504241996.html>; “DR Congo: Kidnappings Skyrocket in East.”

<sup>1198</sup> “DR Congo: Kidnappings Skyrocket in East.”

<sup>1199</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119.

<sup>1200</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013.

<sup>1201</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119; “Finally Good News? What Militia Surrenders Mean for Eastern Congo,” *Suluhi* (blog), November 23, 2013, <https://suluhi.org/2013/11/23/finally-good-news-what-militia-surrenders-mean-for-eastern-congo/>; “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013.

<sup>1202</sup> “Nord-Kivu: 6 Personnes Tuées à Rutshuru Par Des Hommes Armés.”

<sup>1203</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119.

<sup>1204</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” 119; “Congo-Kinshasa: Des Centaines de Miliciens Dans l’attente d’une Éventuelle Intégration Au Sein de l’armée,” *Radio France Internationale*, November 27, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201311270484.html>.

Unfortunately, not much is known of the origins or initial activity of this group. Sources agree that the group's main leader was Kava wa Selly (Kava Seli, Kava wa Seli, Kava Waseli, Bana Sultani Selly, Kava wa Selly Bana).<sup>1205</sup> The group mostly appears in 2012 and 2013, but a reliable source referenced activity as early as 2010. Congo Research Group claims that Kava wa Selly's FOLC participated in a joint attack on Nyaleke military base on 24 to 25 APR 2010, along with several other armed groups. These groups are presented as evidence of a wave of ex-APC defections and remobilizations in the lead up to the 2011 Congolese national elections. During this time, notable ex-RCD-K/ML politicians defected from the ruling Kabila coalition to the political opposition, including Mbusa Nyamwisi. Nyamwisi was subsequently known for his role in orchestrating ex-APC re-militarization (see Mai Mai Hilaire). Kava wa Selly was a captain in APC, but it is unclear whether he had ever integrated into FARDC. Evidently, the goal of such defections was to create "a new rebellion" of RCD-K/ML.<sup>1206</sup>

FOLC was distant enough from APC's (RCD-K/ML's) integration to qualify as a separate group, but not so distant that it does not qualify for other rebel group as organizational history. RCD-K/ML was undergoing integration in 2004, after which point it no longer appears in ACLED.<sup>1207</sup> Although I do not have any statistics on membership, I have coded for other rebels under organizational history, as the context that Congo Research Group presents makes it highly plausible and even likely that FOLC consisted significantly of ex-APC. In addition, I have coded missing for both other and none under initial resources. Nyamwisi is known to have later supplied Mai Mai Hilaire with arms (see Mai Mai Hilaire/URDC), and it is conceivable that FOLC was likewise outfitted through ex-APC networks.

Because of the Congo Research group account, I coded 2010 as the start date, with no certainty. Name date is coded as missing: contemporary accounts of the 2010 Nyaleke attack indicate that FOLC was not identified as a perpetrator.<sup>1208</sup> Other than this, the earliest accounts of FOLC do not show up until 2012 (see below). However, none of these later accounts introduce it as a new group, implying that locals became aware of FOLC at some point in between 2010 and 2012. I coded 1 for clandestine because FOLC's role in the 2010 Nyaleke attack was revealed only seven years later in the Congo Research Group publication. I coded 24 APR 2010 as the first large attack. Although initial reports put the death toll at only five, Congo Research Group's retrospective report put the death toll at twenty-six.<sup>1209</sup> Women

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<sup>1205</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d'expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l'intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki"; Jack Maliro Katson, "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - 44 Éléments de 11 Groupes Armés Maï-Maï Admis Au Centre d'entraînement Militaire de Mangango," *Le Potentiel*, October 3, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310030013.html>; "Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation" (Congo Research Group, September 2017), 26, [http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/crg\\_mass\\_killings\\_beni\\_en\\_sep21-1.pdf](http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/crg_mass_killings_beni_en_sep21-1.pdf); "Nord-Kivu - Un Chef Rebelle Disposé à Quitter Le Maquis Avec Ses Hommes," *Le Potentiel*, March 20, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/09612fdb-af89-4035-b219-4bfdd873a70/?context=1516831>; "RDC : Le Général Autoproclamé Kava Waseli Se Rend Aux FARDC," *Agence Congolaise de Presse*, October 2, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/0cf0bb78-bd26-4fa0-8ee6-ac020e093375/?context=1516831>; Angelo Mobateli, "Le Nord-Kivu et Le Sud-Kivu Investis Par 25 Groupes Armés Congolais et Étrangers," *Le Potentiel*, September 4, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/792efa31-a9fe-4570-9822-0fa1398f26a7/?context=1516831>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Un Chef Milicien s'est Rendu Aux FARDC," *Radio Okapi*, March 18, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201303180543.html>; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 65; "Congo-Kinshasa: Des Habitants de Pangoya et Midede Furent Exécutés de Deux Groupes Armés," *Radio Okapi*, October 19, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201210191111.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Le Chef de La Milice Folc Se Rend Aux FARDC Avec Une Cinquantaine d'hommes," *Radio Okapi*, October 2, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310021162.html>.

<sup>1206</sup> "Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation," 25–27.

<sup>1207</sup> "DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Program Update," 2.

<sup>1208</sup> "Beni: 5 Morts Dans Une Attaque Au Centre de Nyaleke," *Radio Okapi*, April 25, 2010, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/04/25/beni-5-morts-dans-une-attaque-au-centre-de-nyaleke>.

<sup>1209</sup> "Beni: 5 Morts Dans Une Attaque Au Centre de Nyaleke"; "Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation," 25.

and children were among the dead, but it is unclear whether they were intentionally targeted; as such, civilian attack is coded as missing. I have also coded small attack as missing.<sup>1210</sup>

The group next appears with reports of its alignment with M23 in June 2012.<sup>1211</sup> It was around this time that Hilaire Kombi affiliated with the group.<sup>1212</sup> Several sources, all secondary, indicate that Hilaire Kombi led a FOLC successor group called URDC, i.e. took over FOLC.<sup>1213</sup> However, FOLC continues to appear under Kava wa Selly's leadership, independent of URDC/Mai Mai Hilaire. For instance, Kava wa Selly announced intentions for FOLC to surrender and integrate in MAR 2013, then reneged and conducted several more attacks, before finally surrendering along with forty men for integration into FARDC on 1 OCT 2013. No mention is made of Hilaire Kombi during these accounts.<sup>1214</sup> (Hence, Mai Mai Hilaire is understood to be a separate group and not a successor, and is included and coded separately.) However, it is clear that FOLC and Mai Mai Hilaire shared ex-APC networks; both were in contact with and received support from Mbusa Nyamwisi.<sup>1215</sup>

Additional reference to specific attacks includes:

- FOLC attacked the border town of Kasindi on 3 AUG 2012.<sup>1216</sup>
- FOLC carried out a three-day long siege on Pangoya and Midede (Lubero territory) in OCT 2012 jointly with Mai Mai Morgan. These attacks apparently included sexual violence and torture against civilians, although reporting does not include a death toll nor specify that any civilians were killed.<sup>1217</sup>
- On 1 JUL 2013, a group attacked Beni central prison. Initial reports indicated that perpetrators killed and released 244 prisoners. On 5 JUL, the military arrested Mai Mai General Faustin Mandefu, the alleged

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<sup>1210</sup> "Beni: 5 Morts Dans Une Attaque Au Centre de Nyaleke."

<sup>1211</sup> "Nord-Kivu : La Société Civile Demande Aux FARDC de Mettre Fin à l'activisme Des Groupes Armés Coalisés," Radio Okapi, July 4, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/07/04/nord-kivu-la-societe-civile-demande-aux-fardc-de-mettre-fin-aux-activismes-des-groupes-armes-coalises>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Des Habitants de Pangoya et Midede Furent Les Exactions de Deux Groupes Armés"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d'expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l'intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki"; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 65.

<sup>1212</sup> "Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation," 29–30; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 65.

<sup>1213</sup> "Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation," 29–30; "Congo Conflict: The Evolving Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *Suluhu* (blog), November 6, 2013, <https://suluhu.org/congo/>; Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen, and Maria Eriksson Baaz, "The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern DRC: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity," Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 29, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/national-army-and-armed-groups-eastern-congo#.WSol-WjyvIU>.

<sup>1214</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Un Chef Milicien s'est Rendu Aux FARDC"; Angelo Mobateli, "Congo-Kinshasa: L'insécurité En RDC « dans Une Petite Poche » Qui Rapporte 500 Millions USD Aux Groupes Armés Chaque Année," *Le Potentiel*, October 14, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310140724.html>; Katson, "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - 44 Éléments de 11 Groupes Armés Mai-Mai Admis Au Centre d'entraînement Militaire de Mangango"; "Nord-Kivu - Un Chef Rebelle Disposé à Quitter Le Maquis Avec Ses Hommes"; "RDC : Le Général Autoproclamé Kava Waseli Se Rend Aux FARDC"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Le Chef de La Milice Folc Se Rend Aux FARDC Avec Une Cinquantaine d'hommes."

<sup>1215</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Tentatives d'expansion Du M23 Dans Les Territoires de Masisi et Walikale Par l'intermédiaire Des Raïa Mutomboki"; AFP, "Democratic Republic of Congo's Key Armed Groups," *The Daily Star*, July 17, 2013, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/International/2013/Jul-17/224076-democratic-republic-of-congos-key-armed-groups.ashx>; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 65; "Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation," 29–30.

<sup>1216</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 65.

<sup>1217</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Des Habitants de Pangoya et Midede Furent Les Exactions de Deux Groupes Armés."

mastermind behind the attack. Mandefu indicated that he was conducting joint operations with both Kava wa Selly and Hilaire Kombi, although it is unclear whether the comment was made in reference to this attack specifically or more general operations.<sup>1218</sup>

- On 1 OCT 2013, Kava wa Selly presented himself for integration into FARDC with forty men. The article describing the surrender indicates that, since MAR 2013, FOLC had organized “several attacks on prisons and FARDC positions in Beni and Lubero [trans],” although it gave no specifics.<sup>1219</sup>

Both the 2010 Nyaleke and the 2012-2013 attacks took place primarily in Beni (and in 2012-2013, sometimes in Lubero). Although Beni is a small city (around 200,000 inhabitants), evidence from the Congo Research Group suggests a rural operational base. Evidently, Kava wa Selly’s FOLC accepted supplies and land access from Mai Mai Mbonguma Kitobi in exchange for allowing Kitobi’s group expanded access to land in “the national park,” presumably land that FOLC controlled in Virguna National Park.<sup>1220</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.

There were no accounts on ethnicity of leaders or members within the first year of FOLC. Later accounts from 2012 state that Nyamwisi recruited ethnic Nande for FOLC.<sup>1221</sup>

Although the window is narrow, at least one of FOLC’s attacks occurred at least three years after its founding. Assuming the group formed at or just before APR 2010, the 1 JUL 2013 prison attack and the unspecified “several attacks on FARDC positions” between MAR and OCT 2013 likely cause it to qualify. As we have leaned toward inclusion as viable when in doubt, FOLC is coded as viable. I coded 0 for splinter in view of the information regarding URDC above.

Without knowledge of when in 2010 FOLC may have formed, I check all of 2009 for qualifying events for contestation. There are no qualifying events (SCAD type 4 events tagged during this period are actually MILIA-related fighting).

#### **\*Forces populaires pour le changement intégral en RDC (FPCI-RDC)**

AKAs: Popular Forces for Total Change in the DRC, People’s Force for Total Change in the DRC, Forces populaires nationalistes et combatteantes pour le changement intégral, Popular Nationalist Combattant Forces for Total Change, People’s Nationalist Combattant Forces for Total Change

This group appears only one time, in a speech delivered by Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadjé at a meeting to form a coalition of armed groups. He identifies himself as spokesperson and Albert Kahasha as leader of the group.<sup>1222</sup> I could find no further reference to the group. Excluded – no violence or planned violence.

#### **Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC)**

AKAs: Union of Revolutionary Forces of Congo, Forces populaires pour le changement intégral en RDC (FPCI-RDC), Popular Forces for Total Change in the DRC, People’s Force for Total Change in the DRC, Forces populaires nationalistes et combatteantes pour le changement intégral, Popular Nationalist Combattant Forces for Total Change, People’s Nationalist Combattant Forces for Total Change

This group is ostensibly a coalition of South Kivu-based armed groups established in January 2013. However, in the dozens of UFRC mentions in local media, not one actually names any specific armed groups

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<sup>1218</sup> “Nord-Kivu : L’armée Annonce l’arrestation Du Cerveau de l’attaque Contre La Prison de Beni,” Radio Okapi, July 5, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/07/05/nord-kivu-larmee-annonce-larrestation-du-cerveau-de-lattaque-contre-la-prison-de-beni>.

<sup>1219</sup> “RDC : Le Général Autoproclamé Kava Waseli Se Rend Aux FARDC.”

<sup>1220</sup> “Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation,” 26.

<sup>1221</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 65.

<sup>1222</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” 85–86.

belonging to the coalition, nor mentions violent action or tangible plans for violent action.<sup>1223</sup> Likewise, a copy of the declaration of UFRC's creation obtained by the UN Panel of Experts makes no mentions of individual groups within the coalition.<sup>1224</sup> The report's narrative of UFRC's formation sounds like a failed top-down attempt by M23 to establish an allied coalition in South Kivu. The group was created from Rwanda, and the Panel of Experts suspects that its diaspora fundraising amounted to not much more than propaganda.<sup>1225</sup> The self-proclaimed leader of UFRC, Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadi, crossed back into Congo on 9 FEB 2013 and was arrested by Congolese authorities on 10 FEB 2013, which seems to have ended the group.<sup>1226</sup> UFRC claimed responsibility for an attack on the 1002<sup>nd</sup> regiment of FARDC in Chishadu on 24 and 25 APR 2013, with UFRC commander Col. Albert Kahasha apparently engaging. However, other sources said that it was Raia Mutomboki who had died in the battle.<sup>1227</sup>

Col. Kahasha defected from FARDC with around thirty men on 24 JAN 2012, then created UCPD with General Lafontaine on 14 APR 2012.<sup>1228</sup> Another article establishes that he defected from FARDC with about thirty men, then eventually became associated with UFRC.<sup>1229</sup>

Bagayamukwe and Kahasha appear to have attempted to launch an armed group or coalition thereof several times before, which seems to have amounted to nothing in both cases: (1) *Dynamique populaire pour le*

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<sup>1223</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Le Renahoc Réclame Un Procès Contre Gustave Bagayamukwe," *Radio Okapi*, February 23, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302230536.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Des Précisions de Lambert Mende !," *La Prospérité*, February 13, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302130066.html>; Par Groupe De Presse Le Potentiel, "Congo-Kinshasa: Arrestation Du Chef de L'union Des Forces Révolutionnaires Du Congo," *Le Potentiel*, February 13, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302130018.html>; Mobateli, "Congo-Kinshasa: 191 Ex-Rebelles Du M23 Parmi Les 272 Nouveaux Amnistiés"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Gustave Bagayamukwe Sera Jugé « sans Complaisance », Promet Lambert Mende," *Radio Okapi*, February 12, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302120026.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Un Leader D'une Nouvelle Coalition Rebelle Arrêté À Uvira," *Radio Okapi*, February 11, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302110324.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Rebellions - La Série D'arrestations Continue !," *La Prospérité*, February 10, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302100304.html>; Angelo Mobateli, "Congo-Kinshasa: Kinshasa Présente Goma Comme « Une Ville Défendue Comme Il Se Doit En Cas D'attaque », " *Le Potentiel*, February 9, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302090405.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Groupes Armés Pullulent Toujours À L'est !," *La Prospérité*, February 7, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302071195.html>; Stanislas Ntambwe, "Congo-Kinshasa: La Situation Sécuritaire À l'Est et Au Katanga Demeure « Tendue, Imprévisible et Instable », " *Le Potentiel*, February 7, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302070279.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Après Le M23, Voici l'UFRC," *La Prospérité*, February 6, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302060364.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: 2012 - Année Noire En RDC," *Le Potentiel*, February 6, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302060079.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Etouffer L'action Dans L'oeuf," *Le Potentiel*, February 5, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302050885.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Après Le Nord-Kivu et l'Ituri, Le Virus de L'instabilité Atteint Le Nord-Katanga et Le Sud-Kivu," *Le Potentiel*, February 4, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302040469.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Miliciens Raia Mutomboki Étendent Leur Influence Sur Les Zones Minières - allAfrica.com," *Le Potentiel*, February 7, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201302071035.html>.

<sup>1224</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," 90–91.

<sup>1225</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," paras. 49–59.

<sup>1226</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 59; Potentiel, "Congo-Kinshasa: Arrestation Du Chef de l'union Des Forces Révolutionnaires Du Congo"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Un Leader d'une Nouvelle Coalition Rebelle Arrêté À Uvira"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Rebellions - La Série d'arrestations Continue !"

<sup>1227</sup> "Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 59.

<sup>1228</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," paras. 126–127.

<sup>1229</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Groupes Armés Pullulent Toujours À L'est !"



This group, as well as Bgayamukwe and Kahasha's previous attempts to established armed groups, are excluded for three reasons: (1) it seems highly plausible that the UFRC only existed on paper, and if it did not (2) it was theoretically a coalition of pre-existing armed groups, i.e. a merger by our criteria, or (3) it was actually just Kahasha and his 30 defectors, in which case it would qualify as a splinter of UCP, which predates UFRC and its predecessors. Excluded – likely disqualified as splinter or merger, no evidence of violence or planned violence.

This group is a coalition of Mai-Mai armed groups from several ethnic groups that formed in MAR 2007.<sup>1235</sup> This group is excluded due to insufficient information: it is likely that some constituent groups qualified for inclusion before formation of PARECO, but we have insufficient information to determine how many such groups qualify independently and hence whether the coalition qualifies per our codebook. Excluded – insufficient information.

#### Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS)

AKAs: Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo

This group is a splinter group of PARECO, the Bahunde (Hunde) wing that broke off under the leadership of General Janvier Buingo Karairi in 2008.<sup>1236</sup> Excluded – splinter group.

#### \*Combattants Hutu

AKAs: MAGRIVI, Hutu Combatants

This group formed in the early 1990s. Excluded – predates our period of interest.<sup>1237</sup>

#### \*Mongol

AKAs: Mai Mai Mongol?

Three groups appear under this name. The first was formed circa 1998 and consisted of Hutu discontents with the ADFL, led by Turinkinko and Mugabo. It referred to itself merely as Mongol or les Mongoles. This group probably contained combattants but I couldn't find reliable commentary either way. In fact, I could also find no information on specific attacks. This group is probably not codable owing to insufficient information. The second group appeared circa 2008 for the peace accord, led by Félicien Miganda. It collaborates with PARECO, which is also Hutu, so it could be a continuation or revival of the original Mongol – but its unclear the relation between the two. I'm skeptical that the second is even a real rebel group, as there is no record I could find of it engaging, but it shows up for the peace accords and DDR in 2008. The latter one refers to itself as Mai Mai Mongol. The UN also refers to a third group of around 30 militiamen directed by Munyamariba Nyunga, a well-known Hutu leader; it is likewise unclear how this one relates to the others. The only reference I found to this one is in a single paragraph of one UN report – also not enough to code. Excluded – insufficient information to code.

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<sup>1235</sup> Stearns, "PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen, and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu"; Richards, "Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control," 4–5; "Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007)," para. 50; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)" (United Nations Security Council, December 12, 2008), para. 60, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/772](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/772); "'You Will Be Punished': Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo" (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 13, 2009), 26, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1209webwcover2.pdf>; "Caught in a Web of Clashes between Armed Groups," IRIN, October 25, 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2007/10/25/caught-web-clashes-between-armed-groups>; Roos Haer, *Armed Group Structure and Violence in Civil Wars: The Organizational Dynamics of Civilian Killing* (Routledge, 2015), 128, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ZnpKCAAQBAJ&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=pareco+congo&source=bl&ots=wHveQni8xv&sig=aRsRmBJN1IP1EwypQOEwQq7FUeg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0pcfy5qLVAhUFNj4KHf\\_aCb84ChDoAQgjMAA#v=onepage&q=pareco%20congo&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=ZnpKCAAQBAJ&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=pareco+congo&source=bl&ots=wHveQni8xv&sig=aRsRmBJN1IP1EwypQOEwQq7FUeg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0pcfy5qLVAhUFNj4KHf_aCb84ChDoAQgjMAA#v=onepage&q=pareco%20congo&f=false).

<sup>1236</sup> Stearns, "PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen, and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu," 32–33; Richards, "Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control," 5; "'You Will Be Punished': Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo," 26; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 45.

<sup>1237</sup> Stearns, "PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen, and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu," 13; "Zaire: IRIN Briefing Part IV, 02/28/97," University of Pennsylvania -- African Studies Center, February 28, 1998, [http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin\\_brf2287.html](http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_brf2287.html); "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003" (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2010), para. 152.

**\*Mai Mai Muhamba** – Two reliable reports seem to indicate that this is an operational unit within PARECO: the UN says it is “associated with PARECO-Lafontaine” and Radio Okapi says Muhamba commands a part of PARECO.<sup>1238</sup> Another local source, the Groupe d’Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme et de la Paix, associates Muhamba with UPCP (AKA of or successor to PARECO-Lafontaine).<sup>1239</sup> At other times, Radio Okapi lists Muhamba independently.<sup>1240</sup> While Mai Mai Muhamba group has not stated any political ambitions, it does control territory around Lake Edward.<sup>1241</sup> It is unclear whether this group is or ever was independent from PARECO-Lafontaine. Moreover, if it was, we do not have sufficient information to code it. Excluded – insufficient information to code, seems likely a splinter group.

### **Coalition des groupes armés de l’Ituri (COGAI)**

AKAs: Coalition of Armed Groups of Ituri, Coalition of Ituri’s Armed Groups

This group is a coalition, although there are variations in reporting its members. The UN reports five armed group members: (1) FRPI; (2) FRPI-Aru, led by Col. Eneko; (3) Front populaire pour la défense et le développement de l’Ituri, led by Col. Hitler; (4) Force armée d’intégration iturienne, led by Col. Semire; and (5) Force armée de la révolution, led by Col. Kabu.<sup>1242</sup> Radio Okapi and Congo Siasa report four armed group members: (1) FRPI, led by Cobra Matata; (2) Front populaire pour le développement durable de l’Ituri, led by Eneko Kila; (3) Force armée pour la révolution, led by Kabuli; and (4) Forces armées d’intégration de l’Ituri, led by Charité Semire. Other than FRPI, I could find no mention of any of these groups outside of COGAI formation announcements. This dovetails with information from Congo Siasa and other expert blogs that little was known about non-FRPI COGAI members.<sup>1243</sup>

However, I also found no violence or planned violence on the part of COGAI. There were indications of recruitment and of individual surrenders to FARDC, and a COGAI spokesperson commented publicly denying accusations leveled at FRPI.<sup>1244</sup> This lack of tangible action on COGAI’s part matches

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<sup>1238</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” paras. 267, 558; “RD Congo/Butembo : les miliciens Maï Maï Pareco font la loi à Bakununu, selon la société civile,” Text, ReliefWeb, December 8, 2010, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congobutembo-les-miliciens-ma%C3%AF-ma%C3%AF-pareco-font-la-loi-%C3%A0-bakununu>.

<sup>1239</sup> Deograttias Kakule Siku and Moïse Kambere Kayitambya, “La Jungle: Rapport de Monitorings Des Violations Des Droits Humains Au Nord Kivu” (Butembo: Groupe d’Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme et de la Paix, March 2015), <http://sckasando.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RAPPORT-DE-MONITORING-DES-VIOLATIONS-DES-DROITS-HUMAINS-JANVIER-MARS-2015.pdf>.

<sup>1240</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Julien Paluku Invite Les Groupes Armés de Beni et Butembo à Désarmer,” *Radio Okapi*, November 27, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201311271598.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Des Populations de 3 Villages Furent Des Exactions Des Maï-Maï à Lubero,” *Radio Okapi*, November 30, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201211300499.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Butembo - Le Chef Maï-Maï Kikuru-Kuku Se Rend Aux Fardc,” *Radio Okapi*, December 9, 2011, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201112091263.html>.

<sup>1241</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” 267.

<sup>1242</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 80.

<sup>1243</sup> Henning Tamm, “Coalitions and Defections in a Context of Uncertainty – A Report from Ituri (Part II),” *Congo Siasa* (blog), August 27, 2012, [http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/08/coalitions-and-defections-in-context-of\\_27.html](http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/08/coalitions-and-defections-in-context-of_27.html); Christoph Vogel, “Congo’s Immobilised Demobilisation Programme,” *Suluhu* (blog), November 12, 2014, <https://suluhu.org/2014/11/12/congos-immobilised-demobilisation-programme/>.

<sup>1244</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Plus d’une Centaine de Miliciens Se Sont Rendus Depuis Fin Janvier,” *Radio Okapi*, March 20, 2014, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201403201159.html>; Tamm, “Coalitions and Defections in a Context of Uncertainty – A Report from Ituri (Part II)”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Les Groupes Armés Recrutent Des Jeunes En Ituri,” *Radio Okapi*, July 17, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201207171079.html>; “Violence Hampers Aid Work in Ituri,” IRIN, August 21, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96144/drc-violence-hampers-aid-work-ituri>.

expectations and descriptions that the group was a paper rebellion or never got off the ground.<sup>1245</sup> It also syncs with ACLED, tagged only one event as COGAI – its formation.

There are two possibilities for COGAI, each of which results in exclusion: (1) the group did plan and/or commit violence, but never operated truly separately from FRPI (there are references to a FRPI-COGAI coalition), or (2) the group never planned or committed violence.<sup>1246</sup> Excluded – does not meet criteria for inclusion as merger and/or no evidence of violence/planned violence.

### Mouvement de résistance populaire au Congo (MRPC)

AKAs: Popular Resistance Movement in the Congo, Popular Resistance Movement of Congo

This group is sometimes presented as a successor to or associated with COGAI.<sup>1247</sup> However, the UN Panel of Experts states that “although *MRPC did not replace or abolish COGAI*, it clearly emerged as a result of the failure of the latter to gain momentum [emphasis added].”<sup>1248</sup> Most accounts consulted point out that most members of MRPC were FARDC deserters. Its named leadership includes Eric Dhedongha (president, legal advocate) and Jules Musafiri (chief of staff, former UPC) – neither of whom I saw named as COGAI leadership.<sup>1249</sup> Other names are given in association with a breakaway faction (MRPC-Rutsholi, see below), but is unclear whether these individuals affiliated before or after the factions splintered from MRPC. Even including these names, the only name which reappears from COGAI is Charité Semire.<sup>1250</sup> As such, I believe it is highly likely that this group meets our inclusion criteria regarding successors or splinters: most leadership and most members did not come from COGAI. Even if MRPC is a COGAI successor, COGAI never reached a point in development where it met our criteria for a rebel group; as such, MRPC would still be included.

Discussion of MRPC’s origin does suggest that many members were former UPC who had undergone integration into FARDC; if they defected less than five years after integration, then MRPC could be considered a UPC revival and disqualified.<sup>1251</sup> My best guess, however, is that integration would have occurred at least five years prior, as sources place the UPC as defunct around 2005-2006, whereas MRPC formed in 2012.<sup>1252</sup> Remnants remained as PUSIC, MRC, and other splinters, but the defectors were referred to specifically as former UPC. It thus seems unlikely that MRPC can be excluded as an UPC revival.

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<sup>1245</sup> Tamm, “Coalitions and Defections in a Context of Uncertainty – A Report from Ituri (Part II)”; Thomson Reuters Foundation, “Congo (DR) Conflict,” December 9, 2013, <http://news.trust.org/spotlight/Congo-DR-conflict/?tab=background>; Henning Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 44, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/upc-ituri#.WS4T9WjyVIV>.

<sup>1246</sup> “Ouganda: Poursuite Des Opérations Conjointes FARDC-MONUSCO Contre La LRA,” *Le Potentiel*, June 28, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201206280605.html>.

<sup>1247</sup> “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013; Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 44.

<sup>1248</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 86.

<sup>1249</sup> Ibid., paras. 86, 89; “Congo-Kinshasa: Les Farde Arrêtent Eric Dedhonga, Un Chef Milicien de l’Ituri,” *Radio Okapi*, September 17, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209171008.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Les Députés Appellent Les Miliciens « À Déposer Les Armes » - allAfrica.com,” *Radio Okapi*, September 9, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209100190.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Province Orientale - Le MRPC, Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé En Ituri,” *Radio Okapi*, September 4, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209040486.html>.

<sup>1250</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 86.

<sup>1251</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 86; Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 44–45.

<sup>1252</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 44; Vogel, “Towards a Genealogy of Armed Actors in Eastern Congo.”

However, owing to the many qualifications I made for this group's inclusion, I have downgraded its certainty to a 2.

As a result of the leadership descriptions given above, I have coded 1 for former rebel under initial leadership. I have left current security as missing: there were FARDC defectors in the leadership of MRPC-Rutsholi, but it unclear whether these were first affiliated with MRPC or joined after the splintering. Regarding organizational history, the UN states that "former ethnic Hema militia members and both Tutsi and Hema Congolese armed forces deserters constitute most of MRPC."<sup>1253</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for military under organizational history, as it seems likely from this description that at least one-third of members were FARDC defectors. I have coded missing for self-defense and other rebels, as the character of the aforementioned Hema militias is not clear, nor is clear any previous affiliations of FARDC defectors.

Sources consistently place MRPC's formation in AUG 2012.<sup>1254</sup> The earliest article I found naming the group was published by Radio Okapi on 3 SEPT 2012.<sup>1255</sup> There is no direct evidence that the group's operations were clandestine, but also no evidence to the contrary; as such, I have coded missing for clandestine. Only one source (Radio Okapi) mentioned any MRPC goals: it said they demanded the departure of the public prosecutor and the district commissioner.<sup>1256</sup> In addition, the group argued over whether it should align with M23.<sup>1257</sup> As such, I have coded 0 for all goal variables.

I have not coded any attack dates for this group, as I found no mentions of specific attacks that MRPC initiated. However, I believe there is significant evidence that the group planned to commit violence, differentiating it from COGAI. The group appears in media outside the declaration of its formation. FRPI called for the group to lay down arms, and a local Hema cultural association denounced the group "present in their villages".<sup>1258</sup> In another article, witnesses from several villages attest that they had seen columns of MRPC fighters.<sup>1259</sup> FARDC claims to have recovered weaponry and medicine from MRPC, and appears to have engaged it once (FARDC initiated, MRPC denies, but it was reported by Radio Okapi and appears in ACLED).<sup>1260</sup> Another article mentions generalized fighting between MRPC and FARDC, while Tamm writes that it "remains a minor force".<sup>1261</sup>

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<sup>1253</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 86.

<sup>1254</sup> Ibid.; Angelo Mobateli, "Congo-Kinshasa: L'insécurité En RDC « Dans Une Petite Poche » Qui Rapporte 500 Millions USD Aux Groupes Armés Chaque Année," *Le Potentiel*, October 14, 2013, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310140724.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Fardc Arrêtent Eric Dedhonga, Un Chef Milicien de l'Ituri"; Tamm, "UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo," 44.

<sup>1255</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Province Orientale - Le MRPC, Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé En Ituri."

<sup>1256</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Province Orientale - Le MRPC, Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé En Ituri"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Fardc Arrêtent Eric Dedhonga, Un Chef Milicien de l'Ituri."

<sup>1257</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 86.

<sup>1258</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - La Monusco Appelle Les Jeunes à Ne Pas Intégrer Les Groupes Armés," *Radio Okapi*, September 21, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209211286.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Les Miliciens Du FRPI Appellent à Un Cessez-Le Feu," *Radio Okapi*, September 21, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209211289.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Une Association Hema Invite La Population à Dénoncer Les Rebelles Du MRPC," *Radio Okapi*, September 11, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209111112.html>.

<sup>1259</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Province Orientale - Le MRPC, Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé En Ituri."

<sup>1260</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - 20 Militaires Poursuivis Pour Vol Dans Une Ferme à Bule," *Radio Okapi*, September 27, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209270690.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Monusco - Des Patrouilles Intensives Pour Empêcher Les Activités de La IRA," *Radio Okapi*, September 13, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209131208.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Les FARDC Ont Tué 10 Miliciens à Djiba," *Radio Okapi*, September 6, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209061229.html>.

<sup>1261</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Les Députés Appellent Les Miliciens « À Déposer Les Armes » - allAfrica.com"; Tamm, "UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo," 45.



Most articles giving specific information on the location of MRPC point toward Djugu territory (Ituri district); another article mentions Djiba village, also located northwest of Bunia, albeit slightly farther away.<sup>1262</sup>

However, leader Eric Dedhonga was arrested in Bunia, a city of 300,000+, evidently along with other political leaders of the movement. However, the article specifically mentioned that they were political leaders and also makes it sound as if they were there only temporarily (“The reason for their presence in Bunia is not yet known.”).<sup>1263</sup> I suspect most operational planning happened in Djugu rather than Bunia. As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.

MRPC members are most often discussed as having Hema ethnic origin.<sup>1264</sup> The UN also mentions ethnic Tutsi membership.<sup>1265</sup>

MRPC-Rutsholi included several envoys from the Government of Rwanda, including John Tibasima and Major Bebwa.<sup>1266</sup> However, it is not clear whether these envoys were associated with MRPC before the splintering; moreover, if they were, it is not enough to meet our threshold for foreign government support. As such, initial resources are coded as none.

Under contestation, I coded 1 for both protests (SCAD events 4900421, 4900424, 4900440) and riots (4900428, 4900433).

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of Ituri, contestation variables are coded as 0. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but nonlocally. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Neither MRPC nor its offshoot (MRPC-Rutsholi) appear after 2012, except in amnesty lists. As such, I have coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ.

#### **\*Mouvement de résistance populaire au Congo-Rutsholi (MRPC-Rutsholi)**

AKAs: See above for variations of MRPC

Shortly after the arrest of its president Eric Dhedongha and chief of staff Jules Musafiri, MRPC splintered into two factions: one in favor of working with M23 and one opposed. The former is called MRPC-Rutsholi, led by Lt. Col. Rutsholi. Other names associated with this faction include John Tibasima and Maj. Bebwa (envoys of Rwandan government); Charité Semire (demobilized former UPC); and Col. Eric Ndole Panya, Major Nonzi “Taekwondo” Bondokana, and Maj. Katanazi (FARDC defectors). Excluded – splinter.

#### **\*Union de congolais pour la défense de la démocratie (UCDD)**

AKA: Union of Congolese for the Defense of Democracy

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<sup>1262</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Les Miliciens Du FRPI Appellent à Un Cessez-Le Feu”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - La Monusco Appelle Les Jeunes à Ne Pas Intégrer Les Groupes Armés”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Monusco - Des Patrouilles Intensives Pour Empêcher Les Activités de La IRA”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Une Association Hema Invite La Population à Dénoncer Les Rebelles Du MRPC”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Ituri - Les FARDC Ont Tué 10 Miliciens à Djiba.”

<sup>1263</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Les Fardc Arrêtent Eric Dedhonga, Un Chef Milicien de l’Ituri.”

<sup>1264</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 44–45; Mobateli, “Congo-Kinshasa: L’insécurité En RDC « Dans Une Petite Poche » Qui Rapporte 500 Millions USD Aux Groupes Armés Chaque Année”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” 86.

<sup>1265</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 86.

<sup>1266</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 86.



I found no mention of this group beyond reference to its formation/the UN report addendum implicating Rwanda.<sup>1267</sup> It does not appear in ACLED. One opinion piece calls the group “bogus”.<sup>1268</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

**\*Chiribanya militia** – I found reference to this group through a UN report; it stated that Xavier Chiribanya launched the group in 2003 with the aim of independence for Maniema, North Kivu, and South Kivu.<sup>1269</sup> The group I found was not of such grandeur, however. The RCD installed Chiribanya as governor of South Kivu during the Second Congo War, and he retained the position through the transition created by the 2002 Global and Inclusive agreement (wherein he officially became a member of the Kinshasa government, rather than a rebel occupying government). It seems he did not trust the incoming military commander in the region, Prosper Nyabiolwa. Nyabiolwa accused him of fomenting a military rebellion in the region. In FEB 2004, it became clear that Chiribanya was in fact maintaining a private militia and stockpiling weapons. He was suspended as governor, and eventually handed over what appears to be some or all of his weaponry and demobilized some or all of his militiamen. In exchange, he was not arrested. Fellow collaborators also came from within the government: Chiriwami (mayor of Bukavu) and Lukompa (provincial official of the security services).<sup>1270</sup>

This group presented challenges within our classification. Although it seems most membership fell outside of the government, named leadership came from within the government. It is not entirely clear what Chiribanya’s intentions with the militia were. However, since co-conspirators were all within the government, we decided to exclude to label the group as inter-governmental violence rather than violence by non-state actors. As such, it is excluded. Excluded – not a non-state actor.

**\*Forces de défense nationale (FDN)**

AKAs: Mai Mai Akilo, Raia Mutomboki Akilo (possibly), FDN Wamaza (possibly)

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<sup>1267</sup> “Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 41–43; “Congo-Kinshasa: Révélation Troublante Des NU - Kagame Veut Créer Un Nouvel Etat Au Pays,” *Le Phare*, July 11, 2012, AllAfrica,

<http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201207110599.html>; Pan Butamire, “Rwanda: The UN - the Millstone Around Rwanda’s Neck,” *The New Times (Kigali)*, July 6, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207060954.html>.

<sup>1268</sup> Félix Mbayi-Kalombo, “Afrique: Réflexion Sur Le Déploiement d’une Force de l’UA,” *Le Potentiel*, July 19, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201207190202.html>.

<sup>1269</sup> “Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 40.

<sup>1270</sup> “Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo,” 3; Joëlle Sabella, “RDC: A Bukavu - encore une crise désamorcée,” Text, ReliefWeb, February 17, 2004, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rdc-bukavu-encore-une-crise-d%C3%A9samorc%C3%A9e>; “R.D.Du Congo : Le Renforcement Des Factions Au Sein Du Gouvernement Inquiète Kofi Annan,” Centre d’actualités de l’ONU, March 30, 2004, <http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=7649&Cr=RDC&Cr1=MONUC#.WXjlyYjyvIV>; “L’ex-Gouverneur Du Sud-Kivu Remet Ses Armes Au Gouvernement (RDC),” PANA Press, February 11, 2004, [http://www.panapress.com/L-ex-gouverneur-du-Sud-Kivu-remet-ses-armes-au-gouvernement-\(RDC\)--12-710556-145-lang1-index.html](http://www.panapress.com/L-ex-gouverneur-du-Sud-Kivu-remet-ses-armes-au-gouvernement-(RDC)--12-710556-145-lang1-index.html); Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Whether Some South Kivu Inhabitants and Their Family Members Who Go to Burundi and Rwanda Are Suspected of Being ‘Katangese Subjects’ Working with Vice-President Raphaël Katebe Kototo and the South Kivu Governor to Launch a New Rebellion (Oct. 2003 - June 2004),” Refworld, June 25, 2004, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/41501c507.html>; “Caches d’armes et Mutinerie à Bukavu, Danger d’une Troisième Guerre Au Congo,” *Debout Congolais*.Info, March 7, 2004, <http://www.deboutcongolais.info/actualite3/art-114.html>; Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*; “Congo-Kinshasa: Retombées Des Incidents de Bukavu : Le Gouverneur Du Sud-Kivu Suspendu,” *Le Phare*, February 11, 2004, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200402110153.html>; Fidèle Musangu, “Congo-Kinshasa: Théophile Mbemba Fundu Attendu à Bukavu Ce Matin,” *Le Phare*, January 13, 2004, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200401130254.html>; Fidèle Musangu, “Congo-Kinshasa: Le Président de l’Assemblée Régionale Enlevé et Porté Disparu,” *Le Phare*, January 6, 2004, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200401060635.html>.

IRIN names this as an armed group in the DRC, led by Colonel Akilimali Luendo (alias Akilo) and Colonel Jeremie and operating in Walikale, but it does not show up in ACLED.<sup>1271</sup> Suluhu has two groups that might be a match: FDN-Wamaza and Raia Mutomboki Akilo, both of which also operate in Walikale territory.<sup>1272</sup> I found two conflicting narratives on where this group came from: (1) I found reference to a Mai Mai FDN in a 2013 World Bank document. According to this document, Mai Mai FDN and Mai Mai Akilo are AKAs of APCLS, where Akilimali (alias Akilo) is a dissident in APCLS.<sup>1273</sup> (2) Another source reports that Forces de Défense Nationale was created by FARDC defectors in 2010 (also locates it in Walikale).<sup>1274</sup> Beyond these sources, I could not find much information beyond passing mentions. I found one Radio Okapi article referencing a Mai Mai Akilo in Walikale and a few other mentions of a Mai Mai Akilo, including one from an unknown source claimed that it had integrated into FARDC in 2012.<sup>1275</sup> I was not able to find any additional information using the name Colonel Jeremie. I suspect this may be a group of interest, but we have insufficient information to code it. Excluded – insufficient information to determine inclusion/code.

#### M18

AKAs: Congolese People's Liberation Army, United Congolese People's Army (only presented in English; possible French translations include Armée populaire congolaise de la libération, Armée populaire congolaise unie)

I believe this group existed and operated as an armed group, but information on it is scant. Two facts were consistently reported: (1) Its leader or one of its leaders, Lt. Col. Ndamira Zackaria (alternatively Zacharia Ndamire Ndozi or Ndosa, alias Eric or Eric Ndozi, a renegade FARDC officer) was kidnapped on Ugandan soil in MAR 2013, evidently by Congolese security, but they were intercepted and Eric was

<sup>1271</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013.

<sup>1272</sup> "Congo Conflict: The Evolving Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo."

<sup>1273</sup> Elbert, Schauer, et al., "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants."

<sup>1274</sup> Rugeje and Maeresera, "The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronized Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?," 72.

<sup>1275</sup> "Séléka : Une Faction Dissidente Ouverte « à Tout Le Monde »"; Sasha Lezhnev, "U.S. Conflict Minerals Law Having Impact in Congo," Ocnus.Net, June 23, 2011, [http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Africa\\_8/U-S-Conflict-Minerals-Law-Having-Impact-in-Congo.shtml](http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Africa_8/U-S-Conflict-Minerals-Law-Having-Impact-in-Congo.shtml); Cosmas Mungazi and Mustapha Mulonda, "Nord-Kivu : À La Recherche de La Paix Dans Le Masisi et Walikale," September 21, 2012, [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=18&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwih9OrXwejUAhUJ5YMKHwBOAm04ChAWCFAwBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.ccfid-terresolidaire.org%2Fgrandslacs%2Fpublic%2FKivu\\_Nord\\_A\\_la\\_recherche\\_de\\_la\\_paix\\_dans\\_le\\_Masisi\\_et\\_Walikale.\\_09\\_12\\_\\_\\_SYFIA\\_.doc&usg=AFQjCNHBJzWSqFRRG5TCdNVh7U9rndxldg](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=18&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwih9OrXwejUAhUJ5YMKHwBOAm04ChAWCFAwBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.ccfid-terresolidaire.org%2Fgrandslacs%2Fpublic%2FKivu_Nord_A_la_recherche_de_la_paix_dans_le_Masisi_et_Walikale._09_12___SYFIA_.doc&usg=AFQjCNHBJzWSqFRRG5TCdNVh7U9rndxldg).

transferred into UPDF custody.<sup>1276</sup> (2) Its marauding caused a wave of thousands of refugees fleeing into Uganda in OCT 2013.<sup>1277</sup> Two sources corroborate that the group formed in late 2012.<sup>1278</sup>

Beyond that, there are two inconsistent narratives on the group's origins. *Daily Monitor* reports indicate that M18 is a breakaway faction of FAPC or a breakaway of UPC (the organization from which FAPC broke away).<sup>1279</sup> M18 was composed of Nilotes (ethnic grouping including Alur, Kakwa, Lugbara, Zande, and Lendu, as opposed to the Bantu ethnic grouping) who felt marginalized within FAPC and deserted in the early 2000s. They reportedly operated mainly as criminal gangs after defecting, but reorganized in late 2012. According to these reports, M18 was led by Ben Benjamin Muki, an exiled former Uganda army soldier from the Idi Amin era who allegedly formerly worked as an undercover Kampala agent among LRA rebels in the DRC. The source of this information was unspecified "intelligence sources".<sup>1280</sup> FAPC broke away from UPC in 2003 (see above); presumably the discontents deserted in or after 2003, leaving a sizeable gap between desertion and formation of M18 during which they operated as criminal gangs that would not qualify for inclusion, creating a gap long enough that it would not be excluded as a revival. According to the *Daily Monitor*, M18 was cooperating with M23.<sup>1281</sup>

An alternative narrative, set forth by the Congolese government, states that Eric Ndozi was a FARDC defector who took his followers with him, aiming to meet up with M23 in Kivu. Finding this impossible, he decided to launch M18 independently.<sup>1282</sup>

Both of these narratives conflicts with Reuters reporting based on Ugandan military sources that M18 is not linked to M23.<sup>1283</sup> However, neither of these origins accounts seems likely to disqualify M18 from inclusion, as it is either a revived splinter that probably meets our dormancy requirements for inclusion or FARDC defectors, or some combination thereof. Moreover, even though only one source offers any specific information on attacks, several sources report massive population displacement at the hands of M18 (see above), which suggests that violence occurred. As such, I have included M18 in our dataset.

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<sup>1276</sup> Richard Drasimaku, "Uganda: Congo 'Fugitive' Rebel Leader Held in Arua," *New Vision (Kampala)*, March 18, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201303180053.html>; Lucy Beck, "More than 10,000 Congolese Civilians Flee to Uganda to Escape Fighting in North Kivu," UNHCR, October 30, 2013, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/10/52713ee26/10000-congolese-civilians-flee-uganda-escape-fighting-north-kivu.html>; Godfrey Olukya, "Congolese Rebel Leader Arrested in Uganda," *The Africa Report*, March 18, 2013, <http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/congolese-rebel-leader-arrested-in-uganda.html>; Tabu Butagira, "M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned," *Daily Monitor*, November 14, 2013, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/M18-rebels-test-the-waters-where-M23-have-drowned/688334-2072256-xhsapoz/index.html>; Richard Drasimaku, "Uganda: Thousands of Congolese Flee M18 Attacks to Uganda," *New Vision (Kampala)*, October 28, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201310280042.html>.

<sup>1277</sup> Beck, "More than 10,000 Congolese Civilians Flee to Uganda to Escape Fighting in North Kivu"; "Congolese Overwhelm West Nile amid Fresh Fighting," *Africa Review*, October 29, 2013, <http://www.africareview.com/news/Congolese-refugees-overwhelm-West-Nile-amid-fresh-fighting/979180-2051806-jn4qe8/index.html>; Butagira, "M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned"; Drasimaku, "Uganda: Thousands of Congolese Flee M18 Attacks to Uganda"; Elias Biryabarema, "Refugees Stream into Uganda after East Congo Fighting Spreads," *Reuters*, October 28, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-congo-refugees-idUSBRE99R0PD20131028>.

<sup>1278</sup> Butagira, "M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned"; Rugeje and Maeresera, "The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronized Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?," 72.

<sup>1279</sup> Butagira, "M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned"; Asuman Bisiika, "The Congo File: President Kabila, M23 and What to Make of M18," *Daily Monitor*, November 2, 2013, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/edb6248b-a125-416d-8c6e-515ecf9e77ac/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1280</sup> Butagira, "M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned."

<sup>1281</sup> Butagira.

<sup>1282</sup> Drasimaku, "Uganda: Congo 'Fugitive' Rebel Leader Held in Arua"; See also Olukya, "Congolese Rebel Leader Arrested in Uganda."

<sup>1283</sup> "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; Biryabarema, "Refugees Stream into Uganda after East Congo Fighting Spreads."

Unable to corroborate most information, I code information reported consistently but leave information where sources conflict as missing. I have downgraded its certainty to two, as sources conflict and no concrete information on origins was corroborated by another source. I did not downgrade it to one because none of the information seems likely to disqualify it from inclusion.

Based on the first origins narrative, I coded missing for other rebels under organizational history. Based on the second narrative, I coded missing for military under organizational history. One of these may be true, but I am unsure that both would be true simultaneously. Because of the information on Eric Ndosi (which is consistent), I have coded current security under initial leadership. Because of conflicting origins narrative and dearth of information, I coded missing for current rebels and former rebels – it is not clear whether other leaders or Ndosi himself had affiliations with previous or currently operating rebel groups.

The only source offering record of a specific attack came from the *Daily Monitor*. On 28 DEC 2012, M18 elements attacked the Bazi customs post (as best I could tell from searches, the Bazi post was on the South Sudanese border), abducting two policemen and stealing weaponry. Evidently the group had first reorganized as a civil disobedience pressure group, and this first attack was disguised (“couched”) as a protest.<sup>1284</sup> As such, I have coded 28 DEC 2012 as small attack date. Also based on this information, I coded missing for party under organizational history. (Even if the attack occurred, I am not confident in this origin’s narrative due to conflicting information.) There are no further mentions of specific attacks, although other sources mention generalized activities including targeted assassination of FARDC officers and government officials.<sup>1285</sup> It is worth noting that the account of the Bazi attack and origins as a civil pressure groups seems inconsistent with the narrative from the DRC government, which states that Ndosi defected at Mahagi and marched south until repulsed by FARDC.<sup>1286</sup> However, it is not entirely impossible, as South Sudan is about 160-170 km (about 100 miles) from Mahagi – a long but not intraversable distance. Because of this narrative, I have also left party missing under organizational history.

(map generated using Google Maps)

It appears that M18 operates both within DRC and in neighboring countries. Most of the violence they commit seems to be in the DRC. The waves of refugees that garnered much attention in OCT 2013 were exodus from Omgbokolo and Ariwara, Aru territory, Ituri district, Orientale Province.<sup>1287</sup> According to the Ugandan newspaper *New Vision*, Ndosi was stationed in Mahagi district, Orientale Province, when he defected; he was subsequently repulsed and pushed into the Congo-Uganda-South Sudan border area where M18 established bases.<sup>1288</sup> Likewise, the *Daily Monitor* reports that it operates in border areas (attacked a customs post). In addition, the *Daily Monitor* reports some attacks on traders in South Sudan, which M18 reportedly carried out. In addition, the *Daily Monitor* reports that M18 had been meeting and recruiting in the Arua and Koboko districts of Uganda.<sup>1289</sup> As stated above, M18 leader Eric Ndosi was abducted in Kampala in MAR 2013. Because all reports except Ndosi’s presence in Kampala place them in rural areas, I have coded 1 for “rural”. Given the many conflicting sources on locational information and my inability to confirm it, I have coded planning\_inside and planning\_border as missing.

Both the *Daily Monitor* and the *New Vision* report that M18 claims to be fighting marginalization, presumably of Orientale province.<sup>1290</sup> A security source not further identified claimed that the group aimed to “fight from the north and the M23 from the south (in eastern DRC) and meet midway to carve out the Orientale

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<sup>1284</sup> Butagira, “M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned.”

<sup>1285</sup> Drasimaku, “Uganda: Congo ‘Fugitive’ Rebel Leader Held in Arua.”

<sup>1286</sup> Drasimaku.

<sup>1287</sup> Drasimaku; Drasimaku, “Uganda: Thousands of Congolese Flee M18 Attacks to Uganda”; Biryabarema, “Refugees Stream into Uganda after East Congo Fighting Spreads.”

<sup>1288</sup> Drasimaku, “Uganda: Congo ‘Fugitive’ Rebel Leader Held in Arua.”

<sup>1289</sup> Butagira, “M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned.”

<sup>1290</sup> Drasimaku, “Uganda: Congo ‘Fugitive’ Rebel Leader Held in Arua”; Butagira, “M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned.”

Province as a separate new country.”<sup>1291</sup> However, I coded secede as missing rather than a definitive 1 – the aim of secession was not corroborated and came from a source external to the group.

The group’s activities may have an ethnic flavor. As mentioned above, the *Daily Monitor* claims the organization consists of Nilotic (Alur, Kakwa, Lugbara, Zande, and Lendu) fighters who defected from the Bantu-dominated FAPC.<sup>1292</sup> Another source mentions that most of the refugees are Kakwa-speaking peoples.<sup>1293</sup> As best I could tell, the first article identifying the group appeared in MAR 2013.<sup>1294</sup> However, the Congolese military seems to have been aware of the group earlier, as they were seeking out Eric Ndosi at that time. As mentioned previously, it seems the FARDC had been engaging with Ndosi since shortly after his defection. As such, naming variables are coded as missing. However, if the group formed in late 2012, it was certainly named within a year, so name\_time2 is coded as 1. Likewise, clandestine variables are coded as missing.

Curiously, all the reporting I encountered on this group was in English – no French language reporting. This may have been because Ugandan newspapers generated most of the reporting, owing to the refugee presence caused by M18 and the arrest of Ndosi in Kampala.

I encountered several alternative names for M18: Congolese People’s Liberation Army and United Congolese People’s Army.<sup>1295</sup>

I code 1 for protest (ACLED event 4900449) and for riot (ACLED event 4900433).

## M26

AKAs: Mouvement de 26 Octobre, Movement of 26 October, Nyatura-Noheri (possibly), M26-Nyatura (possibly) This group formed on 26 October 2012, which is how it got its name.<sup>1296</sup> It is reportedly made up of Nyatura who refused integration into FARDC; however, because of citations and similar phrasing, I believe that all reporting of M26 as former Nyatura stems from a single source (likely Great Lakes Voice).<sup>1297</sup> There are many Nyatura factions: if all members of M26 came from the same Nyatura faction refusing integration, it would not qualify; if M26 members came from various Nyatura factions, it may possibly qualify. However, given that specifics are not available, I have excluded M26. It seems likelier than not that M26 would be disqualified as a splinter group.

<sup>1291</sup> Butagira, “M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned.”

<sup>1292</sup> Butagira.

<sup>1293</sup> Drasimaku, “Uganda: Thousands of Congolese Flee M18 Attacks to Uganda.”

<sup>1294</sup> Drasimaku, “Uganda: Congo ‘Fugitive’ Rebel Leader Held in Arua.”

<sup>1295</sup> “Congolese Overwhelm West Nile amid Fresh Fighting”; Butagira, “M18 Rebels Test the Waters Where M23 Have Drowned”; Drasimaku, “Uganda: Thousands of Congolese Flee M18 Attacks to Uganda.”

<sup>1296</sup> “Nord-Kivu : Les Élèves Désertent Les Écoles à Cause Du Recrutement Des Groupes Armés à Mpati,” Radio Okapi, January 22, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/01/22/nord-kivu-eleves-enseignants-desertent-les-ecoles-du-recrutement-des-groupes-armes-mpati>; Rugeje and Maeresera, “The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronized Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?,” 72; “RDC : Le Chaos Rayonne Au Nord-Kivu,” *OEIL D’AFRIQUE* (blog), May 24, 2013, <http://oeildafrique.com/rdc-le-chaos-rayonne-au-nord-kivu/>.

<sup>1297</sup> “Nord-Kivu : Les Élèves Désertent Les Écoles à Cause Du Recrutement Des Groupes Armés à Mpati”; Josephine Lukoya, “DRC: M26, A New Militia in the Making,” Great Lakes Voice, January 22, 2013, <http://greatlakesvoice.com/drc-m26-a-new-militia-in-the-making/>; “Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” October 31, 2013; Berghezan, “Groupes Armés Actifs En République Démocratique Du Congo : Situation Dans Le «Grand Kivu» Au 2ème Semestre 2013,” 26.

M26 operates in Masisi territory.<sup>1298</sup> It controls some territory and operates a “parallel administration” or government in Mweso.<sup>1299</sup> Several articles corroborate that the M26 charges a “rengera buzima” tax, Kiyarwandan for “right to life” tax, in the areas they control, amounting to approximately 1 USD per person aged eighteen or older per month.<sup>1300</sup> According to a local in one article, civilians are beaten to death if they do not pay the tax. This does not give a definitive date of when M26 began targeting civilians, but it appears to have been within a year of founding (article ran in MAR 2013). The same article reported infighting between two colonels within M26. In addition, it indicates that M26 cohabits with FARDC, with whom they ally against M23.<sup>1301</sup> However, a different article suggests a more hostile relationship between M26 and FARDC.<sup>1302</sup>

Several sources I encountered listed Kasongo as head of M26, with no further identification of who Kasongo was or who additional leaders may be.<sup>1303</sup>

Suluhu identifies two groups that may be a match: Nyatura-Noheri (M26) and M26-Nyatura.<sup>1304</sup>

Excluded – insufficient information to determine inclusion.

#### \*Mai Mai of Padiri Bulenda

AKAs: many, no official name

Although this group is not listed in ACLED, numerous articles I encountered throughout my DRC research referred to Mai Mai forces loyal to Padiri Bulenda. However, I have decided to exclude this group or these groups because they likely originated prior to our period of study. Although documentation of Mai Mai in this era is scant, multiple sources date the armed group(s) which Padiri commanded and Padiri’s military career to the Masisi war era (early 1990s) or the AFDL/First Congo War era (began in 1996).<sup>1305</sup>

#### Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Soki (FDLR-Soki) – See Rwanda

#### \*Forces de protection du peuple (FPP)

<sup>1298</sup> “Nord-Kivu: 54 400 Déplacés En Détresse À Mwesso,” *Radio Okapi*, January 14, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/01/14/nord-kivu-54-400-deplaces-en-detresse-mwesso>; “Nord-Kivu : Les Élèves Désertent Les Écoles À Cause Du Recrutement Des Groupes Armés À Mpati”; Lukoya, “DRC: M26, A New Militia in the Making”; “RDC : Le Chaos Rayonne Au Nord-Kivu.”

<sup>1299</sup> “Nord Kivu : 5 Groupes Armés Créés En Une Année À Kitshanga,” *Radio Okapi*, May 15, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/05/15/nord-kivu-5-groupes-armes-crees-en-une-annee-kitshanga>; “Nord-Kivu: 54 400 Déplacés En Détresse À Mwesso.”

<sup>1300</sup> “Nord-Kivu: 54 400 Déplacés En Détresse À Mwesso”; Taylor Toeka Kakala, “Local Communities Forced to Pay Salaries of DRC Army and Rebels,” *InterPress Service*, March 15, 2013, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/local-communities-forced-to-pay-salaries-of-drc-army-and-rebels/>; “RDC : Le Chaos Rayonne Au Nord-Kivu”; Mwanza Kasongo, “RDC: Le Droit À La Vie, Une Nouvelle Taxe Pour Les Habitants Du Nord Kivu,” *OEIL D’AFRIQUE*, March 9, 2013, <http://oeildafrique.com/rdc-le-droit-a-la-vie-une-nouvelle-taxe-pour-les-habitants-du-nord-kivu/>.

<sup>1301</sup> Kasongo, “RDC: Le Droit à La Vie, Une Nouvelle Taxe Pour Les Habitants Du Nord Kivu.”

<sup>1302</sup> “RDC : Le Chaos Rayonne Au Nord-Kivu.”

<sup>1303</sup> “Nord-Kivu: Le Gouvernement Appelé à Mettre Fin à l’activisme Des Groupes Armés à Masisi,” *Radio Okapi*, April 29, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/04/29/nord-kivu-le-gouvernement-appelle-mettre-fin-lactivisme-des-groupes-armes-masisi>; “Rapport Annuel d’Activities 2012” (Synergie des Femmes pour les Victimes des Violence Sexuelles, 2012), 4, <http://donordirectaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/annualreport2012.pdf>.

<sup>1304</sup> “Congo Conflict: The Evolving Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

<sup>1305</sup> Kisangani and Bobb, *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 334–35; Stearns, Verweijen, and Eriksson Baaz, “The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern DRC,” 19; Kasper Hoffman, “GOVERNING THE ‘MAQUIS’: A CASE STUDY OF GENERAL PADIRI’S MAÏ-MAÏ MOVEMENT -- Working Paper N°6” (Conflict Research Group, September 2006), 3, [http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/Publications/working%20papers/workingpaper\\_hoffmann.pdf](http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/Publications/working%20papers/workingpaper_hoffmann.pdf); “Congo-Kinshasa: War Not over for the Mai-Mai,” *Business Day (Johannesburg)*, September 16, 1999, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199909160028.html>.



AKAs: Forces for the Protection of People

This group appears to be a successor group to FDLR-Soki/FDLR-Kasongo. However, its composition seems to have changed over time, such that most members are now Congolese youth. As a result, it is sometimes called a Nyatura.<sup>1306</sup> Excluded – successor group by original membership.

#### Union des patriotes congolais (UPC)

AKAs: Union of Congolese Patriots, Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC, armed wing), Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (armed wing)

The UPC formed when ethnic Hema members of RCD-K/ML led by Thomas Lubanga broke away from that organization. Dissent by this group began in 2000, and reached open rebellion by 2002.<sup>1307</sup> As such, it is excluded as a splinter organization.

#### \*Union des patriotes congolais-Lubanga (UPC-Lubanga)

AKAs: see above for variants of UPC

A faction that formed when UPC split in two in late 2003.<sup>1308</sup> Excluded – splinter group.

Listed in ACLED only under description, not actors.

#### \*Union des patriotes congolais-Kisembo (UPC-Kisembo)

AKAs: see above for variants of UPC

A faction that formed when UPC split in two in late 2003.<sup>1309</sup> Excluded – splinter group.

#### Parti pour l'unité et la sauvegarde de l'intégrité du Congo (PUSIC)

AKAs: Party for the Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of the Congo

A faction that split off the UPC in FEB 2003.<sup>1310</sup> Excluded – splinter group.

#### Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC)

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<sup>1306</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015),” paras. 92–93; Timo Mueller, “Congo: What’s Happening in FDLR’s Stronghold in Rutshuru?,” *Timo Mueller* (blog), July 8, 2014, <https://muellertimo.com/2014/07/08/congo-whats-happening-in-fdlrs-stronghold-in-rutshuru/>; Keith Krause, *Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 188,

[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZcjSCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA191&lpg=PA191&dq=alir+armee+pour+la+liberation+du+rwanda&source=bl&ots=oXRSpOUhsL&sig=debXEglt1zzkEjSca\\_JRKO6e7nY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi53KGpjt7UAhXGRyYKHV8ACBs4ChDoAQhOMAg#v=onepage&q=alir%20armee%20pour%20la%20liberation%20du%20rwanda&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=ZcjSCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA191&lpg=PA191&dq=alir+armee+pour+la+liberation+du+rwanda&source=bl&ots=oXRSpOUhsL&sig=debXEglt1zzkEjSca_JRKO6e7nY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi53KGpjt7UAhXGRyYKHV8ACBs4ChDoAQhOMAg#v=onepage&q=alir%20armee%20pour%20la%20liberation%20du%20rwanda&f=false); “RDC: Affrontements Entre Deux Groupes Armés à Masisi,” Radio Okapi, May 15, 2017, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2017/05/15/actualite/securite/rdc-affrontements-entre-deux-groupes-armes-masisi>.

<sup>1307</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 8–9; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 5; IRIN, “DRC: Who’s Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders,” Text, ReliefWeb, April 20, 2005, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-whos-who-ituri-militia-organisations-leaders>.

<sup>1308</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 35; “Seeking Justice: The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in the Congo” (Human Rights Watch, March 7, 2005), 52, <https://www.hrw.org/publications?country%5b0%5d=9469&page=1>; “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 10; IRIN, “DRC: Who’s Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders.”

<sup>1309</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 35; “Seeking Justice: The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in the Congo,” 52; “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 10; IRIN, “DRC: Who’s Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders.”

<sup>1310</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 35; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 16; IRIN, “DRC: Who’s Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders”; “Who’s Who: Bosco Ntaganda at the International Criminal Court,” International Justice Monitor, accessed July 3, 2017, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/bosco-ntaganda-whos-who/>.

AKAs: Armed Forces of the Congolese People, Union of Congolais pour la paix et la démocratie (UPCP), Union of Congolese for Peace and Democracy, FAPC/UPCP, Union des Congolais pour la Démocratie, Union for Congolese Democracy, UCD/FAPC  
A faction that split off the UPC in MAR 2003.<sup>1311</sup> Excluded – splinter group.

### Front nationaliste intégrationniste (FNI)

AKAs: Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes, Nationalist and Integrationist Front, Nationalist Integrationist Front

NOTE: Residents and combatants refer to Lendu militias as FNI even in eras that predate the FNI.<sup>1312</sup>

This group was one of our most difficult to code. Violence broke out between ethnic Hema and ethnic Lendu in Djugu territory (Ituri province, Orientale province) over disputed land titles in 1999. It was not the first time that Hema and Lendu had fought.<sup>1313</sup> This time, however, the local disputes became entangled in the dynamics of the Second Congo war, causing it to escalate repeatedly as Congo war combatant groups chose ethnic militias as favorites or proxies. In particular, many UPDF occupiers favored the Hema until late 2002.<sup>1314</sup> In addition, the conflict became embroiled in RCD-K/ML leadership struggles, with Wamba dia Wamba recruiting Lendu and Mbusa Nyamwisi recruiting Hema for their RCD-K/ML factions.<sup>1315</sup>

Most narratives refer to self-defense groups or militias that eventually evolved into a (at least nominally) united group called FNI. It was clear that Lendu militia, Lendu militias, or the FNI should be included in our data, but it was difficult to determine the point at which this group or these groups first met our inclusion criteria. After considering the following information, we decided that the Lendu militia(s) met our inclusion criteria *prior to* the establishment of FNI:

- Lendu militia attacks on civilians, especially Hema civilians, began well before FNI emerged (including, for instance, Dhendro on 14 SEPT 1999, Mandro on 7 JUN 2002, Nyankunde on 5 SEPT 2002, and Mahagi on 16 SEPT 2002).<sup>1316</sup>

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<sup>1311</sup> Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 35; “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 36–37; IRIN, “DRC: Who’s Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders”; “Access to Resources and Predictability in Armed Rebellion: The FAPC’s Short-Lived ‘Monaco’ in Eastern Congo,” *Africa Spectrum* 46, no. 2 (2011): 49.

<sup>1312</sup> Office of the Prosecutor, “Annex 1: Pre-Trial Chamber 1: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui” (International Criminal Court, April 21, 2008), 9, [https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2008\\_02158.PDF](https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2008_02158.PDF).

<sup>1313</sup> “Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict in Uganda-Controlled Congo,” Human Rights Watch, January 2001, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/hemabckg.htm>; “DRC: IRIN Focus on Hema-Lendu Conflict [19991115],” University of Pennsylvania -- African Studies Center, November 15, 1999, [http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin\\_111599b.html](http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_111599b.html); “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale” (Association Africaine de Defense des Droits de l’Homme, December 6, 1999), [http://cprgla.chez.com/droits\\_de\\_la\\_personne/CPRGLA\\_ASADHOhema.htm](http://cprgla.chez.com/droits_de_la_personne/CPRGLA_ASADHOhema.htm); “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One],” IRIN, March 3, 2000, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/12699/drc-irin-special-report-ituri-clashes-part-one>.

<sup>1314</sup> “Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict in Uganda-Controlled Congo”; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003” (United Nations Security Council, July 16, 2004), paras. 4, 19–20, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/93F81A37C5B409E785256EEC00679CE1-unscc-drc-16jul.pdf>; “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]”; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 12–13.

<sup>1315</sup> “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 5; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 18.

<sup>1316</sup> “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” secs. 51–62.

- Lendu militia attacks on UPDF began before the FNI emerged.<sup>1317</sup> In other words, attack on the effective state force (as UPDF was the occupying force at that point<sup>1318</sup>) began before FNI.
- It would appear that FAC directly supplied the Lendu militia in Rethy (Djugu territory) before FNI began.<sup>1319</sup>
- IRIN cites sources suggesting that Lendu attacks were planned in advance as early as 1999: "...both Lendu and Hema victims point out, also, that it would have taken lengthy planning to make the enormous numbers of arrows used in mass attacks..."<sup>1320</sup> These early reports also suggest that Lendu extremists were headquartered in Rethy and that UPDF soldiers (the occupying force running Ituri at the time) had been killed since the conflict onset.<sup>1321</sup>
- HRW writes that international community viewed the Hema-Lendu conflict as a tribal conflict until 2003, but HRW views this characterization as inaccurate.<sup>1322</sup>
- FNI leader Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui stood trial at the International Criminal Court. While the trial increased the amount of documentation available, it also created motives to distort and contest the origins of the FNI, especially its military operations. For instance, the Prosecutor claims that Ngudjolo commanded all FNI Lendu fighters south of Bunia starting in late 2002; Ngudjolo had the clear authority to select targets and order attacks among the Zumbe militias.<sup>1323</sup> In his ICC testimony, FNI leader Floribert Njabu contests this information, stating that FNI did not have a military headquarters until 18 MAR 2003.<sup>1324</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that the court acquitted Ngudjolo owing to weakness of evidence demonstrating Ngudjolo's authority over FNI.<sup>1325</sup>
- Henning Tamm writes that Lendu and Ngiti militias started as extremely decentralized and evolved over time. FNI was a political attempt (i.e. led by politicians, not militiamen) to unite Lendu militias. Yet even after the establishment of FNI, political leaders of FNI struggled to control the

<sup>1317</sup> "Uganda; Lendu Militia Attack UPDF in Bunya," *New Vision*, January 5, 2002, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6519cd80-d604-4ad9-992e-a80f514ad521/?context=1516831>; "Uganda; Lendu Lose 9 In Attack ON UPDF," *New Vision (Kampala)*, March 17, 2002, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/1e270635-f564-42e0-ac26-a714b88780a8/?context=1516831>; "Uganda; 5 UPDF Soldiers Killed in Fresh Congo Clashes," *The Monitor*, November 26, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/cd261c3d-09f9-420b-b6a6-51fc4ac822d1/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1318</sup> "IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes [Part Two]," IRIN, March 3, 2000, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/12700/drc-irin-special-report-ituri-clashes-part-two>; "'Covered in Blood': Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC"; "Democratic Republic of Congo: On the Precipice: The Deepening Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Ituri" (Amnesty International, March 2003), 6, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=AFR62%2F006%2F2003&language=en>; "Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife," 50; "Democratic Republic of Congo: UN Must Take Urgent Steps to Stop the Escalation of Ethnic Killings," Press Release (Amnesty International, October 17, 2002), <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiB4dfqxJ7YAhWLqVQKHWTbAfsQFggvMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amnesty.org%2Fdownload%2FDocuments%2F112000%2Faf620222002en.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0KfWDi52JZD5aBOISpRC5b>; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 364.

<sup>1319</sup> "Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003," para. 30.

<sup>1320</sup> "IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]."

<sup>1321</sup> "IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes [Part Two]."

<sup>1322</sup> "'Covered in Blood': Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC," 2.

<sup>1323</sup> Office of the Prosecutor, "Annex 1: Pre-Trial Chamber 1: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui," paras. 48, 55-63.

<sup>1324</sup> "Floribert Njabu Concludes His Testimony," International Justice Monitor, April 27, 2011, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2011/04/floribert-njabu-concludes-his-testimony/>.

<sup>1325</sup> Jennifer Easterday, "Ngudjolo Acquitted by ICC," International Justice Monitor, December 18, 2012, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2012/12/ngudjolo-acquitted-by-icc/>.

self-defense groups. On the Lendu militias, Tamm writes “Except for the Mongbwalu branch of the FNI, these militias continued to lack cohesion. In other words, the regional alliance shifts that occurred between mid-2002 and mid-2003 gave the decentralized northern Lendu and the fragmented Ngiti militias each a common name and provided them with weapons, but they did not fundamentally alter their organizational structures.”<sup>1326</sup>

- Lendu militias had attacked Bunia before FNI was established. On 19 JAN 2001, Lendu and Ngiti militias attacked UPDF headquarters at the Bunia airport. Apparently, their objectives were to disable a helicopter that the UPDF had used to attack Lendu and to block the return of Hema leaders from negotiations in Kampala. UPDF killed some eighty assailants, and then retreating Lendu militia killed some sixty Hema civilians in Bunia northern suburbs Soleniema and Mwanga. In response, UPDF encouraged Hema attacks on Lendu in Bunia, resulting in the death of some 150 to 250 Lendu civilians.<sup>1327</sup> There was also a lone report from the Ugandan paper *New Vision* that Lendu militiamen attacked the airport on 1 JAN 2002.<sup>1328</sup>
- For consistency, we also consider other relevant groups we have included:
  - MILA (D.R. Congo) – MILIA originated from an ethnic conflict over land/fishing rights. We code it as a rebel group starting on the first day it attacked state forces.
  - Anti-Balaka (Central African Republic) – Most of anti-Balaka’s attacks targeted Muslim civilians, just as most Lendu attacks targeted Hema civilians. However, anti-Balaka also aimed to control territory and engaged Séléka forces. We also had evidence that anti-Balaka activities were coordinated from the outset.
  - In both of the above cases, the initial engagement with state forces occurred after state forces attempted to intervene after ethnic killings. After the initial engagement, additional engagements followed. For consistency with these cases and the codebook, Lendu militia should be coded as a rebel group after the first time they engage state (or here, occupying) forces, assuming they meet other inclusion criteria.
  - In the cases of Raia Mutomboki and Nyatura, we decided that each autonomously operating faction should be coded separately since factions they were not operationally unified. In the case of Raia Mutomboki, we were able to code only the initial faction and one other. For Nyatura, we were not able to code any. For consistency with these cases and with the codebook, FNI should not be coded as a single entity if it was composed of loosely affiliated, autonomously operating units.

As such, we have decided not to include the FNI as the time when Lendu armed group(s) first met our criteria. Instead we code them prior to this point in time (see Lendu ethnic militia, below).

### Lendu ethnic militia (Walendu Pitsi)

AKAs: Lendu militia, Lendu self-defense group, Lendu tribesmen, Lendu extremists, etc.

<sup>1326</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI.”

<sup>1327</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 46; “59 Morts et Sept Blesses Dans Des Combats a Bunia (Source Independante),” *Agence France Presse*, January 19, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ee21bfb3-9020-47bf-9c29-37940eb3c215/?context=1516831>; “Congo Kinshasa; United Nations Rapporteur Condemns Bunia Violence,” *Africa News*, February 2, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/7c06a555-c3ac-4fc4-90f5-60196d2eb33f/?context=1516831>; “Congo-Kinshasa; Bunia Situation ‘Critical,’” *Africa News*, February 2, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6aee8b0b-078f-47af-8c02-59a37157c028/?context=1516831>; “Congo-Kinshasa; Up to 400 Reported Dead After Bunia Clashes,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, February 9, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/69e6b595-7f93-4179-95d5-2774899a98fa/?context=1516831>; “Congo-Kinshasa; Areas Surrounding Bunia Still in Turmoil,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, February 9, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f44c1557-b5da-4cc7-b4c5-fa0e16cdadae/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1328</sup> “Uganda; Lendu Militia Attack UPDF in Bunya.”

NOTE: There are multiple Lendu militias, but we refer here only to the initial Lendu organized militia. We believe we have sufficient evidence to indicate an initial organized and coherent Lendu militia. It is clear that over time, additional militias or militia factions that operated autonomously emerged; however, we were not able to differentiate or discern origins of subsequent additional militias or factions. See FNI above.

NOTE: FNI constitutes a successor group to this and other Lendu militias. However, residents and combatants refer to Lendu militias as FNI even in eras that predate the FNI.<sup>1329</sup>

Reporting on early stages of Hema-Lendu violence in Ituri is scant. Indeed, *The East African* in 2000 described Bunia as experiencing a “total news blackout,” with news only percolating in from the countryside via travelers.<sup>1330</sup> There are few direct accounts of developments in 1999, when the violence began. Nonetheless, we infer that early Lendu violence was organized, had political aims, targeted the dominant force standing in for the state (the occupying UPDF/their RCD-K/ML partners), and aimed to control territory.

The 1999 violence is widely recognized to have arisen due to a land dispute. Although some sources eschew or dispute the issue, most sources agree that Hema landowners obtained land deeds of questionable legitimacy and sought to evict Lendu occupants.<sup>1331</sup> With the second Congo war in 1998, the UPDF and their RCD partners (RCD and later RCD-K/ML) effectively controlled and administered Ituri.<sup>1332</sup> Lendu and Hema had experienced disputes before, but in this case the state forces who normally arbitrated such disputes were absent and the second Congo war fundamentally altered Hema-Lendu power dynamics.<sup>1333</sup>

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<sup>1329</sup> Office of the Prosecutor, “Annex 1: Pre-Trial Chamber 1: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,” 9.

<sup>1330</sup> Levi Ochieng, “Congo-Kinshasa: No Work, No Pay And No Roads, But War Goes On in Bunia,” *The East African* (Nairobi), September 15, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200009150158.html>.

<sup>1331</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 34; “DRC: IRIN Focus on Hema-Lendu Conflict [19991115]”; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” paras. 4, 17; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 18; “Congo-Kinshasa: ‘It Has Now Become A Conflict Over Power And Money,’” *All Africa News Agency*, November 19, 1999, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199911190062.html>; Johan Pottier, “Displacement and Ethnic Reintegration in Ituri, DR Congo: Challenges Ahead,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 434–36, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003364>; Johan Pottier, “Representations of Ethnicity in the Search for Peace: Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo,” *African Affairs* 109, no. 434 (2010): 25–26; Alex Veit, *Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War and Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Campus Verlag, 2010), [https://books.google.com/books?id=uk3lAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114&dq=hema+lendu+1999&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZtcXCmJ7YAhUprFQKHekwC\\_sQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=hema%20lendu%201999&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=uk3lAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114&dq=hema+lendu+1999&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZtcXCmJ7YAhUprFQKHekwC_sQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=hema%20lendu%201999&f=false); “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 365.

<sup>1332</sup> “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes [Part Two]”; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC”; “Democratic Republic of Congo: On the Precipice: The Deepening Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Ituri,” 6; “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 50; “Democratic Republic of Congo: UN Must Take Urgent Steps to Stop the Escalation of Ethnic Killings”; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 364.

<sup>1333</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 33–34; “DRC: IRIN Focus on Hema-Lendu Conflict [19991115]”; “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale”; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 18; David Gough, “Tribal Rivalry Sparks Killing Spree in Congo; Humanitarian Catastrophe Unfolds as 150,000 Flee Massacres Which Have Claimed 7,000 Lives,” *The Guardian*, February 14, 2000, sec. Foreign Pages; “Congo-Kinshasa: ‘It Has Now Become A Conflict Over Power And Money’”; Christian P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 337, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ceFiryEHTL4C&pg=PA338&dq=hema+lendu+1999&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZtcXCmJ7YAhUprFQKHekwC\\_sQ6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=hema%20lendu%201999&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=ceFiryEHTL4C&pg=PA338&dq=hema+lendu+1999&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZtcXCmJ7YAhUprFQKHekwC_sQ6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=hema%20lendu%201999&f=false).

The UPDF was widely perceived as pro-Hema and is known to have engaged on behalf of Hema in armed conflict.<sup>1334</sup> In particular, Hema often hired UPDF fighters to protect their lands and/or attack Lendu communities.<sup>1335</sup> In a move widely perceived as accelerating the violence, the RCD appointed Adèle Lotsove, a Hema perceived as supporting pro-Hema policies, as governor of the newly created Kibali-Ituri province in JUN 1999.<sup>1336</sup> The partiality of the UPDF/RCD is what differentiates this ethnic conflict from others that do not qualify for inclusion: because Lendu perceived occupying forces as pro-Hema rather than neutral, they began to target the state.

Accounts of early violence are not especially detailed. IRIN suggests that the “trigger” event that tilted conflict into mass killings is not known.<sup>1337</sup> Sources routinely identify several watershed moments in conflict onset. The first watershed is APR 1999. According to some sources, this date is when wealthy Hema landowners paid UPDF/RCD to evict Lendu tenants from disputed land. During this incident, violent unrest erupted among the Lendu and several Lendu leaders were arrested.<sup>1338</sup> Another United Nations

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<sup>1334</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 35–39; “Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict in Uganda-Controlled Congo”; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002–December 2003,” para. 4; “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale”; “Democratic Republic of Congo: On the Precipice: The Deepening Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Ituri,” 5; Pottier, “Representations of Ethnicity in the Search for Peace,” 28; Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 337; “Democratic Republic of Congo: UN Must Take Urgent Steps to Stop the Escalation of Ethnic Killings”; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” paras. 364, 366.

<sup>1335</sup> Some sources cite APC troops for hire rather than UPDF. APC is the RCD-K/ML’s armed branch. Based on other research in the Congo, I suspect this discrepancy is because locals often did not distinguish between UPDF and APC. UPDF is more frequently cited. “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 37; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002–December 2003,” para. 19; “DRC: IRIN Focus on Hema-Lendu Conflict [19991115]”; “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]”; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 12–13; Gough, “Tribal Rivalry Sparks Killing Spree in Congo; Humanitarian Catastrophe Unfolds as 150,000 Flee Massacres Which Have Claimed 7,000 Lives”; Lara Santoro, “Congo’s Death Spiral,” *Newsweek*, February 21, 2000; Veit, *Intervention as Indirect Rule*, 114; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 365.

<sup>1336</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 34–35; “Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict in Uganda-Controlled Congo”; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002–December 2003,” para. 20; “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale”; “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]”; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 18; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 17; “Ethnic Clashes in Congo Claim 200,” *Associated Press Online*, July 6, 1999, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8dc08492-04db-46a3-a0dd-656e7774e403/?context=1516831>; “Rebels Confirm Fighting in Eastern Congo,” *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, July 2, 1999, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ea47532-bd23-4003-a32b-65686626de9e/?context=1516831>; “Creation of Rebel Adminsitration Sparks Clashes in Congo,” *Associated Press*, July 6, 1999, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e7b89cce-d623-40fa-9b6f-a99c6d6086d7/?context=1516831>; Pottier, “Representations of Ethnicity in the Search for Peace,” 28; Veit, *Intervention as Indirect Rule*, 114; Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 338; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 366.

<sup>1337</sup> “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One].”

<sup>1338</sup> “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale”; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 365; Although no details on events given, see also Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 337.



reports describes what appears to be similar or the same events but dates them to late MAY 1999 instead.<sup>1339</sup> Tamm likewise describes the APR 1999 events as a simple appeal to police that triggered a Lendu attack, whereas the end of MAY is when Hema landowners paid UPDF to expel Lendu from disputed land and arrest Lendu leaders.<sup>1340</sup> Either way, most accounts seem to indicate that the Lendu retaliation was a spontaneous response to the attacks and arrests, so I do not think these incidents qualify for inclusion. The second watershed is 18-20 JUN 1999, which is often recognized as the date when mass killings began. Several accounts cite JUN 1999 as the onset of mass violence without providing details on any events.<sup>1341</sup> Based on those that do include some details, it appears that Lendu attacks during this time were not immediate, spontaneous responses to Hema or UPDF abuse (i.e. were not immediately preceded by such abuse) and that Lendu attacks occurred in both Djugu and Blukwa administrative areas (some sources cite only one or the other, some both).<sup>1342</sup> However, several sources suggest UPDF did initiate attacks during this time.<sup>1343</sup> Although the appointment of Lotsove as Kibali-Itrui governor is often cited as accelerating the violence, detailed sources tend to place the onset of mass killings by Lendu before or coinciding Lotsove's appointment, so the attacks must have been planned before her appointment.<sup>1344</sup>

All these accounts come from retrospective reports. The earliest media reports of the violence did not emerge until JUL 1999 and carried few details.<sup>1345</sup>

Evidence suggests that initial attacks were planned:

Lendu and Hema victims concur that extremists in the Pitsi group initiated mass killings. Mass attacks were preceded by written 'warnings' or threats sent by the chiefs from Pitsi Lendu in May 1999; the chiefs wanted nothing less than that the Hema would vacate the land and leave their livestock and crops behind. The planned assaults took the Hema unaware, and aimed to remove the Hema from land considered Lendu. It took lengthy planning, organization and intensive preparation to recruit hundred (if not thousands) of fighters, armed with traditional weapons and agricultural instruments, and use enormous numbers of machetes and bows and arrows in mass attacks. Ugandan soldiers reported that thousands of Lendu fighters come together for an attack on Hema villages.<sup>1346</sup>

Likewise, an IRIN article suggests:

Research in the area of conflict shows that initial attacks were far more sophisticated than spontaneous grievances, and paperwork kept in the administration files of Blukwa – a flashpoint in the clashes – demonstrate an element of planning and execution in the absence of any real authority... All camps make references to a "hidden hand", implying a political strategy behind the conflict... Lendu and Hema victims concur that extremists in the Pitsi collectivity initiated mass killings. The planned assaults took the Hema unaware and aimed to remove the Hema from land considered Lendu. Both Lendu and Hema victims point out, also, that it would have taken lengthy planning to make the enormous number of arrows used in mass attacks... Attacks were

<sup>1339</sup> "Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003," para. 19.

<sup>1340</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 16.

<sup>1341</sup> "Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife," 34; "'Covered in Blood': Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC," 18; "Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003," 51.

<sup>1342</sup> "Rapport de l'Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale"; Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 17; "IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]"; Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 338.

<sup>1343</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 17; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 366.

<sup>1344</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 17; "Rapport de l'Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale"; Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 338; "Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003," 51.

<sup>1345</sup> "Ethnic Clashes in Congo Claim 200"; "Rebels Confirm Fighting in Eastern Congo"; "Creation of Rebel Administration Sparks Clashes in Congo."

<sup>1346</sup> Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 338.

preceded by written warnings sent out in May from chiefs from the Pitsi locality that Hema should vacate the land and leave their livestock and crops behind. Blukwa administration has kept notes sent out by the Lendu chiefs of Bamgusu and Mukpa (Pitsi grouping) to the population of Uchubu and Juza to vacate by 18 June.<sup>1347</sup>

According to IRIN, official letters from Blukwa administration pleading for security support, with original copies of the ultimatums attached, bear authentic date stamps.<sup>1348</sup> Finally, a United Nations report states:

[Circa June 1999] *The Walendu Pitsi organized themselves into self-defense forces and confronted the UPDF soldiers* and Hema self-defense forces created by concession holders in Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Djatsi, Walendu Tatsi and Ndo Okelo communities. The Lendu and Hema self-defense forces *quickly transformed themselves into community militias* and people living the Djugu region were subjected to a first campaign of ethnic cleansing, which resulted in hundreds of deaths. [emphasis added]<sup>1349</sup>

Sources agree that Walendu Pitsi was the hotbed of Lendu violence and was the first area to organize an armed group or groups, led by extremists.<sup>1350</sup> Lendu militias were recruiting members as early as JUN 1999.<sup>1351</sup> In another source, a witness of the Blukwa attack said that Lendu women and children participated in the massacre, assigned to carry baskets of arrows to resupply fighters and setting buildings afire.<sup>1352</sup> Extremist leadership pressured other Lendu to participate in the escalating violence against the Hema.<sup>1353</sup> *The above evidence suggests that the mass killings were planned in advance by an organized group or organized groups.* While we do not have clear evidence that planning efforts were completely centralized, we do infer that initial attacks were coordinated and thus code the militia as a single group.

Lendu militias also attempted to control territory. For instance, ASADHO reports that by JUN 1999 “les Lendu avaient ainsi décidé de détruire des biens des hema sans distinction dans le but de les contraindre à quitter leurs terres” [the Lendu had thus decided to indiscriminately destroy Hema holdings to force the Hema to leave the land].<sup>1354</sup> Several reports indicate that Lendu erected roadblocks.<sup>1355</sup> Finally, a United Nations report revealed a series of battles for control of Fataki village in Walendu Pitsi.<sup>1356</sup> This evidence suggests that the group(s) tried to control territory.

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<sup>1347</sup> “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One].”

<sup>1348</sup> “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One].”

<sup>1349</sup> “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 366.

<sup>1350</sup> “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale”; “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]”; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” para. 19, p. 51; Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa*, 337.

<sup>1351</sup> “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 366.

<sup>1352</sup> Gough, “Tribal Rivalry Sparks Killing Spree in Congo; Humanitarian Catastrophe Unfolds as 150,000 Flee Massacres Which Have Claimed 7,000 Lives.”

<sup>1353</sup> “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One]”; Gough, “Tribal Rivalry Sparks Killing Spree in Congo; Humanitarian Catastrophe Unfolds as 150,000 Flee Massacres Which Have Claimed 7,000 Lives.”

<sup>1354</sup> “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale.”

<sup>1355</sup> Craig Nelson, “Aid Group Warns of Humanitarian Catastrophe in Eastern Congo,” *Associated Press*, January 15, 2000, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/2d910c8d-e161-46e5-902f-d9ecbe8cca62/?context=1516831>; Hrvoje Hranjski, “Foreign Interference, Lack of Authority Fuel Tribal Clashes in Congo,” *Associated Press International*, February 9, 2000, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/ae2a0611-708c-4837-b786-74b935012586/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1356</sup> “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” paras. 366–367.

Lendu militia targeted the occupying forces. In an attack in either JUN or JUL 1999, Lendu militiamen killed 190 Hema and four UPDF (location unknown).<sup>1357</sup> On 11 MAR 2000, Lendu militiamen attacked UPDF barracks at Dhelu, near Fataki.<sup>1358</sup> In AUG 2000, Lendu militiamen killed four UPDF at Katoto.<sup>1359</sup> The Lendu militia competed with UPDF to control territory. For instance, one UN account reports the following sequence of events: Hema and APC attacked Fataki on 14 SEPT 1999 and expelled all Lendu residents, Lendu militias attempt to regain control of Fataki several times in the following months, but UPDF continues to concentrate troops in Fataki and use it as a base to attack Lendu. In addition, this source suggests that the 1 DEC attack on Bambu (Bambou) targeted UPDF and Hema militia control of the town.<sup>1360</sup> As such, Lendu militia targeted for violence the effective state force at the time.

In short, Lendu militia violence was coordinated and planned in advanced by an organized group, attempted to control territory, and targeted the stand-in state force for violence. As the written warnings from Pitsi chiefs represent the earliest evidence of planning, I code MAY 1999 as the founding date. (However, it is possible that these were effectively empty threats at the time and planning began later in JUN; it is also possible that planning occurred as early as APR. As such I have downgraded the certainty.) I have coded the name date as 20 JUN 1999: while Hema were clearly aware of Lendu grievances and demands before the initial attacks, their surprise at these attacks implies they were unaware that Lendu extremists had formed armed groups for offensive purposes. For the same reason, I coded clandestine as 1 rather than missing. Reporting on the initial fighting tends to place the death toll at around 200 dead, with some reports indicating the victims were mostly Hema and presumably civilians, as is the modus operandi for the Lendu ethnic militia. While this figure meets our threshold for large attack, it seems that multiple locations were attacked (see above). However, given also reports that these were the first mass killings (see above), I would guess that at least one of the attack locations meets our threshold for large attack. As such, 20 JUN 1999 is also coded as the large attack date and civilian attack date.

Because the goals seem to have been to secure land for Lendus and combat partiality toward Hema (no alternative goals articulated, recall written warnings), I have coded zero for all goals.

Some sources suggest the pre-existing cultural association LORI (Liberation of the Oppressed Race in Ituri) was involved and supported the violence.<sup>1361</sup> (ASADHO notes LORI involvement negotiating on behalf of Lendu communities at the conflict outset.<sup>1362</sup>) However, the role of LORI is not entirely clear. As such, I have coded other as missing under organizational history.

Throughout the full history of the conflict, Lendu militias generally evolved from self-defense groups. Tamm describes in detail early Lendu self-defense groups:

Lendu representatives from across Djugu refer to the early stages of Lendu militias as *autodéfense populaire* (popular self-defense). In the words of one local leader, there was ‘strong resistance, but no strong organization.’ Using drums, the traditional way of warning nearby villages of imminent danger, Lendu self-defense groups sprung up, village by village, in reaction to Hema militia activity. Whoever led these spontaneous uprising or proved their strength in the battlefield would automatically become a commander, while others were simply known as *combattants* or fighters.<sup>1363</sup>

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<sup>1357</sup> “Ugandan Paper Reports over 200 Killed in Ethnic Clashes in Northeast,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 7, 1999, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/54092fe3-a46f-44c6-a1e0-3812ade580c3/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1358</sup> “Uganda; Lendu Lose 9 In Attack ON UPDF.”

<sup>1359</sup> Wairagala Wakabi, “Uganda: Hundreds Of Congolese Rebels Training In Uganda,” *The East African (Nairobi)*, September 28, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200009280216.html>.

<sup>1360</sup> “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 369.

<sup>1361</sup> “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes - [Part One].”

<sup>1362</sup> “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale.”

<sup>1363</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 18.

However, it seems unlikely that such defense groups would have the capacity to conduct mass-killings on the scales described. I suspect that these defense groups did form and evolve into militias over time, accounting for the emergence of multiple autonomously operating Lendu militias. In other words, I suspect most Lendu militias did evolve out of self-defense groups. However, I have not coded these initial extremists in Walendu Pitsi as emerging from self-defense groups, as the above descriptions make clear the intent was aggression from the outset, not defensive.

Given the apparent role of the chiefs in sending the written warnings discussed above, I suspect Lendu chiefs were involved in the formation of the militia and planning of attacks. However, we have no hard information on initial militia leadership. As such, I have coded all leadership variables as missing.

Several sources suggest that the Lendu militia received outside support in the first year. Although most UPDF supported the Hema, several reports also suggest that a few individual UPDF officers supported the Lendu. In particular, Peter Karim (Kerim) reportedly purchased AK-47s for Lendu use using coffee profits.<sup>1364</sup> An HRW report from MAR 2001 states that Karim had reportedly trained and armed 1,000 Lendu by that time; as such, it is likely he met our threshold of support within the first year.<sup>1365</sup> Hence, I have coded 1 for foreign government under initial resources. In addition, by late 2000, RCD-K/ML factions “had trained enough [Lendu and Hema] combatants to be in a position to inflict serious damage on the other,” with several sources suggesting that Lendu fighters trained by RCD-K/ML factions defected back to their villages and joined Lendu armed groups.<sup>1366</sup> However, several sources suggest that most RCD-K/ML trainees were recruited in the second half of 2000, i.e. not within the first year.<sup>1367</sup> As such, this training does not meet our requirement for initial resources.

In addition, I investigated the potential for mineral resources within the first year, as Bambou (Bambu) is a significant mining location and home to mining company OKIMO (Office des Mines d’Or des Kilo Moto).<sup>1368</sup> While the Lendu militia attacked Bambu, I found no evidence that it successfully occupied the mining sites there or elsewhere within the first year.<sup>1369</sup>

As far as I am aware, reported Lendu attacks in the early eras of fighting were universally large attacks: for instance, over 100 killed at Musekere in JUL 1999, about 475 killed at Dhendro on 14 SEPT 1999, about 200 killed at Bambu (Bambou) on 1 DEC 1999, 416 killed at Blukwa on 1 JAN 2000.<sup>1370</sup> Several sources

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<sup>1364</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 39; “IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes [Part Two]”; Nelson, “Aid Group Warns of Humanitarian Catastrophe in Eastern Congo”; Hranjski, “Foreign Interference, Lack of Authority Fuel Tribal Clashes in Congo”; Veit, *Intervention as Indirect Rule*, 123.

<sup>1365</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 39.

<sup>1366</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 42.

<sup>1367</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 42; Tamm, “UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo,” 19; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 404.

<sup>1368</sup> IRIN, “DRC: Thousands Return to Ituri Gold Town after Army Ousts Rebels,” ReliefWeb, October 4, 2005, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-thousands-return-ituri-gold-town-after-army-ousts-rebels>; “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 78; “Guide of Mining Investor” (Democratic Republic of Congo Ministry of Mines, June 2003), 24, [http://www.miningcongo.cd/pdf\\_divers/guide\\_of\\_mining\\_investor.pdf](http://www.miningcongo.cd/pdf_divers/guide_of_mining_investor.pdf).

<sup>1369</sup> Anthony Morland, “Little Sign of Compromise between Warring Groups in NE DR Congo,” *Agence France Presse -- English*, February 6, 2000, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/2c36444d-da1d-47ab-969d-7f8c2a85e920/?context=1516831>; “Uganda Deploys More Troops in DR Congo,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, February 16, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/9cff9e3f-12a5-4793-a7fe-25ca5818f8e7/?context=1516831>; “Uganda: More UPDF Men Deployed In Ituri,” *New Vision (Kampala)*, February 16, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200002160124.html>.

<sup>1370</sup> “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” paras. 366, 368–370; “Uganda Deploys More Troops in DR Congo”; Minangoy Robert, “Le Nord-Est Du Congo-Kinshasa En Proie à Des Massacres

mention additional attacks, but dates and casualty counts are not known.<sup>1371</sup> Likewise, an HRW report indicates that at least nineteen Lendu attacks occurred from JUN to DEC 1999, most of which I have not been able to identify.<sup>1372</sup> Finally, an IRIN article cites a UN source saying “scores” of villages were burned.<sup>1373</sup> As such, I think it possible and even likely that smaller skirmishes occurred that were not reported. Hence, I have coded small attack as missing rather than never occurred. Based on the locations mentioned, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside1”.

As can be expected given the context of the fighting, one source reports that “the first self-defense groups that emerged in 1999 seem to have been almost uniformly Lendu in composition.”<sup>1374</sup> I take that as sufficient evidence that the extremist Lendu militia leading the initial attacks was predominantly Lendu. Based on several accounts, it appears that Djugu territory is likely ethnically diverse.<sup>1375</sup>

This group is coded as viable based on continued activity of Lendu militias and the FNI. (See ACLED tags for Lendu ethnic militia and FNI; qualifying events include 1975DRC, 2139DRC, 2145DRC, 2146DRC, 2276DRC, 2281DRC, etc.) While we cannot ultimately match the original Walendu Pitsi militia to ongoing activity, there was so much ongoing fighting that I feel confident in asserting this militia continued to participate. For consistency with other coding, we code merge as 0 – although Lendu militia coordinated with other Lendu militia and Ngiti militia, and although FNI represented a political attempt to unify these militia, each militia effectively retained operational autonomy (see above).

The Lendu militia are in UCD from 1999. The FNI appears in GTD, but not until 2003 (GTD = 0).

I code 0 for contestation as there are no qualifying events in SCAD.

#### Ngiti ethnic militia (Walendu Bindi)

AKAs: Forces de résistance patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI), Forces de résistance patriotique en Ituri, Ituri Patriotic Resistance Forces, Patriotic Forces of Resistance of Ituri, Patriotic Resistance Forces of Ituri, Front for the Patriotic Resistance of Ituri, Garrison Mobile, Combattants

The organizational history of the FRPI is hotly contested, with documents often conflicting. There are essentially no contemporaneous records or accounts of the earliest organizational origins of the FRPI. Moreover, FRPI leader Germain Katanga was tried at the ICC and found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity; prosecution hinged on the argument that the Ngiti militia (predecessor to the FRPI) operated with a “common purpose” and had an effective military structure.<sup>1376</sup> Because of the high political stakes in explaining the organization’s early history and the lack of contemporaneous reporting, it will likely never be possible to firmly identify the first time at which the Ngiti ethnic militia met our inclusion criteria. We have done our best to classify it, relying heavily on the ICC ruling.

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Interethniques; Les Heurts Auraient Fait Des Milliers de Morts Dans La Région de l’Ituri, Selon Une Organisation Religieuse,” *Le Monde*, January 31, 2000, sec. International, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/a2840b9f-2a1e-4946-9df1-ce4044ac0fb0/?context=1516831>; “Uganda: More UPDF Men Deployed In Ituri.”

<sup>1371</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 31–32; “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” 366–67.

<sup>1372</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 38.

<sup>1373</sup> “DRC: IRIN Focus on Hema-Lendu Conflict [1999]115].”

<sup>1374</sup> Veit, *Intervention as Indirect Rule*, 142.

<sup>1375</sup> “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” paras. 12–13; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 14; “Rapport de l’Asadho Sur Le Conflit Inter-Ethnique Hema-Lendu En Territoire de Djugu Dans La Province Orientale.”

<sup>1376</sup> “Case Information Sheet: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07,” Case Information Sheet (The Hague: International Criminal Court, March 20, 2018), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf>; “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute” (The Hague: International Criminal Court, March 7, 2014), para. 524, [https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015\\_04025.PDF](https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF).

The Ngiti are an ethnic sub-group of the Lendu found in Southern Ituri. The two groups speak different languages but are culturally similar.<sup>1377</sup> The Ngiti are concentrated in Walendu-Bindi collectivité, which is majority Ngiti.<sup>1378</sup> Self-defense groups emerged in Walendu-Bindi in late 2000 in response to repeated UPDF attacks.<sup>1379</sup> The militia eventually took the offensive, as described below. As such, I have coded self-defense for organizational history. Because the militia was based in Walendu-Bindi, in which I could find no towns with available population statistics, I coded 1 for “rural”. I coded 1 for “planning\_inside”. Most documentation on the Ngiti ethnic militia’s organization history focus on the era immediately preceding the attack on Bogoro on 23 FEB 2003. The ICC found Germain Katanga guilty of enabling the FRPI’s Bogoro attack by facilitating supply of weapons and ammunition. Although the ICC did not find sufficient evidence to convict Katanga for ordering war crimes and crimes against humanity himself, it did conclude that the Ngiti militia at that time qualified as a military organization.<sup>1380</sup> Thus, the Ngiti militia at least met our inclusion criteria by this time. However, we believe there is sufficient evidence to qualify the Ngiti militia as a rebel group prior to 2003. Although originating as self-defense groups, the Ngiti militia first initiated an attack (i.e. not strictly defensive) in either December 2000 or January 2001. HRW cites a joint Ngiti-Lendu attack on Hema villages in Bunia in mid-December, but it provides no details on the attack.<sup>1381</sup> Several sources report a Ngiti attack on Nyankunde on 6 January 2001, but other major sources fail to mention this attack; the UN reports 50 civilians killed, but it’s unclear whether there were also UPDF/UPC targets.<sup>1382</sup> More sources identify a Ngiti militia attack on 18-19 January 2001. Several days earlier on 10 January 2001, a UPDF helicopter attacked CODECO, a Lendu agricultural cooperative operating in Walendu-Bindi and founded by Kakado. Operating jointly with Lendu militia, the Ngiti retaliated and attacked the UPDF based at Bunia airport, reportedly attempting to destroy the helicopter employed in the attack. The airport attack was the first public record I found of the Ngiti militia.<sup>1383</sup> Contemporary accounts suggest that the Ngiti and Lendu militia killed over fifty Hema civilians after failing to take the airport.<sup>1384</sup> Because of these reports, I have coded JAN 2001 as the large attack and civilian attack dates, leaving the precise day missing to reflect the earlier unconfirmed reports.

<sup>1377</sup> “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 14.

<sup>1378</sup> “Katanga/Ngudjolo Chui: Informal Weekly Summary, 26-30 September 2011” (Coalition for the International Criminal Court), accessed May 6, 2018, [http://www.iccnw.org/documents/Katanga-Ngudjolo\\_Weekly\\_Summary\\_26-30\\_September\\_2011.pdf](http://www.iccnw.org/documents/Katanga-Ngudjolo_Weekly_Summary_26-30_September_2011.pdf); “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” para. 13; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 9.

<sup>1379</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 525–526; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” para. 27.

<sup>1380</sup> “Case Information Sheet: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07”; “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute.”

<sup>1381</sup> “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,” 46.

<sup>1382</sup> “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” 54; Johan Pottier, “Emergency in Ituri, DRC: Political Complexity, Land and Other Challenges in Restoring Food Security” (FAO International Workshop on “Food Security in Complex Emergencies: building policy frameworks to address longer-term programming challenges,” Tivoli, September 23, 2003), 4, <http://www.fao.org/3/a-ae515e.pdf>.

<sup>1383</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 465–466; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,” 54; “DR Congo Clashes Leave 59 Dead,” *Agence France Presse -- English*, January 19, 2001, sec. International news, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/9246a323-0c72-4b47-9211-d5416609db7a/?context=1516831>; Hrvoje Hranjski, “Mass Killings Reported in Congo,” *Associated Press Online*, January 22, 2001, sec. International news, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3dde2324-0cfd-4cec-8f4c-a94beb71ec75/?context=1516831>; Daniel K. Kalinaki, “Uganda; UPDF Blamed For Ethnic Killings in Eastern Congo,” *The Monitor (Kampala)*, January 23, 2001, sec. News, Documents & Commentary, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/faef941b-deb5-4d2d-b06d-c396c90eb98b/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1384</sup> Kalinaki, “Uganda; UPDF Blamed For Ethnic Killings in Eastern Congo”; “DR Congo Clashes Leave 59 Dead.”



Moreover, there is some evidence that the Ngiti militia met our criteria for initiating attacks and for “organizational structure,” early 2001, although interpretation of this evidence vis-à-vis our inclusion criteria, e.g. designated leadership roles, is ambiguous:

- According to Katanga himself, the elders in the Walendu-Bindi community decided to “launch an offensive against the Ugandans” in early 2001.<sup>1385</sup>
- The ICC judgment found “no doubt that in 2001 and early 2002, the general state of mind of the population in Walendu-Bindi collectivité was to defend their community at all cost from all outside attackers and, where necessary, *to go on the offensive as part of the resistance effort*.” [emphasis added]<sup>1386</sup>
- Even the defense also acknowledged that as early as 2001 there were recognized leaders at each militia location and that “elders and fetish-priests exerted real authority over these groups”.<sup>1387</sup>
- The ICC judgment also notes that military figures were also already prominent at this time, including Colonel Kandro, Cobra Matata, several others.<sup>1388</sup>
- Other sources, including ICC witnesses, routinely name several individuals including Colonel Kandro and Bernard Kakado as early leaders possessing authority over the Ngiti militia at this time.<sup>1389</sup> Bernard Kakado was eventually tried and found guilty of war crimes by the Bunia Military Garrison Tribunal for crimes committed by the FRPI in 2002.<sup>1390</sup>
- The ICC concluded that a “minimal degree of organization” existed and recognized commanders exercised authority, although the precise nature of that authority was not clear.<sup>1391</sup>
- On the other hand, the prosecution argued that, “From 2000-2001, the Walendu-Bindi collectivité began to organize itself into a self-defense group. At the outset, each village or locality *had its own defense force*. By the end of 2001, the names of some Ngiti commanders...were already “known to everyone” in the collectivité... When Bunia fell in August 2002, the Ngiti combatants of Walendu-Bindi were organized under a *unified command*, led by Kandro, their supreme commander.” [emphases added]<sup>1392</sup>

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<sup>1385</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 528–532.

<sup>1386</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 528–532.

<sup>1387</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 528–532.

<sup>1388</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 528–532.

<sup>1389</sup> “Procedural Matters (Open Session) [ICC-01/04-01/07-T-316-ENG]” (International Criminal Court, October 4, 2011), 31–35, <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/19b9ea/pdf/>; “Trial Hearing (Open Session): Witness: DRC-D02-P-0228 [ICC-01/04-01/07-T-252-ENG ]” (International Criminal Court, April 21, 2011), 58, <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e7b2a7/pdf/>; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 22–23; “Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui: Public Redacted Version -- Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief” (The Hague: International Criminal Court, June 29, 2012), paras. 556–557, [https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012\\_07159.PDF](https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07159.PDF); “Confirmation of Charges Hearing -- Open Session: Ruling” (International Criminal Court, July 15, 2008), 52–53, <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/019a67/pdf/>.

<sup>1390</sup> “Bunia : Début Du Procès Kakado, Chef Spirituel Des Miliciens de La FRPI,” Radio Okapi, January 21, 2010, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2010/01/21/bunia-debut-du-proces-kakado-chef-spirituel-des-miliciens-de-la-frpi>; “Bunia: Kakado, Le Chef de La Milice FRPI, Condamné à Perpétuité Pour Crimes de Guerre,” Radio Okapi, August 10, 2010, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/08/10/bunia-kakado-le-chef-de-la-milice-frpi-condamne-a-perpetuite-pour-crimes-de-guerre>.

<sup>1391</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” para. 533.

<sup>1392</sup> Office of the Prosecutor, “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Prosecution’s Observations on Article 25(3)(d)” (The Hague: International Criminal Court, April 8, 2013), paras. 35–36, [https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013\\_02705.PDF](https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02705.PDF).

Generally, I code start dates for self-defense come rebel groups as the date of the first attack initiated by the group, i.e. first offensive attack. In this case, that means January 2001. Admittedly, it is still a bit ambiguous whether the Ngiti militia meets our organizational structure inclusion criterion at that point. Importantly, we have previously classified cases in which groups retain autonomy, even if coordinating, as distinct groups rather than a single group. However, it sounds like elders such as Kakado at least had definitive veto power over any Ngiti attack at this point, indicated some degree of non-autonomy among the groups. We have coded the start date as January 2001, although there is also a case to be made that the Ngiti militia did not meet our criteria until spring or summer 2002.

Following its activity in early 2001, the Ngiti militia went quiet for about a year, resuming activity in mid-2002. Human Rights Watch lists a series of attacks on civilians by Lendu and Ngiti militia around this time: Komanda in August and early September 2002, Nyankunde on 5 September 2002, Nizi on 11 October 2002, and Blukwa and Logo in October 2002.<sup>1393</sup> Many sources corroborate the Nyankunde attack on 5 September.<sup>1394</sup> The Ngiti militia/FRPI activity continued thereafter. The Ngiti militia/FRPI qualifies as viable (see for instance ACLED events 3225DRC, 3232DRC, 3239DRC, 3240DRC). Attacks on civilians also continued, but I code 88 for viable\_civ as it meets our viable criteria.

The Ngiti militia did not receive assistance by 2001 and early 2002, as demonstrated by the fact that they fought predominantly with traditional weapons.<sup>1395</sup> One ICC document indicates that Colonels Cobra Matata and Kandro profited from gold, but it seems to have been only personal profit rather than financing for the Ngiti militia.<sup>1396</sup> I found no reference to control of major gold mining areas during this era. By July 2002, the APC was training hundreds of Ngiti soldiers in Bunia.<sup>1397</sup> After the UPC captured Bunia in August 2002, many APC retreated to Songolo, a major Ngiti militia base. The Ngiti militia benefited from the large number of Ngiti APC soldiers, who swelled their ranks.<sup>1398</sup> It seems that around this time, the Ngiti militia began benefiting from training and receipt of supplies from the Kinshasa government and the APC.<sup>1399</sup> The ICC confirms that the Ngiti militias began receiving weapons and ammunitions shipments from the Kinshasa government by at least December 2002. The exact volume is not identifiable, but the ICC concluded that it was “quite considerable” and represented a “significant supply” that made the September 2003 Bogoro attack feasible.<sup>1400</sup> However, since none of these resources were available within the first year (i.e. by January 2002), I have coded none for initial resource base.

Regarding the professional histories of the leadership, some personal histories are available for named leaders. Bernard Kakado (AKA Tsubina Kabaonga Kakado Bernard) had previously run an agricultural cooperative called CODECO and was a fetish-priest known for his prophetic abilities.<sup>1401</sup> Colonel Cobra

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<sup>1393</sup> “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 30.

<sup>1394</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 476, 549–567; “Special Report on Events in Ituri, January 2002–December 2003,” paras. 52–61; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 30–35; “Democratic Republic of Congo: On the Precipice: The Deepening Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Ituri,” 17; Pottier, “Emergency in Ituri, DRC: Political Complexity, Land and Other Challenges in Restoring Food Security,” 5.

<sup>1395</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” para. 530.

<sup>1396</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” para. 540.

<sup>1397</sup> “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 19.

<sup>1398</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 542–548.

<sup>1399</sup> “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 9.

<sup>1400</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” paras. 643–651.

<sup>1401</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 22; Tilman Rodenhäuser, *Organizing Rebellion: Non-State Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 465; “Procedural Matters (Open Session) [ICC-01/04-01/07-T-316-ENG],” 31–35.

Matata (AKA Banakoli Justin) is also identified as an early military leader of the Ngiti militia, although I found no details of his personal history before then.<sup>1402</sup> Finally, several sources also identify Colonel Kandro (Khandro) as an early military leader of the Ngiti militia. Kandro had previously served as a soldier under Mobutu, under AFDL, and under RCD.<sup>1403</sup> Cobra Matata, Kandro, and other early military leaders (no personal histories) have been identified as Ngiti.<sup>1404</sup> I also coded former security (Mobutu), former rebels (AFDL), and current rebels (RCD) under initial leadership.

The Ngiti militia were initially referred to as “the farmers,” then, “the self-defense,” (auto-défense), then “combatants” (combattants), and ultimately FRPI.<sup>1405</sup> The FRPI and the Ngiti militia were not initially synonymous, but eventually became so as Ngiti militia appropriated the FRPI name. The FRPI was formally inaugurated in October/November 2002. Bernard Kakado, often associated with the Ngiti militia, was a key player in the formation of FRPI. However, it also included many non-combatants (including refugees and IDPs) and political actors like Dr. Adirodu, an advisor to RCD-ML president Mbusa Nyamwisi. The FRPI was also formed from APC desire to counter the UPC. The FRPI shared common aspirations with the Ngiti militia, namely mounting ongoing resistance to UPC and Hema dominance in the region. The FRPI was more a movement or coordinating group than a formal organization.<sup>1406</sup>

I code 1 for riots because of SCAD event 4900133. Riots erupted over the death of Catholic Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko, who had previously been expelled from his post by occupying RCD (which was also the de facto governing force in Ituri at this time); locals thought the RCD may have had a hand in his death, thus the riots can be considered anti-state.<sup>1407</sup>

SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because this event occurred outside of the group formation province of Ituri, contestation variables are coded as 0. No qualifying Type 2 events occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

I code 0 for GTD (does not appear until 2005, only as FRPI). FRPI appears in UCD in 2002.

#### Front populaire pour la justice au Congo (FPJC)

AKAs: Popular Front for Justice in Congo, People’s Front for Justice in Congo

Many sources refer to this group as an offshoot or splinter of FRPI or even as FPJC-FRPI, which would preclude its inclusion in our dataset.<sup>1408</sup> However, some sources suggest that FPJC drew members from several

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<sup>1402</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” para. 532; Tamm, “Coalitions and Defections in a Context of Uncertainty – A Report from Ituri (Part II).”

<sup>1403</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 22; “Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui: Public Redacted Version -- Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,” para. 557; “Katanga/Ngudjolo Chui: Informal Weekly Summary, 26-30 September 2011.”

<sup>1404</sup> Office of the Prosecutor, “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Prosecution’s Observations on Article 25(3)(d),” para. 35; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 22.

<sup>1405</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” 591.

<sup>1406</sup> “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga: Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” 480–83, 486, 598; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 16.

<sup>1407</sup> “Rwanda; Uneasy Calm In Bukavu After Archbishop Kataliko’s Death,” *Panafrican News Agency*, October 5, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f460616f-9674-4581-a549-7b85c604564e/?context=1516831>; “DR Congo Declares Day of Mourning for Bukavu Archbishop,” *Agence France Presse -- English*, October 9, 2000, sec. International News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3c633cfc-674a-4501-9526-3d4681f736c0/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1408</sup> “DRC: Who Are the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI)?,” *International Business Times UK*, October 29, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/battle-control-drc-who-are-front-patriotic-resistance-ituri-frpi-1526289>;

Ituri militias; it was a collection of all who refused to demobilize and integrate in 2008.<sup>1409</sup> (FNI, FPJC, and UPC all demobilized during this period.<sup>1410</sup>) Evidence is mixed:

- These claims of diversity may have originated from the initial claims of FPJC leader Charif Manda (alias Cherif Manda, Chérif Manda, Sherif Manda, Sharif Manda, Sharrif Manda, Sheriff Manda, Serge Manda) that the group drew members from militias including the FRPI (ethnic Ngiti), FNI (ethnic Lendu), UPC (ethnic Hema) and others.<sup>1411</sup> It is unclear whether these claims were ever independently verified, and he would have motive to lie in an area plagued by ethnic conflict.
- An expert interview reaffirmed that many FPJC members, including the leader Charif Manda, were not from FRPI.<sup>1412</sup>
- Sources confirm that the initial leader of FPJC, Charif Manda came from FNI, not FRPI.<sup>1413</sup> On the other hand, at least one source which documents Charif Manda's witness testimony at the trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui indicates that Charif Manda was a high-ranking FRPI official who had first-hand knowledge of the organization's formation in DEC 2002 (i.e. before the FNI-FRPI merger, so the association would not be an artifact of the merger).<sup>1414</sup>

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"Congo-Kinshasa: More Than 30,000 Flee New Attacks By Splintered Rebel Factions," *UN News Service*, April 7, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200904070773.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Insecurity Continues to Bedevil Aid Work in Northeast," *IRIN*, September 17, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200909170671.html>; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "2008 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo," 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington: U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2009), <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118995.htm>; "Who's Who among Armed Groups in the East," *IRIN*, June 15, 2010, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89494/drc-who%E2%80%99s-who-among-armed-groups-east>; Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 323; "Update Briefing: Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from the East" (Kinshasa/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 5, 2011), 3, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b80-congo-the-electoral-process-seen-from-the-east.pdf>.

<sup>1409</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 38–39; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)," para. 121; "Congo-Kinshasa: Hoping for Peace in Ituri," *IRIN*, February 10, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200902100481.html>; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "2008 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo"; Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, "Mapping Conflict Motives: Province Orientale (DRC)" (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, March 17, 2010), 9,

[http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4851~v~Mapping\\_Conflict\\_Motives\\_Province\\_Orientale\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4851~v~Mapping_Conflict_Motives_Province_Orientale_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_.pdf); "Congo-Kinshasa: Affaire Nkunda, La Vraie Position de La Monuc," *La Prospérité*, October 9, 2008, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200810090302.html>.

<sup>1410</sup> "RDC : Les Éléments Du FPJC Appelés Par Leur Chef Arrêtés à Abandonner La Lutte Armée En Ituri," *Xinhua News Agency - French*, September 15, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e5ea5897-b7ea-4558-ad55-fc214dd20bec/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1411</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "2008 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo"; Hem Okaré, "Congo-Kinshasa: Bunia - Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Voit Le Jour En Ituri," *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, October 5, 2008, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200810050009.html>.

<sup>1412</sup> Expert Interview, Skype, August 24, 2017.

<sup>1413</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 38–39; Olivia Bueno, "Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui at the International Criminal Court: Appearance of Ituri Militia Fuels Speculation," *International Justice Monitor*, April 15, 2011, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2011/04/appearance-of-ituri-militia-fuels-speculation/>.

<sup>1414</sup> Jennifer Easterday, "Witness Claims Bogoro Attackers Included Women, Acted Like Civilians," *International Justice Monitor*, accessed December 8, 2017, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2011/05/witness-claims-bogoro-attackers-included-women-acted-like-civilians/>.

- Several accounts suggest that FPJC and FRPI fought in 2008.<sup>1415</sup> However, early accounts of FPJC fighting are generally confused; it appears as if journalists received these accounts secondhand and were not present in the field.
- Most FPJC operations occurred in the vicinity of Walendu Bindi (see below), a majority Ngiti area and traditional FRPI stronghold. This evidence would suggest that FPJC is mostly former FRPI.

On the balance of evidence, I suspect this qualifies as a FRPI splinter. However, it is likely not possible to know the balance of membership. It is unclear if a majority of members came from FRPI. Owing to these circumstances, we have included FPJC but at a downgraded certainty of only 1. I have coded other rebel for organizational history, as it appears the majority of members came from other Ituri militias, presumably a significant amount from FRPI.

Xinhua claimed that FPJC formed in JUN 2008, although I found no sources to corroborate this information.<sup>1416</sup> Most sources suggest that the group formed in SEPT or OCT 2008.<sup>1417</sup> A United Nations report suggests that the group was founded in SEPT 2008, but then within the same report indicates that FPJC claim that they conducted joint initiatives with CNDP in AUG 2008 (I found no corroboration elsewhere). I suspect accounts suggesting it emerged in OCT arise because that is when the group first appeared in media accounts. Although some accounts suggest later dates, the earliest account I found of naming occurred on 1 OCT 2008: FPJC leader Charif Manda declared the group's existence on Radio Okapi.<sup>1418</sup> However, its first attacks seem to predate this proclamation, occurring in SEPT (see below). I have coded 1 OCT 2008 as the name date. However, because of the contradicting information on the founding date, I coded it as AUG 2008 with downgraded certainty. I coded missing for name\_time and 1 for name\_time2 (as all suggested formation dates are within a year of the name date). I coded missing for clandestine.

Accounts of FPJC's goals were not particularly common. Several sources suggest the group sought compliance with former demobilization and amnesty agreements, which it claimed had not been honored. In addition, they sought the security of Ituri province and disarmament of the LRA.<sup>1419</sup> As such, I have coded 0 for all goal variables.

Reporting on initial attacks is quite confused, making it difficult to pinpoint the date of first attack. However, I suspect it was in the last few days of SEPT 2008. Although the earliest Radio Okapi article dates to 6 OCT 2009, I believe there may have been reporting delays; the information is jumbled and does not

<sup>1415</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "2008 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo"; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "30,000 Congolese Flee to Escape Fresh Conflict in Ituri District," UNHCR, April 7, 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2009/4/49db6d312/30000-congolese-flee-escape-fresh-conflict-ituri-district.html>.

<sup>1416</sup> "RDC : Les Éléments Du FPJC Appelés Par Leur Chef Arrêté À Abandonner ... La Lutte Armée En Ituri."

<sup>1417</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 38–39; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)," para. 121; "Congo-Kinshasa: Hoping for Peace in Ituri"; "Congo-Kinshasa: More Than 30,000 Flee New Attacks By Splintered Rebel Factions"; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "30,000 Congolese Flee to Escape Fresh Conflict in Ituri District"; "Congo-Kinshasa; Peace Pact Needs Continued Global Support - UN," *UN News Service*, April 9, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8e09bbb6-c187-471c-915d-4ec1e18d7f75/?context=1516831>; "Congo-Kinshasa: 2009 Human Rights Report: DRC," *United States Department of State (Washington, DC)*, March 17, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201003170829.html>; Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 323; Spittaels and Hilgert, "Mapping Conflict Motives: Province Orientale (DRC)," 9.

<sup>1418</sup> Okaré, "Congo-Kinshasa: Bunia - Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Voit Le Jour En Ituri"; "Ituri : FPJC, Une Nouvelle Milice Est Née," Radio Okapi, October 4, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/04/ituri-fpjc-une-nouvelle-milice-est-nee>.

<sup>1419</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)," para. 121; "Congo-Kinshasa: Hoping for Peace in Ituri"; "Update Report: The Democratic Republic of the Congo" (New York: Security Council Report, October 14, 2008), 5, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%2014%20October%202008\\_DRC.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%2014%20October%202008_DRC.pdf); Okaré, "Congo-Kinshasa: Bunia - Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Voit Le Jour En Ituri."

present a coherent narrative (most articles indicate clashes had started about a week beforehand).<sup>1420</sup> In all my searches, including a full reading of all Radio Okapi articles with an FPJC tag, I found no large attacks perpetrated by FPJC. As such, I coded never occurred. There were several isolated, small civilian attacks, never with more than about five victims. In a succession of attacks in Irumu territory (Ituri district, Orientale Province), FPJC killed a fifty-two year old man in an attack on the village of Muze and kidnapped two people from Bukou village; the bodies of the kidnapped individuals were later found mutilated in Sezabo. The date of attack was not given but the article ran on 21 APR 2009.<sup>1421</sup> The mutilation of the kidnapped individuals means the civilian deaths were probably deliberate. This appears to be the first attack on civilians. As such, I have coded 0 for `civ_attack_time` and 1 for `civ_attack_time2`. FPJC attacks and activity in the first year were spread throughout the following locales: Kombokado (20km SW of Bunia), Songolo (45km S of Bunia), Tchekele and Getty/Gety (Walendu Bindi, 60km S of Bunia), Lengabo (10km S of Bunia), Nyakunde (45km S of Bunia), Baipi and Bulanzabo (50km SW of Bunia), Potopoto (Walendu Bindi, 70km SW of Bunia), Marobo (40km S of Bunia), Bulanzabo and Akilimani (location unknown), Bahiti (40km SW of Bunia), Aveba (Walendu Bindi), Songolo (Walendu Bindi), Tchey (Walendu Bindi), Gavi (Walendu Bindi), Rwadenge (Walendu Bindi near Tcheyi), Ero (Walendu Bindi), Bukiringi (Walendu Bindi), Bukou (Irumu territory), Muze (Irumu territory), Ndugu 2 (Irumu territory), Matalatala (60km S of Bunia), Bialos (60km S of Bunia), Kpauma (60km S of Bunia), Djandra (Walendu Bindi), Kpuberi (Walendu Bindi), Toho (Walendu Bindi), Butembo (50km S of Bunia), Nyasona (50km S of Bunia), Fichama (50km S of Bunia), Gogi (90 km SW of Bunia), Ngombe Nyama (80km S of Bunia), Bogi (80km S of Bunia), Tchekele (60km S of Bunia), Boyante (location unknown), Djunde (20km S of Bunia), and Nyakeru (10 km S of Bunia).<sup>1422</sup> As such, it appears most of FPJC's

<sup>1420</sup> "Kotoni : 7 000 Déplacées sans Assistance Humanitaire," Radio Okapi, October 6, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/06/kotoni-7-000-deplacees-sans-assistance-humanitaire>; "Ituri : Le Village de Kombokabo Sous Contrôle Des Miliciens FPJC," Radio Okapi, October 9, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/09/ituri-le-village-de-kombokabo-sous-contrôle-des-miliciens-fpjc>; "Ituri : Environ 8 000 Déplacés sans Assistance à Bukiringi," Radio Okapi, October 7, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/07/ituri-environ-8-000-deplaces-sans-assistance-a-bukiringi>.

<sup>1421</sup> "Irumu : Nouvelle Incursion Des Miliciens Du FPJC, 3 Morts et 5 Femmes Violées," Radio Okapi, April 21, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/04/21/irumu-nouvelle-incursion-des-miliciens-du-fpjc-3-morts-et-5-femmes-violees>.

<sup>1422</sup> "Ituri : Le Village de Kombokabo Sous Contrôle Des Miliciens FPJC"; "Ituri : Plus de 40 000 Déplacés de Guerre Déjà Enregistrés," Radio Okapi, October 9, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/09/ituri-plus-de-40-000-deplaces-de-guerre-deja-enregistres>; "Ituri : L'armée Reprend Le Contrôle de Tchekele et Getty- Mission," Radio Okapi, October 10, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/10/ituri-larmee-reprend-le-contrôle-de-tchekele-et-getty-mission>; "Ituri : Le Calme Revient à Bunia," Radio Okapi, October 10, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/10/ituri-le-calme-revient-a-bunia>; "Ituri : Des Miliciens Du FPJC Se Livrent Au Pillage à Nyakunde," Radio Okapi, October 16, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/16/ituri-des-miliciens-du-fpjc-se-livrent-au-pillage-a-nyakunde>; "Ituri : La Milice FPJC s'affronte Aux FARDC à Bulanzabo," Radio Okapi, October 17, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/17/ituri-la-milice-fpjc-saffronte-aux-fardc-a-bulanzabo>; "Walendu-Bindi : Le Calme Est Revenu Après Les Affrontements," Radio Okapi, December 1, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/12/01/walendu-bindi-le-calme-est-revenu-apres-les-affrontements>; "Ituri : Violents Affrontements Entre FARDC et Miliciens," Radio Okapi, December 24, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/12/24/ituri-violents-affrontements-entre-fardc-et-miliciens>; "Walendu Bindi : Présence de 200 Miliciens FPJC et FRPI, Les Notables Lancent Un Cri d'alarme," Radio Okapi, February 26, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/02/26/walendu-bindi-presence-de-200-miliciens-fpjc-et-frpi-les-notables-lancent-un-cri-d%25e2%2580%2599alarme>; "Ituri : Les FARDC Attaqués Par Le FPJC à Bahiti," Radio Okapi, March 20, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/03/20/ituri-les-fardc-attaques-par-le-fpjc-a-bahiti>; "Bunia : Affrontements Entre Miliciens FPJC et FARDC, La Population Fuit," Radio Okapi, March 30, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/03/30/bunia-affrontements-entre-miliciens-fpjc-et-fardc-la-population-fuit>; "Walendu Pindi : Des Combats Opposent Les Miliciens Du FJPC et Les



activities occurred in or near Walendu Bindi, in Irumu territory of Orientale province. (The other Lendu chieftancies are north of Bunia in Djugu territory, not in Irumu.<sup>1423</sup>) However, several sources indicate that at least some planning occurred in Uganda. FPJC's leader Charif Manda was spent time in Uganda, where he was arrested in SEPT 2010.<sup>1424</sup> Interviews conducted by the UN Panel of Experts suggest that FPJC leaders may have located training camps in Uganda and used Kampala as a "rear base for political activity and fundraising," although the panel was not able to independently confirm the former.<sup>1425</sup> Despite this information, I have coded 1 for "rural" and 1 for "planning\_inside": the information regarding the training camps was not corroborated, and it appears only the high leadership was in Uganda; I suspect most operational planning still occurred within Irumu territory. However, I leave planning\_border as missing.

Charif Manda is the individual most frequently named as a leader of FPJC. As stated above, he was former FNI or FRPI; as such, I have coded current rebels under initial leadership. The only other individual named in multiple accounts is operations officer Adirodu Mbadu; I found no information on his personal history before joining FPJC.<sup>1426</sup> In addition, individual sources from within the first year named Victor Ngezayo and Gaston Kangele (political leaders of FPJC, stated in a UN reports which indicates corroboration by multiple sources), Colonel Stefano (personal history unknown), and Simon Manzikale (spokesperson,

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FARDC," Radio Okapi, April 13, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/04/13/walendu-pindi-des-combats-opposent-les-miliciens-du-fjpc-et-les-fardc>; "Irumu : Nouvelle Incursion Des Miliciens Du FPJC, 3 Morts et 5 Femmes Violées"; "Bunia: Les Miliciens de FPJC Encerclent Plusieurs Villages de Walendu Bindi," Radio Okapi, July 22, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2009/07/22/bunia-les-miliciens-de-fjpc-encerclent-plusieurs-villages-de-walendu-bindi>; "Bunia: Poursuite Des Combats Entre FARDC et Miliciens Du FPJC," Radio Okapi, July 24, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/07/24/bunia-poursuite-des-combats-entre-fardc-et-miliciens-du-fjpc>; "Bunia : Les FARDC Conquièrent 3 Nouveaux Villages, 12 Miliciens FPJC Tués," Radio Okapi, July 28, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2009/07/28/bunia-les-fardc-conquierent-3-nouveaux-villages-12-miliciens-fjpc-tues>; "Ituri : Attaque Des Miliciens Du FPJC à Gogi, 3 Enfants Enlevés et 41 Maisons Incendiées," Radio Okapi, August 15, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/08/15/ituri-attaque-des-miliciens-du-fjpc-a-gogi-3-enfants-enleves-et-41-maisons-incendiees>; "Bunia: Nouvelle Attaque Des Miliciens de FPJC à Ngombe Nyama et Bogi," Radio Okapi, August 31, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2009/08/31/bunia-nouvelle-attaque-des-miliciens-de-fjpc-a-ngombe-nyama-et-bogi>; "Bunia: Nouvelle Attaque Des Miliciens Du FPJC à Ngombenyama," Radio Okapi, September 7, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/09/07/bunia-nouvelle-attaque-des-miliciens-du-fjpc-a-ngombenyama>; "Irumu : FARDC et Miliciens FPJC s'affrontent Vers Tchekele," Radio Okapi, September 17, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/09/17/irumu-fardc-et-miliciens-fjpc-s%25e2%2580%2599affrontent-vers-tchekele>; "Ituri : Des Miliciens Du FPJC Pillent et Incendient Des Cases à Djunde et à Nyakeru," Radio Okapi, September 26, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/09/26/ituri-des-miliciens-du-fjpc-pillent-et-incendient-des-cases-a-djunde-et-a-nyakeru>.

<sup>1423</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 14; "Map of Ituri," IPIS, February 11, 2017, <http://ipisresearch.be/publication/map-of-district-of-ituri-a0/>.

<sup>1424</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 38–39; "4 Leaders Des Groupes Armés de l'Ituri Arrêtés En Ouganda," Radio Okapi, March 15, 2010, <https://www.radiookapi.net/en-bref/2010/03/15/4-leaders-des-groupes-armes-de-l%25e2%2580%2599ituri-arretes-en-ouganda>; "Bunia: Le Leader Du FPJC, Sharif Manda Aux Arrêts," Radio Okapi, September 4, 2010, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/09/04/bunia-le-leader-du-fjpc-sharif-manda-aux-arrets>; "Update Briefing: Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from the East," 3; Dan Fahey, "Guns and Butter: Uganda's Involvement in Northeastern Congo 2003-2009," *L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs*, 2010 2009, 362; Bueno, "Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui at the International Criminal Court: Appearance of Ituri Militia Fuels Speculation."

<sup>1425</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008)," paras. 122, 125.

<sup>1426</sup> "Ituri : Les FARDC Récupèrent à Nouveau Kagaba," Radio Okapi, October 4, 2008, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/10/04/ituri-les-fardc-recuperent-a-nouveau-kagaba>; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008)," para. 240.

personal history unknown).<sup>1427</sup> Victor Ngezayo was a very successful Tutsi businessman from North Kivu who had enjoyed ties with Mobutu; Ngezayo came to oppose the RCD and founded the opposition party MPC (Mouvement des patriotes congolais), but it does not appear that he ever held office.<sup>1428</sup> Gaston Kangele was formerly an RCD official and then later a CNRD official.<sup>1429</sup> As such, I have also coded former rebel under initial leadership. Other officers named, but not within the first year, include Baraka Ngona and Jean-Claude Baraka (possible alias of Baraka Ngona).<sup>1430</sup> One source indicates that Cobra Matata also became affiliated with the group at a later date.<sup>1431</sup>

Several sources suggest that the group was multi-ethnic.<sup>1432</sup> The ethnicity of most leadership is unknown, however; the only leaders of known leadership are Tutsi whereas most leadership was likely Ngiti or Lendu (because of relations with FRPI and FNI). One source suggests that ethnic Ngiti make up the majority of the parts of Irumu territory where FPJC was operating.<sup>1433</sup> Walendu Bindi, the Ngiti homeland, is in Irumu territory.

Several accounts published just after our one year window indicate that FPJC was taxing, exploiting, and selling gold.<sup>1434</sup> The group may have profited from mining within the first year, but I was unable to confirm

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<sup>1427</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008),” paras. 124–125; “Ituri : Violents Affrontements Entre FARDC et Miliciens.”

<sup>1428</sup> Miriam Berger, “The Goma Paradox,” Roads & Kingdoms, August 30, 2016,

<http://roadsandkingdoms.com/2016/the-goma-paradox/>; Kenny Katombe, “Congo Army Hunts Rebels Deep into Mountain Bases,” *Reuters*, October 31, 2013, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-congo-democratic-rebels/congo-army-hunts-rebels-deep-into-mountain-bases-idUKBRE99U17720131031>; Jason Stearns, “Goma Murder Mystery,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), October 22, 2009, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/10/goma-murder-mystery.html>; “Rebel Leader with a Difference,” *News24*, November 6, 2000, <https://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Rebel-leader-with-a-difference-20001106>; Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2010),

[https://books.google.com/books?id=PvpiDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT85&lpg=PT85&dq=Mudundu+40&source=bl&ots=NaatJaA44g&sig=zmqzLpQYB5hS8cXnBLGoBtkQnyQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHp\\_HHczUUhUITCYKH R04ATEQ6AEIPzAF#v=onepage&q=Mudundu%2040&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=PvpiDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT85&lpg=PT85&dq=Mudundu+40&source=bl&ots=NaatJaA44g&sig=zmqzLpQYB5hS8cXnBLGoBtkQnyQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHp_HHczUUhUITCYKH R04ATEQ6AEIPzAF#v=onepage&q=Mudundu%2040&f=false); Muriel Devey Malu-Malu, “Victor Ngezayo, l’hôtellerie Comme Seconde Nature,” *Jeune Afrique.Com* (blog), February 17, 2011, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/192696/archives-thematique/victor-ngezayo-l-h-tellerie-comme-seconde-nature/>; Geenen, *African Artisanal Mining from the Inside Out*.

<sup>1429</sup> Emmy Allio, “Congo-Kinshasa: Congo Rebel Held,” *New Vision (Kampala)*, December 15, 1999,

<http://allafrica.com/stories/199912150030.html>; “Congo Talks,” *New Vision*, January 10, 2001,

[http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1041721/congo-talks](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1041721/congo-talks); IRIN, “IRIN-CEA Update 806 [19991122],” University of Pennsylvania -- African Studies Center, November 22, 1999,

[http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin\\_112299b.html](http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_112299b.html); “L’UMPC, Un Nouveau Mouvement Regroupant Cinq Mouvements Dissidents Du RCD-Goma, Est Porté Sur Les Fonts Baptismaux,” *Le Soft International*, October 3, 2002, <http://www.lesoftonline.net/articles/lumpc-un-nouveau-mouvement-regroupant-cinq-mouvements-dissidents-du-rcd-goma-est-port%C3%A9-sur>.

<sup>1430</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008),” para. 240; “Who’s Who among Armed Groups in the East.”

<sup>1431</sup> “Update Briefing: Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from the East,” 3.

<sup>1432</sup> “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 Vol.1” (United States Department of State, December 2010), 139,

[https://books.google.com/books?id=qHolsCdgvFsC&pg=PA139&lpg=PA139&dq=FPJC+congo&source=bl&ots=R D\\_DHL27gR&sig=VqlKmlb9jgKY7LAcVgGPU3obDu8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwisoqfpjVAhXLWT4KH YMDCGY4ChDoAQgjMAA#v=onepage&q=FPJC%20congo&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=qHolsCdgvFsC&pg=PA139&lpg=PA139&dq=FPJC+congo&source=bl&ots=R D_DHL27gR&sig=VqlKmlb9jgKY7LAcVgGPU3obDu8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwisoqfpjVAhXLWT4KH YMDCGY4ChDoAQgjMAA#v=onepage&q=FPJC%20congo&f=false); “Ituri : FPJC, Une Nouvelle Milice Est Née”; Spittaels and Hilgert, “Mapping Conflict Motives: Province Orientale (DRC),” 9; Okaré, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bunia - Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Voit Le Jour En Ituri.”

<sup>1433</sup> Okaré, “Congo-Kinshasa: Bunia - Un Nouveau Groupe Armé Voit Le Jour En Ituri.”

<sup>1434</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008),” para. 242; “Ore Smuggling Grows Apace in East Congo,” *Africa Mining Intelligence*, October 28, 2009, sec. Exploration & Production, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/69923154-a9c5-493e-b461-ba17d7e906f4/?context=1516831>; Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 38–39.

whether this is the case, so I left it as missing. The group may have also benefited from the personal wealth of Victor Ngezayo, although again, I have no evidence of whether this was the case. Finally, the group appears to have developed links to the CNDP, apparently within the first year.<sup>1435</sup> As such, other is coded as missing under initial resources.

The group had largely fizzled out by 2010, but residual attacks on civilians occurred just long enough after formation to qualify it for viable\_civ: on 20 DEC 2011, FPJC pillaged Masome village (Irumu territory), taking hostage and raping five women; on 24 JAN 2012, FPJC attacked and pillaged Bubongo village (Irumu territory), opening fire on inhabitants but failing to inflict any casualties.<sup>1436</sup> One source indicated they were attempting to control Gety area in FEB 2012, but I found no sources to corroborate this information.<sup>1437</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for viable\_civ.

I code 1 for riots (SCAD event 4900335).

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but because these events occurred outside of the group formation province of Ituri, contestation variables are coded as 0. One Type 2 event occurred during this time, but nonlocally. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Forces de résistance patriotique d'Ituri-Rambo (FRPI-R)

AKAs: FRPI-Rambo, see above for FRPI variations

This group was tagged in a single ACLED event. Looking at the original article, I think ACLED coders mistook “Rambo” camp to mean an FRPI faction, when I think it was just the name of a camp as in physical place.<sup>1438</sup>

**\*Mai Mai Kambala** – Several credible sources (IRIN, HRW) suggest that the original Katangese Mai Mai were united under a commander named Kambala.<sup>1439</sup> However, at this stage the Mai Mai to not meet our inclusion criteria because they were pro-government forces. The Mai Mai were encouraged or even organized, funded, and armed by Kinshasa during the Second Congolese War. They fought alongside Congolese military forces (at this time FAC) against anti-government forces from Rwanda, Uganda, and their proxies (particularly RCD).<sup>1440</sup> Excluded – does not target the government, organized by the state.

<sup>1435</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 38–39; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 18(d) of Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008),” paras. 123–124.

<sup>1436</sup> “Province Orientale: 5 Femmes Prises En Otage Puis Violées Par Les Miliciens Du FPJC à Irumu,” Radio Okapi, December 21, 2011, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/12/21/province-orientale-5-femmes-prises-en-otage-puis-violees-par-les-miliciens-du-fpjc-irumu>; “Irumu: Des Miliciens Du FPJC Attaquent et Pillent Le Village de Bubongo,” Radio Okapi, January 24, 2012, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/01/24/irumu-des-miliciens-du-fpjc-attaquent-pillent-le-village-de-bubongo>.

<sup>1437</sup> Southern Africa Resource Watch and Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, “Conflict Gold to Criminal Gold: The New Face of Artisanal Gold Mining in Congo” (Southern Africa Resource Watch, 2012), 37, [http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/from\\_conflict\\_gold\\_to\\_criminal\\_gold.pdf](http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/from_conflict_gold_to_criminal_gold.pdf).

<sup>1438</sup> “RDC : L’armée Mène Des Opérations Contre Les Miliciens Du FRPI En Ituri,” Africatime.com, July 30, 2015, [http://fr.africatime.com/republique\\_democratique\\_du\\_congo/articles/rdc-larmee-mene-des-operations-contre-les-miliciens-du-frpi-en-ituri](http://fr.africatime.com/republique_democratique_du_congo/articles/rdc-larmee-mene-des-operations-contre-les-miliciens-du-frpi-en-ituri).

<sup>1439</sup> Eva Gilliam, “DRC: Mai Mai Leader Gedeon of Manono Territory - Known ‘Good Guy’, Accused Cannibal,” Text, ReliefWeb, April 14, 2004, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-mai-mai-leader-gedeon-manono-territory-known-good-guy-accused>; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, “War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga,” July 21, 2006, 2–3.

<sup>1440</sup> “Congo: Bloody Katanga,” *Strategy Page*, April 23, 2013, <https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/congo/articles/20130423.aspx>; Gilliam, “DRC: Mai Mai Leader Gédéon of Manono Territory - Known ‘good Guy’, Accused Cannibal”; “DR Congo: Mai Mai Warlord Must Face Justice,” *Human Rights Watch*, May 18, 2006, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/05/18/dr-congo-mai-mai-warlord-must-face-justice>; Georges Berghez, “GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS” (Brussels: Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la securite, 2015), 8,

### Forces d'autodéfense populaire (FAP)

AKAs: Popular Self-Defense Forces, People's Self-Defense Forces, Forces d'Intervention Populaire (FIP), Popular Intervention Forces, People's Intervention Forces, Simba

This term seems to generally be used to describe Mai Mai from the Second Congo war that were organized in a more top-down fashion, with more direct control of the government.<sup>1441</sup> Excluded – organized by the state.

### Mai Mai Gédéon

AKAs: Mayi Mayi Militia (Gédéon Kyungu Mutanda)

NOTE: This group was not finished owing to resource constraints. It may or may not qualify for inclusion but is not included in the data at present.

Mai Mai Gédéon is a splinter faction from Mai Mai Kambala.<sup>1442</sup> Mai Mai Gédéon has been chosen for inclusion, whereas Mai Mai Kambala was not, for two reasons: (1) The death of Kambala led to infighting within the Katangese Mai Mai. At this point, Mai Mai began competing with each other to control territory.<sup>1443</sup> (2) As the Second Congolese war drew to a close, government support for the Mai Mai dwindled. Unwilling to disarm and demobilize, the Mai Mai turned against and began to attack the Congolese armed forces and the local population. Although this happened gradually (dates vary, indicating there is likely no precise turning point), it roughly coincides with the splintering of Mai Mai Kambala.<sup>1444</sup> For these reasons, I have chosen to select the the initiation of Mai Mai Gédéon as the incident of rebel group formation.

Kambala died in NOV 2001.<sup>1445</sup> Gédéon first engaged other Mai Mai later that year (skirmishes against Mai Mai Makabe in Kasunge).<sup>1446</sup> As such, I have indicated DEC 2001 as founding date and first small attack (no casualty counts given). The earliest recorded specific instance of Mai Mai Gédéon targeting civilians was . It is important to note that generalized reports of civilian abuse predate this specific incident, so the first targeting of civilians may have occurred before this date.<sup>1447</sup>

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[http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2015/Rapport\\_2015-3.pdf](http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2015/Rapport_2015-3.pdf); "Katanga: Tensions in DRC's Mineral Heartland" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 3, 2016), 5, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/239-katanga-tensions-in-drcs-mineral-heartland.pdf>; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," 1–3; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA" (Lubumbashi: Organisations de la Société du Katanga, March 26, 2013), 5, <http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Rapport-Inse%CC%81curite%CC%81-Katanga-Mars-2013.pdf>.

<sup>1441</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 8; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," 2; Jason Stearns, "Mai-Mai Yakutumba: Resistance and Racketeering in Fizi, South Kivu," Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 22–23, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/mai-mai-yakutumba#.WTLKXmjyIV>.

<sup>1442</sup> Gilliam, "DRC: Mai Mai Leader Gédéon of Manono Territory - Known 'good Guy', Accused Cannibal"; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," 2–3.

<sup>1443</sup> Gilliam, "DRC: Mai Mai Leader Gédéon of Manono Territory - Known 'good Guy', Accused Cannibal"; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," 2–3.

<sup>1444</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 8; "DR Congo: Mai Mai Warlord Must Face Justice"; "Congo: Bloody Katanga"; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," 3; Elsa Buchanan, "Will Surrendered Congolese Warlord 'Gédéon' Kyungu Mutanga Avoid His Life Sentence?," *International Business Times UK*, October 13, 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/will-surrendered-congolese-warlord-gede-kyungu-mutanga-avoid-his-life-sentence-1586261>.

<sup>1445</sup> Gilliam, "DRC: Mai Mai Leader Gédéon of Manono Territory - Known 'good Guy', Accused Cannibal"; Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," 2–3.

<sup>1446</sup> Van Woudenberg to Ngoy, "War Crimes Allegedly Committed by the Mai Mai in Katanga," July 21, 2006, 3.

<sup>1447</sup> Ibid., 1; Gilliam, "DRC: Mai Mai Leader Gédéon of Manono Territory - Known 'good Guy', Accused Cannibal."

I have marked one on self-defense groups for organizational history, since Mai Mai were characterized as self-defense groups protecting Katanga from foreign aggression. I have also marked one for current regime security for initial leadership. Since the Mai Mai had existed openly, Mai Mai Gédéon never operated clandestinely. Although no formal announcement seems to have been issued, I indicated the name date as identical to formation date.

Gédéon and his men surrendered to MONUC forces on \*\* MAY 2006. On \*\*\* 2009, Gédéon and twenty other Mai Mai were tried and found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death. As the DRC has not actually executed individuals recently, Gédéon was imprisoned in Lubumbashi.

#### **Mai Mai Gédéon (revival)**

AKAs: Mayi Mayi Militia (Gédéon Kyungu Mutanda), Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai Kata Katanga, Mai Mai Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai militia (Bakanta Katanga), Bakata Katanga Communal Militia, Mouvement des Indépendantistes Révolutionnaires Africains (MIRA), Movement of Independentist African Revolutionaries

Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga and 150 of his combatants surrendered to MONUC on 12 MAY 2006.<sup>1448</sup> He and twenty other Mai Mai were convicted for crimes against humanity in 2009; Gédéon and six others were sentenced to death. Despite the sentence, DRC has not practiced capital punishment in some years, so Gédéon was left in a Lubumbashi prison.<sup>1449</sup> On 7 SEPT 2011, an unidentified armed group staged a prison break, freeing Gédéon and over 900 others.<sup>1450</sup> It appears that Mai Mai Gédéon began operating again following Gédéon's escape (see below). Because the gap was over five years from surrender to prison break, this group qualifies for inclusion as a revival. Because of this history, I have coded one for former rebels and current security under leadership (the Katanga Mai Mai were originally pro-government and then evolved into rebel groups; see Mai Mai Gédéon and Mai Mai Kambala above) and missing for other rebels under organizational history (I suspect an overlap in membership but have no direct evidence for it). I have coded the escape date as the formation date, although I have lowered the certainty to reflect that it may not have been instantaneous.

Unfortunately, reporting on violent activity in Katanga outside Lubumbashi tends to be generalized and does not convey information on individual attacks. Generalized accounts indicate an uptick in violent activity starting in 2011 and 2012, sometimes naming Gédéon as suspect, and do mention attacks on civilians. Most these accounts emanate from Gédéon's former stomping grounds, the "death triangle" of Mitwaba-Pweto-Manono, and surrounding area.<sup>1451</sup> As such, I have coded the rural variable as 1 and planning inside as 1. I found mention of only two specific attacks: (1) a suspected Mai Mai Gédéon attack on a FARDC camp in Mitwaba in early DEC 2011, and (2) a suspected attack at an unspecified location in

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<sup>1448</sup> "DR Congo: Mai Mai Warlord Must Face Justice"; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 8.

<sup>1449</sup> Buchanan, "Will Surrendered Congolese Warlord 'Gédéon' Kyungu Mutanga Avoid His Life Sentence?"; "DR Congo: Militia Leader Guilty in Landmark Trial."

<sup>1450</sup> "Congo: Bloody Katanga"; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 12; Maud Jullien, "Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo's Cash Cow to Secede," *BBC News*, August 12, 2013, sec. Africa, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23422038>; Buchanan, "Will Surrendered Congolese Warlord 'Gédéon' Kyungu Mutanga Avoid His Life Sentence?"; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTENTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA," 3.

<sup>1451</sup> "Congo: Bloody Katanga"; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 13–14; Jullien, "Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo's Cash Cow to Secede"; "Katanga: Tensions in DRC's Mineral Heartland," 19; Andrew McGregor, "Refworld | New Offensive Expected Against Mai Mai Militias in Mineral-Rich Katanga," Refworld, April 4, 2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/534f99be4.html>; "D.R. Congo's Neglected 'Triangle of Death': The Challenges of the Protection of Civilians in Katanga" (Kinshasa: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2013), [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/DRC/Final\\_version\\_Protection\\_Report\\_Katanga\\_11.04.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/DRC/Final_version_Protection_Report_Katanga_11.04.pdf); "RAPPORT CIRCONSTENTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA," 3.



AUG 2012.<sup>1452</sup> I have coded the former as the small attack date, but have left the large attack date as missing. Owing to Gédéon's history and the generalized accounts, I highly suspect that attacks on civilians occurred. However, because I could not find specific accounts of such attacks, I have coded all civilian attack variables as missing. Likewise, I have coded the name date as missing, although I did not code the group as clandestine – lack of naming seems to be because of reporting insufficiencies, not deliberate attempts at remaining clandestine. However, we know because of the Mitwaba attack that naming definitely occurred within a year.

Although I have no detailed accounts, I highly suspect that Gédéon received outside support from Katangese elites during the first year of revival. Katangese political elite had previously supplied him with arms, and were also later accused of supporting the wave of violent Katangese activities beginning circa 2010. These elites include John Numbi, former Inspector-General of the Congolese National Police, and Daniel Mulanda Ngoy Nyanga, a former president of the Independent National Electoral Commission. John Numbi has also been accused of playing a role in the prison break that freed Gédéon.<sup>1453</sup> In addition, one account indicates that CORAK, which some have implicated in the prison break, began supplying Mai Mai Gédéon following the revival (no specific date given).<sup>1454</sup> As such, I have coded missing for other and none under initial resources.

Under contestation, I coded 1 for protest (SCAD event 4900421).

SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. One Type 2 event (Event ID 4900391) occurred during this time in the group formation province of Haut-Katanga.

No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

I found one account from 2015 suggesting that Gédéon was attempting to launch an affiliated political party, Mouvement des Indépendantistes Révolutionnaires Africains (MIRA). See below for group's affiliation with Kata Katanga.

Most accounts of Kata Katanga from the 2013-2014 era indicate that Gédéon was still active in leadership of the group, which I have assumed to mean that his group as a whole was still active. It was difficult to determine whether this group qualified as viable or only viable\_civ, but I found at least two Kata Katanga attacks initiated against FARDC during OCT and NOV 2014 (8761DRC and 8866DRC/8870DRC respectively) which qualify this group as viable.<sup>1455</sup> It should be noted, however, that this group was generally on the decline by this time; those two qualifying attacks were the last attacks Kata Katanga initiated against FARDC, as far as I am aware. In other words, the group barely qualified as viable (although it would certainly have qualified as viable\_civ otherwise).

#### Coordination pour le référendum et l'autodétermination du Katanga (CORAK)

AKAs: CORAC, Coordination for a Referendum on Self-Determination for Katanga, Coordination pour le référendum et l'autodétermination du Katanga-Kata Katanga, CORAK-Kata Katanga, Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai Kata Katanga, Mai Mai Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai militia (Bakanta Katanga), Bakata Katanga Communal Militia

NOTE: In ACLED only as Bakata Katanga (see entry below).

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<sup>1452</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 12; Jullien, "Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo's Cash Cow to Secede."

<sup>1453</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 8, 16–18; "Katanga: Tensions in DRC's Mineral Heartland," 5.

<sup>1454</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 12, 14; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2011 (2011)," 53.

<sup>1455</sup> On Gédéon's ongoing involvement in Kata Katanga, see Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 20; On NOV attack, see "Deux Attaques Des Miliciens Bakata Katanga Enregistrées À Mitwaba," *Radio Okapi*, November 4, 2014, <http://www.radiookapi.net/regions/katanga/2014/11/04/deux-attaques-des-miliciens-bakata-katanga-enregistrees-mitwaba>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Offensive de L'armée Contre Les Rebelles Mai-Mai Kata Katanga," *Radio France Internationale*, November 6, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201411061167.html>.



According to one source, this group originated as a political organization. CORAK broke off from the Katangese Notables (not included, no formal structure) in 2008. It appears that its early work was non-violent: requesting that the UN back Katangese secession, writing reports claiming Katanga's historical independent status, etc. In 2010 it unilaterally proclaimed the Federal Multiracial Republic of Katanga. However, at some point (date unspecified, although presumably in either 2010 or early 2011), it split into two factions over disagreement on necessity of violent tactics. The branch led by Ngonga Tshinyama began recruiting militia members.<sup>1456</sup> However, other sources name Matuka Munana Tshitshi Simon as leader; he is also associated with the declaration pleading for recognition of a Federal Multiracial Republic of Katanga.<sup>1457</sup> According to the UN, Matuka Munana Tshitshi Simon is the political leader, whereas Tshinyama Ngonga Ya Cingo Gédéon (not Gédéon of Mai Mai Gédéon) is the military leader.<sup>1458</sup> It appears to have retained use of the name CORAK. Because it originated as a political organization, one is coded for party under organizational history. Because of the declaration, goal is coded as secession. CORAK begins meeting our inclusion criteria when it turned to violent means and began recruiting militia members. Because its leadership was named but no personal histories indicated relevant positions, I have coded zero for leadership variables.

I found no evidence that it tried to keep its identity clandestine, although it does not seem to claim its attacks (coded missing for clandestine). The name date is listed as 4 FEB 2011 (small attack, see below), as this is when its violent activity became clear.

Beyond its prior existence as a political party/organization, Katangese Tigers are relevant to its organizational history. There are many Katangese Tigers within CORAK.<sup>1459</sup> One source specified that CORAK was "born on the cinders" of the FLNC.<sup>1460</sup> However, there is evidence that young people have been active in recent Katangese rebel groups, likely including CORAK.<sup>1461</sup> I do not believe CORAK should be viewed as merely an FLNC successor. I considered coding other rebels under organizational history to reflect the Katangese Tigers membership as I did below for CPK; however, unlike with CPK, I have no gauge for measuring just how much of CORAK Katangese Tigers represent. As such, I have left other rebels as missing under organizational history.

CORAK's first small attack appears to have been on Lubumbashi airport on 4-5 FEB 2011. A single source attributed the attack to CPK, whereas six attribute it to CORAK.<sup>1462</sup> It was suspected in several

<sup>1456</sup> Erik Kennes and Miles Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa: Fighting Their Way Home* (Indiana University Press, 2016), 185,

<https://books.google.com/books?id=WCFjDAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=Katangese+tigers&source=bl&ots=7svzHot60u&sig=Jlblooh8wKihhuEq4yKoBXsUv0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwium7HHhu7UAhWEKiyKHUK4CpkQ6AEILjAC#v=onepage&q=Katangese%20tigers&f=false>.

<sup>1457</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 12.

<sup>1458</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," para. 50.

<sup>1459</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 12; Jullien, "Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo's Cash Cow to Secede."

<sup>1460</sup> "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA," 5.

<sup>1461</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 17–18;

Trésor Kibangula, "Katanga : Qui Se Cache Derrière Les Kata Katanga ?," *JeuneAfrique.com*, May 14, 2013, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/137482/politique/katanga-qui-se-cache-derri-re-les-kata-katanga/>; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA."

<sup>1462</sup> "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA," 5; Jullien, "Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo's Cash Cow to Secede"; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 11; Matshi, "Congo-Kinshasa: Accrochage Entre FARDC et Un Groupe Armé À Lubumbashi - 4 Morts," *Le Potentiel*, December 24, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201212240932.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Début Du Procès Des Rebelles Indépendantistes Du Katanga," *Radio Okapi*, December 28, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201112281259.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Attaque de L'aéroport de Lubumbashi En 2011 - Poursuite Du Procès Des Militaires de La Garde

subsequent attacks, none of which qualified as a large attack.<sup>1463</sup> All attacks in which CORAK was implicated or suspected within its first year were in or near Lubumbashi, I have coded “rural” as 1 and “planning\_inside” as 1.

Regarding attacks on civilians, I did not find specific evidence thereof. Some reports from 2013 indicate attacks on civilians which were not clearly attributed and could have been CORAK.<sup>1464</sup> However, it is more likely these attacks were Mai Mai Gédéon, as they occurred within its operational zone.<sup>1465</sup> I have coded 0 for attack on civilians within three months or within one year, because all specifically attributed attacks during this era were military or political targets. I have coded missing for civilian attack, however, because of attribution issues arising when Kata Katanga emerged (specific attributions not known, see below). For the same reason, I have coded large attack as missing.

See below for information regarding CORAK’s affiliation with Kata Katanga. For reasons listed there, initial resources – other is left as missing, rather than zero.

Because of the emergence of the Kata Katanga movement, we have not been able to verify whether CORAK specifically remained active three years after its emergence. (Attacks are attributed to Kata Katanga, rather than individual organizations within the movement.) As such, we have left all viability variables as missing for this group.

#### \*Front de libération nationale du Congo (FLNC)

AKAs: Front de libération nationale congolaise, Front nationale pour la libération du Congo (FNLC), Front for Congolese National Liberation, Congo National Liberation Front, Katangese Tigers, Katangan Tigers, Katangese Tigers, Katangese gendarmes

This is a group who originally served as gendarmes in Moïse Tshombe’s independent Katanga. Following Tshombe’s demise, they sought refuge in neighboring Angola, where they founded the FLNC in 1968. They twice attempted to invade Katanga from Angola, first in 1977 and again in 1978 (known as the Shaba wars). During the First Congo War, members crossed back into Katanga to fight alongside Laurent Kabila’s AFDL against the Mobutu regime. It’s unclear if a centralized FLNC organization still exists, but members still refer to themselves as Katangese Tigers.<sup>1466</sup> Excluded – predates our period of interest. Even if considered a revival, it would have started in 1996.

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Républicaine,” *Radio Okapi*, August 15, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208150845.html>; “Attaque de L’aéroport de Lubumbashi – Une Vingtaine de Militaires de La Garde Républicaine Condamnés,” *Le Congolais*, November 15, 2012, <http://www.lecongolais.cd/attaque-de-laeroport-de-lubumbashi-une-vingtaine-de-militaires-de-la-garde-republicaine-condamnes/>; Erik Kennes and Miles Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa: Fighting Their Way Home* (Indiana University Press, 2016), 185, <https://books.google.com/books?id=WCFjDAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=Katangese+tigers&source=bl&ots=7svzHot60u&sig=Jlblooh8wKihhuEeq4yKoBXsUv0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwium7HHhu7UAhWEKiYKHUk4CpkQ6AEILjAC#v=onepage&q=Katangese%20tigers&f=false>.

<sup>1463</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Attaque À Lubumbashi D’un Convoi de Matériel Électoral - Négligence Coupable,” *Le Potentiel*, December 2, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201112020268.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Lubumbashi - 4 Morts Dans Un Échange Des Tirs Entre Militaires et Inciviques,” *Radio Okapi*, December 21, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201212211134.html>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Lubumbashi - Attaque D’un Dépôt D’armes Du Camp Major Nvangu,” *Radio Okapi*, November 27, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/20111270186.html>; Berghezan, “GROUPE ARMÉ AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS,” 11–14; “RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA,” 5.

<sup>1464</sup> “Congo: Bloody Katanga”; Jullien, “Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo’s Cash Cow to Secede.”

<sup>1465</sup> Berghezan, “GROUPE ARMÉ AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS,” 14.

<sup>1466</sup> “Congo: Bloody Katanga”; Berghezan, “GROUPE ARMÉ AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS,” 10; “Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland,” 4; “Katangese “Tigers” Could Turn Against Kabila In His Home Province,” Utusan Online, August 27, 1998, [http://www1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=1998&dt=0827&pub=Utusan\\_Express&sec=Features&pg=fe\\_02.htm](http://www1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=1998&dt=0827&pub=Utusan_Express&sec=Features&pg=fe_02.htm); Kennes and Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa*.

### \*Congrès des peuples du Katanga (CPK)

AKAs: Congrès du peuple Katangais, Congrès du peuple Katangais, Congrès progressiste du Katanga, Mai Mai CPK, Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai Kata Katanga, Mai Mai Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai militia (Bakanta Katanga), Bakata Katanga Communal Militia

This group is not in ACLED, but in reading about Katanga (searching for CORAK, Kata Katanga, and Mai Mai Gédéon), I found it consistently named in regard to the arrest of seven individuals on 23 MAY 2010. The individuals planned to remove the DRC flag and hoist the Katangese independence flag in Lubumbashi's main square; they also planned to target the seat of the provincial government, the Vangu military camp, and the post office. They had in their possession 3 AK-47s, one shipper, and two Katangese independence flags. The arrestees claimed to be part of the Congrès des peuples du Katanga led by Kazadi Mutombo Tanda Imena (Tandaimena, Tanda Emena, Ntanda Imena, Ntandaimena). Five of the arrestees claimed to be Katangese Tigers.<sup>1467</sup> Because of this incident, I have listed 2010 as a tentative formed date. I have also listed a 1 for clandestine 2 and 1 for name\_duress, as their identity was not revealed until they were captured and questioned. This incident is also listed as the first small attack and as a name date.

Katangese Tigers are common in CPK membership.<sup>1468</sup> However, I do not consider it a revival for several reasons: (1) While former members of the FLNC are often referred to as Katangese Tigers, including in fighting from 1996 on, I found no evidence that FLNC continued to function as a structured organization into the 1990s and 2000s. (2) There is evidence that many young people have been generally active in the more recent armed groups, namely that the UNAFEC party leader banned use of party apparel because young members were sighted wearing it while committing acts of violence.<sup>1469</sup> Nonetheless, Katangese Tigers probably played a significant role in organizational development (for instance, see aforementioned attack), so I have coded 1 for other\_rebels under organizational history.

No individual leaders were named beyond Tanda Imena. As such, I have coded 0 for most initial leadership variables. However, I left former rebels as missing to convey the possibility of Katangese Tigers in leadership ranks.

Several sources associate this CPK group with a Congrès du peuple katangais that in 1992 applied for OAU recognition as an official liberation movement for separatist Katanga.<sup>1470</sup> (The petition did not succeed.) However, one scholar points out a slight name differentiation – the new organization is Congrès des peuples du Katanga – as well as the fact that no one has actually established links between the 1992 group and more recently active CPK.<sup>1471</sup> Even if this CPK is the same as the 1992 group, there was no evidence that the latter planned or conducted violence. As such, I have coded the groups formation as having likely occurred in 2010, as the first identification of the group occurred on 23 MAY 2010. However, I have coded party as missing, rather than 0 or 1, for organizational history. I still coded the goal as secession, however, owing to the symbolism of the Katangese independence flag in the MAY 2010 incidence.

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<sup>1467</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 11; Freddy Mulongo, "Lubumbashi: Le Camp Militaire «Major Vangu» Dévasté et Ses Munitions Pillées Dans La Nuit !," *Réveil FM International*, November 28, 2011, <http://reveil-fm.com/index.php/reveil-fm.com2011/11/28/1885-lubumbashi-le-camp-militaire-major-vangu-devaste-et-ses-munitions-pillees-dans-la-nuit>; Radio Okapi, "RDC/Troubles de Lubumbashi : 7 suspects arrêtés," Text, *ReliefWeb*, (May 28, 2010), <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rdc-troubles-de-lubumbashi-7-suspects-arr%C3%AAt%C3%A9s>.

<sup>1468</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 12.

<sup>1469</sup> Ibid., 17–18; Kibangula, "Katanga : Qui Se Cache Derrière Les Kata Katanga ?"; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA."

<sup>1470</sup> "Congo: Bloody Katanga"; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 10–11.

<sup>1471</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 11.

In addition to the initial arrest incident, CPK may have committed an attack on the Lubumbashi airport in JAN 2011 (I could find only vague references).<sup>1472</sup> CPK probably participated in additional incidents, but there are several identification problems: (1) The assailants in many Katangese attacks were never clearly identified. (2) Following the emergence of Kata Katanga (see below), all separatist activity tends to be attributed to that movement rather than individual groups within the movement. It is also possible that the various separatist groups collaborate. Because of these identification problems, I have coded large attack and civilian attacks as missing. However, I have coded that civilian attacks did not occur within the first three months or first year, as there was no evidence of any attacks on Katangese civilians by any group during that period. In addition, I have coded 0 for “rural” and for “planning inside”, as all attacks specifically implicating CPK within the first year occurred in or near Lubumbashi.

Under contestation, I coded 1 for protest (SCAD events 4900389, 4900391) and riots (4900389).

See below for information regarding CPK’s affiliation with Kata Katanga. For reasons listed there, initial resources – other is left as missing, rather than zero.

SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. One Type 2 event (Event ID 4900391) occurred during this time in the group formation province of Haut-Katanga. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Because of the emergence of the Kata Katanga movement, we have not been able to verify whether CPK specifically remained active three years after its emergence. (Attacks are attributed to Kata Katanga, rather than individual organizations within the movement.) As such, we have left all viability variables as missing for this group.

### Kata Katanga

AKAs: Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai Kata Katanga, Mai Mai Bakata Katanga, Mai Mai militia (Bakanta Katanga), Bakata Katanga Communal Militia

This group is frequently reported on but little understood. Kata Katanga means “cut off Katanga” in Swahili, referring to secessionist tendencies. The UN Panel of Experts describes Kata Katanga as “a loosely structured armed group that brings together individuals and groups advocating the secession of Katanga Province from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”<sup>1473</sup> Various sources say that Kata Katanga is primarily the work of/under the direction of Mai Mai Gédéon, CORAK, or CPK – none consistently, frequently conflicting, sometimes even within the same source.<sup>1474</sup> It is unclear who is the driving force and whether the groups actually coordinate or just borrow the name of Kata Katanga. It is better characterized as a movement or alliance than a merging of the three groups.

One source tracked the emergence of “Kata Katanga”: the earliest I saw the term was that some members of the commandos who broke Gédéon out of prison had the expression displayed on their clothing.<sup>1475</sup> In OCT

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<sup>1472</sup> Ibid.; Agence Congolaise de Presse, “Lubumbashi :Transfert Des 245 Miliciens Maï-Maï À Kinshasa,” *Ambassade de La RD Congo Près Le Benelux et l’Union Européenne*, accessed July 4, 2017, [http://www.ambardc.eu/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=512:lubumbashi-transfert-des-245-miliciens-mai-mai-a-kinshasa&catid=41:top-headlines](http://www.ambardc.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=512:lubumbashi-transfert-des-245-miliciens-mai-mai-a-kinshasa&catid=41:top-headlines).

<sup>1473</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” para. 83.

<sup>1474</sup> Ibid., paras. 83–84; “Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012),” paras. 47–50; Maurice Wa Ku Demba, “Congo-Kinshasa: Une Quête Violente de L’autonomie Au Katanga,” *InterPress Service*, April 10, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201304101298.html>; Berghezan, “GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS,” 14, 16; Jullien, “Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo’s Cash Cow to Secede”; Kibangula, “Katanga : Qui Se Cache Derrière Les Kata Katanga ?”; “Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland,” 18; Agence Congolaise de Presse, “Lubumbashi :Transfert Des 245 Miliciens Maï-Maï À Kinshasa”; McGregor, “Refworld | New Offensive Expected Against Mai Mai Militias in Mineral-Rich Katanga”; “RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA,” 6.

<sup>1475</sup> Berghezan, “GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS,” 12.

2012, a group of fighters presented themselves in Mupanga (Mitwaba) for demobilization talks, claiming to belong to Kata Katanga. Kata Katanga, the group, first began appearing in media in JAN 2013.<sup>1476</sup> The first major act/act of violence attributed to Kata Katanga is the 23 MAR 2013 march on Lubumbashi, in which approximately 350 fighters marched on Lubumbashi's central square, removed the DRC flag, and hoisted the Katangese independence flag. They also wore red, green, and white garb (independence colors). They were lightly armed, possessing only a rocket launcher and some 30 AK-47s between them. Twenty-six died in the attack, twenty-two of which were rebels.<sup>1477</sup> Following this attack, the rise of Kata Katanga makes attribution of violent acts a serious problem. For instance, Mai Mai militia (Bakata Katanga) and the Bakata Katanga Communal militia are tagged frequently in ACLED, and likewise frequently implicated during reporting on attacks, which gives us little information on who is actually behind ongoing attacks. In addition, it was only after the emergence of Kata Katanga that accusations of elite Katangese political support for insurgencies emerged – although it is possible and even likely that the support began earlier, possibly within the first year of Mai Mai Gédéon, CORAK, or CPK's violent activities.<sup>1478</sup> This group is excluded because all its constituent groups are previously included (merger criteria) and because it appears to not actually be a structured organization.

#### \*Mouvement pour l'indépendance du Katanga (MIK)

AKAs: Movement for the Independence of Katanga

On 6 MAY 2005, several big names in Katanga, including Moïse Tshombe's son André Tshombe Njimbu, were arrested for an alleged secessionist plot under the banner of a supposed group called Mouvement pour l'indépendance du Katanga (MIK). They were later released and the state never furnished any evidence to support its allegations.<sup>1479</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

#### Union nationale des fédéralistes du Congo (UNAFEC)

AKAs: National Union of Congolese Federalists, National Union of Federalists of Congo, Jeunes de l'Union des nationalistes fédéralistes du Congo, JUNAPEC, Youth National Union of Federalists of Congo, Zulus

This group is a political party currently in the opposition. Its youth wing is known as jeunes de l'Union des nationalistes fédéralistes du Congo (JUNAPEC), sometimes nicknamed Zulus. Several incidents from ACLED required follow up:

- 9709DRC – According to ACLED, General Zazou (Zasou), head of JUNAPEC, and several other JUNAPEC members were arrested for kidnapping and torturing someone at party headquarters in NOV 2015. Additional searches reveal the sketchiness of this event. Most accounts of the arrest do not indicate what the arrestees were charged with, and those that do vary – arson, kidnapping,

<sup>1476</sup> Berghezan, 14.

<sup>1477</sup> Angelo Mobateli, "Congo-Kinshasa: Kinshasa - Les Miliciens « Bakata Katanga » Auditionnés À L'auditorat Militaire," *Le Potentiel*, March 30, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201303300115.html>; Angelo Mobateli, "Congo-Kinshasa: Le Katanga Continue D'attendre « L'identification » Des Personnes Qui Entretiennent Les « Bakata Katanga », " *Le Potentiel*, February 2, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402020038.html>; Wa Ku Demba, "Congo-Kinshasa: Une Quête Violente de L'autonomie Au Katanga"; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 15; Jullien, "Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo's Cash Cow to Secede"; Kibangula, "Katanga : Qui Se Cache Derrière Les Kata Katanga ?"; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA," 6–7.

<sup>1478</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)," paras. 51–53; Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 16–18; "Katanga: Tensions in DRC's Mineral Heartland," 19; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA," 9; Christophe Rigaud, "RDC : Les « Bakata Katanga », Nouveau Parti Politique ?," *AFRIKARABIA*, August 20, 2015, <http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/rdc-les-bakata-katanga-nouveau-parti-politique/>.

<sup>1479</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 10–11.

driving vehicles without a license plate.<sup>1480</sup> Moreover, it appears the arrests may have been politically motivated to harass UNAFEC, which had recently fallen into the opposition after criticizing Kabila.<sup>1481</sup> An NGO complained that some five months later, Zazou was being held incommunicado in Kinshasa and no legal proceedings had been initiated.<sup>1482</sup> The arrests sparked spontaneous violence of party members against the police in Lubumbashi.<sup>1483</sup> I am disinclined to accept the arrests as credible evidence of political violence, given that charge were never substantiated.

- 8138DRC – In APR 2014, JUNAPEC clashed with FARDC in a spontaneous violence situation that had gradually escalated: FARDC soldiers stole civilian property, JUNAPEC members beat the soldiers, FARDC started a manhunt to try to find the JUNAPEC members who had beaten the soldiers.<sup>1484</sup> Of more concern are reports in several articles that JUNAPEC in Likasi had been organizing essentially vigilante police forces in public spaces. These forces were known to arrest individuals and hold them in dungeons.<sup>1485</sup> However, I would classify these as vigilante rather than rebel groups; there was no evidence that they attempted to engage FARDC or other armed groups to control territory or that they chose political targets.
- 5818DRC – election violence <sup>1486</sup>
- 5834DRC – election violence (see event description in ACLED)

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<sup>1480</sup> “RDC : Deux Des Militants de l’opposition Arrêtés à Lubumbashi, Transférés à Kinshasa,” VOA, November 11, 2015, <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/rdc-deux-des-militants-de-l-opposition-arretes-a-lubumbashi-transferes-a-kinshasa/3053456.html>; “Lubumbashi : Le Militant de l’Unafec Interpellé Avait Séquestré Un Individu, Selon La Police,” Radio Okapi, November 11, 2015, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2015/11/11/actualite/societe/lubumbashi-le-militant-de-lunafec-interpelle-avait-sequestre-un>; Aaron Ross, “Police Clash with Opposition Protesters in Congo Mining Hub,” *Reuters*, November 10, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-politics-idUSKCN0SZ1P720151110>; Aaron Ross, “Police Fire Tear Gas at Anti-Govt Crowd in Congo’s Lubumbashi,” *Reuters*, November 10, 2015,

<http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0SZ1Q320151110?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>.

<sup>1481</sup> Ross, “Police Fire Tear Gas at Anti-Govt Crowd in Congo’s Lubumbashi”; Ross, “Police Clash with Opposition Protesters in Congo Mining Hub”; “RDC: Affrontements Entre Policiers et Militants de Kyungu à Lubumbashi,” Radio Okapi, November 10, 2015, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2015/11/10/actualite/securite/rdc-affrontements-entre-policiers-et-militants-de-kyungu-lubumbashi>.

<sup>1482</sup> Jay Faustin Kumwaf, “Congo-Kinshasa: L’ACAJ Exige La Libération Des Personnes Détenuées Arbitrairement Par l’ANR,” *Le Potentiel*, May 2, 2016, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201605021060.html>; “Une ONG Critique Sévèrement l’ANR et Réclame La Libération Des Personnes Détenuées Au Secret,” *Politico.Cd* (blog), April 28, 2016, <http://www.politico.cd/actualite/la-une/2016/04/28/ong-critique-severement-lanr-reclame-liberation-personnes-detenuées-secret.html>.

<sup>1483</sup> “Lubumbashi : Le Militant de l’Unafec Interpellé Avait Séquestré Un Individu, Selon La Police”; “RDC: Affrontements Entre Policiers et Militants de Kyungu À Lubumbashi”; Ross, “Police Clash with Opposition Protesters in Congo Mining Hub”; Ross, “Police Fire Tear Gas at Anti-Govt Crowd in Congo’s Lubumbashi.”

<sup>1484</sup> “RDC : Trois Morts Dans Des Échauffourées Entre Militaires et Jeunes à Likasi,” *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), April 21, 2014, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/164247/politique/rdc-trois-morts-dans-des-chauffour-es-entre-militaires-et-jeunes-likasi/>; “Likasi: Les Échauffourées Entre Militaires et Jeunes de l’Unafec Ont Fait 3 Morts,” Radio Okapi, April 20, 2014, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/04/20/likasi-les-echauffourees-entre-militaires-jeunes-de-lunafec-ont-fait-3-morts>; “Likasi : Panique Suite à Un Déploiement de Militaires Dans La Ville,” Radio Okapi, April 19, 2014, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/04/19/likasi-panique-suite-deploiement-de-militaires-dans-la-ville>.

<sup>1485</sup> “Likasi: Une ONG Réclame La Dissolution Des Groupes de Jeunes de l’Unafec,” Radio Okapi, April 21, 2014, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/04/21/likasi-une-ong-reclame-la-dissolution-des-groupes-de-jeunes-de-lunafec>; “RDC : Trois Morts Dans Des Échauffourées Entre Militaires et Jeunes à Likasi.”

<sup>1486</sup> “Lubumbashi: Affrontements Entre Militants de l’UDPS et de l’Unafec, Plusieurs Personnes Blessées,” Radio Okapi, November 5, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/11/05/lubumbashi-affrontements-entre-militants-de-ludps-de-lunafec-plusieurs-personnes-blessees>; “Campagne Électorale : Moïse Katumbi Appelle l’UDPS et l’Unafec à La Tolérance.”



- 9321DRC – UNAFEC tagged as victims of violence, not perpetrators  
Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence. However, it should be noted that some evidence indicates the participation in or support for Katangese rebel groups among individual UNAFEC members.<sup>1487</sup>

### Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC)

AKAs: Movement for the Liberation of Congo, Congo Liberation Movement, Congo's Liberation Movement, Armée de Libération du Congo (armed branch), ALC, Army for the Liberation of Congo

The MLC is led by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (or Jean-Pierre Gombo Bemba), whose father was a prominent Congolese businessman and close associate of former Zairean President Mobutu. Following completion of his schooling, Bemba began managing some of his father's business and launched some of his own, becoming very wealthy.<sup>1488</sup> One source indicated that Bemba had served as a financial advisor to Mobutu in 1997, but I could not corroborate this information.<sup>1489</sup> Another source had referred to him as a political novice at his time of launching MLC, implying that he had no previous political experience.<sup>1490</sup> His father, however, had served Mobutu in several official capacities.<sup>1491</sup>

Following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, Bemba fled into exile.<sup>1492</sup> From there, I found varying dates for his founding MLC, ranging from May 1998 to November 1998.<sup>1493</sup> The account with the most detail and that makes the most sense is from Human Rights Watch, which states that

<sup>1487</sup> Berghezan, "GROUPES ARMÉS AU KATANGA : ÉPICENTRE DE MULTIPLES CONFLITS," 17–18; Kibangula, "Katanga : Qui Se Cache Derrière Les Kata Katanga ?"; "RAPPORT CIRCONSTANTIEL SUR LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE DANS LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA."

<sup>1488</sup> David Moore, "From King Leopold to King Kabila in the Congo: The Continuities & Contradictions of the Long Road from Warlordism to Democracy in the Heart of Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 87 (2001): 133; Henry Louis Gates Jr, Emmanuel Akyeampong, and Steven J. Niven, *Dictionary of African Biography* (OUP USA, 2012), 422; Ian Fisher, "Gbadolite Journal; Rebel Insists That a Leopard-Skin Hat Doesn't Fit," *The New York Times*, September 25, 2000, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/25/world/gbadolite-journal-rebel-insists-that-a-leopard-skin-hat-doesn-t-fit.html>; "IRIN Emergency Update No. 83 on the Great Lakes," Text, ReliefWeb, January 23, 1997, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/irin-emergency-update-no-83-great-lakes>; "Profile: Jean-Pierre Gombo Bemba - Mouvement de Libération Du Congo," IRIN, August 23, 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2006/08/23/profile-jean-pierre-gombo-bemba-mouvement-de-lib%C3%A9ration-du-congo>.

<sup>1489</sup> "Profile: Jean-Pierre Gombo Bemba - Mouvement de Libération Du Congo."

<sup>1490</sup> "A Hard War to Stop—or Win," *The Economist*, December 3, 1998, <http://www.economist.com/node/178221>.

<sup>1491</sup> Fisher, "Gbadolite Journal; Rebel Insists That a Leopard-Skin Hat Doesn't Fit"; "IRIN Emergency Update No. 83 on the Great Lakes."

<sup>1492</sup> Bradshaw and Fandos-Rius, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, 422; Todd Pitman, "Congo Rebels Meet with Rival Anti-Kabila Group.," *Reuters News*, November 19, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926dubj04876&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1493</sup> Gérard Prunier, "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)," *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (2004): 361; Moore, "From King Leopold to King Kabila in the Congo," 133; Kisangani, "CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO," 61; Open Society Foundations, "Jean-Pierre Bemba at the International Criminal Court: Who's Who," International Justice Monitor, accessed March 7, 2017, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/jean-pierre-bemba-gombo-whos-who/>; "Democratic Republic of Congo (MLC) 1998-2002" (Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung), 2, accessed July 6, 2017, [https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk\\_publicationen/DR-Congo-MLC-1998-2002.pdf](https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publicationen/DR-Congo-MLC-1998-2002.pdf); Gates Jr, Akyeampong, and Niven, *Dictionary of African Biography*, 423; Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 320; IRIN, "DRC: MLC's Bemba Expected in Kinshasa on Monday," Text, ReliefWeb, August 23, 2002, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-mlcs-bemba-expected-kinshasa-monday>; "Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife," 25; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 381.

A handful of Congolese exiles led by Jean-Pierre Bemba told the Ugandan president in October 1998 that they wanted to change their government at home, but did not want to join the RCD.

Ugandan authorities sent the group to a crash military and ideological training course and weeks later flew them to Equateur to launch what would become MLC.<sup>1494</sup>

Founding date was coded as October 1998, although I reduced certainty to 1 to reflect conflicting reports on founding date.

This report also demonstrates that the MLC received Ugandan military assistance from the outset. Many reports indicate generalized Ugandan support for the MLC.<sup>1495</sup> Other specific reports of assistance within the first year include corroboration of MLC training by UPDF, Bemba's use of a UPDF helicopter for transport within the DRC, and UPDF forces fighting under or on behalf of Bemba's MLC.<sup>1496</sup> Beyond this, Bemba reportedly used his own personal fortune to finance the movement.<sup>1497</sup> Finally, we know that the MLC enjoyed access to mineral wealth. Although I found no definitive proof, I found strongly suggestive evidence that MLC controlled diamond-laden areas and profited from them in its first year.<sup>1498</sup> Moreover, the MLC harvested and stole coffee (hundreds of tons), printed counterfeit money (enough to cause substantial local inflation), and robbed banks (millions of USD) to generate substantial financial resources within its first year of operation.<sup>1499</sup> The MLC was notable among rebel groups for its

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<sup>1494</sup> "Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife," 25.

<sup>1495</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 15; Prunier, "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare," 380; Moore, "From King Leopold to King Kabila in the Congo," 133; Gates Jr, Akyeampong, and Niven, *Dictionary of African Biography*, 423; Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 320; "The Bubbles of Rebel Congo," *All Africa*, November 20, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dubl00cxb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Todd Pitman, "Congo Rebels Play down Government Counter-Offensive.," *Reuters News*, November 27, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926dubr03fx8&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Todd Pitman, "ANALYSIS-Political Divisions Weaken Congo Rebels.," *Reuters News*, December 31, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926ducv01jax&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War" (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 20, 2000), 4, <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5396/2248.pdf?sequence=1>; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 381; "Kampala Paper Gives Further Details of Ugandan-Rwandan Clashes in DR Congo.," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, December 30, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010922duc002pi&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Profile: Jean-Pierre Gombo Bemba - Mouvement de Libération Du Congo"; "'Covered in Blood': Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC," 15.

<sup>1496</sup> Elbert, Schauer, et al., "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants," 133; "Democratic Republic of Congo (MLC) 1998-2002," 2; Prunier, "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare," 380; "FOCUS-Congo Rebels Face Hitch over Uganda Talks.," *Reuters News*, December 3, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926duc30399f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife," 25; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 381; "Ugandan Troops Said to Have Seized Eastern Town Early November.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 4, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010922duc4001fl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; IAN FISHER, "Uganda's Helping Hand to Congo Rebels Raises Questions About Motives," *The New York Times*, December 21, 1998, sec. Foreign Desk; Section A.

<sup>1497</sup> Gates Jr, Akyeampong, and Niven, *Dictionary of African Biography*, 423.

<sup>1498</sup> "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," para. 178; "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War," 37.

<sup>1499</sup> "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," paras. 35, 40, 63, 67.

success in drawing financial resources.<sup>1500</sup> As such, one is coded for foreign government, oil/diamonds, and other under initial resources.

In addition to demonstrating Ugandan support for MLC, the HRW statement indicates that MLC was not a splinter of RCD. Several sources call MLC a splinter.<sup>1501</sup> However, I could find no evidence of a relationship between Bemba and the RCD prior to his launching the MLC. Furthermore, reports discussing the founding members of the RCD and Bemba list the two separately.<sup>1502</sup> I think reports of MLC as a “splinter” may relate to the fact that this was the first time Congolese rebel opposition was not wholly united and/or reporting during MLC’s formation that MLC represented a splintering of the Rwandan-Ugandan alliance.<sup>1503</sup>

Reporting on individual attacks is somewhat confused; it was clear from reporting that no journalists were actually witnessing the fighting but got information secondhand in Kinshasa or other areas. As best I could gather, MLC’s first large attack predated its first small attack. I believe the first large attack was the either battle of Aketi or battle of Dulia in late OCT 1998, although the dates of these battles is not consistently reported.<sup>1504</sup> Both RCD and MLC claimed these victories, I think because most fighters under Bemba’s command at this stage were UDPF.<sup>1505</sup> However, he did command some of his own MLC fighters.<sup>1506</sup> Moreover, UDPF implicitly gave Bemba credit for this attack when they flew him there to rally the local population afterward.<sup>1507</sup> Otherwise, the first large attack would be at the battle of Bumba

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<sup>1500</sup> “Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War,” 37.

<sup>1501</sup> “Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest”; Todd Pitman, “Congolese Rebels Claim Killing 93 Chadian Soldiers,” *Reuters News*, November 11, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926dubb04nnt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1502</sup> “Congo Rebels Ready for Ceasefire,” BBC News, August 31, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/434181.stm>; Chris McGreal, “Mistrust Casts Pall on Congo Signing,” *The Guardian*, August 30, 1999, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/31/chrismcgreal>; “UN Welcomes Rebel Signing of Peace Accord,” IRIN, September 1, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/09/01/un-welcomes-rebel-signing-peace-accord>.

<sup>1503</sup> “The Bubbles of Rebel Congo.”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Congo Rebels In Big Split,” *New Vision (Kampala)*, November 15, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199811150006.html>; “Kampala Paper Gives Further Details of Ugandan-Rwandan Clashes in DR Congo.”

<sup>1504</sup> “Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)”; “IRIN Weekly Round-Up 46-98 Covering the Period 6-12 Nov 1998,” Text, ReliefWeb, November 13, 1998, <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/irin-weekly-round-46-98-covering-period-6-12-nov-1998>; “Uganda: Rebels Kill 70 Chadian Troops,” *New Vision (Kampala)*, November 4, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199811040072.html>; “A Hard War to Stop—or Win”; “Latest Congo Warlord Says over 300 Chadians Killed,” *Reuters News*, November 12, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926dubc04ptr&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare,” 380.

<sup>1505</sup> Todd Pitman, “FOCUS-Congo Rebel Groups May Unite against Kabila,” *Reuters News*, November 19, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926dubj0455k&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Ugandan Troops Said to Have Seized Eastern Town Early November.”; FISHER, “Uganda’s Helping Hand to Congo Rebels Raises Questions About Motives.”

<sup>1506</sup> “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,” para. 381; “Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War,” 4.

<sup>1507</sup> “Rwandan Minister Denies Reports of Clash with Ugandan Troops in DR Congo,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 29, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010922duct001jg&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare,” 380.

on 17 NOV 1998.<sup>1508</sup> The first small attack would have been at Mindembo, reported on 3 DEC 1998 (date of fighting unclear), in which two government troops were killed.<sup>1509</sup>

The first media reports on MLC came out on 9 NOV 1998.<sup>1510</sup> However, this delay in public naming of the group appears to have been from reporting lags owing to lack of journalistic presence on the front rather than deliberate attempts to remain clandestine. As such, I have coded missing for clandestine.

I did not encounter and could not locate any accounts of MLC attacks on civilians within its first year of operations. The first reports I saw came from 2002.<sup>1511</sup>

MLC operated primarily out of Equateur province, the home province of both Bemba and Mobutu. However, reports over location of his headquarters vary substantially (Gbadolite, Equateur, DRC; Kabale, Uganda; Kisangani, Orientale, DRC; Aketi, Equateur, DRC) suggesting that headquarters were relatively mobile.<sup>1512</sup> I have coded the locational variables as missing, since these headquarters would give use different coding results.

With his family ties to the former regime and the geographic location of his rebel group, Bemba's MLC attracted many former Mobutu supporters.<sup>1513</sup> Reports suggest that former FAZ (Forces armées zaïroises) and FAC (Forces armées congolaises) deserters played a major role in MLC within the first year, both in leadership and membership.<sup>1514</sup> As such, I have coded one for military under organizational history. However, Bemba is the only named leadership reported during the initial period. I have left most leadership variables as missing, as I suspect former regime security/leadership and current regime defectors likely played leadership roles within the organization.

The MLC's reported goal was evidently takeover from the outset.<sup>1515</sup>

As ACLED denotes, MLC continued fighting with RCD-G and RCD-K/ML for control of territory through the end of 2001 and into 2002. As such, I have coded 1 for viable. Although MLC briefly formed a coalition

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<sup>1508</sup> Matthew Bigg, "Congo Rebel Vows to Fight on despite Peace Deal.," *Reuters News*, December 1, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926duc103c09&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 381.

<sup>1509</sup> "FOCUS-Congo Rebels Face Hitch over Uganda Talks."

<sup>1510</sup> "Many Chadian Troops Said Hospitalized in Kinshasa after Rebel Ambush.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, November 9, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010922dub9000mv&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1511</sup> "Attacks on Civilians in Ugandan Occupied Areas in Northeastern Congo," February 13, 2002, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/bunia0213bkg.htm>; "Seeking Justice: The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in the Congo."

<sup>1512</sup> "Covered in Blood": Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC," 15; Ngolet, "African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire," 81; Gates Jr, Akyeampong, and Niven, *Dictionary of African Biography*, 423; "Latest Congo Warlord Says over 300 Chadians Killed.," "Ugandan Troops Said to Have Seized Eastern Town Early November."

<sup>1513</sup> Prunier, "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare," 380; Bob W. White, "The Political Undead: Is It Possible to Mourn for Mobutu's Zaire?," *African Studies Review* 48, no. 2 (2005): 77; Kisangani, "CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO," 61; Bigg, "Congo Rebel Vows to Fight on despite Peace Deal.," Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 320.

<sup>1514</sup> Kisangani, "CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO," 61; John Chiahem, "New Congo Rebellion Reported in Mobutu Stronghold.," *Reuters News*, November 10, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926duba04tmf&cat=a&ep=ASE>; DONALD G. McNEIL Jr, "A War Turned Free-for-All Tears at Africa's Center," *The New York Times*, December 6, 1998, sec. Week in Review Desk; Section 4; "Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003," para. 381.

<sup>1515</sup> "Questions and Answers: Verdict Delivered in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo on 21 March 2016" (The Hague: International Criminal Court), 1, accessed July 6, 2017, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/EN-QandA-Bemba.pdf>.

called FLC (see below), it did not really operationalize or truly consolidate forces with another group. As such, I did not code 1 for merge. In APR 2002, Jean-Pierre Bemba reached a deal with Kabila wherein Bemba assumed the office of prime minister (Kabila remained head of state and government).

### Front de libération du Congo (FLC)

AKAs: Congolese Liberation front, Front for the Liberation of Congo, Congo's Liberation Front

This group is Uganda's attempt to merge their proxy groups: Mouvement de libération du Congo, RCD-K/ML, and RCD-N. It never really got off the ground.<sup>1516</sup> Excluded – all groups met qualifications for rebel group before merge.

### \*Force populaire pour la démocratie du Congo (FPDC)

AKAs: Popular Force for Democracy in Congo, People's Force for Democracy in Congo

NOTE: A similarly named political party, Forces populaires pour la démocratie au Congo (FPDC) emerged in JUL 2017. There is no apparent connection to the original FPDC.<sup>1517</sup>

This group, formed in 2002, is consistently referred to as one of the armed groups in Ituri during the 2002-2004 era. It apparently consists of ethnic Alur and Lubara, formed to counter the UPC. FPDC is led by Thomas Unenchan (alias Thomas Unen Chen, Unenchan Uketha, Thomas, Unen Can, Thomas Ucala). It seems to be a political party that also militarized.<sup>1518</sup> The group joined FIPI and may have received

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<sup>1516</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 22; "Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife"; Kisangani, "CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO," 61.

<sup>1517</sup> "Ituri: Un Nouveau Président National Pour Le Parti Politique FPDC," *Agence Congolaise de Presse*, August 1, 2017, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/777cbc1f-053c-44f9-9a6e-20fba185df32/?context=1516831>; "Ituri: Le Congrès Du Parti Politique FPDC Prévu Du 29 Au 30 Juillet 2017," *Agence Congolaise de Presse*, July 28, 2017, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/2f7e5217-dd17-43cb-a146-96a1a3b43fb9/?context=1516831>; "Tenue à Bunia Du Premier Congrès de La «FPDC»,» *Agence Congolaise de Presse*, July 31, 2017, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/c3fc7054-6f57-40f6-bd7d-566df4bbb2e0/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1518</sup> Tamm, "FNI and FRPI," 29; "'Covered in Blood': Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC," 16; "Congo-Kinshasa; Who's Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders," *IRIN*, April 20, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/611d274c-d0a6-49fd-856f-da8a28419d39/?context=1516831>; Georges Tamba, "Only One of 6 Militias in DR Congo's Ituri Disarming as Planned," *Agence France Presse -- English*, September 21, 2004, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/969a476c-85f8-4d9d-9ec0-55d3adde9713/?context=1516831>; "Congo-Kinshasa; Slow Start to Disarmament in Ituri," *IRIN*, September 16, 2004, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/2aafc1d8-f4b6-4d70-ac02-2a1f6882919e/?context=1516831>; "Main Armed Groups in DR Congo's Ethnic Fighting," *Agence France Presse -- English*, August 31, 2003, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/387d7de3-3d48-4aa7-9884-871d7b4a61d1/?context=1516831>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Conflict Continues in Northern Katanga," *SouthScan (London)*, September 7, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200509070477.html>; Office of the Prosecutor, "Annex I: SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. GERMAIN KATANGA and MATHIEU NGUDJOLO CHUI" (International Criminal Court, April 21, 2008), para. 29, <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c0b5a2/pdf/>; "Commission Electorale Indépendante" (Commission Electorale Indépendante), accessed October 29, 2017, <http://www.droitcongolais.info/files/liste-partis-politiques.pdf>; Pan African News Agency, "Armed Groups in DRC's Ituri Region Take Path to Peace," Text, ReliefWeb, August 20, 2003, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/armed-groups-drcs-ituri-region-take-path-peace>; Les Détenus, "Congo-Kinshasa: Les Détenus Floribert Ndjabu et Consorts Exigent Leur Comparution Devant La CPI," *La Prospérité*, February 16, 2007, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200702160544.html>; "CONGO: FOUR PRIORITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN ITURI" (International Crisis Group, May 13, 2008), 1, 28, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/140-congo-four-priorities-for-sustainable-peace-in-ituri.pdf>; Jean TSUMBU GBORO, "Dynamique Des Conflits Armés En Province de l'Ituri de 1999 à 2015," *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies* 21, no. 3 (October 2017): 429, 431; Providence Ngoy Walupakah and Sandra Muya Miyanga, *Le Droit de la guerre à l'épreuve du conflit armé en République démocratique du Congo: Quelques réflexions sur les défis, enjeux et perspectives* (Editions Publibook, 2015), 68, <https://books.google.com/books?id=cGjHCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=FPDC+milice+congo&source=bl>

support from Uganda.<sup>1519</sup> In 2004-2005, it entered negotiations and demobilized.<sup>1520</sup> Evidently, some FPDC also joined FAPC.<sup>1521</sup>

Despite consistently being referred to as an armed group, I found no record of the group actually planning or engaging in violence. Instead, I found reference to it as a “non-aggressive militia” that “never made to prove its effectiveness.”<sup>1522</sup> As such, I suspect that it was primarily defensive or even just symbolic. Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

#### \*Front pour l'intégration et la paix en Ituri (FIPI)

AKAs: Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri

An alliance of three armed groups/parties that seems to have fallen apart quickly/never got off the ground. Excluded.<sup>1523</sup>

#### Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (MRC)

AKAs: Congolese Revolutionary Movement

This group is a coalition of previous rebel groups (FNI, FRI, PUSIC, UPC, FARC, RCD-K/ML) formed in 2005 to resist FARDC and MONUC; constituent groups were weakened but refused to lay down arms or integrate into FARDC.<sup>1524</sup>

#### Forces républicaines fédéralistes (FRF)

AKAs: Federalist Republican Forces, Republican Federalist Forces; Forces congolaises de résistance (armed wing), FRC, Congolese Resistance Forces; Masunzu rebellion

The FRF was originally just a political group started by around thirty prominent Banyamulenge in JUNE 1998. In 2002, it became a militant group when troops rebelling against RCD-Goma, led by Patrick Masunzu, associated with FRF. The group splintered in 2005, with a faction led by Michel Makanika Rukunda claiming the name FRF while Patrick Masunzu led an opposing group; because of this splintering, some

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<sup>1519</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 29; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 16; “Congo-Kinshasa; Who’s Who in Ituri - Militia Organisations, Leaders”; Office of the Prosecutor, “Annex I: SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. GERMAIN KATANGA and MATHIEU NGUDJOLO CHUI,” para. 29.

<sup>1520</sup> Tamba, “Only One of 6 Militias in DR Congo’s Ituri Disarming as Planned”; “Congo-Kinshasa; Slow Start to Disarmament in Ituri”; “CONGO: FOUR PRIORITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN ITURI,” 32.

<sup>1521</sup> Africa Initiative Program (AIP) et al., “Ituri: Stakes, Actors, Dynamics,” 2003, 14, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E78669B9447072DC49256DE3001F9947-fewer-cod-31oct.pdf>.

<sup>1522</sup> “CONGO: FOUR PRIORITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN ITURI,” 28; Walupakah and Miyanga, *Le Droit de la guerre à l’épreuve du conflit armé en République démocratique du Congo*, 68.

<sup>1523</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 29; “‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DRC,” 15.

<sup>1524</sup> Tamm, “FNI and FRPI,” 35; Anjan Sundaram, “We Cannot Have Elections Like This,” Global Policy Forum, May 29, 2006, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181/33633.html>; “Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008” (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008), 109, <https://www.child-soldiers.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=26c0549d-aa35-4f1a-8e34-5956f8e2ec51>; “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Elections in Sight: ‘Don’t Rock the Boat,’” 17; Guy Arnold, *The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa* (Scarecrow Press, 2009), 111,

<https://books.google.com/books?id=zhs88tKVha0C&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=MRC+congo&source=bl&ots=hZGnOwsyAl&sig=TM7WI0GHxfID9ONwRBO4hs3xKb0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjQoMK93oLVAhUCOSYKHVL0C9cQ6AEIPzAF#v=onepage&q=MRC%20congo&f=false>; Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World* 2012, 320.



sources say the FRF was formed in 2005.<sup>1525</sup> The original militant FRF (2002) does not qualify for inclusion because it was a splinter from RCD-Goma. The subsequent Bisogo/Rukunda and Masunzu factions are also excluded as splinters.

#### **Groupe de 47 (G47)**

AKAs: Group of 47, G-47

This group qualifies as a splinter group by our criteria. In May 2004, former RCD-Goma who had integrated into FARDC mutineed under the leadership of Jules Mutebutsi, also former RCD-Goma. The mutinous forces subsequently crossed into Rwanda. Eventually, a subset of 47 mutineers crossed back into the DRC to again fight in the Moyens Plateaux under the leadership of Colonel Venant Bisogo.<sup>1526</sup> Excluded – leadership and membership were former RCD-G, qualifies and splinter group.

#### **\*Force pour la défense du peuple (FDP)**

AKAs: Force for Defense of the People, FRF (see above for variants)

The only found two mentions of this group: (1) a passing mention of a single combatant who surrendered to MONUSCO<sup>1527</sup> and (2) a short explanation in an Usalama Project report stating that it was a reconstituted armed wing of FRF formed by the merged G47 and Rukunda factions. Rukunda had been previously associated with FRF (see above), so I assume this was a splinter group. As such, FDP is a merge of two splinter groups, and does not qualify.<sup>1528</sup> Excluded.

#### **\*Mouvement populaire pour le changement du Congo (MPCC)**

AKAs: Popular Movement for Changing the Congo, Popular Movement for Change in Congo

This group is a splinter of FRF that refused to integrate into FARDC in 2011 led by Richard Tawimbi.<sup>1529</sup>

#### **\*Alliance pour la libération de l'est du Congo (ALEC)**

AKAs: Alliance of the Liberation of Eastern Congo, Alliance for the Liberation of East Congo

This was an attempt to organize an armed group that, as far as I could find, never got off the ground. In July 2012, Banyamulenge diaspora in Rwanda formed ALEC. Initial leadership included Thomas Kigabo and Akim Hakizimana Muhoza. Recruitment appears to have been mainly among youth, and therefore membership

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<sup>1525</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Irin Interview With Banyamulenge Leader On Fighting in Minembwe,” *IRIN*, May 3, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200205030247.html>; Judith Verweijen, “Guest Blog: The FRF Armed Group,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), August 10, 2011, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2011/08/guest-blog-frf-armed-group.html>; Jason Stearns, “Congo’s Army Reaches Breakthrough with Kivus’ Rebel Group,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 2011, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0202/Congo-s-army-reaches-breakthrough-with-Kivus-rebel-group>; Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 205, <https://books.google.com/books?id=KPVxJX6ycG8C&pg=PA205&lpg=PA205&dq=masunzu+frf&source=bl&ots=kCxtNEutY3&sig=kAcnJYRVpZeLrALxENNY2PieYI8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjvidqH5oLVAhVLwiYKHbgeDeAQ6AEIWDAL#v=onepage&q=masunzu%20frf&f=false>; Jason Stearns, “Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 22–28, [http://riftvalley.net/publication/banyamulenge#.WTF\\_jWjyvIV](http://riftvalley.net/publication/banyamulenge#.WTF_jWjyvIV).

<sup>1526</sup> Stearns, “Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu,” 29–32; “North-Kivu: Civilians Pay the Price for Political and Military Rivalry” (Amnesty International, September 27, 2005), 9–11, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=afr62%2f013%2f2005&language=en>; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: CDi.018 JULES MUTEBUTSI,” United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, accessed July 12, 2017, <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/jules-mutebutsi>; “Rwanda Grants Rebel Leader Asylum,” BBC News, August 19, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4165992.stm>.

<sup>1527</sup> L.c., “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Des Miliciens Se Rendent à La MONUSCO,” *Le Potentiel*, September 20, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201309201815.html>.

<sup>1528</sup> Stearns, “Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu,” 32.

<sup>1529</sup> Stearns, 39–40.

was likely mostly non-previous combatants. However, I could find no attacks attributed to ALEC, which matches accounts of group never reaching an operational stage.<sup>1530</sup> Suhulu associates Muhima Nkingi with ALEC, but that was the only place where I saw them associated.<sup>1531</sup> Nkingi's group is listed separately below. Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

**\*Nkingi faction** – I found several references Muhima Nkingi suggesting that he worked briefly with MCC, some of which suggest that he had an independent faction before or after his collaboration with MCC/Mai Mai Bede for the 18 SEPT 2012 attack on the Luberizi military camp.<sup>1532</sup> However, I could find no evidence of violence or planned violence by Nkingi or a group he commanded outside of his collaboration with MCC/Mai Mai Bede. I found only one record about his receiving amnesty in 2014.<sup>1533</sup> As such, this group is excluded.

#### **\*Mai Mai Bede**

AKAs: Mai Mai Bede Rusagara, Mouvement congolais pour le changement (MCC), Congolese Movement for Change; Coalition des congolais pour la libération, CCL, Congolese Coalition for Liberation, Coalition of Congolese for Liberation; possibly also Rassemblement congolais pour le renouveau, RCR, Congolese Rally for Renewal, Congolese Coalition for Renewal

This group was difficult to track down. This difficulty is partially owing to lack of information and partially owing to the fact that a group of militants commanded by Bede Rusagara appears under myriad names, which I have been unable to differentiate and I assume are essentially the same group.

The group is commanded by Bede (Obedi, Bedy) Rusagara. Bedy first joined Mai Mai/self-defense forces set up under the AFDL in 1996. In 2000, he joined the RCD-Goma. He underwent brassage (integration into FARDC), defected to join CNDP, and then re-integrated in 2009. In 2011, he defected to establish an armed group.<sup>1534</sup> As such, I have coded 1 under leadership for former rebel and current security.

I could find no record of Bede taking men with him as he defected, however; I instead found records of him recruiting from local defense forces and from Rwandan refugee camps.<sup>1535</sup> Because I have not been able

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<sup>1530</sup> Stearns, 41; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 77–80.

<sup>1531</sup> “Congo Conflict: The Evolving Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

<sup>1532</sup> Stearns, “Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu,” 42; Jason Stearns, “Attempts to Spread the M23 Rebellion,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), September 24, 2012, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/09/attempts-to-spread-m23-rebellion.html>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” para. 73.

<sup>1533</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: Cinquième Vague d’amnistie - 191 Ex-Rebelles Du M23 Parmi Les 272 Nouveaux Amnistiés,” *Le Potentiel*, September 4, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201409041498.html>.

<sup>1534</sup> “Sud-Kivu: Décès Du Chef Milicien Bede Rusagara à Kasenga,” Radio Okapi, August 30, 2015, <http://www.radiookapi.net/2015/08/30/actualite/securite/sud-kivu-deces-du-chef-milicien-bede-rusagara-kasenga>; Judith Verweijen, “Guest Blog: The Gordian Knot of Identity-Based Conflicts in the Kivus: The Case of the Chefferie of the Ruzizi Plain,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), October 9, 2012, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2012/10/guest-blog-gordian-knot-of-identity.html>; Judith Verweijen, “A Microcosm of Militarization: Conflict, Governance and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu,” Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016), 27, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/microcosm-militarization#.WTNcUmjyIV>; Stearns, Verweijen, and Eriksson Baaz, “The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern DRC,” 38; “Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 23, 2013), 11, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/understanding-conflict-in-eastern-congo-i-the-ruzizi-plain.pdf>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” paras. 70–72.

<sup>1535</sup> Verweijen, “A Microcosm of Militarization,” 27; Jason Stearns, “New Armed Groups Appear in South Kivu,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), September 15, 2011, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2011/09/new-armed-groups-appear-in-south-kivu.html>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011),” 73–74; Stearns, “Attempts to Spread the M23 Rebellion.”

to verify this group's main source of membership, I have downgraded its certainty to a 2. I have coded missing for self-defense and no prior org under organizational history, as I suspect this but haven't been able to verify it. I have coded 2011 as the founding date, as there was no information on when he formed the group after defecting, except that his intention was to do so. Name date is listed as 15 SEPT 2011, when Congo Siasa referenced that Bede had defected and reportedly started his own group.

Bede is ethnic Bafuliuro (Bafuliro).<sup>1536</sup> HRW described his group as predominantly ethnic Bafuliuro in 2014, and Bede has been portrayed as a defender of the Bafulira community.<sup>1537</sup> However, I also found reports that his group has connections to FNL, a Burundian group.<sup>1538</sup> Moreover, there are reports of ethnic Barundi and Banyamulenge among his group's ranks.<sup>1539</sup> The group has been described as multiethnic.<sup>1540</sup>

The declared main objective is to fight the government of the DRC, although the ultimate prize for this fighting (takeover, secession, etc.) was not specified.<sup>1541</sup> The International Crisis Group said that the group's demands are to be integrated into FARDC/government.<sup>1542</sup>

The earliest attack I found in which Bede's group was implicated is the assassination of former mwami (chief) Ndabagoye, an ethnic Barundi who was preparing to resume the position of mwami in lieu of an ethnic Bafuliuro. He was assassinated in his home in Luberizi on 26 APR 2012.<sup>1543</sup> Although Bede's group was never formally implicated, it is generally suspected to be behind the incident. I have coded this as the first small attack. In addition, Bede's group was suspected to be behind an attack on a military camp at Luberizi on 18 SEPT 2012.<sup>1544</sup> His group seems to have been intermittently active until his death in 2015, but I was not able to identify much specific information on subsequent attacks; as such, I have coded large attack as missing. HRW documented that Bede's group killed a cattle herder near Mutarule on 6 JUN 2014.<sup>1545</sup> However, given that Bede's group is known for predation on the local population, I suspect this was not the first.<sup>1546</sup> I have coded civilian attack and related variables as missing. Because Bede's earliest attacks were consistently in Luberizi (Uvira territory, Ruzizi Plain), I have coded 1 for "rural" and 1 for "planning\_inside".

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<sup>1536</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 70; Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 27; Verweijen, "Guest Blog: The Gordian Knot of Identity-Based Conflicts in the Kivus: The Case of the Chefferie of the Ruzizi Plain"; "Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain," 11.

<sup>1537</sup> "DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop Massacre," Human Rights Watch, July 2, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/02/dr-congo-army-un-failed-stop-massacre>; Verweijen, "Guest Blog: The Gordian Knot of Identity-Based Conflicts in the Kivus: The Case of the Chefferie of the Ruzizi Plain."

<sup>1538</sup> Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 27; "Sud-Kivu: Décès Du Chef Milicien Bede Rusagara à Kasenga."

<sup>1539</sup> Stearns, "Attempts to Spread the M23 Rebellion"; Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 27; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 73.

<sup>1540</sup> Stearns, "Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu," 42.

<sup>1541</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 70.

<sup>1542</sup> "Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain," 11.

<sup>1543</sup> "Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain," 11–12; "Sud-Kivu: L'ancien Chef de Collectivité Ndabagoy Abattu à Son Domicile," Radio Okapi, April 26, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/04/26/sud-kivu-lancien-chef-de-collectivite-ndabagoy-abattu-son-domicile>; Verweijen, "Guest Blog: The Gordian Knot of Identity-Based Conflicts in the Kivus: The Case of the Chefferie of the Ruzizi Plain"; Stearns, Verweijen, and Eriksson Baaz, "The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern DRC," 38; Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 31.

<sup>1544</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 76; Stearns, "Attempts to Spread the M23 Rebellion"; Verweijen, "Guest Blog: The Gordian Knot of Identity-Based Conflicts in the Kivus: The Case of the Chefferie of the Ruzizi Plain."

<sup>1545</sup> "DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop Massacre."

<sup>1546</sup> Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 28.

Musagara's group received support from ex-CNDP, M23, and M23 collaborators in various capacities, including financial. The UN panel of experts recorded at least one transfer of \$4,000 on 3 SEPT 2012.<sup>1547</sup>

Regarding viability, the only reference I found to Bede Rusagara from 2014 or later was reference to his group killing civilians in June 2014 (probably just under three years after formation, and only a single incident) and reference to his death under sketchy circumstances under the custody of security forces in 2015.<sup>1548</sup> As such, I have coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ.

#### **\*Forces républicaines fédéralistes-Gasore (FRF-Gasore)**

AKAs: See variants for FRF above

Excluded, splinter group of FRF<sup>1549</sup>

#### **\*Forces d'autodéfense locales et légitimes (FALL)**

AKA: Local Defense Forces-Lemera, Local Defense Forces, Force auto-défense légitime (FAL), Local and Legitimate Self-Defense Forces, Legitimate Self-Defense Force

This group/these groups were organized by local authorities with the consent of FARDC to provide security; they remained subject to local customary authorities and collaborate with FARDC.<sup>1550</sup> One author writes that, "given that they were created with the benediction of the FARDC, in their own perception, these forces are official."<sup>1551</sup> While it is true that customary power disputes caused some politicization of the FALL, we have viewed them as a government force and excluded them.<sup>1552</sup>

#### **Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC)**

AKAs: Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, Mouvement pour la libération du peuple congolais (MLPC), Movement for the Liberation of the Congolese People, Forces nationales congolaises (armed wing), FNC, Congolese National Forces, Rassemblement national pour la libération du Congo, National Rally for the Liberation of Congo, Mouvement orange pour la révolution populaire, Orange Movement for Popular Revolution, Union des forces républicaines pour la stabilité et le développement, Union of Republican Forces for Stability and Development

NOTE: Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo is also the name of UPC's armed wing; however, this FPLC is a different, separate group.

It is not entirely clear when this group formed. Several sources cite JAN 2010, but I think this is merely because that is when it was first picked up in media coverage (see below).<sup>1553</sup> The United Nations Panel of Experts suggests that FPLC formed in NOV 2008 in response to CNDP attacks in Kiwanja.<sup>1554</sup> The UN report also includes an FPLC political program "distributed early in 2009," but the copy included in the annex is not an original copy and does not include a time or place signature.<sup>1555</sup> Finally, another source cites

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<sup>1547</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," para. 74.

<sup>1548</sup> "DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop Massacre"; "Sud-Kivu: Décès Du Chef Milicien Bede Rusagara à Kasenga."

<sup>1549</sup> Stearns, "Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu," 43.

<sup>1550</sup> Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 25–27, 37–43; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)," paras. 252–254.

<sup>1551</sup> Verweijen, "A Microcosm of Militarization," 43.

<sup>1552</sup> On politicization, see Verweijen, 37.

<sup>1553</sup> "Terrorism/War Risks: Growing Divisions in the CNDP Increase Risks to Aid Workers in North Kivu and the Likelihood of Rwandan Incursions into the DRC.," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, June 24, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020151130e66o00188&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1554</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 50.

<sup>1555</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," 105–7.

unspecified “aid agencies” claiming that Ngabo had been recruiting since 2008.<sup>1556</sup> Two sources suggest the group formed on 5 JUL 2009 after a meeting in Kama, Pangi territory, Maniema province; it is not clear where this information came from nor is it repeated elsewhere.<sup>1557</sup> I am not especially confident in either of these narratives. As such, I have coded NOV 2008 as the founding date, but with limited certainty.

However, it seems clear that the group first became public on 31 JAN 2010 in a Voice of America article.<sup>1558</sup> (The UN Panel of Experts claimed Ngabo announced FPLC to Radio Okapi on 1 JAN 2010, but I found no record of this on the Radio Okapi website or search engines that usually pick up Radio Okapi.<sup>1559</sup>) It also seems reasonably clear that they existed prior to this date. In addition to the sources listed above suggesting that FPLC was founded in 2008 or 2009, the Congo Siasa blog reports that rumors of an armed group led by Ngabo Gabi surfaced in SEPT 2009, at which time it was blamed for a series of looting incidents on the Rutshuru-Ishasha Road.<sup>1560</sup> As such, I have coded 0 for name\_time (within three months) and missing for name\_time2 (within a year). For these reasons, I coded 1 for clandestine.

Several sources mention generalized accounts of looting by FPLC.<sup>1561</sup> Beyond that, I found reference to only one specific attack: on 1-2 JUN 2010, FPLC attacked a FARDC position at Burungu, near Kitchanga in Masisi territory. Reported death tolls range from ten to fourteen, the latter of which specifies the death of 12 FARDC and 2 civilians. It is unclear whether the killing of these civilians was incidental or targeted.<sup>1562</sup> As such, I have left civilian attack date as missing. FPLC reportedly conducted several attacks on FARDC, but this attack is the only one for which specific information appears.<sup>1563</sup> (FPLC attacks may have been mis-reported as FDLR attacks; this particular attack was originally attributed to FDLR.<sup>1564</sup>) As such, I coded this incident as the first small attack.

FPLC is ostensibly multi-ethnic (Hutu, Tutsi, Nande, Hunde) and welcomes members from various armed groups including CNDP, FDLR-Rud, FDLR-FOCA, Mai-Mai, PARECO, and FARDC defectors.<sup>1565</sup> However, it seems that it primarily drew membership from Nkunda factions of CNDP:

- Information from diplomatic sources published on Congo Siasa states: “When meeting with a Gad delegation in early May however, it was obvious – as during the Nkunda-days – that the majority of his rebel force is Tutsi [as are CNDP] and that the tactics used, ambushes and hit-an-

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<sup>1556</sup> “Ugandan Security Forces Arrest Congo Rebel Leader - Officials,” *Dow Jones International News*, July 1, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DJI0000020100701e671000np&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1557</sup> “RDC: arrestation en Ouganda du chef rebelle congolais Gadi Ngabo,” *Le Service en français de Xinhua*, July 5, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=XHFRNS0020100705e675006y2&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Le Chef Rebelle Gadi Ngabo Aux Arrêts En Ouganda,” Radio Okapi, July 5, 2010, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/07/05/le-chef-rebelle-gadi-ngabo-aux-arrets-en-ouganda>.

<sup>1558</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC,” Congo Research Group, June 7, 2010, <http://congoreserchgroup.org/love-triangle-rwanda-uganda-drc/>; Peter Clotey, “Rebel Leader Claims Readiness to Liberate Congolese,” VOA, January 30, 2010, <https://www.voanews.com/a/rebel-leader-claims-readiness-to-liberate-congolese--83214167/152999.html>.

<sup>1559</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 50.

<sup>1560</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC.”

<sup>1561</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; “Terrorism/War Risks.”

<sup>1562</sup> “RDC,” July 5, 2010; “DR Congo Rebel Leader Arrested in Uganda,” *Agence France Presse*, July 2, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR0000020100702e672006el&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “DRC Rebel Leader Held in Uganda | IOL,” IOL, July 2, 2010, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/drc-rebel-leader-held-in-uganda-488724>; “Masisi: Les FARDC Lancent Une Offensive Contre Les FDLR,” Radio Okapi, June 4, 2010, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/06/04/masisi-les-fardc-lancent-une-offensive-contre-les-fdlr>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 55.

<sup>1563</sup> “DRC Rebel Leader Held in Uganda | IOL”; “DR Congo Rebel Leader Arrested in Uganda.”

<sup>1564</sup> “Masisi: Les FARDC Lancent Une Offensive Contre Les FDLR.”

<sup>1565</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” paras. 51, 54.

run [sic] attacks against FARDC units and the spreading of rumors, have the same modus operandi as the CNDP.”<sup>1566</sup>

- Following the split within the CNDP (Nkunda versus Ntaganda), FPLC is portrayed as a rival to the CNDP aligned with Nkunda.<sup>1567</sup> Nkunda had been arrested at the time and was thus was himself unable to lead his loyalists.<sup>1568</sup>
- FPLC’s original leader, Ngabo Gadi, is Tutsi and former CNDP.<sup>1569</sup> In addition, the group has recruited Nkundist ex-CNDP including former officers.<sup>1570</sup>

As such, I highly suspect that FPLC qualifies as a splinter group of CNDP by our criteria. However, because of the claims that the group was multi-ethnic, I have included it at a certainty of only 1. Given the above information, I have coded other rebels under organizational history.

As previously mentioned, the group is led by Ngabo Gadi (Ngaabo Gad, Ngaabo Gadi, Ngabo Gad). Ngabo Gadi is an ethnic Tutsi from Masisi.<sup>1571</sup> He belonged to a succession of armed groups including ADFL, RCD, RCD-Kisangani, and CNDP; he may also be linked to UPC or PUSIC.<sup>1572</sup> Other named leadership includes Lieutenant Colonel Célestin Bisungu Kaluka (Chief of Staff of the FNC, the FPLC’s armed wing), Colonel Freddy Gasava (intelligence officer, former CNDP officer), Aimé Munyakazi (FPLC spokesperson and candidate in the 2006 Congolese national elections); the two former may have been integrated into FARDC (unclear).<sup>1573</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for current rebels and missing for current security under initial leadership.

The group is known to have cooperated with FDLR and FDLR splinters, drawing animosity from Rwanda.<sup>1574</sup> It is rumored to have received support from Uganda, although I was not able to find sufficient evidence to code it as such for our purposes.<sup>1575</sup> As a result, I have left support from foreign government as missing under initial resources. Ngabo may have also received support from Raphael Soriano (wealthy Katangese

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<sup>1566</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC.”

<sup>1567</sup> “Who’s Who among Armed Groups in the East”; “Ugandan Security Forces Arrest Congo Rebel Leader - Officials”; “Terrorism/War Risks”; Clottey, “Rebel Leader Claims Readiness to Liberate Congolese”; Georgianne Nienaber, “Congolese Groups Demand Ouster of Abusive Army Commander,” *LA Progressive* (blog), March 2, 2010, <https://www.laprogressive.com/congolese-groups-demand-ouster-abusive-army-commander/>.

<sup>1568</sup> Chiara Carter, “Rebel Link to Assassination Bid,” *Weekend Argus*, July 4, 2010, E1 edition, sec. News.

<sup>1569</sup> “Terrorism/War Risks”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” 104; “DRC Rebel Leader Held in Uganda | IOL”; “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; Carter, “Rebel Link to Assassination Bid.”

<sup>1570</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 57; “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; Edwin Musoni, “Kayumba Terror Network Busted,” *All Africa*, June 29, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110629e76t000pl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 238.

<sup>1571</sup> “Terrorism/War Risks”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” 104; “DRC Rebel Leader Held in Uganda | IOL”; “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; Carter, “Rebel Link to Assassination Bid”; “Le Chef Rebelle Gadi Ngabo Aux Arrêts En Ouganda.”

<sup>1572</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” 104; “Terrorism/War Risks.”

<sup>1573</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 51.

<sup>1574</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; “Terrorism/War Risks”; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” para. 59.

<sup>1575</sup> “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; “Terrorism/War Risks”; Carter, “Rebel Link to Assassination Bid”; Frank Chemaly, “The Solutions to the Mystery Shooting of Rwandan Dissident Lieutenant-General...,” *Sunday Tribune*, July 4, 2010, E3 edition, sec. News.



businessman) and Faustin Nyamwasa (Rwandan dissident general living in Johannesburg).<sup>1576</sup> Hence, I have also coded other as missing.

Within the first year (approximately), FPLC has espoused two generalized goals: (1) the ouster of Kabila and “liberation” of the DRC,<sup>1577</sup> and (2) the elimination of Rwandan influence from North Kivu.<sup>1578</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for takeover under initial goals.

The group seems to operate mainly in Rutshuru and Masisi territories.<sup>1579</sup> FPLC may be headquartered in Virunga National Park.<sup>1580</sup> However, Ngabo Gadi seems to have spent extensive time in Kampala, Uganda.<sup>1581</sup> He was arrested in Kampala on 29 JUN 2010 in what appears to be a Ugandan attempt to improve Ugandan-Congolese relations.<sup>1582</sup> FPLC sources seem to indicate that was not his residence while commanding FPLC, saying that Ngabo Gadi had only been present there since 28 JUN 2010 to receive medical treatment.<sup>1583</sup> One Congo Siasa blog post from 9 JUN 2010 tracking armed groups lists “Rutshuru and Uganda” for FPLC, but I haven’t seen any other sources suggest FPLC presence in Uganda besides just Ngabo.<sup>1584</sup> At any rate, it appears most planning occurred in the DRC. As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”.

As best I can tell, this group seems to have degenerated after Ngabo was arrested. It continued to show up in UN reports until 2011, evidently conducted several joint ambush attacks on FARDC positions on the Ishasha road from DEC 2010 to FEB 2011 (no further details).<sup>1585</sup> I found no other records of such attacks. As of late 2011, the new main FPLC leader, Emmanuel Nsengyumva, was assassinated by his own bodyguard (paid by Ntaganda on behalf of Rwanda); the organization seemed to be falling apart – some members

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<sup>1576</sup> “A l’assaut des terres en zone pétrolière,” *La Lettre de l’Océan Indien*, December 18, 2010, sec. AFFAIRES & RESEAUX, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLETF0020110107e6ci0000r&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Carter, “Rebel Link to Assassination Bid”; Chemaly, “The Solutions to the Mystery Shooting of Rwandan Dissident Lieutenant-General...”; Deon Delpont, “Mystery Shooting of a General,” *Sunday Tribune*, July 4, 2010, E1 edition, sec. News.

<sup>1577</sup> Clotey, “Rebel Leader Claims Readiness to Liberate Congolese”; Henry Mukasa, “Uganda: Govt, Congo Discuss New Plot Against LRA,” *New Vision (Kampala)*, September 20, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201009200177.html>; “RD Congo: un chef rebelle congolais arrêté en Ouganda,” *Agence France Presse*, July 2, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPFR00020100702e67200549&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1578</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” 107; Carter, “Rebel Link to Assassination Bid.”

<sup>1579</sup> “Terrorism/War Risks”; “DR Congo Rebel Leader Arrested in Uganda”; “DRC Rebel Leader Held in Uganda | IOL”; “Who’s Who among Armed Groups in the East”; “RDC,” July 5, 2010; “Le Chef Rebelle Gadi Ngabo Aux Arrêts En Ouganda”; “RDC: violents affrontements entre l’armée et les rebelles FDLR à Masisi,” *Le Service en français de Xinhua*, June 4, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=XHFRNS0020100604e6640076d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1580</sup> Georgianne Nienaber, “Kabila Says ‘Peace Before Justice’ in DRC; Rebel General Gadi Ready to Fight,” *Huffington Post* (blog), April 10, 2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/kabila-says-peace-before\\_b\\_454375.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/kabila-says-peace-before_b_454375.html).

<sup>1581</sup> Nienaber; Nienaber, “Congolese Groups Demand Ouster of Abusive Army Commander”; “The Love Triangle: Rwanda-Uganda-DRC”; “Ugandan Security Forces Arrest Congo Rebel Leader - Officials”; “A l’assaut des terres en zone pétrolière.”

<sup>1582</sup> “Le Chef Rebelle Gadi Ngabo Aux Arrêts En Ouganda”; “DRC Rebel Leader Held in Uganda | IOL”; “Ugandan Security Forces Arrest Congo Rebel Leader - Officials”; “DR Congo Rebel Leader Arrested in Uganda”; “RDC,” July 5, 2010; “Uganda Offers to Train DR Congo Troops,” *Agence France Presse*, September 21, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020100921e691006n0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1583</sup> “RDC,” July 5, 2010; “Arrestation en Ouganda du chef rebelle congolais Gadi Ngabo,” *Agence Belga*, July 6, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BELGAF0020100706e676001xh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1584</sup> Jason Stearns, “List of Armed Groups in the Kivus,” *Congo Siasa* (blog), June 9, 2010, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/06/list-of-armed-groups-in-kivus.html>.

<sup>1585</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)” (United Nations Security Council, June 7, 2011), para. 42, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/345](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/345).

went into hiding in Uganda while others have integrated into FARDC or armed groups loyal to Ntaganda. Evidently FPLC was renamed several times during this period: first, Rassemblement national pour la libération du Congo, then Mouvement orange pour la révolution populaire, and then Union des forces républicaines pour la stabilité et le développement.<sup>1586</sup> However, I found no record of groups by these names. Several Radio Okapi articles from early 2013 make reference to an FPLC, but it is unclear whether this is the same organization: it operates in Fizi and Uvira territories, over 350 km south of FPLC's operations in Rutshuru and Masisi, and its spokesperson in Obedi Ruzigira (possible alias for Bedi Rusagara?), who was not formerly affiliated with FPLC.<sup>1587</sup> Moreover, no specific attacks are mentioned. It is mentioned again in 2016, this time in Ituri, with no additional information.<sup>1588</sup> In short, I found no records of attack that would qualify FPLC for either viable or viable\_civ.

I code 1 for riot (SCAD events 4900335, 4900357).

#### **\*Armée de résistance populaire (ARP)**

AKAs: Popular Resistance Army, Army of Popular Resistance, Conscience Action Forum of Initiatives in the Development of Africa (self-declared mouthpiece based in South Africa)

The UN Panel of Experts presents this as a rebel group in apparently complete confidence, although I have doubts. I will first put forth the narrative proposed by those purporting the ARP to be a real rebel group, and then review the evidence against inclusion. I included it as a rebel group, but only with a certainty of one. Anti-government violence did occur; the question is rather attribution of the violence to the ARP. For the purposes of coding, I assume information regarding alleged ARP attacks and ARP organizational history to be truthful.

The ARP is led by General Faustin Munene. Munene fought in the Mulelist rebellion and the Angolan independence wars before joining the AFDL and rising to a prominent position.<sup>1589</sup> Under Laurent-Désiré Kabila, he attained the positions of Deputy Interior Minister and Air Force Chief of Staff. When Joseph Kabila came into power, he became Chancellor of the National Orders.<sup>1590</sup> According to one source, he evidently relinquished this position to stand for election to an MP position for Kinshasa, which

<sup>1586</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," paras. 238–242.

<sup>1587</sup> "Uvira: Des Mai-Mai FPLC Se Disent Prêts à Intégrer Les FARDC," Radio Okapi, January 15, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/01/15/uvira-des-mai-mai-fplc-se-disent-prets-integrer-les-fardc>; "Uvira: Le Général Pacifique Masunzu Appelle Les Groupes Armés à Intégrer Les FARDC," Radio Okapi, February 11, 2013, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/02/11/uvira-le-general-pacifique-masunzu-appelle-les-groupes-armes-integrer-les-fardc>.

<sup>1588</sup> "Le Gouvernement Veut Neutraliser Les Groupes Armés En Ituri," Radio Okapi, July 14, 2016, <https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/07/14/actualite/securite/le-gouvernement-veut-neutraliser-les-groupes-armes-en-ituri>.

<sup>1589</sup> Fungala Fumu Ndgonji and Fweley Diangitukwa, "Qui Est Le General Munene, Ses Objectifs, Sa Strategie, Ses Supports," CONGOSECURITE, November 20, 2010, <http://securitecongo.canalblog.com/archives/2010/11/20/19651349.html>; Jason Stearns, "Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion," *Congo Siasa* (blog), November 11, 2010, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/11/former-kabila-general-launches-another.html>.

<sup>1590</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 46; Stearns, "Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion"; "Kinshasa: Le Général Faustin Munene Est Porté Disparu, Selon Sa Famille," Radio Okapi, October 8, 2010, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/10/08/kinshasa-le-general-faustin-munene-est-porte-disparu-selon-sa-famille>; "Affaire Des Présumés Infiltrés Ex-Faz: La Perpétuité Pour Le Général Munene et 20 Ans de Prison Pour 77 Autres Prévenus," Radio Okapi, March 5, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/03/05/affaire-des-presumes-infiltrés-ex-faz-la-perpetuite-pour-le-general-munene-et-20-ans-de-prison-pour-77-autres-prevenus>; "Le Général Faustin Munene Arrêté Au Congo Brazzaville," Radio Okapi, January 18, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/01/18/le-general-faustin-munene-arrete-au-congo-brazzaville>; "Une Délégation de l'opposition En à La Monusco," Radio Okapi, January 18, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/revue-de-presse/2011/01/18/une-delegation-de-l%25e2%2580%2599opposition-en-a-la-monusco>.

he did not win. He seemed to have held no significant military or government position after that.<sup>1591</sup> In 2010, Kinshasa papers published that he had been complicit in a coup attempt. His family reported that, following the publications, he went missing (fled) on 27 SEPT 2010 and his residences were ransacked.<sup>1592</sup>

Munene resurfaced on Congolese diaspora media on 10 NOV 2010, giving interviews and issuing a press release announcing the Armée de résistance populaire.<sup>1593</sup> The press release claimed the group formed in JAN 2010, which does not make much sense. There is no evidence to support this, and Munene still had not fled Kinshasa.<sup>1594</sup> In another source, an interview with Faustin Munene, the interviewer states that he founded ARP after his disappearance; Munene does not correct him.<sup>1595</sup> In another source, a government prosecutor indicates that he formed ARP after he fled. I find it more likely that the group formed in OCT 2010, following his disappearance.<sup>1596</sup>

Munene called the ARP a “political-military movement,” claiming that it had an armed wing.<sup>1597</sup> The group’s objectives were three-fold: (1) resolve the DRC’s current political crisis, (2) rid the country of foreigners, and (3) restore and ensure Congolese Democratic institutions.<sup>1598</sup> It seems fairly clear that Kabila is considered an impediment to these goals. As such, initial goal is coded as takeover.

Other leadership included spokesperson Jean Kalama Ilunga, a former advisor to Laurent-Désiré Kabila called a “heavyweight” of the diaspora resistance, and Fanfan Longa Fuamba, who presented himself as Secretary-General of the ARP and has signed at least one declaration as such. The latter is located in London.<sup>1599</sup> Like these leaders, Munene himself lived abroad in Congo-Brazzaville following his flight from Kinshasa. He was arrested there in JAN 2011, but never extradited and eventually released.<sup>1600</sup> Thus,

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<sup>1591</sup> Stearns, “Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion.”

<sup>1592</sup> “Kinshasa: Le Général Faustin Munene Est Porté Disparu, Selon Sa Famille”; “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 46; “Affaire Des Présumés Infiltrés Ex-Faz: La Perpétuité Pour Le Général Munene et 20 Ans de Prison Pour 77 Autres Prévenus.”

<sup>1593</sup> Fumu Ndgondji and Diangitukwa, “Qui Est Le General Munene, Ses Objectfs, Sa Strategie, Ses Supports”; Freddy Mulongo, “Général Faustin Munene En Maquis, Son Équipe de l’ARP Fait Un Travail de Fond Au Sein de La Diaspora !,” Réveil FM International, December 15, 2010, <http://reveil-fm.com/index.php/reveil-fm.com2010/12/15/1174-defrmunene>; Stearns, “Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion.”

<sup>1594</sup> Stearns, “Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion.”

<sup>1595</sup> Mulongo, “Général Faustin Munene En Maquis, Son Équipe de l’ARP Fait Un Travail de Fond Au Sein de La Diaspora !”

<sup>1596</sup> “Affaire Des Présumés Infiltrés Ex-Faz: La Perpétuité Pour Le Général Munene et 20 Ans de Prison Pour 77 Autres Prévenus.”

<sup>1597</sup> Mulongo, “Général Faustin Munene En Maquis, Son Équipe de l’ARP Fait Un Travail de Fond Au Sein de La Diaspora !”

<sup>1598</sup> Mulongo; Fumu Ndgondji and Diangitukwa, “Qui Est Le General Munene, Ses Objectfs, Sa Strategie, Ses Supports”; Mulongo, “Général Faustin Munene En Maquis, Son Équipe de l’ARP Fait Un Travail de Fond Au Sein de La Diaspora !”

<sup>1599</sup> Freddy Mulongo, “Le Général Faustin Munene Confirme Jean Kalama Ilunga Comme Porte-Parole de l’ARP,” Le Post (Huffington Post), August 12, 2011, [http://archives-lepost.huffingtonpost.fr/article/2011/08/12/2567601\\_le-general-faustin-munene-confirme-jean-kalama-ilunga-comme-porte-parole-de-l-arp.html](http://archives-lepost.huffingtonpost.fr/article/2011/08/12/2567601_le-general-faustin-munene-confirme-jean-kalama-ilunga-comme-porte-parole-de-l-arp.html); Mulongo, “Général Faustin Munene En Maquis, Son Équipe de l’ARP Fait Un Travail de Fond Au Sein de La Diaspora !”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Situation Sécuritaire Tendue Au Bas-Congo - Bruits de Bottes à Tshela,” *Le Potentiel*, July 28, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201107280257.html>.

<sup>1600</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” 46; “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” para. 243; “Affaire Des Présumés Infiltrés Ex-Faz: La Perpétuité Pour Le Général Munene et 20 Ans de Prison Pour 77 Autres Prévenus”; “Une Délégation de l’opposition En à La Monusco”; “Le Général Faustin Munene Arrêté Au Congo Brazzaville”; Christophe Rigaud, “RDC : L’ARP de Munene « n’écarte Pas l’option Des Armes Pour 2016 »,” *AfrikArabia.Com* (blog), August 27, 2015, <http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/rdc-larp-de-munene-necarte-pas-loption-des-armes-pour-2016/>.

it seems that most ARP leadership is located abroad, though evidently not all in the same place. In addition, former Mobutu-era intelligence chief Honoré Ngbanda has announced his support for the ARP, although it is not apparent that he holds a leadership position in the organization.<sup>1601</sup> As such, I have coded current security, current government leaders, and former rebels under initial leadership.

According to one group's testimony, all ARP members were FARDC officers loyal to Munene.<sup>1602</sup> However, ARP would likely still qualify as a rebel group assuming that they, like Munene, fled their posts in OCT and NOV 2010 (seems likely given the various locales of the attacks, most outside of Kinshasa, where Munene had been based). As such, I coded military for organizational history.

The group appears several times throughout 2010 and 2011, in violent incidents and otherwise. The UN Panel of Experts identifies them as behind the 2 NOV 2010 attack on the military camp at Kikwit (Bandundu province), which resulted in the death of three soldiers.<sup>1603</sup> According to Congo Siasa, ARP also claimed an attack on Mbandaka around the same time.<sup>1604</sup> Another UN accounts suggests that twenty-eight soldiers were similarly arrested in Bas-Congo in late DEC 2010 for their participation in the ARP insurrection.<sup>1605</sup> Authorities arrested seventy-seven additional individuals in Bas-Congo in early FEB 2011.<sup>1606</sup> According to the UN Panel of Experts and some other accounts, Munene's ARP and Ujani Mangbama's Enyele militia were jointly responsible for 27 FEB 2011 attacks on the presidential residence and Camp Kokolo in Kinshasa in which six security forces were killed.<sup>1607</sup> As of JUL 2011, the UN announced that it believed ARP to be sheltering in the Mayumbe forest (Tshela territory, Bas-Congo), where it evidently found some armbands which MONUSCO discovered.<sup>1608</sup> (ARP denied the armbands belonged to them.<sup>1609</sup>) The UN Panel of Experts also points to ARP as behind a "small attack" in Lukolela, Equateur province (additional details unknown).<sup>1610</sup> As such, I have coded 1 for clandestine because the first attack occurred prior to the public identification of the group. I coded the Kikwit attack as the first small attack, and large attack and civilian attack as never occurred (although it is possible that the Lukolela attack was a large or civilian attack).

The planning location of ARP is supremely unclear: diasporic leadership operates from at least two different countries (Congo-Brazzaville and the United Kingdom), while alleged ARP operations have spanned four

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<sup>1601</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 46; Stearns, "Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion."

<sup>1602</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 244.

<sup>1603</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 46; "Le Général Faustin Munene Arrêté Au Congo Brazzaville."

<sup>1604</sup> Stearns, "Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion."

<sup>1605</sup> "Affaire Des Présumés Infiltrés Ex-Faz: La Perpétuité Pour Le Général Munene et 20 Ans de Prison Pour 77 Autres Prévenus."

<sup>1606</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 46; "Kinshasa: Attaque de La Résidence Présidentielle, 6 Morts, Selon L. Mende," Radio Okapi, February 27, 2011, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/02/27/kinshasa-attaque-de-la-residence-presidentielle-6-morts-selon-l-mende>; Legal Aid Board, "Democratic Republic of the Congo -- Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 8 September 2011: Any Information on Recent Treatment of Supporters of General Faustin" (Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland, September 8, 2011), [https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/11/general\\_faustine.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/11/general_faustine.pdf); Juakali Kambale, "DRC: Did pro-Mobutu Remnants Stage Anti-Kabila Attack?," Africa Review, March 8, 2011, <http://www.africareview.com/analysis/979190-1121050-ix23sa/index.html>.

<sup>1607</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 46.

<sup>1608</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Situation Sécuritaire Tendue Au Bas-Congo - Bruits de Bottes à Tshela."

<sup>1609</sup> Mulongo, "Le Général Faustin Munene Confirme Jean Kalama Ilunga Comme Porte-Parole de l'ARP."

<sup>1610</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1552 (2010)," para. 243.

difference Congolese provinces (Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Kinshasa, and Equateur). Unsure what to make of this, I have left all locational variables as missing.

Following these incidents, ARP appears to go quiet. It appears in amnesty lists in 2014, then again in late 2015 when Faustin Munene threatens to relaunch the armed movement. However, nothing seems to have come of these threats. I have coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ.

While several accounts suggest that ARP may have used Congo-Brazzaville as an operational planning base, there is no evidence that ARP received support from the Brazzaville government. As discussed above, the Brazzaville government in fact arrested him. As such, I have coded none for initial resources.

Under contestation, I coded 1 for protest (SCAD event 4900391).

SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Two Type 2 events occurred during this time, but nonlocally to the group formation province of Ituri. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Evidence against the inclusion of the ARP as a rebel group includes:

- As mentioned above, all of the named leadership of the organization seems to be based abroad.
- Writing in *Congo Siasa*, Jason Stearns suggests, “It is probable that both the Kikwit and the Mbandaka attacks were local problems that people like Ngbanda claimed as their own to inflate their importance... some people have linked the unrest in Kikwit, 500 km east of Kinshasa, to Munene, but... the killing of 3 Congolese soldiers on November 2 may have just been due to banditry.” Comments that follow this blog post also concur that ARP is a “cyber or mediatic rebellion,” rather than a real one.<sup>1611</sup>
- The 27 FEB attacks have been attributed to a wide range of actors: Congo Siasa suggests that renegade MLC elements may have conducted the attacks with the complicity of security forces.<sup>1612</sup> Christophe Vogel, on his blog *Sulu*, suggests that it was a governmental inside job staged to justify a crackdown.<sup>1613</sup> Another source likewise submits that it may have been staged.<sup>1614</sup> The Irish Refugee Documentation Centre documents narratives of the event that have been remarkably inconsistent and that indicate that the government has lied repeatedly about the attacks.<sup>1615</sup>
- The dispersed locations of alleged ARP attacks make me seriously doubt that they were carried out by a single group; I have not seen that level of mobility in any Congolese rebel group.

### Bunda Dia Kongo (BDK)

AKAs: Bundu Dia Kongo

Bunda dia Kongo is a political-religious group based in Bas Congo province seeking greater autonomy for the Bas Congo province.<sup>1616</sup> Government officials claim that BDK is an armed group that has formed alliances

<sup>1611</sup> Stearns, “Former Kabila General Launches Another (Soldierless?) Rebellion.”

<sup>1612</sup> “Attack on State Installations in Kinshasa – Coup Attempt?,” Congo Research Group, February 27, 2011, <http://congoresearchgroup.org/attack-on-state-installations-in/>.

<sup>1613</sup> “Kinshasa on the Verge Of...what Exactly?,” *Sulu* (blog), December 31, 2013, <https://suluhu.org/2013/12/31/kinshasa-on-the-verge-ofwhat-exactly/>.

<sup>1614</sup> “Coup Attempt in Kinshasa?,” *Friends of the Congo* (blog), February 27, 2011, <http://congofriends.blogspot.com/2011/02/>.

<sup>1615</sup> Legal Aid Board, “Democratic Republic of the Congo -- Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 8 September 2011: Any Information on Recent Treatment of Supporters of General Faustin.”

<sup>1616</sup> “Fears over Increasing Sect-Related Violence in Southwest,” IRIN, March 6, 2008, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/240679>; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Information on the Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) Movement, Including Its Political Program, Location of Its Offices, the Number of Its Members, Its Situation with Respect to Other Political Parties, and the Attitude of Government Authorities toward Its Leaders and Members (2007 - April 2011),” Refworld, accessed July 31, 2017, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4db7c1382.html>; “‘We Will Crush You’: The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 25, 2008), 66, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1108web.pdf>.

with other rebel groups and has established a military training camp.<sup>1617</sup> One local paper reports that BDK's goal is to carry out ethnic cleansing.<sup>1618</sup> There is no question that BDK supporters have political goals and have engaged in acts of violence; the question is whether such acts were planned. In areas where state control was weak, BDK has functioned as a governing force, in some cases administering summary justice.<sup>1619</sup> For instance, they have condemned and burned alleged sorcerers and driven Roman Catholic clergy out of such areas.<sup>1620</sup>

Moreover, BDK followers have attacked state forces, although it appears that such violence has generally arisen spontaneously.<sup>1621</sup> For instance, on 31 JAN 2007, a police raid on the home of BDK's spiritual leader and local corruption prompted demonstrations and spontaneous violence in several Bas Congo locations. This violence included the erection of barricades; attacks on police, including lethal stonings and beatings; the killing of two civilians; raids on police stations and other administrative offices; and the burning of MONUC vehicles.<sup>1622</sup> However, the bulk of investigations of and reports on these incidents emphasize excessive and irresponsible use of force on behalf of the government.<sup>1623</sup> HRW acknowledges incidents of illegal and lethal violence by BDK supporters, but also indicates that government claims of an organized armed insurrection have not been substantiated by the government or by United Nations investigations.<sup>1624</sup> While MONUC announced at the time that the 31 JAN police raid captured a stockpile of machetes, HRW's retrospective report states that "no weapons were found" at the home.<sup>1625</sup> (I would tend to believe the latter report, which was conducted after several thorough investigations.) HRW further reports that BDK demonstrators often carry sticks and stones, but not firearms.<sup>1626</sup> Moreover, BDK leaders have not encouraged use of violence, and have sometimes made calls for peaceful demonstrations. They submitted notice of public demonstrations to law enforcement (although by flyer rather than the prescribed method

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<sup>1617</sup> "Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo" (Human Rights Watch, April 12, 2007), 2, 7–8, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0407.pdf>; "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 72–73.

<sup>1618</sup> Kgm, "Congo-Kinshasa: Tentative D'épuration Ethnique Dans Le Bas-Congo : Affrontements Sanglants Entre Adeptes de Bundu Dia Kongo et Police Nationale," *Le Phare*, May 26, 2006, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200605260431.html>.

<sup>1619</sup> "Fears over Increasing Sect-Related Violence in Southwest"; IRIN, "DRC: UN 'lied' in Report on Bas-Congo Killings - Govt," Text, ReliefWeb, June 18, 2008, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-un-lied-report-bas-congo-killings-govt>; "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 69.

<sup>1620</sup> "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 75.

<sup>1621</sup> "Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo"; "Fears over Increasing Sect-Related Violence in Southwest."

<sup>1622</sup> "Bas-Congo: 12 Morts à Matadi et 6 à Moanda, Bilans Des Manifestations de Bundu Dia Kongo," Radio Okapi, February 1, 2007, <http://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2007/02/01/bas-congo-12-morts-a-matadi-et-6-a-moanda-bilans-des-manifestations-de-bundu-dia-kongo>; Eoin Young, "Congo-Kinshasa: Violent Unrest in Matadi Leaves 10 Dead And Many Injured," *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, February 1, 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200702010877.html>; E. Young and B. Alao, "Congo-Kinshasa: Bas-Congo Appeals Court Orders a Second Round of Governor Elections," *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, February 8, 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200702080861.html>; "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 71–72; "Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo," 2.

<sup>1623</sup> "Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo"; "Congo-Kinshasa: Monuc Demands of the Authorities to Respect the Law," *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, February 7, 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200702070808.html>; "Fears over Increasing Sect-Related Violence in Southwest"; IRIN, "DRC: UN 'lied' in Report on Bas-Congo Killings - Govt."

<sup>1624</sup> "Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo"; "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 73.

<sup>1625</sup> Young, "Congo-Kinshasa: Violent Unrest in Matadi Leaves 10 Dead And Many Injured"; "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 71.

<sup>1626</sup> "'We Will Crush You': The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 68–69.



of a formal letter).<sup>1627</sup> Based on this information, I have excluded Bunda Dia Kongo despite clear political goals: the violence committed by BDK members does not appear to be premeditated, coordinated, or supported by the organization's leadership.

### Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD)

AKAs: People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy

The PPRD is the ruling party in the DRC, established in preparation for the 2006 elections.<sup>1628</sup> Most of the events involving PPRD were either election-related violence (3191DRC, 3192DRC, 3205DRC, 3206DRC, 3207DRC, 3244DRC, 3247DRC, 3248DRC, 3249DRC) or spontaneous violence (5525DRC, 5828DRC, 5833DRC). In addition, there were several incidents where PPRD was the victim of violence (5823DRC, 8981DRC, 8982DRC, 9568DRC). I followed up on one incident, 5650DRC, in which the body guards of PPRD Secretary-General Evariste Boshab attack RTG@ cameraman Serge Kembila for filming empty seats at a party event. Evidently, the RTG@ television station was owned by a parliamentarian who recently left PPRD.<sup>1629</sup> However, the event does not qualify as anti-government violence since PPRD was the ruling party.

### Mouvement pour la revendication de la vérité des urnes

AKAs: Movement for Claiming the Truth of the Ballot Box, Armée du peuple congolais pour le changement et la démocratie, Congolese People's Army for Change and Democracy

This group was announced on 16 AUG 2012.<sup>1630</sup> It was led by Lt. Col. Tshibangu (then claiming the rank of Lt. Gen.), who had defected from FARDC along with twelve to twenty men on 12 AUG 2012.<sup>1631</sup> He was formerly second in command of the 4<sup>th</sup> FARDC military region.<sup>1632</sup> The group demanded that opposition

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<sup>1627</sup> "Statement by Human Rights Watch to the DRC Parliamentary Commission Investigating Events in Bas Congo," 3–4.

<sup>1628</sup> Kisangani and Bobb, *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 495; "Kabila Party Formed in DR Congo," *BBC News*, April 2, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1907252.stm>.

<sup>1629</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Journalist Violently Attacked During Ruling Party Congress," *Journaliste En Danger (Kinshasa)*, August 25, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108250711.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Call to Ruling Party Politicians After Threats And Attacks On Journalists," *Reporters sans Frontières (Paris)*, August 26, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108261014.html>; Mohamed Keita, "Congo-Kinshasa: DRC Journalists Urge Ruling Party to Halt Abuse," *Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)*, August 30, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108300076.html>.

<sup>1630</sup> Emmanuel R. Karake, "New Rebel Group in DRC?," *The New Times Rwanda*, August 23, 2012, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/56504/>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai-Occidental - Un Déserteur Crée Un Mouvement Pour «revendiquer La Vérité Des Urnes»," *Radio Okapi*, August 17, 2012,

<http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208170958.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai-Oriental - Un Journaliste Arrêté Pour Avoir Hébergé Un Déserteur," *Radio Okapi*, August 17, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208170013.html>.

<sup>1631</sup> Karake, "New Rebel Group in DRC?"; Brahim Elidrissi, "Le Mouvement Des Jeunes Pour Le Changement Crée Dcheira, Sa Branche Armée | Forsatin.Org," June 6, 2014, <http://www.forsatin.org/393-le-mouvement-des-jeunes-pour-le-changement-cree-dcheira-sa-branche-armee.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai-Oriental - 300 Militaires et Policiers Déployés Pour Arrêter Le Colonel Dissident John Tshibangu," *Radio Okapi*, August 23, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208231260.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Un Colonel Déserteur Crée Le Mouvement Pour Revendiquer La Vérité Des Urnes," *Radio France Internationale*, August 19, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208190314.html>.

<sup>1632</sup> AfricaNews, "CAR: Group of Ex-Séléka Rebels Claims to Have Captured LRA Leader," *Africanews*, February 8, 2016, <http://www.africanews.com/2016/02/08/central-africa-ex-Séléka-rebel-group-claim-to-have-captured-a-leader-of-lra/>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai-Oriental - Les Autorités Invitent La Population À Dénoncer Les Complices Du Colonel Rebelle Tshibangu," *Radio Okapi*, August 26, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208260467.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai-Oriental - Un Journaliste Arrêté Pour Avoir Hébergé Un Déserteur"; "John Tshibangu, L'homme Qui Veut Chasser «Joseph Kabila» Du Pouvoir!," *LeCongolais.CD*, August 20, 2012, <http://www.lecongolais.cd/john-tshibangu-lhomme-qui-veut-chasser-joseph-kabila-du-pouvoir/>.

leader Etienne Tshisekedi be installed as president.<sup>1633</sup> The government dispatched some 300 FARDC and police to find him; these forces were subsequently accused of abusing the population.<sup>1634</sup> However, I found only one article recording any violence perpetrated by this group: APARECO announced that Tshibangu's forces took the town of Kabeya Kamwanga on 30 SEPT 2012, killing two FARDC.<sup>1635</sup> However, APARECO, an organization in exile, is known to be of questionable credibility.<sup>1636</sup> The group appears again when several members were arrested and again in amnesty lists.<sup>1637</sup> Since there was no additional sources to corroborate the attack, I have not included the group. Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

**\*Union des mouvements patriotiques congolais (UMPC)** – I found scant reference to this group, just several articles announcing its formation as a coalition of Mai Mai groups. Even stranger, articles referencing UMPC appeared in 2002, while UMPC appears in a UN report in 2011.<sup>1638</sup> At any rate, I could find no evidence of violence or planned violence – excluded.

**\*Groupe d'action et de soutien d'Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi (GRASABI)**

AKAs: Group of Action and Support of Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi

I found only one reference to this group beyond passing mention; it stated that GRASABI was an armed group comprised of local Bembe youth following Bembe-Banyamulenge tensions, founded circa 1996.<sup>1639</sup> Excluded – predates period of interest.

**Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)** – see Angola

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<sup>1633</sup> Karake, "New Rebel Group in DRC?"; "John Tshibangu, l'homme Qui Veut Chasser «Joseph Kabila» Du Pouvoir!"

<sup>1634</sup> "RDC : Le Colonel Déserteur Tshibangu Accuse Les Forces Armées Gouvernementales D'exactions," *RFI Afrique*, November 5, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121105-rdc-le-colonel-deserteur-tshibangu-accusent-forces-armees-gouvernementales-exaction>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai-Oriental - Un Journaliste Arrêté Pour Avoir Hébergé Un Déserteur"; "Ethiopia: Some 300 Armed Militia in Amhara State Reconciled with Residents," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 7, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020070607e367003xp&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Donatien Ngandu Mupompa, "Congo-Kinshasa: Le Village Mupompa Vidé de Ses Habitants - La Société Civile Exprime Ses Inquiétudes," *Le Potentiel*, November 1, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201211011096.html>; Charlotte Idrac, "Congo-Kinshasa: Des Militaires Soupçonnés de Viols Dans Deux Provinces," *Radio France Internationale*, November 4, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201211040420.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Traque Du Colonel Dissident Tshibangu, Des Habitants de Mupompa Furent Dans La Brousse," *Radio Okapi*, September 10, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209101147.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Défection Du Colonel Tshibangu - Ngoyi Kasanji Appelle La Population Du Kasai-Oriental À La Vigilance," *Radio Okapi*, August 30, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208300983.html>.

<sup>1635</sup> Christophe Rigaud, "RDC : John Tshibangu Tente Une Offensive Au Kasai," *AfrikArabia.Com* (blog), October 2, 2012, <http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/rdc-john-tshibangu-tente-une-offensive-au-kasai/>.

<sup>1636</sup> Jason Stearns, "What's Going on in Dongo?," *Congo Siasa* (blog), December 10, 2009, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/12/whats-going-on-in-dongo.html>; Jason Stearns, "The Mystery of Dongo," *Congo Siasa* (blog), January 6, 2010, <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/01/mystery-of-dongo.html>.

<sup>1637</sup> "Congo-Kinshasa: Kasai Oriental - 5 Personnes Proches Du Colonel Dissident John Tshibangu Arrêtées," *Radio Okapi*, August 28, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208281243.html>; "Congo-Kinshasa: Deuxième Vague Des Personnes Bénéficiaires de La Loi d'amnistie Du 11 Février 2014," *Le Potentiel*, May 2, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201405021457.html>.

<sup>1638</sup> Isidore Nzanga, "Congo-Kinshasa: Relance de La Guerre Au Kivu: Qui Arme Les Mai-Mai?," *L'Eveil*, October 29, 2002, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200210290105.html>; "L'UMPC, Un Nouveau Mouvement Regroupant Cinq Mouvements Dissidents Du RCD-Goma, Est Porté Sur Les Fonts Baptismaux"; "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)," para. 165.

<sup>1639</sup> Koen Vlassenroot, "South Kivu: Identity, Territory, and Power in Eastern Congo," Usalama Project (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 36, <http://riftvalley.net/publication/south-kivu#.WTNYhmjyIV>.

**Front for the Liberation of Cabinda-Renovada (FLEC-Renovada)** – see Angola

**Alliance démocratique pour le développement (ADD)**

AKAs: Democratic Alliance for Development, Alliance for Democratic Development

This group is a political party. It was only tagged in one ACLED event, which was spontaneous and election-related violence.<sup>1640</sup>

**Alliance for Democratic Change** – This group is tagged in two ACLED events. The description for the first refers to Alliance for Democratic Change/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, and the other to ADF-NALU. As such, I believe these events were merely mistags of ADF. Excluded.

**Union des Forces pour la Libération du Katanga (UFLKA)** – This group announced its existence and distributed pamphlets, then was never heard from again. Moreover, the article concerning its formation calls it a movement, not an armed group.<sup>1641</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence, no clear organization.

**Sikilyamuba** – see Uganda

**People's Redemption Army (PRA)** – see Uganda

**Nzamba ya Bankoko** – This group was only tagged in two ACLED events. It is a religious sect and sounds a lot like a cult. It has been accused of committing various acts of violence against the community – for instance, violent theft, erecting roadblocks, torture, etc. – but none of the violence is of a political nature.<sup>1642</sup> Excluded.

**National Democratic Congress (NDC)** – This group is only tagged in two ACLED events. I found the original article and confirmed that it is a mis-tagging of the Nduma Defense of Congress.<sup>1643</sup> Excluded.

**Ingobokagihugu militia** – This group is only tagged in one ACLED event, which dovetails with what I found searching for the group elsewhere: it was created/named and then never heard from again.<sup>1644</sup> Even if this was an active group, it sounds like it would likely be disqualified under splinter criteria. It was headed by Colonel Kasongo, formerly of FDDH, and is composed of various Nyatura.<sup>1645</sup> Excluded – no evidence of violence or planned violence.

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<sup>1640</sup> “Bandundu : Les Partisans Du Palu et de l’ADD S’affrontent À Gungu.”

<sup>1641</sup> Xinhua, “Congo, République Démocratique : Un Nouveau Mouvement Indépendantiste Signalé Au Katanga,” AFRAN, December 22, 2011, <http://www.afran.info/francais/modules/news/article.php?storyid=3714>; Jacqueline Maquet, “Conférence de Presse Des Nations-Unies Du Mercredi 21 Décembre 2011,” *Congo Belge - Province de l’Equateur* (blog), lundi décembre 2011, <https://provincedelegequateur.blogspot.com/2011/12/de-presse-des-nations-unies-du-mercredi.html>.

<sup>1642</sup> “Equateur : Les Membres d’une Secte Religieuse Accusés de Vol, Pillage et Tortures,” Radio Okapi, March 13, 2012, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/03/13/equateur-les-membres-dune-secte-religieuse-accuses-de-vol-pillage-tortures>.

<sup>1643</sup> “RDC: 16 Morts Après 2 Jours Des Combats Entre Miliciens à Masisi,” Radio Okapi, September 29, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/09/29/rdc-16-morts-apres-2-jours-des-combats-entre-miliciens-masisi>.

<sup>1644</sup> “Global Overview: May 2014,” Crisis Group, May 31, 2014, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/may-2014>; “Democratic Republic of the Congo (1990-First Combat Deaths),” accessed July 21, 2017, [http://ploughshares.ca/pl\\_armedconflict/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1990-first-combat-deaths/](http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1990-first-combat-deaths/); Ludi Cardoso, “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Deux Nouveaux Groupes Armés Hutu Signalés à Lubero,” *Le Potentiel*, May 15, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201405151546.html>.

<sup>1645</sup> Cardoso, “Congo-Kinshasa: Nord-Kivu - Deux Nouveaux Groupes Armés Hutu Signalés à Lubero.”

### Armée du Salut Public

AKAs: Public Salvation Army (PSA)

This group claimed responsibility for an explosion and subsequent fire that killed over one hundred people at Ndjili airport (main Kinshasa airport) on 14 APR 2000. The timing was significant: a new ceasefire between Kabila and eastern rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda went into effect that day.<sup>1646</sup> The statement claiming the attack originated in Brussels. The group threatened further attacks, the next to target the State House.<sup>1647</sup> However, so far as I am aware, they never appeared again. A government official claimed the statement is a lie; the explosion and fire were accidental.<sup>1648</sup> Only one report gave specific details on the attack:

The fire broke out at an arms depot containing shells and grenades in the military section of the airport. A succession of blasts smashed the airport terminal roof, blew out window panes and damaged a customs shed and three civilian passenger aircraft. Fire also reached an oil depot... Most of the dead were customs workers...<sup>1649</sup>

I found no further details or investigation into the incident beyond government and the group's claims. Both explanations of the event seem plausible: on the one hand, the date was politically significant and the statement was issued on the same day, i.e. relatively quickly following the attack; on the other hand, the group does not reappear and may have just been opportunistic diaspora.

I have included the group, but at a certainty of only one – the only thing linked the group to the incident was their statement claiming responsibility; there was no independent verification. I coded large attack and name date as 14 APR 2000, as this was when the explosion and fire occurred and when the statement was posted. Given that the alleged attack occurred in the military section of the airport and that most victims were government employees, I did not code this as a civilian attack. Since the group was never heard from again, I coded never occurred for small attack and civilian attack, and 0 for viability. I coded one for clandestine, as they clearly would have planned and executed the attack before they were named. I coded the founding date as 2000 with a certainty of 0, as we have no information on when it was formed. I have left all information on organizational history, initial leadership, and locational variables. In addition, I coded none for initial resources. I also coded 0 for initial goals, as the statement does not seem to have outlined them.

### Minembwe dissidents

AKAs: FRF, see variants of FRF above

This group first appears in ACLED on 27 MAR 2007, but I believe the group to which it refers is an FRF splinter that started fighting earlier, on 25 JAN 2007. The original militarized FRF leader Masunzu integrated into FARDC as a general in JUL 2005. He commanded the 112<sup>th</sup> brigade, composed entirely of Banyamulenge

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<sup>1646</sup> "Rebel Group Claims It Started DR Congo Fire That Killed 104: Report," *Agence France-Presse*, April 19, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010803dw4j01lhu&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kinshasa Pledges to Get to Bottom of DR Congo Fire," *Agence France-Presse*, April 20, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010803dw4k01mq8&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1647</sup> "A Fire Broke out at Kinshasa Airport Last Weekend...," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, April 21, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010804dw4l0042s&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Rebel Group Claims It Started DR Congo Fire That Killed 104"; "Unknown Group Claims Responsibility for Airport Fire," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, April 19, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010804dw4k00efe&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kinshasa Pledges to Get to Bottom of DR Congo Fire."

<sup>1648</sup> "A Fire Broke out at Kinshasa Airport Last Weekend..."; "Rebel Group Claims It Started DR Congo Fire That Killed 104"; "Unknown Group Claims Responsibility for Airport Fire."; "Kinshasa Pledges to Get to Bottom of DR Congo Fire."

<sup>1649</sup> "Kinshasa Pledges to Get to Bottom of DR Congo Fire."

who never underwent mixage. Another former FRF faction, led by Michel Rukunda, insisted on the continued integrity of the Minembwe territory, which had been abandoned during the political transition. Masunzu and Rukunda's forces began fighting in JAN 2007.<sup>1650</sup> Rukunda's forces eventually merged with Bisogo's G47.<sup>1651</sup> Neither Rukunda's independent force nor the later Rukunda-Bisogo merged group qualifies for inclusion; the former is a splinter of FRF, while the latter is a merger of two splinter groups.

#### **Mouvement pour la restauration de la démocratie au Congo (MRDC)**

AKAs: Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in the Congo, see Mai Mai Hilaire above for additional variants

I think this is just an AKA for Mai Mai Hilaire/URDC. The names are similar (Union pour la Réhabilitation de la Démocratie du Congo), and articles about MRDC indicate it is led by Hilaire Kombi.<sup>1652</sup>

#### **\*Front de Libération de l'Est du Congo (FLEC)**

AKAs: Front for the Liberation of East Congo, Liberation Front of East Congo

Information on this group was sketchy and difficult to put together, but I am confident that the group should not be included. The group was hatched by Laurent Nkunda, Xavier Chiribanya, and others (one source mentions a General Janvier Bora Uzima Kamwanya). Evidently the group met in Bukavu several times circa JAN 2004 to discuss launching an armed rebellion to seek the secession of East Congo, backed by Rwanda. As is evident by difficulty in finding the group, this FLEC never became well known. According to various accounts, it may be considered a splinter group of RCD-Goma and its armed wing ANC, a forerunner to SNPC and/or CNDP, a political group that supported CNDP, or a group that never made it off the ground – each of which seems fairly accurate and none of which leads to inclusion in our dataset.<sup>1653</sup>

#### **Front de libération et émancipation du Congo (FLEC)**

AKAs: Front for the Liberation and Emancipation of Congo

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<sup>1650</sup> Stearns, "Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu," 31–32; Verweijen, "Guest Blog: The FRF Armed Group"; "Mission to Evaluate Displaced in Minembwe," IRIN, February 2, 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/69883/drc-mission-evaluate-displaced-minembwe>; "FARDC : Les Insurgés de Minembwe Mis En Déroute, Selon La 10e Région Militaire," Radio Okapi, July 31, 2007, <http://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2007/07/31/fardc-les-insurges-de-minembwe-mis-en-deroute-selon-la-10e-region-militaire>.

<sup>1651</sup> "FARDC : Les Insurgés de Minembwe Mis En Déroute, Selon La 10e Région Militaire"; Stearns, "Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu," 32.

<sup>1652</sup> For instance see Anthony Kushaba, "MRDC Commander Surrenders to Congolese Government Forces," Uganda Radio Network, December 11, 2013, <http://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/mrdc-commander-surrenders-to-congolese-government-forces>; "Nord-Kivu : Le Groupe Armé Fidèle à Hilaire Kombi Contrôle Cinq Villages à Beni"; "Nord-Kivu: Des Hommes Armés Enlèvent 30 Personnes à Mamundioma," Radio Okapi, April 20, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/04/20/nord-kivu-des-hommes-armes-enlevent-30-personnes-mamundioma>.

<sup>1653</sup> Sadananda Sahoo and B. K. Pattanaik, *Global Diasporas and Development: Socioeconomic, Cultural, and Policy Perspectives* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 298, <https://books.google.com/books?id=11u6BAAQBAJ&pg=PA298&lpg=PA298&dq=Xavier+Chiribanya&source=bl&ots=NrEVp2cEWA&sig=4W5huOWT81h7d1Dcbw8PwmP1tP8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiq5piMiZbVAhUFbD4KHxQCqQQ6AEIUzAH#v=onepage&q=Xavier%20Chiribanya&f=false>; François Misser, "DR Congo: The North Kivu Crisis (With Addendum: The Arrest of Laurent Nkunda and the Rwandan Military Incursion in the DRC)" (WRITENET (for UNHCR), January 2009), 3, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4988032e2.pdf>; Bucyalimwe Mararo Stanislas, "LES ÉLECTIONS DE 2006 ET L'ORDRE POST-TRANSITION AU KIVU : CHANGEMENTS ET CONTINUITÉS," *L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs* 2006–2007 (June 2007): 250; Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 211; Africa Initiative Program and Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) Africa, "South Kivu: June 2004: Situation Report and Recommendations for Engagement," June 2004, 9, [http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/ngo/fewer\\_0604.pdf](http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/ngo/fewer_0604.pdf).



This group is essentially a splinter from CNDP formed by Bosco Ntaganda and discontents from the CNDP integration disagreement of 23 MAR 2009.<sup>1654</sup> Some articles suggest that it is different from previous groups because it was not built along ethnic lines.<sup>1655</sup> Perhaps this is referring to Congolese Hutu, but there is some evidence that certain Hutu were members of CNDP integrated into FARDC before this splintering, who subsequently defected.<sup>1656</sup> Some other Hutu may be involved, but I suspect it is predominantly former CNDP. Excluded – splinter group.

#### Force de défense du peuple locale de la Province Orientale (FD-PLO)

AKAs: Force for the Defense of the Local People of Orientale Province

I have only one source on this group, but it seems fairly solid. I have coded it as a certainty of 1.

This group appeared in a single Radio Okapi article published on 9 JAN 2013. The article describes massive population displacements from Aru territory (Ituri district, Orientale province) caused by a new armed group, FD-PLO. The article reports that the group is comprised primarily of former FAZ and demobilized soldiers numbering about 300. (I believe the French word here, “militaires,” implies membership in official armed forces, as opposed to “miliciens,” or militia members.) FD-PLO attacks have apparently targeted police. They began on 17 DEC 2012 and continued through the following weeks into JAN. Military and civil sources identified attacks at Ingobokolo, Ariwara, Bula, and Kengezi carried out by the group. The local FARDC commander confirmed the presence of FD-PLO, and said that military units had been sent to track it down, causing it to retreat toward South Sudan.<sup>1657</sup>

I coded the formed date as DEC 2012, with a downgraded certainty, and the name date as 9 JAN 2013. The FD-PLO's goals were not known. I coded military for organizational history, given that the article identified FAZ and demobilized soldiers as a major source of membership. Most of the locations they attacked were smaller villages. Although Ariwara appears to be a larger town (I could not find any specific population estimates), I have assumed from the diversity of attack locations that their base was probably located outside Ariwara. As such, I have coded 1 for “rural” and 1 for “planning\_inside”. I coded zero for initial resources. Since I do not have specific casualty accounts on any one attack, I have assumed the attacks were small (as is more common for the area) and have coded 17 DEC 2012 as the initial small attack. I have left large and civilian attacks as missing. I coded all initial leadership as missing, since no leadership was named. I coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ, as I could find no further documentation of this group.

Under contestation, I coded 1 for protest (SCAD event 4900391).

SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Two Type 2 events occurred during this time, but nonlocally to the group formation province of Ituri. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Patriotes résistants de Dongo

AKAs: Resistance Patriots of Dongo, Patriotes résistants congolais, Resistance Patriots of the Congo, Congolese Resistance Patriots, Patriots-Resistance of Dongo

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<sup>1654</sup> CRG, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” Congo Research Group, November 23, 2009, <http://congoresearchgroup.org/sorcerers-apprentice/>; Josh Kron, “Alarm as DRC Military Leader Forms Own Squad,” The East African, December 7, 2009, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/2558-817850-terodiz/index.html>; Laurent d’Esru, “Le Nord-Kivu vit dans la crainte d’une nouvelle rébellion,” *La Croix*, December 22, 2009, [http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Le-Nord-Kivu-vit-dans-la-crainte-d-une-nouvelle-rebellion-\\_NG\\_-2009-12-22-570715](http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Le-Nord-Kivu-vit-dans-la-crainte-d-une-nouvelle-rebellion-_NG_-2009-12-22-570715); “Bosco Ntaganda Starts New Rebel Group in DR Congo,” *Free Uganda* (blog), November 30, 2009, <https://freeuganda.wordpress.com/2009/11/30/bosco-ntaganda-starts-new-rebel-group-in-dr-congo/>.

<sup>1655</sup> Kron, “Alarm as DRC Military Leader Forms Own Squad.”

<sup>1656</sup> d’Esru, “Le Nord-Kivu vit dans la crainte d’une nouvelle rébellion.”

<sup>1657</sup> “Aru: Des Habitants Se Réfugient Au Soudan Du Sud Pour Échapper à Une Milice,” Radio Okapi, January 9, 2013, <http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/01/09/aru-des-habitants-se-refugient-au-soudan-du-sud-pour-echapper-une-milice>.



This group first appeared on 27 NOV 2009, when it released a statement from theretofore unknown leader Ambroise Lobala Mokobe claiming responsibility for shots fired at a MONUC helicopter on 26 NOV 2009.<sup>1658</sup> In the statement, the group dedicated itself to the overthrow of the “puppet regime” of Kabila. It claims that its membership include former FAZ and FARDC deserters, that Rwandan troops were in the region and that MONUC was complicit “with these Mafia-like imperialists,” and that it had “retaken” the town of Dongo.<sup>1659</sup> Both Agence France Press and Jason Stearns refer to the press release as “confused,” implying doubts about its credibility.<sup>1660</sup> Stearns points out that the statement was supposedly signed in Dongo, yet “the village has no internet connection and was completely deserted at the time,” making this claim unlikely.<sup>1661</sup> While Resistance Patriots of Dongo appears in about a dozen engagements in ACLED, I could not locate any original articles or corroborate any findings outside of the MONUC helicopter incident. I found several articles mentioning the helicopter incident, none with more information than that given above.<sup>1662</sup>

Moreover, Resistance Patriots of Dongo is associated with another organization known for its limited credibility, APARECO. APARECO published Resistance Patriots of Dongo communiques on its website from NOV 2009 to JAN 2010.<sup>1663</sup> APARECO has also claimed to seize 25,000 tons of ammunition from a Congolese army barge, which is blatantly false.<sup>1664</sup> Finally, multiple sources characterize the Dongo conflict as primarily a local ethnic conflict, launched over fishing and land rights.<sup>1665</sup> All this information leads me to suspect that Resistance Patriots of Dongo is a sham group, created to opportunistically seize on local violence for political advancement at a larger stage. In our expert interview, the expert conveyed that his awareness of the Dongo conflict was that it involved two local ethnic groups; he was unsure whether the groups were organized or even named. He did not have specific knowledge of the Resistance Patriots of Dongo, but suggested that the instinct that it may have been opportunistic expats has merit.<sup>1666</sup> Thus, despite ACLED tagging Resistance Patriots of Dongo in multiple attacks, we have excluded it from our data. Excluded – no credible evidence the group planned or committed violence.

#### Mouvement de libération indépendante des alliés (MILIA)

AKAs: MLIA, MILA, Independent Liberation Movement and Allies, Enyele, Enyelle, Nzobo Ya Lombo (trans. Village bandits), Nzobo Yalobo (trans. new military groups)

NOTE: There is no tag directly equivalent for MILIA in ACLED. However, violence involving MILIA is generally tagged as Enyele ethnic militia. Discussion follows on why we believe ACLED’s classification of this group as an ethnic militia is inaccurate.

<sup>1658</sup> Stearns, “What’s Going on in Dongo?”; “Armed Group Claims Firing at UN Chopper in DR.Congo,” *Agence France Presse -- English*, November 27, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/885a6004-1959-4d18-9519-de5d315f1cc0/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1659</sup> “Armed Group Claims Firing at UN Chopper in DR.Congo.”

<sup>1660</sup> Stearns, “What’s Going on in Dongo?”; “Armed Group Claims Firing at UN Chopper in DR.Congo.”

<sup>1661</sup> Stearns, “What’s Going on in Dongo?”

<sup>1662</sup> “DR Congo: After Dongo Violence, 90,000 Refugees and Displaced,” Text, ReliefWeb, December 2, 2009, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-after-dongo-violence-90000-refugees-and-displaced>; “Armed Group Claims Firing at UN Chopper in Congo,” Dalje.com, November 27, 2009, <http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-world/armed-group-claims-firing-at-un-chopper-in-congo/283811>; “RDC: les insurgés de Dongo se replient au Congo-Brazzaville,” *Xinhua News Agency*, December 16, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/c9a87950-29a0-47e0-a462-ffbea7adb299/?context=1516831>; Gus Selassie, “Government Seeks to Quell Unrest in North-Western DR Congo,” *IHS Global Insight*, December 8, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/37d61a95-5db0-47ef-be1f-bd335f981406/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1663</sup> “Responses to Information Requests (RIRs): COD103696.FE” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, April 5, 2011), <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/04/COD103696.FE.pdf>.

<sup>1664</sup> Stearns, “What’s Going on in Dongo?”

<sup>1665</sup> Stearns, “The Mystery of Dongo”; “DR Congo: After Dongo Violence, 90,000 Refugees and Displaced”; Selassie, “Government Seeks to Quell Unrest in North-Western DR Congo”; “Armed Group Claims Firing at UN Chopper in DR.Congo.”

<sup>1666</sup> Expert Interview.

NOTE: I refer to the group as MILIA throughout the discussion below. However, as best I can tell, this name was first used for the group on 7 DEC 2009.<sup>1667</sup>

This group stemmed from a historical conflict over land and fishing rights in the town of Dongo (Kungu territory, South Ubangi district, Equateur province). The original conflict dates back to 1946. There has been some tendency to characterize it as a local ethnic conflict rather than an organized rebellion. Fighting did occur, including lethal fighting, before 30 OCT 2009.<sup>1668</sup> However, starting on 30 OCT 2009, evidence is sufficient to categorize it a rebellion.

On the night of 28-29 OCT 2009, MILIA attacked non-ethnic Lobola living in Dongo.<sup>1669</sup> On 30 OCT, police forces responded; MILIA engaged the police forces and subsequently captured the town of Dongo.<sup>1670</sup> Police retreated to the village of Zambi (Libenge territory).<sup>1671</sup> Death tolls from the police-MILIA engagement vary, as does the narrative surrounding the armed group. Local government officials, including the interim Equateur governor Guy Inenge, characterize the armed group as a “small rebellion” and place the death toll at forty.<sup>1672</sup> Accounts from Kinshasa government leaders characterize the violence as local ethnic clashes; these accounts put the death toll at only eleven (seven police, four civilians).<sup>1673</sup> Because Dongo is especially remote, no sources independently verify the death toll.<sup>1674</sup> However, I am

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<sup>1667</sup> “Gemena : L’inquiétude Gagne La Population,” Radio Okapi, December 7, 2009,

<https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2009/12/07/gemena-linquietude-gagne-la-population>.

<sup>1668</sup> “Kungu : Affrontements Entre Les Enyele et Les Monzaya Autour d’un Étang Piscicole,” Radio Okapi, April 11, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/04/11/kungu-affrontements-entre-les-enyele-et-les-monzaya-autour-dun-etang-piscicole>; “Général Gabriel Amisi: «Il n’y a Pas de Rébellion En Gestation à Kungu.»,” Radio Okapi, August 22, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/08/22/general-gabriel-amisi-%25c2%25abil-ny-a-pas-de-rebellion-en-gestation-a-kungu-%25c2%25bb>; “Dongo : La Voie de La Négociation Envisagée,” Radio Okapi, November 4, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/04/dongo-la-voie-de-la-negociation-envisagee-2>; “Le Who’s Who Des Groupes Armés Dans l’est,” IRIN, June 15, 2010, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/89513/rdc-le-who%E2%80%99s-who-des-groupes-arm%C3%A9s-dans-l%E2%80%99est>; Mike Jobbins, “Community-Driven Civilian Protection in the DRC: Preventing Violence and Mitigating Harm” (Brookings, October 2010), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Case-Study-DRC-Oct-2010-Mike-Jobbins.pdf>; Michelle Faul, “New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest,” *Associated Press*, May 3, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/21249d5c-58fd-4573-9d97-61d8d644b253/?context=1516831>; “DRC: Who Are the Enyelle and Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA)?,” *International Business Times UK*, October 30, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/battle-control-drc-who-are-enyelle-independent-movement-liberation-allies-milia-1526294>.

<sup>1669</sup> “Dongo : Spectacle Désolant d’une Cité Déserte,” Radio Okapi, November 16, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/16/dongo-spectacle-desolant-d%25e2%2580%2599une-cite-deserte-2>.

<sup>1670</sup> “Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo,” Radio Okapi, October 30, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/10/30/equateur-plusieurs-policiers-tues-par-des-jeunes-du-clan-enyele-a-dongo-2>; “Equateur : Après Les Incidents Entre La Police et Les Jeunes Gens, La Situation Demeure Confuse à Dongo,” Radio Okapi, October 31, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/10/31/equateur-apres-les-incidents-entre-la-police-et-les-jeunes-gens-la-situation-demeure-confuse-a-dongo-2>.

<sup>1671</sup> “Equateur : Après Les Incidents Entre La Police et Les Jeunes Gens, La Situation Demeure Confuse à Dongo”; “Equateur : Un Renfort de La Police Est Arrivé à Gemena Pour Reprendre Dongo,” Radio Okapi, November 1, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/01/equateur-un-renfort-de-la-police-est-arrive-a-gemena-pour-reprendre-dongo-2>.

<sup>1672</sup> “Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo”; “Equateur : Un Renfort de La Police Est Arrivé à Gemena Pour Reprendre Dongo”; “Dongo : Le Village de plus En plus Désert, et Les Cas de Blessés de plus En plus Nombreux,” Radio Okapi, November 2, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2009/11/02/dongo-le-village-de-plus-en-plus-desert-et-les-cas-de-blesses-de-plus-en-plus-nombreux-2>.

<sup>1673</sup> “Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo”; “Equateur : Un Renfort de La Police Est Arrivé à Gemena Pour Reprendre Dongo.”

<sup>1674</sup> “Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo.”

more inclined to accept the local government accounts for five reasons: (1) MONUC visits to Dongo indicate that corpses continued to litter the streets for weeks following the engagement; this phenomenon seems more plausible with the higher death toll.<sup>1675</sup> (2) The local government's characterization of the group as a rebellion was more accurate, as demonstrated by their ongoing attacks on police, FARDC, and MONUC and by accounts of the group's goals (discussed below). (3) In Dongo two weeks following the incident, Congolese Deputy Inspector-General of Police Benjamin Alongaboni cited 26 police officers as missing.<sup>1676</sup> (4) A later US State Department publication put the death toll at 45 police officers.<sup>1677</sup> (5) The Kinshasa government had motive to downplay the rebellion, and subsequently did.<sup>1678</sup> This motive is especially true given its rumored links to Jean-Pierre Bemba (also discussed below), who led a highly successful rebellion against the Kinshasa regime (MLC, see above). Thus, I have coded 30 OCT as the first large attack.

Following the 30 OCT incident, MILIA continued to attack civilians as well as to engage state forces and MONUC in attempts to control territory. Reported incidents include (but are not limited to) the following:

- On 31 OCT, Radio Okapi reported that MILIA had attacked the town of Imese, 85 km from Dongo (no additional details, coded as first small attack).<sup>1679</sup> Other articles indicate that MILIA elements evidently began marching on Kungu center.<sup>1680</sup>
- On 1 NOV, police reinforcements arrived in nearby Gemena.<sup>1681</sup> On 7 NOV, police forces engaged MILIA in Dongo and recaptured the town.<sup>1682</sup> Although there are no detailed accounts of this fighting, a joint government and MONUC delegation visited Dongo and confirmed government control on 14 NOV. During this visit, a police official indicated that fighting continued in Imese.<sup>1683</sup>
- On 18 NOV, MILIA elements attacked Sabasaba and Lobondo in the Bomboma area, and police responded, resulting in the death of six MILIA and four civilians.<sup>1684</sup> Although the group likely deliberately targeted and killed civilian before this incident, these killings are the first after MILIA attacked state forces, i.e. met our qualifications for a rebel group. Sources corroborate that after attacking Dongo, MILIA "carried out targeted killings against the Boba before moving southwards across the jungle."<sup>1685</sup> As such, this incident is coded as the first civilian attack.

<sup>1675</sup> "Dongo : Spectacle Désolant d'une Cité Déserte"; "Dongo : Les Cadavres En Putréfaction Font Craindre Des Risques Des Maladies," Radio Okapi, November 22, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/22/dongo-les-cadavres-en-putrefaction-font-craindre-des-risques-des-maladies-2>.

<sup>1676</sup> "Dongo : Spectacle Désolant d'une Cité Déserte."

<sup>1677</sup> "Background Notes: Congo, Democratic Republic of The," *State Department Documents and Publications*, November 16, 2011, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/94039970-4b6e-45ab-a850-58cc61e9504e/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1678</sup> Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest."

<sup>1679</sup> "Equateur : Après Les Incidents Entre La Police et Les Jeunes Gens, La Situation Demeure Confuse à Dongo."

<sup>1680</sup> "Dongo : La Voie de La Négociation Envisagée."

<sup>1681</sup> "Equateur : Un Renfort de La Police Est Arrivé à Gemena Pour Reprendre Dongo."

<sup>1682</sup> "Kungu : La Localité de Dongo Désormais Sous Contrôle Des Forces de l'ordre," Radio Okapi, November 8, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/08/kungu-la-localite-de-dongo-desormais-sous-contrôle-des-forces-de-lordre-2>.

<sup>1683</sup> "Dongo : Spectacle Désolant d'une Cité Déserte."

<sup>1684</sup> "Mbandaka : 10 Personnes Tuées, Bilan d'une Attaque Dans Le Secteur de Bombama," Radio Okapi, November 20, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2009/11/20/mbandaka-10-personnes-tuees-bilan-dune-attaque-dans-le-secteur-de-bombama-2>.

<sup>1685</sup> Jobbins, "Community-Driven Civilian Protection in the DRC: Preventing Violence and Mitigating Harm"; "DRC: Who Are the Enyelle and Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA)?"

- On 26 NOV, MILIA elements attacked a MONUC helicopter in Dongo, injuring five.<sup>1686</sup> MONUC later revealed that the attack occurred in the context of ongoing fighting between MILIA and Congolese police to control Dongo.<sup>1687</sup>
- Shortly thereafter, rumors circulated speculating whether the state retained control of Dongo.<sup>1688</sup> Radio Okapi reported that on 2 DEC, Congolese police and FARDC began planning an armed operation for Dongo. Officials failed to confirm whether police retained control of Dongo, Buburu, and Imese.<sup>1689</sup> It is possible that MILIA had regained control of Dongo at this time, but independent verification was not possible.
- On 14-15 DEC, FARDC engaged MILIA and drove them toward Enyele, 50 km south of Dongo. At least 15 FARDC were wounded. FARDC confirmed its control of Dongo.<sup>1690</sup>
- On 20 DEC, 160 IDPs arrived in Mbandaka, the capital of Equateur province. They arrived from Lobengo (Makandja territory), reporting that FARDC and MILIA had been fighting there for about ten days.<sup>1691</sup>
- On 4 APR 2010, MILIA attacked the Equateur provincial capital Mbandaka. Targets included the governor's office, the governor's residence, and the provincial assembly and the airport, the latter of which the group succeeded in holding for some 24 hours.<sup>1692</sup> Death tolls vary: the US State Department counts

<sup>1686</sup> "Un Hélicoptère de La Monuc Attaqué à Dongo, 5 Blessés," Radio Okapi, November 26, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/26/un-helicoptere-de-la-monuc-attaque-a-dongo-5-blesses-2>; "ONU : Ban Kin-Moon Condamne l'attaque d'un Hélicoptère de La Monuc à Dongo," Radio Okapi, November 28, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/11/28/onu-ban-kin-moon-condamne-l%25e2%2580%2599attaque-d%25e2%2580%2599un-helicoptere-de-la-monuc-a-dongo-2>.

<sup>1687</sup> "Dongo : La Police et Les FARDC Planifient Une Opération Armée," Radio Okapi, December 2, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/12/02/dongo-la-police-et-les-fardc-planifient-une-operation-armee-2>.

<sup>1688</sup> "Kabila à Gemena : Des Promesses à La Pelle," Radio Okapi, December 1, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/12/01/kabila-a-gemena-des-promesses-a-la-pelle-2>; "Dongo : La Police et Les FARDC Planifient Une Opération Armée."

<sup>1689</sup> "Dongo : La Police et Les FARDC Planifient Une Opération Armée."

<sup>1690</sup> "Monuc : Le Général Babacar Gaye à Dongo," Radio Okapi, December 16, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/12/16/monuc-le-general-babacar-gaye-a-dongo>.

<sup>1691</sup> "Mbandaka : Des Déplacés Arrivés Ce Dimanche de Lobengo Disent Avoir Fui Les Combats Entre FARDC et Enyele," Radio Okapi, December 20, 2009, <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/12/20/mbandaka-des-deplaces-arri-ves-ce-dimanche-de-lobengo-disent-avoir-fui-les-combats-entre-fardc-et-eneyle-2>.

<sup>1692</sup> Buchanan, "Central African Republic"; "Background Notes: Congo, Democratic Republic of The"; "Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga Captured by the FARDC," *Prosperity*, July 5, 2010, [https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=73579000-1f2d-443f-b460-3c2c88e914ef&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW1-VFR1-2SPK-H3FY-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW1-VFR1-2SPK-H3FY-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=363692&pdteaserkey=sr30&ecomp=k7\\_k&earg=sr30&prid=2026fd77-3659-44ad-a949-094d771327b7](https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=73579000-1f2d-443f-b460-3c2c88e914ef&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW1-VFR1-2SPK-H3FY-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW1-VFR1-2SPK-H3FY-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=363692&pdteaserkey=sr30&ecomp=k7_k&earg=sr30&prid=2026fd77-3659-44ad-a949-094d771327b7); "DR.Congo Rebel Leader Surrenders to Congo Police: Reports," *Agence France Presse -- English*, May 10, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/bf19e1aa-c870-4ac1-a5a7-41d53df35f3b/?context=1516831>; Véron-Clément Kongo, "Captured, the Head of the Enyele Put at the Disposal of the Military Justice," *Le Potentiel*, July 2010, [https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=4d98ea94-cddd-4cbb-acd3-e591a36cc36b&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW0-P950-YC5N-707J-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW0-P950-YC5N-707J-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=363714&pdteaserkey=sr81&ecomp=k7\\_k&earg=sr81&prid=79954d4a-2afd-45de-8603-f70833469b58](https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=4d98ea94-cddd-4cbb-acd3-e591a36cc36b&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW0-P950-YC5N-707J-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7YW0-P950-YC5N-707J-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=363714&pdteaserkey=sr81&ecomp=k7_k&earg=sr81&prid=79954d4a-2afd-45de-8603-f70833469b58); Gus Selassie, "DR.Congolese Court Hands Down Death Sentence Against Rebels for Airport Raid," *IHS Global Insight*, May 19, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/df236051-b389-4164-a804-dc456a885a9a/?context=1516831>; "RDC: Udjani, Le Chef Rebelle Des Enyele Décédé à Brazzaville," Radio Okapi, May 11, 2014, <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/05/11/rdc-udjani-le-chef-rebelle-des-eneyle-decede-brazzaville>; "RDC: Deux Proches Du Chef Des Insurgés Enyele En Détention," *Xinhua News Agency - French*, May 30, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/7cb4a016-d6b5-4a49-8cc3-419b8a2bb145/?context=1516831>.

sixteen total deaths.<sup>1693</sup> AFP cited twelve civilian deaths.<sup>1694</sup> The UN reported the death of one Ghanaian peacekeeper and a South African pilot, while the DRC government claimed the death of nine insurgents, four soldiers, and two police.<sup>1695</sup> In addition, MILIA elements kidnapped a Spanish doctor.<sup>1696</sup>

- Although I found no details, several sources indicate that MILIA activities ranged as far east as Kisangani.<sup>1697</sup>

The most commonly cited named leadership of the group is Udjani Mangbama (Adjani, Odjani, Ondjani, Oudjani) and Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga. Both individuals are alternately reported to be witch doctors or fetishists.<sup>1698</sup> Ibrahim is Udjani's father.<sup>1699</sup> Ibrahim was apparently a teacher and member of the "committee of sages and great fetishists" before leading the rebellion.<sup>1700</sup> Radio Okapi vaguely reports that Udjani was a FARDC officer, but the many accounts on him offer no corroboration of this claim.<sup>1701</sup> Hence, I code missing for current security under leadership. Congolese forces captured Ibrahim on 20 JUL 2010 near Bomongo.<sup>1702</sup> Udjani fled to Congo-Brazzaville in JUN or JUL 2010.<sup>1703</sup> Congo-Brazzaville government reported that they had arrested him, but then apparently killed him in a shootout (not in prison) on 10 MAY 2014.<sup>1704</sup> It appears that some accounts confuse the two individuals.<sup>1705</sup> In

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<sup>1693</sup> "Background Notes: Congo, Democratic Republic of The."

<sup>1694</sup> "DR.Congo Rebel Leader Surrenders to Congo Police: Reports."

<sup>1695</sup> Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest."

<sup>1696</sup> "Man's Body Hair Shaved for Magic after Abduction in Congo," *Indo-Asian News Service*, April 11, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/883a8c2d-5166-4b52-be95-7f4c39dc972a/?context=1516831>; "Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga Captured by the FARDC"; Kongo, "Captured, the Head of the Enyele Put at the Disposal of the Military Justice."

<sup>1697</sup> "Le Who's Who Des Groupes Armés Dans l'est"; "DRC: Who Are the Enyele and Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA)?"

<sup>1698</sup> "Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo"; "DRC: Who Are the Enyele and Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA)"; Jobbins, "Community-Driven Civilian Protection in the DRC: Preventing Violence and Mitigating Harm"; "RDC: Udjani, Le Chef Rebelle Des Enyele Décédé à Brazzaville"; "Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga Captured by the FARDC"; "Congo Working on Returning DR.Congo Refugees: President," *Agence France Presse -- English*, June 4, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/a7d40469-7d60-4bdb-9fc6-841e775d71af/?context=1516831>; "Le Feuilleton Enyele," *Le Potentiel*, July 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/719727a4-3fcb-4aeb-b77b-7009b845e174/?context=1516831>; "DR.Congo Rebel Leader Surrenders to Congo Police: Reports"; Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest"; "Man's Body Hair Shaved for Magic after Abduction in Congo"; Kongo, "Captured, the Head of the Enyele Put at the Disposal of the Military Justice."

<sup>1699</sup> "Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga Captured by the FARDC"; Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest"; "RDC: Udjani, Le Chef Rebelle Des Enyele Décédé à Brazzaville."

<sup>1700</sup> "Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga Captured by the FARDC"; Kongo, "Captured, the Head of the Enyele Put at the Disposal of the Military Justice."

<sup>1701</sup> "Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo"; "Kungu : La Localité de Dongo Désormais Sous Contrôle Des Forces de l'ordre."

<sup>1702</sup> "Ibrahim Mangbama Mambenga Captured by the FARDC"; Kongo, "Captured, the Head of the Enyele Put at the Disposal of the Military Justice"; "RDC: Arrestation Du Chef Des Rebelles Enyele (PAPIER GENERAL)," *Xinhua News Agency - French*, July 4, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/72bca75b-0e96-4fe6-ab5f-1ed24c4f7925/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1703</sup> "Background Notes: Congo, Democratic Republic of The"; "Mangbama's Head on a Plate," *West Africa Newsletter*, May 14, 2014, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/330009c2-f35f-4dc7-97c2-1da73ff6e564/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1704</sup> "RDC: Udjani, Le Chef Rebelle Des Enyele Décédé à Brazzaville"; "Mangbama's Head on a Plate"; "DR.Congo Rebel Leader Surrenders to Congo Police: Reports"; Gus Selassie, "Confusion Surrounds Fate of DR.Congolese Militia Leader," *IHS Global Insight*, May 11, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/9599396b-85f2-404b-9aa2-aae7e4a224e6/?context=1516831>; "French Radio Disproves DR.Congo Government Claim on Arrest of Rebel Leader," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, May 6, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/5a5c533d-706a-40c6-85c5-c3bfla8265a1/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1705</sup> "Le Who's Who Des Groupes Armés Dans l'est."

addition, Xinhua reported that Udjani's uncle Albert Ebanzo "played an important role" in MILIA (not specified, no personal history given).<sup>1706</sup> Finally, Radio Okapi cited Edo Bokoto, a former/suspended local government leader (unclear under what regime). The interim Equateur governor alleged that several local officials were involved in forming or supporting the group, but other than Edo Bokoto, they remain unnamed.<sup>1707</sup> Kinshasa government spokesperson Lambert Mende later claimed that at least one Equateur legislator and two national legislators sponsored the group, again without identifying any individuals.<sup>1708</sup> Because only government sources cited deviant government leaders as MILIA founders/leaders, I have left current government leaders as missing under initial leadership.

Membership is reportedly originated as Enyele youth.<sup>1709</sup> The group subsequently attracted membership from local ex-combatants, both from former MLC and demobilized FAC/FARDC.<sup>1710</sup> This appeal benefits from the historic importance of Equateur as Mobutu's homeland and the home of Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC rebellion.<sup>1711</sup> I have no records indicating the extent of membership these ex-combatants may have comprised.

One source cites personal links between Udjani to Bemba.<sup>1712</sup> As stated above, the government alleged that certain officials supported the group, without identifying any individuals. However, as far as I can tell, it never received substantial outside support. Apparently, they were only lightly armed.<sup>1713</sup>

I did not locate any original MILIA statements indicating the group's goals. However, several sources give secondhand accounts of the group's goals. In a Radio Okapi article, assistant district commissioner of South Ubangi Willy Isekusu reports that their goals are three-fold: (1) destabilize the Kinshasa regime, (2) make gains against the Boba tribe, and (3) to challenge the authority of local officials who are not from Dongo. Isekusu learned this information from local security forces.<sup>1714</sup> Likewise, the Kinshasa-based paper *Prosperité* reported that the group's goals included establishing a "Lobala country" or homeland and seizing power in Kinshasa.<sup>1715</sup> Finally, following the attack on Mbandaka, one of the captured MILIA rebels reported that Udjani told fighters that they would seize Mbandaka on the way to seizing the capital, upon which Ibrahim would assume the presidency.<sup>1716</sup> As such, takeover is coded as the goal.

The above events and goals provide sufficient evidence that, from 30 OCT 2009 forward, the scope of fighting exceeded ethnic clashes over local fishing rights and constituted a systematic attack on state forces throughout (and possibly beyond) Equateur province. However, because the group mobilized via ethnic militias before qualifying as a rebel group, its identity/presence was always known, if not by the name MILIA specifically. For instance, the earliest reports on the 30 OCT fighting include identifications of Enyele youth under the leadership of Udjani.<sup>1717</sup> As such, I listed 30 OCT 2009 as the name date and coded 0 for clandestine. I also coded other\_org under prior organization. I did not code self\_defense because the scope of activities was not limited to self-defense; they included offensive attacks on other ethnic groups.

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<sup>1706</sup> "RDC: Deux Proches Du Chef Des Insurgés Enyele En Détention."

<sup>1707</sup> "Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo."

<sup>1708</sup> Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest."

<sup>1709</sup> "Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo"; "Equateur : Après Les Incidents Entre La Police et Les Jeunes Gens, La Situation Demeure Confuse à Dongo"; "DRC: Who Are the Enyelle and Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA)?"

<sup>1710</sup> "DRC: Who Are the Enyelle and Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA)?" ; Jobbins, "Community-Driven Civilian Protection in the DRC: Preventing Violence and Mitigating Harm"; Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest."

<sup>1711</sup> "Le Who's Who Des Groupes Armés Dans l'est"; Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest."

<sup>1712</sup> "Mangbama's Head on a Plate."

<sup>1713</sup> "RDC: Udjani, Le Chef Rebelle Des Enyele Décédé à Brazzaville."

<sup>1714</sup> "Equateur : Après Les Incidents Entre La Police et Les Jeunes Gens, La Situation Demeure Confuse à Dongo."

<sup>1715</sup> Kongo, "Captured, the Head of the Enyele Put at the Disposal of the Military Justice."

<sup>1716</sup> Faul, "New Congo Rebel Group Sparks Fears of More Unrest."

<sup>1717</sup> "Equateur : Plusieurs Policiers Tués Par Des Jeunes Du Clan Enyele à Dongo."



Following the arrest of Ibrahim and flight of Udjani to Congo-Brazzaville, the group seems to have died out. Some sources implicate MILIA rebels in a 22 JUL 2014 attack on government sites in Kinshasa, but the perpetrators of this attack were never firmly established – other groups were also suggested as suspects.<sup>1718</sup> I find their involvement unlikely, given that no other MILIA activity preceded or succeeded the attack. Several sources from SEPT 2015 indicate a “probable re-organization” of MILIA in Dongo under Mayoko Nyaloma (alias Arigana, Moise, Moses), cousin of the late Udjani Mangbama.<sup>1719</sup> However, apparently Mayoko was killed around this time.<sup>1720</sup> There were no reported attacks, and the group did not resurface again. As such, I have coded 0 for viable and viable\_civ.

Due to initial attacks in Dongo, “rural” is coded as a 1. Although the “rural” variable is not always coded as location of first attacks, in this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation. Per the codebook, the coder used this location to code the “rural” variable.

MILIA is entered in GTD as “Enyele Militia” for its APR 2010 attack on the Mbandaka airport. I code 1 for riot (SCAD event 4900357).

#### **Raia Mukombozi**

AKAs: Mayi Mayi Militia (Raia Mukombozi)

NOTE: This group was not finished owing to resource constraints. It may or may not qualify for inclusion but is not included in the data at present.

**WNBF: West Nile Bank Front** was founded in 1993.<sup>1721</sup>

**Banyamulenge Ethnic Militias** were active at least as early as 1996.<sup>1722</sup>

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<sup>1718</sup> Jon Schubert, “Armed Attack on DRC Military Camp Highlights Increasing Risks of Politically Motivated Violence Ahead of 2016 Elections,” *IHS Global Insight*, July 23, 2014, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/c3643481-32e1-460e-9ee9-f9c375534ae2/?context=1516831>; Juakali Kambale, “DRC: Did pro-Mobutu Remnants Stage Anti-Kabila Attack?,” *Africa Review*, March 8, 2011, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/82ae28e9-22ec-4ca9-b25c-1bd0c2da3b9c/?context=1516831>.

<sup>1719</sup> “Defunct Rebel Group Reportedly Reorganizing in DR Congo’s Northwestern Province,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, September 3, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/229c1f54-b362-4352-8103-143df65cf61e/?context=1516831>; “Sud-Ubangi : Les Autorités Suspectent Une Réorganisation de La Rébellion Du MLIA,” Radio Okapi, September 3, 2015, <https://www.radiookapi.net/2015/09/03/actualite/securite/sud-ubangi-les-autorites-suspectent-une-reorganisation-de-la-rebellion>.

<sup>1720</sup> “Sud-Ubangi : Les Autorités Suspectent Une Réorganisation de La Rébellion Du MLIA.”

<sup>1721</sup> “Ugandan Rebel Leader Reported Killed in Fighting,” *CNN*, March 16, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/16/briefs/uganda.rebels/>.

<sup>1722</sup> Stephen Buckley, “Ethnic Battles Flare Anew in Africa: In Tense Region, Bad Blood Between Zaire and Tutsis Boils Over,” *Washington Post*, October 26, 1996.

**Background:** Since independence, the country has been dominated primarily by the People's Rally for Progress party, which was primarily an ethnically Somali party. The one sustained period of violence in the country's history took place in the early 1990s, when disaffected Affars formed the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in 1991. The conflict between FRUD and the Djiboutian government lasted until 1994, when the moderate members of FRUD signed a peace treaty with the Djiboutian government granting them increased representation in government.<sup>1723</sup> An insurgency by hardline members of FRUD, known as FRUD-Combatant (FRUD-C) continued for some years afterwards, but was largely ineffectual. Since then, Djibouti has only been subject to one terrorist attack according to ACLED, which was executed by Al-Shabab in 2014. The country's security has been in large part ensured by the presence of a large number of foreign troops in the country.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: Low**

**Explanation:** Following the conclusion of the Djiboutian Civil War, there has been little violence in Djibouti, with the exception of activities of Al-Shabab and limited activities of FRUD-C. This is in part due to the small geographic area of the country.

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**Al Shabab**

Excluded as base of operations is Somalia, not Djibouti.

**Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy-Combatant (FRUD-C)**

Excluded as group formed before 1997.<sup>1724</sup>

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<sup>1723</sup> KESSELS, EELCO, TRACEY DURNER, and MATTHEW SCHWARTZ. *Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses*. Report. Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 9-13. Accessed April 22, 2020. doi:10.2307/resrep20264.8.

<sup>1724</sup> Ibid.

## Egypt

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**Narrative Summary:** *The anti-state violence in Egypt from 1997 to today has been encouraged in large part by modern period of instability following the 2011 revolution in which forced Hosni Mubarak to resign the presidency after 3 decades in power. Following a brief military rule, Mohammed Morsi was elected president of Egypt. Seen as a religious fundamentalist by liberal and secular actors in government, the Muslim Brotherhood-backed president legalized the group and began authoritarian crackdowns on dissent across Egypt, including in the Sinai Peninsula where many had become sympathetic to the Gazan struggle after the 2011 Revolution. Elsewhere, groups like the Black Bloc formed to push back against the regime and push for a return to the ideals of the revolution. In July of 2013 the military removed Morsi after public outcry over the actions of his government and the Muslim Brotherhood it supported. A new government was established and new elections were held, but this coup d'état was opposed by the Brotherhood and other Egyptians who supported Morsi and his Islamic government, leading to several rebel groups like Revolutionary Punishment and Ajnad Misr. At the same time, groups like the Islamic State-Sinai Province continued to challenge the Egyptian military in its capacity assisting Israel with administration and occupation of the bordering Gaza strip.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** *The rotating Egyptian regimes have had different sympathies for different groups, and in some cases can obscure the existence of rebel groups amidst the near constant violence that has followed the 2011 revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood is also suspected to have helped form and manage multiple different groups (including Revolutionary Punishment) so they may have formed groups which never became visible to reporters, researchers, or even government intelligence agencies. And for many groups, operating anonymously and clandestinely appears to be an important aspect of their operation (even if they are publicly named) so there may be other groups operating completely under the radar relative to traditional sources of information. Finally, it is hard when considering unidentified armed group events in ACLED to determine whether or not these represent truly unidentified, independent groups or operations from international rebel and terror organisations which have some influence in the country, including Al-Qaeda, AQIM, and the Islamic State.*

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### Ahrar Party

The Ahrar Party is a political party in Egyptian government, but the only violence attributed to the group (ACLED event 54EGY) appears to be intra-party violence between competing factions (“Sadat” and “Hemeida” factions, per ACLED). There is no evidence that this political party tried to organize and violently challenge the authority of the state whilst out of power, so they are excluded from our dataset.

### Ajnad Misr

Ajnad Misr was founded in 2013 after the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood government from power in Egypt. According to the group’s manifesto, they sought to “target ‘criminal’ elements” of the Egyptian regime, and generally espoused Salafist sentiments of wider implementation of Sharia law through violence. The group

specifically targeted security forces in their attacks and bombings and do meet our criteria for inclusion in the dataset.<sup>1725</sup>

When exactly Ajnad Misr formed and began to plan its violence is unclear, but the group did publicly announce its existence via Twitter on January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2014 and claimed the next day responsibility for a pair of attacks in Cairo on the 24<sup>th</sup>. Notably, another group active in Egypt (ABM) initially claimed responsibility for all violence occurring on the 24<sup>th</sup>, but they later corroborated and legitimized Ajnad Misr's claim of responsibility for the violence.<sup>1726</sup> However, the group also claimed responsibility for earlier attacks occurring on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2013, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 2013, and January 7<sup>th</sup>, 2014 which they claim were for the purpose of testing the reaction of the Egyptian police and security forces to their violence.<sup>1727</sup> From this, it can be inferred that the group formed prior to the November 20<sup>th</sup> attack. The group has also claimed that one of its primary goals is retribution for the response by Egyptian security forces to protestors at Rab'a and al-Nahda.<sup>1728</sup> The protests ended on August 14<sup>th</sup>, 2013 when Egyptian officials opened fire on the protestors, resulting in at least 817 deaths and over 1,000 injuries.<sup>1729</sup> Thus, there is a rough 3 month window between the inciting event for Ajnad Misr's formation and the first instance of violence reasonably attributable to the group, resulting in a low-level of certainty about the date of formation (only year can be confirmed.) As the codebook directs, "formed\_month" will be coded as "9" (September) as the event of formation likely occurred within the time frame of mid-August to mid-November of 2013 (1-2 months).

Because it is possible and likely that the group was formed more than 3 months before publicly naming themselves on January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2014, "name\_time" is coded as "0." According to the codebook, the government of a country "not attributing violence to a group until after the group claimed it for themselves" qualifies as "explicit evidence" that a group intended to be clandestine. As cited previously, Ajnad Misr engaged in violent attacks for which the government pointed to no suspect and for which the group did not claim credit until several weeks or months afterwards. Therefore, the "clandestine" variable is coded as "1."

Although the group's publicly stated goals were limited primarily to retribution for the government's actions at Rab'a and al-Nahda, its founding statement included references to the establishment of a religious state in Egypt (although notably, not the expansion of the Islamic caliphate in line with the Islamic State (IS) and other affiliated organizations in the Middle East/North Africa) and the group took specific issue with the Morsi government's treatment of women.<sup>1730</sup> The establishment of a religious state and opposition to the Morsi regime satisfies the codebook definition of the "goal\_take" variable, so that has been coded as "1" with all other "goal" variables coded as "0."

Despite evidence suggesting that some members of the small group may have come from other rebel/jihadist organizations or be affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood-adjacent political parties, there is no compelling evidence

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<sup>1725</sup> "Ajnad Misr, Egypt's Latest Jihadist Group | FDD's Long War Journal," February 2, 2014, [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ajnad\\_misr\\_egypts\\_latest\\_jihad.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ajnad_misr_egypts_latest_jihad.php). "New Egypt Terror Group Adopting 'lone Wolf' Approach - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East," September 18, 2014, <https://web.archive.org/web/20140918050829/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/07/egypt-new-terror-group-lone-wolf-approach.html#>.

<sup>1726</sup> "Militants Step up Egypt Attacks," *BBC News*, January 24, 2014, sec. Middle East, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25874370>. Mokhtar Awad, "Ajnad Misr: The Rise of Homegrown Egyptian Jihadists," *TIMEP*, September 18, 2014, <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/ajnad-misr-rise-homegrown-egyptian-jihadists/>.

<sup>1727</sup> David Barnett, "Ajnad Misr, Egypt's Latest Jihadist Group | FDD's Long War Journal," *ThreatMatrix*, February 2, 2014, [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ajnad\\_misr\\_egypts\\_latest\\_jihad.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ajnad_misr_egypts_latest_jihad.php).

<sup>1728</sup> Awad, "Ajnad Misr."

<sup>1729</sup> "All According to Plan," *Human Rights Watch*, August 12, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt>.

<sup>1730</sup> "Ajnad Misr," *TIMEP*, accessed July 29, 2020, <https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/ajnad-misr/>.

that more than roughly 1/3 of the membership of Ajnad Misr came from any prior organization.<sup>1731</sup> However, the credible assertions of the groups ties to both religious political parties and other rebel organizations lead to the coding of some “prior\_org” variables as uncertain (“.”) to reflect the plausible but unsubstantiated use of these organizational structures. Although information about where the group originally met and formed is hazy, the group is frequently referred to as “operating out of the Cairo area” and a vast majority of their attacks have occurred in Cairo and surrounding neighborhoods.<sup>1732</sup> It can be assumed that the group did most or all of its initial planning within the greater Cairo region, a highly urban area, which meets the codebook definition of a “0” coding for the “rural” variable.

It can be said with near certainty that the group did not gain initial funds through oil, diamonds, ivory, or gold, nor did they receive any direct support from any foreign government. However, the group does appear to have some ties and relations to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is an organization typically flush with cash through many legitimate revenues, including profits from member-owned businesses and dues and membership fees from over 600,000 members across multiple countries.<sup>1733</sup> Due to the likely, but not affirmatively demonstrated, reality that the members of Ajnad Misr received some financial support initially from the Muslim Brotherhood, “other” for the initial resource base variables is coded as missing (instead of “0”).

The first attack coordinated by Ajnad Misr came on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2013. As indicated previously, the group eventually took responsibility for this “test run” attack after naming themselves in January of 2014. The attack involved a number of assailants throwing a grenade at a police checkpoint in Cairo, resulting in injuries to 4 police officers.<sup>1734</sup> There are no attacks attributable to Ajnad Misr which resulted in more than 25 casualties, so they did not commit a “large attack” based on the codebook’s definition, and such has been noted in the dataset. One aspect of the group which sets it apart from others in the region is their strict avoidance of civilian casualties when possible.<sup>1735</sup> So despite the civilian deaths which have occurred as the result of violence from Ajnad Misr, the group has not committed a “civilian attack,” which the codebook defines as an attack which “must involve intent to kill...a non-combatant.”<sup>1736</sup>

The main credited founder of Ajnad Misr was Hamam Mohamed, who founded the group after leaving Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM), another rebel group in the Sinai Peninsula.<sup>1737</sup> As ABM was still an active rebel group when Mohamed left to form Ajnad Misr, the “current\_rebels” variable is coded as “1.” There is little information available on the background of the only other named leader of the small group, Magd Eddin al-Masy (AKA Ezz al-Din al-Masri).<sup>1738</sup> However, it is indicated in reporting that he previously fought with Mohamed in Iraq and in

<sup>1731</sup> Wissam Matta, “New Egypt Terror Group Adopting ‘lone Wolf’ Approach,” Al-Monitor, July 3, 2014, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/07/egypt-new-terror-group-lone-wolf-approach.html>.

<sup>1732</sup> Nawal Sayed, “All You Need to Know about ‘Ajnad Misr’ Terrorist Group,” EgyptToday, October 8, 2017, <http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/26644/All-you-need-to-know-about-‘Ajnad-Misr’-terrorist-group>.

<sup>1733</sup> “Muslim Brotherhood,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed July 29, 2020, <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/muslim-brotherhood>. Awad, “Ajnad Misr.”

<sup>1734</sup> “Suicide Bombing Kills 11 Off-Duty Soldiers in Egypt,” accessed July 30, 2020, <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=0c058e6b-4ad6-4cc9-b92f-b1e24c9f05cd&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A59W9-XXP1-DYWX-S2NY-00000-00&pdccontentcomponentid=296079&pdteaserkey=sr8&pditab=allpods&ecomp=gb63k&earg=sr8&prid=2cc2ee48-6f3e-4d51-be21-678dcb5f62e4>.

<sup>1735</sup> Awad, “Ajnad Misr.”

<sup>1736</sup> “Ajnad Misr Claims Wednesday’s Cairo University Blast - Politics - Egypt,” Ahram Online, accessed July 30, 2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/113778.aspx>.

<sup>1737</sup> “Founder of Islamist Militant Group Ajnad Misr Killed: Police Spokesman - Politics - Egypt,” Ahram Online, accessed July 29, 2020, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/126984/Egypt/Politics-/Founder-of-Islamist-militant-group-Ajnad-Misr-kill.aspx>.

<sup>1738</sup> Al-Masry Al-Youm, “Ajnad Misr Posts First Video of Its Leader on YouTube,” Egypt Independent, January 13, 2015, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/agnad-misr-posts-first-video-its-leader-youtube/>.

the Sinai Peninsula, where ABM formed and operated.<sup>1739</sup> There is no evidence indicating the affiliations of al-Marsi in the region, or of Mohamed's prior to joining ABM. It is plausible that either or both men were involved with other groups in the region who were no longer active/viable at time of Ajnad Misr's founding, so the leadership variable for "former\_rebels" is coded with uncertainty (".").

As previously mentioned, the impetus for formation of this group was recent, large-scale social demonstrations in Cairo and subsequent government reaction, so the contestation variables will be coded positively. SCAD notes that these demonstrations started originally as organized protests (eventid 6511010) but uses the "event type" variable "4" to define the events of August 14<sup>th</sup>, 2013 as a "spontaneous violent riot".

The group appears to have no longer been viable more than 3 years after formation; they failed to take responsibility for any attack after killing one police officer with a bomb on April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2015.<sup>1740</sup> Additionally, many the group's militants were arrested and sentenced to death in 2014, and original founder Mohamed was eventually killed by Egyptian security forces.<sup>1741</sup>

### Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)

AKA: Al Jihad

EIJ was a militant Islamic group aiming to overthrow the more secular Egyptian government in favor of a religious regime. The group was originally founded in the 1970s, and in 2001 the group merged with existing terror group Al-Qaeda after previously establishing a financial relationship.<sup>1742</sup> Because the group as it existed during the 2001 merger was formed prior to 1997, it is excluded from the dataset for Egypt.

### Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda was a group formed originally in Afghanistan and Sudan in the early 1990, so for forming both outside of Egypt and before 1997 they are excluded from the dataset.<sup>1743</sup>

### Al-Gama'at Al-Aslamiyya

AKA Islamic Group (IG)

IG was originally founded as an umbrella group for student Sunni militias in Egypt in the 1970s, primarily as a reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood's calls for nonviolence. The group began initiating serious attacks against

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<sup>1739</sup> "Egypt Terrorist Group Confirms Leader's Death," MEO, April 9, 2015, <https://middle-east-online.com/en/egypt-terrorist-group-confirms-leaders-death>.

<sup>1740</sup> "Ajnad Misr Claims Zamalek Bombing - Daily News Egypt," accessed July 31, 2020, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/04/06/ajnad-misr-claims-zamalek-bombing-2/>.

<sup>1741</sup> "Founder of Islamist Militant Group Ajnad Misr Killed." Egypt Independent, "Egypt's Cassation Court Rejects Appeal of Ajnad Misr on Death, Life Sentences," *Egypt Independent*, May 7, 2019, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=EGYPEN0020190507ef57000gs&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1742</sup> Holly Fletcher, "Egyptian Islamic Jihad," Council on Foreign Relations, May 29, 2008, <https://www.cfr.org/background/egyptian-islamic-jihad>.

<sup>1743</sup> "Al-Qaeda's Origins and Links," July 20, 2004, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle\\_east/1670089.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1670089.stm).



state institutions in the early 1990s<sup>1744</sup>. Because they formed and engaged in violence against the Egyptian government before 1997, IG is excluded from the data set.

### Al-Takfir wal Hijrah (ATWH)

AKA: Gama'at al-Takfir wal Hijrah, The Society of Muslims, Gama'at al-Higra, The Group of Emigration

ATWH originally formed as a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s, with a specific focus on an extreme reading of and emphasis on “takfir,” the accusation of apostasy in Islam.<sup>1745</sup> Because this group is both a splinter and formed prior to 1997 (and exists in the same organizational form today as it originally began as), it is excluded from our dataset.

### April 6<sup>th</sup> Movement

The April 6<sup>th</sup> movement was a non-violent protest and strike movement established by Egyptian youth in 2008 in order support a planned strike action against the textile industry. After government crackdowns on the protest and the groups involvement, the group continued to advocate for non-violent action against objectionable government activities in Egypt and in other North African countries.<sup>1746</sup> Even if some of the members of the group became violent during these protests, the group specifically planned non-violent activity in order to push back against the Egyptian government, so they are excluded from our data set.

### Islamic State – Sinai Province (IS-SP)

AKA: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM), Wilayat Sinai, State of Sinai

IS-IP is a jihadist militant organization founded as ABM following the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011. Although the group originally formed to oppose the Israeli government and Egyptian influence in Israel (and thus targeted their attacks towards the Israeli state) in 2013 they refocused their violence on fighting oppression of Muslim groups by the Egyptian government in the Sinai Peninsula.<sup>1747</sup> The group did engage in organized violence targeting the Egyptian state and state officials, so they are included in the data as a rebel group.<sup>1748</sup> The group began engaging in violence in 2012, launching rockets at the southern Israeli city of Eilat and attacking border guards.<sup>1749</sup>

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<sup>1744</sup> Holly Fletcher, “Jamaat Al-Islamiyya,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 30, 2008, <https://www.cfr.org/background/jamaat-al-islamiyya>.

<sup>1745</sup> Jeffrey B. Cozzens, “Al-Takfir Wa’l Hijra: Unpacking an Enigma,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (May 28, 2009): 493, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902886044>.

<sup>1746</sup> “Revolution in Cairo - April 6 Youth Movement,” FRONTLINE, accessed July 23, 2020, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/>.

<sup>1747</sup> “FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Islamic State – Sinai Province,” accessed July 28, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state-sinai-province>.

<sup>1748</sup> “Profile: Sinai Province Militant Group,” *BBC News*, May 12, 2016, sec. Middle East, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25882504>.

<sup>1749</sup> “Terrorist Designation of Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis,” U.S. Department of State, accessed August 1, 2020, //2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/224566.htm.

IS-SP originally formed as an organization after the end of the Mubarak regime left a vacuum of power in the Gaza/Sinai region, in which local tribal communities took up arms and joined with the small militant group Al-Tawahid wa'al-Jihad in order to combat oppression of Muslim groups in Gaza and greater Israel.<sup>1750</sup> Although the group claims to be working with an inspired by Al-Qaeda, no formal link between the organizations appears to exist.<sup>1751</sup> For the purposes of this database, however, ISIP is recorded as “forming” on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2013. This is the end date for the successful coup of Mohamed Morsi, which is when the group moved their focus away from attack Israel and towards violently challenging Egyptian authority in the Sinai Peninsula, thus “forming” as specifically an Egyptian Rebel group.<sup>1752</sup> For consistency in the database, this is also considered their “name date,” which leads to 1 codings for the “name\_time” variables” and 0 coding for the “clandestine” variable.

Although the extension of the Islamic Caliphate into Egypt could potentially be coded as “goal\_secede” because it would involve the changing of control of the territory from the Egyptian government to ISIS, the allegiance pledge by ISIP to ISIS and thus the explicit aim of joining the caliphate did not occur within the first year following formation.<sup>1753</sup> During the year after formation as an Egyptian group, ISIP engaged in violence in the hope of destabilizing and removing the government which was responsible for the 2013 coup; this sought-after wholesale change in government regimes qualifies as a goal of “take” per the codebook. As previously cited, the group became an Egyptian rebel group after operating as an anti-Israel rebel group, and actively recruited from communities in the Sinai who had armed themselves following post-2011 destabilization of the Egyptian government. Therefore, for the “prior organization” variables, both “other\_rebels” and “self-defense” are coded as “1.”

Many of the first few attacks by ISSP following the coup took place near Ismila, which has a po.<sup>1754</sup> However, the area has over 200,000 people, so the “rural” variable will be coded as “0.” There is no evidence that the group planned violence from anywhere outside of Egypt, so “planning\_inside” and “planning\_border” are recorded as “1” and “0” respectively. ISIP also have made claims during the initial planning session to have received financial funding from the Muslim Brotherhood, so “other” for the “initial resource base” is coded as “1.”<sup>1755</sup>

The first attack attributable to IS-SP after their formation was an attempted assassination of Egyptian Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim on September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2013.<sup>1756</sup> No one but the suicide bomber died, although a number onlookers experienced injuries from the blast.<sup>1757</sup> The first “large attack,” defined as resulting in at least 25 casualties, occurred on October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014 when a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb at an Egyptian military

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<sup>1750</sup> “FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Islamic State – Sinai Province.”

<sup>1751</sup> Patrick Kingsley, “Egypt Faces New Threat in Al-Qaida-Linked Group Ansar Beyt al-Maqdis,” *The Guardian*, January 31, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/egypt-alqaida-terrorist-threat-ansar-beyt-almaqdis>.

<sup>1752</sup> “FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Islamic State – Sinai Province,” accessed August 1, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state-sinai-province>.

<sup>1753</sup> “Egypt Militants Pledge Loyalty to IS,” *BBC News*, November 10, 2014, sec. Middle East, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29993183>.

<sup>1754</sup> “Jihadists Claim Responsibility for Ismailia Military Bombing,” *Daily News Egypt*, October 21, 2013, <https://dailynewsegyp.com/2013/10/21/jihadists-claim-responsibility-for-ismailia-military-bombing/>.

<sup>1755</sup> “Islamic Jihad Founder: Brotherhood Has Been Funding Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis,” *Egypt Independent*, September 9, 2013, <https://egyptindependent.com/islamic-jihad-founder-brotherhood-has-been-funding-ansar-bayt-al-maqdis/>.

<sup>1756</sup> Thomson Reuters Foundation, “Sinai-Based Islamist Militants Claim Responsibility for Attack on Egypt Interior Minister,” *news.trust.org*, accessed August 1, 2020, <https://news.trust.org/item/20130908174612-dt7gd/>.

<sup>1757</sup> David D. Kirkpatrick and Mayy El Sheikh, “Egypt’s Interior Minister Survives Assassination Attempt,” *The New York Times*, September 5, 2013, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/world/middleeast/egypts-interior-minister-survives-attack.html>.

checkpoint in Northern Sinai killing 28 soldiers.<sup>1758</sup> This, along with the simultaneous attack killing 3 more soldiers at a different location, also happen to be the last attacks committed by the group under the ABM name before changing it to IS-SP.<sup>1759</sup> The first attack targeting civilians which can be confidentially attributed to IS-SP (the group claimed responsibility for the incident) was the bombing of a tour bus on February 16<sup>th</sup>, 2014. The group claimed that the killing of the tourists was part of their “economic campaign” against the Egyptian government, and the blast killed 4 civilians and the assailant and caused 14 other injuries.<sup>1760</sup>

In the year prior to IS-SP forming, there were several protests and riots in opposition to the governing regime. Most notably, widespread protests across multiple cities in opposition to the Morsi government on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2013 eventually devolved into violent clashes between protestors and security forces. This makes this event (SCAD ID 6510841) count for both the “protest” and “riot” variables for the dataset.

The variable “op\_planning\_location” notes “Ismailia” as the formation location of this group. According to the SCAD, there were several instances of qualifying local contestation there.

#### **Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami** (The Helpers of Global Jihad)

This group is named for violence in Egypt, however they are frequently described as a “Kurdistan-based affiliate of Al Qaeda” and there is no evidence suggesting the group has organized a violent challenge to Egyptian state authority.<sup>1761</sup> Therefore, they are excluded from the dataset for Egyptian rebel groups.

#### **Jaysh al Islam (Army of Islam)**

Jaysh al Islam is a terrorist group named for frequent violence against Egyptian security forces and civilians and have been blamed for a number of violent incidents by the Egyptian government.<sup>1762</sup> However, the Gaza based group appears to be less of an organized rebel group and more an umbrella term for a number of Salafist groups in the Gaza strip who oppose Israeli occupation and military involvement in the region.<sup>1763</sup> Importantly, the “group” has not claimed responsibility for any attack occurring in cities away from the Egyptian/Gazan border in the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian security officers appear to be targeted by the group in response to their cooperation with the Israeli government, which is the main stated target of the group’s violence. Because this group isn’t challenging the authority of the *Egyptian* state, they are excluded from the dataset of Egyptian rebel groups.

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<sup>1758</sup> David D. Kirkpatrick, “31 Egyptian Soldiers Are Killed as Militants Attack in Sinai,” *The New York Times*, October 24, 2014, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/middleeast/militants-kill-at-least-26-egyptian-soldiers-in-sinai-peninsula-attack.html>.

<sup>1759</sup> “If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai!,” Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/28/if-you-are-afraid-your-lives-leave-sinai/egyptian-security-forces-and-isis>.

<sup>1760</sup> Foundation, “Sinai-Based Islamist Militants Claim Responsibility for Attack on Egypt Interior Minister.”

<sup>1761</sup> Karen J. Greenberg, “The Norway Attacks: Who Is Abu Suleiman Al Nasser?,” *The New Republic*, July 21, 2011, <https://newrepublic.com/article/92532/what-ansar-al-jihad-al-alami>.

<sup>1762</sup> “Egypt Blames Gaza Group for Bombing,” accessed July 28, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112311414915283.html>.

<sup>1763</sup> “The Sinai: Jihadism’s Latest Frontline | Wilson Center,” accessed July 28, 2020, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-sinai-jihadisms-latest-frontline>.

## Black Bloc Egypt (Black Bloc)

The Black Bloc is an anarchist movement in Egypt seeking to overthrow the Morsi regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Although a diffuse group organized mostly through online channels, they appear to have planned and executed violent attacks and encounters with Egyptian security forces, especially those working specifically for high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood members and Morsi himself.<sup>1764</sup> Because they are violently challenging the authority of the state, they are included in the dataset.

The Black Bloc announced its existence on January 24<sup>th</sup>, 2013, taking inspiration and style from a similar leftist/anarchist German protest movement in the 1980s.<sup>1765</sup> Exact information about when the group “formed” and began to plan their activity is unavailable, although one leader of the group did claim that founding members of the Black Bloc were present at the riot at the US embassy in Cairo on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2012.<sup>1766</sup> Because of this, it can be assumed that the group formed sometime between September 11<sup>th</sup> and January 24<sup>th</sup>, so the group is coded as having formed in November of 2013 to account for up to ~2 months of uncertainty in either direction. Given this uncertainty, it is not known whether or not the group had publicly named itself less than 3 months after formation, but it can be said affirmatively that the Black Bloc publicly named itself less than a year after forming. Similarly, there is no available evidence that the group intended to be clandestine at any point following their formation, but they group did not engage in any public activity or violence prior to their public naming. Due to the possibility that the group formed and began planning more than 3 months before their first attacks, “clandestine” is coded as missing.

The group’s main goal was to overthrow the “fascist” regime of Mohammed Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party/Muslim Brotherhood, particularly motivated by the regime’s protection of those who engage in violence against secularist dissenters.<sup>1767</sup> This meets the codebook definition of “goal\_take” as a goal of sweeping policy change and ultimately a regime change. Although the group operated publicly and posted regularly to Facebook and Youtube pages, they did seek a level of secrecy from government and journalists as to the details of their operation, planning, and formation, so information about where geographically the group planned most of their action is incredibly limited.<sup>1768</sup> Further, given the use of social media and internet applications by the group to broadcast, it’s highly likely these tools were used to coordinate action with members spread across different locales, each of which may meet a different criteria for the “rural” planning variable, so it is coded with uncertainty. Despite this uncertainty, the fact that many of the anonymous members of the organization had participated in protests and demonstrations in Cairo and other locations in Egypt previously seems to be strong evidence that the planning was done, even if diffusely, from “inside” Egypt proper.

Interestingly, the Black Bloc doesn’t appear to have taken responsibility for any singular instances of violence against the state. It appears that their tactics involved helping to plan protests and demonstrations, with the goal of escalating conflict between security forces and other pro-state apparatuses.<sup>1769</sup> Even on the rare occasion when the

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<sup>1764</sup> Zeinab El Guindy, “Meet the Black Bloc: Egypt’s Most Talked about Radical Opposition Group - Features - Egypt,” *Ahram Online*, June 13, 2013, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/73889/Egypt/Features/Meet-the-Black-Bloc-Egyptys-most-talked-about-radical.aspx>.

<sup>1765</sup> Zeinab El Guindy, “Meet the Black Bloc: Egypt’s Most Talked about Radical Opposition Group - Features - Egypt,” *Ahram Online*, June 13, 2013, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/73889/Egypt/Features/Meet-the-Black-Bloc-Egyptys-most-talked-about-radical.aspx>.

<sup>1766</sup> El Guindy. “Egyptians Angry at Film Scale U.S. Embassy Walls,” *Reuters*, September 11, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-usa-protest-idUSBRE88A11N20120911>.

<sup>1767</sup> Fauchier Delavigne, “‘Black Bloc’ Revolutionaries Baffle Egyptians,” *France 24*, January 31, 2013, <https://www.france24.com/en/20130131-egypt-black-bloc-morsi-demonstrators-twitter-facebook>.

<sup>1768</sup> Oz Katerji, “Egypt’s Black Bloc Doesn’t Want to Be Your Friend,” *Vice News*, February 12, 2013.

<sup>1769</sup> El Guindy, “Meet the Black Bloc,” June 13, 2013.

group does claim responsibility for more traditional forms of rebel violence, it's often doubtful that they were the main responsible party or even involved at all. For example, a large car bomb in Cairo targeting police was claimed by IS-SP before the Black Bloc took responsibility, and government investigations have pointed to a separate, unnamed Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group.<sup>1770</sup> Due to the difficulty of attributing specific acts of violence to the Black Bloc, all of the attack variables for the group will have to be coded as missing.

As far as the group's leaders, they remained anonymous to reporters, researchers, and government officials, and use pseudonyms or partial names when speaking on record to media outlets.<sup>1771</sup> Given the group's roots in Egyptian political activism, it's unlikely that any leaders have ties to former or current security forces or governing regimes. It is plausible, yet unconfirmable, that initial leaders had ties and past experience with former or current rebel groups. However, due to the obscurity and lack of information, the variables for initial leaders for all categories are coded with uncertainty.

In the year prior to the group's formation, SCAD records the occurrence of both protests and riots. For example, on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2012, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters organized a protest against the military regime stripping power away from the office of the president prior to elections. The demonstrations occurred in Tahrir Square in Cairo (SCAD ID 6510599). Similarly, anti-government protests in the same location nearly a year prior (November of 2011) devolved into riots due to violent responses from Egyptian police forces (SCAD ID 6510437).

The information for "op\_planning\_location" and formation dates are unknown, so I am unable to code the contestation variables.

**Groupe des Mourabitounes de l'Awad (GMA)** – See group entry in Mali.

### **Freedom and Justice Party**

FJP was the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, whose candidate Mohamed Morsi, controlled the Egyptian government after the Egyptian revolution in 2011. Notably, the party was banned from politics by Egyptian courts in 2014, so any challenge they made to the authority of the new Egyptian state after that point would be considered, for the purposes of this dataset, a challenge to state authority from "non-state" actors.<sup>1772</sup> However, there is no evidence that former members of the party have specifically been engaged in violence after the 2014 ban (not speaking to Muslim Brotherhood as an organization), so they will be excluded from our dataset.

### **Hunayshat Ethnic Militia (Egypt)**

This group is named in one ACLED event (196EGY) in a mass attack related to a previous murder and family disputes. However, research does not reveal the existence of any sort of formally organized militia in the Hunayshat ethnic group, so they are excluded from our dataset.

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<sup>1770</sup> "Bomb Targets Egypt Security Building," *BBC News*, August 20, 2015, sec. Middle East, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33998536>. UMD START GTD, ID 201508200003.

<sup>1771</sup> El Guindy, "Meet the Black Bloc," June 13, 2013.

<sup>1772</sup> "Egypt Court Dissolves Muslim Brotherhood's Political Wing," *Reuters*, August 10, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-brotherhood-idUSKBN0G90AM20140810>.

### Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade

This group is the military wing of Hamas, the main political power in the Gaza strip. The group was both founded before 1997 and is primarily engaged in opposing the Israeli government by targeting Israeli civilians.<sup>1773</sup> For both of these reasons, this group is excluded from our dataset.

### Jund Ansar Allah

This Palestinian group, founded in 2008, was opposed to Israeli control in Gaza but differed with Hamas on the implementation of Sharia law.<sup>1774</sup> The group did not challenge the authority of the Egyptian state; they are only named in ACLED incidental to arrests of members in Alexandria and Cairo by Egyptian officials (events 6168EGY and 6181EGY), so this group is excluded from our dataset.

### Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is a religiopolitical organization founded in Egypt in 1928. They have consistently sought various regime changes in Egypt, beginning with the ousting of the British government, and some paramilitary wings of the organization have engaged in some violence. However, the group has not shifted its central aim towards explicitly engaged in a violent challenge to state authority, and in fact took an explicitly non-violent stance in the 1980s.<sup>1775</sup> Although some supporters and members have engaged in violence, the group was formed before 1997 and fails before and after that point to meet the criteria of “violently challenging the authority of the state,” so they are excluded from the dataset.

### National Salvation Front (NSF)

The NSF is a coalition of opposition parties formed in 2012 and the only recorded event involving them in ACLED (event 1504EGY) is the organization explicitly denouncing violence.<sup>1776</sup> Being both a part of the state through representation in government and refraining from using violence to seek their opposition objectives, the group is excluded from our dataset.

### Revolutionary Punishment (RP)

Revolutionary Punishment was a religious nationalist group formed in 2015 to push back against government forces they deemed to be supportive of the coup of former President Morsi. The group was only briefly active,

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<sup>1773</sup> “Izz Ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades | Terrorist Groups | TRAC,” accessed July 28, 2020, <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/izz-ad-din-al-qassam-brigades>.

<sup>1774</sup> “Profile: Jund Ansar Allah,” August 15, 2009, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/8203239.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8203239.stm).

<sup>1775</sup> Bryony Jones and Susannah Cullinane, “What Is the Muslim Brotherhood?,” CNN, July 3, 2013, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-explainer/index.html>. “Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood - BBC News,” December 25, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405>.

<sup>1776</sup> “National Salvation Front,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed July 28, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/03/national-salvation-front-pub-54921>.



and it went “dormant” in January of 2016. However, the group did engage in organized violence challenging the authority of the state, so they will be included in the dataset for Egypt.

Revolutionary Punishment first announced itself as an organization in January of 2015, on the 4<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the of the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution.<sup>1777</sup> Although evidence about the specific date of formation for RP is sparse, work by Egyptian investigative reporters credibly assert that the group likely emerged from a “special operations” training held by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in September of 2014, so this timeframe will be recorded as the date of formation.<sup>1778</sup> The “clandestine” is coded as “1” given the 4 months between the groups likely founding and their public naming.

The main goal of the group, unlike other Jihadist/Islamic groups in the region, is nationalist in nature, in that they seek to reinstate the policy goals of the 2011 revolution, which they feel ended in 2013 when President Morsi was ousted in a coup.<sup>1779</sup> For this database, this constitutes a goal of “take,” which includes groups seeking policy reform or regime change. The only named leader of RP in any source is Mohammed Kamal, who in September of 2014 began recruiting members of the Muslim Brotherhood to join in a new, violent approach to resistance.<sup>1780</sup> Based on this information, RP will be coded as taking organizational structure from a religious organization. Although the group committed violence exclusively in Egypt, where exactly the group began to form and train is unclear. Considering the role the internet played in the formation and communication of RP and the Muslim Brotherhood in general, it’s entirely possible that the group “formed” and prepared for violence across multiple regions in Egypt, each meeting a different criteria for the “rural” variable, so it is coded as missing.<sup>1781</sup> Given that the Muslim Brotherhood had administrative offices in Egypt and the recruited members were Egyptian residents, there is nothing to suggest that the planning for the group happened outside of Egypt, so “planning\_inside” is coded as “1” and “planning\_border” is coded as “0.” Just as RP relied on some organizational support from the Muslim Brotherhood, there is also evidence suggesting that the group received some level of initial funding from them, as well as from Palestinian group Hamas.<sup>1782</sup> Therefore, the “other” variable for initial funds is coded as “1.”

The first attack attributable to RP occurred on January 29<sup>th</sup>, 2015 when members of the group ambushed a police officer in Minya on his way to work; the officer survived but sustained multiple gunshot wounds.<sup>1783</sup> Although not public at first, RP later claimed responsibility for this attack, according to the START database. There is no record of RP committing or claiming to commit any attack resulting in more than 25 casualties, so the “large attack” variables for the group are not coded.

The only named leader associated with RP was Mohamed Kamal, who served in a number of prominent roles within the Muslim Brotherhood organization.<sup>1784</sup> Given RP’s origins within the Muslim Brotherhood, it seems appropriate to assume that any other prominent leaders of the rebel group would have similarly been pulled or recruited from Muslim Brotherhood membership. As primarily a religious and political advocacy organization, the Muslim Brotherhood does not meet the codebook definitions for former or current security forces, former or

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<sup>1777</sup> Mokhtar Awad, “Emerging Armed Groups in Egypt,” July 2017, 8.

<sup>1778</sup> Mohamed Hamama, “An Organization without a Name: How a Group of Beginners Killed Egypt’s Prosecutor General,” *Mada Masr* (blog), August 10, 2017, <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/08/10/feature/politics/an-organization-without-a-name-how-a-group-of-beginners-killed-egypts-prosecutor-general/>.

<sup>1779</sup> Mokhtar Awad Hashem Mostafa, “Egypt’s Escalating Islamist Insurgency,” Carnegie Middle East Center, accessed August 5, 2020, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/10/21/egypt-s-escalating-islamist-insurgency-pub-61683>.

<sup>1780</sup> Hamama, “An Organization without a Name.”

<sup>1781</sup> Awad, “Emerging Armed Groups in Egypt,” 7-8.

<sup>1782</sup> Hamama, “An Organization without a Name.”

<sup>1783</sup> “Policeman Shot in Egypt’s Minya,” accessed August 6, 2020, <http://www.aswatmasriya.com/en/news/details/9142>.

<sup>1784</sup> “Egypt Says It Killed Senior Muslim Brotherhood Leader in Shootout,” *Reuters*, October 4, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-security-idUSKCN124009>.

current rebels, or former or current government. The only incidence of violence in which RP appears to have targeted any civilian occurred on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2015, when members of the group kidnapped and shot Ateya el-Harouny, a civilian who later died from his wounds. RP targeted Harouny for allegedly “collaborating” with the government by filing police reports about Muslim Brotherhood activists.<sup>1785</sup> Because he was not working for the government in any official capacity, this attack does qualify as a civilian attack for this dataset.

In the year prior to RP’s formation, contestation against the government in both riot and protest form occurred. On July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2014, hundreds of Egyptians sympathetic to deposed president Mohamed Morsi organized protests across multiple locations on the anniversary of his ousting; demonstrators were eventually dispersed by security forces (SCAD ID 6511332). In April of 2014, multiple groups of pro-Morsi students violently clashed with security forces across Egypt, resulting in numerous injuries (SCAD ID 6511302).

The information for “op\_planning\_location” and formation dates are unknown, so I am unable to code the contestation variables.

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<sup>1785</sup> “Revolutionary Punishment,” Ace News Services, accessed August 6, 2020, <https://acenewsservices.com/tag/revolutionary-punishment/>.

## Eritrea

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**Narrative Summary:** Eritrea has remained relatively stable throughout our period of interest with regards to rebel group formation/activity. In 1993, Eritrea formally gained independence from Ethiopia after years of war. The rebels fighting against the Ethiopian government, EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), subsequently took power and effectively turned Eritrea into a totalitarian state. Under President Isaias Afwerki and the renamed PFDJ (The People's Front for Democracy and Justice), Eritrea has never held elections, banned independent media outlets, banned all political parties other than PFDJ, and used its conflict with Ethiopia to justify its authoritarian regime.

Most of the opposition political parties and groups have consolidated under one umbrella organization, the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA). As a whole, the EDA is not a rebel group, but some of its constituent organizations are. Two such organizations that are coded in our dataset are the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation and the Eritrean National Salvation Front. The EDA, and its individual rebel groups, has been supported by the Ethiopian government; conferences are held in Ethiopia, financial funding comes from Ethiopia, and rebels have military camps and training in Ethiopia. Ethiopia's support for the EDA and Eritrean rebel groups stems from an effort to oust Isaias Afwerki from power due to the long-standing conflict with the regime. Sudan has also at times supported the EDA and other rebel groups, but not to the extent of Ethiopia.

In 2018, Eritrea signed a peace deal with Ethiopia that formally ended the conflict between the two countries. Rebel activity has largely ceased since the peace deal. However, the Eritrean government has made it clear that they do not plan to negotiate with rebels for their return into the country and/or their incorporation into the political system; furthermore, tension between the two countries persists today. It is yet to be seen how these two factors will influence rebel group formation/activity in Eritrea.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** Due to Eritrea's ban on independent media inside its borders, coverage on rebel groups is very limited. Therefore, it is possible that groups could have formed undetected. Furthermore, with many groups being funded by Ethiopia, it would also be in the Ethiopian government's best interest to keep some of these groups clandestine. However, there was not a large prevalence of attacks perpetrated by unidentified armed groups in ACLED, and those that were often involved intra-civilian conflict between Eritreans and Ethiopians.

Moreover, literature surrounding Islamist groups in Eritrea is confusing. Most reports suggest that all the Islamist groups in Eritrea are actually, in some form or another, the same group; additionally, the reports that suggest that there are distinct Islamist groups indicate that some do not support armed rebellion.

Additionally, there was one group, the Democratic Front for Eritrean Unity, that is listed in multiple sources with relation to one attack carried out with RSADO. DFEU is not in ACLED and no other information could be found on the group other than its one attack with RSADO. Therefore, DFEU was not included in our dataset, but it is possible that they would have met our inclusion criteria.

Nonetheless, literature suggests that all Eritrean opposition groups are consolidated into the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), and it is unlikely that a rebel group formed that was not in this alliance. Furthermore, in many cases of highly authoritative governments, such as Eritrea, rebel group formation is harder to achieve. Therefore, there may be a high probability of a low number of rebel groups that should have been included in our dataset; however, in general it is unlikely that there are a high number of groups that we missed in our dataset for Eritrea.

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### Beja Congress (BC)

This group formed in 1958 to oppose the Sudanese government.<sup>1786</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset in Eritrea because it formed before 1997 and is not opposing the Eritrean government. For more information, see “Beja Congress” under Sudan.

### \*Democratic Front for Eritrean Unity (DFEU)

This group was referenced in one attack alongside the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation.<sup>1787</sup> However, other than this attack there was no information found that indicated this group was a rebel group. One source notes that the DFEU was an opposition party and its chairman was Tewolde Gebre Sellasie.<sup>1788</sup> There was not enough information to reliably code this group in our dataset. Additional follow up with local (on-the-ground) sources would be desirable.

### Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama (DMLEK)

AKA: Eritrean Kunama Democratic Liberation Movement; EKDL

This group is an armed rebel group fighting on behalf of the Kunama ethnic group and formed on April 1, 1995.<sup>1789</sup> It is excluded from our dataset because it formed before 1997.

### Eastern Front

This is a coalition of armed groups fighting against the Sudanese government.<sup>1790</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset for Eritrea because it is not targeting the Eritrean government. For more information, see “Eastern Front” under Sudan.

### Eritrean National Salvation Front (ENSF)

This group originally was an opposition organization that was part of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance, and it formed in 2006.<sup>1791</sup> However, according to our inclusion criteria, this group became a rebel group sometime in 2009, when ENSF began to launch consistent attacks that killed Eritrean officials<sup>1792</sup> (their first attack was on July 25, 2009).<sup>1793</sup> These attacks were launched alongside RSADO, and targeted military bases/units.<sup>1794</sup> ENSF has military bases in Ethiopia and receives training from

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<sup>1786</sup> “Beja Congress (Inactive),” Small Arms Survey Sudan, n.d., <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/sudan/eastern-sudan/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Beja-Congress.pdf>.

<sup>1787</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Eritrean Rebels Claim Killing 7 Intelligence Agents,” *Sudan Tribune*, December 23, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020141223eacn000gq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1788</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Eritrea’s President Breaks Silence over Army Mutiny Incident,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 11, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020130211e92b0002v&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1789</sup> “Eritrean Opposition Group Claims Attacks on Government Forces in Gash Barka,” Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Eritrea Asmara, April 10, 2006), [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06ASMARA327\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06ASMARA327_a.html).

<sup>1790</sup> Dorina Bekoe, “The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” United States Institute of Peace, October 15, 2007, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/10/eastern-sudan-peace-agreement-taking-stock-and-moving-forward>.

<sup>1791</sup> Dan Connell, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea* (Scarecrow Press, 2010), 221. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/reader.action?docID=634284#>

<sup>1792</sup> “63. Eritrea (1993-Present),” University of Central Arkansas, accessed June 2, 2020, <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/eritrea-1993-present/>.

<sup>1793</sup> “Eritrean Rebels Claim Successful Attack on Intelligence Center,” *Sudan Tribune*, August 2, 2009, <https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32000>.

<sup>1794</sup> “63. Eritrea (1993-Present).”

the Ethiopian government (foreign\_govt variable coded as “1” and “rural” coded as Eastern Tigray near Adigrat in Ethiopia).<sup>1795</sup> Due to ENSF receiving training in Ethiopia and the general trend of Eritrean opposition groups being located in Ethiopia, the planning\_border was coded as “1” despite an unknown exact location of formation for ENSF. After 2011, the group appears to have stopped killing government officials.<sup>1796</sup> Although there is relatively scarce information on ENSF, the civilian attack variables are coded as not applicable because the coder determined that if ENSF had intentionally killed civilians, it would have been well documented.

There are a number of coding decisions that should be clarified. First, there is reliable evidence that ENSF had an armed wing prior to 2009; however, it was mainly used for intelligence gathering missions rather than attacks aimed at killing government officials.<sup>1797</sup>

Second, ENSF is coded as having emerged from a prior organization; it existed as an opposition organization before it met our criteria for a rebel group.

Third, ENSF is coded as “1” for the “clandestine” variable. The coder inferred that ENSF avoided telling many people their plans for violence because in October 2009 the ENSF held its first conference in Addis Ababa in which ENSF publicized a peaceful agenda; furthermore,<sup>1798</sup> in December 2009 ENSF reiterated their peaceful agenda to U.S. government officials.<sup>1799</sup> However, less than one month after that meeting ENSF launched an attack that killed 25 Eritrean soldiers and would continue doing so for the coming years.<sup>1800</sup>

Fourth, there was no evidence of contestation in the one year prior to ENSF’s formation, and therefore those variables are coded as “0.”

Fifth, there was no evidence that ENSF became viable, however, there was one attack in 2015 by ENSF,<sup>1801</sup> nonetheless, this attack did not appear to kill government officials, nor was there more than one attack in any given year 3+ years after ENSF’s formation. Therefore, the group was still coded as not viable.

Last, ENSF is coded as “1” for the “goal\_take” variable because at their first conference in October 2009, ENSF called for the ousting of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.<sup>1802</sup>

### Eritrean Popular Congress (EPC)

AKA: Eritrean People’s Congress; Eritrean Islamic Jihad; EIJ; Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement; EIJM; Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement; EIRM

This is the name under which EIJM/EIRM signed into the EDA.<sup>1803</sup> EIJM formed in 1980 as an Islamist group and changed its name to EIRM in 2003.<sup>1804</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it formed before 1997.

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<sup>1795</sup> “Eritrean Opposition Group Seeking New Opposition Alliance,” Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Ethiopia Addis Ababa, October 10, 2007), [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA3016\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA3016_a.html).

<sup>1796</sup> “63. Eritrea (1993-Present).”

<sup>1797</sup> “Eritrean Opposition Group Seeking New Opposition Alliance.”

<sup>1798</sup> “Eritrean Opposition in Ethiopia Asks for Increased Usg Cooperation,” Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Ethiopia Addis Ababa, December 31, 2009), [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ADDISABABA3068\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ADDISABABA3068_a.html).

<sup>1799</sup> “Eritrean Opposition in Ethiopia Asks for Increased Usg Cooperation.”

<sup>1800</sup> “Ethiopia Denies Involvement in Skirmish on Eritrea Border,” Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Ethiopia Addis Ababa, January 12, 2010), [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ADDISABABA50\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ADDISABABA50_a.html).

<sup>1801</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Eritrean Rebels Claim Attacks Government on Facility in Asmara,” *Sudan Tribune*, March 16, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150316eb3g0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1802</sup> “Eritrean Opposition in Ethiopia Asks for Increased Usg Cooperation.”

<sup>1803</sup> Connell, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea*, 206.

<sup>1804</sup> “Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM),” January 2015, [https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/eritrean-islamic-jihad-movement-eijm#\\_edn2](https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/eritrean-islamic-jihad-movement-eijm#_edn2).

### Front of the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)

This is an armed group targeting the Djibouti government.<sup>1805</sup> This group is excluded in our dataset for Eritrea because it is not opposing the Eritrean government.

### Islamic Party of Eritrea for Development and Justice (IPEDJ)

AKA: Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement; EISM; Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development; EIPJD.

This group is the new name for the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement which formed in 1998 as a faction of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement.<sup>1806</sup> In 2004, this group denounced armed struggle;<sup>1807</sup> however, between 1998 and 2004, we did not include this group as a rebel group because there are no reports of any attacks or clear statements advocating for armed struggle.

ACLED did code one event for IPEDJ in 2011 in which they killed government officials,<sup>1808</sup> however there are no other reports of any attacks, and we determined that this was an isolated attack and did not reflect an explicit armed struggle of the group.

Furthermore, reports surrounding the Islamist groups in Eritrea are varied – some indicate that IPEDJ, in some form or another, is the EIJM.<sup>1809</sup> Moreover, the named leader for EIJM<sup>1810</sup> is the same named leader for IPEDJ,<sup>1811</sup> Khalil Mohammed Amer.

For all these reasons, we ultimately excluded EISM/IPEDJ from our dataset.

### National Redemption Front (NRF)

This is a coalition of armed groups that formed in 2006 to oppose the Sudanese government.<sup>1812</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset in Eritrea because it is not opposing the Eritrean government.

### Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

This group formed in 1973 to oppose the Ethiopian government.<sup>1813</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset in Eritrea because it formed before 1997 and is not opposing the Eritrean government.

### Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO)

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<sup>1805</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Djibouti: Treatment of Members of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) by the Current Government,” Refworld, November 1, 1998, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acef30.html>.

<sup>1806</sup> Connell, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea*, 206.

<sup>1807</sup> Connell, 207.

<sup>1808</sup> “Eritrean Rebels Reportedly Kill Five Government Soldiers,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 28, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020110728e77s00335&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1809</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Eritrea,” Refworld, March 11, 2008, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/47d92c16c1.html>.

<sup>1810</sup> “Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM).”

<sup>1811</sup> “The Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development Final Statement of the 5th General Conference,” January 20, 2013, <https://english.farajat.net/archives/8332>.

<sup>1812</sup> “Founding Declaration of Darfur’s National Redemption Front,” Sudan Tribune, June 30, 2006, [https://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id\\_article=16455](https://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16455).

<sup>1813</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Including Origin, Mandate, Leadership, Structure, Legal Status, and Membership; Treatment of Members and Supporters by Authorities (2014-2015),” Refworld, May 7, 2015, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html>.



This group is an Afar ethnic rebel group attempting to oust the Isaias regime from power,<sup>1814</sup> and it formed on October 17, 1998 in Ab'ala Ethiopia.<sup>1815</sup> RSADO was founded by Ethiopia to challenge the EPLF in Eritrea, and consisted of many Afar fighters that had fled Eritrea in the early and mid-1990s due to persecution from the government.<sup>1816</sup> Prior to October 17, 1998, these Afar fighters had consolidated into one committee, which made it easier for Ethiopia to create one unified group at the Ab'ala Conference; naturally, RSADO enjoyed extensive funding from the Ethiopian government.<sup>1817</sup> Following the Ab'ala conference, RSADO initially tried to recruit senior Afar politicians in Ethiopia (these are likely Ethiopian politicians, not Eritrean, though the source is ambiguous on this matter), but soon turned to recruiting students; these efforts culminated in the first RSADO conference in Ab'ala on January 26, 1999, which is coded as 1 for the rural variable. At this conference, Ibrahim Harun, a second-year student in Ethiopia, was named Vice Chairman of RSADO and would later assume the role of Chairman.<sup>1818</sup>

Based in Ethiopia, RSADO occasionally launched attacks across the border in the Dankalia region, the ethnic home of the Eritrean Afar; this includes RSADO's first recorded attack on June 3, 2000 when they ambushed two military vehicles.<sup>1819</sup> The first large attack by RSADO was on January 1, 2009 when they killed 30 Eritrean soldiers and wounded dozens more during a raid in the Araata Zone.<sup>1820</sup> It should be noted that this attack was only mentioned in one source, which cited RSADO's claim of this attack. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to find reports of attacks confirmed by independent sources, and therefore we felt comfortable coding this as the first large attack. Although there is relatively scarce information on RSADO, the civilian attack variables are coded as not applicable because the coder determined that if RSADO had intentionally killed civilians, it would have been well documented. Furthermore, given their funding by the Ethiopian government and concentrated struggle against Eritrean troops/officials, it is highly unlikely RSADO would have committed civilian attacks.

In 2003 RSADO joined the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), a coalition of Eritrean opposition groups; however, the EDA is mainly a political coalition, and RSADO continued to launch independent attacks against the Eritrean government. The last recorded attack for RSADO came in 2016,<sup>1821</sup> however they are very active on Facebook.<sup>1822</sup>

There are a few coding decisions that require clarification. First, besides RSADO's Facebook page, no official RSADO statements could be found. However, the earliest source that referenced the RSADO was on April 28, 1999.<sup>1823</sup> It is unclear if the original conferences (Ab'ala in October 1998 and RSADO conference in January 1999) were clandestine or made public, and therefore those are not coded as the name dates.

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<sup>1814</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Ethiopia/Eritrea: Treatment of the Afars in Ethiopia and Eritrea since the Outbreak of the Hostilities in May 1998," Refworld, October 15, 1999, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8173.html>.

<sup>1815</sup> Yasin Mohammed Yasin, "Political History of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea," *Africa Spectrum* 43, no. 1 (2008): 39–65, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175221>.

<sup>1816</sup> Yasin.

<sup>1817</sup> Yasin.

<sup>1818</sup> Yasin.

<sup>1819</sup> ACLED Event 275ERI

<sup>1820</sup> "Afar Rebels Continue Attack, Claim Killing 30 Eritrean Troops," *Sudan Tribune*, January 2, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020090102e5120002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1821</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "Eritrean Rebels Raid Military Base, Kill Intelligence Agents," *Sudan Tribune*, January 29, 2016, <https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57840>.

<sup>1822</sup> "Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO)," accessed June 2, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/AFARSADO/>.

<sup>1823</sup> "The Military Balance.," *All Africa*, April 28, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dv4s0220h&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Second, there was no evidence of contestation in the one year prior to RSADO's formation, and therefore those variables are coded as "0."

The "other\_org" variable is coded as "1" because before the Ab'ala conference there was a provisional committee set up to organize multiple Afar groups that had expressed desires to challenge the Eritrean government. Out of this committee came the RSADO.<sup>1824</sup>

Last, many variables were coded as "missing"/ "unknown" for RSADO. There are a couple explanations for this. First, Eritrea banned all press in 2001,<sup>1825</sup> and it is likely that information is missing as a result. Second, since RSADO was founded by Ethiopia, it would be in Ethiopia's best interest to hide concrete statements and plans from the Eritrean government, and this might explain some of the missing information; hence, the "clandestine" variable is coded as "1".

#### **Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)**

This group formed in 1983 in order to fight against the Sudanese government; they have been supported by Eritrea.<sup>1826</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it formed before 1997 and is not targeting Eritrea.

#### **United Front for Liberation and Development (UFLD)**

This group was created by Eritrea to oppose the Sudanese government.<sup>1827</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset in Eritrea because it is not opposing the Eritrean government.

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<sup>1824</sup> Yasin, "Political History of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea."

<sup>1825</sup> Abraham Zere, "Remembering the Day the Eritrean Press Died," Al Jazeera, September 18, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/remembering-day-eritrean-press-died-170918074330130.html>.

<sup>1826</sup> "SUDAN," Human Rights Watch, accessed June 2, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sudan/Sudarm988-07.htm>.

<sup>1827</sup> "Rebel Umbrella Urges Recognition of New Balance of Power in Darfur," Sudan Tribune, July 24, 2007, [https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id\\_article=22988](https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=22988).

### ***Narrative Summary:***

*A military coup removed Emperor Hailie Selassie I in 1974 and established the Marxist Derg regime, which would be dominated by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam during most of its rule. There were already several rebel groups in exile before the coup, and the Derg had to contend with rebellions throughout the country. Some groups such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) were more ideologically organized, while many other rebel groups were organized along ethnic lines. In addition to fighting against the Derg, the various rebel groups also fought each other. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the secessionist Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) became the two dominant rebel groups and began winning victories against the Derg in the 1980s. Other smaller rebel groups formed during the 1970s and 1980s included the Afar Liberation Front (ALF), Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Sidama Liberation Front (SLF), and the United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF).*

*In 1988, TPLF and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), later renamed the Amhara People's Democratic Movement (APDM), formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Several other groups eventually joined the EPRDF coalition, and other rebel groups and parties coordinated their activities with the EPRDF. The TPLF-dominated EPRDF and the EPLF worked together to drive the Derg from power in 1991, and the new EPRDF government of Ethiopia recognized Eritrea as an independent state. The EPRDF tightened its grip on power during the post-war transitional government (1991-1995), and the OLF took up arms against the new regime in Oromia, while the ONLF and UWSLF fought government forces in the Ogaden region along the border with Somalia. New rebel movements, such as the Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of northwestern Ethiopia, also formed.*

*Following the Ethiopian victory over Eritrea in the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean War and the war's failure to resolve the countries' border dispute, Eritrea became more directly involved in hosting, supporting, and organizing Ethiopian rebel groups. In 2000, several smaller groups formed the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF), an Ethiopian nationalist group, and in 2001, TPLF defectors formed the Tigray People's Democratic Movement (TPDM) in Eritrea. The EPPF and TPDM would become the strongest of a group of newer, Eritrea-backed rebel groups and periodically launched cross-border raids into Ethiopia. Former Derg leader Thowat Pal Chay launched the Ethiopian United Patriotic Front (EUPF) of his fellow Nuers from the northwestern region of Gambella, while the Gambella People's Liberation Front (GPLF) emerged following the 2002 mass killing of ethnic Anuaks in Gambella. Both EUPF and GPLF, as well as the later Gambella Democratic Movement (GDM), established bases in Sudan, now South Sudan, and received Eritrean support, but neither was able to do much more than occasional cross-border attacks on Ethiopian troops.*

*On May 15, 2005, Ethiopia held its most free elections in its recent history. The political opposition, particularly the new Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), officially won nearly a third of the vote, and CUD mayoral candidate Berhanu Nega was elected mayor of Addis Ababa. In the aftermath of the election, the EPRDF government banned protests, and CUD protestors clashed with security forces. The government arrested and convicted many prominent CUD leaders, though they were later pardoned. Disheartened by 2005 election outcome and their subsequent persecution by the Ethiopian state, Nega and Andargachew Tsege launched the Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (G7) in May 2008. Attracting more radical CUD members, G7 received Eritrean support and established a small base of operations in western Eritrea. While maintaining a relatively high media profile and training a small fighting force, G7 carried out few if any attacks prior to its*

*January 2015 merger with the EPPF to form the Arbegnoch-Ginbot 7 Unity and Democracy Movement (AGUDM). AGUDM's armed wing has carried out a number of attacks in Ethiopia since the merger.*

*While the Eritrean government continues to engineer mergers and coalitions among the Ethiopian rebel groups it supports, the Ethiopian government has tried to disrupt the rebels' activities and claimed that TPDM and EUPF made peace in 2015 and 2016, respectively. After years of mergers and rebel coalitions which failed to last, the Ethiopian rebels appeared to be making progress toward unity in 2015. Following AGUDM's January founding, BPLM, GPLM, TPDM, and the Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM) signed agreements with the new group in May, and on September 7, the United Movement for the Salvation of Ethiopia through Democracy (UMSED) launched. This coalition of AGUDM, TPDM, ADFM, and the Afar People's Liberation Movement (APLM) combined the political leadership of AGUDM with the military strength of TPDM's forces, with Nega as its political chief and TPDM's Mola Asgedom as his second-in-command. Within days, Asgedom and as many as 800 TPDM fighters defected to Ethiopia, a move whose impact on TPDM and UMSED remains unclear. Similarly, EUPF chair Thowath Pal Chay returned to Ethiopia and signed a peace agreement in 2016, but EUPF leaders remaining in South Sudan refused to comply with the deal.*

*Many Ethiopian rebel groups continue to be active, although none appears to have the ability to seriously challenge the government. The relationship between the various rebel movements and the mass protests, which began among the Oromo people, the country's populous ethnic group, in November 2015 is also unclear. The protests spread beyond Oromia and gained global prominence when Ethiopian marathoner Feyisa Lilesa crossed his arms above his head in the gesture associated with the Oromo protests as he won the silver medal at the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. While the protests emerged largely apart of any organized rebel groups, they highlighted both the extent of opposition to the Ethiopian government which exists and the determination of the EPRDF to maintain control of the country.*

***Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: high***

***Explanation:*** *There are almost certainly rebel groups which were active in Ethiopia during the 1997-2015 period which are not in our dataset. The closed nature of information in the Ethiopia, as well as that of Eritrea, makes it impossible to obtain reliable information about even the older, more established organizations. With our research restricted to open-source English-language information, it would be very easy for a clandestine group which has not issued press releases picked up by BBC Monitoring or other sources to remain undetected. Also, the government's habit of not acknowledging or challenging rebels' claims of attacks makes it difficult to assess the veracity of such claims. For example, the Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force (EUFF) claimed a series of attacks against government and ruling party targets from 2011 to 2013, but the government's general refusal to acknowledge the group's existence and the lack of independent media make any outsider's assessment of the EUFF highly problematic. Some of the rebel groups we identified may have significantly exaggerated their own success. With the frequent announcements of rebel group alliances, coalitions, and mergers, many of them engineered in part by the Eritrean government, it is difficult to figure out which groups are still active and which have truly merged. Even among the named groups we uncovered during our research, there were organizations like Salsai Weyane, Tatek Ethiopian United Front, and Debub Hizboch Front for we could find virtually no information.*

[Note: The coding for Ethiopia was completed months before Abiy Ahmed replaced Hailemariam Desalegn as prime minister in April 2018 and the subsequent political reforms, reconciliation with Eritrea, and return of prominent rebel leaders.]

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Foreign rebel groups present included AIAI: Al-Itihad Al-Islamia, Al Shabaab, Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO), Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), the Abdul Wahid al-Nur faction of the Sudan Liberation

Movement/Army (SLM/A), various factions of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and the Southern Sudan Independence Movement.

Ethiopian government and opposition political parties mentioned in ACLED included the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (MEDREK), OFDM: Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement Party (OFDM), and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

### ***Named Ethiopian groups:***

#### **Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM)**

Opposition website Ethiopian Review interviewed Colonel Alebel Amare, a leader in ADFM, on April 15, 2010, the first public announcement of the group's existence.<sup>1828</sup> Col. Amare reportedly was a former deputy division commander in the Ethiopian army and, more recently, a top commander in the rebel EPPF, with which he claimed the ADFM would be closely working.<sup>1829</sup> However, Ethiopian Review editor Elias Kifle asserted that the members of ADFM were not former EPPF fighters but the remnants of Ethiopian army defectors who had been associated with the Amhara National Democratic Movement, part of the ruling EPRDF political coalition. These defectors had arrived in Eritrea in 2009 to join Ginbot 7, but a key Eritrean government adviser to the Eritrean-supported Ethiopian rebel groups mismanaged the defectors and had to create ADFM as a separate entity for those who remained.<sup>1830</sup> If Kifle's account is true, then ADFM actually formed in Eritrea, though it is unclear whether in Asmara or elsewhere in the country, rather than in the group's namesake Amhara region in northern Ethiopia, as Col. Amare claimed in his initial interview; Kifle's claim that Eritrean Col. Fitsum's interference weakened Eritrea-based rebel groups would be consistent with the fact that no English-language source mentioned any ADFM attack and the ADFM's December 2014 report that the Eritrean government had imprisoned five of its senior leaders, including Vice Chairman Dawit Tesema.<sup>1831</sup> There is not enough information in the English-language sources to code the ADFM's first-year political goals. SCAD did not record qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to qualify as contestation in the year preceding April 2010. The group's members and leaders, on Kifle's account and by its name, and more than two thirds of the population of the Amhara region Col. Amare claimed to have formed the group in are of the Amhara ethnicity.

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<sup>1828</sup> "New Rebel Group Formed in Ethiopia - Website," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, April 16, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020100416e64g002s1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Col. Alebel Amare Introduces Newly Formed Armed Amhara Group," *Ethiopian Review* (blog), April 15, 2010, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/27555>.

<sup>1829</sup> "Ethiopian Opponents in Eritrean Orbit," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, April 24, 2010, sec. Politics & Power/On the Line, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020100513e64o00005&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "New Rebel Group Formed in Ethiopia - Website."

<sup>1830</sup> "Ethiopia Opposition Website Editor Blasts 'Rogue' Eritrean Colonel," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 30, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020101230e6cu0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Elias Kifle, "TPDM on a Short Leash," *Ethiopian Review* (blog), December 29, 2010, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/30804>.

<sup>1831</sup> "Ethiopia : Amhara Democratic Force Movement Leaders Detained by Eritrean Government – ADF," *Media, Borkena.com*, (November 25, 2014), <http://www.borkena.com/2014/11/25/ethiopia-audio-amhara-democratic-force-movement-leaders-detained-eritrean-government-adf/>. Ethiopian newspaper *The Reporter* did suggest that at least some of the ambushes and theft associated with bandits in northwestern Ethiopia might be the work the ADFM and EPPF. See "'Armed Bandits' blamed for Insecurity in Northwestern Ethiopia," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, April 24, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020100424e64o001gt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

In 2014, Ginbot 7, EPPF, and the Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM) signed a memorandum of understanding to unite under a joint command structure.<sup>1832</sup> On May 15, 2015, ADFM, the Tigray People's Democratic Movement (TPDM), Gambela People's Liberation Movement (GPLM), Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM), and Arbegnoch-Ginbot 7 for Unity and Democracy Movement (AGUDM) signed a "cooperation agreement."<sup>1833</sup> Opposition website Ethiopian Review claimed in July 2015 that AGUDM and ADFM together had fewer than 100 fighters.<sup>1834</sup> On September 7, 2015, AGUDM, ADFM, Afar People's Liberation Movement (APLM), and TPDM officially merged into the United Movement for the Salvation of Ethiopia through Democracy (UMSED) headed by AGUDM and Ginbot 7 leader Berhanu Nega.<sup>1835</sup>

The UMSED ran into trouble immediately after its formation with the defection of TPDM leader and UMSED deputy chairman Mola Asghedom and hundreds of TPDM fighters to Ethiopia.<sup>1836</sup> While ADFM continues to have a social media presence and issue online videos, it does not appear to have continued as a separate rebel group, and AGUDM likely absorbed the small ADFM armed wing. The attack information entered in the dataset for ADFM are those carried out by AGUDM fighters after the September 7, 2015, merger.<sup>1837</sup> As mentioned above, I could find no evidence of any earlier ADFM attacks, though the group had fighters, Eritrean support, and the intention to eventually attack. Because the AGUDM carried out at least two attacks in a given year more than three years after ADFM's likely founding in April 2014, ADFM meets our dataset's viability criteria.<sup>1838</sup>

#### Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) [6 events]

Three armed groups merged in 1993 to form the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, a group aiming to reunite the Afar, a largely pastoralist people who live in northeastern Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti.<sup>1839</sup> The ARDUF signed a ceasefire with the Ethiopian government in 1998

<sup>1832</sup> "Three Opposition Groups Unite to Fight Ethiopian Government," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, August 27, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020140827ea8r0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1833</sup> "Tension on Ethiopia-Eritrea Border as Rebels Attack Ethiopian Forces," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 8, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150708eb78001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1834</sup> Elias Kifle, "AG7, TPDM, and ADFM to Form a Coalition; OLF and ONLF Excluded," *Mereja Forum* (blog), July 22, 2015,

<https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2MuppKOK8WwJ:https://www.mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php%3Ft%3D101207+&cd=17&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.

<sup>1835</sup> Zelalem Kibret, "A Non-Exhaustive Guide of Ethiopian Political Parties Marriage," *Medium* (blog), November 1, 2016, <https://medium.com/@zelalemkbg/a-non-exhaustive-guide-of-ethiopian-political-parties-marriage-f22d9cd9aec0>; TesfaNews, "Four Ethiopian Armed Groups (TPDM, AG7, Amara, Afar) Merge," *TesfaNews* (blog), September 7, 2015, <https://www.tesfanews.net/four-ethiopian-armed-groups-merge/>.

<sup>1836</sup> Martin Plaut, "Updated: Eritrean Regime Loses Key Ethiopian Rebel Backing," *Martinplaut.Wordpress.Com* (blog), September 14, 2015, <https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2015/09/14/eritrean-regime-loses-key-ethiopian-rebel-backing/>; Georgina Hutchinson, "Defection by Militia Leader to Ethiopian Government Indicates Weakening Opposition," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, September 15, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020150915eb9f00016&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1837</sup> Jordan Anderson, "Ethiopia's Claim to Have Foiled Gun Attack by Eritrea-Based Militant Group Indicates Increased Risk of Cross-Border Violence," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, May 20, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020160520ec5k0001c&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1838</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Reportedly Burn Fuel Tankers in Northwest," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 7, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020171207edc7002jp&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "BBCM Africa Watchlist for 20 June," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 20, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020170620ed6k000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1839</sup> "Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front (ARDUF)" (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, February 28, 2013), <http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/WorldInsurgencyTerrorism/Display/1320939>; "Focus on



to join forces to resist the invading Eritreans, but a splinter refused to join and resumed armed struggle against Ethiopia in 2002.<sup>1840</sup> Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

#### **Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM)** [2 events]

The Benishangul People's Liberation Movement formed around 1995 and fights for the secession of the Benishangul-Gumuz region of northwestern Ethiopia, with alleged support from Sudan and Eritrea. It reportedly signed peace agreements with the government in 2005, 2012, and 2013.<sup>1841</sup> However, BPLM fighters continue to attack Ethiopian troops and projects, and BPLM joined with the OLF, ONLF, SLF, and GPLM in the People's Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in 2015.<sup>1842</sup> Ethiopian information minister Yemane Gebremeskel denied having ever heard of BPLM in response to questions about its alleged role in an early 2017 attack on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.<sup>1843</sup> Excluded because of its pre-1997 founding.

#### **Ethiopian Patriotic United Front (EUPF)\***

AKAs: Ethiopian Unity Patriots Front (and several other very similar renderings in English) Thowat Pal Chay formed what would become the Ethiopian Unity Patriots Front (EUPF). Under the Derg military regime's rule, he had served as a "chief administrator of Gambela region and head of security within an intelligence unit."<sup>1844</sup> Thowat Pal is from the Nuer ethnic group, presently the largest in Gambella Region and also a significant presence across the border in South Sudan, and the EUPF was primarily a Nuer group.<sup>1845</sup> The Nuer are the most populous ethnic group in Gambella but are less than half of the country's population.<sup>1846</sup> EUPF was notable for identifying as a "pan-Ethiopian" group rather than one fighting for secession or regional autonomy, and Chay claimed he aimed to restore Marxist rule.<sup>1847</sup> The International

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the Afar People" (Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 17, 2002), <http://www.irinnews.org/report/31943/ethiopia-focus-afar-people>.

<sup>1840</sup> "Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front (ARDUF)."

<sup>1841</sup> Zeryhun Kassa, "Benishangul People's Liberation Movement Abandons Arms," *All Africa*, June 10, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130610e96a000z7&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "Sudan-Based Rebel Group and Ethiopia Seal Peace Accord," *All Africa*, August 21, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120822e881000ax&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Government, Rebel Group Sign Peace Deal," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, August 19, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120819e88j000rt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1842</sup> "Rebel Group Claims Killing 13 Ethiopian Soldiers in West," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, January 12, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020170112ed1c000jh&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Five Ethiopian Rebel Groups Form Alliance to Change 'Hegemonic Culture,'" *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 25, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020151025ebap001b9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1843</sup> "A Fake Attack on GERD?," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, March 10, 2017.

<sup>1844</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "Exiled Nuers Oppose Appointment of S. Sudan's New Envoy to Ethiopia," *Sudan Tribune*, March 3, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58188>.

<sup>1845</sup> "Ethiopia: The Gambella Conflict - Structures and Prognosis" (London: WRITENET (for UNHCR), August 16, 2004), 8, Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4186616c4.html>.

<sup>1846</sup> Felix Horne, "'Waiting Here for Death': Forced Displacement and 'Villagization' in Ethiopia's Gambella Region" (New York: Human Rights Watch, January 16, 2012), 15, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/16/waiting-here-death/forced-displacement-and-villagization-ethiopia-gambella-region>; Jon Harald Sande Lie and Axel Borchgrevink, "Layer upon Layer: Understanding the Gambella Conflict Formation," *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 6, no. 1/2 (2012): 139.

<sup>1847</sup> Tadesse Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability" (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, May 1, 2007), 23, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123907/2007\\_05\\_01\\_Gambella.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123907/2007_05_01_Gambella.pdf); "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, March 2005), 8–9, note 17, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0305/>.

Crisis Group described the EUPF as “Thokwath Pal’s long-running (though minimally active) rebellion in Ethiopia’s Gambella region.”<sup>1848</sup>

Information about the exact circumstances and even the date of the EUPF’s founding is scarce. An official EUPF statement in 2014 claimed that the group had been engaged in armed conflict with the Ethiopian state for the previous 21 years.<sup>1849</sup> *Sudan Tribune* also reports that he founded the rebel group which would become EUPF in the 1990s.<sup>1850</sup> In exile in Sudan, Kenya, and the United States, Chay worked to oppose the EPRDF regime during the 1990s, initially alongside fellow former Derg leader Kassa Kebede, though with little success.<sup>1851</sup> In 2000, he visited Eritrea, and the Eritrean government provided him with weapons and training for his Sudan-based fighters.<sup>1852</sup> Chay established a base at Akobo, southern Sudan in 2001, with the support of fellow Nuer Michael Wal Duany’s South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Akobo is coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1.<sup>1853</sup> Also in 2000, EUPF joined with the Ethiopian Democratic Movement (EDM) and the BPLM to form the EPPF, and Chay became the new group’s first deputy chairman.<sup>1854</sup> Although both BPLM and EUPF later left EPPF, media reports still sometimes referred to Chay as a senior EPPF commander. News blog posts in 2015 and 2017 both suggested a 2003 founding, somewhat later than other reports.<sup>1855</sup> By 2007, EUPF had been active in the Gambella Region for at least four years.<sup>1856</sup> While evidence on the group’s formation date is spotty, the balance of evidence supports a belief that that EUPF began after January 1, 1997, and thus we include it in our dataset, though with a lower certainty of only “2”. SCAD did not record qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to qualify as contestation in 1999.

The EUPF was primarily active in northwestern Ethiopia’s Gambella Region and across the border in southern Sudan. In 2002, SSLM permitted the air transport of 400 Chay-allied Ethiopian dissidents from Somalia into Akobo in exchange for AK-47s, and Chay’s forces

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<sup>1848</sup> International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard,” Africa Report (Juba/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 20, 2016), 11, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/243-south-sudan-rearranging-chessboard>.

<sup>1849</sup> Ethiopian Unity Patriotic Front, “Response to Articles Appearing on Nyamilepedia on 3rd October 2014,” *Nyamilepedia* (blog), October 26, 2014, <http://nyamile.com/response-to-articles-appearing-on-nyamilepedia-on-3rd-october-2014/>.

<sup>1850</sup> James Gatdet Dak, “Ethiopian Rebels Leave South Sudan as Peace Initiative Fails,” *Sudan Tribune*, June 24, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020090624e56o0002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1851</sup> “Tuhath Pol Gives Himself in to Addis Ababa,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, September 16, 2016, LexisNexis; “Worried Ethiopian Exiles,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 19, 1998, LexisNexis; “Ethiopia: Looking for New Pals,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, November 7, 1998, LexisNexis.

<sup>1852</sup> John Young, “Armed Groups Along Sudan’s Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis,” Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007), 39, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-09-Eastern-Frontier.pdf>; SPLM/A Media Office - Kenya, “SPLM/SPLA –IO Response to Thowath Pal Accusations of Recruiting Ethiopian Citizens,” October 7, 2017, <https://www.facebook.com/914519348572262/posts/press-releasesplmspla-io-response-to-thowath-pal-accusations-of-recruiting-ethio/1730221533668702/>.

<sup>1853</sup> “Pals with Pal,” *Africa Confidential*, March 22, 2002, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/408/Pals\\_with\\_Pal](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/408/Pals_with_Pal).

<sup>1854</sup> “Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF)” (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, May 31, 2012), <http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/WorldInsurgencyTerrorism/Display/1320809>.

<sup>1855</sup> Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, “Ethiopian Rebels Arrested in South Sudan over Arms Purchases,” *Africanews* (blog), May 9, 2017, <http://www.africanews.com/2017/05/09/ethiopian-rebels-arrested-in-south-sudan-over-arms-purchases/>; “South Sudan Rebels: Ethiopia United Patriots Front (EUPF) Fights alongside South Sudan Government,” *Awash Post | Oromo News* (blog), April 7, 2015, <http://www.awashpost.com/south-sudan-rebels-ethiopia-united-patriots-front-eupf-fights-alongside-south-sudan-governmnet/>.

<sup>1856</sup> Medhane, “Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability,” 18.

clashed with Riek Machar's South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF).<sup>1857</sup> From late July to early August 2004, EUPF forces clashed with Ethiopian troops in major battles around the town of Akobo. Eritrea allegedly airlifted EUPF troops to the area, and the EUPF force included not only Nuer fighters but also Eritrea-based fighters of other groups. With at least 100 fatalities total, the Akobo clashes count as the group's earliest large attack.<sup>1858</sup> We also code July 2004 as the group's first small attack on the assumption that the Akobo clashes included at least one; it is very likely that the EUPF attacked Ethiopian state targets prior to July 2004, but the surveyed sources do not mention any such attack. EUPF also reportedly temporarily occupied several Ethiopian villages near the Sudanese border.<sup>1859</sup> The surveyed sources include no mention of EUPF attacks against civilians, but given the limited nature of the information available, the civilian attack variable data is coded as missing.

In 2016, Chay returned to Ethiopia for the first time since 1991 and signed an agreement with the Ethiopian government in which the EUPF abandoned its armed struggle and promised to work for change within the political system.<sup>1860</sup> However, at least some EUPF leaders and fighters remain in South Sudan and have accused Chay of unilaterally signing the agreement without receiving the group leadership's approval.<sup>1861</sup> Because the Akobo clashes took place more than three years after EUPF's founding, the group meets our viability threshold.

### Ethiopian Patriotic Front

AKAs: Kefagn, Kefagn Patriotic Front (KPF)

There have been at least two armed rebel groups named the Ethiopian Patriotic Front (EPF). The first group formed before our January 1, 1997, start date and was accused by the Ethiopian government of plotting terrorist attacks in Addis Ababa.<sup>1862</sup> Its members were reportedly from the Amhara people.<sup>1863</sup> The EPF, also known as Kefagn or even Kefagn Patriotic Front (KPF), has received Eritrean support.<sup>1864</sup> Jane's describes the KPF as a group that began resisting the TPLF in the northwestern Welkayt region in the late 1980s, with some support from the Derg, and continued to do so after the Derg's 1991 collapse. A major 1993 government operation broke the KPF's power, with its remnants unable to stage more than limited, cross-border raids from

<sup>1857</sup> "Pals with Pal."

<sup>1858</sup> "Ethiopia: The Gambella Conflict - Structures and Prognosis," August 16, 2004, 8.

<sup>1859</sup> Young, "Armed Groups Along Sudan's Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis," 39.

<sup>1860</sup> "Gov't, Ethiopian Unity Patriots Front Ink Peace Accord," *Walta Info*, November 4, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HWALTA0020161107ecb400001&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tuhat Pol Gives Himself in to Addis Ababa"; "Ethiopian Top Rebel Leader from Gambella Region Joins Government," *Sudan Tribune*, September 12, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60205>.

<sup>1861</sup> "S. Sudanese Authorities Arrest Ethiopian Rebels in Juba," *Sudan Tribune*, May 9, 2017,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020170509ed59000b9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Shaban, "Ethiopian Rebels Arrested in South Sudan over Arms Purchases."

"Newly-Heard Short-Wave Radio Confirmed as Opposition Operation.," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, July 11, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010929dt7b006wz&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Ethiopia - Police Hold 'Terrorist' Plot Suspects," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, June 24, 1996, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020011016ds6o000x9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1863</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Ethiopia," Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2004),

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27727.htm>; Hailleleul Getahun and Hailemariam Getahun, *Assault on Rural Poverty: The Case of Ethiopia* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), 77; Sandra F. Joireman and Thomas S. Szayna, "The Ethiopian Prospective Case," in *Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model*, ed. Thomas S. Szayna (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 210–11.

<sup>1864</sup> Fita Challa, "Fundamentals of Law vs Political Crises in Ethiopia," *Ethiomedica* (blog), January 4, 2006, [https://ethiomedica.com/articles/fundamental\\_laws\\_and\\_political\\_crises.html](https://ethiomedica.com/articles/fundamental_laws_and_political_crises.html).

Sudan.<sup>1865</sup> There is minimal information about the Kefagn/EPF available, and sometimes sources mention EPF when they appear to actually mean EUPF or EPPF. Some EPF elements appear to have survived to cooperate with other rebel formations. The 2015 UN Security Council Monitoring Group report mentioned the “Patriotic Front” as one of four rebel groups, including the EPPF which is listed separately as Argenoch, involved in forming a new Eritrean-backed rebel front in May 2015.<sup>1866</sup> Excluded because of its pre-1997 founding.

### Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF)

AKAs: Argenoch Ginbar, Argenoch

The EPPF was an Eritrean-backed “non-ethnic” (or at least publicly less ethnically based) rebel group which claimed to aim at overthrowing the EPRDF.<sup>1867</sup> The Ethiopian Democratic Movement (EDM), the Ethiopian Unity Patriotic Front (EUPF), and the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) formed the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front on February 7, 2000.<sup>1868</sup> When the groups officially merged in October, Tesfaye Gatachew’s small Democratic Movement of Patriots for Ethiopian Unity also joined.<sup>1869</sup> The BPLM and EUPF both later withdrew, leaving the old EDM as the EPPF’s core.<sup>1870</sup> Although Eritrea intended for EPPF to be a major force for staging attacks in Ethiopia, the group did not fulfill these hopes, and Eritrea continued to support new rebel groups, such as TPDm and Ginbot 7, and new alliances. The EPPF was part of several alliances, including the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) in 2006 and the Unity of Ethiopians for Democratic Change (UEDC) in 2007.<sup>1871</sup>

Though based in Sudan and Eritrea, the EPPF sometimes launched attacks on Ethiopian targets, with its most intense fighting in 2002 and 2006.<sup>1872</sup> The group often claimed great victories over the Ethiopian military, but independent media were unable to verify them.<sup>1873</sup> By 2012, Eritrea continued to support EPPF, but the group had few fighters and “little, if any, operational capability” to challenge the Ethiopian state.<sup>1874</sup> Eritrean interference and internal divisions hampered the EPPF’s effectiveness.<sup>1875</sup>

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<sup>1865</sup> “Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF)” (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, May 31, 2012), <http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/WorldInsurgencyTerrorism/Display/1320809>.

<sup>1866</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2182 (2014)” (New York: United Nations Security Council, October 13, 2015), 18, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/802](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/802).

<sup>1867</sup> B. Wondwosen Teshome, “Ethiopian Opposition Political Parties and Rebel Fronts: Past and Present,” *International Journal of Human and Social Sciences* 4, no. 1 (2009): 65.

<sup>1868</sup> “Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF),” May 31, 2012, 2.

<sup>1869</sup> “More Aid for Ethiopian Rebels,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, November 4, 2000, LexisNexis.

<sup>1870</sup> “Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF),” May 31, 2012, 10.

<sup>1871</sup> “New Ethiopian Opposition Alliance Formed - Eritrean Report,” *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, November 21, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020071121e3b100051&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Ethiopian Opposition Groups Form Umbrella Body,” *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, May 23, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020060523e25n003s5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1872</sup> “Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF),” May 31, 2012, 1.

<sup>1873</sup> “Ethiopian Rebels Claim Putting 127 Government Soldiers out of Action,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, April 9, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020060409e249001gt&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Ethiopian Rebels Claim Putting 340 Government Troops out of Action in North,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 25, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040625e06p0035x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1874</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)” (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 13, 2012), 11, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544).

<sup>1875</sup> “Elias Kifle Is Very Annoyed with Asmara,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 21, 2010, LexisNexis; “Ethiopian Rebel Group Drops Former Commander,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, April 21, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020080421e441002s1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Asmara’s Ethiopian Allies in Trouble,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, February 17, 2007, LexisNexis.

Eritrea tried for years to engineer the merger of Ginbot 7 and EPPF.<sup>1876</sup> In 2014, Ginbot 7, EPPF, and the Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM) signed a memorandum of understanding to unite under a joint command structure.<sup>1877</sup> In January 2015, Ginbot 7 and EPPF formed a new united front called Arbegnoch-Ginbot 7 (AG7).<sup>1878</sup> Excluded as a merger of other rebel groups.

### Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force (EUFF)

The Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force carried out a series of attacks on government targets in Gonder between 2011 and 2013. While some of the opposition media, particularly Ethiomedia, covered EUFF's victory claims, government media and government spokespeople remained silent on the group, and third-party sources, such as human rights NGOs, had very little information on the group. Given the scope of some of their claimed attacks and their location in or near major towns, where it would be harder for the government to deny the group's existence, the general lack of corroborating reports raises serious questions about how the reliability of the group's claims.<sup>1879</sup> We include it in our dataset with a lower certainty of "2" rather than the maximum "3."

The first public mention of EUFF we could identify in English-language media was its June 7, 2011, statement cited by Ethiomedia. In the statement, the group took responsibility for a May 4 fire in Gonder town in Ethiopia's northwestern Amhara region that reportedly burned 11 stores owned by ruling party officials. According to Ethiomedia, EUFF was an "entirely home-based rebel organization that has been carrying out combat operations in Gonder, Gojjam, Wollo and northern Shewa" which had delayed its public statement to ensure its members' safety. The EUFF also alleged that the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) had been falsely claiming EUFF attacks as its own.<sup>1880</sup> EUFF's initial attacks in Gonder satisfies the "rural" variable as a 1. Although the "rural" variable is not always coded as location of first attacks, in this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation. Per the codebook, the coder used this location to code the "rural" variable. In April and May 2012, the EUFF subsequently claimed a pair of arson attacks in the northwestern city of Metema, one targeting businesses owned by TPLF officials and the other targeting housing for TPLF security forces.<sup>1881</sup> EUFF also claimed to have cut the internet cables servicing Gonder and two other northwestern towns in June 2012.<sup>1882</sup> In their first mentioned attacks on government targets, EUFF took responsibility for attacks on two northern prisons in November and December 2012, bombing a prison in Adigat but only killing inmates and then killing 17 guards while rescuing 5 EUFF prisoners from a prison in Debre Markos; a non-EUFF source

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<sup>1876</sup> "Eritrea Wants to Form a United Front of Ethiopian Opponents," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, March 5, 2011, LexisNexis; "Ethiopian Opponents in Eritrean Orbit"; "Asmara Wants to Unite Ethiopian Foes," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 12, 2009, sec. POLITICS & POWER, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020091223e5cc0000g&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1877</sup> "Three Opposition Groups Unite to Fight Ethiopian Government."

<sup>1878</sup> "Ethiopia," January 10, 2015.

<sup>1879</sup> Email correspondence with country expert, September 1, 2017.

<sup>1880</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Reportedly Destroy Ruling Party's Stores in Northwest," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 7, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020110607e76700231&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Rebels Destroy Ruling Party Stores in Gonder," *Ethiomedia* (blog), June 7, 2011, <https://ethiomedia.com/andnen/2571.html>.

<sup>1881</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Reportedly Attack Northwestern Town," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 2, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120502e852000m9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Rebel Group Reportedly Burns Hotel, 20 Stores in Northwest," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, April 17, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120417e84h0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1882</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Reportedly Cut Communication Cables in Northwest," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 17, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120617e86h000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



verified the attack to Ethiomedia, while the second attack enters our dataset as the first attack that reportedly caused bodily harm to state personnel.<sup>1883</sup> In the first attack reportedly killing 25 or more government agents, the EUFF claimed to have killed dozens of officials of the Amhara National Democratic Movement, one of the parties in the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), when a landmine blew up a ANDM bus returning from a New Year's celebration on January 8, 2013.<sup>1884</sup> In 2013, the EUFF also claimed responsibility for blowing up a TPLF oil tanker and a TPLF cotton truck, for killing at least 25 government troops in a three-day battle, and for killing 12 ANDM officials in a gun attack on a wedding in the northwestern tourist city of Bahir Dar.<sup>1885</sup> Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn denounced the May 12, 2013, wedding attack, but the government claimed the shooter was a disgruntled police officer and didn't comment on EUFF's claim of responsibility.<sup>1886</sup> That attack was the last one claimed by EUFF, although an Ethiopian seeking asylum in the U.S. claimed that EPDRF operatives accused him of supporting the EUFF in a 2015 interrogation.<sup>1887</sup>

Other than the EUFF's claims of responsibility, as reported by Ethiomedia and archived by BBC Monitoring, there is virtually no information available about EUFF. There is no information about its leadership or membership. While refusing to acknowledge the EUFF's existence, the Ethiopian government again accused Eritrea of providing support to rebels associated with the EUFF-claimed April 2012 arson attack and an EUFF-claimed attack on a Sudanese governor along the border that same month.<sup>1888</sup> However, the EUFF's statements highlight its status as a locally based group without external support, and, as discussed, its first public statement denounced the Eritrean-supported EPPF for claiming credit for EUFF attacks while not having a single fighter on Ethiopian soil. Given the slim evidence for Eritrean support and the absence of EUFF mentions among the lists of Eritrean-backed rebel groups in the UN Security Council's Monitoring Group reports, our dataset codes EUFF as not receiving foreign support. SCAD did not record qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to qualify as contestation in 2010.

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<sup>1883</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Reportedly Kill 17 Prison Guards, Free Five Comrades," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 26, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020121227e8cr0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Over 14 Inmates Killed on Prison Attack in Northern Ethiopia," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, November 3, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020121103e8b3000ma&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1884</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Kill Dozens of Party Officials in North," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 10, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130110e91a000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1885</sup> "Ethiopian Rebel Group Claims Killing 12 Government Officials in Northwest," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 14, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130514e95e001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Rebel Group Reportedly Destroys State-Owned Truck in North," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 29, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130329e93t001jn&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Rebels Claim Victory over Government Forces in North," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 2, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130302e9320008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Rebel Reportedly Attack Fuel Tanker, 20 Killed, 21 Injured," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 4, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130104e914001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1886</sup> Daniel Berhane, "PM Hailemariam Desalegne Outraged by Bahirdar Killing Spree," *Horn Affairs* (blog), May 14, 2013, <http://hornaffairs.com/2013/05/14/pm-hailemariam-desalegne-outraged-by-bahirdar-massacre/>; "Bahir Dar Rebel Attack Death Toll Rises to 14," *Ethiomedia* (blog), May 13, 2013, [https://ethiomedia.com/abc\\_text/4111.html](https://ethiomedia.com/abc_text/4111.html).

<sup>1887</sup> "The Northern NJ Sanctuary Coalition Is Looking for One Host Volunteer and One Case Worker," *The Unitarian Society of Ridgewood* (blog), June 1, 2016, <http://www.uuridgewood.org/1454-2/>.

<sup>1888</sup> Information Centre for Asylum and Migration, "Information Centre for Asylum and Migration Briefing Notes" (Nuremberg, Germany: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, April 23, 2012), 3, ECOI, [https://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/4232\\_1413197654\\_deutschland-bundesamt-fuer-migration-und-fluechtlinge-briefing-notes-23-04-2012-englisch.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4232_1413197654_deutschland-bundesamt-fuer-migration-und-fluechtlinge-briefing-notes-23-04-2012-englisch.pdf); "EUFF Rebels Burn down Metema Town's TPLF-Owned Business Units," *Zehabesha* (blog), May 1, 2012, <http://www.zehabesha.com/euff-rebels-burn-down-metema-towns-tplf-owned-business-units/>.



The EUFF seemingly receded from the public scene in mid-2013 as suddenly as it had appeared in 2011. No alliances or merged rebel groups claimed the EUFF as a component, nor have I found any additional EUFF statements. Although it is possible that EUFF fighters have continued launching attack without claiming responsibility, that would mark a major departure from their usual approach. The balance of evidence indicates that the EUFF no longer exists and did not meet our criteria as a long-term viable rebel group.

#### Ethiopian Unity and Justice Movement (EUJM)

The Ethiopian Unity and Justice Movement was a small rebel movement in northern Ethiopia about which very little is known. We include it in our dataset, though with a lower certainty of only “2” because the group’s mentions by the surveyed sources were limited to opposition websites and BBC Monitoring references to those opposition websites. During the weekend of May 23-24, 2009, a group of rebels attacked the police station and other targets in the town of Shewa Robit (or Shoa Robit) in the Amhara region of northcentral Ethiopia. Asrat Hailu, the group’s spokesperson, claimed EUJM responsibility for the attack and several attacks several months earlier against other Amhara Region towns.<sup>1889</sup> That was the only instance in the surveyed sources when the EUJM publicly claimed credit for an attack. We coded March 2009 as the date of the group’s first claimed small attack. The surveyed sources did not mention any large or civilian attacks. Due to the limited information about the group, the data for many variables, including civilian attack variables, is missing.

In August 2010, Ginbot 7 joined with EUJM and the Afar People’s Party to form a new opposition coalition called the Alliance for Liberty, Equality, and Justice in Ethiopia (ALEJE).<sup>1890</sup> Opposition websites Ethiopian Review and Ethiomedia have not published or reported on any ALEJE statements since July 2012, with the last one signed by EUJM appearing in May 2012.<sup>1891</sup> The current status of EUJM is unknown, but it appears to be inactive or dissolved. It is possible Ginbot 7 or OLF, who issued the July 2012 statement with ALEJE, absorbed EUJM, but the group is not coded as meeting our viability threshold because of a lack of evidence of any merger. SCAD did not record qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to qualify as contestation in 2008.

#### Front of the Ethiopian Democratic Union Forces (EDU)

The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) formed in London in 1975 as a pro-Western opposition group following the Derg’s overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and was one of the groups targeted by the Derg in the Red Terror of the late 1970s.<sup>1892</sup> As it established the new order

<sup>1889</sup> “Ethiopian Rebel Group Reportedly Claims Battlefield Victories in North.,” *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, July 14, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010804dw7e009bn&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Elias Kifle, “Rebels Attack Woyanne Targets in Northern Ethiopia,” *Ethiopian Review* (blog), May 26, 2009, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/9820>.

<sup>1890</sup> LandInfo characterizes both the Afar People’s Party and EUJM as “unregistered political groups.” “Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 Party,” Topical note (Oslo: LandInfo Country of Origin Centre, August 20, 2012), 6, <http://www.landinfo.no/id/2479.0>.

<sup>1891</sup> “Joint Communiqué of ALEJE and OLF,” *Ethiopian Review* (blog), July 21, 2012, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/39836>; Alliance for Liberty, Equality, and Justice in Ethiopia (ALEJE), “Let Us Struggle in Unison for Our Dignity and Freedom!,” *Ethiomedia* (blog), May 5, 2012, [http://www.ethiomedia.com/2012\\_report/3769.html](http://www.ethiomedia.com/2012_report/3769.html).

<sup>1892</sup> David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, “Red Terror,” in *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Scarecrow Press, 2013), 351; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Ethiopia: 1. Information on the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). 2. Confirmation That Former Civil Servants and Cabinet Ministers under Haile Selassie Were Arrested, Detained and/or Executed under Mengistu and Information on Current Situation in

following the 1991 defeat of the Derg, the victorious EPDRF identified EDU as “a feudal party” and “the enemy of the people.”<sup>1893</sup> Although one faction aligned with the EPDRF, another EDU faction resisted, and its armed wing battled government forces throughout the 1990s and in May 2000 in northern Ethiopia.<sup>1894</sup> EDU merged with the Ethiopian Democratic Party to form the United Ethiopian Democratic Party (UEDP) in 2003.<sup>1895</sup> Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

### Gambella Democratic Movement (GDM)

AKAs: Gambelan [or Gambellan] Democratic Movement, Gambella Democratic Movement/Army (GDM/A)

The Gambella Democratic Movement (GDM) formed in early 2012 as a group claiming to defend the rights of Gambella’s Anuak people. The Anuak are the second most populous ethnic group in Gambella, where no ethnic group is a majority.<sup>1896</sup> Although the Ethiopian government claimed in court that GDM had been founded in the U.S., both one of its key witnesses and the chief defendant in that trial asserted that the group had formed in Juba, South Sudan, which seems more consistent with the limited amount of other open-source information available about the group and which we code as the location for initial planning (rural).<sup>1897</sup> “Formed in x location” prevents us from coding that location for “rural” because the wording is vague, however I judged it is enough to assume some degree of operational planning that satisfies the coding criteria for “rural.” On May 2, 2012, opposition website Ethiopian Review published a press release from GDM claiming that Ngeli O. Opiew, the commander-in-chief of the GDM’s military wing, and his fighters had defeated the attacking Ethiopian military on April 29 in Gambella’s Akobo District; BBC Monitoring noted that GDM was a “newly-formed Ethiopian rebel group” and that this press release was the first public mention of the group.<sup>1898</sup> The GDM denounced the ongoing sale of indigenous Anuaks’ land to multinational corporations and declared its intention to keep fighting until the land was restored to the Anuak.<sup>1899</sup> The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs cited April 2012 fighting between Ethiopian forces and unnamed “alleged Anuak opposition forces,” presumably GDM, as causing Ethiopian Anuaks to flee to South Sudan, though the Ethiopian government denied the reports.<sup>1900</sup> This fighting involved at least

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Ethiopia. 3. Information on the Arrest and Execution of Col. or Brig. Gen. Kefle Wolde Sembet (1978-79)” (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, November 1, 1989), Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab7d90.html>.

<sup>1893</sup> Antewbitcha A. Dejene, “History Will Repeat : War-Torn Ethiopia Will Get Only a New Mengistu,” *Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, June 25, 1991, City edition, sec. Insight.

<sup>1894</sup> David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, “Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU),” in *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, Historical Dictionaries of Africa 91 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 145–46; “Ethiopian Rebel Group Reportedly Claims Battlefield Victories in North.”

<sup>1895</sup> “New Opposition Party Formed - Says Land Reform Is Key Issue.,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 14, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020030714dz7e003ux&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1896</sup> Horne, ““Waiting Here for Death’: Forced Displacement and ‘Villagization’ in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region,” 15; Lie and Borchgrevink, “Layer upon Layer,” 139.

<sup>1897</sup> Okelo Akway Ochalla, “Statement of Defendant Number 1 as per Criminal Code Number 148 in Case 154647 (Translated)” (Oakland Institute, January 22, 2016), 2, 5, <https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/okello-statement-english-amharic.pdf>.

<sup>1898</sup> “New Ethiopian Rebel Group ‘Repulses’ Government Attack in West,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 9, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BB00020120509e859000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1899</sup> “New Ethiopian Rebel Group ‘Repulses’ Government Attack in West.”

<sup>1900</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Ethiopia Denies Anuak Are Fleeing Violence into South Sudan - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan,” *Sudan Tribune*, May 16, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Ethiopia-denies-Anuak-are-fleeing,42603>; OCHA South Sudan, “South Sudan Weekly Humanitarian Bulletin 4-10 May 2012” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, May 10, 2012), 2, Refworld, <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan-republic/south-sudan-weekly-humanitarian-bulletin-4-10-may-2012>.

some small rebel ambushes of government forces.<sup>1901</sup> The surveyed sources did not report any large attacks or attacks on civilians. SCAD did not record qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to qualify as contestation in the year preceding April 2012.

The GDM likely received support from Eritrea and David Yau Yau's Cobra Faction rebels. In late November or early December 2013, Ethiopian security forces claimed to triumphed over a force of GDM in a battle in Humera in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray; the rebels had allegedly trained in Eritrea and entered Ethiopia through Sudan.<sup>1902</sup> The UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported in 2014 that Eritrea indirectly supported GDM by providing weapons and logistical support to David Yau Yau's South Sudanese rebels. The Yau Yau rebels reportedly provided the GDM/A sanctuary in eastern South Sudan's Pibor County, and GDM/A recruited South Sudanese Anuak to carry out attacks on Ethiopian territory.<sup>1903</sup>

In June 2014, Ethiopian prosecutors charged Okelo Akuayi Ipola (also known as Okelo Akuai Uchala or his nickname Monorim Kawanam), who served as president of Gambella region in 2005, and six South Sudanese with terrorism related to their alleged involvement with GDM and the Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM). The government asserted that Okelo and his associates were behind the region's violence and that they had formed GDM and GPLM in order to create an autonomous Gambella state.<sup>1904</sup> The defendants allegedly recruited members and raised funds from the Gambella ethnic groups' diasporas, negotiated with Eritrea and other Ethiopian and South Sudanese rebel groups including Ginbot 7 and the Oromo Liberation Front, and planned to carry out terrorist activities in Gambella.<sup>1905</sup> In his closing statement at trial, Okelo challenged many of the charges. He also noted that even in his initial defense statement, which he claimed he had made under duress, he had conceded to being GDM but claimed to have been removed from his post because of his commitment to Ethiopian unity prior to his March 2014 arrest in South Sudan.<sup>1906</sup> (A January 2014 GDM press release claimed that he had ceased to serve as the group's chair effective January 18, 2014, because of unauthorized outreach to other opposition groups and that he was no longer affiliated with the GDM military or political wings.<sup>1907</sup>) The court found Okelo and his co-defendants guilty of all charges on April 27, 2016.<sup>1908</sup> Besides Okelo, there was no additional information available on the background of other GDM leaders mentioned in open source reports, including Ngeli O. Opiew, Johnson Ujulu, and Api Uchudo.<sup>1909</sup>

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<sup>1901</sup> Douglas McGill, "Minnesota Anuak Community Reacts to New Outbreak of Attacks, Killing, Disappearance in Ethiopia and South Sudan," *Twin Cities Daily Planet*, June 1, 2012, <https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/minnesota-anuak-community-reacts-new-outbreak-attacks-killing-disappearance-ethiopia/>.

<sup>1902</sup> "Ethiopian Security Kill and Capture Eritrean-Trained Rebels," Media, *Radio Hormuud* (blog), December 2, 2013, <http://skooisujnbwww.radiohormuud.dk/print.php?id=11782&page=>.

<sup>1903</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia" (New York: United Nations Security Council, October 13, 2014), 21, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544).

<sup>1904</sup> "Ethiopia Charges Ex-Regional State Governor with Terrorism," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, June 15, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020140615ea6f0025t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1905</sup> "Okelo Akuai Uchala and 6 Others," *Ethio Trial Tracker* (blog), February 20, 2017, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180121182822/https://ethiotrialtracker.org/okelo-akuai-uchala-and-6-others/>.

<sup>1906</sup> Ochalla, "Statement of Defendant Number 1 as per Criminal Code Number 148 in Case 154647 (Translated)," 8.

<sup>1907</sup> Grant Peters, "Gambella Democratic Movement (GDM) Press Release," *GambelaToday.Com* (blog), January 20, 2014, <http://gambelatoday.com/blog/2014/01/20/gambella-democratic-movement-gdm-press-release/>.

<sup>1908</sup> "Update on Okelo Akuai Uchala and 6 Others – Ethio Trial Tracker," *Ethio Trial Tracker* (blog), February 19, 2017, <https://ethiotrialtracker.org/update-on-okelo-akuai-uchala-and-6-others/>.

<sup>1909</sup> "Okelo Akuai Uchala and 6 Others"; "Seven Individuals, Including Former Gambella Chief Found Guilty of Terrorism Offences," *Fana Broadcasting Corporate (FBC)* (blog), April 16, 2016, [http://www.fanabc.com/english/index.php/news/item/5566-six-individuals,-including-former-gambella-chief-found-guilty-of-terrorism-offences](http://www.fanabc.com/english/index.php/news/item/5566-six-individuals,-including-former-gambella-chief-found-guilty-of-terrorism-offences;); "New Ethiopian Rebel Group 'Repulses' Government Attack in West."

The current status of GDM is unknown. It has not appeared in any English-language media reports, aside from coverage of Okelo's trial, since 2014. None of the frequently announced opposition alliances appear to include GDM.<sup>1910</sup> In response to the ongoing fighting in South Sudan, Gambella rebels have become more focused on localized concerns rather than challenging the Ethiopian state.<sup>1911</sup> With no evidence of GDM attacks against state targets in 2015 or beyond, the group does not qualify as a long-term viable rebel organization by our criteria.

#### **Gambella People's Liberation Front (GPLF)\***

AKAs: Gambella People's Liberation Force or the Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM)

The Gambella People's Liberation Front formed in December 2003 in Pochalla, Sudan (now South Sudan), in the aftermath of the military-assisted killing of hundreds of the Anuak people in Gambella town in Ethiopia's southwestern Gambella Region.

Between December 13 and 15, 2003, Ethiopian security forces and Ethiopian highlander civilians, those from Gambella's ethnic groups other than the indigenous Anuak and Nuer, killed many Anuak people, an ethnic minority within the Gambella Region, in an attack on Gambella town. Although the subsequent government inquiry determined that the death count had been 67, Human Rights Watch estimates that the government had killed 424 people, primarily Anuak; raped Anuak women; and destroyed at least 440 houses.<sup>1912</sup> The angry crowd of soldiers and highlanders launched their attacks on the town's Anuak neighborhoods as revenge for a series of attacks on government personnel and highlanders over the previous several months, culminating in the killing of 8 highlanders, including a policeman and other government employees, outside of Gambella town on December 13. Although no group took credit for these earlier attacks, armed Anuak groups were likely responsible for them as they fought for Anuak autonomy, against the inflow of non-Anuak into Gambella and the Anuak's loss of lands traditionally viewed as theirs, and related causes.<sup>1913</sup> The Anuak are the second most populous ethnic group in Gambella, where no ethnic group is a majority.<sup>1914</sup>

It is unclear exactly how related the GPLF is to the earlier Gambella People's Liberation Front, the armed wing of the Gambella People's Liberation Movement. The earlier GPLM/F, a Sudan-based Anuak rebel group which allied with Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front against the Derg regime, began in 1980 as the Gambella Liberation Front and became the GPLM in 1985.<sup>1915</sup> After the EPLF came to power in 1991, the GPLM became Gambella's ruling

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<sup>1910</sup> A Minnesota-based diaspora support group for a "Gambella Democratic Movement" signed a 2011 joint statement with local support groups for three other rebel groups, but there is not sufficient information to determine whether this GDM was a separate entity, a political precursor to the armed group which announced itself in 2012, or, in line with the Ethiopian government's allegation in the Okelo trial that GDM was US-founded, the group itself. "Minnesota Declaration: OLF, ONLF, Ginbot 7, GDM," *ECADF: Ethiopian News, Politics, Video and Opinions* (blog), May 27, 2011, <http://ecadforum.com/blog/minnesota-declaration-olf-onlf-ginbot-7-and-gambella-democratic-movement/>.

<sup>1911</sup> Email correspondence with country expert, September 1, 2017.

<sup>1912</sup> "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 19–20.

<sup>1913</sup> "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," 7–8, 11–12.

<sup>1914</sup> Horne, "'Waiting Here for Death': Forced Displacement and 'Villagization' in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," 15; Lie and Borchgrevink, "Layer upon Layer," 139.

<sup>1915</sup> Berouk Mesfin, "Rebel Movements in Ethiopia," in *Violent Non-State Actors in Africa* (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017), 168, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51352-2\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51352-2_7); Sandra Steingraber, "Ethiopia's Policy of Genocide Against the Anuak of Gambella," *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 1986, 56.

party.<sup>1916</sup> The GPLM and EPRDF were in an uneasy alliance, however, and EPRDF pressured the GPLM over its alleged corruption and failure to include representatives of the ethnic Nuer population in regional decision-making. At one point in 1992, clashes between GPLM/F and EPRDF led the former to temporarily withdraw back across the border into Sudan. As part of the negotiations to resolve the impasse, the GPLM dissolved the GPLF forces, which were absorbed into the Ethiopian military. Thereafter, the GPLM changed its name to the Gambella People's Liberation Party (GPLP) and merged into a series of various political parties which tried unsuccessfully to bridge Nuer-Anuak tensions up until 2003, when the EPRDF, which was taking an increasingly central role in Gambella politics, eliminated all political parties in the region and created three ethnically organized people's democratic organizations united within a new Gambella People's Democratic Movement (GPDM).<sup>1917</sup> The Gambella regional president, Okelo Akuayi Ipola, and one of Gambella's three representatives to the national House of People's Representatives, Peter Opiti, fled to Sudan and Switzerland, respectively, following the December 2003 violence, and the EPRDF-dominated central government has continued to exercise control over the region's formal political structures since then.<sup>1918</sup> The GPDM, now called the Gambella People's Unity Democratic Movement, remains the titular ruling party of the region. Most sources are silent on the relationship between the old GPLF and the current organization, but several reports portray the latter as a "resurrect[ion]" of the former and claim that Anuaks who had defected from the ruling party to form an opposition party, the Gambella People's Democratic Congress, fled to Sudan after the Gambella town killings and started "GPLF II."<sup>1919</sup>

The new GPLF formed in December 2003 in Pochalla, Sudan (a rural town), following the Gambella town massacre.<sup>1920</sup> The U.S.-based, nonviolent opposition Anuak Justice Council reported that the Ethiopian central government had convened a secret meeting in September 2003 to address some Anuaks' recent formation of "a liberation front to fight the government."<sup>1921</sup> No other source cited the formation of this group, and its relationship, if it in fact existed, to GPLF is unclear; thus, December 2003 remains the likeliest start date for GPLF.<sup>1922</sup> GPLF's membership included both Anuaks who had fled from Gambella in the massacre's aftermath and members of less organized, existing groups already in Sudan; Anuak police who had been fired in 2003 as the central government weakened the Anuaks' traditional domination of the regional government had

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<sup>1916</sup> "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 9.

<sup>1917</sup> Dereje Feyissa, "The Ethnic Self and the National Other: Anywaa Identity Politics in Reference to the Ethiopian State System," in *Society, State, and Identity in African History*, ed. Bahru Zewde (African Books Collective, 2008), 146-47.

<sup>1918</sup> "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 10.

<sup>1919</sup> Young, "Armed Groups Along Sudan's Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis," 41; Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability," 17.

<sup>1920</sup> Doug McGill, "Again and Again - Pochalla Dispatch," *New Republic, The*, July 19, 2004, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/1392530A5E291D78?p=AWNB>.

<sup>1921</sup> Anuak Justice Council, "December 13, the Anniversary of the Genocide of the Anuak: Two Years Later and Still No Justice" (Genocide Watch, December 13, 2005), 2, [http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Ethiopia\\_13\\_Dec\\_05\\_The\\_Anniversary\\_of\\_the\\_Genocide\\_of\\_the\\_Anuak\\_Two\\_years\\_later\\_and\\_still\\_no\\_justice.pdf](http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Ethiopia_13_Dec_05_The_Anniversary_of_the_Genocide_of_the_Anuak_Two_years_later_and_still_no_justice.pdf).

<sup>1922</sup> EPRDF sources told GW/SRI investigators about the September 2003 meeting but did not mention a new Anuak rebel group among the topics discussed. Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International, "Operation Sunny Mountain: Soldiers, Oil & Ongoing State Terror against Anuak & Other Indigenous Minorities of Southwestern Ethiopia," Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International Field Reports (Washington, D.C.: Genocide Watch, December 13, 2004), 14, [http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Ethiopia\\_13\\_Dec\\_04\\_Operation\\_Sunny\\_Mountain.pdf](http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Ethiopia_13_Dec_04_Operation_Sunny_Mountain.pdf).

formed several of these self-defense groups.<sup>1923</sup> For the purposes of our dataset, both existing informal self-defence groups and the Gambella People's Democratic Congress count as prior groups with which a notable number of GPLF members were previously associated. Relatively little information on the GPLF is available. In the 2016 trial of former Gambella regional president Okelo for terrorist activities, the Ethiopian government claimed that Okelo met with the GPLM's alleged founder and leader, Peter Kaga, and accepted the latter's offer to become the head of the group's external relations.<sup>1924</sup> The surveyed sources provided no information regarding how long Okelo was in his external relations position and whether or not he stepped down from his GPLM/F role when he later became head of the Gambella Democratic Movement (GDM). Similarly, I found no further details about Peter Kaga beyond the allegations raised during the Okelo trial. The earliest reference to GPLF by name that I found was in a March 19, 2004 *Africa Confidential* article; however, it inaccurately identified GPLF as a predominantly Nuer group led by Thuat Pol, characteristics that instead describe the Ethiopian Patriotic United Front (EPUF).<sup>1925</sup> Although the GPLF did not apparently issue their first press release until October 30, 2005, the group featured in multiple media reports between March 2004 and October 2005, and Human Rights Watch interviewed its leadership in Nairobi in late 2004.<sup>1926</sup> The GPLF's goals include a restoration of regional autonomy with strong Anuak influence and a halt to foreign oil exploration.<sup>1927</sup>

The GPLF carried out several attacks in early 2004. On February 3, 2004, its fighters ambushed trucks carrying Ethiopian troops near the Sudanese border and killed between 20 and 40 soldiers.<sup>1928</sup> Although GPLF leaders told Human Rights Watch in late 2004 that they had not launched any attacks since March or April 2004, Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International mentioned a longer series of "pitched battles" between GPLF and EPRDF forces, including "major defeats" between March and June 2004.<sup>1929</sup> In October 2005, GPLF fighters killed between 20 and 30 Ethiopian soldiers in attacks in Gambella and also killed a regional police commissioner and 10 others while freeing the inmates from Gambella town's prison and seizing weapons from the government arsenal.<sup>1930</sup> The October 2005 attacks appeared to mark a shift in rebel tactics away from attacking highlander civilians and toward a greater focus on

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<sup>1923</sup> Dereje Feyissa, "A National Perspective on the Conflict in Gambella," in *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, ed. Svein Ege et al., vol. 2 (Trondheim: Department of Social Anthropology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2009), 646; "Murder in Gambella," *Africa Confidential*, March 19, 2004, 5.

<sup>1924</sup> "Okelo Akuai Uchala and 6 Others"; "Seven Individuals, Including Former Gambella Chief Found Guilty of Terrorism Offences."

<sup>1925</sup> "Murder in Gambella."

<sup>1926</sup> Young, "Armed Groups Along Sudan's Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis," 41; "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 46.

<sup>1927</sup> Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability," 19.

<sup>1928</sup> Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International, "Operation Sunny Mountain: Soldiers, Oil & Ongoing State Terror against Anuak & Other Indigenous Minorities of Southwestern Ethiopia," 19.

<sup>1929</sup> "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, March 2005), 46, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0305/>; Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International, "'Today Is the Day of Killing Anuaks': Crimes Against Humanity, Acts of Genocide and Ongoing Atrocities Against the Anuak People of Southwestern Ethiopia," Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International Field Reports (Washington, D.C.: Genocide Watch, February 25, 2004), 19, <http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Ethiopia25Feb04TodayIsTheDayOfKillingAnuaks.pdf>.

<sup>1930</sup> Young, "Armed Groups Along Sudan's Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis," 41; Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability," 18.



government targets.<sup>1931</sup> The GPLF claimed to have killed 2,000 government soldiers in five days of battle in mid-January 2006, but no other sources verified this claim.<sup>1932</sup>

While at least one source linked each of the attacks above to GPLF fighters, there have been many other attacks on military and civilian targets in Gambella carried out by unknown attackers, usually assumed to be Anuak rebels. Reports mention the existence of at least one additional Anuak group, and likely others, who were active at the same time GPLF was forming.<sup>1933</sup> The group which killed the 8 highlanders on December 13, 2003, the incident preceding the mass killing of Anuaks in Gambella town, was likely an Anuak group, although Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International contest the standard theory and suggest a cover-up of the killers' non-Anuak identity.<sup>1934</sup> Human Rights Watch documented a number of attacks on highlander civilians in Gambella in 2004 and 2005 but could not definitively determine which group, if any, bore responsibility. The attackers were likely Anuaks avenging the government-enabled killing and displacement of Anuaks, but GPLF leadership categorically denied any civilian attacks in an interview with HRW investigators in Nairobi in late 2004.<sup>1935</sup> GPLF sources similarly denied any involvement with a June 11, 2006, ambush of a passenger bus east of Gambella town.<sup>1936</sup> Some of the attacks, such as a major battle between Anuak miners and EPDRF troops followed by the killing of highlander civilians in Dimma on January 30, 2004, seemed to involve a fairly significant degree of coordination but may have been the work of GPLF, another rebel group, or a more spontaneously organized group.<sup>1937</sup> Although GPLF was primarily based in Pochalla, Sudan, with its leadership in Sudan and Kenya, Eritrea was its main foreign backer.<sup>1938</sup> In Okelo's trial, the Ethiopian government alleged that, as head of GPLM/F's external affairs, he had made plans for Kaga to travel to Eritrea.<sup>1939</sup> However, Eritrea provided less support to GPLF than to the larger, better known groups. Anuaks living abroad were key leaders and supporters of GPLF, and Ethiopia accused Okelo of extensively fundraising among the Anuak diaspora.<sup>1940</sup> SCAD includes no qualifying instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and no Type 2 contestation in the year prior to group formation. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

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<sup>1931</sup> International Human Rights Law Clinic, "'We Are Now Hoping for Death': Grave Human Rights Abuses in Gambella, Ethiopia" (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, December 14, 2006), 41–42, <http://www.anuakjustice.org/downloads/HARVARD-ETHIOPIAREPORT.pdf>.

<sup>1932</sup> Young, "Armed Groups Along Sudan's Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis," 41.

<sup>1933</sup> Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability," 18; "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 44–47.

<sup>1934</sup> Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International, "Operation Sunny Mountain: Soldiers, Oil & Ongoing State Terror against Anuak & Other Indigenous Minorities of Southwestern Ethiopia," 15–17.

<sup>1935</sup> "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 46.

<sup>1936</sup> Anuak Justice Council, "Local Testimonies of Bus Ambush on June 11 near Gambella, Ethiopia," *Anuak Justice Council* (blog), June 15, 2006, <http://www.anuakjustice.org/060615AmbushOfBusNearGambellaEthiopia.htm>.

<sup>1937</sup> Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability," 31; "Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region," March 2005, 35; McGill, "Again and Again - Pochalla Dispatch"; Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International, "'Today Is the Day of Killing Anuaks': Crimes Against Humanity, Acts of Genocide and Ongoing Atrocities Against the Anuak People of Southwestern Ethiopia," 18.

<sup>1938</sup> Gemedu Humnasa, "Eritrea Creates a Second Somalia Government in Eritrea," *All Africa*, March 26, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020070326e33q0006a&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Young, "Armed Groups Along Sudan's Western Frontier: An Overview and an Analysis," 42; "Ethiopia: The Gambella Conflict - Structures and Prognosis" (London: WRITENET (for UNHCR), August 16, 2004), 3, Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4186616c4.html>.

<sup>1939</sup> Ochalla, "Statement of Defendant Number 1 as per Criminal Code Number 148 in Case 154647 (Translated)," 2.

<sup>1940</sup> John Okello, *Revolution in Zanzibar* (Nairobi: East African Pub. House, 1967); Medhane, "Gambella: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability," 17.

The GPLF was inactive for several years before merging into a new rebel movement in 2011. I have been unable to find any reports of GPLF attacks after its January 2006 claim to have killed thousands of Ethiopian troops in five days of fighting. GPLF thus did not become a long-term viable rebel group. In April 2011, GPLF and “GPLM—The 2nd” issued a statement with the Gambella People United Democratic Front (GPUDF) condemning EPRDF’s actions in Gambella ahead of EPRDF officials’ visits with the Ethiopian diaspora in the U.S. and Canada.<sup>1941</sup> On August 10, 2011, GPLM/F, the Gambella People United Democratic Front (GPUDF), and the Southwest Ethiopia Nilo-Saharan Peoples Independent Movement (SENPIM) officially merged to form the Gambella United Nilotes Movement/Army (GUNM/A).<sup>1942</sup> I have been able to locate very few official GPLF statements or media mentions of GPLF activity since the merger. Though the *Sudan Tribune* noted the past existence of an unnamed Sudan-based Anuak rebel group, the Ethiopian government’s denial of the GDM’s existence included its assertion that there were no active rebel groups in Gambella in 2012.<sup>1943</sup> The GUNM/A has actively issued public statements but has not claimed responsibility for any attacks on government or civilian targets, although the Gambella region president of the region’s ruling party and an eyewitness claim that GUNM/A was responsible for a March 4, 2012, attack on a bus of Gambella Agricultural College students outside Gambella town that left at least 20 non-Anuak students dead.<sup>1944</sup> In November 2013, an Ethiopian police source claimed Ethiopian security forces killed and captured Eritrean-trained rebel fighters who had crossed into northern Ethiopia from Sudan to launch attacks and identified the rebels as members of an unspecified Gambella rebel group.<sup>1945</sup> In October 2015, GPLM joined with BPLM, OLF, ONLF, and SLF to form the People’s Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (PAFD).<sup>1946</sup> GPLM/F appears to have continued as an independent organization after it supposedly merged into GNUM/A in 2011. In response to the ongoing fighting in South Sudan, Gambella rebels have become more focused on localized concerns rather than challenging the Ethiopian state.<sup>1947</sup> Because of the lack of GPLM/F attacks on state targets after 2006, the group did not meet our viability threshold.

#### Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army (GNUM/A)

On August 10, 2011, GPLM/F, the Gambella People United Democratic Front (GPUDF), and the Southwest Ethiopia Nilo-Saharan Peoples Independent Movement (SENPIM) officially merged to form the Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army (GNUM/A).<sup>1948</sup> Its main goals included “bringing freedom to the indigenous peoples of Gambella and the neighbouring Southwest Nilotic

<sup>1941</sup> ecadforum, “Press Release on TPLF Agents Visit: Gambella Political Parties | Ethiopian News,” *ECADF Ethiopian News and Articles* (blog), April 9, 2011, <http://ecadforum.com/articles/2011/04/09/press-release-on-the-visit-of-tplf-agents-to-usa-and-canada-gambella-political-parties/>.

<sup>1942</sup> Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army, “‘Unity for Freedom’: First Year Anniversary of GNUM/A” (Anyuak Media, August 10, 2012), [http://www.anyuakmedia.com/GNUM\\_First\\_Year\\_Anniversary\\_-\\_August\\_10th\\_2012.pdf](http://www.anyuakmedia.com/GNUM_First_Year_Anniversary_-_August_10th_2012.pdf).

<sup>1943</sup> Tekle, “Ethiopia Denies Anuak Are Fleeing Violence into South Sudan - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan.”

<sup>1944</sup> Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army (GNUM/A) Central Committee, “Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army” (Zehabesha, March 9, 2017), <http://www.zehabesha.com/gambella-nilotes-united-movementarmy/>; Yonas Adaye Adeto, “Conflict Complexity in Ethiopia: Case Study of Gambella Regional State” (Ph.D. dissertation, Bradford, UK, University of Bradford, 2014), 274–76, <https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/handle/10454/8860>.

<sup>1945</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Ethiopia Security Kills Six Rebels, Capture 12,” *Sudan Tribune*, November 29, 2013, [https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=48999](https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=48999).

<sup>1946</sup> “Five Ethiopian Rebel Groups Form Alliance to Change ‘Hegemonic Culture.’”

<sup>1947</sup> Email correspondence with country expert, September 1, 2017.

<sup>1948</sup> Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army, “‘Unity for Freedom’: First Year Anniversary of GNUM/A.”

Ethiopians from all forms of political, economic and social discrimination and oppression.”<sup>1949</sup> The GUNM/A has actively issued public statements but has not claimed responsibility for any attacks on government or civilian targets, although the Gambella region president of the region’s ruling party and an eyewitness claim that GUNM/A was responsible for a March 4, 2012, attack on a bus of Gambella Agricultural College students outside Gambella town that left at least 20 non-Anuak students dead.<sup>1950</sup> GUNM/A was also mentioned in connection with an April 2012 attack that killed five employees of Saudi Star petroleum company. Regional government officials asserted that Ethiopian forces killed Okello Odiel, allegedly GUNM/A’s leader, in South Sudan in March 2013.<sup>1951</sup> Excluded as a merger of other rebel groups.

### **Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy**

AKAs: Ginbot Sebat, G7

On the eve of the three-year anniversary of Ethiopia’s May 15, 2005 general elections, opposition leaders formed a new movement, the Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy.<sup>1952</sup> Its name, sometimes also spelled out as Ginbot Sebat, comes from the equivalent date of May 15 on the Ethiopian calendar.

Many of the Ginbot 7 leaders and members came from more radical elements within the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD/Kinjit), the largest opposition coalition in the 2005 elections which had made significant gains in urban areas and won in Addis Ababa.<sup>1953</sup> In the aftermath of the elections, the government of the ruling EPRDF coalition cracked down on dissent, violently suppressing protests and arresting CUD leaders. In June 2007, the Supreme Court convicted 38 opposition leaders of treason and sentenced them to life imprisonment, but they received pardons in exchange for taking responsibility for post-election violence and protests. Among the pardoned leaders was Berhanu Nega, the CUD’s victorious 2005 Addis Ababa mayoral candidate.<sup>1954</sup> Andargachew Tsege, a former EPRDF deputy mayor of Addis Ababa (1991-1994) and a CUD leader in exile in the U.S., was convicted in absentia.<sup>1955</sup> Nega returned to his economics teaching position at Bucknell University in the U.S., and Nega and Tsige formed Ginbot 7 in Washington, DC, in May 2008.<sup>1956</sup> Both men had been involved with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a radical rebel group, in its 1970s struggle against the Derg.<sup>1957</sup> In its founding press release, the group declared that its “primary objective” was “to stir our country towards a stable democratic process and transition” and professed its

<sup>1949</sup> Adeto, “Conflict Complexity in Ethiopia: Case Study of Gambella Regional State,” 273.

<sup>1950</sup> Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army (GNUM/A) Central Committee, “Gambella Nilotes United Movement/Army”; Adeto, “Conflict Complexity in Ethiopia: Case Study of Gambella Regional State,” 274–76.

<sup>1951</sup> Adeto, “Conflict Complexity in Ethiopia: Case Study of Gambella Regional State,” 276.

<sup>1952</sup> Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy, “Ginbot 7, a Movement for Justice and Democracy Is Formed” (Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy, May 14, 2008), [http://ginbot7.com/Ginbot\\_7-Movement\\_for\\_Justice\\_Liberty\\_and\\_Democracy\\_is\\_Formed.htm](http://ginbot7.com/Ginbot_7-Movement_for_Justice_Liberty_and_Democracy_is_Formed.htm).

<sup>1953</sup> J. Abbink, “Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath,” *African Affairs* 105, no. 419 (2006): 183.

<sup>1954</sup> International Crisis Group, “Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents,” Africa Report (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 4, 2009), 10, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-ethnic-federalism-and-its-discontents>.

<sup>1955</sup> Amnesty International, “Ethiopian Activist at Risk of Torture: Andargachew Tsige” (New York: Amnesty International, July 4, 2014), 2, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR25/003/2014/en/>.

<sup>1956</sup> Joshua Hammer, “Once a Bucknell Professor, Now the Commander of an Ethiopian Rebel Army,” *The New York Times*, August 31, 2016, sec. Magazine, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/magazine/once-a-bucknell-professor-now-the-commander-of-an-ethiopian-rebel-army.html>.

<sup>1957</sup> “Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 Party,” 6; “A New Mayor in Addis Ababa,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, May 21, 2005; David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, “Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP),” in *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, Historical Dictionaries of Africa 91 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 154–56.

intention to use all available means to achieve that.<sup>1958</sup> Tsege and Nega split leadership responsibilities, with Tsege on the ground in Eritrea leading the movement's fighters while Nega raised funds and rallied diaspora support.<sup>1959</sup> It is reasonable to assume based on the initial press release and freedom of movement in Washington DC, that the formation of the group was planned in Washington DC. However, there is no location within one year of formation that indicates operational planning and so the rural variable is coded as missing. Elias Kifle of the opposition Ethiopian Review, previously an EPPF leader, announced his support for Ginbot 7 in 2009.<sup>1960</sup> SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Two Type 2 events qualifying as contestation occurred during this time, but these were not in the same first level administrative district as group formation, which occurred outside Ethiopia. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

While Ginbot 7 did not reject armed struggle, there is relatively little information about specific attacks, consistent with its spokesman's July 2015 claim that the group was only then commencing armed resistance.<sup>1961</sup> The *Indian Ocean Newsletter* claimed in August 2010 that Ginbot 7 lacked an armed wing.<sup>1962</sup> Eritrea provided significant support in terms of funds, training, and bases for Ginbot 7.<sup>1963</sup> Egypt also allegedly provided \$500,000 to the group.<sup>1964</sup> Although most of the direct evidence for foreign support dates from after the group's first year, Tsege was already in Asmara meeting with Eritrean officials and the leadership of other Eritrea-based Ethiopian rebel groups in May 2009, a fact that combined with the later evidence led the coder to indicate foreign support in the group's first year.<sup>1965</sup> The group's efforts to recruit armed fighters met with little success; the *Indian Ocean Newsletter* estimated it had only 20 to 30 fighters based near Tenessey, Ethiopia, in 2013.<sup>1966</sup> The Ethiopian government charged numerous individuals, including military officers, with coup plots and conspiracies against the state, but there was much doubt surrounding the truth of the charges and whether or not their activities, even if they happened, were actually connected to Ginbot 7.<sup>1967</sup> In 2011, the EPRDF-dominated Ethiopian parliament official designated Ginbot 7 as one of five terrorist

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<sup>1958</sup> Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy, "Ginbot 7, a Movement for Justice and Democracy Is Formed."

<sup>1959</sup> Hammer, "Once a Bucknell Professor, Now the Commander of an Ethiopian Rebel Army."

<sup>1960</sup> "Addis Ababa," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, January 10, 2009, sec. POLITICS & POWER/BEHIND CLOSED DOORS,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020090121e51a00004&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1961</sup> Douglas Mpuga, "Ethiopian Opposition Group Threatens Armed Resistance," *Voice of America Press Releases and Documents*, July 25, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=VOA0000020150727eb7p0000q&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 Party," 7; "The EPRDF's Many Weak Spots," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, May 23, 2009.

<sup>1962</sup> "Asmara Wants to Unite Ethiopian Foes."

<sup>1963</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2182 (2014)," 21; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia," 30–32; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)," July 13, 2012, 15.

<sup>1964</sup> "Addis-Abeba," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, June 28, 2013, LexisNexis.

<sup>1965</sup> "US-Based Ethiopian Opposition Activist Visits Eritrea," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 29, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020090529e55t002s1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1966</sup> "Addis Ababa," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 20, 2013.

<sup>1967</sup> Dutch Council for Refugees, "Country of Origin Information Report Ethiopia" (Dutch Council for Refugees, May 2016), 13, Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/573f2f334.html>; "Ethiopia: The Ginbot 7 Party," 7.

organizations.<sup>1968</sup> When Tesge, the group's secretary-general, was arrested in Yemen in 2014 and extradited to Ethiopia to stand trial, Nega agreed to take his place in Eritrea.<sup>1969</sup>

In 2014, Ginbot 7, EPPF, and the Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM) signed a memorandum of understanding to unite under a joint command structure.<sup>1970</sup> In January 2015, Ginbot 7 and EPPF formed a new united front called Arbegnoch-Ginbot 7 for Unity and Democracy Movement (AGUDM).<sup>1971</sup> On May 15, 2015, the Tigray People's Democratic Movement (TPDM), Gambela People's Liberation Movement (GPLM), Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) and Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM) signed a "cooperation agreement" with AGUDM.<sup>1972</sup> On September 7, 2015, AGUDM, ADFM, Afar People's Liberation Movement (APLM), and TPDM officially merged into the United Movement for the Salvation of Ethiopia through Democracy (UMSED) headed by AGUDM and Ginbot 7 leader Berhanu Nega.<sup>1973</sup>

The UMSED ran into trouble immediately after its formation with the defection of TPDM leader and UMSED deputy chairman Mola Asghedom and hundreds of TPDM fighters to Ethiopia.<sup>1974</sup>

I could find no English-language information about Ginbot 7 attacks prior to the January 2015 merger, and information about AGUDM attacks is very limited. In July 2015, Ginbot 7 spokesperson Dr. Tadesse Biru confirmed the group's merger with the EPPF and announced that the group would begin armed resistance against Ethiopia, breaking with its previous nonviolent efforts.<sup>1975</sup> Opposition media reported that AGUDM fighters launched a series of strikes into Ethiopia in early July 2015, which counts as Ginbot 7's first attack in our dataset.<sup>1976</sup> AGUDM claimed to have killed 40 Ethiopian soldiers and lost 10 of its own fighters in a July 2015 attack in northern Ethiopia.<sup>1977</sup> This counts as the group's first large attack in our dataset, although the attack's sourcing from opposition media with no government comment cast some doubt on the AGUDM's claim. Because the July 2015 AGUDM attacks took place more than three years after Ginbot 7's founding, the group meets our viability criteria. AGUDM also took credit for a May 12, 2016 attack on Ethiopian troops at the former U.S. drone base in Arba Minch in southern Ethiopia; the rebels claimed to have killed 20 government soldiers, while the government insisted its forces had been victorious and had killed a number of AGUDM fighters.<sup>1978</sup> There is no evidence that either Ginbot 7 or AGUDM has carried out attacks on non-government targets. AGUDM remains an active rebel group based in Eritrea.

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<sup>1968</sup> "Ethiopian Parliament Designates Five Groups as Terrorists," *Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, June 15, 2011, sec. Africa: Ethiopia,

<http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/IntelligenceWeekly/DisplayFile/jiwb23808?edition=2011>.

<sup>1969</sup> Hammer, "Once a Bucknell Professor, Now the Commander of an Ethiopian Rebel Army."

<sup>1970</sup> "Three Opposition Groups Unite to Fight Ethiopian Government."

<sup>1971</sup> "Ethiopia," January 10, 2015.

<sup>1972</sup> "Tension on Ethiopia-Eritrea Border as Rebels Attack Ethiopian Forces," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 8, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150708eb78001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1973</sup> Kibret, "A Non-Exhaustive Guide of Ethiopian Political Parties Marriage"; TesfaNews, "Four Ethiopian Armed Groups (TPDM, AG7, Amara, Afar) Merge."

<sup>1974</sup> Plaut, "Updated"; Hutchinson, "Defection by Militia Leader to Ethiopian Government Indicates Weakening Opposition."

<sup>1975</sup> Mpuga, "Ethiopian Opposition Group Threatens Armed Resistance."

<sup>1976</sup> "EPRDF Split over Potential Intervention in Eritrea," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, July 10, 2015; "Tension on Ethiopia-Eritrea Border as Rebels Attack Ethiopian Forces," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 8, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150708eb78001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopia: Rebels Intensify Attacks, PM Threatens Eritrea," *TesfaNews* (blog), July 7, 2015, <https://www.tesfanews.net/rebels-intensify-attacks-ethiopia-warns-eritrea/>.

<sup>1977</sup> "Ethiopian Rebels Say over 40 Government Soldiers Killed," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, July 15, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020150715eb7f001e1l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1978</sup> Hammer, "Once a Bucknell Professor, Now the Commander of an Ethiopian Rebel Army"; "Series of False Notes between EBC and Berhanu Nega," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, June 3, 2016.

**OLF: Oromo Liberation Front** [37 Kenya events, 1998-2011; 323 Ethiopia events] and its armed wing **OLA: Oromo Liberation Army** [81 events]

The OLF began in 1973 as a rebel group claiming to defend the rights of Ethiopian minority Oromo people and has continued to fight for an independent Oromo state since leaving the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government in 1992.<sup>1979</sup> The Oromo predominantly live in south central and southern Ethiopia, including along the Kenyan border, as well as in northern Kenya and Somalia.<sup>1980</sup> The OLF's goals have shifted back and forth over time, ranging from greater regional autonomy to full secession. By the late 1990s, the OLF had become the strongest rebel group in Ethiopia. It has used bases in Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya, and the Ethiopian government has alleged that it receives support from Eritrea.<sup>1981</sup> In October 2015, the OLF joined with the BPLM, GPLM, ONLF, and SLF to form the People's Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (PAFD).<sup>1982</sup> Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

**ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front** [641 events] and its armed wing **ONLA: Ogaden National Liberation Army** [51 events]

The Ogaden National Liberation Front began in 1984 as a group pledging to defend the rights of the Ogaden people in eastern Ethiopia, including their right to national self-determination, with significant membership coming from the weakened Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Its armed wing, the OLA, did not begin operations until 1994. Among the ONLF's targets have been foreign-owned natural resource extraction sites in eastern Ethiopia.<sup>1983</sup> Although a faction made peace with the government in 2010, the ONLF remains one of the most significant rebel groups in Ethiopia.<sup>1984</sup> In October 2015, the ONLF joined with the BPLM, GPLM, OLF, and SLF to form the People's Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (PAFD).<sup>1985</sup> Excluded due its pre-1997 founding.

### **Sidama Liberation Front (SLF)**

Claiming to represent the Sidama people of southern Ethiopia, the Sidama Liberation Front formed in the mid-1970s to oppose the Derg following the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and received support from Somalia.<sup>1986</sup> The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary

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<sup>1979</sup> "Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Including Origin, Mandate, Leadership, Structure, Legal Status, and Membership; Treatment of Members and Supporters by Authorities (2014-2015)" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, May 7, 2015), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html>.

<sup>1980</sup> Gishinga Njoroge, "Kenyans Have Oromos, Too," *Game Yetu*, February 27, 2016, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/sports/>.

<sup>1981</sup> "Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)" (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, November 12, 2012), <http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/WorldInsurgencyTerrorism/Display/1320704>.

<sup>1982</sup> "Five Ethiopian Rebel Groups Form Alliance to Change 'Hegemonic Culture.'"

<sup>1983</sup> "Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)" (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, January 8, 2013), <http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/WorldInsurgencyTerrorism/Display/1320810>.

<sup>1984</sup> "Ethiopia Rebels Claim Military Victories," *Agence France Presse*, November 9, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020101109e6b90064e&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1985</sup> "Five Ethiopian Rebel Groups Form Alliance to Change 'Hegemonic Culture.'"

<sup>1986</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Ethiopia: Information on the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), Including History, Goals, and Methods; Whether the Group Uses Violence and Has Participated in Armed Conflict; Treatment of Members by the Authorities (2012-October 2016)" (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, November 2, 2016), Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/589443ab4.html>; David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, "Sidamo Liberation Front (SLF)," in *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, Historical Dictionaries of Africa 91 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 358.



Democratic Front expelled the SLF from the post-Derg transitional government in 1993.<sup>1987</sup> The SLF resumed its armed struggle against the central government and remains an active rebel group, though much smaller and weaker than OLF and ONLF with which it sometimes coordinates its activities.<sup>1988</sup> In October 2015, the SLF joined with the BPLM, GPLM, OLF, and ONLF to form the People's Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (PAFD).<sup>1989</sup> Eritrea supports SLF's activities.<sup>1990</sup> Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

#### **Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Front for Justice and Equality\* (SEPFJE)**

AKAs: Ethiopian People's Front for Equality and Justice

There is very little information about this group, and frequently it appears on lists of Ethiopian rebel groups without any additional information.<sup>1991</sup> The SEPFJE is a rebel group which claims to represent various ethnic groups of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region in southwestern Ethiopia. The limited descriptions of the group typically describe it as being active in southern Ethiopia.<sup>1992</sup>

The surveyed sources' earliest English-language mention of the SEPFJE came in August 24, 2006, statement from the Sidama Liberation Front which noted that some Sidamas at SLF-sponsored listening sessions had argued that the SEPFJE "is a wrong idea and is against the interest of Sidama people."<sup>1993</sup> The first and only attack where media sources mention SEPFJE was a March 8, 2007, attack on Ethiopian troops stationed in Adi Geshu in northwestern Ethiopia's Tigray region. On March 15, the TPDM and SEPFJE jointly took credit for the "lightning attack," which they claimed killed 193 government soldiers and destroyed several vehicles and an arms depot.<sup>1994</sup> EPPF also claimed to have carried out joint operations with SEPFJE, though the Jane's report mentioning these claims provides no specifics.<sup>1995</sup> By November 2009, opposition website Ethiopian Review noted that the group had changed its name to the Ethiopian People's Front for Equality and Justice (EPFEJ).<sup>1996</sup> SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2005 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time. Therefore, the coder listed protest as a 0. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

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<sup>1987</sup> "Ethiopian Parliament Expels Five Political Groups," *Reuters News*, April 3, 1993,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011120dp4303xrs&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1988</sup> "Three Opposition Forces Claim 473 Ethiopian Soldiers Killed in Joint Attack," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 19, 1999,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010901dv8j00aor&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1989</sup> "Five Ethiopian Rebel Groups Form Alliance to Change 'Hegemonic Culture.'"

<sup>1990</sup> "A Hastily Formed Alliance," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, May 27, 2006, sec. POLITICS & POWER,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020060602e25r0000a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1991</sup> "Fall out at the Top," *Africa Confidential*, October 19, 2007; Humnasa, "Eritrea Creates a Second Somalia Government in Eritrea."

<sup>1992</sup> "New Ethiopian Opposition Alliance Formed - Eritrean Report," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, November 21, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020071121e3bl0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1993</sup> SLF Executive Committee, "Sidama Liberation Front Statement: An Official Response to SNLO's Allegation" (Sidama National Liberation Front (SNLF), August 24, 2006),

<http://www.sidamanationalliberationfront.org/Archive.html>.

<sup>1994</sup> "193 Ethiopian Soldiers Killed in Rebel Attack - Statement - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan,"

*Sudan Tribune*, March 16, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20793>; "Two Ethiopian Rebel

Groups Claim Jointly Killing 193 Soldiers in Northwest," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 15, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020070315e33f000um&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>1995</sup> "Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF)," May 31, 2012, 3.

<sup>1996</sup> Elias Kifle, "EPPF Strives to Fill the Leadership Gap," *Ethiopian Review* (blog), November 18, 2009,

<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yNE7uyXcIuwJ:www.ethiopianreview.com/index/11274&num=1&hl=en&gl=us&strip=1&vwsr=0>.

Meke Meazo served as SEPJE's representative at a May 2006 meeting of Ethiopian opposition groups in Utrecht, Netherlands.<sup>1997</sup> Beyond his appearance in the photo of the allied groups' leaders from the summit, no sources revealed anything else about Mr. Meazo, including whether or not he was in fact the SEPFJE's main leader.

Various sources, including some independent sources not connected to the Ethiopian government, mention that Eritrea has provided support for SEPFJE/EPFJE, although their information generally doesn't include specifics.<sup>1998</sup> Ethiopian Review's Elias Kifle claimed that he visited EPFJE fighters during a 30-day clandestine trip to meet with various rebel groups; it is unclear whether the fighters were in Eritrea or Ethiopia.<sup>1999</sup>

The surveyed sources did not mention the group in connection with any attacks since its 2007 joint operation with TPDM. The group failed to meet our definition as a long-term viable rebel group. SEPFJE/EPFJE reportedly participated in at least three opposition alliances—the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) formed in 2006, the Unity of Ethiopians for Democratic Change (UEDC) formed in 2007 and the Ethiopian Coalition for Democratic Change (ECDC) formed in 2010.<sup>2000</sup> The current status of the EPFJE is unknown, but it appears to be inactive.

#### **Tigray People's Democratic Movement (TPDM) [5 events]**

AKAs: Tigrayan People's Democratic Movement, Demhit

The Tigray People's Democratic Movement is an Eritrea-supported rebel group whose membership primarily come from the Tigray people, the same ethnic group associated with the ruling coalition's Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).<sup>2001</sup> TPLF defectors, including Mola Asgedom and other soldiers, left Ethiopia in 2001 and established TPDM with the Eritrean

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<sup>1997</sup> Abede Gelaw, "The Pros and Cons of an Alliance," *Ethiomedica* (blog), May 23, 2006, [https://ethiomedica.com/carepress/afd\\_pros\\_and\\_cons.html](https://ethiomedica.com/carepress/afd_pros_and_cons.html); "Statement Announcing the Formation of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy," *Ethiounited* (blog), May 22, 2006, <http://ethiounited.blogspot.com/2006/05/statement-announcing-formation-of.html>.

<sup>1998</sup> "Ethiopia Berates Eritrea over Unity of Country's Four Rebel Groups," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, November 28, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020101128e6bs000p2&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Fall out at the Top"; Dr J. Peter Pham, "Regional Dimensions of the Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in the 'Ogaden,' Somalia, and Beyond - Testimony of Dr. J. Peter Pham [Document]," *All Africa*, October 3, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071003e3a3001e5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Humnasa, "Eritrea Creates a Second Somalia Government in Eritrea."

<sup>1999</sup> Kifle, "EPPF Strives to Fill the Leadership Gap."

<sup>2000</sup> "Ethiopia Berates Eritrea over Unity of Country's Four Rebel Groups"; "Ethiopia: Opposition Alliance," *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 44, no. 11 (December 1, 2007): 17302C-17302C, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2007.01372.x>; "New Ethiopian Opposition Alliance Formed - Eritrean Report," November 21, 2007; Elias Kifle, "Four Ethiopian Opposition Groups Create New Structure," *Ethiopian Review* (blog), November 22, 2007, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/1538>; "Ethiounited."

<sup>2001</sup> An earlier organization by the same name, a political organization for Tigray opponents of the TPLF, helped form the Tigrean Alliance for National Democracy (TAND) with other likeminded groups at a 1996 Washington, DC, meeting, but virtually all sources agree that the rebel group TPDM began in 2001 without making any mention of the earlier TPDM, the two organizations do not appear to be directly linked. Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Ethiopia: Information on the Tigrean Alliance for National Democracy (TAND), Its Structure, Membership, Activities, Objectives, and on Its Treatment by the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF)" (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, September 1, 1996), Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac2938.html>.

government's support.<sup>2002</sup> Former high-ranking TPLF security forces officer Fiseha Hailemariam Tedla led the group from its founding until his 2008 assassination in western Eritrea.<sup>2003</sup> In March 2001, significant internal divisions within the TPLF emerged over the December 2000 peace agreement with Eritrea, and the pro-treaty faction purged those who argued that the treaty was too favorable to Eritrea, sacking TPLF vice chairman Tewolde Wolde-Mariam and his allies on the party central committee.<sup>2004</sup> The disorder within the TPLF contributed to April student protests in Addis Ababa, which led to major riots.<sup>2005</sup> The TPLF's public infighting, the culmination of longstanding and complex divisions within the TPLF that were as much about Tigrayan nationalism as the peace agreement, may not have been directly linked to the TPDM's founding, but these events were a key part of the Ethiopian political context in which the rebel group formed and highlighted growing anti-TPLF sentiment among its Tigrayan base at home and in the diaspora.<sup>2006</sup> SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2000 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time. Therefore, the coder listed protest as a 0. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

There is relatively little information on the founding and early years of TPDM. By 2014, the TPDM's website stated that its goal was "to establish a popular democratic government of Ethiopia where the rights nation and nationality are respected," but it is not clear how at that point that became its public goal.<sup>2007</sup> The earliest mention of the group that I found was in *Africa Confidential's* May 31, 2002 issue, which described it as "led by ex-TPLF members" and working closely with EPPF.<sup>2008</sup> On June 23, 2002, the TPDM claimed responsibility, via Eritrea's Voice of the Masses Radio, for attacks on Ethiopian troops in Tigray since March 2002, including a June 6 battle that allegedly resulted in 18 government soldiers' deaths.<sup>2009</sup> In the first recorded claim of an attack with at least 25 fatalities that I could find, TPDM similarly used Eritrean state media to announce an April 2, 2006 attack that allegedly killed 145 Ethiopian troops in northwestern Tigray.<sup>2010</sup> Because the group committed at least two attacks in at least one year (e.g., 2006) more than three years after its founding, it meets the dataset's viability criteria.<sup>2011</sup> Most attack reports, even while recorded by BBC Monitoring, only represented TPDM's narrative, but I could find no other accounts of these incidents. The surveyed sources

<sup>2002</sup> Martin Plaut, *Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State* (Oxford University Press, 2017); Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2244 (2015)" (New York: United Nations Security Council, October 31, 2016), 16, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/920](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/920); "Tigray People's Democratic Movement," accessed July 21, 2017, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/tpdm.htm>.

<sup>2003</sup> Yilma Bekele, "Ato Molla Asgedom and the Search for Freedom," *Madote* (blog), September 2015, <http://www.madote.com/2015/09/ato-molla-asgedom-and-search-for-freedom.html>.

<sup>2004</sup> "Ethiopia Country Profile (Discontinued 2008) - Main Report" (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2, 2001), 9–10, <http://www.eiu.com/article43606204.html?pubtypeId=30000203>.

<sup>2005</sup> William Maclean, "ANALYSIS-Ethiopia Riots Show up Economic, Political Rifts.," *Reuters News*, April 25, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010713dx4p01eld&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2006</sup> For a detailed account of the TPLF's March 2001 power struggle, see Paulos Milkias, "Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor," *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 13–66.

<sup>2007</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia," 28.

<sup>2008</sup> "A War Unwon," *Africa Confidential*, May 31, 2002, 6.

<sup>2009</sup> "Rebel Group Claims Victory over Government Forces in North.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, June 23, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020020623dy6n0020a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2010</sup> "Ethiopia: Northern Rebel Group Claims Killing 145 Government Troops," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, April 7, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020060407e247000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2011</sup> "Ethiopian Rebel Group Claims Killing Six Government Soldiers in North," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, April 1, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020060401e241002mh&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Ethiopian Rebels Reportedly Destroy Government Forces in North," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, November 23, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020061123e2bn0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

contained no reports of TPDM attacks on Ethiopian civilians, though its fighters allegedly attacked Eritrean civilians in Asmara as the group helped Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki reassert control following a 2013 coup attempt.<sup>2012</sup>

The Eritrean government has provided significant support to TPDM, as regularly noted by the UN Security Council's Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. Sources interviewed by the Monitoring Group claimed that Eritrean government trainers were training TPDM fighters in the Een camp in 2009; that by 2012, the TPDM's main base was at Harena with a presence at several other training camps in Eritrea, and the Ethiopia military attacked their bases in mid-2012; that the Eritrean military transferred weapons and equipment including sniper rifles and semi-automatic pistols to TPDM in fall 2013; and that Eritrean trainers had instructed TPDM members on how to build improved explosive devices in 2014.<sup>2013</sup> Following his defection back to Ethiopia, former TPDM leader Mola Asgedom told the Monitoring Group that, during his tenure as leader, Eritrea had provided monthly financial support equivalent to \$30,000 in addition to operational planning assistance and weapons.<sup>2014</sup> By 2015, the Monitoring Group estimated the TPDM's strength at 20,000 fighters, though journalist Martin Plaut estimated it had only 4,000 in 2014.<sup>2015</sup>

Eritrea's military advisers worked to promote unity through the creation of various alliances and mergers, but it was unclear whether TPDM's leadership and forces were actually integrated into new structures as the group appeared to continue as a distinct organization. In November 2007, Eritrean state radio reported that TPDM, EPPF, SEPFJE, and BPLM had formed the Unity of Ethiopians for Democratic Change (UEDC).<sup>2016</sup> On September 7, 2015, AGUDM, ADFM, Afar People's Liberation Movement (APLM), and TPDM officially merged into the United Movement for the Salvation of Ethiopia through Democracy (UMSED) headed by AGUDM leader Berhanu Nega with Asghedom as his deputy.<sup>2017</sup>

The UMSED ran into trouble just days after its formation with the defection of Asghedom and up to 800 TPDM fighters back to Ethiopia.<sup>2018</sup> Opposition sources claimed that only 80 fighters had crossed the border with Asghedom or even that the "defectors" had actually been kidnapped and that Nega and other TPDM leaders had only narrowly escaped the same

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<sup>2012</sup> "Troubled Road to Liberalism," *Africa Confidential*, April 17, 2015, 7; Gedab News, "A Mercenary Army: Isaias Afwerki's Last Stand," *Awate.Com*, October 30, 2013, <http://awate.com/a-mercenary-army-isaias-afwerkis-last-stand/>.

<sup>2013</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2244 (2015)," 17; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia," 30; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2002 (2011)" (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 13, 2012), 14–15, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545); Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 1916 (2010)" (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 18, 2011), 79, 355, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433).

<sup>2014</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2244 (2015)," 16.

<sup>2015</sup> Plaut, *Understanding Eritrea*; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2244 (2015)," 29.

<sup>2016</sup> "New Ethiopian Opposition Alliance Formed - Eritrean Report," November 21, 2007.

<sup>2017</sup> TesfaNews, "Four Ethiopian Armed Groups (TPDM, AG7, Amara, Afar) Merge."

<sup>2018</sup> "Ethiopia: Defection of Rebels," *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 52, no. 9 (October 1, 2015): 20720A-20720B, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2015.06619.x>; Economist Intelligence Unit, "Ethiopian Rebel Group Flees Eritrea," *Economist Intelligence Unit* (blog), September 18, 2015, <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1883517972&Country=Ethiopia&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&ubsubtopic=Political+stability&u=1&pid=1175407901&oid=1175407901&uid=1>.

fate.<sup>2019</sup> TPDM has been relatively quiet since the September 2015 defections, but according to the UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea's 2015 report, "remains the most significant armed Ethiopian group being trained, financed and hosted inside Eritrea."<sup>2020</sup> By 2016, however, the Monitoring Group concluded that TPDM had been greatly weakened by the defections and was becoming "increasingly fragmented."<sup>2021</sup> Even opposition websites have made only limited references to the group since September 2015, with no mentions of specific attacks.<sup>2022</sup> AGUDM and its allies have likely absorbed the remnants of TPDM's forces, which pose much less of a threat to the Ethiopian state than they did prior to September 2015.<sup>2023</sup>

#### United Western Somali Liberation Front UWSLF

Tracing its roots back to the Ogaden Liberation Front which fought for Somalia's 1960 independence, the United Western Somali Liberation Front, sometimes referred to as the Western Somali Liberation Front, began as a Somalia-supported rebel group in eastern Ethiopia in 1975. During the 1977-78 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia, UWSLF and Somali forces took over much of eastern Ethiopia before being driven back. Following Somalia's defeat, the weakened UWSLF continued to fight against Ethiopia's Derg regime. In 1984, a faction broke off to form the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as a rebel group free of Somalia's influence.<sup>2024</sup> As part of a 1988 agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, Somalia ceased its support for the UWSLF.<sup>2025</sup> The UWSLF continued to fight for self-determination for the Ogaden region until it signed a July 2010 peace agreement with Ethiopia.<sup>2026</sup> Excluded because of its pre-1997 founding.

<sup>2019</sup> Plaut, *Understanding Eritrea*, 65–66; "Ethiopian Rebel Leader Did Not Defect, 'Was Kidnapped' - Website," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 17, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150917eb9h000um&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Elias Kifle, "Breaking: Mola Asgedom Was Kidnapped; Berhanu Nega and Others Escaped," *Mereja* (blog), September 16, 2015, <http://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=104475>; "Ethiopian Rebel Group Downplays Leader's Defection," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 15, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150915eb9f000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2020</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2182 (2014)," 19–20.

<sup>2021</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Eritrea Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2244 (2015)," 16.

<sup>2022</sup> "Tigray People Democratic Movement Rants TPLF Slang," *Borkena.Com* (blog), March 9, 2017, <http://www.borkena.com/2017/03/09/tigray-people-democratic-movement-tplf-ethiopia/>; Amanuel Biedemariam, "Obama's Ethiopia in Tatters and in Danger of Civil War," *Zehabesha* (blog), July 23, 2016, <http://www.zehabesha.com/obamas-ethiopia-in-tatters-and-in-danger-of-civil-war/>.

<sup>2023</sup> Correspondence with country expert, September 1, 2017.

<sup>2024</sup> David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, "Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)," in *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Scarecrow Press, 2013), 417–18.

<sup>2025</sup> Jonathan Wright, "Somali-Ethiopian Deal Reflects Concern with Rebel Threat," *Reuters News*, April 5, 1988, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011203dk45013v0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2026</sup> "Ethiopia Grants Amnesty to Rebel Group Members Following Peace Deal," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 30, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020100730e67u000ul&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

**Narrative Summary:** *Gabon is a smaller authoritarian state with government control of the media and regions outside of the capital. With previous protests and coup attempts President Omar Bongo, and his son as his successor, would control the media while quietly suppressing or negotiating away conflicts depending on the situation. This practice has helped contribute to the relatively small number of attacks recorded in ACLED on the governing regime outside of infrequent internal coup attempts.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *All other acts of violence detailed in ACLED were either local violence or election protests not related to an attack on the state itself, and this dataset therefore does not include any of these events' associated actors. Outside research did not reveal any missing events or groups in Gabon not mentioned in ACLED. SCAD further supported that the unidentified groups in ACLED were tied to riots and protests surrounding elections rather than organized rebel groups.*

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### \*Patriotic Movement of the Defence and Security Forces of Gabon

Generals of the state military, opposition leaders and civil society attempted a coup to overthrow the Ali Bongo regime January 6<sup>th</sup>, 2019.<sup>2027</sup> Though there could be a further analysis of the structure of the group in order to determine if it could be included in this dataset, the group likely formed sometime around October of 2018.<sup>2028</sup> Therefore, it is automatically excluded from this dataset as the scope of included groups is from 1997-2015.

### Unidentified Armed Group

Members of the government secret forces were plotting a coup starting in 2009 that was thwarted in 2011 before any action could be taken.<sup>2029</sup> Given the fact that they had not separated themselves from the state and formed their own institution they are excluded from this dataset.

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<sup>2027</sup> "Gabon Coup Attempt: Government Says Situation under Control," BBC News (BBC, January 7, 2019), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46779854>.

<sup>2028</sup> "Gabon Coup Attempt: Government Says Situation under Control," BBC News (BBC, January 7, 2019), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46779854>.

<sup>2029</sup> Roberts, Martin. "Former Head of Gabon's National Security Jailed for Coup Plotting." *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*. March 14, 2011. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020110315e73e0000h&cat=a&cp=ASE>.



## Ghana

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**Narrative Summary:** *Ghana has experienced very little organized resistance and rebellion against the government at large in Accra. This may be due to the amount of devolved power regionally and locally, which stems from the strength of the chieftaincy system. This system was in operation before colonial control and served as a foundation of the 1992 constitution. Most of the violence in opposition to the national government has come from the main opposition party and its supporters, as opposed to non-state actors.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** *Low*

**Explanation:** *Nearly every named Ghanaian group in ACLED is associated with an ethnic or tribal interest, and the concerns of such groups primarily regard local land control, resource allocation, and other political issues. Most incidents of unidentified violence are attributed to these same ethnic and political conflicts by local media, which is relatively free of government control. There is some evidence of organized rebel activity in the Northwest, but most of these incidents have been attributed to groups from other countries such as like Cote d'Ivoire and Mali.*

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### New Patriotic Party (NPP)

NPP is one of the two major political parties in Ghana, and there is credible reporting of violence organized by the party captured by the ACLED database. However, they have held significant political power ever since the competitive parliamentary elections in 1996, so civilians engaging in violence on behalf of the party, particularly around elections and electioneering activities (e.g. events 15GHA and 59GHA in ACLED) do not meet this research's definition of "non-state" actor and are thus excluded from the data set.<sup>2030</sup>

### National Democratic Congress (NDC)

NDC is one of the two major political parties in Ghana, and there is credible reporting of violence organized by the party captured by the ACLED database. However, they have held significant political power ever since the competitive parliamentary elections in 1996, so civilians engaging in violence on behalf of the party, particularly around elections and electioneering activities (see examples cited for NPP) do not meet this research's definition of "non-state" actor and are thus excluded from the data set.<sup>2031</sup>

### Alavanyo Ethnic Militia

The Alavanyo Ethnic Militia has some organizational structure and has engaged in violence against minor state actors in the name of controlling an area of land. However, they don't appear to dispute the authority of the

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<sup>2030</sup> Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, eds., *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 434.

<sup>2031</sup> Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, eds., *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 434.

greater Ghanaian government, only dispute land claims with another ethnic group, the Nkonya.<sup>2032</sup> Because of this, the group has been excluded from the data set.

#### Nkonya Ethnic Militia

The Nkonya Ethnic Militia has some organizational structure and has engaged in violence against minor state actors in the name of controlling an area of land. However, they don't appear to dispute the authority of the greater Ghanaian government, they only dispute land claims with another ethnic group, the Alavanyo.<sup>2033</sup> Because of this, the group has been excluded from the data set.

#### Afadi Ethnic Militia

Little information is available about this group, but the ACLED event for this group (event 37GHA) asserts violence perpetrated over land disputes, not uncommon for Southeastern Ghana. Due to lack of compelling evidence that this group was organized in a significant capacity or challenged any authority beyond that of a fellow ethnic militia for land control, this group has been excluded from the data set.

#### Akrashi Ethnic Militia

Little information is available about this group, but the ACLED event for this group (event 37GHA) asserts violence perpetrated over land disputes, not uncommon for Southeastern Ghana. Due to lack of compelling evidence that this group was organized in a significant capacity or challenged any authority beyond that of a fellow ethnic militia for land control, this group has been excluded from the data set.

#### Andanis Ethnic Militia

Although the violence against authorized tribal leaders by this group meets the codebook criteria for "violence against the state," the group has been engaged in a land conflict connected to the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, the organizational roots of which start before 1997 and thus this group falls outside the scope of this database.<sup>2034</sup>

#### Abudus Ethnic Militia

Although the violence against authorized tribal leaders by this group meets the codebook criteria for "violence against the state," the group has been engaged in a land conflict connected to the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, the organizational roots of which start before 1997 and thus this group falls outside the scope of this database.<sup>2035</sup>

#### Zamarama Ethnic Militia

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<sup>2032</sup> Dennis Amego Korbla Penu and David Wellington Essaw, "Geographies of Peace and Violence during Conflict: The Case of the Alavanyo-Nkonya Boundary Dispute in Ghana," *Political Geography* 71 (May 2019): 91–102, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.03.003>.

<sup>2033</sup> Penu and Essaw.

<sup>2034</sup> Akudugu, Mamudu A., and Edward S. Mahama. 2011. Promoting Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Bawku Traditional Area of Ghana. *Peace Research* 43, (1): 80-103, 111-112

<sup>2035</sup> Akudugu, Mamudu A., and Edward S. Mahama. 2011. Promoting Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Bawku Traditional Area of Ghana. *Peace Research* 43, (1): 80-103, 111-112

This group is named in the ACLED database, but only in violence with other ethnic groups in Eastern Ghana (event 305GHA) No outside evidence can be found of organized, anti-state violence in line with the code book, so this group is excluded from our dataset.

#### **Dagbon Chieftaincy Militia**

The Dagbon Chieftaincy Militia dates back to pre-colonial Ghana, and given that the Dagbon Chieftain is considered and acts as a state-like authority in the Dagbon region, this group is excluded from the dataset due to its pre-1997 founding and its status as an armed/defense force of a state or state-like institution (i.e. incapable of challenging the authority of the state).<sup>2036</sup>

#### **Mamprusi Ethnic Militia**

The available evidence suggests the Mamprusi Ethnic Militia has only engaged in violence against other non-state ethnic militias and violence against citizens based on ethnicity (events 30GHA, 49GHA, 72GHA, e.g.), so this group is excluded from our dataset.

#### **Kusasi Ethnic Militia**

The available evidence suggests the Kusasi Ethnic Militia has only engaged in violence against other non-state ethnic militias and violence against citizens based on ethnicity (events 77GHA, 85GHA, 94GHA, e.g.), so this group is excluded from our dataset.

#### **Fulani Ethnic Militia**

The available evidence suggests the Fulani Ethnic Militia has only engaged in violence against other non-state ethnic militias and violence against citizens based on ethnicity (event 205GHA, 88GHA, e.g.), so this group is excluded from our dataset.

#### **Jamond Clan Militia**

The violence this group is engaged in focuses primarily on a chieftaincy and land dispute, not on a plan to challenge the authority of the greater state, so they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>2037</sup>

#### **Jafok Clan Militia**

The violence this group is engaged in focuses primarily on a chieftaincy and land dispute, not on a plan to challenge the authority of the greater state, so they are excluded from this dataset.<sup>2038</sup>

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<sup>2036</sup> IsaacOlawale Albert, "From 'Owo Crisis' to 'Dagbon Dispute': Lessons in the Politicization of Chieftaincy Disputes in Modern Nigeria and Ghana," *Round Table* 97, no. 394 (February 2008): 47–60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530701625976>.

<sup>2037</sup> Samuel Duodu and Zadok Kwame Gyasi, "Update: Three Killed in Renewed Ethnic and Chieftaincy Dispute in Bunkpurugu," Graphic Online, November 30, 2015, <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/two-killed-in-renewed-ethnic-and-chieftaincy-dispute-in-bunkpurugu.html>.

<sup>2038</sup> Duodu and Gyasi.

**Narrative Summary:** *Guinea-Bissau has remained highly unstable over our period of study. The period opened with democratically-elected President João Bernardo Vieira in power. In 1998, a military mutiny occurred that plunged the country into civil war, resulting in Vieira's ouster in 1999. Elections were held in 2000, bringing Kumba Ialá to power. In 2003, Ialá was overthrown in a coup. Elections in 2005 brought Vieira back into power, but he was assassinated in 2009. Malam Bagai Sanhá took power later that year in an emergency election. He passed away from natural causes in 2012. A military coup later that year prevented his replacement via elections. Later in 2012, a civilian government was set up, and elections in 2014 brought Jose Mario Vaz to power. Much violence against the state in Guinea-Bissau seems to originate from state actors, representing power struggles among the military and ruling elite. Ethnic rivalry has played a role in this violence, as demonstrated with the case of alleged 2000-2002 coup attempts in which Mandinkas in the military and government positioned themselves against the Balantas (see below).*

*Guinea-Bissau's instability made it vulnerable to and now perpetuates massive drug trafficking through the country, which is used as a transit hub moving cocaine from Latin America to Europe. The government is complicit in or even an active participant in the drug trade, making politics a lucrative business. The United Nations has dubbed Guinea-Bissau a narco-state.<sup>2039</sup>*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** *There were several groups considered where information was lacking, in particular because we were not able to integrate Lusophone news sources. However, it seems that most violence in Guinea-Bissau seems to occur within the state apparatus (government and military). I suspect this is the case for most, if not all, remaining unidentified armed groups.*

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### Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Front Sud)

Secessionist group MFDC splinters into northern and southern factions in 1992.<sup>2040</sup> Excluded.

### Agueantas militia

State-sponsored special forces.<sup>2041</sup> Excluded.

### Militia (Ntchama)

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<sup>2039</sup> Ed Vulliamy, "How a Tiny West African Country Became the World's First Narco State," *The Guardian*, March 9, 2008, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/09/drugstrade>; Antony Loewenstein, "Guinea-Bissau Struggles to End Its Role in Global Drugs Trade," *The Guardian*, January 7, 2016, sec. Global development, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jan/07/guinea-bissau-global-drugs-trade>; Antony Loewenstein, "In a Forgotten State: Shining a Light on Guinea-Bissau," *African Arguments* (blog), October 21, 2016, <http://africanarguments.org/2016/10/21/in-a-forgotten-state-shining-a-light-on-guinea-bissau/>.

<sup>2040</sup> Priscilla Sadatchy, "Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), Fiche Documentaire" (Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité, November 23, 2011), [http://archive.grip.org/fr/siteweb/images/NOTES\\_ANALYSE/2011/NA\\_2011-11-23\\_FR\\_P-SADATCHY.pdf](http://archive.grip.org/fr/siteweb/images/NOTES_ANALYSE/2011/NA_2011-11-23_FR_P-SADATCHY.pdf).

<sup>2041</sup> "Fighters Cross Border," IRIN, January 22, 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/64538/guinea-guinea-bissau-fighters-cross-border>; "Le Chef d'état-Major de l'armée Tué Dans Un Attentat," *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), March 1, 2009, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/161162/politique/le-chef-d-tat-major-de-l-arm-e-tu-dans-un-attentat/>; "Le Président de Guinée-Bissau Tué Par Des Militaires," March 2, 2009, <http://www.abidjantalk.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=140169>.

A former body guard to the army chief of staff and alleged perpetrator of the 2009 assassination of the president, Pansau Ntchama, returned from exile in Portugal to attempt a coup. His followers appear to have been soldiers.<sup>2042</sup> Because most of the actors in the group seem to be mutinying state forces (all except Ntchama), it is excluded.

#### Unidentified armed group (42GNB, 54GNB)

Most reports describe this fighting in Mansoa as an extension of the fighting occurring in the capital, an armed rebellion from within the military that grew into the Guinea-Bissau Civil War, eventually ousting President Vieira.<sup>2043</sup> Excluded because the rebels were state actors; there was no break in fighting after initial coup attempt and rebels never abandoned their posts/resources.

#### Unidentified armed group (85GNB)

Former justice minister/interior minister Nicando Barreto was killed by suffocation in his home. The investigation never established suspects, and there were multiple possible motives for the attack: political destabilization, political revenge, etc.<sup>2044</sup> Many former Vieira administration officials were killed extra-judicially in this time period, none of which were seriously investigated.<sup>2045</sup> My guess would be it was not the action of an organized group bent on challenging the state, and if it was we have no leads to find it. Excluded due to lack of information.

*Special note on 2001-2002 coup attempts: Reading over sources, there is little documentation of any of these coup attempts. To the extent that they are documented, people seem doubtful that they actually happened.*

#### \*February 2001 Coup Group

I found this while searching for information on 100GNB. I found only one reference with not many details. It said that the attempt was led by “civilians and soldiers” who planned to kill President Yala and ignite “ethnic-religious war.”<sup>2046</sup> Excluded due to lack of information.

#### \*December 2001 Coup Group

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<sup>2042</sup> Lassana Cassama and Rukmini Callimachi, “Guinea-Bissau Says Coup Plotter Came from Portugal,” October 22, 2012, <https://www.yahoo.com/news/guinea-bissau-says-coup-plotter-came-portugal-123117307.html>; “Guinée-Bissau: Le Régime de Bissau Accuse Le Portugal et Carlos Gomes de Contre-Coup d’Etat - RFI,” RFI Afrique, October 22, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121022-guinee-bissau-accuse-portugal-carlos-gomes-cplp-pansau-ntchama>.

<sup>2043</sup> “Hundreds Flee Town as Fighting Spreads in Guinea Bissau,” BBC News, July 2, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/124557.stm>; “Guinea-Bissau Government Meets Rebels,” BBC News, June 29, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/122221.stm>; “Fighting Widens,” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1998, [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-06-29/news/9806290076\\_1\\_guinea-bissau-bissau-ansumane-mane](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-06-29/news/9806290076_1_guinea-bissau-bissau-ansumane-mane); “More than 100 Civilians Killed in Bissau - Agency,” Text, ReliefWeb, July 3, 1998, <http://reliefweb.int/report/guinea-bissau/more-100-civilians-killed-bissau-agency>.

<sup>2044</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Guinea-Bissau Humanitarian Situation Report, 16- 31 Aug 1999,” Text, ReliefWeb, August 31, 1999, <http://reliefweb.int/report/guinea-bissau/guinea-bissau-humanitarian-situation-report-16-31-aug-1999>.

<sup>2045</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Guinea-Bissau,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2001), <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/828.htm>.

<sup>2046</sup> Jeremy I. Levitt, *Illegal Peace in Africa: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power Sharing with Warlords, Rebels, and Junta* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 193.

I found this while searching for information on 100GNB. Evidently, the group was led by Lt-Col Almani Camara, the army's deputy chief of staff.<sup>2047</sup> The alleged coup plotters came from within the military.<sup>2048</sup> Apparently, they were mainly Mandinka (Mandinga) officers. The government released very little information the coup attempt, leading many to doubt veracity of coup allegations.<sup>2049</sup> The U.S. State Department reports that "did not release publicly any evidence linking the 28 detainees to the reported coup."<sup>2050</sup> Other sources report that the alleged perpetrators were loyalists to Vieira and/or General Mane.<sup>2051</sup> Excluded – state actors.

### Unidentified armed group (100GNB)

According to ACLED notes, the government alleges that about two dozen coup plotters were trained in Gambia. Bissau-Guinean President Yala alleged that the Gambia had trained and blessed the coup perpetrators, and as a result threatened to "crush" the Gambia. Setting aside the issue of whether or not the alleged coup attempt actually occurred, there seems to be generalized doubt that the Gambia played any role in instigating it. The Bissau-Guinean opposition deemed Yala's threats against the Gambia evidence of his mental instability. Meanwhile, the Gambia dismissed Yala's claims regarding its involvement as "untrue and unfounded," "ridiculous," and "ludicrous," pointing out that the Gambia leads the Friends of Guinea-Bissau group at the UN and that instability in the area would be detrimental to the Gambia as well.<sup>2052</sup> Much of this coverage came from *The Independent of Banjul*, an independent Gambian paper that has no qualms over criticizing the Gambian government, so its coverage of the allegations as bizarre and ridiculous carry additional weight. Moreover, the only <sup>2053</sup> comment of the UN Envoy sent to try to calm the situation made only one comment: "As far as The Gambia is concerned, there is no proof that its involvement in any scheme against the government in Guinea-Bissau." Guinea-Bissau later backed off their claims, calling them a "misunderstanding".<sup>2054</sup>

Then there is the issue of whether a coup attempt actually occurred and, if so, who perpetrated it. As best I could find, the government never released any details on how the alleged 22 MAY 2002 coup attempt was planning to operate or how it was detected – no specifics. Meanwhile, one source reports that this and previous allegations of coup attempts "surprised many because there were no visible signs of unrest."<sup>2055</sup> The government did apparently secure a taped confession from the leader of the coup attempt, Fode Conte, explaining that he feared purges of his Mandinka (Mandinga) ethnic group from the military, so he

<sup>2047</sup> Europa Publications, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, 33rd ed. (London: Europa Publications, 2003), 531; Levitt, *Illegal Peace in Africa*, 193.

<sup>2048</sup> Publications, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, 531; "Guinea-Bissau Profile - Timeline," *BBC News*, January 4, 2017, sec. Africa, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13579838>.

<sup>2049</sup> Publications, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, 531.

<sup>2050</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Guinea-Bissau: Country Reports on the Human Rights Practices," Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2003), //2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18208.htm.

<sup>2051</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa, "Guinea-Bissau: Treatment of People Suspected of Having Helped Former President João Bernardo Vieira by Supporters of Ansumane Mané; Protection Available to Vieira Supporters," Refworld, August 20, 2002, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/47d654891e.html>.

<sup>2052</sup> "Gambia: Bissau Opposition Chide Yala Over Invasion Threats," *The Independent (Banjul)*, June 18, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200206180003.html>; "West Africa: Gambia Shocked By Guinea-Bissau Coup Claims," *IRIN*, June 18, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200206180294.html>; "Gambia: Government Reacts to Bissau Allegations, President Yala's Claims Described As Hypocritical," *The Independent (Banjul)*, June 18, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200206180001.html>.

<sup>2053</sup> "Guinea Bissau: UN Secretary-General Sends Envoy to Ease Tension," *IRIN*, July 2, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200207020657.html>.

<sup>2054</sup> S. b Camara, "Guinea Bissau: Bissau Now Safe for Gambians," *The Independent (Banjul)*, July 19, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200207190231.html>.

<sup>2055</sup> "Guinea Bissau: Amnesty Plan Unconstitutional," *IRIN*, June 14, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200206140004.html>.



planned to assassinate Yala and other top officers of the Balanta ethnic group; other sources report Fode Conte was protesting the death of General Mane (a fellow Mandinka) at the hands of the military in 2000.<sup>2056</sup> Fode Conte was a reserve army officer, but was evidently dismissed in the aftermath of General Mane's alleged coup attempt in 2000.<sup>2057</sup> The circumstances under which the government elicited Fode Conte's confession were unclear. I did not find details on the other twenty people detained. This is excluded because of lack of information, because of doubts that a challenge to state authority really occurred, and because it seems likely that participants came from within state apparatuses (if it happened).

#### Unidentified armed group (108GNB)

A group of unidentified men (I never found any names) attacked an army barracks in Mansoa, but were successfully repelled. Two assailants were killed, but assailants inflicted no death in the military. Several sources reported that the attack was led by associates or relatives of Ansumane Mane, the army general who led the 1998 rebellion resulting in civil war.<sup>2058</sup> The late General Mane retains much popularity within the military.<sup>2059</sup> The same group may have been responsible for additional fighting with government troops in Farim about two weeks later (mentioned in ACLED but no other reference found). There may be more information in Portuguese sources, but I can't read them. It seems likely that there was planning involved, but the assailant's background is unknown. Given the history of military mutinies and coups in Guinea-Bissau and the rumors that assailants were affiliated with General Mane, it seems highly plausible that the group came from within state security forces. Excluded due to lack of information.

#### Unidentified armed group (130GNB)

Over two days, armed men attacked several places in the capital including the Electoral Mission, the Presidential Palace, Army Headquarters, and the Interior Minister one week before the presidential election runoff. The attackers seemed to be supporters of or connected to Vieira, who was in second place after the first round of voting.<sup>2060</sup> Excluded – election violence.

#### Unidentified armed group (134GNB)

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<sup>2056</sup> Levitt, *Illegal Peace in Africa*, 193; "Alleged Coup Plotters to Be Pardoned," IRIN, June 12, 2002, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2002/06/12/alleged-coup-plotters-be-pardoned>; "Coups in Guinea-Bissau Frustrated: President," People's Daily Online, June 12, 2002, [http://en.people.cn/200206/12/eng20020612\\_97673.shtml](http://en.people.cn/200206/12/eng20020612_97673.shtml); Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa, "Refworld | Guinea-Bissau."

<sup>2057</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa, "Refworld | Guinea-Bissau"; "Coups in Guinea-Bissau Frustrated: President"; Levitt, *Illegal Peace in Africa*, 193.

<sup>2058</sup> "L'attaque Du Camp de Mansoa Aurait Fait Deux Morts et Un Blessé," PANA Press, September 26, 2003, <http://www.panapress.com/L-attaque-du-camp-de-Mansoa-aurait-fait-deux-morts-et-un-blese--13-701297-18-lang4-index.html>; "Two Killed as Army Repels Assault on Barracks," IRIN, September 26, 2003, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/46389/guinea-bissau-two-killed-army-repels-assault-barracks>; "Attaque d'une Garnison," Afrik.com, October 1, 2003, <http://www.afrik.com/breve802.html>.

<sup>2059</sup> "L'attaque Du Camp de Mansoa Aurait Fait Deux Morts et Un Blessé."

<sup>2060</sup> "Incident Summary for GTDID: 200507160010," Global Terrorism Database, accessed February 23, 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=200507160010>; "Incident Summary for GTDID: 200507170006," Global Terrorism Database, accessed February 23, 2017, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=200507170006>; "Incident Summary for GTDID: 200507160010"; "Incident Summary for GTDID: 200507160008," Global Terrorism Database, accessed February 23, 2017, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=200507160008>.

Bus ran over an explosive device, killing twelve people. The explosion was likely a landmine laid by MFDC, which commonly lays mines in the area.<sup>2061</sup> Otherwise, it was likely from another war. Excluded.

#### Unidentified armed group (158GNB)

The ACLED-recorded bombing at military headquarters appeared to be part of escalating tensions between democratically elected President Vieira and the military elite. Earlier in 2009, the president's elite guard was accused of shooting at Army Chief General Na Wai. Na Wai pledged that his military would retaliate if he were killed. President Vieira was killed by soldiers one day after the attack on army headquarters that killed Na Wai.<sup>2062</sup> Likely internal power struggle within government, excluded.

#### Unidentified armed group (162GNB)

Attacks on homes of Lebanese nationals. Could not find reference outside ACLED. Most likely not of interest as the attack was not on state forces. Excluded.

#### Unidentified armed group (168GNB)

Independent newspaper editor was murdered, apparently by drug traffickers who hoped to silence his publication.<sup>2063</sup> Excluded.

#### Unidentified armed group (179GNB)

The former military intelligence deputy chief Colonel Samba Diallo was shot dead by men dressed in military uniform in a bar near his home. The shooting occurred only hours after polls closed for the presidential election. Diallo had been accused of involvement in the 2009 bombing that killed General Na Wai.<sup>2064</sup> Motives were unclear. Diallo was no longer in the military, so it probably does not represent an assault on the state. In addition, it appears it may have been perpetrated by state actors. Excluded.

#### Unidentified armed group (203GNB)

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<sup>2061</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Afrique de l'Ouest : Rapport sur la situation humanitaire No 24, Mars 2006," Text, ReliefWeb, March 31, 2006, <http://reliefweb.int/report/benin/afrique-de-louest-rapport-sur-la-situation-humanitaire-no-24-mars-2006>; "Guinea-Bissau," Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, accessed February 23, 2017, <http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2006/guineabissau.html#fn18>; Monique Mas, "Salif Sadio pris à revers par l'armée bissau-guinéenne," March 17, 2006, [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/075/article\\_42543.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/075/article_42543.asp); Dabo, "Guinea Bissau Troops Pound Senegal Rebels on Border," Redorbit, March 19, 2006, [http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/434530/guinea\\_bissau\\_troops\\_pound\\_senegal\\_rebels\\_on\\_border/](http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/434530/guinea_bissau_troops_pound_senegal_rebels_on_border/).

<sup>2062</sup> Alberto Dabo, "Guinea-Bissau's President, Army Chief Killed," *Reuters*, March 2, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-bissau-attack-idAFJOE52100E20090302>; Lydia Polgreen and Alan Cowell, "Soldiers Reportedly Kill President Vieira of Guinea-Bissau," *The New York Times*, March 2, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/world/africa/03guinea.html>; "General Na Wai Killed in Government Building Attack: Guinea-Bissau - WELT," DIE WELT, March 2, 2009, <https://www.welt.de/english-news/article3300063/General-Na-Wai-killed-in-government-building-attack.html>.

<sup>2063</sup> Reporters Without Borders, "Pioneer of Independent Journalism Attacked in His Newspaper's Offices," IFEX, May 21, 2010, [http://www.ifex.org/guinea-bissau/2010/05/21/de\\_barros\\_attacked/](http://www.ifex.org/guinea-bissau/2010/05/21/de_barros_attacked/).

<sup>2064</sup> "Guinea Bissau's Former Military Intelligence Chief Shot Dead in Bar," March 19, 2012, sec. World, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/guineabissau/9152347/Guinea-Bissaus-former-military-intelligence-chief-shot-dead-in-bar.html>; "Guinea-Bissau Army Denies Involvement in Assassination," Africa Daily, March 19, 2012, [http://www.africadaily.net/reports/Guinea-Bissau\\_army\\_denies\\_involvement\\_in\\_assassination\\_999.html](http://www.africadaily.net/reports/Guinea-Bissau_army_denies_involvement_in_assassination_999.html).

Minister of State for Transportation and Telecommunications was assaulted in his home. Investigations were never conclusive but suspicions point toward military personnel.<sup>2065</sup> Excluded, likely internal governmental power struggles.

#### Unidentified armed group (208GNB)

A minibus hit a landmine while swerving to avoid standing water near Mansoa. The minibus carried people en route to a funeral. The landmine was likely an unexploded ordinance from Guinea-Bissau's war for independence or fighting in the 1990s.<sup>2066</sup> Excluded.

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<sup>2065</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Guinea-Bissau 2013 Human Rights Report," Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (U.S. Department of State, 2013), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220333.pdf>; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Guinea-Bissau 2014 Human Rights Report," Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (U.S. Department of State, 2014), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236580.pdf>; Freedom House, "Guinea-Bissau | Country Report," Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2014), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/guinea-bissau>.

<sup>2066</sup> "At Least 22 Killed in Guinea-Bissau Landmine Blast," Text, ABC News, September 28, 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-28/at-least-22-killed-in-guinea-bissau-landmine/5774166>; "Guinea-Bissau Landmine 'Kills 22,'" *BBC News*, September 27, 2014, sec. Africa, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29397736>.

## Guinea-Conakry

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**Narrative Summary:** *Guinea has seen significantly less internal conflict than many of its neighbors. The vast majority of insurgent attacks in the country have been due to insurgent groups from Sierra Leone or Liberia. However, there was one group with domestic origins: The Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG). The RFDG developed out of the security vacuum present in Liberia at the time and was supported by Charles Taylor as a way to punish Guinea's Leader Lansana Conte for supporting Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). There was also spillover inter-ethnic violence related to the Second Liberian War (1999-2003) that made its way to Guinea between Mandingo and Loma groups, as the former were associated with United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO).*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** *Low*

**Explanation:** *Further research into ACLED events from 1997 to 2015 classified as involving unidentified Guinean actors found no reason to suspect the existence of additional armed groups meeting our inclusion criteria. While there were 55 incidents classified under "Unidentified Armed Group-Guinean" carrying out attacks, the majority of these that display insurgent behavior took place around early 2001, leading us to classify these groups as probably linked to the Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea.*

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### Armed Forces Revolutionary Council:

Excluded: formed in Sierra Leone and not Guinea.<sup>2067</sup>

### Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD):

Excluded: formed in Liberia, not Guinea.<sup>2068</sup>

### Revolutionary United Front (RUF):

Formed in 1991, this group is excluded as it formed before the 1997. Primary base of operations was Sierra Leone.<sup>2069</sup>

### The Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG):

I decided to exclude the RFDG from our dataset as the group did not satisfy the criteria for being an independent rebel group. Instead, the RFDG appeared to be a force that was created and controlled by Charles Taylor in order for him latter to achieve his political objectives. I came to this conclusion for several reasons. First, I was unable to determine if the group had any Guinean leadership. In interviews with the press, the group's spokesman denied that it ever had a leader. The group's spokesman was reported by some sources to be Mohamed Lamine Fofana.<sup>2070</sup> However, there is some degree of

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<sup>2067</sup> "Sierra Leone: The Main Players 5/12/99," accessed April 22, 2020, [http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin\\_51299b.html](http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_51299b.html).

<sup>2068</sup> Pike, John. "Military." *Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)*, [www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lurd.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lurd.htm).

<sup>2069</sup> "Revolutionary United Front | Guerrilla Unit, Sierra Leone," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Revolutionary-United-Front>.

<sup>2070</sup> "Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series, January 1st–31st 2001 Published February 22nd 2001." *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 38, no. 1 (2001): 14251-4286.

disagreement about this claim, as another source stated that Fofana was under arrest, but his name was in fact being used by Souleymane Farath Camara, who deserted from the Guinean Armed Forces following a mutiny in 1996.<sup>2071</sup>

Second, Guinean intelligence also claimed that a number of ex-Guinean military officers who had previously served in the Libyan Legion had a role in running the group.<sup>2072</sup> However, I view these claims made by Guinean intelligence incredibly cautiously, due to the fact that it was in Sekou Touré's interest to weaken any possible opposition to his role. The military has historically been viewed as a threat to the Guinean state, and many military officers held few qualms about kicking out a leader who had come to power through a coup.

Lastly, the lack of any independently verifiable claims of Guinean involvement leads me to view this group as a military formation created by Charles Taylor so that he would be able to attack Guinea while maintaining some degree of plausible deniability. As is shown in the Ivory Coast, discussed below, Taylor preferred using proxy forces as a way to strike at those he disagreed with without risking the international condemnation of using nominally Liberian formations, even if these forces largely consisted of Liberians and mercenaries.

United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy:

Includes: Johnson Faction (ULIMO-J), and Kromah Faction (ULIMO K):

Excluded: formed in 1991.<sup>2073</sup> Primary area of operation was Liberia.

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Arieff, Alexis. "Still Standing: Neighbourhood Wars and Political Stability in Guinea \*." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, no. 3 (2009): 331-48.

Vonhm Benda, Ebenezer Mainlawon. 2004. The internationalization of civil war: Liberia as a case study. Ph.D. diss., American University, <http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/305206571?accountid=11243> (accessed May 20, 2020).

<sup>2071</sup> "The War Moves North." *The War Moves North | Article Preview | Africa Confidential*, [www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/290/The\\_war\\_moves\\_north](http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/290/The_war_moves_north).

<sup>2072</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2073</sup> "Country Of Origin Information Report Liberia" (UK Home Office, April 2006).

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**Background:** Cote d'Ivoire has experienced two civil wars throughout the duration of the dataset. The First Ivorian Civil War, which began in 2002, had complex roots, including inter-ethnic competition over resources and long-standing political grievances between the predominantly Christian South and predominantly Muslim North of the country. The spark of the conflict was the move by President Laurent Gbago to demobilize soldiers who had served in the army of his predecessor. This led to a massive mutiny and coup attempt amongst the already poorly paid soldiers on September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2002.<sup>2075</sup> The rebel's initial attempt to take control of Abidjan failed, so they retreated to the north of the country, where they had more support. This country was then bisected between the government-controlled Southern portion, and the north, which was controlled by the Patriotic Movement for the Ivory Coast (MPCI), who later became the known as the New Forces (FNCI). The conflict soon developed into an uneasy stalemate which featured many attempts for peace.<sup>2076</sup> In 2007, warring parties reached compromise in which the head of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro, was appointed Prime Minister, and the northern territory was returned to state control soon after. In 2010, elections were held, and Alassane Ouattara, who had run against Gbago previously in 2002, won. Gbago refused to recognize the results of the election, which in turn started the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ivorian civil war, in which forces loyal to Ouattara moved to oust Gbago. The war ended relatively quickly, in April 2011. Ouattara has been president of the country ever since. His heavy-handed methods of ruling have drawn a fair bit of criticism and raised fears of a possible return to conflict in the country.<sup>2077</sup>

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** Although the country saw two civil wars throughout this period, there was extensive coverage of the conflict from many outside news sources, which meant there was extensive information on the groups which were present. Furthermore, with the exception the beginning of the civil war in 2002, much of the country was under some sort of rule, as it was either under the governance of the FNCI or the Ivorian government for much of the dataset. This meant there was little room for new rebel groups to develop.

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#### Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes (COJEP)<sup>2078</sup>

AKA: Young Patriots

COJEP is an Ivorian nationalist paramilitary youth group created by Charles Ble Goude in order to bolster Laurent Gbago. The group is excluded as it was created by the state, and therefore not an insurgent grouping.<sup>2079</sup>

#### Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire (FNCI)

AKA: FN or FAFN

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<sup>2074</sup> Throughout the rest of this section, I will use "Ivory Coast" to refer to the country.

<sup>2075</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "Côte d'Ivoire: From the MPCI to the Forces Nouvelles." In *What Rebels Want*. Cornell University Press, 2013.

<sup>2076</sup> Cheeseman, Bertrand, and Husaini, *A Dictionary of African Politics*.

<sup>2077</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2078</sup> Kone, G. (2012). The Politics of Counter-insurgency: How Did the Young Patriots Emerge in Côte d'Ivoire? *Understanding Collective Political Violence*, 222-245. doi:10.1057/9780230348318\_11

<sup>2079</sup> "A Young Patriot's Conviction and Anger," January 4, 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4079385.stm>.



The FNCI formed as result of a coalition of various Ivorian rebel groups in early 2003.<sup>2080</sup> Due to the fact that it formed as part of a coalition of already existing rebel groups, it is not counted as a new rebel group.

#### Front for the Liberation of the Great West (FLGO)

Group is excluded as it fought on the side of the Ivorian government against rebel forces in Western Ivory Coast.<sup>2081</sup> The group drew its support primarily from the We ethnic group and also recruited Liberians from refugee camps.<sup>2082</sup>

#### Ivorian Movement for the Liberation of the West of Côte d'Ivoire (MILOCI)

Group is not counted as a rebel group since it served as a militia allied with the Gbago government in the first Ivorian Civil War instead of a force fighting against it.<sup>2083</sup> The group's proclaimed itself to be an ethnic militia acting the interests of the Yacouba ethnic group, but international observers regarded group as proxy for Laurent Gbago's government forces.<sup>2084</sup>

#### Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO)

MPIGO is a rebel group which was active in the First Ivorian Civil War.<sup>2085</sup> The group's fighters began training in Liberia, near the border with the Ivory Coast, in October of 2000, which is what I use as the formation date for the group.<sup>2086</sup> I was unable to find any distinct information regarding whether the group intentionally planned on staying clandestine. Therefore, I decided to code "clandestine" as missing because no information appears to have been public about the group before it carried out its first attack in November of 2002.

I coded the group's explicitly stated goals as a change in government. The group stated that its goal was to seek revenge for the death of Robert Guéï by deposing Laurent Gbagbo.<sup>2087</sup> However, this goal was different than what Charles Taylor had in mind for the group. Taylor viewed the group as an instrument which he could use to deny Gbagbo revenue from cocoa plantations in western Ivory Coast, as well as tie down the Ivorian governments already thinned out forces.<sup>2088</sup>

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<sup>2080</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "Côte d'Ivoire: From the MPCCI to the Forces Nouvelles." In *What Rebels Want*. Cornell University Press, 2013.

<sup>2081</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2082</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). Côte d'Ivoire: The Front for the Liberation of the Great West (FLGO)... the government's attitude toward members and supporters of these four groups (2005-2006). Retrieved from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f1470e2.html>

<sup>2083</sup> United Nations. (n.d.). Côte d'Ivoire: The Front for the Liberation of the Great West (FLGO), the Patriotic Alliance of the Wê (AP-Wê), the Union of Patriots for the Resistance of the Great West (UPRGO) and the Ivorian Movement for the Liberation of the West of Côte d'Ivoire (MILOCI); the government's attitude toward members and supporters of these four groups (2005-2006). Retrieved from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f1470e2.html>

<sup>2084</sup> Country on a Precipice: The Precarious State of Human Rights and Civilian Protection in Côte d'Ivoire. (2015, April 29). Retrieved May 17, 2020, from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/05/03/country-precipice/precarious-state-human-rights-and-civilian-protection-cote>

<sup>2085</sup> Ibid, 361.

<sup>2086</sup> Ibid, 281.

<sup>2087</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." Order No. 3137052, Georgetown University, 2004, pg 278.

<sup>2088</sup> Ibid, 278.

Multiple sources said that at least half of the group was Liberians mercenaries who formerly fought under Charles Taylor.<sup>2089</sup> For this reason, I decided to code the group as developing out of another rebel group. For the variables in this section, it is important to note that we are looking at whether at least 1/3 of the group was part of a prior organization 10 years before joining said group. This 10-year time span would include the time that many of these soldiers would have been fighting in the First Liberian Civil War against Liberian government forces as rebels.

I decided to code the group as receiving support from foreign government. MPIGO received extensive support from the Liberian state, to the extent that it has been called a Liberian proxy group.<sup>2090</sup> This support included arms as well as extensive training. I decided to code the group as receiving support from “other” sources due to the group’s use of the cocoa harvest to fund operations, as the group launched its initial attack during the harvesting seasons in the Ivory Coast. They then forced villagers to harvest the cocoa, substantial amounts of which was exported abroad.<sup>2091</sup> This strategy also had the added benefit of denying revenue to Gbagbo, who was heavily reliant on cocoa exports in order to finance his war effort, which led some to believe that the attack had been specially coordinated in order to do so.<sup>2092</sup>

The group’s first small attack took place on November 28<sup>th</sup>, 2002, when they attacked the city of Danane in the far west of the Ivory Coast.<sup>2093</sup> I was unable to code the group as carrying a large attack. This is in large part due to the fact that the area where the group operated were quite chaotic. However, I found no incidents which would have indicated that the group killed over 25 government employees. I decided to code the group’s first attacks on civilians as taking place in November of 2002, when the group took over the town of Toulepleu, where atrocities against civilians are reported as having taken place.<sup>2094</sup> The part of the group that was most responsible for this where the Liberian mercenaries under its command, which would cause tension between MPIGO and other groups with more Ivorian members.<sup>2095</sup>

I coded the group’s leadership as emerging from former and current security. I decided to do this as the group’s only non-Liberian leader, Felix Doh, had served as general Robert Guéi’s bodyguard when the general was in power.<sup>2096</sup> This would qualify him as being a member of former security. In defining the leadership of MPIGO, I included Liberians who were reported as being responsible for organizing the group such as Adolphus Dolo, Kuku Dennis, and Jack the Rebel, all of whom had positions in the security system of Charles Taylor.<sup>2097</sup> I chose to include them as leaders of MPIGO due to the fact that they assisted in creating the group in Liberia and helped lead its initial attack on Danane.<sup>2098</sup>

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<sup>2089</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte d’Ivoire.” Refworld. Accessed May 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4f59460.html>.

<sup>2090</sup> Ibid, 279.

<sup>2091</sup> Ibid, 284.

<sup>2092</sup> Ibid, 242.

<sup>2093</sup> Ibid, 243.

<sup>2094</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. “Refworld | Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte d’Ivoire.” Refworld. Accessed May 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4f59460.html>.

<sup>2095</sup> Ibid, 282.

<sup>2096</sup> “Ivorian Rebel Leader ‘Killed,’” April 28, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2981383.stm>.

<sup>2097</sup> “Côte D’Ivoire: ‘The War Is Not Yet Over,’” September 28, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-d-ivoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-not-yet-over>, 18.

<sup>2098</sup> Ero, Comfort, Anne Marshall, and Roland Marchal. “L’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire : un conflit libérien ?” *Politique africaine* N° 89, no. 1 (2003): 9.

I decided to code the group as fulfilling the contestation variables. This is because it was formed following the ouster of Robert Guéï in 2000, which involved large scale protests as well as riots.<sup>2099</sup> MPIGO's membership and the majority of the civilian population around its home area shared the same ethnicity. Unlike the MPCI, most of MPIGO's members were Yacouba (also known as the Dan), or their Liberian ethnic cousins, the Gio.<sup>2100</sup> Furthermore, the areas in western Ivory Coast where they operated were also predominately inhabited by the Dan as well.<sup>2101</sup>

I decided to code the group as becoming viable, due to the fact that it had merged with another group that was still carrying out attacks in October 2003. According to the leader of MPIGO, the movement had merged with the MJP in mid-December 2002, and took the name of the MJP.<sup>2102</sup> This same report from the BBC also placed Felix Doh, the head of MPIGO, as the head of this new union of groups. By merging with the MJP, which was proxy group for the MPCI rebel group, the group eventually merged into the MPCI.

Because MPIGO's "op\_planning\_location" variable is unknown, we are unable to determine any local events. However, there are certainly national events that happened within a year prior to its formation date (interpreted as October 1, 2000). A type 1 event where opposition supporters marched against the incumbent party and clashed with police. There were eight type 2 events. These events can be summarized as some citizens protesting against the French Minister and others marching in favor of him, students marching for and against a junta leader, students protesting an upcoming election, Ivorian women marching in support of the opposition leader and demanding the junta leader's resignation, and journalists marching in protest of the beating of a colleague.

### Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)

The MJP was a group which formed in Liberia in 2002 following the ceasefire signed on October 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002.<sup>2103</sup> In contrast to MPCI, the MJP and the closely related group MPIGO have much less information on them. This is in large part attributable to their much smaller size, as they both occupied much smaller territories in the western Ivory Coast, in contrast with the large area in the north of the country where the MPCI held control.<sup>2104</sup> It coordinated with MPIGO to launch its first attack on Man November 28<sup>th</sup>, 2002, which was the first time it publicly shared its name.<sup>2105</sup> Similarly to MPIGO, I found no reference to the group before the time of its first attack in the Ivory Coast.

<sup>2099</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." Order No. 3137052, Georgetown University, 2004, pg 358.

<sup>2100</sup> "Côte D'Ivoire: 'The War Is Not Yet Over,'" September 28, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%3%B4te-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-not-yet-over>, 21.

<sup>2101</sup> Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte d'Ivoire." Refworld. Accessed May 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4f59460.html>.

<sup>2102</sup> Africa | Ivory Coast: Who are the rebels? (2003, January 15). Retrieved May 18, 2020, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2662655.stm>

<sup>2103</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." Order No. 3137052, Georgetown University, 2004, 363.

<sup>2104</sup> Ibid, 295.

<sup>2105</sup> "Côte D'Ivoire: De Nouveaux Combats à L'ouest - Côte D'Ivoire." *ReliefWeb*, reliefweb.int/report/c%3%B4te-divoire/c%3%B4te-divoire-de-nouveaux-combats-%3%A0-louest.

"Côte D'Ivoire: 'The War Is Not Yet Over,'" September 28, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%3%B4te-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-not-yet-over>, 20.

We did not include the MJP as a rebel group because it appears to be proxy group created by and often controlled by the MPCCI rebels in order to contest territory in western Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>2106</sup> In contrast, MPIGO was created by a foreign government (Liberia). The codebook states that rebel groups formed by foreign governments should be included, while here we consider MJP as an extension (into a new region) of an already-formed rebel group.

### Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI)

The MPCI was a rebel group that fought in the First Ivorian Civil War.<sup>2107</sup> The MPCI's leadership had initially planned to launch a coup against the Ivorian State. Then, following its failed attempt to take control of Abidjan on the 19<sup>th</sup> of September 2002, the group retreated to the north of the country to form a violent organization. This signifies a transition from an attempted coup to the beginning of a rebel group as it sought to organize its forces in preparation for a protracted campaign.<sup>2108</sup>

The exact founding of the group is hard to concretely pin down. The roots of the group go back to 2000, when members of the Ivorian military who had been kicked out by Gbagbo began plotting a coup. They did this in coordination with still active members of the Ivorian military.<sup>2109</sup> However, this does not count as the beginning of the group based on our codebook criteria, as the soldiers planning the action were planning for a coup, not a rebel group that would wage a protracted conflict against the state. Instead, the group transformed into a rebel group in the days after the failure of the coup as it retreated north from Abidjan to the regions it had established control over.

The time the name MPCI was in a press conference on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2002.<sup>2110</sup> Therefore, I decided to code the group naming certainty as a "3," as I know both the day, month and year MPCI was used. Due to the fact that the group had developed after a failed coup attempt, I decided to code it as 0 for the clandestine variable.

I coded the group's goal as taking control of government. This is interesting in the case of the MPCI, as the group initially had no stated motivation other than to remove Gbagbo from power.<sup>2111</sup> Many members of the group stated that their aim was to rid the country of Gbagbo's authoritarian rule: "We started the rebellion because the current regime is a dictatorship hiding under the guise of democracy."<sup>2112</sup> These negative sentiments towards Gbagbo can be traced back to the fact that Gbagbo planned on dismissing hundreds of soldiers who had been recruited under his predecessor as he was concerned about their loyalty.<sup>2113</sup> Due to the fact that most of the initial rebels had been members of the military of the Ivory Coast, I coded the group as emerging from the military. Even though most of the planning for the putsch was carried out in Ouagadougou, I was unable to code the location where the group originated or

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<sup>2106</sup> Ero, Comfort, Anne Marshall, and Roland Marchal. "L'ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire : un conflit libérien ?" *Politique africaine* N° 89, no. 1 (2003): 9.

<sup>2107</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." Order No. 3137052, Georgetown University, 2004, 224. <http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/305184327?accountid=11243>.

<sup>2108</sup> Ibid, 224.

<sup>2109</sup> Ibid, 225.

<sup>2110</sup> "Rebels Launch 'Patriotic Movement' And Vow To Oust Gbagbo." *All Africa*, October 2, 2002. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021003dya2000b6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2111</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "Côte d'Ivoire: From the MPCI to the Forces Nouvelles." In *What Rebels Want*. Cornell University Press, 2013, 142.

<sup>2112</sup> "Ivory Coast Rebel Speaks Out," September 25, 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2280251.stm>.

<sup>2113</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." 235.

the “planning\_border” variable.<sup>2114</sup> Due to the rather chaotic nature that surrounded the formation of the group, I was unable to find an exact location where the group’s leaders decided to transition from trying to take control of the central government to retreating back to the north and settling down for the long war and beginning operational planning. Furthermore, I lack information over whether this decision was made by people based in Ouagadougou, or by leaders in the Ivory Coast. However, since The MPCCI received extensive support from Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, who provided its troops with both funding and weapons.<sup>2115</sup> The support from Compaore is notable due to its extensiveness, as it included purchasing anti-aircraft missiles as well as specialist training in clandestine operations from the Burkinabe military.<sup>2116</sup> The group also received support from Charles Taylor in Liberia due to his animosity towards Gbagbo, but this was to a much lesser degree than the support it received from Compaoré.

Due to the fact that our dataset does not view coup attempts as rebel groups, I did not count the September 19<sup>th</sup> coup attempt as the initial attack. Instead, I counted the initial small attacks as occurring in September of 2002 and the MPCCI forces began clashing with government forces in the center of the country. I counted the first large attack as an incident in October of 2002, when the MPCCI executed 130 gendarmes and their families in Bouake.<sup>2117</sup> Since this attack was carried out against both agents of the government (gendarmes), as well as their civilians (their families), I decided to code for both the initial attack on civilians as well as initial large attack. Due to the fact that this attacked happened within a month of when the rebel group was formed, I coded it as satisfying both of the “civ\_attack\_time” variables. Bouake is therefore coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 0.

I coded the group’s leadership as comprising of military officers who had served both in the current and past Ivorian security establishment. The core leadership of these primarily consisted of ex-Ivorian Army Non-Commissioned Officers who had left the country for Burkina Faso. The man most often regarded as the mastermind behind the attempted putsch, Ibrahim ‘IB’ Coulibaly, served as a staff sergeant in the Ivorian army and was a member of the Presidential Guard under Gueï.<sup>2118</sup>

The Ivory Coast had seen large scale unrest in the year before up to the formation MPIGO in 2002 according to SCAD. This had included protests organized by wide number of civil society actors, including students, disabled people, police, and housewives across the country. For this reason, I decided to code the group as fulfilling the protest variable. Furthermore, following the initial coup attempt that occurred in the days before the formation of the group, there were massive riots in Abidjan against Burkinabes. For this reason, I decided to code the group as satisfying the “riot” criteria as well.

I chose to code the MPCCI as not having a shared ethnicity for its leaders. Defining ethnicity when it comes to understanding the MPCCI is difficult. The group did not draw on one ethnic group for its strength, in contrast with groups such as MODEL and LURD and Liberia. Instead, those in the group were brought together by a shared identity as Muslim northerners who were opposed to Gbagbo.<sup>2119</sup> The group continued to exist and remain viable for more than three years after 2002, and had become a de-

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<sup>2114</sup> Ibid, 236.

<sup>2115</sup> Ibid, 237.

<sup>2116</sup> “Côte D'Ivoire: ‘The War Is Not Yet Over,’” September 28, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-not-yet-over> , 10.

<sup>2117</sup> Mikaberidze, Alexander. *Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: an Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013, 328.

<sup>2118</sup> “Côte D'Ivoire: ‘The War Is Not Yet Over,’” September 28, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-not-yet-over> , 9.

<sup>2119</sup> Ibid, 238.

facto government which ruled over the north of the Ivory Coast while continuing to have clashes with the internationally recognized government in the South.<sup>2120</sup>

According to the SCAD, there were events occurring in the year prior to group formation (interpreted as September 1, 2002), but they were not local to the start of the rebel group.

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<sup>2120</sup> “Ivory Coast Profile.” *BBC News*, January 15, 2019, sec. Africa. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13287585>.



## Kenya

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**Narrative Summary:** *While Kenya has experienced significant political violence at times, relatively little of it is associated with rebel groups. The government, particularly under President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002), used organized violence to repress opposition. With the return of multiparty elections in 1992, electoral violence accompanying ethnically organized political mobilization has been a serious concern. Many of the ACLED events from 1997 to 2015 were election-related, particularly the violent attacks in the months following the controversial December 2007 elections for which the International Criminal Court would indict six prominent Kenyans.*

*Somalia's Islamist group al-Shabaab has been engaged in cross-border attacks since at least 2008, but it declared war on Kenya after Kenyan troops advanced into Somalia in 2011. Al-Hijra, al-Shabaab's Kenyan affiliate which began as the independent Muslim Youth Centre, has channeled fighters and resources to Somalia while also carrying out a string of attacks within Kenya, both near the Somali border and far away from it. While al-Shabaab and al-Hijra have failed to force the Kenyan military to withdraw from Somalia, the group's fighters have killed hundreds of Kenyans in attacks on Westgate Mall, Garissa University College, and other civilian and government targets.*

*Clashes over land, including ongoing pastoralist-farmer strife, and cattle raids were other sources of violence in the period. Although the vast majority of these clashes did not meet this project's definition of rebel activity, the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) waged a fierce 2006-2008 campaign against the Kenyan government over land redistribution scheme in the Mt. Elgon area along the Ugandan border. The SLDF's attacks on police, local officials, and ordinary civilians contributed to the formation of other armed militias, including the Moorland Defence Forces and the Political Revenge Movement, and local politicians used the SLDF to intimidate voters in the run-up to the 2007 general elections. Following the end of the post-election violence in other regions of the country, Kenya's security forces launched a large-scale assault on the SLDF and broke the movement's power.*

*The only major secessionist movement in Kenya is the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), founded in 1999. Echoing a long line of coastal agitators, the MRC's leaders demand independence for Kenya's Indian Ocean coastline, a strip of land which had been technically under the Zanzibar sultan's sovereignty prior to 1963. Fighters with suspected MRC links have attacked security forces and other targets in and around Mombasa, but the group itself has public denied any responsibility for violence. The government has arrested many members and leaders and tried to ban the organization, but the Court of Appeals overturned the most recent ban in 2016. There also several smaller groups related to MRC, such as Muyeye and the Nyuki Movement, operating in the coastal region.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** medium

**Explanation:** *Kenya had a large number of unidentified events in ACLED. Given the salience of ethnic divisions in mobilization political support in Kenya, it is quite possible that some of the events attributed to ethnic militias or which appear to be "ethnic violence" were actually the work of organized groups with the types of political goals normally associated with rebel groups. Among all the violence attributed to al-Shabaab and al-Hijra, it is entirely possible that there are additional Kenyan armed groups which have linked up with al-Shabaab. Whether or not the MRC has ties to al-Shabaab, international Islamist terrorist networks, and the Tanzanian secessionist group Uamsho is unclear. The relationship between the MRC and a number of lesser known, seemingly likeminded coastal organizations such as Muyeye is also unclear. It may be the case that all of these groups are affiliates or splinters of MRC, but one or more of them may also be independent groups in their own right.*

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Foreign rebel groups listed in ACLED included OLF: Oromo Liberation Front, SPLA/M factions, SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement, LRA: Lord's Resistance Army, Tigray People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, PRA: People's Redemption Army, and UWSLF: United Western Somali Liberation Front.

Political parties and groups implicated in violence included KANU: Kenya African National Union, NARC: National Rainbow Coalition, SDP: Social Democratic Party, NDP: National Development Party, FORD: Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, PNU: Party of National Unity, ODM: Orange Democratic Movement, National Labour Party, TNA: The National Alliance, Amani Coalition, UDF: United Democratic Forum, RC: Republican Congress, and the pro-government Banana Political Militia. None of these met our inclusion criteria, and attacks associated with them or their supporters were generally violence aimed at affecting election outcomes.

None of the many groups ACLED coded as ethnic militias met our inclusion criteria.

### ***Major Foreign Groups in Kenya***

#### **Al Qaeda** [3 events, 1998-2012]

Osama Bin Laden founded al Qaeda in 1988 as an organization to enable the mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan to expand their struggle to other countries.<sup>2121</sup> Al Qaeda operatives were responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.<sup>2122</sup>

Al Qaeda was also associated with a coordinated pair of Mombasa attacks on November 28, 2002. Three individuals launched a suicide attack on Mombasa's only Israeli-owned hotel, minutes after other unknown assailants fired two missiles from shoulder-mounted missile launchers at an Israeli-owned charter airliner departing Mombasa's international airport, narrowly missing the aircraft.<sup>2123</sup> Although ACLED attributes these attacks to The Government of Universal Palestine in Exile, Army of Palestine Militia, and Islamist Militia (Kenya) [1100-1102KEN, 2904KEN], GTD points to Al-Qaeda, which is consistent with U.S. and Israeli governmental assessments.<sup>2124</sup> The Government of Universal Palestine in Exile, the Army of Palestine, a previously unknown organization claiming to be based in Lebanon, was the first to claim responsibility for the attacks, but Al-Qaeda later released its own online statement taking credit.<sup>2125</sup> While Kenyans were arrested for alleged involvement in the incidents, particularly the

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<sup>2121</sup> Mapping Militant Organizations Project, "Al Qaeda," Official, Stanford University, August 18, 2015, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21>; Jayshree Bajoria and Greg Bruno, "Al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida)," Official, Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2012, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126>.

<sup>2122</sup> LARRY NEUMEISTER, "Second Bombing Suspect Arrives in U.S.; Said to Blame Bin Laden," *Associated Press Newswires*, August 29, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010915du8t0g8la&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2123</sup> Matthew Rosenberg, "Suicide Attackers Strike Hotel in Kenya," *AP Online*, November 28, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=asp0000020021128dybs007pt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2124</sup> Mark Lavie, "White House Document Accuses Palestinians of Violating Commitments to Stop Violence," *Associated Press Newswires*, December 5, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020021205dyc500ngk&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Al-Qaeda Suspicions Deepen over Kenya Attacks: Mofaz," *Agence France-Presse*, December 1, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020021201dyc1007q3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2125</sup> Maggie Michael, "Statement Attributed to Al-Qaida Claims Responsibility for Kenya Attacks," *Associated Press Newswires*, December 2, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020021203dyc3004hh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

missile firing, all sources attribute ultimate responsibility to a non-Kenyan organization or organizations.

Unlike Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, Al Qaeda did not directly attack the Kenyan government but used Kenyan territory to attack foreign targets in the country. Some Kenyan nationals were involved in its activities, but leadership, resources, and many of the personnel involved in the 1998 and 2002 attacks came from outside Kenya. Excluded.

#### Al Shabaab [264 events, 2008-2015]

The Somali group Al Shabaab formed in the early 2000s as the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union, a broad Islamist coalition seeking to restore order to anarchic Somalia, and emerged as an independent force following ICU's 2006 military defeat by Ethiopian forces.<sup>2126</sup> ACLED and GTD identify 2008 as the year of the earliest Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya, but the group's activities drastically increased following Kenya's mid-October 2011 decision to deploy military troops to battle Al Shabaab in Somalia, an escalation of the conflict triggered in part by the Somali group's continued cross-border raids, including the kidnapping of foreigners on Kenyan soil.<sup>2127</sup> Al Shabaab, in turn, promised retribution unless Kenya withdrew its troops, a threat the group has repeated multiple times in subsequent years.<sup>2128</sup> Al Shabaab has been responsible for most recent anti-government attacks in Kenya, various small grenade attacks and cross-border raids but also high-profile, mass casualty attacks on Nairobi's Westgate Mall (2013) and Garissa University (2015).<sup>2129</sup> Excluded.

#### Hizbul Islam (HI) [5 events, 2009]

The February 2009 merger of four smaller Somali rebel groups led to the formation of Hizbul Islam as an Islamist rebel organization challenging Somalia's weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG). After losing ground to its sometime ally Al Shabaab, a weakened Hizbul Islam officially merged with Al Shabaab in December 2010.<sup>2130</sup> Hizbul Islam was much less involved in Kenya than Al Shabaab, with its activities in the country primarily related its fighters' flight in the face of Al Shabaab advances.<sup>2131</sup> Excluded.

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<sup>2126</sup> Mapping Militants Project, "Al Shabaab," Official, Stanford University, February 20, 2016, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61>; Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, "Al-Shabab," Official, Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650>.

<sup>2127</sup> "Kenyan Forces Advance on Strategic Somali Rebel Bases," *Agence France Presse*, October 18, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020111018e7ai003jy&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Mustafá Haji Abdinur, "Kenyan Forces Hunt Militants Deep inside Somalia," *Agence France Presse*, October 17, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020111017e7ah005my&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2128</sup> Kevin J. Kelley and Peter Leftie, "Al-Shabaab Warns of More Attacks in Kenya," *Daily Nation*, April 1, 2012, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Al+Shabaab+warns+of+more+attacks+in+Kenya+/-/1056/1378252/-/6tf861z/-/index.html>; Gregg Carlstrom, "Al-Shabab Threatens to Attack Kenya," *Al Jazeera*, October 18, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/20111017171543493140.html>.

<sup>2129</sup> Christian Purefoy, Greg Botelho, and Ashley Fantz, "Al-Shabaab's Long, Bloody Legacy with Kenya," *CNN*, April 3, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CNNWR00020150403eb43001xh&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Daniel Howden, "Terror in Nairobi: The Full Story behind al-Shabaab's Mall Attack," *The Guardian*, October 4, 2013, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya>.

<sup>2130</sup> Mapping Militant Organizations Project, "Hizbul Islam," Stanford University, June 20, 2016, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/113>.

<sup>2131</sup> Noor Ali, "Fighting Pushes Somalis, Islamist Rebels, into Kenya," *Mail & Guardian Online*, November 30, 2009, sec. Africa, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AIWMAG0020091130e5bu0002v&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Security at Border Up as Somali Islamists Advance," *All Africa*, December 3, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020091204e5c40002v&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

## Named Kenyan Groups

**Al-Hijra** [3332KEN, recruiting of Kenyan youth for fighting in Somalia]

AKAs: Muslim Youth Centre

Al Hijra is a militant Islamist organization affiliated with Somalia's Al Shabaab. The group began around 2006 as an informal self-help organization associated with the Pumwani Riyadhha Mosque in Nairobi's Majengo area and focused on providing religious counseling to Muslim youth. Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali, a key leader of the group, led radical youths' 2007 successful effort to remove five allegedly corrupt top officials of Nairobi's Pumwani Riyadhha Mosque, an incident which led to one death as the youth seized control, and subsequently formally founded the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) as a community-based organization in December 2008.<sup>2132</sup> Aboud Rogo Mohamed, a Mombasa-based radical imam acquitted of involvement in the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel, had significant influence on the MYC before his 2012 assassination.<sup>2133</sup> The MYC organized Kenyan youth to join the Al Shabaab fighters in Somalia, and Ali and Rogo both spent time in Somalia, the former relocating there permanently in 2009.<sup>2134</sup> Several Kenyans, at least one of whom had MYC connections, were allegedly involved in facilitating Al-Shabaab's first major attack outside of Somalia, the July 2010 suicide bombings of World Cup viewing locations in Kampala.<sup>2135</sup> MYC/al-Hijra members came from many ethnic groups, and the group was initially based in Nairobi, coded as 0 for the "rural" variable.<sup>2136</sup>

MYC's primary focus before its formal merger with Al Shabaab was providing recruits, funds, and other support for the latter's struggle in Somalia, rather than attacking Kenyan state forces and institutions. The Kenyan organization did not take credit for any attacks prior to its merger, nor do event databases such as ACLED or GTD attribute any attacks to the group. There is evidence of possible MYC involvement in one pre-merger Kenyan attack as well as the group's intentions to wage war in Kenya. The *Daily Nation* newspaper identified Al-Ghuraba, the "combat wing" of MYC/Al-Hijra, as the suspected culprit behind the June 2010 grenade attack (2876KEN in ACLED) on a church-sponsored rally against the proposed national constitution in

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<sup>2132</sup> Fred Mukinda, "Masterminds Target Youth to Execute Terror Attacks," *Daily Nation*, March 3, 2014, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Masterminds-target-youth-to-execute-terror-attacks/1056-2228164-214vdr/index.html>; Nyambega Gisesa, "Sheikh Ali: The Making of a Kenyan Terrorist Commander," *Daily Nation*, January 22, 2012, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/The-making-of-a-Kenyan-terrorist-commander-/1056-1312182-gca4fb/index.html>; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)" (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 18, 2011), 140, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/viewm\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433](http://www.un.org/ga/search/viewm_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433).

<sup>2133</sup> Wycliffe Muga, "Kenya: The Mysterious Life and Death of Sheikh Aboud Rogo," *The Star (Nairobi)*, September 2, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201209020025.html>; Anthony Kitimo and Philip Muyanga, "Sheikh Rogo Arrested Again, Weapons Seized," *All Africa*, January 30, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120130e81u000r5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Kevin J. Kelley and Jacob Ng'etich, "America Bans Kenyan Linked to Al-Shabaab," *Daily Nation*, July 30, 2011, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/America-bans-Kenyan-linked-to-al-Shabaab/-/1056/1210368/-/1dypiz/-/index.html>.

<sup>2134</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "The Future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a Foresight Project," World Watch: Expert Notes, May 2013, 62; Kelley and Ng'etich, "America Bans Kenyan Linked to Al-Shabaab."

<sup>2135</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "The Future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a Foresight Project," 62; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)," July 18, 2011, 136.

<sup>2136</sup> Anneli Botha, "Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council," ISS Papers (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, September 4, 2014), 11, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council>.

Nairobi's Uhuru Park.<sup>2137</sup> The UN Security Council's Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia found that the MYC was taking steps toward challenging the Kenyan government domestically. Sheikh Ali called for attacks in Kenya and in a December 2010 message he asked Kenyans to consider a hypothetical man who volunteers to blow himself up in Parliament.<sup>2138</sup> The group reportedly began to seriously plan for attacks within Kenya in addition to continuing its support for Al-Shabaab's operations in Somalia and established two cells in late 2011 which began identifying possible Nairobi targets.<sup>2139</sup> Government sources suspected that MYC members were involved in some of the attacks and bombings that took place in Kenya following Kenya's October 2011 deployment of troops to Somalia, and MYC celebrated the attacks in its announcements and social media posts.<sup>2140</sup> For the purposes of our dataset, Al-Hijra/MYC's first attack on civilians was the June 2010 Uhuru Park bombing, though with some uncertainty because only a single credible source (*Daily Nation*) links the attack to the group, and its next attacks would have been the string of late 2011 attacks, largely against non-government targets. The first Al-Hijra/MYC attacks against the Kenyan state occurred after the January 2012 merger with Al-Shabaab. In accordance with our merger coding guidelines, the first post-merger Al-Shabaab attack targeting Kenyan government personnel within Kenya's borders, a January 11, 2012, raid on a police camp in northeastern Kenya, counts as Al-Hijra/MYC's first attack on the government.<sup>2141</sup> Al-Shabaab's first post-merger attack within Kenya which caused at least 25 fatalities and at least partially targeted government personnel was its June 2014 assault on the coastal town of Mpeketoni, the targets of which included the town's police station.<sup>2142</sup>

In January 2012, Al-Shabaab named MYC leader Ahmed Iman Ali, based in Somalia since 2009, as the leader of its Kenyan operations and featured him preaching in Swahili in an online video.<sup>2143</sup> Sheikh Ali called for jihad in Kenya as retribution for Kenya's intervention

<sup>2137</sup> Sunday Nation Team, "Al-Shabaab Commander Suspected of Running Businesses in Nairobi," *Daily Nation*, August 13, 2016, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/al-shabaab-commander-suspected-of-running-businesses-in-nairobi/1056-3343992-otp5y/index.html>.

<sup>2138</sup> Nyambega Gisesa, "The Final Curtains on Controversial Muslim Youth Centre Read More at: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/Lifestyle/Article/2000135687/the-Final-Curtains-on-Controversial-Muslim-Youth-Centre>," *Standard*, September 21, 2014, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/lifestyle/article/2000135687/the-final-curtains-on-controversial-muslim-youth-centre>.

<sup>2139</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "The Future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a Foresight Project," 62.

<sup>2140</sup> Frederick Nzes, "Terrorist Attacks in Kenya Reveal Domestic Radicalization," *CTC (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) Sentinel*, October 2012, 15; Christopher Anzalone, "Kenya's Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabab's East African Recruitment," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point* (blog), October 29, 2012, 12, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/kenyas-muslim-youth-center-and-al-shababs-east-african-recruitment>; Anneli Botha, "Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism," ISS Papers (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, April 2013), 8, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164232/Paper245.pdf>; Neela Ghoshal, "Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military Abuses against Ethnic Somalis" (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2012), 13, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisals/kenyan-police-and-military-abuses-against-ethnic-somalis>.

<sup>2141</sup> "Six Kenyans Shot Dead near Somali Border: Police," *Agence France Presse*, January 12, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020120112e81c002c7&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Al Shabaab Attack Kenyan Police Camp, Kill 7," *Reuters News*, January 12, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020120112e81c000qr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2142</sup> Onyango Oloo, "Lessons From Mpeketoni," *All Africa*, November 24, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020141124eabo0015f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Islamist Gunmen Kill at Least 49 in Kenya Attack," *Agence France Presse*, June 16, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020140616ea6g003ye&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2143</sup> "Local Said Picked to Head Somali Islamist Al-Shabab in Kenya," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, January 17, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020120117e81h000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Dominic Wabala, "Majengo Youth 'Recruiting Terrorists,'" *All Africa*, July 20, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120721e87k00028&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



against Al-Shabaab in Somalia.<sup>2144</sup> These announcements marked the formal merger of MYC into Al-Shabaab's regional command structure, but analysts noted that the two organizations had already closely coordinated for several years.<sup>2145</sup> MYC changed its name to Al-Hijra in February 2012, in part to avoid UN and Kenyan government actions targeting assets held in MYC's name.<sup>2146</sup> For the purposes of our dataset, Al-Hijra/MYC was an independent group from its formal founding in December 2008 until the January 2012 merger and has been a constituent unit of Al-Shabaab since then.

During its formative years, Al-Hijra/MYC received much of its funding through the Pumwani Riyadh Mosque Committee (PRMC), the mosque's governing board on which Sheikh Ali served as organizing secretary following his 2007 takeover. With Sheikh Ali's influence, MYC members became closely involved in collecting revenue from the PRMC's Gikomba market and other local businesses. MYC fighters in Somalia received funds which had ostensibly been donated to the PRMC for reconstruction of the mosque.<sup>2147</sup> SCAD recorded qualifying anti-government protests and riots of sufficient size to qualify as contestation in the year preceding December 2008. Numerous Type 1, 3, and 4 as well as Type 2 contestation events were recorded in SCAD in 2008 including large riots after irregularities in election results and protests against rising food prices in Nairobi Province, the province in which the group formed. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

The integration of Al-Hijra/MYC into Al-Shabaab came as Al-Shabaab escalated its attacks against both government and civilian targets within Kenya. Its efforts to pressure Kenya to withdraw its troops from Somalia had begun following the October 2011 deployment of Kenyan troops across the border and continue into 2017.<sup>2148</sup> The return of Kenyans who had fought alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia strengthened Al-Hijra.<sup>2149</sup> Among other attacks, Al-Hijra members participated in the 2013 Al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall, the second largest Al-Shabaab attack on Kenyan soil.<sup>2150</sup> Kenyan Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, also known as Ikrima and a top al-Shabaab commander until he was sidelined following the 2013 internal purge, initially joined al-Shabaab through al-Hijra and was instrumental in planning the Westgate attack; the U.S. Navy SEALs launched an unsuccessful 2013 raid to capture him at his residence along the southern Somali coast.<sup>2151</sup> Expanding beyond MYC's Nairobi and Mombasa roots, Al-Hijra has been active in the Garissa area near the Somali border.<sup>2152</sup> The Kenyan

<sup>2144</sup> patrick mayoyo, "Al-Shabaab Video Declares Holy War Against Country," *All Africa*, January 11, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120111e81b000h9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2145</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "The Future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a Foresight Project," 61.

<sup>2146</sup> Frederick Nzes, "Al-Hijra: Al-Shabaab's Affiliate in Kenya," *CTC (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) Sentinel*, May 2014; Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)," July 13, 2012, 16.

<sup>2147</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)," July 18, 2011, 146–48.

<sup>2148</sup> Carlstrom, "Al-Shabab Threatens to Attack Kenya."

<sup>2149</sup> Nicholas Kulish, Josh Kron, and Josh Kron, "Extremist Group Gains Foothold Among Kenyans," *The New York Times*, October 10, 2013, Late Edition-Final edition, sec. Foreign Desk; SECTA.

<sup>2150</sup> Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia," 19–20; Aman Sethi, "Westgate Mall Attackers Identified," *The Hindu*, October 6, 2013, sec. INTERNATIONAL, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=THINDU0020131006e9a6000ao&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2151</sup> "The Most Dangerous Kenyan Alive: A Profile of the Elusive Mohamed Abdikadir, a.k.a. Ikrima," *The Star (Kenya)*, August 8, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=STARKY0020150812eb880005r&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2152</sup> Ben Brumfield CNN, "Garissa University Attack: The Problems Plaguing Kenya's Security Efforts," *CNN Wire*, April 6, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CNWNR00020150406eb46002gx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



government named Al-Hijra's emir, Ahmed Iman Ali, as one of the planners behind the 2015 assault on Garissa University College, the bloodiest Al-Shabaab attack in Kenya yet.<sup>2153</sup>

The Kenyan government has moved aggressively against Al-Hijra as part of its larger efforts to root out Al-Shabaab operatives and sympathizers within the country. Unknown assailants, widely suspected to be connected to the government's security forces, have assassinated a number of radical Kenyan imams associated with Al-Shabaab and Al-Hijra, most notably Sheikh Rogo and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff (Makuburi).<sup>2154</sup> Although IHS Global Insight listed Al-Hijra as a defunct Al-Shabaab affiliate in an October 2016 briefing, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) investigators identified Al-Hijra as still active though weakened in an August 2016 report.<sup>2155</sup> Because Al-Hijra/Shabaab was still committing attacks against state targets in Kenya more than three years after MYC's founding, the group meets the dataset's viability criteria.

### Kaya Bombo Raiders

AKAs: Militia (Students), Unidentified Armed Group (Kenya) in ACLED

On August 13, 1997, hundreds of armed raiders attacked Mombasa's Likoni police station, tourist booth, and district administration. They killed police officers, seized arms and ammunition, and then continued attacking the surrounding neighborhoods. Violence continued into November and forced hundreds of thousands of area residents to flee.<sup>2156</sup> The attackers are commonly referred to as the Kaya Bombo raiders, named after the forest held to be sacred by Mijikenda people where the fighters swore oaths. The Institute for Strategic Studies reports that the Kaya Bombo fighters were trained "at the instigation of prominent politicians and with the support of the government and the military" and used "to foment ethnic violence."<sup>2157</sup> The ruling but embattled Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party used longstanding grievances held by many residents of the Coast, particularly the indigenous Mijikenda peoples, to mobilize the forces ahead of the 1997 general elections.<sup>2158</sup> Attacks targeted residents from upcountry ethnic groups such as the Luo who had more recently arrived at the Coast and had voted against KANU in the 1992 elections. Leaders of the later Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), though sympathetic to the grievances motivating the 1997 attacks, recognized the KANU operatives' manipulation of the Kaya Bombo

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<sup>2153</sup> Harun Maruf, "Kenyan University Reopens Nine Months After Horrific Attack," *Voice of America Press Releases and Documents*, January 4, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=VOA0000020160104ec140005s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2154</sup> "Gunned down in Mombasa the Clerics That Have Died," *IRIN Africa Service*, July 28, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IRINASE020140728ea7s00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Nyambega Gisesa, "Profile of Sheikh Abubakar Shariff Alias Makaburi," *Standard*, April 2, 2014,

<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000108425/profile-of-sheikh-abubakar-shariff-alias-makaburi>.

<sup>2155</sup> IGAD Security Sector Program and Sahan Foundation, "Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat" (Addis Ababa: Intergovernmental Authority on Development, August 15, 2016), 25–29,

[https://www.igad.int/attachments/article/1373/1413\\_ISSP%20Report%20on%20Al%20Shabaab%202016%20FINAL3%20copy.pdf](https://www.igad.int/attachments/article/1373/1413_ISSP%20Report%20on%20Al%20Shabaab%202016%20FINAL3%20copy.pdf). IGAD indicated that Al-Shabaab's central leadership had lost confidence in Al-Hijra and set up a parallel East African militant group called Jaysh Ayman which predominantly carried out attacks along the Kenyan coast.

<sup>2156</sup> Alamin Mazrui, "Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood: Violence, Ethnicity and the State in Coastal Kenya" (Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission, n.d.), 1.

<sup>2157</sup> Adams Oloo, "Marginalisation and the Rise of Militia Groups in Kenya: The Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force," in *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa*, ed. Okumu Wafula and Augustine Ikelegbe (Tshwane (Pretoria): Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 150, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MilitiasRebelsIslamistMilitantsNov2010.pdf>.

<sup>2158</sup> "Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed," *Africa Briefing* (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 13, 2016), 8, note 25, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-s-coast-devolution-disappointed>; Mazrui, "Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood: Violence, Ethnicity and the State in Coastal Kenya," 50–53.

fighters and emphasized that their movement was not serving politicians.<sup>2159</sup> Excluded as a pro-government (or at least indirectly pro-ruling-party) force.

### Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)

The Mombasa Republican Council is an organization advocating for the secession of the Kenyan coastal strip which had been ruled by Zanzibar's sultan for most of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Like Tanzania's Uamsho, the MRC consistently denies any connection to violence despite numerous government claims to the contrary. Unlike Uamsho and al Shabaab, the MRC is officially non-sectarian and includes Christians, Muslims, and followers of traditional religions among its membership.<sup>2160</sup>

By at least some accounts, the MRC began in 1999, but very little is known about its early years.<sup>2161</sup> There is not conclusive evidence to identify a significant block of its initial members as coming from any preexisting organization. While some sources claim many MRC members had been Kaya Bomba fighters in 1997, MRC leaders have consistently denied such links.<sup>2162</sup>

Contrary to the claims of two early MRC leaders who had since left the movement that secession was not part of the group's original agenda, coastal secession and autonomy were likely the group's political goals from the beginning as other sources assert.<sup>2163</sup> However, without any public statement of goals or enough information to infer political goals within the group's first year, all three of our tracked political goals are coded as missing in the dataset. In its first organized move toward achieving its goals, the MRC sent a January 1, 2005, letter to Queen

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<sup>2159</sup> Paul Goldsmith, "An Oral History of the MRC, Part I," *Kwani?* 8 (2015): 55; Paul Goldsmith, "The Mombasa Republican Council: Conflict Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for Engagement" (Nairobi: U.S. Agency for International Development, November 2011), 6, 26,

[http://www.kecosce.org/downloads/MRC\\_Conflict\\_Assessment\\_Threats\\_and\\_Opportunities\\_for\\_Engagement.pdf](http://www.kecosce.org/downloads/MRC_Conflict_Assessment_Threats_and_Opportunities_for_Engagement.pdf).

<sup>2160</sup> Justin Willis and George Gona, "Pwani C Kenya? Memory, Documents and Secessionist Politics in Coastal Kenya," *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (January 1, 2013): 65, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads064>; Paul Goldsmith, "An Oral History of the MRC, Part I," *Kwani?* 8 (2015): 61; Anneli Botha, "Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council," ISS Papers (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, September 4, 2014), 8, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council>.

<sup>2161</sup> Ramadhan Rajab, "Mombasa Republic Council: Criminal Gang or Legit Movement," *The Star*, August 23, 2016, [http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/08/23/mombasa-republican-council-criminal-gang-or-legit-movement\\_c1407137?platform=hootsuite](http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/08/23/mombasa-republican-council-criminal-gang-or-legit-movement_c1407137?platform=hootsuite); Robert M. Maxon and Thomas P. Ofcansky, "Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)," in *Historical Dictionary of Kenya*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 231; Emmanuel Kisiangani, "Kenya's Mombasa Republican Council: Liberators or Nascent Radical Fanatics?," *ISS Today* (blog), June 27, 2012, <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-mombasa-republican-council-liberators-or-nascent-radical-fanatics>; James Macharia, "Insight - Separatist Storm Brewing on Kenya's Coast," *Reuters*, July 23, 2012, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-coast-mrc-idUKBRE86M0H820120723>.

<sup>2162</sup> Goldsmith, "An Oral History of the MRC, Part I," 2015, 55; Goldsmith, "The Mombasa Republican Council: Conflict Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for Engagement," 6, 26; Andrew McGregor, "Kenya's Coast Province and the Mombasa Republican Council: Islamists, Separatists or Political Pawns?," *Terrorism Monitor* 10, no. 20 (November 2, 2012): 8; Masheti Masinjila and Naana Marekia, "Violence and Transition Project Phase 3 (VTP 3): The Transformation of Violence through an African Comparative Lens: Lessons for Violence Prevention" (Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa, 2012), 10, <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/violence-and-transition-project-phase-3-vtp-3-the-transformation-of-violence-through-an-african-comparative-lens-lessons-for-violence-prevention/>.

<sup>2163</sup> Tobias Chanji, "MRC Founders: Separation Was Not Part of Original Agenda," *Standard*, October 16, 2012, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000068550/mrc-founders-separation-was-not-part-of-original-agenda>; Goldsmith, "An Oral History of the MRC, Part I," 2015, 54; Maxon and Ofcansky, "Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)"; Ngumbao Kithi, "'Gang' Seeks 'Independence' for Mombasa from Kenya," *Standard*, November 22, 2010, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000022978/gang-seeks-independence-for-mombasa-from-kenya>.

Elizabeth II appealing for British support for coastal secession.<sup>2164</sup> Former MRC leaders Khatib Mjaka Mtengo and Suleiman Said Yeya, the group's founding secretary general and chairman, respectively, claimed that the group held its first public meeting, an educational discussion about the treaties related to the coast, in January 2005 in Ukwanda, the largest city in Kwale County outside of the coastal metropolis of Mombasa.<sup>2165</sup> The MRC's initial leaders did not come from any of our tracked leadership categories (government, security forces, other rebellions). In its 2013 final report, the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) convened to investigate Kenya's 2007-08 post-election violence concluded that "[l]and-related injustices at the coast lie at the root of the emergence of the Mombasa Republican Council."<sup>2166</sup> SCAD recorded qualifying anti-government protests of sufficient size to count as contestation in 1998. Numerous Type 1, 3, and 4 as well as a few Type 2 contestation events were listed in SCAD. Because no group formation location is coded, the coder recorded contestation variables as "unknown". No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

The MRC's initial leadership was predominantly Mijikenda, a broad ethnic label covering 10 coastal tribes identifying as indigenous to the region.<sup>2167</sup> Although the Coast Province was not ethnically homogenous and contained Arabs, Waswahili, Mijikenda, and more recently arrived "up-country" groups, the MRC's main bases of support were in Kwale and Kilifi Counties outside of Mombasa, and both counties were more than 80 percent Mijikenda in the 2009 national census.<sup>2168</sup>

While all current and former leaders maintain that the group was founded as a non-violent organization, accusations of violence have followed it throughout its existence. In March 2005, Kenyan police tipped off by local informants surprised a group of 100 to 300 youth receiving weapons training in Mulungunipa forest outside Kwale town and opened fire after the youth reportedly attacked. The government claimed that the fighters had taken oaths and that the group had connections to coastal political leaders, including MPs, and that its objectives included secession.<sup>2169</sup> Mtengo and Yeya claimed that the Mulungunipa militants were MRC members eager to more aggressively challenge the state.<sup>2170</sup> Researchers reported persistent rumors that MRC's armed wing was based in Mulungunipa.<sup>2171</sup> In a June 2006 raid on a similar group of

<sup>2164</sup> Goldsmith, "An Oral History of the MRC, Part I," 2015, 54; Justin Willis and George Gona, "Pwani C Kenya? Memory, Documents and Secessionist Politics in Coastal Kenya," *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (January 1, 2013): 62, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads064>.

<sup>2165</sup> Chanji, "MRC Founders: Separation Was Not Part of Original Agenda."

<sup>2166</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. IIB)" (Nairobi: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, May 3, 2013), 54, <http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc/4/>.

<sup>2167</sup> Chanji, "MRC Founders: Separation Was Not Part of Original Agenda"; Elkana Jacob, "MRC Leaders Live in Squalor [Opinion]," *All Africa*, October 27, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121027e8ar0004w&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2168</sup> Daniel Tsuma Nyassy, "Hezron Awiti Strikes Deal with Mijikenda Community on Governor Race - Daily Nation," *Daily Nation*, February 28, 2017, <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Awiti-strikes-deal-with-Mijikenda-community/1954178-3830762-15tbg9p/index.html>; Kathleen Klaus, "Contentious Land Narratives and the Nonescalation of Election Violence: Evidence from Kenya's Coast Region," *African Studies Review* 60, no. 2 (August 26, 2017): 64.

<sup>2169</sup> "Four Kenyan MPs under Probe over Alleged Link with 'Secessionist' Coastal Group," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, March 27, 2005, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMF0020050327e13r0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Patrick Beja, "State Dispels Fears of Clashes At the Coast," *All Africa*, March 18, 2005, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020050319e13i0000m&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2170</sup> Chanji, "MRC Founders: Separation Was Not Part of Original Agenda."

<sup>2171</sup> Kisiangani, "ISS Africa | Kenya's Mombasa Republican Council"; Goldsmith, "The Mombasa Republican Council: Conflict Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for Engagement," 23.

youth reportedly undergoing an oath-taking ceremony in Vuga forest near Kwale, police recovered an MRC pamphlet in Kiswahili calling for readers to fight for secession.<sup>2172</sup> In June 2007, in the run-up to the December 2007 general elections, police raided an alleged MRC militant training camp in Mulungunipa forest, killing one man who attacked them with a machete and arresting 25 MRC members. The police claimed that MRC planned to attack police stations ahead of the elections and that the group had 800 followers.<sup>2173</sup> That raid is the first of 51 ACLED incidents in the 1997-2015 period involving MRC. Despite the allegations of the MRC's violent intentions, there was little firm evidence to tie the MRC to any specific attacks in its first decade, and the MRC's Abeid Abdalla Kavanga testified on the group's behalf before the TJCR that investigated the 2007-2008 election violence.<sup>2174</sup> In August 2008, police arrested three alleged MRC members on charges of trying to steal police officers' guns from the Diani Police Station.<sup>2175</sup>

On October 20, 2010, the Kenyan government banned 33 armed groups, including the MRC.<sup>2176</sup> The MRC challenged the ban in court, and in November 2010, Likoni MRC branch chairman Rashid Kiviyaso claimed that the RC had 15,000 members and was launching a massive recruitment drive to register 100,000 more in the coming year.<sup>2177</sup> Throughout 2011, Kenyan security forces arrested more than 100 suspected MRC members. During a July 2011 dock workers' strike against the proposed privatization of the Mombasa port, a plan the MRC had unsuccessfully challenged in court, suspected MRC members threatened to burn the port if the proposal went ahead.<sup>2178</sup> MRC Secretary-General Nzai Rau Randu denied any MRC involvement in a December 18, 2011, attack on two police officers, killing one, in Likoni.<sup>2179</sup>

Because the MRC's public position has been consistent denial of any involvement in violence and because of the lack of clear evidence linking the MRC to many of the alleged attacks, it is very likely that our dataset does not correctly identify the group's first attacks. The fact that much of the violence associated with the MRC was "opportunistic and locally organized" adds to the difficulty in identifying MRC attacks.<sup>2180</sup> As the 2013 general elections approached, the MRC became more credibly implicated in several violent attacks against government targets. As early as January 2012, the MRC threatened to disrupt the 2013 elections unless the government permitted coastal secession.<sup>2181</sup> In a February 29, 2012 attack that we

<sup>2172</sup> "Kenya: Hate Leaflets Said to Be Circulating in Coast Province," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 21, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020060621e261002jr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2173</sup> Celestynne Achieng, "Kenyan Police Kill One, Discover Gang Training Camp," *Reuters News*, June 20, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070620e36k001ea&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2174</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. IIB)," 101, 210.

<sup>2175</sup> "Kenyan Police Step up Hunt for 'Terror Suspect,'" *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, August 6, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020080806e486002mh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2176</sup> Gus Selassie, "Kenyan Government Targets Organised Gangs," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, October 22, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020101022e6am0002q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2177</sup> "Outlawed Kenyan Pro-Secessionist Group Goes to Court over Ban," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 18, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020101218e6ci0028l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kenyan Outlawed Group on 'Massive Recruitment' of Coastal Youth," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, November 15, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020101115e6bf001p5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2178</sup> Brian Otieno, "Dock Workers Cripple Port As Strike Enters Day Two," *All Africa*, July 25, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110725e77p001qa&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2179</sup> Maureen Mudi, "Police Officer Killed By Gang in Likoni Attack," *All Africa*, December 21, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020111221e7cl0003y&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kenyan Secessionist Group Denies Role in Attack on Police Officers," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 22, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020111222e7cm000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2180</sup> "Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed," *Africa Briefing* (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 13, 2016), 10, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-s-coast-devolution-disappointed>.

<sup>2181</sup> Kerubo Lornah, "We Will Block Next Year's General Election, Says MRC," *All Africa*, January 13, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120113e81d000gf&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

identify as the first MRC small attack, a gang of 10 men suspected of being MRC members attacked the Kaloleni police station at night, injuring two officers.<sup>2182</sup> Among other attacks on state targets, subsequent media reports associated the MRC with an attack on police in Malindi during the March 2012 mock elections exercise, the September 2012 killing of a policeman in Kwale's Mavumbo forest, the October 2012 attack on a Mtwapa rally organized by Fisheries Minister Amason Kingi that killed Kingi's bodyguards, the October 2012 killing of a local chief in Kwale, and March 2013 Election Day attacks on police in Mombasa and Kilifi.<sup>2183</sup> None of the attacks attributed by the media or state officials to MRC resulted in the deaths of 25 or more security forces or other state personnel, so we do not code MRC as having carried out any large attacks. The MRC was also implicated in multiple attacks on civilians, again concentrated in 2012 and 2013. The killing of a village elder on September 27, 2012 who was waiting in a police vehicle while officers were looking for suspected MRC members, an event that led to villagers' subsequent retaliation killing of MRC members, is coded as the group's first civilian attack.<sup>2184</sup> The MRC has never publicly claimed responsibility for any attack, and a number of government efforts to prosecute MRC leaders and alleged MRC members in court have failed.

The extent of the MRC's alleged links with outside governments and armed groups remains unclear. The Kenyan government alleged in 2012 that unspecified foreign states were backing secessionists, an allegation which anonymous Kenyan intelligence sources told a South African newspaper referred to MRC's backing from Sudan and other Arab League states.<sup>2185</sup> Former MRC leaders Mtengo and Yeya claimed they met with Muammar Qaddafi of Libya in 2005.<sup>2186</sup> Although Kenyan officials have alleged ties between MRC and al Shabaab, the MRC has denied any such links, and the International Crisis Group concluded in 2016 that "[i]f there were MRC and al-Shabaab links, they likely were individual, not organizational," a finding in line with the Institute for Security Studies' claim that the MRC is "mistakenly associated" with al-Shabaab.<sup>2187</sup> Kenyan media reports suggest that fundraising among coastal supporters,

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<sup>2182</sup> Maureen Mudi, "Two APS Injured in Night Raid At Kaloleni Camp," *All Africa*, March 2, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120302e832001b9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2183</sup> "Outlawed Gang Accused of Disrupting Mock Elections in Kenyan Coastal Town," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 25, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120325e83p0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kenyan Youth Suspected of Links to Separatists Reportedly Behead Policeman," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 14, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120914e89e001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Olive Burrows, "Madzayo Recalls Horror Machete MRC Attack," *All Africa*, October 9, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121009e8a9000hb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kenya Official Killed over Secessionist Clampdown," *APA News*, October 15, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENE020121015e8af000ma&cat=a&ep=ASE>; CHARLES GICHANE, "Security Bolstered After MRC Attack Leaves 14 Dead," *All Africa*, March 4, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130304e9340014n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2184</sup> "Four More Suspected Secessionist Group Members Lynched to Death in Coastal Kenya," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 29, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120929e89t00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2185</sup> "Sudan Said Accused of Backing Outlawed Kenyan Coastal Outfit," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, July 1, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNf0020120701e871001gt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2186</sup> Chanji, "MRC Founders: Separation Was Not Part of Original Agenda."

<sup>2187</sup> Maureen Mudi and Brian Otieno, "Mombasa Republican Council Has Links With Al Shabab, Says Coast PC," *All Africa*, May 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110510e75a000a1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Police Arrest 28 Members of Outlawed Group," *All Africa*, May 23, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110523e75n0002c&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed," July 13, 2016, 10; Brian Otieno, "Mombasa Republican Council Denies Links With Shabaab," *All Africa*, April 1, 2013,

including businessmen and possibly politicians, and even poaching are the MRC's main sources of support, so we code the group's support as "Other."<sup>2188</sup>

While the MRC has not been associated with a string of attacks on state and civilian targets like that of 2012-13, it has survived despite numerous government raids and arrests of leaders and suspected members. MRC chairman Omar Mwamnuadzi was arrested in January 2016 but, after Nairobi Governor Mike Sonko posted his bail, went missing in October 2016 when he failed to appear back in court.<sup>2189</sup> Because the group's attacks took place more than three years after its founding, the MRC is coded as a viable rebel group. However, because no location of formation or operational planning could be found within one year of group formation, 1999, the "rural, planning\_inside, and planning\_border" variables are coded as unknown.

#### **Moorland Forces Militia (Kenya)** [2042KEN, 2007]

This militia, also known as the Moorland Defense Force (MDF) was one of the new militias which emerged in the Mt. Elgon region along the border with Uganda as the SDLF's power increased in 2007. Its members were primarily from the Ndoroba ethnicity.<sup>2190</sup> However, unlike the SDLF, the Moorland Forces do not appear to have launched attacks against state targets. Their only ACLED incident is the December 2007 killing of three civilians.<sup>2191</sup> There was also reports, denied by security forces, that the government used the Moorland Forces and another militia, the Political Revenge Movement, to fight the SLDF; a local pastor claimed that the MDF later turned in their weapons to the state security forces.<sup>2192</sup> The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission describes the MDF as forming to fight the SLDF.<sup>2193</sup> Excluded due to lack of attacks on state targets.

#### **Mungiki Militia** [also in ACLED as **Mungiki**; 104 events, 2000-2012]

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<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130401e941001c0&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Goldsmith, "An Oral History of the MRC, Part I," 2015, 47–48; Botha, "Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council," September 4, 2014, 2.

<sup>2188</sup> Maureen Mudi, "Coast Leaders Funding Outlawed Group, Says MP," *All Africa*, August 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110810e78a000i5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Paul Wafula, "How MRC Funds Its Activities," *The Standard*, March 22, 2013, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000084143/how-mombasa-republican-council-funds-its-activities>; Joseph Muraya, "Poaching Proceeds Financing Terror, MRC – Nkaissery," *Capital News* (blog), June 5, 2015, <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/06/poaching-proceeds-financing-terror-mrc-nkaissery/>; Tobias Chanji, "MRC Leader in the Dock for 'Raising Money to Fund Group,'" *The Standard*, January 26, 2016, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000189392/mrc-leader-in-the-dock-for-raising-money-to-fund-group>.

<sup>2189</sup> Brian Ocharo, "Trial of Suspected MRC Members Fails to Kick Off," *Daily Nation*, September 26, 2018, <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/MRC-suspects-trial-fails-to-kick-off/1954178-4778896-r8o2baz/index.html>; Chanji, "MRC Leader in the Dock for 'Raising Money to Fund Group.'"

<sup>2190</sup> Peter Ng'etich, "Mt Elgon Violence Takes New Dimension Ahead of the Polls," *All Africa*, November 22, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071122e3bm000nj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2191</sup> Bernard Kwalia and Luke Kapchanga, "A No-Go Zone for Campaigners," *All Africa*, December 9, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071209e3c9000b7&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2192</sup> Peter Ng'etich and Benjamin Muindi, "Provide Proof of Abuses, Says Government," *All Africa*, May 16, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080516e45g000hb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Robert Romborah Simiyu, "Militianisation of Resource Conflicts: The Case of Land-Based Conflict in the Mount Elgon Region of Western Kenya," Monograph, ISS Monograph Series (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 2008), 36, <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/militianisation-of-resource-conflicts-the-case-of-land-based-conflict-in-the-mount-elgon-region-of-western-kenya>.

<sup>2193</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)" (Nairobi: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, May 3, 2013), 70, <http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc/6/>.



The Mungiki is an oath-taking society engaged in organized violence and criminal activity. The membership and leadership are primarily from the Kikuyu ethnic group, and the name means “multitude” in the Kikuyu language. The group appeals for a return to traditional values as opposed to “Western” values associated with Christianity and British colonialism. Mungiki members must go through a secret ceremony and take a solemn oath to the organization, a practice stretching back to the Mau Mau resistance to the British and efforts to consolidate KANU support among the Kikuyu during the 1969 election campaign.<sup>2194</sup> The group’s origins are unclear, with the 1980s commonly cited as the founding era; the traditionalist anti-Christian religious sect Tent of the Living God is often associated with the emergence of the Mungiki.<sup>2195</sup> Alternative accounts view their emergence as part of a conspiracy to overthrow President Moi’s regime.<sup>2196</sup> The Mungiki became increasingly militant during the electoral violence along ethnic lines in the 1992 and 1997 general elections.<sup>2197</sup> They have been associated with numerous violent clashes with police and rival gangs and implicated in interethnic violence, election-related and otherwise. They were heavily involved in the 2007/2008 post-election violence, attacking members of ethnic groups perceived as supporting opposition presidential candidate Raila Odinga in both the Rift Valley and Nairobi’s slums; the International Criminal Court’s prosecutors charged future president Uhuru Kenyatta with funding the Mungiki attacks.<sup>2198</sup> While they appear to meet some aspects of our definition of a rebel group, they formed and were already engaged in violent activity before 1997. Excluded.

#### Muyeye Movement [3437KEN, 2012]

In October 2012, police announced the existence of a new oath-taking society connected to the MRC and called the Muyeye Movement. The MRC claimed Muyeye was actually being funded by enemies of the MRC to undermine the older group.<sup>2199</sup> Excluded as either part of the MRC or a group targeting the MRC rather than the state.

#### Nyuki Movement [3541KEN, 2012]

The secessionist Nyuki Movement for Independence was one of the 33 armed groups banned by the Kenyan government in 2010. While the exact relationship between Nyuki and MRC, most

<sup>2194</sup> Tony Mochama, “The Six Months That May Have Conceived Mungiki,” *Standard*, May 13, 2017, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001239483/the-six-months-that-may-have-conceived-mungiki>.

<sup>2195</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, “Kenya: The Mungiki Sect, Including Organizational Structure, Leadership, Membership, Recruitment and Activities; the Relationship between the Government and Sects, Including Protection Offered to Victims of Devil Worshipers and Sects, Such as the Mungiki (2010-October 2013)” (Refworld, November 15, 2013), <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=52a72f264>; “FACTBOX: Key Facts about Kenya’s Mungiki Gang | Reuters,” accessed June 25, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-gang-mungiki-sb-idUSTRE52537620090306>; Mburu Mwangi, “Kenya: Wa Gakonya - He Fought KANU And Christians With Equal Zeal,” *The Nation (Nairobi)*, November 3, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200611030309.html>.

<sup>2196</sup> “Profile: Kenya’s Secretive Mungiki Sect,” BBC News, May 24, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6685393.stm>.

<sup>2197</sup> Hannah Muthoni, “Youth in Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Mungiki in Kenya and Al-Shabaab in Somalia,” *Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa* 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 169, <https://doi.org/10.4314/jolte.v3i1.66717>.

<sup>2198</sup> Njeri Kimani, “Mungiki Sect Casts Long, Dark Shadow Ahead of Kenya’s 2017 Elections,” *Mail & Guardian*, July 15, 2016, <http://mgafrika.com/article/2016-07-15-mungiki-sect-casts-long-dark-shadow-ahead-of-kenyas-2017-elections>.

<sup>2199</sup> McGregor, “Kenya’s Coast Province and the Mombasa Republican Council: Islamists, Separatists or Political Pawns?,” 9.

media reports identify Nyuki as either part of or a splinter from the MRC.<sup>2200</sup> Excluded as either a splinter group or part of another group.

**SLDF: Sabaot Land Defence Force** [44 events, 2007-2010]

The Sabaot Land Defence Force was a Kenyan insurgent group in the Mt. Elgon area of western Kenya along the Ugandan border active from 2006 until its suppression in 2008, though reports of the group's resurgence in recent years continue to appear. While politicians used and benefitted from SDLF, a longstanding and complicated land tenure dispute, rather than partisan politics, was the primary driver in the group's formation.<sup>2201</sup>

The origins of the land disputes and government efforts to settle them date back to British colonial rule. After the 1926 arrival of the railroad in Kitale, the British appropriated land in the surrounding areas of Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia for white settlers and forced the indigenous inhabitants, including the Sabaot ethnic group, to relocate westwards to Mt. Elgon. The colonial government subsequently created a land reserve for indigenous residents, primarily of the Ogiek ethnicity, around the Mt. Elgon's upper reaches in Chepkitala.<sup>2202</sup> In years immediately before and after Kenya's 1963 independence, violence among Mt. Elgon's communities flared up due to conflicts over land, elections, and political boundaries. The Kenyan government attempted unsuccessfully to resolve land conflicts by implementing the controversial Chebyuk Settlement Scheme in three phases, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with the closing of the Chepkitala reserve into a national park and the resettlement of its population lower down Mt. Elgon. Chebyuk I, II, and III were all implemented partially and led to large numbers of Mt. Elgon residents occupying plots of land to which they lacked legal title, and each subsequent phase failed to resolve the ongoing land disputes among a growing number of claimants.<sup>2203</sup> During Chebyuk III, many residents expected that existing occupation would form the basis of the assignment of title (popularized by MP John Serut's slogan *nyumba kwa nyumba*, "house by house"), but that did not happen.<sup>2204</sup>

One of the most politically salient divisions in Mt. Elgon throughout the Chebyuk phases was between the Mosop (also known as the Ndorobo) and Soy, complex social categories often referred to as Sabaot sub-clans but which have a strong geographic connotation beyond kinship with the Mosop referring to those who had lived higher up the mountain in the moorlands and the Soy referring to those who lived further down its slopes.<sup>2205</sup> The Mosop had received the majority of the allocated land in the first two phases, and Phase III's 1732 plots were divided 50-

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<sup>2200</sup> Maureen Mudi, "49 Charged With Holding Illegal Meeting in Coast," *All Africa*, July 15, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110715e77f000ki&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kenyan Profiles Banned Secessionist Group," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, August 24, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020110824e78o000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Patrick Beja, "Coast Police on High Alert amid Fears of Outlawed MRC Gang Regrouping," *The Standard*, June 26, 2016, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000206633/coast-police-on-high-alert-amid-fears-of-outlawed-mrc-gang-regrouping>; K24TV, *Mombasa Attacks: Intelligence Sources Point To MRC Splinter Group Called Nyuki*, 2014, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahAL\\_tpE0lg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahAL_tpE0lg).

<sup>2201</sup> Prisca Mbura Kamungi, "The Politics of Displacement in Multiparty Kenya," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 347, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000903166713>.

<sup>2202</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 42.

<sup>2203</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, 44–53.

<sup>2204</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, 51–52.

<sup>2205</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, 40–41; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, "'The Mountain of Terror': A Report on the Investigations of Torture by the Military at Mt. Elgon" (Nairobi: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, May 2008), 5, [http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Mt\\_Elgon\\_Report.pdf](http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Mt_Elgon_Report.pdf).

50, with 866 assigned to Mosop claimants and 866 assigned to Soy claimants.<sup>2206</sup> The March 2006 posting of the finalized list of Phase III land recipients triggered protests by the many unsuccessful claimants, including some already living on the reallocated land, and the eviction of residents who did not receive land titles led to clashes with the police.<sup>2207</sup>

The Sabaot Land Defence Force emerged as the land disputes intensified. The actual date of the SLDF's founding is unknown, as its name did not become prominent in media reports until January 2007.<sup>2208</sup> Several witnesses to Kenya's Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission identified two meetings in April 2006 as crucial in the formation of what would become SLDF. The first of these meetings took place at the home of Patrick Komon, father of SLDF leader Wycliffe Matakwei and one of the Mt. Elgon Soy landowners whose farm was much larger than the maximum allowed allocation, and allegedly included local politicians, including future MP Fred Chesebe Kapondi; at the second, a group of Soy men pledged to violently resist the land reallocation by participating in a ritual overseen by Soy *laibon* (traditional healer) Jason Psongwoyo Manyiror Tirop, another large landholder who would allegedly become the SLDF's spiritual leader.<sup>2209</sup> These meetings in the rural Mt. Elgon region satisfy the "rural" variable as a 1.

Conflict related to the disputed land allocation predated the SLDF's formation, and its clandestine nature early on also makes it difficult to determine the group's first attacks. Although apparently not yet publicly under the name of SLDF, more organized attacks on the new land settlements, including advance warning to the residents, began occurring in mid-2006.<sup>2210</sup> Many of the evicted untitled residents hid in Mt. Elgon's caves and forests, and the young men among them formed the core of the SLDF's fighters. In the first SLDF-associated attack on state actors, armed men shot and killed Koboryot sub-location Assistant Chief Shem Cherowo, his daughter, and two vigilantes (or guards) at the Chebyuk Phase III settlement on the afternoon of August 27, 2006. Cherowo had earlier assisted in the eviction of area residents without title to make way for the new settlement and its accompanying police station.<sup>2211</sup> Violence in the final four months of 2006 resulted in 35 deaths, forced the closure of 20 primary schools, and kept fearful villagers

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<sup>2206</sup> Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, "'The Mountain of Terror': A Report on the Investigations of Torture by the Military at Mt. Elgon," 6–7.

<sup>2207</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 53; Bernard Kwalia, "Scores Hurt in Police Battle With Squatters," *All Africa*, February 1, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020060201e2210010d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2208</sup> "Land Rights 'force' claims Responsibility for Killings in Western Kenya," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 12, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020070112e31c00335&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Youths Form 'special Force' to Fight for Land Rights in Clash-Hit Western Kenya," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, January 12, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020070112e31c001md&cat=a&ep=ASE>. One private intelligence report identifies February 2006 as the beginning of SLDF, while the Uppsala Conflict Data Program dates the group's start to late 2005. "Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF)" (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, October 29, 2012),

<http://janes.ihs.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/WorldInsurgencyTerrorism/Display/1320915>; "SLDF," *UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, accessed July 14, 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/704>.

<sup>2209</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 63–65.

<sup>2210</sup> Dominic Wabala and Bernard Kwalia, "The Genesis of Clashes That Have Rocked Northern Rift," *All Africa*, October 8, 2006,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020061009e2a80006p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2211</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 65; Isaiah Lucheli, "Kenya: Refugees in Their Land," *The East African Standard (Nairobi)*, December 26, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200612260330.html>; Wabala and Kwalia, "The Genesis of Clashes That Have Rocked Northern Rift."

from returning to their farm plots to harvest their crops.<sup>2212</sup> SCAD includes two instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. The event location of one event (Event ID 5010308), which involved businesses protesting against new regulations and taxes, is listed as “nationwide.” Three Type 2 events occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

In early January 2007, the SLDF announced itself for the first time to the Kenyan media. The group’s commander, Wycliffe Matakwei, spoke with the media about the group, taking credit for the Mt. Elgon killings. In addition to the nullification of the land allocation scheme, Matakwei demanded the arrest of Mt. Elgon’s MP and Assistant Minister for Planning John Serut and the transfer of the current provincial commissioner for their involvement in the scheme and the subsequent disorder.<sup>2213</sup> The SLDF also called for the resettlement of those without land and the transfer of the district commissioner and all district officers.<sup>2214</sup> The SLDF claimed to have 30,000 fighters, while media sources estimated their strength at 4,000.<sup>2215</sup> Former security forces personnel, most prominently David Sichei Chemaimak formerly of President Moi’s presidential guard, provided military training and leadership within SLDF.<sup>2216</sup> Reports have mentioned allegations about the roles of local politicians, particularly opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) parliamentary candidate Fred Kapondi, in funding the SLDF, but much more of their resources came from extracting fees from local inhabitants, including extorting protection fees from teachers and shares of food crops.<sup>2217</sup>

The SLDF escalated its attacks after going public, including the killing of a local government councilor just days later.<sup>2218</sup> SLDF attacks, clashes between SLDF and security forces, and reprisal attacks by security forces and self-defense forces killed hundreds of people. By September 2007, at least 250 people had died in the conflict, 100,000 people had been displaced, and the local agriculture-based economy had suffered major losses of crops and livestock.<sup>2219</sup> While the early months of SLDF violence had primarily been targeted at the Mosop and the government, their attacks became more oriented toward national politics and broader ethnic political cleavages as the December 2007 general elections approached, with attacks on

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<sup>2212</sup> Lucheli, “Kenya,” December 26, 2006; Peter Ngetich and Bernard Kwalia, “Where Cave Men Kill And Maim Over Land,” *All Africa*, December 12, 2006,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020061212e2cc000w0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2213</sup> “Land Rights ‘Force’ Claims Responsibility for Killings in Western Kenya”; Isaiah Lucheli, “Kenya: 30,000 ‘Land Warriors’ Hiding in the Forest,” *The East African Standard (Nairobi)*, January 12, 2007, 000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200701120828.html>.

<sup>2214</sup> “Death Toll from Western Kenya Land Clashes Hits 46,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 15, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020070115e31f000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2215</sup> Otsieno Namwaya, “Why the Sabaot Militia Has Been a Hard Nut to Crack [Column],” *All Africa*, August 27, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020070829e38r001z5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Lucheli, “Kenya,” January 12, 2007, 000.

<sup>2216</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, “The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III),” 67.

<sup>2217</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, 70–71; Robert Romborah Simiyu, “Militianisation of Resource Conflicts: The Case of Land-Based Conflict in the Mount Elgon Region of Western Kenya,” Monograph, ISS Monograph Series (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 2008), 24, <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/militianisation-of-resource-conflicts-the-case-of-land-based-conflict-in-the-mount-elgon-region-of-western-kenya>; Robert Wanyonyi, “Vigilante Demand ‘Fee’ From Teachers,” *All Africa*, January 15, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080115e41f001pr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2218</sup> Bernard Kwalia and Simbi Kusimba, “Councillor Gunned Down in Clashes,” *All Africa*, January 17, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020070118e31i0004p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2219</sup> Steve Bloomfield, “100,000 Flee Violence in Kenya as Tribal Conflict over Land Worsens,” *The Independent*, September 21, 2007, sec. World, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IND0000020070921e3910003u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Kikuyu residents in neighboring districts and violence against supporters of the Party for National Unity (PNU).<sup>2220</sup> In the 2007 elections, ODM's Kapondi, imprisoned during most of the campaign for alleged SLDF support, defeated Serut for the area's parliamentary seat. However, as post-election violence swept other parts of the country, SLDF attacks continued. Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) documented 613 deaths, 118 abductions, and 33 maiming incidents attributable to SLDF from 2006 through March 2008.<sup>2221</sup> In response to the continuing violence, the Kenyan government deployed large numbers of military and other security forces as part of Operation *Okoa Maisha* ("save lives" in Kiswahili) beginning in March 2008. The operation broke SLDF's power, but the security forces were implicated in mass killings, torture, and other human rights abuses.<sup>2222</sup> The military killed SLDF commander Matwakei in May, and most other top leaders surrendered or were killed or captured.<sup>2223</sup> More than 1,500 individuals, many of them innocent, were arrested during the operation.<sup>2224</sup> Many SLDF fighters fled to Uganda, where David Sichei Chemainak became their commander.<sup>2225</sup> The district commissioner lifted the curfew it had imposed on Mt. Elgon District in December 2009, well after regular attacks had ceased.<sup>2226</sup>

Remnants of the SLDF have been associated with attacks on civilians in the Mt. Elgon area, and Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism database identifies the group as still active under Chemainak's command.<sup>2227</sup> These later SLDF attacks did not target state actors. The SLDF did not become viable.

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<sup>2220</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 69; "Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF)"; Simiyu, "Militianisation of Resource Conflicts: The Case of Land-Based Conflict in the Mount Elgon Region of Western Kenya," October 2008, 30.

<sup>2221</sup> "Kenya: Army and Rebel Militia Commit War Crimes in Mt. Elgon End Murder, Torture, and Rape of Civilians" (Human Rights Watch, April 2, 2008), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/02/kenya-army-and-rebel-militia-commit-war-crimes-mt-elgon>.

<sup>2222</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 72–75; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, "'The Mountain of Terror': A Report on the Investigations of Torture by the Military at Mt. Elgon."

<sup>2223</sup> Dominic Wabala, "Sabaot Militias Surrender to the Military," *All Africa*, June 23, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080623e46n000hg&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Top Kenyan Militia Commanders Surrender: Official," *Agence France Presse*, June 22, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020080622e46m0093t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Peter Ng'etich and Bernard Kwalia, "Droves of Militia Surrender," *All Africa*, May 25, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080525e45p0005s&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Peter Ngetich and Bernard Kwalia, "Soldiers Gun Down Sabaot Rebel Leader," *All Africa*, May 16, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080516e45g001vd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Kenyan Prisons Said 'Bursting' Following Crackdown on Mt Elgon Militia," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 12, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020080512e45c0018h&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2224</sup> "Court Frees 66 SDLF Suspects," *All Africa*, November 1, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020081101e4b1000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2225</sup> Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, "The Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (Vol. III)," 78–79.

<sup>2226</sup> Bernard Kwalia, "Govt Lifts Mt Elgon Curfew," *Daily Nation*, December 13, 2009, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-821706-iko8nlz/index.html>.

<sup>2227</sup> Titus Oteba, "Three Suspected Remnants of Sabaot Land Defence Force Lynched in Mt Elgon," *Daily Nation*, February 25, 2017, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/3-suspected-SLDF-members-killed-in-Mt-Elgon/1056-3827212-9xnaw9/index.html>; Luke Anami and Titus Oteba, "Is Sabaot Land Defence Force Militia Regrouping in Mt Elgon?," *Standard*, October 4, 2015, <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000178457/is-sabaot-land-defence-force-militia-regrouping-in-mt-elgon>; John Nalanyia, "SLDF Blamed for Killings in Bungoma," *All Africa*, August 21, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140821ea8l000jw&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF)."

## Lesotho

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**Narrative Summary:** Lesotho became independent in 1966, but the ruling Basotho National Party's prime minister Leabua Jonathan refused to step down after his party lost in the 1970 elections. Multiparty democratic elections only returned to Lesotho in 1993 after years of Jonathan's rule followed by military government. A 1994 military coup led by King Letsie III led to negotiations and the return of his father as King Moshoeshoe II, previously dethroned by the military in 1990, and democratic rule. Letsie III re-ascended to the throne upon his father's death in a car accident in 1996. During the surveyed time period, Lesotho experienced two coup attempts, but neither developed into a non-state organization meeting this project's criteria to be included as rebel groups. In September 1998, ongoing opposition protests related to the disputed March general elections grew, and the security forces' attempts to crack down on the protestors led to a mutiny by junior officers which deposed senior pro-government commanders. South African and Botswanan forces intervened, with fatal clashes between South African and pro-coup Lesotho troops, and preserved Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili's government. A subsequent 2014 military attempt to remove Prime Minister Tom Thabane caused him to flee to South Africa, but he soon returned with South African security. In spite of the coup attempts, Lesotho has remained under democratic rule and does not have any ongoing insurgencies.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** The period in question did not have major anti-state activity in Lesotho beyond the 1998 and 2014 coup attempts, which did not involve groups meeting our inclusion criteria. Given Lesotho's relationship with South Africa and the expectation of South African military involvement in backing the state against any insurgency, it seems unlikely that any notable organized rebel groups are operating at present.

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### All Basotho Convention (ABC)

Political party. ACLED event 106LES, the only event with ABC listed as a major actor, involved a youth league attack against a civilian. Excluded.

### Alliance of Rebel Groups

This ACLED tag, used only in event 24LES (South African troops killed while trying to restore the Lesotho government's authority), signifies the various anti-government forces associated with the 1998 post-election protests, army mutiny, and attempted coup d'état.

Opposition politicians alleged fraud and widespread irregularities in the ruling Lesotho Democratic Congress's victory in Lesotho's May 1998 general elections. Following the death of 4 opposition protesters in early August, the government agreed to allow an outside South African commission to examine the election results for fraud, and the announcement that the commission's work was finished, reported in early September 1998, strengthened the demands of opposition protesters who had been assembled outside King Letsie III's palace to demand new elections for the previous four weeks.<sup>2228</sup> When police opened fire on protesters on September 3,

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<sup>2228</sup> "Probe into Lesotho Polls Ended.," *Xinhua News Agency*, September 1, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=xnews00020010928du9101mf8&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "May Election Rugged.," *All Africa*, September 2, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107du9300pm5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



military forces guarding the police in turn fired on the police in support of the protesters.<sup>2229</sup> As tensions escalated, South African Vice President Thabo Mbeki refused to publicly release the commission's findings until after the upcoming Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit, even as his top aide publicly confirmed that the report substantiated allegations of fraud without providing details.<sup>2230</sup> On September 11, Lieutenant-General Makhula Mosakheng "resigned" as the Lesotho Defence Forces (LDF) commander under duress, and junior officers arrested him and a number of other senior commanders over disagreements about the latter's desire to crack down on protesters, possibly including reported efforts to purge elements which had fired on the police at the palace.<sup>2231</sup> Although urgent diplomatic efforts by South Africa temporarily eased tensions and led to the officers' release, the situation continued to worsen, and, following the post-election report's public release on September 17, opposition protesters effectively paralyzed the ruling administration, and the military, purged of its pro-government leadership, did not take action against them.<sup>2232</sup> South African and Botswanan forces intervened on September 22 in support of the embattled government and, though meeting stiffer resistance from the mutinying LDF than expected, had largely restored the government's control by September 27. While some pro-opposition LDF forces initially fled Maseru and prepared for a drawn-out fight in Lesotho's rural areas, the South African troops soon secured the LDF's main base of Mokoanyane, and many of the mutineers returned to base as ordered by the reinstated pro-government commander.<sup>2233</sup> In the aftermath of mutiny, the SADC facilitated political dialogue and negotiations among Lesotho's political factions.<sup>2234</sup> Because the coup/mutiny forces never became an independent rebel group, they do not meet our inclusion criteria.

Excluded as a coup d'état that did not develop into an independent rebel movement. Whether the mutineers and civilian supporters of the coup would have coalesced into a rebel group in the absence of a peace agreement is unclear.

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<sup>2229</sup> "One Killed as Lesotho Police and Soldiers Exchange Fire (UPDATES Injury Toll, ADDS Detail)," *Agence France-Presse*, September 3, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915du9300044&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2230</sup> "Mbeki Says He Cannot Release Lesotho Election Report (RECASTS with Mbeki Declining to Reveal Findings)," *Agence France-Presse*, September 9, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915du99003ve&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Report into Lesotho Poll Reaffirms Irregularities: Official," *Agence France-Presse*, September 10, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915du9a002xa&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2231</sup> "Lesotho Army Chief 'Resigns,'" *BBC News*, September 12, 1998,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/169950.stm>; "Top Lesotho Officers Arrested, Radio Urges Calm," *Reuters News*, September 11, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021108du9b00voq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2232</sup> "Army In Bombshell Saga," *All Africa*, September 17, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107du9i00q4j&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "South African Troop Alert as Maseru Mutinies," *All Africa*, September 17, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107du9i0071f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Lesotho Situation Remains Tense," *Xinhua News Agency*, September 21, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=xnews00020010928du9l01jli&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2233</sup> "Ousted Army Chief Mosakeng Resumes Command," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, September 26, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010922du9q0015f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; ANDREW SELSKY, "Hundreds of Lesotho Soldiers Heed Call to Return to Headquarters," *Associated Press Newswires*, September 26, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010915du9q0ierx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Sechaba ka'Nkosi, "SANDF's Chaotic Invasion," *Mail & Guardian*, September 25, 1998, <https://mg.co.za/article/1998-09-25-sandfs-chaotic-invasion/>.

<sup>2234</sup> Khabele Matlosa, "Conflict and Conflict Management: Lesotho's Political Crisis After the 1998 Election," *Lesotho Social Science Review* 5, no. 1 (1999): 190–91.

A smaller-scale coup attempt on August 30, 2014, forced Prime Minister Tom Thabane to flee to South Africa, but he returned within days with South African protection.<sup>2235</sup> The actions of military leadership during this crisis, reportedly triggered by Thabane's removal of LDF commander Lieutenant General Kennedy Tlali Kamoli, also fail to meet our inclusion criteria as they never made any effort to depart from the state apparatus and form a new rebel organization.

**Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)**

Opposition political party. ACLED events in 1997 and 1998 are primarily election-related violence, especially post-election protests. Excluded.

**Basotho National Party (BNP)**

Opposition political party. ACLED event 45LES in 2000 was a protest against the government, not a targeted attack against the state. Excluded.

**Factory Workers' Union (FAWU)**

Union. ACLED event 53LES in November 2003 involved the police firing on striking FAWU members. Excluded.

**Ha Makopela Communal Militia (Lesotho) and Ha Semoli Communal Militia (Lesotho)**

Violent clashes over land control in 2012 (ACLED event 92LES), not attacks against the state. Excluded.

**Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)**

Ruling party involved in violent election-related clashes with opposition supporters. Excluded.

**Vigilante Militia (Lesotho)**

Not involved in attacks against the state. Excluded.

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<sup>2235</sup> David Smith, "South African Police Guard Lesotho PM after 'Military Coup,'" *The Guardian*, September 4, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/04/south-african-police-lesotho-pm-military-coup>.

**Background:** Liberia suffered from major violent conflict beginning in about 1980, when a military officer of the Krahn ethnic group, Samuel Doe, overthrew the government of William Tolbert, who was Amero-Liberian. The public execution of Tolbert marked the end of 100 years of domination of the Amero-Liberian True Whig Party. Much like his Amero-Liberian predecessors, Doe relied on members of his own ethnic group to run the country, although he eventually incorporated some of the Amero-Liberian elite. This ethnic favoritism alienated large portions of the population.<sup>2236</sup> Due to an economic downturn during this period, many Liberian youth went to Libya, where they received military training.<sup>2237</sup>

### **First Liberian Civil War** **AKA (First Liberian War)**

Charles Taylor worked in the Doe administration during the 1980s, when he had embezzled large amounts of funds in his job managing procurement. After fleeing to the US, he was jailed, broke out, and eventually found his way to Libya, where he received military training.<sup>2238</sup> Taylor then made his way to Cote D'Ivoire, where he gained support from Mano and Gio Liberians who had been oppressed by Doe. Taylor's forces, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NFPL) invaded Liberia in December of 1989 and took over sizable portions of the countryside but were then bogged down in Monrovia. Concerned about the instability, west African states that were members of ECOWAS, dominated by Nigeria, created the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which sought to provide a unified response to the crisis. In order to counter Taylor, Sierra Leone and ECOMOG created the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), which consisted primarily of members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. This period of stalemate ended as groups splintered and new ones were created by a variety of actors in order to put pressure on the NFPL.<sup>2239</sup> By 1997, a peace agreement had been reached in which the heads of various armed groups would lay down their weapons and enter the political arena as political parties. Throughout these years, Taylor gave extensive support to the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone, as the Sierra Leonean government had backed ECOMOG operations against him.

### **Interwar Period**

Charles Taylor won the Liberian elections of 1997. Taylor's first cabinet featured members of several fighting groups from the Liberian civil war, with the former head of ULIMO-J being named head of rural development.<sup>2240</sup> During this time, Taylor showed a great deal of skill in filling his party's coffers. He continued to assist the Firestone Corporation, which employed many former NFPL fighters on its plantation.<sup>2241</sup>

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<sup>2236</sup> Van Walraven, Klaas. *The Netherlands and Liberia: Dutch Policies and Interventions with Respect to the Liberian Civil War*. Report. Clingendael Institute, 1999. 19-36. Accessed April 22, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05429.6](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05429.6).

<sup>2237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2238</sup> Afolabi, Babatunde Tolu. "The Liberian Civil War: Interests, Actors & Interventions." In *The Politics of Peacemaking in Africa: Non-State Actors' Role in the Liberian Civil War*, 73-99. Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2017. Accessed April 22, 2020. doi:10.7722/j.ctt1t6p5wp.9.

<sup>2239</sup> Van Walraven, Klaas. *The Netherlands and Liberia: Dutch Policies and Interventions with Respect to the Liberian Civil War*. Report. Clingendael Institute, 1999. 19-36. Accessed April 22, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05429.6](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05429.6).

<sup>2240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2241</sup> T. Christian Miller and Jonathan Jones, "Firestone and the Warlord," ProPublica, accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-and-the-warlord-intro>.

*The peacebuilding mission in Liberia had several problems that made it particularly vulnerable to renewed conflict. The majority of the troops sent to ECOMOG-managed “demobilization centers” were not well trained, and the leadership of the various rebel groups kept their best troops still armed and ready for deployment.<sup>2242</sup> Furthermore, little effort was put into reintegrating the formerly armed fighters into Liberian society. During this period, many members of ULIMO left the country, as they feared victor’s justice dispensed by Taylor’s forces.*

### **Second Liberian Civil War**

*The Second Liberian Civil War grew out of this unstable peace. In April of 1999, former ULIMO troops began to attack targets in Liberia from bases in Sierra Leone.<sup>2243</sup> The exile leaders, however, lacked opportunities to find basing in neighboring countries. In July of 2000, the situation changed when a group of fighters from the Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea, which was backed by Charles Taylor, attacked the Guinean town of Gueckedou. Following this attack, the Guinean leader Lansana Conte offered to provide a base to Liberian exiles, and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was created. Over the next two years, the two groups found themselves engaged in combat across northeastern Liberia.<sup>2244</sup> The situation changed in February 2002, as LURD took over large portions of eastern Liberia. In September of 2002, Taylor-backed groups invaded Cote D’Ivoire. This decision to open up a war on a new front was primarily a decision made out of desperation, as Taylor was now surrounded by two unfriendly countries, and Cote D’Ivoire offered the only possibility for him to get another government on his side.<sup>2245</sup> The invasion was repulsed by the Ivorian Armed Forces, who also began to arm Liberian refugees who had fled into the country, in order to help fight against Taylor. This group eventually turned into the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). MODEL quickly took over the south-eastern portion of the country, as it faced little resistance from overstretched GoL forces. By July 2003, the situation for Taylor had grown quite dire. Monrovia found itself under siege once again, and large numbers of civilian casualties began to occur due to shelling.<sup>2246</sup> Food and fuel supplies were running low, and Taylor’s troops were running out of ammunition. On May 7<sup>th</sup>, 2003, Taylor had been indicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone on 17 counts, including inciting terrorism and murder. On August 11<sup>th</sup> of 2003, Taylor resigned his position as president and left the country for exile in Nigeria.*

### **Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: Low**

**Explanation:** *While Liberia experienced a full-fledged civil war between 1997 and 2003, there was a great deal of coverage in the media of events, which would have likely captured new groups. Since the war ended, there has been relatively little violence that suggests the formation of new insurgent groups. Most of the violence that has taken place is interethnic, and does not involve the state.*

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### **Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia**

Breakaway faction of the NFPL led by Prince Johnson. Excluded since its start date was before 1997.<sup>2247</sup>

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<sup>2242</sup> Kieh, George Klay. "THE ROOTS OF THE SECOND LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR." *International Journal on World Peace* 26, no. 1 (2009): 8. Accessed January 28, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/20752871](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752871).

<sup>2243</sup> Lidow, Nicholai Hart. *Violent Order : Understanding Rebel Governance through Liberia's Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central.

<sup>2244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2245</sup> Kähkö, Ilmari. “The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: from Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 29, no. 4, Apr. 2018, pp. 783., doi:10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417.

<sup>2246</sup> “Deaths Mount in Liberian Capital,” July 22, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3085617.stm>.

<sup>2247</sup> “Libera: The Cycle of Abuse: Human Rights Violations Since The November Cease-Fire (Human Rights Watch Report, October 21, 1991).” Accessed August 10, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/liberia/>.

### Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD):

Note: When referring to state and irregular forces loyal to Charles Taylor, we use GoL (Government of Liberia).

LURD was formed in July 1999 during a series of meetings of Liberians exiles based in Guinea and Sierra Leone. I was able to find a year and month for the formation of LURD, but not a day. This is due to the fact that it came into creation throughout in a series of meetings during the month of July 1999.<sup>2248</sup> This series of meeting is crucial for why I decided to code LURD as a distinct group for the case of this dataset, in contrast to groups like the Organization of Displaced Liberians, which I discuss below. These meetings witnessed members of ULIMO-K and J come together and explicitly create a new rebel that was a clear and intentional rejection of their past groups.

The organization was formed, in large part as a response to, feeling excluded from the ECOMOG-sponsored Abuja peace accords in 1998.<sup>2249</sup> The formation of LURD was preceded by efforts led by exiled Liberians to utilize Sierra Leone as base of operations to attack Taylor with the support of ECOMOG. Their initial plan involved infiltrating Monrovia by boat and then ambushing Charles Taylor's convoy as it drove through the streets, but this idea was later shelved for being near suicidal. They left Sierra Leone after their chief supporter Maxwell Khobe, who was Chief of Staff of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces, died in April of 2000.<sup>2250</sup> I decided to code LURD as being named in July of 2000 as the first reference I found to the named group began appearing during this period.<sup>2251</sup> I did not choose to code "clandestine" as 0 since there appears to have been no concerted effort to keep the group a secret and new people were brought onto the National Executive Council throughout this time period. I decided to code LURD's as fulfilling "goal\_take," as their main goal was driving Charles Taylor out of power.<sup>2252</sup>

The structure of LURD was divided into three parts. The political wing was the National Executive Council, headed by Sekou Conneh, which was responsible for the external relations of the LURD and procuring support for it. This was based in Conakry and found itself often at odds with LURD commanders on the ground in Liberia.<sup>2253</sup> Separate from this was the office of President, who also served as commander-and-chief of the armed forces. I coded LURD's membership as primarily coming from other rebel groups, as the majority of its members had previously fought with ULIMO during the first Liberian Civil War.<sup>2254</sup>

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<sup>2248</sup> "Taylor, Stubborn Since His Childhood." *All Africa*. March 29, 2006.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020060329e23t001mi&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2249</sup> "Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)," Briefing Paper, Armed Non-State Actors Project (London, UK: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 2003) pg. 2.

<sup>2250</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, "'Taylor Must Go' – the Strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 254, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561>.

<sup>2251</sup> "Liberia; Liberia Rebels Give 90 Day Deadline To Taylor." Accessed July 27, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=0cef5b14-3027-4838-ad49-76432444c3b5&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A40SK-YMV0-0040-T09W-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=8320&pdteaserkey=sr0&pdtitab=allpods&eomp=gb63k&earg=sr0&prid=adc0a77f-2c73-478d-a197-4cbcb08f8da0>.  
"Liberia; Liberia Bans Independent Reports of Fighting." Accessed July 27, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=724d58f0-36fd-443a-b6b1-128545a8a8df&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A40V3-TBW0-0040-T2Y6-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=8320&pdteaserkey=sr1&pdtitab=allpods&eomp=gb63k&earg=sr1&prid=adc0a77f-2c73-478d-a197-4cbcb08f8da0>.

<sup>2252</sup> "Liberia; Liberia Rebels Give 90 Day Deadline To Taylor."

<sup>2253</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, "'Taylor Must Go' – the Strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 257, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561>.

<sup>2254</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013, 109. [http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE\\_batch:20170722muse51975](http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE_batch:20170722muse51975).



Since the group was created in meetings held in Freetown and Conakry, I coded the group as a starting in a large urban setting as well as fulfilling the “planning\_border” criterion. LURD sought to contrast itself with that of the many of the ethnic insurgent groups of the First Liberian Civil War.<sup>2255</sup> Accordingly, it set its message to be “Taylor must go,” which allowed it to cultivate a much broader base of support. LURD leadership, remembering the lessons of the First Liberian Civil War and ULIMO, recognized that preventing group fracturing was one of their chief goals.

LURD’s support came from many sources. In part due to Ayesha Conneh, Sekou Conneh’s wife, the group received support from the Guinean Government. Increased Guinean military support in 2001 is in large part responsible for the group’s improved performance.<sup>2256</sup> LURD also displayed a great uniformity in weapons, with most of their troops being armed with AK-model rifles supplied by the Guinean government. This support, however, came about after a year of the group’s existence, which is outside the time limit for the “foreign government” support variable. It is important to note, however, that LURD leadership did not engage in large-scale extractive industries in order to finance their war effort. Even though many LURD soldiers tried to extract diamonds to profit individually, this was done at small scale basis.<sup>2257</sup> Due to their support from Guinea, LURD did not need to engage in extractive enterprises such as diamond mining.<sup>2258</sup> Furthermore, by engaging in mining, the leadership of LURD would be granting more power of the organization to members on the ground, which could lead to further destabilization of a group that nearly fell apart several times. Lastly, LURD leadership recognized that mining and logging would inevitably lead to increased hostility from locals who would be conscripted into such operations and would distract them from their main goal of overthrowing Charles Taylor. I encountered some debate on what degree LURD relied on the Liberian diaspora for funding. Some sources argued that LURD received relatively little funding from the diaspora.<sup>2259</sup> However, I decided to view the group as relying in large part on the fundraising of the Liberian diaspora, as this was confirmed in an interview with that Dr. Jennifer Hazen conducted with Sekou Conneh, the nominal head of LURD.<sup>2260</sup> For this reason, I decided to code LURD as a recipient of “other” aid.

I decided to code the group’s first attack as taking place on July 8, 2000, when its attacked from the town of Voinjama from across the Guinean border.<sup>2261</sup> Even though LURD was not mentioned at the time of these attacks, and the Liberian government blamed them on remnants of ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, I still decided to code them as LURD’s first attack.<sup>2262</sup> I decided to do this as later reports, including an interview with LURD commander General Wiley, claimed these attacks on Voinjama to be the group’s

<sup>2255</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, “‘Taylor Must Go’ – the Strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 250, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561>.

<sup>2256</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, “‘Taylor Must Go’ – the Strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 255, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561>.

<sup>2257</sup> Nicholai Hart Lidow, *Violent Order: Understanding Rebel Governance through Liberia’s Civil War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 146.

<sup>2258</sup> Email correspondence with Professor Ilmari Khaiko, Swedish Defense University.

<sup>2259</sup> Antwi-Boateng, Osman. “The Political Participation of the U.S.-Based Liberian Diaspora and Its Implication for Peace Building.” *Africa Today* 58, no. 1 (2011): 3-26. Accessed April 22, 2020. doi:10.2979/africatoday.58.1.3.

<sup>2260</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, UNITED STATES: Cornell University Press, 2013, 116. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=3138443>.

<sup>2261</sup> “State Radio: Insurgents Attack Northern Liberian Town.” Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=a40bee93-4062-4432-b568-310c99844e59&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A40P6-KFV0-00BT-M3GH-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=138211&pdteaserkey=sr7&pditab=allpods&ecompgb63k&earg=sr7&prid=e5d5f55c-09a6-4235-aa49-910c3c411e31>.

<sup>2262</sup> “Fighting Rages in Northern Liberia: Government.” Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=98d2c45c-ee3a-4162-a028-1b65742b57b2&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A40PD-JGJ0-00GS-K2R2-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=10903&pdteaserkey=sr9&pditab=allpods&ecompgb63k&earg=sr9&prid=e5d5f55c-09a6-4235-aa49-910c3c411e31>.



first small attack.<sup>2263</sup> Due to the fact that ACLED had this combat as causing over 50 deaths, I decided to code it as the first large attack. Furthermore, since I was aware that fewer military casualties than civilian casualties, I presumed there was at least one civilian casualty, which also counted this as the first civilian attack. Due to the fact that this attack occurred within a year of being formed, I decided to code it as satisfying “civilian\_attack\_2” variable. Voinjama is also coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1. However, it should be noted that Voinjama later (after a year of formation) became the group’s military headquarters.<sup>2264</sup>

I decided to code the group as emerging from former rebel groups. This is due to the fact that most of the group’s leaders had formerly served in either ULIMO-K or ULIMO-J.<sup>2265</sup> I also decided to code the group as satisfying the contestation variable due to the fact that multiple protests had occurred in the years leading up to the attack across the country.<sup>2266</sup> I decided to code the group as not coming from the same ethnic group. This is because LURD tried to overcome the problems that ULIMO had faced and tried to integrate members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups.<sup>2267</sup> LURD leadership, however, was never able to fully paper over these divisions, which would end with the Krahn element from LURD leaving to start ULIMO in the Ivory Coast. This occurred as Mandingo members of the group were able to develop closer connections to sources of funding in Guinea, which gave them increased influence within the group.<sup>2268</sup> I decided to code the group as being viable as the group was still a functioning group in July 2002, three years after it had been formed.<sup>2269</sup> I did not code it as having splintered with the formation of ULIMO, due to the fact that ULIMO does not count as a splinter group for the context of our dataset.

Within the year prior to LURD’s formation date (interpreted as July 1, 1999), there occurred a type 1 incident in SCAD on May 4, 1999 where residents of Voinjama protested in Monrovia to demand better government protection to prevent rebel groups based in Guinea from attacking them. However, there was no evidence for *local* contestation events.

### Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL):

<sup>2263</sup> “Liberia War Spreads Southward.” *All Africa*, August 8, 2001.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dx8802316&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2264</sup> James Brabazon, “Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD),” Armed Non-State Actors Project (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003), 3.

<sup>2265</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, UNITED STATES: Cornell University Press, 2013, 109. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=3138443>.

<sup>2266</sup> “Liberia; Liberian Daily News Bulletin.” Accessed August 5, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=90ccb669-ac2f-4a4e-99c7-451940761c25&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3T57-JTB0-0040-T12V-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=8320&pdteaserkey=sr9&pdtab=allpods&ecomp=gb63k&earg=sr9&prid=813ff537-c55d-483a-a251-57b85e1bc9bf>.

“Liberia; Liberian Daily News Bulletin.” Accessed August 5, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=b295ac4e-b8b7-44d4-8472-2da29163e080&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3V2N-9YM0-0040-T4T8-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=8320&pdteaserkey=sr35&pdtab=allpods&ecomp=gb63k&earg=sr35&prid=9274af19-8282-43a0-8e7b-599830c6e424>.

<sup>2267</sup> Kähkö, Ilmari. “‘Taylor Must Go’ – the Strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 251. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561>.

<sup>2268</sup> Kähkö, Ilmari. “‘Taylor Must Go’ – the Strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 258. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561>.

<sup>2269</sup> “Liberian Troops Recapture Key Town-Sources.” *Reuters News*. July 9, 2002. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020020709dy79012a0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) has a history that is closely intertwined with that of LURD. However, due to the fact that the majority of the soldiers had not been prior members of LURD, I count MODEL as a distinct group. I was unable to find an exact date when the group was created in beyond the fact that it occurred in the latter half of 2002.<sup>2270</sup> Due to the lack of information on the groups initial period of activity in Cote d'Ivoire, I was unable to code either of clandestine variables. I did decide to code the group as satisfying "goal\_take," due to its goal of removing Charles Taylor from power on behalf of the Krahn people who felt oppressed by his dictatorial rule.<sup>2271</sup>

While the majority of the leadership of MODEL had been affiliated with the LURD, the majority of its foot-soldiers had not. I coded MODEL's membership as coming from both self-defense forces as well as former rebels. The majority of MODEL's fighters originated from Lima, an ethnic militia created by Ivorian forces recruited from Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>2272</sup> Furthermore, there were other soldiers that had previously fought in ULIMO-K as well as a few who had fought in LURD.<sup>2273</sup>

The group began to organize in the the Niela refugee camp in Cote d'Ivoire,<sup>2274</sup> so the group is coded as "rural" and a 1 for "planning\_border." The movement found its start following Taylor's invasion of Cote D'Ivoire, as the Ivorian government sought for a way to strike back against Taylor. To do so, the Ivorian government allowed for Liberian exile leaders to come and recruit from amongst its massive refugee camps in the area. Furthermore, the Ivorian government gave the group access to weapons, ensuring that it was well armed for its initial attack into Liberia.<sup>2275</sup> I also coded MODEL as receiving support from "other," because the group received substantial funding from the Liberian Diaspora.<sup>2276</sup>

I coded the group as carrying out its first attacks in late January of 2003, as it launched its first raids across the Ivorian border.<sup>2277</sup> I decided to code its first large attack occurring in occurring in July of 2003. This was due to the attacks against the port of Buchanan, which also sapped the group of large portions of its strength, due to the heavy casualties it took.<sup>2278</sup>

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<sup>2270</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." Order No. 3137052, Georgetown University, 2004, pg 172. <http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/305184327?accountid=11243>.

<sup>2271</sup> Ilmari Käihkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 790, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

<sup>2272</sup> Ilmari Käihkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 785, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

Accord to Ilmari Käihkö, the name Lima originated from the NATO alphabetical "L," which the group adapted as standing for Liberia.

<sup>2273</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013, 122. [http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE\\_batch:20170722muse51975](http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE_batch:20170722muse51975).

<sup>2274</sup> Ilmari Käihkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 785, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

<sup>2275</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013, 122. [http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE\\_batch:20170722muse51975](http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE_batch:20170722muse51975).

<sup>2276</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013, 121. [http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE\\_batch:20170722muse51975](http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE_batch:20170722muse51975).

<sup>2277</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013, 132. [http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE\\_batch:20170722muse51975](http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.PMUSE_batch:20170722muse51975).

<sup>2278</sup> "LIBERIA / FIGHTING 2nd UPDATE (L-O)." *Voice of America Press Releases and Documents*. July 28, 2003. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=VOA0000020030729dz7s00003&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Ilmari Käihkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 792. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

I coded MODEL's leadership as coming from both former rebel groups, current rebel groups and former government's armed forces. Much of MODEL's Krahn leadership had prior experience serving in the Armed Forces of Liberia under Samuel Doe.<sup>2279</sup> Many of the group's leaders had been part of LURD before leaving to lead MODEL. They did this for a variety of reasons. Many Krahn leaders felt like they were losing power in LURD, as the Mandingo forces had higher priority for supplies.<sup>2280</sup> Furthermore, many non-Krahn in LURD sought to minimize their presence as they wanted to draw a difference between themselves and the Krahn-dominated Doe government. Krahn leaders saw the large Krahn refugee population as an excellent base to create a group from. Notably, I coded the group as sharing the same ethnicity with the area where it operated. The Krahn members of MODEL drew support from the Krahn inhabited areas of South-Eastern Liberia where they launched their initial offensives.<sup>2281</sup> I coded the group as satisfying the contestation variable as protests continued to occur in the year before the group formed.<sup>2282</sup> I ended up coding the group as not achieving viability due to the fact the Second Liberian Civil War ended in 2003.<sup>2283</sup>

Within the year prior to MODEL's formation date (interpreted as January 1, 2002), there occurred a type 2 conflict on May 11, 2001 where Nigerians demonstrate outside the Nigerian embassy and business men striked to demand justice for those accused of killing Enakerakp while in police custody. There was also a type 4 conflict on December 1, 2001 where students protested the killing of a fellow student by the local police chief. There was no evidence for local protests or riots or contestations.

### Organization of Displaced Liberians (ODL)

The Organization of Displaced Liberians was a Liberian resistance organization that was founded in 1998 following the expulsion of ULIMO-K from Monrovia. Deciding whether or not to include this group was challenging, but it was excluded based off of the following criteria:

- The group was a splinter group of ULIMO-K. The majority of the group's fighters and leadership were former members of ULIMO-K.<sup>2284</sup> The group gave itself a new name as it had been pushed out of Liberia. In large part, this decision may have been done as an opportunity to rebrand itself, as many of the parties of the First Liberian Civil War had very negative name connotations.

### National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL):

<sup>2279</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 786, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

<sup>2280</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 783, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

<sup>2281</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, "The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 787, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488417>.

<sup>2282</sup> "Police Breaks Up Student Protest - Teachers Get One-Month Pay." *All Africa*, October 3, 2002. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021003dya3008hr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2283</sup> "Timeline: Liberia: From Civil War Chaos to Fragile Hope." *Reuters*, November 7, 2011. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-liberia-election-events-idUSTRE7A62BN20111107>.

<sup>2284</sup> Gerdes, Felix. *Civil War and State Formation: the Political Economy of War and Peace in Liberia*. Frankfurt: Campus, 2013.

Charles Taylor's forces during the First Liberian Civil War. The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Prince Johnson branched off from them. Excluded due to the fact that they were formed before the beginning of the dataset in 1997.<sup>2285</sup>

#### Revolutionary United Front (RUF):

Formed in 1991, this group is excluded as it formed before the start date. However, the RUF received much support from Charles Taylor, as he sought to strike against his Sierra Leonean rivals.

#### United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy:

Includes: Johnson Faction (ULIMO-J), and Kromah Faction (ULIMO K):

Excluded as they were formed in 1991, before the start date of 1997.<sup>2286</sup> Provided base of the LURD and MODEL rebel groups during the Second Liberian War.

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<sup>2285</sup> Suleiman, Muhammad Dan. "What Makes Islamist Movements Different? A Study of Liberia's NPFL and Nigeria's Boko Haram in West Africa." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 123. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1351957>.

<sup>2286</sup> Republic of Liberia. (2020, April 2). Retrieved from <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/country/liberia-contents>

## Libya

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**Nomenclature Notes:** *Many names of groups, individuals, and cities in Libya have multiple spellings.*

*Instead of using one variation throughout my Record of Analysis for Libya, I utilized the spelling that matched my sources' spelling for that particular discussion. For example, many groups had a presence in the city of Derna, also spelled Dirnah, Dernah, or Dirna. In my discussion of each group in Derna, I utilized the spelling of the city that matched the spelling in my sources for that group.*

**Narrative Summary:** *From 1997-2011 Libya remained politically stable with little rebel group formation. However, beginning in 2011 Libya descended into a highly politically volatile state and rebel group formation increased drastically.*

*In 1997, Muammar Gaddafi has already been ruling the country for 28 year after he consolidated power in a 1969 coup. He would continue to rule Libya until 2011 when violent protests erupted on February 17, 2011, igniting a civil war and an international intervention that culminated with Gaddafi's death on October 20, 2011. However, after Gaddafi's death Libya did not stabilize.*

*Immediately following Gaddafi's death, the National Transitional Council (NTC) assumed power of the state, publicly declaring themselves as the interim government until elections would be held to elect a new government. On October 8, 2012 the NTC handed power over to the democratically elected General National Congress (GNC). The GNC was comprised of two main coalitions, a nationalist coalition called the National Forces Alliance (NFA) and an Islamist coalition. The GNC was given an 18-month mandate to draft a democratic constitution for Libya, however with their deadline approaching in February 2014, little progress was made. Dominated mostly by the Islamist coalition, the GNC voted to extend its mandate of power which led to protests and uprisings. The GNC's refusal to disband ignited fighting between Islamist militias backing the GNC and nationalist/secular militias pushing for the GNC's removal and aligned with the NFA. These militias were all once rebel groups during the anti-Gaddafi revolution and were subsequently absorbed into the NTC and GNC following the revolution; given the NTC's and GNC's failure to provide security services under one military wing, these militias routinely provided security services throughout Libya, effectively controlling major cities while nominally apart of the government.*

*On May 16, 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a prominent general in Gaddafi's military who attempted a coup against Gaddafi and fought against him in the revolution, launched Operation Dignity to defeat the Islamist militias that were controlling Benghazi. In response, many Islamist militias aligned with the GNC formed the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) on June 20, 2014 to counter Operation Dignity. Amidst heavy tension and fighting, elections were held on June 25, 2014 to elect a new House of Representatives (HoR).*

*With the Islamists being largely elected out of power during the elections, they refused to leave the government which led to the launching of Operation Dawn—a coalition of Islamist militias aligned with the GNC aiming to oust Haftar's forces from the capital, Tripoli. The intensity of the fighting forced the HoR to leave the capital and set up its headquarters in the eastern city of Tobruk, while the GNC reasserted itself in Tripoli. The HoR then formally endorsed Haftar's forces in November 2014, following a ruling by the Supreme Court in Tripoli that greatly delegitimized the power of the HoR.*

*In December 2015 the UN brokered a peace agreement that created the General National Accord (GNA) which included elements of both the HoR and GNC, with the HoR remaining as the legitimate parliament. However, the GNA failed to assert its power in Libya and heavy fighting continues between HoR/Haftar forces, forces loyal to the GNC, and the GNA.*



***Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: High***

***Explanation:*** During the 2011 revolution against Gaddafi, there are estimates of hundreds to thousands of armed groups that emerged in Libya. While conducting research on the revolution, it was clear that during the revolution it was incredibly effortless, and common, for individuals to group around tribal, familial, and even school connections in order to obtain weapons and fight Gaddafi forces. Brian McQuinn, a researcher who conducted extensive fieldwork in Libya during the height of the revolution, estimates that there were 236 armed groups in the city of Misrata alone during the revolution, and around 700 across the country. The coder identified an additional 326 potential rebel groups during his research that he could not identify or code due to time constraints. While there were some major players in the revolution, such as Ansar al Sharia, February 17 Martyrs Brigade, and the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade, it is impossible to code and document every armed group that emerged in Libya without local sources.

Furthermore, following Gaddafi's death many rebel groups became state actors; either they were militias in the Department of Defense and/or Interior, or they were fighting on behalf of state actors such as the GNC, NFA, or HoR. Many of these state actor groups were in ACLED and when conducting research on them, information could only be found during their time as state actors rather than anti-Gaddafi rebel groups. Therefore, many groups were excluded from our dataset for being state actors, when it is possible, that they were once rebel groups (examples include the Special Deterrence Force). Nonetheless, when there was any explicit evidence, of a state actor's initial existence as an anti-Gaddafi rebel group it was more often than not coded (such as the Bashir Sadawi Brigade).

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We identified the following groups which are not in ACLED, and when researching them, the coder could not find reliable information that would allow for including them in the dataset. The names of these groups are exactly as the coder found them online, and therefore it is possible that these names may be referencing another group. For example, the coder found reference to a "Busalim Martyrs Brigade," which could be the same group as the "Abusalim Martyrs Brigade." Nevertheless, the "Busalim Martyrs Brigade" is included in the list of groups the coder excluded for lack of sufficient evidence.

- \*Faruq Militia
- \*Revolutionaries of Sirt
- \*Gulf of Nafaliya Martyrs
- AKA: Nafaliya Shahid Saleh al-Nass
- \*Ansar al-Hurriya
- \*Umar al-Khattab
- \*Agency for Preventive Security
- \*Al Quwarsha Martyrs
- \*Shahid Mohamed al-Huma
- \*Mountain
- \*Al-Nur
- \*Hizb al-Tahrir
- \*The Brigade of the Martyr Mohammed al-Madani
- \*Misrata Boys
- \*Triq Asour Brigade
- \*Support Group no. 6 AKA: Knights of Janzur Brigade
- \*Busalim Martyrs Brigade
- \*Benghazi Martyrs Brigade
- \*West Mountain Brigade
- \*Cyrenaica Defense Force
- \*Al-Awfiya Battalion
- \*Red Companies



AKA: Sarayat al-Hamra  
\*Jawarikh Brigade  
\*Tripoli Revolutionaries Council  
\*Martyrs of Suq al-Jum'a  
\*Jazirah Brigade  
\*Hamza Brigade  
\*Jadu Brigade AKA: Jado Brigade

#### Abu Ghilan Brigade

The only mention of this group in ACLED is event 2901LIB in which an anti-aircraft battalion headquarters, which the Abu Ghilan Brigade controls, was attacked by the LNA. However, the Abu Ghilan Brigade was not explicitly mentioned in any articles about this attack.<sup>2287</sup> Furthermore, had the Abu Ghilan Brigade controlled these headquarters,<sup>2288</sup> they were nonetheless government headquarters and therefore the Abu Ghilan Brigade would be a state actor. Furthermore, no other evidence of the Abu Ghilan Brigade could be found, other than a 2019 UN Security Council report that claimed the Abu Ghilan Martyrs Battalion was allied with the Government of National Accord.<sup>2289</sup> In any event, the Abu Ghilan Brigade is a state actor and therefore excluded from our dataset.

#### Abu Raawi Brigade

The only mention of this group in ACLED is event 2892LIB in which its commander was arrested by another local militia. Articles covering this event detail how the Abu Raawi Brigade's commander transferred the group's loyalty to the House of Representatives, when most of the town's, Zawiyah, groups are loyal to Libya Dawn and the GNC.<sup>2290</sup> Once they pledged allegiance to HoR, they are state actors. Furthermore, before they pledged allegiance evidence suggests they would have been loyal/part of Libya Dawn, which is another state actor due to their connections with the GNC. There is no evidence to suggest that the Abu Raawi Brigade was ever a non-state actor, and therefore it is excluded from our dataset; although it is possible that they started as an anti-Gaddafi group in 2011, this is mere speculation and no mention of this group exists before 2014.

#### Abu Obeida Brigade

This is an Islamist group based in Zawiyah responsible for a few violent events in ACLED. Very little information could be found on this group, however ACLED event 3860LIB notes that the Abu Obeida Brigade is a member of the Libya Dawn alliance, a state actor. It is possible that the Abu Obeida Brigade was a rebel group during the anti-Gaddafi revolution; however, with no reference to this group during the revolution, and evidence surrounding this group's membership in Libya Dawn, the Abu Obeida Brigade is considered a state actor and excluded from our dataset.

#### Ajdabiya Martyrs Brigade

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<sup>2287</sup> "Libyan National Army Command Bombs Anti-Aircraft Battalion," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, November 27, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020141127eabr003xp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2288</sup> "Libyan National Army Command Bombs Anti-Aircraft Battalion."

<sup>2289</sup> "United Nations Security Council S/2019/914," n.d., [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S\\_2019\\_914.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2019_914.pdf).

<sup>2290</sup> "Clashes Break out in Libyan Coastal Town over Pledge of Loyalty to Parliament," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, November 27, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020141127eabr002jp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

This group is mentioned once in ACLED for having its commander assassinated.<sup>2291</sup> No reference of this group could be found online, and its only mention in ACLED was an attack against them, not perpetrated by them. Due to a lack of sufficient information confirming the group's existence, the Ajdabiya Martyrs Brigade is excluded from our dataset.

#### Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council

The Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council (ARSC) was a coalition of Islamist groups that formed in the spring of 2015. The ARSC was formed from militias in Libya Shield and Ansar Al-Sharia branches.<sup>2292</sup> Although the majority militias that formed Libya Shield could not be identified or coded, they were all armed groups that emerged in the anti-Gaddafi revolution.<sup>2293</sup> The ARSC is excluded from our dataset because it is a merger of rebel groups.

#### Al-Keba Brigade

The only mention of this group in ACLED is event 3984LIB in which the Al-Keba is cited as a unit of the LNA; the news article on this event was found and confirmed the brigade as an LNA unit.<sup>2294</sup> As a unit of the LNA, the Al-Keba Brigade is a state actor and excluded from our dataset. although it is possible that they started as an anti-Gaddafi group in 2011, this is mere speculation and no mention of this group exists before 2015.

#### Al Mulathamun

AKA: El Moulathamoune; Those Who Signed in Blood

This group was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar after he splintered from AQIM in 2012 due to disagreements with some AQIM leaders.<sup>2295</sup> Furthermore, their only activity in Libya was targeting Algerian officials. This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a splinter group of AQIM.

#### Al-Qaeda

This group is not included in any of our datasets because it formed before 1997 and is not based in Africa.<sup>2296</sup>

#### Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

This group is the renamed GSPC after its alliance with Al-Qaeda in 2006.<sup>2297</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is the same as GSPC and it is controlled by a mother group (Al-Qaeda).

#### Al Qaqa Brigade

AKA: Al Qa'qa Brigade; Al Qa'qa' Brigade; Al Qaqa Brigade; Al Qaqaa Brigade; Al Qaaqa Brigade

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<sup>2291</sup> ACLED Event 3189LIB

<sup>2292</sup> Palwasha Kakar and Zahra Langhi, "Libya's Religious Sector and Peacebuilding Efforts," *Peaceworks* (United States Institute of Peace, 2017) 15, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/pw124-libya-religious-sector-and-peacebuilding-efforts.pdf>.

<sup>2293</sup> Wolfram Lacher and Alaa al-Idrissi, "Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State" (Small Arms Survey, June 2018), 4. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-armed-groups.pdf>.

<sup>2294</sup> "Clashes Intensify between Libyan Army-Backed Groups, pro-Islamists near Tripoli," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, September 11, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redis/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020150911eb9b0018h&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2295</sup> "Al Mourabitoun."

<sup>2296</sup> "Al Qaeda," Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed June 22, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-qaeda>.

<sup>2297</sup> "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb."

The Al Qaqa Brigade formed sometime in 2011 as part of the uprising against Gaddafi.<sup>2298</sup> The brigade was founded by Abd al-Majid Mliqta, who would become a prominent figure in the National Forces Alliance, a political coalition in the GNC.<sup>2299</sup> As a Zintan militia, the Al Qaqa Brigade likely benefited from U.A.E funding which would aid them in their assault on Tripoli,<sup>2300</sup> coded as their first attack. After Gaddafi was ousted, the Al Qaqa brigade received extensive funding and special treatment from the government, because of a Zintani Minister of Defense, Omar Juwaili,<sup>2301</sup> who took office in November 2011.<sup>2302</sup> Sources also confirm that at this time the Al Qaqa Brigade was officially part of the Ministry of Defense,<sup>2303</sup> as such, is considered a state actor and ceased to be a rebel group according to our criteria.

In February 2014 the Al Qaqa Brigade, along with other Zintan Brigades, demanded that the General National Congress (GNC) to give up all its power;<sup>2304</sup> the GNC was initially scheduled to give up power in February 2014 before they extended that mandate, a possible reason for the Al Qaqa's demand.<sup>2305</sup> In the following months, violence erupted between forces loyal to the GNC and forces against the GNC, including the Al-Qaqa Brigade.<sup>2306</sup> However, there is no evidence to suggest that the Al-Qaqa had abandoned its position in the Ministry of Defense, and therefore they are still counted as a state actor. In fact, an August 1, 2014 article confirms that the Al-Qaqa Brigade was still a state actor and allied with the National Forces Alliance political party.<sup>2307</sup>

On June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Libya held another round of elections in which the House of Representatives (HoR), the Libyan parliament, was elected.<sup>2308</sup> This nominally ended any GNC authority, however the GNC did not accept the results and continued to "stay in power."<sup>2309</sup> Due to the violence, the HoR fled to Tobruk and in November 2014 officially became allies with the Libyan National Army (LNA)—a rebel group led by former Gaddafi general Khalifa Haftar opposed to Islamists and the GNC.<sup>2310</sup> The Al-Qaqa Brigade was also allies with the LNA during 2014,<sup>2311</sup> a year that began the second Libyan Civil War. Due to Al-Qaqa's extensive ties to state actors, they never re-qualified as being a rebel group.

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<sup>2298</sup> "Libya: Zintan Revolutionaries Regain Control of Tripoli Airport from Militias, Hand It Back to Government," *The Tripoli Post*, June 5, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TRIPOS0020120606e86500001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2299</sup> Wolfram Lacher and Peter Cole, "Politics by Other Means: Conflicting Interests in Libya's Security Sector" (Small Arms Survey, 2014), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185177/SAS-SANA-WP20-Libya-Security-Sector.pdf>.

Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath* (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 200.  
<sup>2300</sup> Jalel Harchaoui and Mohamed-Essaïd Lazib, "Proxy War Dynamics in Libya" (VT Publishing, July 24, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.21061/proxy-wars-harchaoui-lazib>.

<sup>2301</sup> Jason Pack, Karim Mezran, and Mohamed Eljarh, "Libya's Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle," *Libya's Faustian Bargains*: (Atlantic Council, 2014), JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03592.6>.

<sup>2302</sup> Nicholas Heras, "A Look at the Commander of the Zintan Military Council: Who Is Osama al-Juwaili?," Jamestown, April 5, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/brief/look-commander-zintan-military-council-osama-al-juwaili/>.

<sup>2303</sup> Lacher and al-Idrissi, "Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State."

<sup>2304</sup> "Al-Jazirah Debates Deadline given to GNC, Security Developments in Libya," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, February 19, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020140219ea2j004mr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2305</sup> I Sari Arraf, "LIBYA: A SHORT GUIDE ON THE CONFLICT," *The Geneva Academy*, June 2017, 11, <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lybia%20A%20Short%20Guide%20to%20the%20Conflict.pdf>.

<sup>2306</sup> Arraf.

<sup>2307</sup> "RPT-INSIGHT-Town vs Town, Faction vs Faction as Libya Descends into 'Hurricane,'" *Reuters News*, August 1, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020140801ea81003dw&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2308</sup> Arraf, "LIBYA: A SHORT GUIDE ON THE CONFLICT."

<sup>2309</sup> Arraf.

<sup>2310</sup> Arraf.

<sup>2311</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib, "Proxy War Dynamics in Libya."

In August 2014, the GNC voted to disband all militias, including the Al-Sawaiq Brigade.<sup>2312</sup> However, this was merely a vote, and paths to enforce the decision were not foreseeable.<sup>2313</sup> Nevertheless, in August 2014 all Zintan militias left Tripoli<sup>2314</sup> and it is reasonable to assume that this officially ended the Qaqa brigade. This assumption is based off many members of Zintan militias joined the Special Operations Force (SOF) under the HoR Interior Ministry, which was led by Emad Trabelsi, the leader of the Al-Sawaiq Brigade.<sup>2315</sup>

In summation, there were many times that the Al-Qaqa Brigade rebelled against a government authority, however this did not constitute the Brigade as being viable because at that point the Al-Qaqa Brigade was also a state actor.

There are still some coding decisions that require clarification for the time period Al-Qaqa Brigade was a rebel group. The “planning inside” variable is coded as “1” because almost all groups that formed during the Libyan revolution were formed inside Libya, and if they were not it would have been documented.<sup>2316</sup> Furthermore, as described in the “Al-Sawaiq” brigade entry, the Al-Qaqa brigade and the “Al-Sawaiq” brigade were two very closely connected brigades. Therefore, the evidence that satisfied the “rural” variable for the Al-Sawaiq brigade as Zintan, is also enough to code Zintan (a rural area) for Al-Qaqa brigade’s “rural” variable.<sup>2317</sup>

Second, the first time the group was named in the media was a November 19<sup>th</sup> 2011 article;<sup>2318</sup> this was a couple of days before Juwaili became Defense Minister,<sup>2319</sup> which effectively made the Al Qaqa Brigade a state actor, and therefore the Al Qaqa Brigade was still a rebel group at the time of the article. However, even though the exact date of formation is unknown, it is highly likely they formed at least one month before the August Tripoli attack.

Exact dates are unknown for large and civilian attacks. It is possible that these attacks never occurred, especially the civilian attacks. However, the civilian attack variable is coded as unknown rather than “0,” because although it is unlikely the Al Qaqa Brigade intentionally killed civilians, it is within the realm of possibility that they would kill civilian Gaddafi loyalists.

Because little information was found on this group during the time it was a rebel group, many of the initial leaders variables are unknown. The “former/current security/government” variables are coded as “0,” rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials, and it is well documented when a rebel group leader was a Gaddafi defect (which Mliqta was not). The “clandestine” variable is coded as “1” because due to Gaddafi’s presence in Zintan, as well as a high level of military savvy amongst Zintani rebels during the revolution due to numerous military defections,<sup>2320</sup> it is likely that rebel groups emerging from Zintan were clandestine.<sup>2321</sup> There is one source that claims the Al Qaqa Brigade

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<sup>2312</sup> Ahmed Elumami and Ayman Al-Warfalli, “Libya’s Parliament Calls for U.N. Aid to Quell Militia Fighting,” *Reuters*, August 13, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0GD1CR20140813>.

<sup>2313</sup> Elumami and Al-Warfalli.

<sup>2314</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib, “Proxy War Dynamics in Libya.”

<sup>2315</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib.

<sup>2316</sup> “In Zintan, Libya, Celebrating Unity and Feeling Some Tension - The New York Times,” accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/world/africa/in-zintan-libya-celebrating-unity-and-feeling-some-tension.html>.

<sup>2317</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib, “Proxy War Dynamics in Libya.”

<sup>2318</sup> Hanna Ingber, “Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Captured in Libyan Desert: Reports,” *The World from PRX*, accessed July 29, 2020, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-11-19/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-captured-libyan-desert-reports>.

<sup>2319</sup> Francois Murphy and Ali Shuaib, “Local Commander Made Libya Defense Minister: NTC Source,” *Reuters*, November 22, 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-idUSTRE7AI0G820111122>.

<sup>2320</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 257-272.

<sup>2321</sup> Interview with Brian McQuinn 8.27.20

was actually part of another brigade, the Tripoli Brigade.<sup>2322</sup> However, this is highly unlikely to be true because the Tripoli Brigade was formed by Libyan expatriates, mainly Irish-Libyans, and many of the groups aligned with the Tripoli Brigade had significant conflict with the Zintan Brigades.<sup>2323</sup>

SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time. Because this group was formed as a part of the Libyan uprising, the coder considers the latest date listed in SCAD for the start of the Libyan uprising, 27 February 2011, to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. This event, Event ID 6200056, occurred nationwide. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Al-Sawaiq Brigade

AKA: Al-Sawa'i'iq Brigade; Al-Sawaiq Battalion; Al-Sawaek Brigade; Sawaiq Brigade; Sawa'i'iq Brigade; Sawaek Brigade

This group formed sometime in 2011 as part of the uprising against Gaddafi, and is led by Emad Trabelsi.<sup>2324</sup> The Al-Sawaiq Brigade is based in Zintan,<sup>2325</sup> but also has roots in Tripoli.<sup>2326</sup> With funding from the U.A.E, the Al-Sawaiq Brigade helped overtake Tripoli, Libya's capital, in August 2011 (coded as their first attack).<sup>2327</sup> After Gaddafi was successfully ousted, the Al-Sawaiq Brigade was absorbed into the Ministry of Defense<sup>2328</sup> and stopped qualifying as a rebel group according to our criteria.

Although the period that the Al-Sawaiq Brigade was a rebel group is very short, the events that transpired after their absorption into the Ministry of Defense are important and impact coding decisions. In November 2013, the Al-Sawaiq Brigade was asked to leave Tripoli, which they were tasked with protecting,<sup>2329</sup> amidst public distaste for the group.<sup>2330</sup> This event was the first the Al-Sawaiq Brigade was named in the media, and thus would have been coded as "1" for "name\_duress"; however, since the Al-Sawaiq Brigade was no longer a rebel group at this point, we coded the Al-Sawaiq Brigade as never having been publicly named. Nonetheless, there is speculation as to whether the Al-Sawaiq Brigade truly left Tripoli,<sup>2331</sup> and it is clear that they had a presence there in 2014.

The Al-Sawaiq Brigade followed a near identical trajectory to the Al-Qaqa Brigade, both very closely connected Zintan Brigades; therefore, please see the discussion of Al-Qaqa Brigades actions starting in February 2014 and apply them to Al-Sawaiq as well.

There are still some coding decisions that require clarification for the time period Al-Sawaiq Brigade was a rebel group. Nevertheless, the "planning\_inside" variable is coded as "1" because almost all groups that formed during the Libyan revolution were formed inside Libya,

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<sup>2322</sup> Margaret Coker and Charles Levinson, "Length of Libya's Standoff Hinges on Leader's Militia," *The Wall Street Journal Online*, August 24, 2011, sec. World News,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WSJO000020110823e78o00a6r&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2323</sup> Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath* (London: Hurst & Company, 2014) 77-93.

<sup>2324</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib, "Proxy War Dynamics in Libya."

<sup>2325</sup> Francesco Finucci, "Libya: Military Actors and Militias," n.d.,

[https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/libyan-militias\\_finucci.pdf](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/libyan-militias_finucci.pdf).

<sup>2326</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib, "Proxy War Dynamics in Libya."

<sup>2327</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib.

<sup>2328</sup> Pack, Mezran, and Eljarh, "Libya's Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle."

<sup>2329</sup> Pack, Mezran, and Eljarh.

<sup>2330</sup> Essam Mohamed, "Militias Leave Tripoli," *All Africa*, November 23, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131123e9bn000ur&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2331</sup> Pack, Mezran, and Eljarh, "Libya's Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle."

and if they were not it would have been documented. The Al-Sawaiq Brigade was identified in Zintan within a year of formation and therefore Zintan satisfies the “rural” variable as 1.<sup>2332</sup>

Exact dates are unknown for large and civilian attacks. It is possible that these attacks never occurred, especially the civilian attacks. However, the civilian attack variable is coded as unknown rather than “0,” because although it is unlikely the Al-Sawaiq Brigade intentionally killed civilians, it is within the realm of possibility that they would kill civilian Gaddafi loyalists. The “former/current security/government” variables are coded as 0, rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials, and it is well documented when a rebel group leader was a Gaddafi defect (which Trabelsi was not).

The “other\_org” and “no\_prior\_org” variables are coded as “0” and “1” respectively, because we determined that if this group had emerged from a prior organization, it likely would have been documented. The “clandestine” variable is coded as “1” because due to Gaddafi’s presence in Zintan, as well as a high level of military savvy amongst Zintani rebels during the revolution due to numerous military defections,<sup>2333</sup> it is likely that rebel groups emerging from Zintan were clandestine.<sup>2334</sup> Because little information was found on this group during the time it was a rebel group, many of the initial leaders variables are unknown.

SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time. SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and one instance of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to 27 February 2011. Because this group was formed as a part of the Libyan uprising, the coder considers the latest date listed in SCAD for the start of the Libyan uprising, 27 February 2011, to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. This event, Event ID 6200056, occurred nationwide, satisfying the conditions for contestation\_local. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Ali Hassan Al-Jaber Brigade

AKA: Ali Hassan Al-Jabar Brigade

This group was a brigade of the National Transitional Council. It is excluded from our dataset because it is a group started by a rebel group and the brigade is controlled by the NTC.<sup>2335</sup>

#### Ansar Al-Sharia

This “group” refers to the merger of ASD and ASB. However, these two groups still operated independently and was not a true merger.<sup>2336</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it was never a true merger, and it is the joining of two rebel groups. However, it should be noted that ACLED only lists “Ansar Al-Sharia” and not ASD or ASB.

#### \*Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi (ASB)

AKA: Ansar Al-Shariah Benghazi; Ansar Al-Sharia Libya (ASL)

Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi (ASB) was a Salafi rebel/terrorist group led by Mohamed Al-Zahawi,<sup>2337</sup> and formed sometime in 2012.<sup>2338</sup> On June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2012 ASB and many other militias

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<sup>2332</sup> Harchaoui and Lazib, “Proxy War Dynamics in Libya.”

<sup>2333</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 257-272.

<sup>2334</sup> Interview with Brian McQuinn 8.27.20

<sup>2335</sup> “United Nations Inter-Agency Mission,” accessed July 17, 2020, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full\\_report\\_157.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_report_157.pdf).

<sup>2336</sup> “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL),” Counter Extremism Project, accessed July 10, 2020, <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/ansar-al-sharia-libya-asl>.

<sup>2337</sup> “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL).”

<sup>2338</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 201.



handed out leaflets in Benghazi advertising their upcoming meeting to support Sharia law on June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2012 near Al-Hurriyah Square.<sup>2339</sup> During that meeting around 300 militiamen paraded with armored vehicles and weapons demanding the implementation of Sharia law (coded as “1” for “goal\_take”).<sup>2340</sup> Due to this show of force, we concluded that ASB had made plans to violently impose Sharia law sometime before this parade, however the exact date is unknown; therefore, the date of formation is just 2012, but the name date is June 3<sup>rd</sup> 2012. It should be noted that one source, an interview with an ASB leader, claims the group to have formed in “early 2012.”<sup>2341</sup>

In late August 2012 ASB was responsible for destroying Sufi sites,<sup>2342</sup> however this is not counted as a civilian attack because the intention was not to kill civilians. On September 11, 2012 a number of ASB militants attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, killing 4 Americans including the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens.<sup>2343</sup> Although this did not result in the death of Libyan government officials, we coded this as ASB’s first small attack; since the U.S. and Ambassador Stevens represented a prominent global authority in Libya allied with the Libyan government, an attack on the Consulate challenges the legitimacy and authority of the Libyan state.

Following the attack on the U.S. Consulate, ASB came under severe public scrutiny and demonstrations. Subsequently ASB renamed itself to Ansar Al-Sharia Libya (ASL) and focused extensively on its *dawa* campaign,<sup>2344</sup> public service, in order to revive its image and present itself as a national movement.<sup>2345</sup>

After a brief exile from Benghazi, ASB returned in February 2013 manning checkpoints and security positions at local institutions such as hospitals. Although they had been kicked out by locals, they were reluctantly welcomed back due to their ability to provide security for the city, which the authorities could not.<sup>2346</sup>

In September 2013, a secret meeting was held in Benghazi between ASB officials and other extremists in the region to increase the armed struggle in Libya and Tunisia.<sup>2347</sup> This date coincides with a surge of violence in Benghazi beginning shortly before September 2013.<sup>2348</sup> Although an exact date for a civilian attack is unknown, sources including the U.S. department of state<sup>2349</sup> confirm that ASB was launching civilian attacks in 2013.<sup>2350</sup> One possible attack was on August 5, 2013 when militants killed a human rights activist.<sup>2351</sup>

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<sup>2339</sup> “Preparations under Way for Holding Meeting in Support of Shari’ah in Libya,” BBC Monitoring, June 4, 2012, <https://global-factiva-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/ga/default.aspx>.

<sup>2340</sup> “Al-Qa’idah Loyalists Stage Military Parade in Benghazi, Want Islamic Shari’ah,” BBC Monitoring, June 18, 2012, <https://global-factiva-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/ga/default.aspx>.

<sup>2341</sup> Mary Fitzgerald, “A Conversation with Abu Khattala,” *The New Yorker*, June 17, 2014, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-conversation-with-abu-khattala>.

<sup>2342</sup> “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL).”

<sup>2343</sup> Thomas Joscelyn, “State Department Designates 3 Ansar al Sharia Organizations, Leaders,” *longwarjournal*, January 10, 2014, [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/state\\_department\\_des\\_2.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/state_department_des_2.php).

<sup>2344</sup> “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL).”

<sup>2345</sup> Henrik Gråtrud and Vidar Benjamin Skretting, “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya: An Enduring Threat,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11, no. 1 (2017): 40–53, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297736>.

<sup>2346</sup> “Libya Militia Linked to U.S. Attack Returns to Benghazi,” *Reuters News*, February 17, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020130217e92h00062&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2347</sup> Ludovico Carlino, “Ansar Al-Shari’a: Transforming Libya into a Land of Jihad,” *Jamestown*, January 9, 2014, <https://jamestown.org/program/ansar-al-sharia-transforming-libya-into-a-land-of-jihad/>.

<sup>2348</sup> Ali Al-Gattani and Asma Elourfi, “Benghazi On the Brink,” *All Africa*, September 5, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130905e995000g3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2349</sup> Joscelyn, “State Department Designates 3 Ansar al Sharia Organizations, Leaders.”

<sup>2350</sup> Ali Al-Gattani, “Libya Battalions Run Private Prisons [Interview],” *All Africa*, September 18, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130918e99i000b6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2351</sup> Asmaa Elourfi, “Libyans Urge Action to Halt Violence,” *All Africa*, August 5, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130805e985000kw&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

After the launch of Operation Dignity by general Haftar in May 2014, ASB focused most of its military campaign against Haftar.<sup>2352</sup> This led to them joining with other militias in forming the Benghazi Revolutionaries' Shura Council (BRSC) in July 2014.<sup>2353</sup> ASB's first large attack is coded as BRSC's first large attack from July 23<sup>rd</sup> - July 27<sup>th</sup> 2014,<sup>2354</sup> when they clashed with Libyan troops over control of Benghazi. On May 28, 2017 ASB disbanded after being severely weakened by fighting in Benghazi.<sup>2355</sup>

ASB was able to set up branches across Libya, including in Sirte, Ajdabiya, and Nawfalia at the height of its operations.<sup>2356</sup>

There are some coding decisions that need clarification. First, the "clandestine" variable is coded as "1" because the group definitely formed sometime before June 2012, but their first attack was not until September 11, 2012. Therefore, we concluded that this gap represented a clandestine strategy in the groups early months.

Second, similarly to ASD, ASB allegedly had ties with Al-Qaeda,<sup>2357</sup> and therefore the "other" and "none" variables under sources of funding are coded as unknown.

Third, the "former\_rebels" variable is coded as "1" because Mohamed Al-Zahawi and Ahmad Abu Khattala were both rebels during the revolution.<sup>2358</sup> Furthermore, the "former\_security" variable is coded as "1" because Fawzi Barawi was an army officer and then on the ASB leadership council.<sup>2359</sup> Last, the "current\_rebels" variable is coded as "1" because Fawzi Barawi used to be a member of the Feb 17 Battalion,<sup>2360</sup> which merged into BRSC and is still operational.<sup>2361</sup>

ASB is coded as "0" for the "viable\_splinter" instead of unknown even though there is no explicit evidence that there were no splinters. However, ASB was so well documented in the press that a splinter group would have likely been documented as well; furthermore, the Benghazi area was so heavily saturated at the time with Islamist groups that a splinter would have had little room to operate. Last, most members of ASB that had left the group defected to ISIS,<sup>2362</sup> rather than attempting to start their own group.

Due to the extensive evidence of ASB being located in Benghazi (first parade at hurriyah, attack on US embassy, and secret meetings in September 2013) the "rural" variable location is coded as Benghazi.

The "civ\_attack\_time" variable is coded as "0" because we concluded it would have been unlikely and well documented if ASB had killed civilians within the first 3 months of formation.

<sup>2352</sup> Gråtrud and Skretting, "Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya."

<sup>2353</sup> "Benghazi 'Falls to al-Qaeda-Linked Rebels,'" Reuters, July 31, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/benghazi-falls-al-qaeda-linked-rebels-2014731161541245353.html>.

<sup>2354</sup> "'Violent Clashes' between Elite Force, Militia in Libya's Benghazi - TV," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, July 23, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020140723ea7n0018h&cat=a&ep=ASE>. "Libya: Twenty-Seven People Killed, 40 Injured in Benghazi Clashes on 26 July," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, July 27, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020140727ea7r0050l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2355</sup> "Libya's Ansar al-Sharia Announces Dissolution," Reuters, May 28, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/libya-ansar-al-sharia-announces-dissolution-170528045219409.html>.

<sup>2356</sup> "Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)."

<sup>2357</sup> "Al-Qa'idah Loyalists Stage Military Parade in Benghazi, Want Islamic Shari'ah."

<sup>2358</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 201.

<sup>2359</sup> Cole and McQuinn, 201.

<sup>2360</sup> Cole and McQuinn, 201.

<sup>2361</sup> "Programme Summary of Libyan Libya's Channel News 1800 Gmt 14 Apr 20," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, April 15, 2020,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020200415eg4f000p1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2362</sup> "Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)."

However, the “civ\_attack\_time2” variable is coded as unknown because we were not able to find a specific civilian attack in 2013 but were confident that they were occurring.

Last, SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Several Type 2 events occurred during this time, and since the location of several of these events is listed as “nationwide” (Event ID 6200056) or “Benghazi”, this fulfills the local requirement and contestation\_local is coded as 1. Notably, this nationwide event marks the start of the First Libyan Civil War. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### **\*Ansar Al-Sharia Derna (ASD)**

AKA: Ansar al-Shariah Derna

Ansar Al-Sharia Derna (ASD) was a rebel group founded and led by Sufian Bin Qumu sometime around 2012.<sup>2363</sup> While the exact date of formation is unknown, ASD and Qumu definitely had a publicly known presence in Derna in March 2012, which is coded as the name date for ASD, and which satisfies Derna (a rural area) for the “rural” variable.<sup>2364</sup> Furthermore, while there were a number of Islamist groups in Derna, there was enough evidence to reasonably attribute attacks in Derna to ASD in March 2012,<sup>2365</sup> which is also coded as the date of first small attack; some of these attacks also included attacks on civilians.<sup>2366</sup> These attacks are motivated by ASD’s desire to establish Sharia law in Libya (coded as “1” for “goal\_take variable”).<sup>2367</sup> Moreover, while Qumu was once a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and therefore may have taken some fighters from there to start ASD, he immediately began recruiting youths in Derna upon launching ASD to join his group.<sup>2368</sup>

ASD remained exclusively in Derna until September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2012, when Qumu and some of his men helped attack the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, US officials have determined.<sup>2369</sup> It should be noted that another group, Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi, participated in this attack as well; although the two groups have similar names, and some sources claim they merged to form Ansar Al-Sharia, these groups operate independently.<sup>2370</sup> Following this attack, there were mass demonstrations against the two groups, and ASD subsequently disbanded on September 22, 2012.<sup>2371</sup> However, the group re-emerged in late 2013,<sup>2372</sup> and is believed to have cooperated with Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi in some attacks.<sup>2373</sup> In December 2014, ASD merged with other Islamist militias, such as the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade, to form the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC); it should be noted that some sources claim ASD and Qumu defected to join

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<sup>2363</sup> Aaron Y. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia,” *Foreign Policy* (blog), September 21, 2012, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/>.

<sup>2364</sup> Asmaa Elourfi, “Libya: Al-Qaeda Elements Surface In Derna,” *Eurasia Review* (blog), April 5, 2012, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/05042012-libya-al-qaeda-elements-surface-in-derna/>.

<sup>2365</sup> Elourfi.

<sup>2366</sup> Elourfi.

<sup>2367</sup> Elourfi.

<sup>2368</sup> Elourfi.

<sup>2369</sup> “Former Guantanamo Detainee Implicated in Benghazi Attack,” *Washington Post*, January 8, 2014, [https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1476229600?accountid=11243&rfr\\_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo](https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1476229600?accountid=11243&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo).

<sup>2370</sup> Zelin, “Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia.”

<sup>2371</sup> “UPDATE 1-Two Islamist Militias in Libya’s Derna Say Disbanding,” *Reuters* (Reuters Limited, September 22, 2012), <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020120922e89m0009g&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2372</sup> “ASL,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 9, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/7046>.

<sup>2373</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah,” *Refworld*, accessed July 9, 2020, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f53c.html>.

ISIS in October 2014.<sup>2374</sup> However, further research found these claims ASD's affiliation with ISIS to be unlikely, as there were no announcements of such defections and clear evidence of ASD joining groups to form DMSC.<sup>2375</sup>

On June 17, 2018 Qumu and his militiamen (it is unclear if these were strictly ASD forces or also DMSC) were defeated and arrested in Derna.<sup>2376</sup> On February 9, 2019 the last remnants of the DMSC were defeated and surrendered to the Libyan National Army (LNA), subsequently ending the group.<sup>2377</sup>

There are a number of coding decisions that warrant explanation. First, Qumu was a tank driver in the Libyan military in the 1980's, and therefore the "former\_security" variable is coded as "1."<sup>2378</sup>

Second, given that ASD was known to the public and perpetrating attacks in March 2012 the "clandestine" variable is coded as "0".

Third, Qumu was known to have close ties with Osama Bin-Laden and Al Qaeda,<sup>2379</sup> and therefore it is possible he received some funding from them but that is unknown. Therefore, the "other" and "none" variables under sources of funding are coded as unknown.

Fourth, since the exact date of formation is unknown for ASD, the "civ\_attack\_time" variable is coded as unknown; however, since ASD formed sometime around 2012, after Ghaddafi's death, and had launched civilian attacks in March 2012, the "civ\_attack\_time2" variable is coded as "1."

Fifth, after researching a myriad of different sources, Bin-Qumu is listed as the only leader of ASD.

Sixth, SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Several Type 2 events occurred during this time, and since the location for one of these events (Event ID 6200056) is listed as "nationwide", this fulfills the local requirement and contestation\_local is coded as 1. Notably, this event marks the start of the First Libyan Civil War. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Seventh, due to DMSC attacking state targets 3+ years after ASD's formation, the "viable" and "viable\_merge" variables are coded as "1."

Eighth, no attack perpetrated either by the Darnah Brigade or DMSC was found to kill at least 25 people, and therefore the large attack variables are coded as missing.

The "planning\_inside" variable is coded as "1" because there was no evidence to suggest that Qumu left Libya at any point in 2011 or 2012. Because his whereabouts throughout his lifetime were very well documented, including his presence in Libya during the anti-Gaddafi revolution, the coder concluded that absence of evidence suggesting he left Libya was evidence that he did not leave Libya.

### **Bashir Sadawi Brigade**

AKA: Bashir Saadawi Brigade; Bashir al-Sadaawi Brigade; Bashir al-Saadawi Battalion

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<sup>2374</sup> "Ansar Al-Shariah (Libya)," Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed July 7, 2020, [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-al-shariah-libya#\\_ftn3](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-al-shariah-libya#_ftn3).

<sup>2375</sup> Thomas Joscelyn, "Ansar al Sharia Libya Fights on under New Leader," longwarjournal, June 30, 2015, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ansar-al-sharia-libya-fights-on-under-new-leader.php>.

<sup>2376</sup> Mohammed al-Arabi, "Libyan Army Arrests Former Bin Laden Driver Abu Sufian Bin Qumu in Derna," Al Arabiya English, June 17, 2018, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/north-africa/2018/06/17/Libyan-army-arrests-former-bin-laden-driver-abu-sufian-bin-qumu-in-Derna.html>.

<sup>2377</sup> "Eye On Jihadis in Libya Weekly Update: February 12," February 13, 2019, <https://jihadology.net/2019/02/13/eye-on-jihadis-in-libya-weekly-update-february-12/>.

<sup>2378</sup> Rod Nordland and Scott Shane, "Libyan Detainee Now U.S. Ally of Sorts," New York Times, April 24, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-files-libyan-detainee-now-us-ally-of-sorts.html>.

<sup>2379</sup> Nordland and Shane.

This group was an anti-Gaddafi rebel group that formed sometime around April 2011 and was led by Fawzi Al-Usta, a former businessman.<sup>2380</sup> The Bashir Sadawi Brigade consisted of a group of Tripolitarians with connections to the towns of Qal'a and Yefren in the western mountains of Libya.<sup>2381</sup> After Gaddafi was killed, the Bashir Sadawi Brigade was integrated into the government and stopped qualifying as a rebel group. It is possible that the Bashir Sadawi Brigade targeted state actors in 2015,<sup>2382</sup> however there is no indication that they had abandoned their positions in the government and therefore the group is coded as unknown for viability. Very little information could be found on this group and many variables are coded as unknown; however, given the trend of rebel group emergence in Libya during the time of the revolution, the coder was confident that this group qualified for our dataset due to evidence of its existence as an anti-Gaddafi group. Nevertheless, the group is coded with a certainty of "2" due to the lack of information, including specific attacks.

There are some coding decisions that require clarification. First, one source notes that Al-Usta was recruiting fighters on a Djerba, a Tunisian island.<sup>2383</sup> However, it is unknown if the initial planning for the group occurred on this island or in Libya. Therefore, the "planning\_inside" variable and the "planning\_border" variables are coded as unknown. Nevertheless, Djerba is coded as 1 for the "rural" variable.

The Bashir Sadawi Brigade was never named in the media when they were an active rebel group (only after they had become a state actor).

It is possible that they received funding from the NTC, as many rebel groups did during the revolution; furthermore, it is possible that this funding came as from foreign government funding. Therefore the "foreign\_govt" and "other" variables are coded as unknown.

The small attack variable is coded as 2011 because despite no attack being linked to the Bashir Sadawi Brigade, their existence as an anti-Gaddafi rebel group makes it fairly certain they launched attacks in 2011. However, the large attack and the civilian attack variables are coded as unknown, rather than 2011, because it is less certain that a group would carry out a large or civilian attack. It appears that this group had no organizational antecedents.

The "clandestine" variable is coded as "1" for a few reasons. First, Usta was organizing resistance fighters on an island off of Libya, which would indicate a desire to be clandestine. Second, in cities where Gaddafi had a military presence during the revolution, such as Tripoli, it was highly likely that rebel groups were clandestine;<sup>2384</sup> the evidence points towards Usta being from Tripoli, due to Gaddafi informants in Tripoli tracking his movements,<sup>2385</sup> and therefore it is likely that Usta's group was clandestine.

The "former/current security/government" variables are coded as 0, rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials, and it is well documented when a rebel group leader was a Gaddafi defect (which Fawzi Al-Usta was not).

SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Several Type 2 events occurred during this time, and the location for one of these

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<sup>2380</sup> Robert F. Worth, "The Surreal Ruins of Qaddafi's Never-Never Land," *The New York Times*, September 21, 2011, sec. Magazine, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/magazine/the-surreal-ruins-of-qaddafis-never-never-land.html>.

Although the article does not mention the Bashir Sadawi Brigade by name, Fawzi al Usta is confirmed as its leader by multiple sources. Furthermore, since this article cites him recruiting members in June 2011, and the revolution started in February 2011, the date of formation is April 2011 because it is likely the group formed within 1-2 of that date.

<sup>2381</sup> Wolfram Lacher and Peter Cole, *Politics by Other Means: Conflicting Interests in Libya's Security Sector*, 2014, 77.

<sup>2382</sup> 4263LIB

<sup>2383</sup> Worth, "The Surreal Ruins of Qaddafi's Never-Never Land."

<sup>2384</sup> Interview with Brian McQuinn 8.27.20

<sup>2385</sup> Worth, "The Surreal Ruins of Qaddafi's Never-Never Land."

events (Event ID 6200056) is listed as “nationwide.” Notably, this event marks the start of the First Libyan Civil War. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)

AKA: Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries

This is a coalition that formed in June 2014 between Ansar al-Sharia, February 17 Martyrs Brigade, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, Libya Shield, Brega Martyrs Brigade, and the Jaysh al-Mujahidin Militia.<sup>2386</sup> Since most groups that formed BRSC were established, armed, violent, groups it is considered a merger and excluded from our dataset.

### Brega Martyrs Brigade

AKA: Al-Burayqah Martyrs Brigade

The Brega Martyrs Brigade is led by Muhammad al-Araybi, also known as Buka.<sup>2387</sup> Buka formed his brigade after Gaddafi had been killed, and quickly provided protection for government buildings.<sup>2388</sup> Though few details could be found on the Brega Martyrs Brigade, multiple sources cite connections that the group had to the state, and therefore the Brega Martyrs Brigade is considered a state actor and excluded from our dataset.<sup>2389</sup> It should be noted that ACLED lists the Brega Martyrs Brigade and the Al-Burayqah Martyrs Brigade as separate actors, however this is the same group and Burayqah is an alternative spelling to Brega.<sup>2390</sup>

### El-Farouk Brigade

This brigade is a Zawiya based brigade led by Abu Obeida Al-Zawi, and was part of Libya Dawn; due to its membership in Libya Dawn this group is considered a state actor and excluded from our dataset.<sup>2391</sup> It is possible that this brigade was a rebel group during the anti-Gaddafi revolution, but there is no reference to them during that time. It should be noted that there was an El-Farouk Brigade that was part of the NTC during the revolution, however this was a brigade from Sirte and led by Touhami Zayani, indicating that it is not the same El-Farouk Brigade.<sup>2392</sup>

### Darnah Brigade

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<sup>2386</sup> “Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 30, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/4369>.

<sup>2387</sup> “Libya’s Operation Dignity Claims Control of Islamists’ Position in Benghazi,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, October 23, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020141023eaan0038p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2388</sup> “Libyan Officials Give Details of Benghazi Attacks, Ansar al-Shari’ah, Militias,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, August 3, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020140803ea83003pd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2389</sup> “Libyan Officials Give Details of Benghazi Attacks, Ansar al-Shari’ah, Militias.”

“Armed Attack Causes Chaos in Libyan Congress during Vote on New Premier,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, April 30, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020140430ea4u0030d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

“Analysis of the Five Main Active Libyan Power Centres,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, July 5, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020140705ea75003xp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2390</sup> “Libya’s Operation Dignity Claims Control of Islamists’ Position in Benghazi.”

“Marsá al Burayqah, Libya,” accessed August 18, 2020, <https://www.mindat.org/feature-2215208.html>.

<sup>2391</sup> “Clashes Break out in Libyan Coastal Town over Pledge of Loyalty to Parliament.”

“LNA Airstrike in Zawia, Airstrikes Continue Overnight in Tripoli,” Al Marsad, May 13, 2019,

<https://almarsad.co/en/2019/05/13/lna-airstrike-in-zawia-airstrikes-continue-overnight-in-tripoli/>.

<sup>2392</sup> “UPDATE 1-Gaddafi Loyalists in Sirte Seek Truce-NTC Commander,” *Reuters*, September 27, 2011, <https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFL5E7KR1ME20110927>.



AKA: Darna Brigade; Darnah Brigade; Abu Salim Brigade; Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade; Abu Slim Brigade; Abu Salim Martyrs Battalion

The Darnah brigade was founded by Abd al-Hakim al Hasadi, a former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member (“former\_rebel” variable coded as “1”),<sup>2393</sup> in the early stages of the revolution (coded as 03/2011).<sup>2394</sup> Along with Hasadi, Salim Derby and Sufian Bin Qumu both held leadership positions in the Darnah Brigade as some point.<sup>2395</sup> Like the vast majority of militias at this time, the Darnah Brigade aimed to topple the Gaddafi regime (coded as “goal\_take”).<sup>2396</sup> The earliest mention of the Darnah Brigade in the media, as found through Factiva, was on April 2<sup>nd</sup> 2011.<sup>2397</sup>

Although exact dates for Darnah Brigade attacks were difficult to ascertain, sources pin them on the front lines near Ajdabiya in early April 2011,<sup>2398</sup> therefore, their small attack is coded as March 2011, because it is likely that their attack occurred within 1-2 months of March. A civilian attack directly attributed to the Darnah Brigade was not found, however, it should be noted that ACLED event 3609LIB claimed the Darnah Brigade (renamed the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade) killed a civilian, but this attack was unable to be verified by any sources. Nonetheless, the Darnah Brigade’s first civilian attack is coded as the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council’s (see below) first civilian attack on May 30, 2018 when they were planting land mines to target civilians attempting to escape Derna amidst intense fighting between them and the LNA.<sup>2399</sup>

Alongside Ansar Al-Sharia Darnah, the Darnah Brigade was ousted from Darnah in September 2012.<sup>2400</sup> However, the Darnah Brigade merged with other militias, including ASD, to form the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) in December 2014.<sup>2401</sup>

There are some coding decisions that require clarification. First, the Darnah Brigade is less documented than many other militias in the region at the time, like ASD. Therefore, many of the variables that were coded as “0” for ASD are coded as “.” for the Darnah Brigade because for the former, absence of evidence likely meant evidence of absence, but for the latter this could not be as easily applied. Variables that were coded as “.” for this reason included the “viable\_splinter” and “leaders\_currentgovt” variables.

Second, sources indicate that the Darnah Brigade possibly trafficked drugs and weapons in 2012, which could have been a possible source of funding for the group,<sup>2402</sup> but this is unknown.

Third, although there is no explicit evidence that the Darnah Brigade started inside Libya, this can be inferred due to the vast majority of groups that formed during this time against

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<sup>2393</sup> Frederic Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” September 19, 2012, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/19/struggle-for-security-in-eastern-libya-pub-49425>.

<sup>2394</sup> Wehrey.

<sup>2395</sup> Wehrey.

<sup>2396</sup> Rod Nordland and Scott Shane, “Libyan, Once a Detainee, Is Now a U.S. Ally of Sorts,” *The New York Times*, April 24, 2011, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-files-libyan-detainee-now-us-ally-of-sorts.html>.

<sup>2397</sup> “Ex-GITMO Libyan Detainee Is Now a US Ally of Sorts,” *Asian News International*, April 2, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HNASNI0020110425e742000ek&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2398</sup> C. J. Chivers and Kareem Fahim, “NATO Hits Libyan Rebels’ Convoy, Rebel General Say,” *New York Times*, April 7, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/world/africa/08libya.html?pagewanted=all>.

<sup>2399</sup> “Five Civilians Said Killed in Fighting in Libya’s Derna,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, May 30, 2018, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020180530ee5u003pd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

“Civilians Said Killed as Fighting Rages in Libya’s Derna,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, May 31, 2018, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020180531ee5v003s5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2400</sup> “UPDATE 1-Two Islamist Militias in Libya’s Derna Say Disbanding.”

<sup>2401</sup> “DPF - Forces of the House of Representatives,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 11, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/14785>.

<sup>2402</sup> Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.”

Gaddafi having formed inside Libya. Operational leaders were in Darnah within a year of formation and thus Darnah (population less than 100,000) satisfies the “rural” variable.<sup>2403</sup>

Fourth, like most groups in Libya, it is very hard to find the tribal affiliations of leaders, and the predominant tribe in the location of first attacks.

Fifth, no attack perpetrated either by the Darnah Brigade or DMSC was found to kill at least 25 people, and therefore the large attack variables are coded as missing.

Sixth, the “clandestine” variable is coded as “0” because the Darnah Brigade was operating openly in the initial months of group formation.

Seventh, SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events in the year prior to group formation. Several Type 2 events occurred during this time, and the location for one of these events (Event ID 6200056) is listed as “nationwide.” Notably, this event marks the start of the First Libyan Civil War. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### February 17 Martyrs Brigade

AKA: 17 February Martyrs Brigade; 17 February Battalion

This group started out as a merger between smaller groups in the early stages of the 2011 uprising.<sup>2404</sup> Although no information could be found regarding the smaller groups, the coder was fairly certain that they would have counted as rebel groups, for our dataset, due to the trend of rebel group emergence in Libya early in the rebellion. Therefore, this group is excluded from our dataset.

### February 17 Movement

This group is cited as in actor in two ACLED events, 1679LIB and 1748LIB. The article cited for the former did not mention a group by this name; the article for the latter only mentioned the February 17 Martyrs Brigade. It is possible ACLED is either using another name for the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, or they are referencing fighters that existed during the February 17 revolution, rather than a group. Nonetheless, the February 17 Movement is not a distinct group and is therefore excluded from our dataset.

### Fighters of the Martyrs Brigade

Other than the events listed in ACLED, no information could be found on this group. Furthermore, all three events listed in ACLED, 781LIB-783LIB, for this group were intra-civilian violence. Since this group was not targeting the state and no other information could be found, it is excluded from our dataset.

### Former Military Forces of Libya

This is not a group in ACLED but rather describes former members of the military in Libya. All events that reference “Former Military Forces of Libya” are violence against the former members, rather than violence perpetrated. This is excluded from our dataset because it is not a group.

### Free Libya Martyrs Brigade

AKA: Free Libya Brigade; Martyrs of Free Libya Brigade

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<sup>2403</sup> Nordland and Shane.

<sup>2404</sup> “February 17 Martyrs Brigade, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 28, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/7049>.

Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 190-191.

This group started as an anti-Gaddafi rebel group that formed sometime around April 2011, with its first mention in the media in June 2011.<sup>2405</sup> In many sources Wissam Bin Hamid is listed as the leader of the group,<sup>2406</sup> a former oil engineer who became a prominent fighter on the front lines during the rebellion;<sup>2407</sup> Bin Hamid also became the leader of Libya Shield.<sup>2408</sup> While some sources point to Bin Hamid starting a coalition called the February 17 Coalition in early 2011,<sup>2409</sup> this does not discredit the likelihood of the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade being an independent group for two main reasons. First, the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade is listed in many sources at multiple stages of the revolution; second, it is possible that the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade was one of the groups that helped form the February 17 Coalition, and since Bin Hamid was such a prominent fighter (presumably with his Free Libya Martyrs Brigade) he became the leader of the February 17 Coalition as well. Like many groups that emerged during the rebellion, not many details could be found about the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade other than they existed and fought Gaddafi; however, in 2014 the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade joined with other militias in forming the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC).<sup>2410</sup>

There are a number of coding decisions that warrant clarification. First, with the first mention of the Brigade in June 2011, and the revolution starting in late February, the date of formation is coded as April 2011 because it is likely that the group formed within 1-2 of that date.

Second, although the exact location of group formation is unknown, the “planning\_inside” variable is coded as “1” because the vast majority of groups that formed during the rebellion formed in Libya, and if they had not it would have been documented.

Third, the exact date for their small attack is unknown, but it is likely it occurred before June 2011, because they were already recognized as a group on the frontlines during that time.<sup>2411</sup>

Fourth, similar to many groups, the tribal affiliations of leaders and populations are difficult to ascertain.

Fifth, the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade is coded as viable because the BRSC was launching attacks against the state in 2014 and beyond. Those attacks included large attacks from July 23<sup>rd</sup> - July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014,<sup>2412</sup> and civilian attacks sometime around September 2014.<sup>2413</sup> Both of these dates are coded as the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade’s large and civilians attacks respectively. Furthermore, although some of the members that formed that BRSC were state actors, such as Libya Shield, upon BRSC’s conception they severed all state ties; therefore, BRSC is not considered a state actor and the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade is sufficiently viable.<sup>2414</sup>

<sup>2405</sup> Spencer Ackerman, “Libya’s DIY Rebels Outfit Trucks With Copter Rockets,” *Wired*, June 14, 2011, <https://www.wired.com/2011/06/libyas-diy-rebels-outfit-trucks-with-copter-rockets/>.

<sup>2406</sup> “NTC Says Qaddafi’s Son Is Still at Large; Battles in Sirte and Bani Walid Continue,” *Al Arabiya*, October 12, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ALARAB0020111013e7ac0008e&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2407</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 192.

<sup>2408</sup> David D. Kirkpatrick, “Violence Against Libyan Protesters Threatens to Undercut Power of Militias,” *The New York Times*, June 9, 2013, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/world/africa/libyan-violence-threatens-to-undercut-power-of-militias.html>.

<sup>2409</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 191.

<sup>2410</sup> “Libya: Security and Humanitarian Situation” (Home Office (UK), January 2017), <https://www.tawergha.org/docs/2017-01-27-libya-uk-gov-home-office-report-libya-security-and-humanitarian-situation-english.pdf>.

<sup>2411</sup> Ackerman, “Libya’s DIY Rebels Outfit Trucks With Copter Rockets.”

<sup>2412</sup> “‘Violent Clashes’ between Elite Force, Militia in Libya’s Benghazi - TV.” “Libya,” July 27, 2014.

<sup>2413</sup> “Spiraling Militia Attacks May Be War Crimes - Protect Civilians - End Looting, Burnings, Arbitrary Arrests,” *Legal Monitor Worldwide*, September 9, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LMOWEN0020140909ea990003d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

“‘Violent Clashes’ between Elite Force, Militia in Libya’s Benghazi - TV.”

<sup>2414</sup> Wolfram Lacher and Peter Cole, *Politics by Other Means: Conflicting Interests in Libya’s Security Sector*, 2014, 62.

Sixth, despite a lack of information on this group, the “former/current security/government” variables are coded as 0, rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials, and it is well documented when a rebel group leader was a Gaddafi defect (which Bin Hamid was not).

Seventh, it appears that this group did not substantially build on prior organizations.

Eighth, the “clandestine” variable is coded as unknown for a few reasons. First, little information could be found on this group and therefore there is uncertainty regarding this variable. Furthermore, sources indicate that Bin Hamid was present in Benghazi during the time of the revolution (0 for the “rural” variable),<sup>2415</sup> and given NATO’s presence in Benghazi it is less likely that rebel groups would be clandestine there.<sup>2416</sup>

Ninth, it is clear that during the early stages of rebellion the Free Libya Martyrs Brigade was working alongside forces of the National Transitional Council;<sup>2417</sup> therefore, it is possible that they received funding from the NTC, including funding that came from foreign governments. Therefore the “foreign\_govt,” “other,” and “none” variables under funding are coded as unknown.

Tenth, SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time.

Last, SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Several Type 2 events occurred during this time, and the location of several of these events is listed as “nationwide” (Event ID 6200056) or “Benghazi.” Notably, this nationwide event marks the start of the First Libyan Civil War. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### **\*Hamer Brigade<sup>2418</sup>**

This group formed sometime in 2011 to fight against Gaddafi. Only one article could be found that mentioned this group, and hence the rebel certainty variable is coded as “1” and the majority of variables are coded as unknown. However, the coder still felt confident about including this group in the dataset for two reasons. First, the overwhelming number of rebel groups that emerged in Libya during the revolution makes it likely that groups mentioned as a 2011 rebel group could be included in our dataset. Second, the article mentions that this group was training fighters and a detailed daily schedule for the trainees. Specific details of training support the coder’s decisions to include this group in the dataset.

There are some coding decisions that require clarification. First, although the location of rebel group formation is unknown, the article suggests that they trained in the Nafusa Mountains, in Western Libya, which satisfies the “rural” variable as a 1. However, since the Nafusa Mountains border Tunisia and it is unclear where in the mountains the Hamer Brigade trained, the planning inside/border2 variable is coded as unknown.

Second, despite there being no attack directly associated with this group, the small attack variable is coded as 2011 because it is likely that the Hamer Brigade fought with Gaddafi forces, specifically in Tripoli as the article states.

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<sup>2415</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 191.

<sup>2416</sup> Interview with Brian McQuinn 8.27.20

<sup>2417</sup> “Rebels Closer to Taking over Two Gaddafi Strongholds,” *Euronews*, September 7, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=EURONEN020110907e7970000i&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2418</sup> Margaret Coker and Charles Levinson, “The Fight for Tripoli: Length of Libya’s Standoff Hinges on Leader’s Militia,” *The Wall Street Journal*, August 24, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=J000000020110824e78o0000t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

All information that could be found on the Hamer Brigade was in this article.

Third, despite a lack of information on this group, the “former security/government” variables are coded as 0, rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials.

Fourth, I looked carefully but found no evidence that this group did substantially built on prior organizations.

Fifth, the “clandestine” variable is coded as 1 because given the that they trained in a rural mountain range, it appears they were likely avoiding the local population.

Last, SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and one instance of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to 27 February 2011. Because this group was formed as a part of the Libyan uprising, the coder considers the latest date listed in SCAD for the start of the Libyan uprising, 27 February 2011, to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. This event, Event ID 6200056, occurred nationwide, satisfying the conditions for contestation\_local. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Islamic Emirate of Barqa

This group formed in Derna, Libya on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2011.<sup>2419</sup> Led by former Al-Qaeda members who were released from prison, this group attacked an arms depot in Derna, seizing 250 weapons and killing four soldiers on February 16, 2011.<sup>2420</sup> Following this attack, this group continued to attack Derna’s port,<sup>2421</sup> which also led to civilian and military personnel being taken hostage.<sup>2422</sup> After their siege of Derna, the group moved to Benghazi to join the larger protests/riots there. Upon their move to Benghazi, little information could be found about this group, likely because of the myriad of armed groups in Libya at the time. However, once source claims that in May 2011 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, leader of Al-Qaeda, sent trained jihadists and recruited about 200 fighters to support this group in Libya.<sup>2423</sup> The first reference to this group was the aforementioned hostage taking on February 20, 2011 which is coded as their name date.<sup>2424</sup>

There are a few ambiguities surrounding this group that require clarification. First, although the leaders of this group were former Al-Qaeda members, this group is not a splinter group because there is no evidence to suggest that its members were from Al-Qaeda; moreover, given the trend of armed militias in Libya, it is more than probable that the members of this group were among the locals of Derna. However, the connections of this groups’ leaders to Al-Qaeda would explain the funding they received from Zawahiri in 2011.

Second, prior to this group’s first attack, a Libyan military general defected and gave them weapons.<sup>2425</sup> It is unclear if this general became of a leader of the group, and therefore the “current\_security” variable is coded as unknown. However, this generals contributions and Zawahiri’s contributions are the “other” sources of funding that were coded for this group.

Third, this group formed days before the outbreak of protests in Libya, and therefore all the contestation variables are coded as “0;” this coding decision is confirmed by the lack of

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<sup>2419</sup> Alan Kuperman and University of Texas, “Did the R2P Foster Violence in Libya?,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 13, no. 2 (June 2019): 38–57, <https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1705>.

<sup>2420</sup> Kuperman and University of Texas.

<sup>2421</sup> Kuperman and University of Texas.

<sup>2422</sup> “Libyan Islamists Seize Arms, Take Hostages,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, February 20, 2011, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/libyan-islamists-seize-arms-take-hostages-20110221-1b19c.html>.

<sup>2423</sup> Mary Habeck, “Libya after ‘Benghazi’: The Origins of the Current Chaos,” *SiteIntelGroup*, August 12, 2014, <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/entry/225-libya-after-“benghazi”-the-origins-of-the-current-chaos>.

<sup>2424</sup> “‘Islamists’ Hold Hostages in Unrest-Hit City: Libya,” *Agence France Presse*, February 20, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020110220e72k000b4&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2425</sup> Kuperman and University of Texas, “Did the R2P Foster Violence in Libya?”

contestation events in SCAD. However, this group was later fueled by the protests/riots that ensued in Libya.

Fourth, as noted above, little information could be found on this group following its formation and initial attacks. It is possible that they still exist and/or were targeting state actors 3 or more years after formation. Therefore, the large attack and viability variables are coded as unknown.

Fifth, the “clandestine” variable is coded as “0” because this group initiated attacks days after forming.

Last, due to this group joining anti-Gaddafi protests, and wanting to establish an Islamic Emirate in Libya, both the “goal\_take” and “goal\_secession” variables are coded as “1.”<sup>2426</sup>

#### Islamic State of Tripoli

AKA: Islamic State (Tripoli)

This group is a branch of the Islamic State that operates in Libya.<sup>2427</sup> Since this group is controlled by a parent group it is excluded from our dataset.

#### Islamic State (Cyrenaica Province)

ACLED denotes this group operating in Darnah; furthermore, after the Shura Council of Islamic Youth, who operate in Darnah, pledged allegiance to ISIS they became the Cyrenaica branch of ISIS.<sup>2428</sup> Therefore, when ACLED references the Islamic State (Cyrenaica Province), they are referencing the Shura Council of Islamic Youth. The Islamic State (Cyrenaica Province) is excluded from our dataset because it is the same group as the Shura Council of Islamic Youth.

#### \*Jansur Brigade<sup>2429</sup>

This group formed sometime in 2011 to fight against Gaddafi. Only one article could be found that mentioned this group, and hence the rebel certainty variable is coded as “1” and the majority of variables are coded as unknown. However, the coder still felt confident about including this group in the dataset for two reasons. First, the overwhelming number of rebel groups that emerged in Libya during the revolution makes it likely that groups mentioned as a 2011 rebel group could be included in our dataset. Second, the article mentions that this group was training fighters and were composed of about 40 fighters. Specific details of group composition and training support the coder’s decisions to include this group in the dataset.

There are some coding decisions that require clarification. First, although the location of rebel group formation is unknown, the article suggests that they trained in the Nafusa Mountains in Western Libya, which satisfies the “rural” variable as a 3. However, since the Nafusa Mountains border Tunisia and it is unclear where in the mountains the Jansur Brigade trained, the planning inside/border variable is coded as unknown.

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<sup>2426</sup> “Plans for Islamist State behind Libya Revolt - Italian Foreign Ministry ‘Source,’” *BBC Monitoring European*, February 21, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020110221e7210015q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2427</sup> ACLED events 3001LIB, 3009LIB, and 3039LIB are among the first instances of Islamic State activity in Libya, including their formal creation of its Libya branch (3039LIB). Other articles refer to this faction as being Islamic State militants operating in Libya, rather than the Islamic State of Tripoli.

<sup>2428</sup> Lachlan Wilson and Jason Pack, “The Islamic State’s Revitalization in Libya and Its Post-2016 War of Attrition,” *CTC Sentinel* 12, no. 3 (March 2019), <https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-states-revitalization-libya-post-2016-war-attrition/>.

<sup>2429</sup> Clemens Höges, “How Tripoli Was Taken - The Lightning Advance That Ended Gadhafi’s Rule,” *Spiegel Online International*, August 29, 2011, sec. International / World,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SPION00020110830e78t0002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

All information that could be found on the Jansur Brigade was in this article.



Second, despite there being no attack directly associated with this group, the small attack variable is coded as 2011 because it is likely that the Jansur Brigade fought with Gaddafi forces, specifically in Tripoli as the article states.

Third, despite a lack of information on this group, the “former security/government” variables are coded as 0, rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials.

Fourth, I looked carefully but found no evidence that this group did substantially built on prior organizations.

Fifth, the “clandestine” variable is coded as 1 because given the small composition of the group and evidence suggesting they trained in a rural mountain range, the coder determined they were likely clandestine.

Sixth, SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time. SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and one instance of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to 27 February 2011. Because this group was formed as a part of the Libyan uprising, the coder considers the latest date listed in SCAD for the start of the Libyan uprising, 27 February 2011, to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. This event, Event ID 6200056, occurred nationwide. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

#### Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

This group is a Sudanese rebel group that once backed Gaddafi Brigades, and has since backed the LNA.<sup>2430</sup> Due to their fighting alongside Gaddafi and the LNA, JEM is a state actor and is therefore excluded from our dataset.

#### Libya Dawn

AKA: Libya Dawn Coalition; Operation Dawn

This coalition is closely aligned to the GNC and started in opposition to Operation Dignity.<sup>2431</sup> Due to its connections to the state it is considered a state actor and excluded from our dataset.

#### Libya Misratan Mujahideen

The only reference to this group in ACLED is event 4259LIB in which a group calling itself Libya Misratan Mujahideen pledged allegiance to ISIS and claimed responsibility for a number of car bombs in recent weeks. However, no other mention of this group could be found online, and it is unclear if they were responsible for the car bombs and/or those bombs targeted state officials. Due to lack of evidence surrounding the existence of this group, it is excluded from our dataset.

#### Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR)

AKA: The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room

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<sup>2430</sup> Abdullah Ibrahim, “Sudanese Rebel Group Acknowledges Fighting for Khalifa Haftar’s Forces in Libya,” The Libya Observer, October 10, 2016, <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/sudanese-rebel-group-acknowledges-fighting-khalifa-haftar%E2%80%99s-forces-libya>.

<sup>2431</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War,” *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies*, February 2015, <https://doi.org/10.19165/2015.1.01>.

This group was a coalition of Islamist militias that was formed and funded by the GNC in 2013.<sup>2432</sup> They subsequently joined Libya Dawn to fight against Haftar's LNA.<sup>2433</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a state actor.

#### Libya Shield Force (LSF)

AKA: Libya Shield Brigade; Shield Militia

The Libya Shield Force was a coalition of militias, created and funded by the government.<sup>2434</sup> LSF is excluded from our dataset because it is an extension of the state and a merger of former rebel groups.<sup>2435</sup>

#### Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin Derna (DMSC)

AKA: Derna Mujahideen Shura Council; Shura Council of Darnah Mujahideen

This group formed as a merger between the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade, Ansar-Al Sharia Derna, and the Islamic Army of Libya.<sup>2436</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because the majority of groups are already rebel groups.

#### Militia (Ibrahim Jadran)

In the summer of 2013 Ibrahim Jadran, then the leader of the Petroleum Facilities Guard in eastern Libya, led a movement of protests and strikes that effectively took control of key oil facilities in the east.<sup>2437</sup> His forces, numbering over 17,000, went through many name changes eventually culminating with the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica aiming to establish an autonomous state in eastern Libya.<sup>2438</sup> Ibrahim Jadran's militia largely consists of forces that were in the Petroleum Facilities Guard,<sup>2439</sup> itself a force composed of militias from the anti-Gaddafi revolution.<sup>2440</sup> Ibrahim Jadran's militia is excluded from our dataset because it emerged from armed groups that had already existed; although those armed groups cannot be identified or coded in our dataset, reliable evidence that they were anti-Gaddafi rebel groups is grounds for exclusion for Ibrahim Jadran's militia.

#### Misrata Martyrs Brigade

The only mention of this group is ACLED event 1089LIB in which "The Misrata Martyrs Brigade based in Beida" handed over weapons to a security force in the city. There was no other mention of this group in ACLED or online sources, including Brian McQuinn's extensive fieldwork in Misrata. There are three likely possibilities for this group. First, this event is ambiguously referring to a Misrata Brigade that is based in Beida. Second, this is a distinct rebel group (possible given the 236 armed groups that emerged in Misrata according to McQuinn). Third, it is

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<sup>2432</sup> Cameron Glenn, "Libya's Islamists: Who They Are - And What They Want | Wilson Center," Wilson Center, August 8, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/libyas-islamists-who-they-are-and-what-they-want>.

<sup>2433</sup> Glenn.

<sup>2434</sup> Glenn.

<sup>2435</sup> Naji Abou-Khalil and Laurence Hargreaves, "Perceptions of Security in Libya," Peaceworks (United States Institute of Peace, 2015), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW108-Perceptions-of-Security-in-Libya.pdf>.

<sup>2436</sup> "DPF," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 27, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/6371>.

<sup>2437</sup> "UPDATE 2-Libya Threatens Army Action against Oil Protesters," *Reuters News*, August 15, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020130815e98f000te&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2438</sup> Margaret Coker, "East Libya Warlord Forms Shadow Government," *WSJ* (blog), November 4, 2013, <https://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/11/04/east-libya-warlord-forms-shadow-government/>.

<sup>2439</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Autonomy Campaign in Cyrenaica Brings Libya's Oil Industry to a Halt," Jamestown, October 31, 2013, <https://jamestown.org/program/autonomy-campaign-in-cyrenaica-brings-libyas-oil-industry-to-a-halt/>.

<sup>2440</sup> Elke Grawert and Zeinab Abul-Magd, *Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed Groups Profit in the MENA Region* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 180.

a coalition of armed groups that emerged from Misrata (also common in Misrata according to McQuinn). Due to the lack of evidence supporting or disproving any of these possibilities, more information is needed, and this group is ultimately excluded from our dataset.

### Muslim Brotherhood (Libya)

This group is excluded from our dataset because it formed before 1997.<sup>2441</sup>

### National Transitional Council (NTC)

AKA: Transitional National Council; Interim Transitional National Council; Free Libya Armed Forces (armed wing); National Liberation Army (armed wing re-named).

The NTC was the main organization/body that represented the Libyan rebels during the 2011 revolution against Muammar Gaddafi, meaning that international actors coordinated with the NTC when coordinating with Libyan rebels. The NTC set up its headquarters in late February 2011 in Benghazi in order to better organize the leaders of liberated eastern cities.<sup>2442</sup> Although it is unclear whether NTC made concrete plans for violence in February, it is likely that they did so within 1-2 months of February and therefore their formation date is still coded as February 2011. This claim is supported by the fact that a major Libyan general who had defected to the NTC, Abdul Fattah Younes, led his troops to battle against state security forces in early April.<sup>2443</sup> On March 5, 2011 the NTC officially/publicly named itself the sole representative of Libya, with Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the former Minister of Justice, as its Chairman;<sup>2444</sup> However, news sources picked up this announcement on February 27, 2011 before it was official, which is coded as the name date.<sup>2445</sup> The NTC's main goal was to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi and establish a transitional government in Libya.<sup>2446</sup>

On May 10, 2011 NTC officially announced the creation and name of its armed wing, the Free Libya Armed Forces, led by Abdul Fattah Younes.<sup>2447</sup> On May 31, 2011 the armed wing was renamed the National Liberation Army.<sup>2448</sup> However, Younes-led forces were being directed by the NTC to join the front-lines in Brega in April 2011,<sup>2449</sup> and possibly as early as March 2011 in Ras Lanuf;<sup>2450</sup> for this reason, NTC first attack is coded as March 2011, because it is likely that their first attack came within 0-2 months of March 2011.

There are many ambiguities/coding decisions that need clarification with the NTC. First, it was very difficult to discern when NTC directly sent their forces to join the fighting. As McQuinn and Cole point out, the NTC was an organization that presented itself with much more capabilities than it was actually able to bear.<sup>2451</sup> As such it is unclear in lots of literature whether rebels are fighting *for* the NTC or *as* the NTC. Therefore, for coding purposes, NTC attacks were

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<sup>2441</sup> "Muslim Brotherhood in Libya," Counter Extremism Project, April 19, 2017,

<https://www.counterextremism.com/content/muslim-brotherhood-libya>.

<sup>2442</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 35-39.

<sup>2443</sup> Jon Lee Anderson, "Killing Abdul Fattah Younes," *The New Yorker*, accessed July 7, 2020, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/killing-abdul-fattah-younes>.

<sup>2444</sup> "NTC Libya National Transitional Council – Libya," accessed June 22, 2020, <http://ntclibya.org/>.

Paul Schemm, "Politicians in Libya's Rebel Stronghold Benghazi Set up First Leadership Council," *Associated Press Newswires*, February 27, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020110227e72r001tx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2445</sup> Schemm, "Politicians in Libya's Rebel Stronghold Benghazi Set up First Leadership Council."

<sup>2446</sup> "NTC Libya | National Transitional Council – Libya."

<sup>2447</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 41.

<sup>2448</sup> Agence France-Presse, "Libyan Rebels Rename Themselves National Liberation Army," *INQUIRER.net*, May 31, 2011, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/10807/libyan-rebels-rename-themselves-national-liberation-army>.

<sup>2449</sup> Anderson, "Killing Abdul Fattah Younes."

<sup>2450</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 35.

<sup>2451</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 38-43.

defined as attacks being led by Abdul Fattah Younes, the clear leader of the armed wing of the NTC. Furthermore, we were unable to find reliable evidence when NTC forces killed over 25 government officials; however, ACLED event 449LIB notes that rebels claimed to kill 57 government troops in Ajdabiya on May 9, 2011. It is unknown if these were NTC forces and therefore the “large attack” variable is coded as unknown. Additionally, there are reports that rebels executed many civilians suspected of being Gaddafi loyalists,<sup>2452</sup> however, it is unknown if the NTC directed these executions or promoted such execution; therefore, the “civilian attack” variable is also coded as unknown.

Second, the NTC utilized funds from extensive sources. One source of funding NTC used within its first year was oil, and spokesperson Iman Bughaighis<sup>2453</sup> confirmed that their first oil export was on April 5, 2011.<sup>2454</sup> Furthermore, the NTC gained extensive international recognition and therefore made use of extensive funds from foreign governments, such as Qatar<sup>2455</sup> and the United States.<sup>2456</sup>

Third, two prominent leaders’ tribal affiliations are known: Mustafa Abdul Jalil, from the Bara’sa Tribe, and Abdul Fattah Younes from the Ubaida Tribe.<sup>2457</sup>

Fourth, the “current\_security” variable is coded as “1” because numerous leaders, including Younes, were members of Gaddafi’s military.<sup>2458</sup>

Fifth, SCAD recorded a qualifying protest and riot in 2011 to code the “protest,” and “riot” variables as “1.”

Sixth, SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and one instance of Type 2 contestation in the year preceding 27 February 2011. Because the NTC was formed to represent the rebels that seized power after the Libyan uprising, the coder considers the latest date listed in SCAD for the start of the Libyan uprising, 27 February 2011, to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. This event, Event ID 6200056, occurred nationwide, satisfying the conditions for contestation\_local. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Seventh, the “clandestine” variable is coded as “0” because NTC forces were openly launching attacks in March 2011. However, it should be noted that while researching the NTC, the coder recognized that ACLED and many other sources are quick to attribute rebel attacks to the NTC, due to the NTC being the representing body of the rebel forces; however, for coding purposes, only attacks directly led by the NTC/Younes forces were counted as NTC attacks.

Finally, although the NTC took over the government in 2011, they handed over power to the GNC in August 2012.<sup>2459</sup> Due to the fact that the NTC did not have control of the government and were no longer negotiating with the government three years or more after it formed, the “viable\_negotiate” variable is coded as “0.”

## Nawasi Brigade

<sup>2452</sup> “Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 Gaddafi Supporters,” Human Rights Watch, October 24, 2011, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-53-gaddafi-supporters>.

<sup>2453</sup> “Libya: Tribute to Salwa Bughaighis,” Human Rights Watch, June 26, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/26/libya-tribute-salwa-bughaighis>.

<sup>2454</sup> Tom Bawden and Chris McGreal, “Libyan Rebels Sell First Oil Shipment,” *The Guardian*, April 5, 2011, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/05/libya-rebels-sell-first-oil>.

<sup>2455</sup> “NATO Ducks Apology over Libya Rebel Deaths,” accessed June 25, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/04/20114885835208982.html>.

<sup>2456</sup> Sebnem Arsu and Steven Erlanger, “Libya Rebels Get Formal Backing, and \$30 Billion,” *The New York Times*, July 15, 2011, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/africa/16libya.html>.

<sup>2457</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 211.

<sup>2458</sup> Cole and McQuinn, 33.

<sup>2459</sup> Joamana Karadsheh, “Libya’s Transitional Council Hands over Power,” CNN, August 9, 2012, <https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/08/world/meast/libya-power-transition/index.html>.

The Nawasi Brigade started as a Salafist, anti-Gaddafi, brigade that formed in 2011 in Suq al Jum'a, a district in Tripoli, and it was led by Abd al-Rauf Kara;<sup>2460</sup> Kara was a peer of a Salafi judge who had formed his own group during the revolution.<sup>2461</sup> Initially, Kara's group reportedly targeted checkpoints and tents of the People's Resistant Forces, a Gaddafi sanctioned group of volunteers in Tripoli; it is likely these "attacks" were target practice and not intended to kill government officials.<sup>2462</sup> After Gaddafi was killed, the Nawasi Brigade was integrated into the government and stopped qualifying as a rebel group according to our dataset.<sup>2463</sup> Very little information could be found on the Nawasi Brigade when they were a rebel group and many variables are coded as unknown; however, given the trend of rebel group emergence in Libya during the time of the revolution, the coder was confident that this group qualified for our dataset due to evidence of its existence as an anti-Gaddafi group. Despite the lack of information, the coder coded the "certainty" variable as "3" rather than "2" due to many sources confirming their existence during the revolution, including many interviews with Abd al-Rauf Kara and his peers.<sup>2464</sup>

There are a number of coding decisions that require clarification.

First, the Nawasi Brigade was never named in the media as a rebel group (only after they had become a state actor), and therefore the "name\_time" variables are not applicable.

Second,, the small attack variable is coded as 2011 because despite no attack being linked to the Nawasi Brigade, their existence as an anti-Gaddafi rebel group makes it fairly certain they launched attacks in 2011. However, the large attack and the civilian attack variables are coded as unknown, rather than 2011, because it is less certain that a group would carry out a large or civilian attack. It should be noted that the Nawasi Brigade was known to target members of the LGBTQ+ community when they were a state actor,<sup>2465</sup> and that could have occurred during their existence as a rebel group as well.

Third, the Nawasi Brigade is coded as unknown for having emerged from a religious organization because since the Nawasi Brigade shared an ultraconservative ideology of Islam, Salafism, it is within the realm of possibility that it emerged from some Salafi organization.

Fourth, the "clandestine variable" is coded as unknown because one source notes that many Suq al Jum'a militias initially intended to be clandestine,<sup>2466</sup> but it is unknown if this applied to the Nawasi Brigade; however, the "clandestine" variable is coded as "1" due to this trend, and because groups in Tripoli would have a tendency to be clandestine.<sup>2467</sup>

Fifth, despite a lack of information on this group, the "former/current security/government" variables are coded as 0, rather than unknown, because it is highly unlikely that any leaders were pre-Gaddafi government officials, and it is well documented when a rebel group leader was a Gaddafi defect (which Abd al-Rauf Kara was not).

Sixth, I looked carefully but found no evidence that this group did substantially built on prior organizations.

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<sup>2460</sup> Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, "Salafism and Libya's State Collapse: The Case of the Madkhalis," in *Salafism in the Maghreb*, by Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars (Oxford University Press, 2019), 107–37, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190942403.003.0007>.

<sup>2461</sup> Lacher and Cole, *Politics by Other Means*, 2014, 33.

<sup>2462</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 83.

<sup>2463</sup> See discussion below of post-Gaddafi affiliations.

<sup>2464</sup> Jamie Dettmer, "Meet the Islamic Fanatic Who Wants to Kill ISIS," *The Daily Beast*, June 11, 2015, sec. world, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/10/meet-the-islamic-fanatic-who-wants-to-kill-isis>.

Wehrey and Boukhars, "Salafism and Libya's State Collapse."

<sup>2465</sup> Lacher and Cole, *Politics by Other Means*, 2014, 33.

<sup>2466</sup> Wehrey and Boukhars, "Salafism and Libya's State Collapse."

<sup>2467</sup> Interview with Brian McQuinn 8.27.20

See entry for Bashir Sadawi Brigade for further clarification.

Seventh, as mentioned above the Nawasi Brigade formed/were present in Suq al-Jumaa. However, it is unclear if meetings to plan the group took place here as well. Therefore, Suq al-Jumaa satisfies the “rural” variable as a “1”.

Eighth, the earliest reference to the Nawasi Brigade was in late 2012 when they were a militia under the Ministry of the Interior.<sup>2468</sup> Throughout the beginning of the 2014 Civil War the Nawasi Brigade still had strong ties to a government body,<sup>2469</sup> in this case the General National Congress.<sup>2470</sup> Although the GNC had nominally been defeated in elections, they still represented a state actor in the Civil War against the House of Representatives (HoR) and those that are loyal to the HoR. As of 2015, the Nawasi Brigade was still in control of parts of Tripoli, and there is no evidence that they had broken ties with government bodies.<sup>2471</sup> Therefore, the Nawasi Brigade is not viable because of its continued existence as a state actor.

Tenth, SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time.

Last, SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and one instance of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to 27 February 2011. Because this group was formed as a part of the Libyan uprising, the coder considers the latest date listed in SCAD for the start of the Libyan uprising, 27 February 2011, to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. This event, Event ID 6200056, occurred nationwide, satisfying the conditions for contestation<sub>local</sub>. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Nusur Al-Sahel Brigade

The Nusur Al-Sahel brigade likely formed sometime around 2012, due to the vast majority of armed militias in Libya forming sometime in 2011 and Nusur Al-Sahel’s first mention in the media being in 2012.<sup>2472</sup> Very little information was found on this group, however, we still felt comfortable coding it as a rebel group for three main reasons: first, there are hundreds of armed groups that formed in Libya during the revolution, so the climate was suitable for armed group emergence. Second, they launched attacks against security services. Third, the group appears to have originated in Misrata,<sup>2473</sup> a city that is well known for armed group emergence with over 236 groups during the early stages of the revolution.<sup>2474</sup> Nonetheless, due to the lack of detailed information surrounding this group, it is coded with a rebel certainty of 2.

Nusur Al-Sahel’s first recorded attack was on November 5, 2012 when they attacked a police station in the town of Khums, leading to one dead and eight wounded from the security

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<sup>2468</sup> George Grant, “Gay Men in Libya Tell of Beatings by the Local Militia,” *The Times Co. Uk*, December 1, 2012, sec. Middle East,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TIMEUK0020121201e8c100007&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2469</sup> Firas Abi Ali, “Co-Ordinated Attacks on Islamists in Libya Are Likely to Fail but Will Further Damage Political Process,” *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, May 20, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020140520ea5k00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2470</sup> “Islamist Brigades Form ‘Steadfastness Front’ as Successor to Libya Dawn - Paper,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, June 18, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020150618eb6i004s9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2471</sup> “Italian Daily Sees Possible Ties between People-Trafficking, Terror Groups,” *BBC Monitoring European*, December 1, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020151201ebc1002pc&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2472</sup> “Kidnapped Journalist Criticises Libyan NTC for Failure to Protect Rights,” *BBC Monitoring*, June 21, 2012, <https://global-factiva-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/ga/default.aspx>.

<sup>2473</sup> Borzou Daragahi, “Libya: Rule of the Gun,” *Financial Times*, November 19, 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/a8f8a2e2-5107-11e3-9651-00144feabdc0>.

<sup>2474</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 251.



services.<sup>2475</sup> On November 15, 2013 Nusur Al-Sahel opened fire on a group of protestors in Tripoli, protesting the group's presence in the city. The fighting lasted for 48 hours and killed almost 50 people, wounding hundreds.<sup>2476</sup> There are reports that other militias came to the aid of the protestors,<sup>2477</sup> as well as government security services,<sup>2478</sup> but it is unclear whether these militias were allied with the government. Although it is likely that somebody associated with the government was killed in the clashes, this could not be verified and therefore the large attack variables are coded as unknown.

There are a couple coding decisions that need clarification. First, although little is known about the group, the "planning\_inside" variable is coded as "1" because there is no evidence to suggest that any of the armed groups that emerged in Libya during the revolution did so outside of the country. There was insufficient information about the location of the group's early activities to code "op\_planning\_location" or "rural."

Also, the "oil\_diamonds" variable is coded as "0" instead of "." because if the group had the capacity to overtake oil fields to use for funding, this would have been documented, as it has with other groups such as the NTC.

Fourth, I looked carefully but found no evidence that this group did substantially built on prior organizations.

Due to limited media coverage of this group, the viability variables are coded as unknown.

#### Omar Mukhtar Brigade

This group was a brigade of the National Transitional Council. It is excluded from our dataset because it is a group started by a rebel group and the brigade answers to/is controlled by the NTC.<sup>2479</sup>

#### Operation Sunrise

This was an operation led by Libya Dawn.<sup>2480</sup> It is excluded from our dataset because it is not a group.

#### Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)

This group was a state-funded militia founded in March 2013 to defend oil and gas plants.<sup>2481</sup> At times the PFG attempted to establish its own "government" to control and export oil from the facilities it already maintained authority over, specifically in the east,<sup>2482</sup> however, during the time the PFG practiced autonomy in the east, it was loyal to the Tobruk government

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<sup>2475</sup> "One Killed, Eight Wounded in Clashes in Libya's Coastal Town of Khums," BBC Monitoring, November 6, 2012, <https://global-factiva-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/ga/default.aspx>.

<sup>2476</sup> Borzou Daragahi, "Militias Accede to Demands to End Violence in Tripoli," Financial Times, November 13, 2013, <https://global-factiva-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/ga/default.aspx>.

<sup>2477</sup> Daragahi.

<sup>2478</sup> Daragahi.

<sup>2479</sup> Evan Hill, "Libyan Rebels Get Organised," Al Jazeera, April 19, 2011, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/201141942947854663.html>.

<sup>2480</sup> Frederic Wehrey, "The Battle for Libya's Oil," The Atlantic, February 9, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/the-battle-for-libyas-oil/385285/>.

<sup>2481</sup> Marie-Louise Gumuchian, "Security Woes Hit Libya Oil and Gas as Guards Become Menace," *Reuters News*, March 7, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020130307e93700171&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2482</sup> Catherine Hunter, "Proposal for New Eastern NOC Reignites Legal Challenges on Libyan Oil," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, March 27, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020150327eb3r00017&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni.<sup>2483</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a state actor (both in its funding by the state and its clear authority over oil facilities/ports).

#### Rafallah Sehati Brigade

This group started as a battalion of the 17 February Martyrs Brigade, and then expanded to form its own group.<sup>2484</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a splinter group.

#### Revolutionaries of the Western Area

The one reference to this group in ACLED is event 3965LIB when they allegedly seized a gas processing plant at the Mellitah Oil & Gas facilities, resulting in zero casualties. However, no news sources could find any mention to this attack or the name of the group. Furthermore, the only attack on the Mellitah Oil & Gas facilities around the same time as 3965LIB was a car bomb near the front office that the Islamic State claimed responsibility for.<sup>2485</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because there is no credible evidence that the group existed or was violently challenging the state.

#### Shura Council of Islamic Youth

AKA: Islamic Youth Shura Council

This group was formed by the Battar Brigade and local jihadists in Derna around June 2014.<sup>2486</sup> The Battar Brigade was formed by Libyans who went to fight in Syria, and then returned to Libya to form the Shura Council of Islamic Youth; the Shura Council of Islamic Youth was comprised mainly of Battar Brigade members in Derna.<sup>2487</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is effectively a merger between the Battar Brigade and some local elements, where the Battar Brigade enjoys the majority of membership. It should be noted that the Shura Council of Islamic Youth pledged allegiance to ISIS and was the starting point for ISIS activity/insurgency in Libya.<sup>2488</sup>

#### Special Deterrence Force

The Special Deterrence Force was created by the Ministry of Interior in 2013 and was led by Salafist Abdel Rauf Kara; they were in charge of ensuring security and combating crime in Tripoli, and effectively was the security force of the city.<sup>2489</sup> Since there is no indication that the Special Deterrence Force was never a non-state actor, it is excluded from our dataset.

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<sup>2483</sup> “Libya: Prospects for Exports Under Wobbly Peace Deal,” *Energy Compass*, December 25, 2015, sec. Feature Stories, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=EGYCMP0020160126ebcp00005&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2484</sup> Marie-Louise Gumuchian, “Security Woes Hit Libya Oil and Gas as Guards Become Menace,” *Reuters News*, March 7, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020130307e93700171&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2485</sup> “Islamic State in Libya Reportedly Claims Responsibility for Tripoli Car Bomb,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, August 31, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020150831eb8v005mu&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2486</sup> “How the Islamic State Rose, Fell and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb,” Crisis Group, July 24, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/178-how-islamic-state-rose-fell-and-could-rise-again-maghreb>.

<sup>2487</sup> Jason Warner and Charlotte Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 8, 2018, <https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent/>.

<sup>2488</sup> Aaron Zelin, “The Islamic State’s First Colony in Libya,” Washington Institute, October 10, 2014, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-first-colony-in-libya>.

<sup>2489</sup> “Libya: Decree Integrating Radaa Forces into a New Security Apparatus Overlooks Need for Accountability” (Amnesty International, June 21, 2018), <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1986292018ENGLISH.pdf>.

### Steadfastness Front

This group is the successor to Libya Dawn, after the latter had begun to dissolve in mid-2015.<sup>2490</sup> Due to the majority of groups in the Steadfastness Front once being in Libya Dawn, and the Steadfastness Front being closely aligned to the GNC<sup>2491</sup> (hence being a state actor), it is excluded from our dataset.

### Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minnawi Faction (SLM/A-Minnawi)

AKA: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawai; SLM/A-MM)

This group is a Sudanese rebel group that has one reference in ACLED for Libya, event 3925LIB. That event, along with other sources,<sup>2492</sup> confirm that SLM/A-Minnawi occasionally fight alongside Haftar's LNA. Due to SLM/A-Minnawi fighting alongside a state actor and effectively being an extension of that state actor, this group is excluded from our dataset.

### Supreme Security Committee (SSC)

The Supreme Security Committee was created and funded by the state.<sup>2493</sup> The SSC is excluded from our dataset because it is an extension of the state.

### Tawhid Al-Salafiya

The one reference to this group in ACLED is a cluster of events between December 16<sup>th</sup>-December 19<sup>th</sup> 2015 when they clashed with the Ajdabiya Shura Council in Ajdabiya.<sup>2494</sup> No other sources could find these attacks, but nonetheless ACLED notes that this group was a pro-LNA group; since the LNA is a state actor, Tawhid Al-Salafiya would also be considered a state actor and therefore is excluded from our dataset.

### Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB)

The first time the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) was mentioned in an act of violence they had already been in control of Tripoli and part of the Ministry of Interior.<sup>2495</sup> Prior to this reference in 2015, sources indicate that the TRB did not have any political goals other than maintain control of areas in Tripoli they were in charge of, and that they were affiliated with the government.<sup>2496</sup> In June 2015, the TRB joined other state-affiliated militias in creating the steadfastness front to counter Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army.<sup>2497</sup> In November 2015 the TRB was accused of abducting the Libyan planning minister,<sup>2498</sup> however there was no indication that the TRB was no longer affiliated with the state at this point. Due to the TRB being a state actor it is excluded from our dataset.

It should be noted that while researching TRB, some sources claimed that they were formed by former rebels fighting Gaddafi or had emerged from a group fighting Gaddafi. However, since there was no mention of this group prior to 2015, nor any evidence of their

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<sup>2490</sup> "Islamist Brigades Form 'Steadfastness Front' as Successor to Libya Dawn - Paper."

<sup>2491</sup> "Islamist Brigades Form 'Steadfastness Front' as Successor to Libya Dawn - Paper."

<sup>2492</sup> Nina Pouls and Umberto Profazio, "Sudanese Militias Play Instrumental Role in Libya's Conflict," IISS, January 17, 2020, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/01/csdp-sudanese-militias-in-libya>.

<sup>2493</sup> Cole and McQuinn, *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 101.

<sup>2494</sup> ACLED Events 4243LIB - 4251LIB

<sup>2495</sup> "Car Bomb Targets Tripoli Militia, Kills One," *Agence France Presse*, February 2, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020150202eb220063i&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2496</sup> "Brigade 301, Ghaniwa Brigade, Nawasi Battalion, TRB," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed August 3, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/7139>.

<sup>2497</sup> "Islamist Brigades Form 'Steadfastness Front' as Successor to Libya Dawn - Paper."

<sup>2498</sup> "Tripoli Militia Abducts Libyan Planning Minister," *EFE News Service*, November 3, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WEFE000020151103ebb3000e9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

existence as a non-state organization, these claims were not conclusive enough to include TRB in our dataset. Last, there was a rebel group called the Tripoli Revolutionaries Council (TRC), and it is possible that the sources that claimed the TRB was an anti-Gaddafi group were actually referring to the TRC; there was no evidence linking the TRC and the TRB other than the similarity in names, and therefore the TRB was not considered as a re-emergence of TRC.

### Truth Martyrs

The only mention of this group is ACLED event 4227LIB when they clashed with the Khoms Military Council. No other reference could be found regarding this group. Due to a lack of information about the Truth Martyrs, the existence of this group could not be verified, and it is therefore excluded from our dataset. The group is not included with low certainty, like some other Libyan groups only mentioned once such as the Nusr al Sahel Brigade, for two main reasons. First, this group is mentioned in 2015, when the climate of hundreds of armed groups emerging was gone. Second, ACLED notes that the group was simply calling itself the “Truth Martyrs” and is believed to be connected to a family; this indicates that the “Truth Martyrs” may just be a group of individuals acting on behalf of their family for personal reasons, rather than being an independent group with political goals to violently challenge the authority of the state.

### \*Zawiya Brigade

AKA: Zawiya Brigade; Az Zawiya Brigade

The Zawiya Brigade formed sometime around June 2011 in the mountains near Zawiya (“rural” variable coded as “1”).<sup>2499</sup> These mountains were close to the border with Tunisia,<sup>2500</sup> so it is unknown whether the Zawiya Brigade had technically crossed over into Tunisia at some point, rendering the “planning\_inside” variable as unknown. The group was formed by residents of Zawiya who had to flee the city after Gaddafi forces overtook it in February and March 2011.<sup>2501</sup>

The earliest mention of this group is in a May 20, 2011 report on violence in Libya,<sup>2502</sup> however, it was odd to find no other mention of this group that early, with all other references to the group in August 2011. Therefore, the date of formation and name date are coded as June 2011, because it is likely that the exact date came within 1-2 months of June. Similarly, the small attack variable is coded as 06/2011 because while the group led attacks to recapture Zawiya in August 2011,<sup>2503</sup> it is possible they were also trying to recapture other cities closer to May 2011,<sup>2504</sup> in preparation for the battle over Zawiya.

After the Zawiya Brigade successfully won back Zawiya, very little information is found on this group. Therefore, the viability variable is coded as “0.” However, it should be noted that ACLED lists a group called the “Zawiya Martyrs Brigade,” but this is a Benghazi based group<sup>2505</sup> that is part of Haftar’s Libyan National Army.<sup>2506</sup>

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<sup>2499</sup> Deborah Haynes, “Rebels Close in on Gaddafi; Battle for Control of Zawiya Brings Front Line to within 25 Miles of Tripoli Libya,” *The Times*, August 15, 2011, 1 edition, sec. News; Front Page, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=T000000020110815e78f000d3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2500</sup> Haynes.

<sup>2501</sup> Haynes.

<sup>2502</sup> “Morgan Strong,” *The Tripoli Post*, May 20, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TRIPOS0020110601e75k00003&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2503</sup> Haynes, “Rebels Close in on Gaddafi; Battle for Control of Zawiya Brings Front Line to within 25 Miles of Tripoli Libya.”

<sup>2504</sup> “Morgan Strong.”

<sup>2505</sup> “Central Libya Shield Forces Pull out of Sirte Airbase,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, April 11, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020140411ea4b003xq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2506</sup> “Vanished Off the Face of the Earth,” *Amnesty International*, August 2015, 10.

There are several coding decisions that warrant clarification. First, since the exact month of formation is coded as unknown, the name\_time variable is coded as unknown; however, the “name\_time2” variable is coded as “1” because the group was definitely publicly named within a year of formation.

Second, exact dates are unknown for large and civilian attacks. It is possible that these attacks never occurred, especially the civilian attacks. However, the civilian attack variable is coded as unknown rather than “0,” because although it is unlikely the Zawiya Brigade intentionally killed civilians, it is within the realm of possibility that they would kill civilian Gaddafi loyalists.

Third, the “current\_security” variables are coded as “1” because many field commanders in the Zawiya Brigade used to be in Gaddafi’s military.<sup>2507</sup> However, other than this variable, information on Zawiya Brigade leaders could not be found and most leadership variables are coded as unknown.

The “clandestine” variable is coded as “0” because the Zawiya Brigade was operating in the open during the initial months of group formation.

The “viable\_negotiate” variable is coded as “0” because the Zawiya Brigade itself did not take over the Gaddafi government, and there was no evidence to suggest that they were negotiating with the government. However, it should be noted that the Zawiya Brigade did successfully take over Zawiya from Gaddafi forces.

Finally, SCAD recorded only Type 2 protest and riot events in 2011 and no Type 1, 3, or 4 events during this time. SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation. Several Type 2 events occurred during this time, and since the location for one of these events (Event ID 6200056) is listed as “nationwide”, this fulfills the local requirement and contestation\_local is coded as 1. Notably, this event marks the start of the First Libyan Civil War. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

### Zawiya Martyrs Brigade

The Zawiya Martyrs Brigade is part of Haftar’s LNA<sup>2508</sup> and therefore considered a state actor. This group is excluded from our dataset for being a state actor.

### 101 Battalion

AKA: 101 Brigade; Brigade 101; Battalion 101

This group is a militia/battalion in the Libyan army<sup>2509</sup> (most likely referring to the army under the GNC because earliest references to this group are in 2013). This group is excluded from our dataset for being a state actor.

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<sup>2507</sup> “Morgan Strong.”

<sup>2508</sup> “Vanished Off the Face of the Earth.”

<sup>2509</sup> “One Man Killed in Clashes between Rival Libyan Militias in Tajouraa,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, November 16, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020131116e9bg002ut&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



## Madagascar

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**Narrative Summary:** Madagascar's government has remained unstable throughout recent history. Our era of analysis opens with Didier Ratsiraka in the office of president. Ratsiraka lost the December 2001 elections to Marc Ravalomanana. However, Ratsiraka refused to step down, leading to seven months of unrest before he sought exile in France. Ravalomanana was re-elected in 2006. A crackdown on opposition beginning in January 2009 led to unrest. In March, Andry Rajoelina seized power in what was widely condemned as a coup. After years of stalled progress and negotiations, democratic elections were held again in December 2013. Hery Rajaonarimampianina won the elections and took power in January 2014. Ethnicities are not commonly discussed in political affairs, as the population is nearly homogenously Malagasy.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** high

**Explanation:** Although the country has never descended into full armed conflict, low grade violence and unrest is common. Remote violence (use of grenades, IEDs) is especially common. The perpetrators for the vast majority of these attacks are never identified. In several cases, remote violence attacks appear sustained and coordinated, likely indicating planning by a group, but no information regarding the attackers was available.

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**I love Madagascar (TIM)** – Acronym from Malagasy translation, Tiako I Madagasikara, the party of Mark Ravalomanana founded in 2001.<sup>2510</sup> Are actors in many ACLED events in 2002, which appears to be mostly spontaneous violence, and all occurred in reference to disputed election results.<sup>2511</sup>

**Determined Madagascar Youth (TGV)** – Acronym comes from Malagasy translation, Tanora malaGasy Vonona, the political party of Andry Rajoelina, formed circa 2007.<sup>2512</sup> ACLED ties TGV to six violent incidents during the turbulent 2009-2010 Malagasy governance crisis. Aside from an incident in January 2009 when government forces opened fire on a crowd attending at TGV rally, it was hard to find specific mention of these incidents.<sup>2513</sup> I did find references to generalized violence during the time, including fighting between supporters on the streets, with death counts at over 200 for early 2009.<sup>2514</sup> My best guess

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<sup>2510</sup> International Business Publications USA, *Madagascar Country: Strategic Information and Developments* (Int'l Business Publications, 2009), 86; "Marc Ravalomanana: President of Tiako i Madagasikara," *Madagasikara Malalako* (blog), accessed March 20, 2017, <http://ampitapitao.blogspot.com/p/marc-ravalomanana-presidentdu-tiako-i.html>; Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2015*, 2015.

<sup>2511</sup> "Madagascar Profile - Timeline," *BBC News*, December 20, 2016, sec. Africa, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13864364>.

<sup>2512</sup> Macharia Munene, "Madagascar: An Island State Caught in a Cycle of Political Turbulence," *The East African (Nairobi)*, September 13, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201009130128.html>; "Madagascar: A Rising Political Star Falls to Earth," *IRIN*, February 3, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200902030765.html>.

<sup>2513</sup> "Madagascar Profile - Timeline"; Lova Rabary-Rakotondravony, "Madagascar: Chaque Camp Blâme L'autre Après Les Incidents," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 9, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200902090424.html>; Par Kevin Doukaga Doukaga, "Gabon: Henri Andrianjafy, Consul de Madagascar Au Gabon : « Nous Sommes Profondément Attristés Par Ce Qui Se Passe À Madagascar »,» *Gabonews*, January 30, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200901300323.html>; Désiré Clitandre Dzonteu, "Madagascar: Quatre Jours Après Le Début Des Violences À Madagascar, La Situation Reste Tendue," *Gabonews*, January 29, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200901290659.html>.

<sup>2514</sup> "Madagascar: La Fin d'une Épopée," *Le Potentiel*, March 18, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200903180926.html>; Rabah Iguer, "Madagascar: Tensions à Antananarivo - Manifestation Contre La France," *La Tribune*, March 11, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200903110649.html>.



is that most of this violence was spontaneous, not planned, although it is certainly possible we are missing organized violence directed at the state during this period.

**Dahalo Militia** – Dahalo is a Malagasy term for bandit, used to refer to cattle thieves. Cattle thievery was a traditional practice in southern Madagascar, serving as a rite of passage or even a prerequisite for marriage. In recent years, thievery has grown to involve groups of criminal gangs that both collude with and challenge state security forces.<sup>2515</sup> Their goal is not to directly challenge the state.

**Defenders of National Sovereignty (DNS)** – In September 2013, a string of five bombings/attempted bombings occurred in Antananarivo. They are believed to be linked and ended when a bomb exploded prematurely killing the bomb-maker.<sup>2516</sup> DNS claimed responsibility for several bombings and is suspected responsible for the rest as well. Denouncing foreign interference in the electoral process (and notably failing to back a particular candidate), DNS targeted international installations in the capital including a hotel and the Bank of Africa. The size of the group is unknown, but planning is evident. The group emailed embassies to claim credit for the bombings and assert their grievances. In addition, authorities believe it is responsible for a weapons and explosives cache found near one of the attack sites. The group's MO is similar to that of previous bombings during 2009-2010.<sup>2517</sup> Excluded because it does not target the state.

**Foroche Militia** – ACLED describes this group as a militia, but they are actually more loosely organized gangs operating predominantly in Antsiranana and Ambilobe. Groups of youths aged about 10 to 20 conduct opportunistic crime, especially robberies, and occasionally target police forces.<sup>2518</sup> Excluded, as the primary function to commit opportunistic crime and not to target the state.

**Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA)** – The acronym AREMA is variously said to stand for Association pour la Renaissance de Madagascar, Avant-garde pour la Rénovation de Madagascar, Avant-Garde de la Révolution Malagache, and Antoky'ny Revolusiona Malagasy. It was founded in 1976 by

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<sup>2515</sup> “Madagascar’s Unforgiving Bandit Lands,” IRIN, July 18, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2012/07/18/madagascars-unforgiving-bandit-lands/>; “Villagers Kill Dozens of Cattle Thieves in Madagascar,” *Reuters*, September 3, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-madagascar-cattle-idUSBRE8820LV20120903>; Cara Brook, “Game Turned National Crisis- Cattle Bandits in Madagascar,” National Geographic Society (blogs), August 9, 2013, <http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2013/08/09/game-turned-national-crisis-cattle-bandits-in-madagascar/>; “23 Dead as Madagascar Troops Battle Cattle Rustlers,” *News24*, August 28, 2015, <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/23-dead-as-Madagascar-troops-battle-cattle-rustlers-20150828>; Noah Cobb, *Madagascar Politics and Governance, a History* (Dany Beck Paper Shop, 2017).

<sup>2516</sup> Overseas Security Advisory Council Research & Information Center, “Madagascar 2015 Crime and Safety Report.” (Washington: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, March 19, 2015), <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17297>.

<sup>2517</sup> Stephen Westcott, “Amateur Bombings in Madagascar Add New Dimension to Elections,” *Future Directions International* (blog), September 25, 2013, <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/amateur-bombings-in-madagascar-add-new-dimension-to-elections/>; “In Madagascar, Bombings Precede a Presidential Election,” *Stratfor*, September 18, 2013, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/madagascar-bombings-precede-presidential-election>.

<sup>2518</sup> Mjara Fih, “Phénomène « Foroche » -La Délinquance Juvénile Poussée à Son Paroxysme,” accessed March 19, 2017, <http://www.matin.mg/?p=3669>; Arnaud R., “Foroche à Antsiranana : Deux Quartiers Encore Classés Zones Rouges – Midi Madagasikara,” *Midi Madagasikara* (blog), August 3, 2016, <http://www.midi-madagasikara.mg/societe/2016/08/03/foroche-a-antsiranana-deux-quartiers-classes-zones-rouges/>; Madagascar Actualités, “Ambilobe : Le Phénomène Foroche Réapparaît,” *Madagascar Actualités* (blog), April 11, 2016, <http://madagascar-actualites.com/ambilobe-le-phenomene-foroche-reapparaît/>; ZHN, “Les Foroches Font Régner La Terreur,” *Orange*, August 1, 2013, <http://www.orange.mg/actualite/foroches-font-regner-terreur>; N.R., “Diana : Antsiranana : Les ‘Foroches’ Soutenus En Haut Lieu ?,” *Madaplust*.info, July 23, 2011, [http://www.madaplust.info/Diana-Antsiranana-les-foroches-soutenus-en-haut-lieu\\_a2774.html](http://www.madaplust.info/Diana-Antsiranana-les-foroches-soutenus-en-haut-lieu_a2774.html).

President Didier Ratsiraka.<sup>2519</sup> It is only tagged in five ACLED events, all of which involved spontaneous violence (riots/violent protests).

**Three National Forces (3FN)** – An opposition coalition/platform in the 2006 elections that included AREMA.<sup>2520</sup> As best I can tell, they did not plan and execute violence. There is only one note in ACLED (lacks description), and I found no record of violence in online searches.

**Unidentified armed group (701MAG)** – A group of six assassinated a former senator in his home. The armed group did not steal anything, but this is perhaps because the family was able to secure the house mid-attack. It is unclear what the motive was.<sup>2521</sup> Excluded, insufficient information.

**Unidentified armed group (656MAG)** – The group had just robbed travelers when it exchanged fire with gendarmes.<sup>2522</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (645MAG)** – A group of three men kidnapped the South Korean consul as he approached his residence.<sup>2523</sup> No follow-up found, no additional information.

**Unidentified armed group (612MAG)** – the one article that seems to have documented the attack is no longer accessible. Excluded for lack of information.

**Unidentified armed group (534MAG)** – The bomb targeted the police and MAPAR (party of Rajoelina). The IED was placed in an alley. It is unclear who is responsible.<sup>2524</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (529MAG, 532MAG)** – Two bombs were discovered within several days of each other at churches/parochial schools in Antananarivo.<sup>2525</sup> I have a suspicion this may be linked to 534MAG – timing makes sense and the descriptions of the bombs were similar. Excluded due to lack of information

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<sup>2519</sup> Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, 877; Richard R. Marcus, *The Politics of Institutional Failure in Madagascar's Third Republic* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 116, [https://books.google.com/books?id=oq\\_NCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA116&lpg=PA116&dq=AREMA+madagascar+1976&source=bl&ots=6ZoKRMAdbSb&sig=3KfGMKjGQxVxineksi-odUvkD0c&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwio37mrsOXSAhWDOSYKHbqsBwsQ6AEIMDAE#v=onepage&q=AREMA%20madagascar%201976&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=oq_NCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA116&lpg=PA116&dq=AREMA+madagascar+1976&source=bl&ots=6ZoKRMAdbSb&sig=3KfGMKjGQxVxineksi-odUvkD0c&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwio37mrsOXSAhWDOSYKHbqsBwsQ6AEIMDAE#v=onepage&q=AREMA%20madagascar%201976&f=false).

<sup>2520</sup> "Country Report: Madagascar," Country Report (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2006), [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRSumESSD/Resources/1729402-1150389437293/EIU\\_Country\\_Report\\_Madagascar.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRSumESSD/Resources/1729402-1150389437293/EIU_Country_Report_Madagascar.pdf); IRIN, "Madagascar: An Uneasy Runup to December Elections," *IRIN*, June 9, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200606090410.html>; Bernard Yves, "Élections Libres, Équitables et Transparentes : Un Pari Difficile à Tenir !," *Témoignages.RE*, May 5, 2006, <http://www.temoignages.re/international/madagascar/elections-libres-equitables-et-transparentes-un-pari-difficile-a-tenir,14864>.

<sup>2521</sup> Riana Randrianarisoa, "Madagascar: Ambohibao - Un Ancien Sénateur Assassiné à Son Domicile," *L'Express de Madagascar*, June 8, 2015, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201506081418.html>.

<sup>2522</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: La Foule Exécute Cinq Braqueurs Armés," *L'Express de Madagascar*, March 9, 2015, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201503092904.html>.

<sup>2523</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Ivandry - Le Consul de Corée Kidnappé Devant Sa Résidence," *L'Express de Madagascar*, January 31, 2015, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201501310427.html>.

<sup>2524</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Les Poseurs de Bombe Narguent Les Forces de l'ordre," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 28, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402281298.html>.

<sup>2525</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Alerte à La Bombe à l'entrée d'une École," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 24, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402241584.html>; Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Alerte à La Bombe Devant Une Église," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 25, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402251358.html>.

**Unidentified armed group (527MAG)** – was armed highway robbers who engaged gendarmes.<sup>2526</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (525MAG)** – An unexploded grenade and a suspicious bag were found in an alley bathroom in Ankondrano-Ouest. Locals attribute their presence to a criminal gang, stashing the grenade and bag as they ran from police.<sup>2527</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (524MAG)** – A grenade was thrown at police, but this even arose when police pursued armed men who attempted to rob a restaurant.<sup>2528</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (512MAG)** - A white man threw a grenade into a crowd near the stadium where the new president was inaugurated several hours after the ceremony. As best I can tell, only one culprit was ever sought and he was never identified.<sup>2529</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (501MAG)** - armed robbery<sup>2530</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (491MAG)** - Police engaged an arm group suspected of robbing a store in an attempt to arrest them.<sup>2531</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (488MAG, 486MAG)** - could not find articles, only referenced in ACLED.

**Unidentified armed group (485MAG)** - clashes as police pursued robbers.<sup>2532</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (479MAG)** - was an accident, not an armed group<sup>2533</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (478MAG)** – clashes as police pursued robbers.<sup>2534</sup>

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<sup>2526</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Embuscade Meurtrière Contre La Gendarmerie,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, February 21, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402211263.html>.

<sup>2527</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: La Découverte d’une Grenade Déclenche Une Alerte,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, February 18, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402181395.html>.

<sup>2528</sup> Didi R, “Madagascar: Antanimena - Jet de Grenade Contre La Police d’intervention,” *Midi Madagasikara*, February 17, 2014, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201402172216.html>.

<sup>2529</sup> Duncan Miriri, “Madagascar’s President Takes over; Grenade Blast Kills Child,” *Reuters*, January 25, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-madagascar-election-idUSBREA000ML20140125>; AFP, “Madagascar Probes Presidential Inauguration Day Blast,” *ModernGhana.com*, January 26, 2014, <https://www.modernghana.com/news/518207/madagascar-probes-presidential-inauguration-day-blast.html>; AFP, “Madagascar: Un Mort Dans l’explosion d’une Grenade Le Jour de l’investiture,” *L’Express.fr*, January 25, 2014, [http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/madagascar-un-mort-dans-l-explosion-d-une-grenade-le-jour-de-l-investiture\\_1317359.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/madagascar-un-mort-dans-l-explosion-d-une-grenade-le-jour-de-l-investiture_1317359.html).

<sup>2530</sup> “Madagascar: Une Famille Mauricienne Attaquée Par Un Commando à Madagascar,” *L’express.Mu*, December 30, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201312302058.html>.

<sup>2531</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Toliara - Fusillade Meurtrière Dans Le Repaire d’un Gang,” *AllAfrica.Fr*, December 8, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201312080379.html>.

<sup>2532</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: ARIVONIMAMO - Quatre Braqueurs Abattus, Deux Armes Saisies,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, October 31, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310310765.html>.

<sup>2533</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina and Francis Ramanantsoa, “Madagascar: SRC Toliara - Une Grenade Tue Un Gendarme et Blesse Quatre Autres,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, October 23, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310231375.html>.

<sup>2534</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Andohan’ Ilakaka - Un Policier Abattu, Trois Bandits Déchiquetés,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, October 21, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310211324.html>.

Unidentified armed group (474MAG) – clashes as police pursued robbers.<sup>2535</sup>

Unidentified armed group (473MAG) - Dahalo<sup>2536</sup>

Unidentified armed group (472MAG) – said to be aimed to influence election<sup>2537</sup>

Unidentified armed group (471MAG) – did not find articles online, but assumed to be election-related violence.

Unidentified armed group (452MAG) – armed robbery<sup>2538</sup>

Unidentified armed group (451MAG) – Dahalo<sup>2539</sup>

Unidentified armed group (443MAG) – A rusty old abandoned bomb exploded when two boys started playing with it.<sup>2540</sup>

Unidentified armed group (417MAG, 420MAG) – The article I found reporting these incidents matches in description (number of deaths and location), but the date for one of the events is off in ACLED. This unidentified armed groups were Dahalo.<sup>2541</sup>

Unidentified armed group (415MAG) – This was an operation aimed at apprehending Remenabila, leader of the Dahalo.<sup>2542</sup>

Unidentified armed group (411MAG) – Armed robbery of a taxi-bus.<sup>2543</sup>

Unidentified armed group (402MAG) – In this incident, a bomb went off near an electronics store and hotel in the capital; a similar incident occurred again several days later, possibly targeting a colonel whose car was nearby. People speculated that motives may be political but it seems no conclusion was ever drawn from the investigations.<sup>2544</sup> Excluded due to lack of information.

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<sup>2535</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Ampitatafika - Trois Attaques Armées En Une Heure,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, October 11, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310110859.html>.

<sup>2536</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Amboasary-Sud - Dix-Sept Morts Dans Une Fusillade,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, October 10, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310101238.html>.

<sup>2537</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Toamasina - Une Bombe Posée Près d’un Bungalow,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, October 2, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201310020978.html>.

<sup>2538</sup> Aina R, “Madagascar: Insécurité - Une Délégation Spéciale à Nosy-Be,” *Midi Madagasikara*, August 7, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201308070770.html>.

<sup>2539</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Tolagnaro - Trente-Huit Morts Dans Une Guérilla Gendarme-Dahalo,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, August 1, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201308010643.html>.

<sup>2540</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Un Explosif Déchiquète Deux Garçonnetts,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, July 10, 2013, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201307100886.html>.

<sup>2541</sup> Aina R, “Madagascar: Accrochage à Miandrivazo - Un Gendarme et Cinq Dahalo Tués,” *Midi Madagasikara*, November 20, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201211201513.html>.

<sup>2542</sup> R. S., “Madagascar: Opération Remenabila - Des Tirs de Lance Roquettes et de Fusils Mitrailleurs,” *Midi Madagasikara*, October 8, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201210081387.html>; IRIN, “À La Recherche de Remenabila,” IRIN, September 24, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/96389/madagascar-%C3%A0-la-recherche-de-remenabila>.

<sup>2543</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Betroka - Assaut Meurtrier de Trois Taxis-Brousse,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, September 14, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209140737.html>.

<sup>2544</sup> Toky R, “Madagascar: Explosion d’une Bombe Artisanale Devant l’AV Center 3 Blessés Dont Un Grave,” *Midi Madagasikara*, August 27, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201208270533.html>; Aina R, “Madagascar: Affaire Bombe - L’enquête Piétine,” *Midi Madagasikara*, September 3, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201209031447.html>.

**Unidentified armed group (401MAG)** – could not find any articles on this event

**Unidentified armed group (397MAG)** – could not find any articles on this event

**Unidentified armed group (395MAG)** – could not find any articles on this event

**Unidentified armed group (373MAG)** – This event appears to have been an armed robbery by a gang of twelve bandits; the article referencing the event includes a highly specific list of stolen items. However, the targets were a bit curious: the group first tried to rob a senior police inspector and then an employee (rank unknown) of Madagascar's Financial Information Services – both potentially government targets. Excluded because it's unclear whether the targets were systematically identified.<sup>2545</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (364MAG, 368MAG)** – Two very similar bombs exploded on successive days near French targets: the first in the parking lot of the French Institute of Madagascar (IFM), between the cars of a French embassy employee and an IFM employee; the second next to Naza Electronic store, near the French embassy. Both bombs were made using motor scooter batteries and concealed in a package, and investigators have suggested the events were linked. However, these events seem to target a foreign government, not the government of Madagascar.<sup>2546</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (363MAG)** – A homemade bomb was discovered and diffused at the Jirama water purification plant in Mandrozeza. The bomb was made using a grenade, a motor scooter batter, matches, and a mosquito coil. Had it exploded, it would have caused serious damage and disrupted water supply throughout the area. Although it occurred just days before, it does not seem linked to the bombings targeting French installations.<sup>2547</sup> We decided to exclude this because it was not clearly targeting the state.

**Unidentified armed group (360MAG)** – A group of thirty bandits attacked the town of Ampopoha, stealing nine cattle. They allegedly also planned to steal rifles held legally by some of the town's residents, as insecurity is rife in the area. It appears to be just an armed robbery.<sup>2548</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (357MAG)** – Major General Claude Ramananarivo, former commander of the national gendarmerie, was found dead in his home along with his wife and his adopted daughter. All three showed signs of torture, and files and records were scattered everywhere. In addition, several valuables including a car, television, and laptop, as well as numerous weapons, were stolen from the home. A tenant of the general discovered the scene some two weeks after the murder while attempting to pay rent.<sup>2549</sup> It appears

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<sup>2545</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Andraisoro - Série d'attaques Armées En Une Nuit," *L'Express de Madagascar*, May 9, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205090690.html>.

<sup>2546</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Analakely - Attentat Devant l'Institut Français," *AllAfrica.Fr*, May 3, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205031116.html>; Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Ambatomena - Une Bombe Explode Devant Naza Electronic," *L'Express de Madagascar*, May 4, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205040854.html>.

<sup>2547</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Mandrozeza - Attentat à La Station de La Jirama," *L'Express de Madagascar*, May 2, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205020452.html>.

<sup>2548</sup> Angola Ny Avo, "Madagascar: Ibity - Des Bandits Attaquent Ampopoha," *L'Express de Madagascar*, April 17, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201204171218.html>.

<sup>2549</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Andohan'I Mandrozeza - Le Général Ramananarivo Assassiné," *L'Express de Madagascar*, April 5, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201204050887.html>; Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Mandrozeza - Vol d'armes Chez Le Général Ramananarivo," *L'Express de Madagascar*, April 7, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201204070170.html>.



that one of the household staff perpetrated the murder with outside associates.<sup>2550</sup> At the last instance of reporting I could find, ten suspects had been arrested.<sup>2551</sup> Although evidence is mixed, I would guess based on available evidence that this was opportunistic theft and not an attempt to target the government: the general appears to have been retired, and most reporting focuses on the theft – including that perpetrators were caught when attempting to sell the stolen goods.

**Unidentified armed group (350MAG)** – A municipal council president was killed while on the road – located the article but details are lacking.<sup>2552</sup> Excluded, lack of information.

**Unidentified armed group (351MAG)** – I had a hard time finding this incident, I think because ACLED's description is inaccurate. There is a similar event in the same location with partial description matches, but the event was mere vigilantism. The police were not involved as either perpetrators or victims.<sup>2553</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (349MAG)** – The violence seems to have been spontaneous: the policeman asked a young man to produce identification, the man asked to return to his house to retrieve it, and returned apparently intoxicated with a group of four friends and beat/stabbed the police officer to death.<sup>2554</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (339MAG)** – attempt to rob a bank via bomb threat.<sup>2555</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (337MAG)** – The president's motorcade was bombed while driving on its daily route to the president's home, causing no damage and injuring no one.<sup>2556</sup> Government investigators blamed opposition leaders, even going so far as to arrest Mamy Rakotoarivelo (TIM, supported ousted president). However, the arrest did not follow proper protocols and fellow opposition leaders have doubted the

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<sup>2550</sup> Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Andohan'I Mandroseza - Le Général Ramanananarivo Assassiné"; Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Affaire Ramanananarivo - Tous Les Suspects Placés à Tsiafahy," *L'Express de Madagascar*, April 14, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201204140380.html>.

<sup>2551</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Assassinat de Ramanananarivo - Un Faux-Commandant Arrêté," *L'Express de Madagascar*, May 14, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201205140364.html>.

<sup>2552</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Amboasary Sud - Un Président de Conseil Municipal Décapité," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 10, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201202100749.html>.

<sup>2553</sup> Vero Andrianarisoa, "Madagascar: Fiofio - Un Homme Victime de Vindicté Populaire," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 10, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201202100823.html>.

<sup>2554</sup> Vero Andrianarisoa, "Madagascar: Tsaramandroso - Un Policier Stagiaire Tué," *L'Express de Madagascar*, February 6, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201202062003.html>.

<sup>2555</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Antsakaviro - Attentat à La Bombe Dans Une Banque," *L'Express de Madagascar*, January 6, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201201060516.html>.

<sup>2556</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Marais Masay - Attentat Sur Le Véhicule Présidentiel," *L'Express de Madagascar*, March 4, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201103040921.html>; Zo Rakotoscheno, "Madagascar: Le Président de La HAT Andry Rajoelina l'a Échappé Belle.," *Midi Madagasikara*, March 7, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201103070497.html>; "Roadside Bomb Targets Madagascar's President," *Reuters*, March 4, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-madagascar-crisis-idAFJOE72307T20110304>; AFP, "Bomb Blast Misses Madagascar Strongman's Convoy," *Africa Review*, March 4, 2011, <http://www.africareview.com/news/Bomb-blast-misses-Madagascar-strongmans-convoy/979180-1119004-erjkcui/index.html>.



veracity of these allegations.<sup>2557</sup> Rakotoarivelo was released and nothing seems to have come of the matter.<sup>2558</sup> Excluded due to lack of information.

**Unidentified armed group (321MAG)** – On April 18, 2010, Special Intervention Forces (FIS) raided what they alleged was a secret meeting planning an attack on the Primature Palace (Prime Minister's office) at Mahazoarivo.<sup>2559</sup> Twenty-two persons were arrested and eventually tried for mutiny; they were found guilty of mutiny to overthrow the government and of other minor charges, but not of the alleged attack on the Primature.<sup>2560</sup> The case is tricky for two reasons: first, it is unclear the extent to which the group was led by military versus civilians. The group was clearly split between civilians and military members, with tallies having civilians outnumbering military men. However, military members were more frequently named in reporting and some "civilians" may have been former army reservists.<sup>2561</sup> Secondly, several commentaries note that the incident fits a pattern of violence just proceeding major internationally-sponsored negotiations in ways that benefit the Rajoelina regime.<sup>2562</sup> Although the government may have been motivated to fabricate such a plot, framing seems unlikely since the group members were only convicted on a lesser account. Ultimately, I decided to exclude this event because the language used to discuss the charges and convictions of the accused was *mutiny*, not sedition or treason, implying the perpetrators were in the military. Additional research on this group would be desirable, available evidence suggests that we exclude the group.

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<sup>2557</sup> Davis R, "Madagascar: Attentat Contre Rajoelina - Voninahitsy Accuse l'opposition," *Midi Madagasikara*, March 7, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201103070521.html>; Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Attentat Contre Andry Rajoelina - Rakotoarivelo En Garde-à-Vue," *L'Express de Madagascar*, March 16, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201103160673.html>; Iloniaina Alain, "Madagascar: Affaire Marais Masay - L'état Se Resserre Autour de Rakotoarivelo," *L'Express de Madagascar*, March 28, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201103280813.html>; Hannah McNeish, "Madagascar Opposition Balks at Re-Appointment of Prime Minister," VOA, March 15, 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/a/opposition-in-madagascar-balks-at-re-appointment-of-prime-minister-118120904/157678.html>.

<sup>2558</sup> Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Human Rights of Parliamentarians: 193rd Governing Council Session," Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013, <http://www.ipu.org/hr-e/193/mag05.htm>.

<sup>2559</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Assaut Contre Mahazoarivo - Les 22 Prévenus Relaxés," *L'Express de Madagascar*, September 26, 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109261036.html>; Andry Ratovo, "Madagascar: Dix-Huit Personnes Arrêtées," *L'Express de Madagascar*, April 19, 2010, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201004191212.html>; maherizo, "Aborted Raid on the Prime Minister's Palace in Mahazoarivo: 17 Militaries and Reserve Troops behind Bars," Madagascar Online, accessed March 28, 2017, <https://www.madonline.com/aborted-raid-on-the-prime-ministers-palace-in-mahazoarivo-17-militaries-and-reserve-troops-behind-bars/?lang=en>; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, "Conflict Barometer 2010," Calameo, 2010, <http://www.calameo.com/read/000191109f028c1b3a597>.

<sup>2560</sup> Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Assaut Contre Mahazoarivo - Les 22 Prévenus Relaxés."

<sup>2561</sup> Fano Rakotondrazaka, "Madagascar: Attaque Contre Mahazoarivo - Les Fign Dégagent Leur Responsabilité," *L'Express de Madagascar*, April 20, 2010, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201004200951.html>; Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Assaut Contre Mahazoarivo - Les 22 Prévenus Relaxés"; Ratovo, "Madagascar: Dix-Huit Personnes Arrêtées"; maherizo, "Aborted Raid on the Prime Minister's Palace in Mahazoarivo"; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, "Conflict Barometer 2010."

<sup>2562</sup> joel, "'Aborted Putsch': The HAT Pointing Finger Is a Cause for Doubts," *Madagascar Online* (blog), April 19, 2010, <https://www.madonline.com/aborted-putsch-the-hat-pointing-finger-is-a-cause-for-doubts/?lang=en>; Ndimby A., "Coup d'état Ou Coup d'éclat ?," *Madagascar Tribune*, April 19, 2010, <http://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Coup-d-etat-ou-coup-d-eclat,13889.html>.

**Unidentified armed group (320MAG)** – Explosives detonated at two service stations in the capital. No one died. It is unclear whether the attacks were related, who perpetrated them, and for what reason.<sup>2563</sup> Excluded, insufficient information.

**\*Unidentified armed group (Ankadilalana camp, 04/2010)** – A spent, defective grenade was thrown into the courtyard of a gendarmerie base. The serial number indicates that it came from the military, but perpetrators may have acquired it after it failed to explode during its initial use.<sup>2564</sup> Excluded, insufficient information.

**Unidentified armed group (322MAG)** – Someone threw a bomb at the home of Justice Minister Christine Razananahasoa and it exploded about fifteen meters away from the home, killing no one.<sup>2565</sup> Excluded, insufficient information.

**Unidentified armed group (311MAG)** – no event description in ACLED, could not find articles online.

**Unidentified armed group (310MAG, 307MAG)** – An armed group attacked the Tana Waterfront Commercial Center around 2:30 AM on July 19, 2009. Two private security guards were killed.<sup>2566</sup> Several reports present the event as a terrorist attack with no further explanation, while one mentions that attackers stole cell phones from victims during the attack, making it seem like mere theft.<sup>2567</sup> However, there is serious evidence pointing towards a coordinated attack on state authority here: first, the fact that it occurred at two in the morning meant that it was not mere “terrorism”; if terror or theft of individuals’ possessions were the goal, it would have occurred during daytime when there were more victims. Second, the center is home to VIVA broadcasting station, owned by then-President Rajoelina.<sup>2568</sup> The station played a prominent political role, with its shutdown by government forces in January 2009 serving as a major catalyst for Rajoelina’s ouster of Ravalomanana.<sup>2569</sup> The event was clearly organized, as road blocks were erected in advance to slow gendarmes’ progress, allowing the perpetrators to escape.<sup>2570</sup> Furthermore, some articles link this attack to other attacks occurring on the same day. In particular, a failed bombing evidently meant to target the government Joint National Investigation Committee (CNME, later renamed

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<sup>2563</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Total Soanierana - Une Explosion sans Dégâts,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, April 19, 2010, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201004191547.html>; Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Des Agitateurs Ont Frappé à Tsiazotafo - Explosion à La Station Total,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, April 19, 2010, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201004190498.html>.

<sup>2564</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Une Grenade Offensive Au Camp,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, April 26, 2010, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201004261098.html>.

<sup>2565</sup> “Bomb Targets Madagascar Minister’s Home,” *Agence France Presse*, April 21, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020100421e641005k9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2566</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Deux Agents de Sécurité Tués,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, July 20, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200907201024.html>; Rakotoarilala Ninaivo, “Antananarivo a Dormi Sous La Menace Du Terrorisme,” *Madagascar Tribune*, July 19, 2009, <http://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Antananarivo-a-dormi-sous-la,12333.html>.

<sup>2567</sup> Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Deux Agents de Sécurité Tués”; maherizo, “Série d’attaques Terroristes Ciblées à Antananarivo : L’escalade ?,” *Madagascar Online*, July 20, 2009, <https://www.madonline.com/serie-dattaques-terroristes-ciblees-a-antananarivo-lescalade/>.

<sup>2568</sup> maherizo, “Andry Rajoelina : Le Bon Prétexte Pour Boycoter La Rencontre d’Addis Abeba,” *Madagascar Online*, July 20, 2009, <http://www.madonline.com/andry-rajoelina-le-bon-pretexte-pour-boycoter-la-rencontre-daddis-abeba/>; Ninaivo, “Antananarivo a Dormi Sous La Menace Du Terrorisme”; maherizo, “Série d’attaques Terroristes Ciblées à Antananarivo.”

<sup>2569</sup> “Anti-Government Protests Burn Two TV Stations - Committee to Protect Journalists,” *Committee to Protect Journalists*, January 26, 2008, <https://cpj.org/2009/01/two-tv-stations-burned-in-anti-government-protests.php>; “Madagascar Profile - Timeline.”

<sup>2570</sup> Andriamarohasina, “Madagascar: Deux Agents de Sécurité Tués”; Ninaivo, “Antananarivo a Dormi Sous La Menace Du Terrorisme.”

Special Investigative Force, FIS). The bomb detonated prematurely, killing several of the perpetrators.<sup>2571</sup> Evidently, investigators recovered a map of targets and roadblocks erected throughout the city from the car remains, firmly connecting the two above attacks.<sup>2572</sup> Several sources also indicate that the group also planned to target other sites with bombs, including the National Gendarmerie at Ankadilalana, the gendarmerie camp at Fort Duchesne, and the Regiment of Intervention Forces at Ivato, and the Central Police Station.<sup>2573</sup> Our requirements for a planned violence against the government are met, as the attacks were clearly planned in advance and had either government targets or politically significant targets.

I did not code this as an attack on civilians, since the two “civilians” were security guards at the broadcasting station. This was a unique case because the target was privately owned but politically significant; the guards were employed by the president, even if not personally, and thus are not civilians in the conventional sense.

Evidently, the victims inquired who the attackers were and why they were there, and were subsequently shot.<sup>2574</sup> We can infer from this, and from the lack of declarations by the group regarding their existence and objectives, that the group was clandestine.

Five people were arrested. Investigators did not release names, but indicated that those arrested were members of the previous Ravalomanana. Despite the attacks occurring the same day as a change in military command at Mahamasina, the gendarmerie did not believe the events represented an internal power struggle.<sup>2575</sup> The attacks may have been aimed at derailing talks in Addis Ababa.<sup>2576</sup> However, the government has blamed opposition too often and with too little evidence to sufficiently implicate former regime members in this case. None were specifically named or arrested.

Since several perpetrators were arrested and there’s no evidence of additional activity, I assume this group was no longer viable after three years.

Due to the location of the attack in Antananarivo “rural” is coded as a “0.”

SCAD reports riots (5800055), violent protests (events 5800053, 5800055), nonviolent protests (5800057) in support of Ravalomamana (against Rajoelina) in preceding months.

SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and several instances of Type 2 contestation in the year preceding the group’s first and only attack on 19 July 2009. Because significant national and local contestation occurred after January 2009, the coder considers 19 July 2009 by the group to be the start date for the purposes of contestation variables to avoid overlooking relevant contestation context. Numerous riot and protest events of Event Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 occurred in Antananarivo, the same location in which group formation occurred. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Unidentified armed group (216MAG) – could not find any articles on this event.

Unidentified armed group (215MAG) – could not find any articles on this event.

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<sup>2571</sup> Ninaivo, “Antananarivo a Dormi Sous La Menace Du Terrorisme”; maherizo, “Série d’attaques Terroristes Ciblées à Antananarivo”; U. S. Embassy in Madagascar, “Human Rights Report: Madagascar,” United States Mission to Madagascar, December 4, 2012, <https://www.antananarivo.usembassy.gov/political-and-economical/human-rights-report.html>.

<sup>2572</sup> maherizo, “Série d’attaques Terroristes Ciblées à Antananarivo.”

<sup>2573</sup> Habibou Bangré, “La Grande Ile Aux Prises Avec Le Terrorisme,” *JeuneAfrique.Com*, July 20, 2009, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/187092/politique/la-grande-ile-aux-prises-avec-le-terrorisme/>; Ninaivo, “Antananarivo a Dormi Sous La Menace Du Terrorisme”; maherizo, “Série d’attaques Terroristes Ciblées à Antananarivo”; Iloniaina Alain, “Madagascar: Une Série de Tentatives d’attentats,” *L’Express de Madagascar*, July 20, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200907200732.html>.

<sup>2574</sup> maherizo, “Série d’attaques Terroristes Ciblées à Antananarivo.”

<sup>2575</sup> Bangré, “La Grande Ile Aux Prises Avec Le Terrorisme”; Alain, “Madagascar: Une Série de Tentatives d’attentats.”

<sup>2576</sup> Alain, “Madagascar: Une Série de Tentatives d’attentats.”

**Unidentified armed group (214MAG)** – could not find event exactly matching the description. Of the two closest matches (both on Sept. 22, death count doesn't match), one targeted a foreign national and one resulted from a private financial dispute.<sup>2577</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (193MAG)** – could not find any articles on this event.

**Unidentified armed group (192MAG)** – could not find any articles on this event.

**Unidentified armed group (191MAG)** – could not find any articles on this event.

**Unidentified armed group (185MAG)** – armed robberies resulted in deaths and injuries<sup>2578</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (186MAG)** – no event description, could not find any articles on this event.

**Unidentified armed group (180MAG, 181MAG)** – grenades targeted the local attorney-general (public prosecutor) Christian Rajaobelina and president of administrative chamber (head of appeals court) George Seraphen on 22 FEB 2005. There were no casualties and no knowledge of the perpetrators. Police are considering it an act of intimidation as the magistrates were currently on strike.<sup>2579</sup> Excluded, insufficient information.

**\*Unidentified armed group (Ankadilalana, July 2012)** – Gendarmerie unearths bomb stash group was planning to use to target commercial installations over business dispute.<sup>2580</sup>

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<sup>2577</sup> Teholy Martin, "Madagascar: Un Mort Lors d'une Fusillade Dans Un Hôtel," *L'Express de Madagascar*, September 24, 2007, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200709240642.html>; Teholy Martin, "Madagascar: Attaque à Main Armée Meurtrière," *L'Express de Madagascar*, September 24, 2007, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200709240641.html>.

<sup>2578</sup> Ro, "Madagascar: Toamasina : 3 Morts et 5 Blessés Dans 2 Attaques À Main Armée !," *Midi Madagasikara*, November 23, 2005, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200511230596.html>.

<sup>2579</sup> Nirina R, "Madagascar: Attentats : Des Magistrats Pour Cibles !," *Midi Madagasikara*, February 23, 2005, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200502230461.html>; "Madagascar Rocked by More Grenade Attacks," *L'Express.mu*, February 24, 2005, <https://www.lexpress.mu/article/madagascar-rocked-more-grenade-attacks>.

<sup>2580</sup> Seth Andriamarohasina, "Madagascar: Attentat - Découverte de 13 Bombes Artisanales," *AllAfrica.Fr*, July 2, 2012, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201207020490.html>.

## Malawi

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**Narrative Summary:** *Malawi's founding prime minister and president, Dr. Hastings Banda, was the dominant figure and dictator dominating the country's politics from its 1964 independence until his defeat in multiparty elections in 1994. The country has experienced several peaceful transitions from one ruling party to another since then with no insurgent activity of note.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *Virtually all ACLED events were related to either election-related violence or vigilante attacks targeting civilians rather than the state.*

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### AFORD: AD: Alliance for Democracy Militia

Opposition political party. Election-resulted violence and an attack against civilians, not the state. Excluded.

### Alimitambo Communal Militia (Malawi)

Only ACLED incident was a 2013 revenge attack on civilians (179MAW). Excluded.

### Anti-Mutharika Party

Opposition political group threatened by police in 2012 ACLED incident (149MAW). Excluded.

### Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

Ruling party from its creation in 2005 until President Bingu wa Mutharika died in 2012 and was succeeded by Vice President Joyce Banda, a former DPP member. ACLED incidents after the DPP's loss of the presidency were primarily election-related violence. Excluded.

### Muslim Militia (Malawi)

Group which attacked civilians in 2005 ACLED incident (211MAW) during a dispute over the Blantyre Islamic Mission's land. Excluded.

### Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP)

Youth wing of the Malawi Congress Party, the longtime ruling party which has been in opposition since the advent of multiparty rule in the early 1990s. Instigator of two 2003 ACLED attacks (62MAW, 63MAW) on political figures connected with a sex scandal. Excluded.

### National Democratic Alliance (NDA)

Opposition political party. ACLED events were primarily election-related violence and attacks against civilians, not the state. Excluded.

### People's Party (PP)

Ruling party at the time of its only ACLED event (189MAW), a 2014 election-resulted assault of an opposition aide. Excluded.

### United Democratic Front (UDF)

Ruling party at the time of the events in ACLED. Excluded.

#### **Vigilante Militia (Malawi)**

ACLED incidents almost all involve attacks on civilians. No attacks against state targets with intent to challenge the state. Excluded.

#### **Young Democrats**

Youth wing of ruling UDF at time of the events in ACLED. Excluded.



## Mali

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**Narrative Summary:** Mali has remained unstable throughout our period of interest and has experienced a great deal of violence, especially since 2012. Most of the violence in Mali is centered in Northern Mali due to conflict between the Malian government and the Tuareg people, the predominant ethnic group in Northern Mali, an area which they refer to as the Azawad. Since Mali gained independence from the French in 1960, Tuaregs have launched multiple rebellions to liberate the Azawad from control of the Malian government.

In 2012 Mali began to rapidly destabilize, marked by the formation of Movement National Pour la Liberation de L'Azawad (MNLA). MNLA, a Tuareg rebel group, began to launch an offensive against the Malian government in order to liberate the Azawad. They did this by attacking military bases in the Azawad and subsequently taking control of numerous cities in the Azawad. Moreover, in 2012 Mali saw a drastic increase in radical Islamism, and many Islamist rebel groups helped MNLA take control of the Azawad. The three main Islamist militant groups operating in the Azawad were Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, and Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de L'Oust (MUJAO).

On March 22, 2012, a military coup overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré who had been President for 10 years; the motivation for the coup came from disdain for Touré's inability to prevent rebel advancements in the Azawad. The instability caused by the coup and help from Islamist rebel groups led MNLA to declare an independent Azawad on April 6, 2012. However, shortly thereafter the Islamist rebel groups broke their alliance with MNLA to take control of the Azawad and implement Sharia law. Between April 2012 and January 2013, the Islamists had clear control of almost the entire Azawad, save the Kidal region which was controlled by MNLA.

This period saw the rise of many self-defense militias that were protecting their cities/communities from rebel takeover. Since the Islamists had clear control of the Azawad and were the de-facto state, we considered self-defense militias fighting Islamists during this time period to be rebel groups; similarly, if a self-defense militia was fighting MNLA in Kidal where they were the de facto authority, then that self-defense militia was coded as a rebel group. These coding decisions only resulted in the inclusion of one self-defense militia, Front National de Libération de L'Azawad/Mouvement Arabe De l'Azawad (FNLA/MAA) who were fighting against MNLA over control of Kidal, in the dataset.

On January 11, 2013, France launched Operation Serval to recapture northern territory from the Islamists, due to Islamists' advance towards the capital. Although the French were successful in their mission, Islamist and Tuareg rebels alike continued to attack government forces/establishments.

Throughout the rebellion, the Malian government held numerous peace negotiations with the Tuareg rebels, namely MNLA and Haut Conseil pour L'Unité de L'Azawad (HCUA), but never the Islamists. One such negotiation led to the Ouagadougou Agreement in June 2013, which paved the way for democratic presidential elections and future negotiations. Nevertheless, the government was never able to achieve sustained peace with the Tuareg rebels, who by 2014 had coalesced into Coordination des Mouvement de L'Azawad (CMA); this coalition is mirrored by a pro-government coalition, Platform, which is composed of groups who receive funding from the state, such as GATIA, and others that simply favor the state over the separatists; their attacks against CMA are spearheaded by Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Allies (GATIA); The Malian government, CMA, and Platform have held peace negotiations on numerous occasions, culminating in the most recent Algiers Agreement of 2015. However, this agreement has not been realized, and violence continues to rain over Northern Mali.

*It should also be noted that there has been a large increase of violence in central/southern Mali between individuals of the Dogon ethnic group, predominantly farmers, and the Fulani ethnic group, predominantly semi-nomadic herders. Both sides accuse each other of abuses, including physical abuse and destruction of land. One rebel group that was coded, Front pour la Libération du Macina (FLM), is an Islamist-Fulani group, however they are more focused on implementing Sharia law despite some attacks against Dogon farmers.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: High**

**Explanation:** *We excluded many self-defense militias who claimed to be fighting the rebels/de-facto state from our dataset for two main reasons. First, there was often a lack of evidence surrounding specific attacks linked to these groups, which implied non-violent goals (see FLN and CMFPR); second, there were numerous self-defense militias where no supporting details could be found regarding their formation, goals, attacks, or personnel. Therefore, it is possible that any of these groups could have counted as rebel groups, but due to lack of information, the coder excluded them. In summation, the coder felt confident that their research, and ACLED, identified the universe of potential rebel groups in Mali, however the lack of information surrounding some of the named groups led the coder to exclude them.*

*Compared to other countries in ACLED, Mali did not have many unidentified armed groups, and those that were cited often involved the use of advanced weaponry such as suicide bombings, landmines, and rockets. While the coder felt confident that ACLED documented rebel groups in Mali well, there were also several community or ethnic militias that were not named in ACLED. It is possible that these community or ethnic militias were defending themselves against rebel groups in a territory that the rebels governed; in this case, it is possible that they may qualify as rebel groups, however, not enough information was found to include or exclude these community militias.*

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**ADC: ALLIANCE DEMOCRATIQUE DU 23MAI POUR LE CHANGEMENT**

AKA: Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change; May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change; 23 May Democratic Alliance for Change; Democratic Alliance for Change May 23

The ADC was a Tuareg rebel group operating in the Kidal Region led by Hassan Ag Fagaga, Iyad Ag Ghaly,<sup>2581</sup> and Ibrahim Ag Bahanga; all three of these leaders were prominent rebels in the Tuareg rebellion in the early-mid 1990's.<sup>2582</sup> The demand of the group was the full implementation of the National Pact of 1992, a peace agreement between the Malian government and rebel groups (most of whom were Tuareg rebel groups) that was never fully realized; the most important pieces of the agreement for the ADC was economic development for the Northern regions, more autonomy for Northern regions, and the designation of a special status for Kidal.<sup>2583</sup> The group claims that these demands were made known to the Malian government beginning in February 2006, and hence why ADC is coded as forming in February 2006 rather than May 2006.<sup>2584</sup> The government's failure to comply with their demands led to the first attack by ADC on May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2006 where they raided military barracks in Kidal and Ménaka, subsequently killing

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<sup>2581</sup> Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement* (RAND Corporation, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR892>.

<sup>2582</sup> "Government of Mali - ATNMC," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/802/4#/exploratory>.

Baba Ahmed, "Mali : Cinq Personnalités à La Tête Des Autorités Intérimaires Du Nord – Jeune Afrique," JeuneAfrique.com, April 24, 2017, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/432066/politique/mali-cinq-personnalites-a-tete-autorites-interimaires-nord/>.

<sup>2583</sup> Pezard and Shurkin, *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali*.

<sup>2584</sup> "The Peace," *Azawad-Union* (blog), May 29, 2006, <http://azawad-union.blogspot.com/2006/05/>.

2 government officials.<sup>2585</sup> Following the attack, the group initiated negotiations with the government, culminating in the Algiers Agreement signed on July 4, 2006, which led to the disbanding of the group on March 12, 2007 when they symbolically surrendered their arms to the Malian government.<sup>2586</sup>

There are some coding decisions that require clarification. First, the “former\_rebels” variable is coded as “1” due to Fagaga’s, Ghaly’s, and Bahanga’s membership in Mouvement Populaire De Libération de L’Azawad.<sup>2587</sup>

Second, the “current\_security” variable is coded as “1” because Fagaga was a member of the Malian National Guard in 2006 until he deserted to become a leader of ADC.<sup>2588</sup>

Third, the “clandestine variable” is coded as unknown because although there was a gap of three months between group formation and first attack, it is unknown if the group made clear their intentions to launch attacks if their demands were not met.

#### **\* Alliance Democratique Du 23Mai Pour Le Changement -Ibrahim Bahanga Faction (ADC-IB)**

AKA: Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change-Ibrahim Bahanga Faction

This group was formed by Ibrahim Bahanga and a number of ADC members that rejected the Algiers agreement of 2006. This group is not included in our dataset because it is a splinter group of ADC.<sup>2589</sup>

#### **Al Mulathamun**

AKA: El Moulathamoune

This group was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar after he splintered from AQIM in 2012 due to disagreements with some AQIM leaders.<sup>2590</sup> This group is not counted in our dataset because it is a splinter group of AQIM.

#### **Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**

This group was originally the GSPC, splinter group of GIA, and then later formed an official alliance with Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2006.<sup>2591</sup> We are not including AQIM in our dataset because it is originally a splinter group, and it is now a sub-group that is controlled by a mother group (in this case Al-Qaeda).

#### **\* Alliance des Communautés de la Région de Tombouctou (ACRT)**

AKA: The Alliance of Communities in the Region of Timbuktu

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<sup>2585</sup> Mark Mullenbach, “25. Mali/Tauregs (1960-Present),” accessed June 1, 2020,

<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/malitauregs-1960-present/>.

<sup>2586</sup> Baz Lecocq, *Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali*, 1st ed., vol. 19, Afrika-Studiecentrum Ser. (Brill, 2010) 397,

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=593753>.

<sup>2587</sup> Ahmed, “Mali.”

Andrew McGregor, “Ibrahim Ag Bahanga: Tuareg Rebel Turns Counterterrorist?,” Aberfoyle Security, March 31, 2010, <https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2773>.

<sup>2588</sup> Ahmed, “Mali.”

<sup>2589</sup> “ATNMC,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/523>.

<sup>2590</sup> “Al Mourabitoun,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-mourabitoun>.

<sup>2591</sup> “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed June 1, 2020, [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/aqim#text\\_block\\_18762](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/aqim#text_block_18762).

This is one of the six self-defense groups that formed the RPF.<sup>2592</sup> Not enough information could be found on this group and it is therefore excluded from our dataset. Additional research using local sources would be desirable.

#### Alliance Touareg Nord Mali Pour le Changement (ATNMC)

AKA: Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change

This Ibrahim-Bahanga led group formed after the alliance between ADC-IB and MNJ ended (soon after it began), effectively ending the Niger-Mali group alliance.<sup>2593</sup> However, this group is not included in our dataset because after the end of the alliance, the remaining fighters were of the original ADC-IB, a splinter group.

However, it should be noted that this group was responsible for almost all the violence that occurred in Mali during the third Tuareg rebellion from 2006-2009.<sup>2594</sup>

#### \*ATNMC: ALLIANCE TOUAREGUE NIGER-MALI POUR LE CHANGEMENT

AKA: Alliance Tuareg Niger-Mali; Tuareg Niger Mali Alliance; Tuareg Niger Mali Alliance for Change;

This group formed as a merger between ADC-IB and the Niger-based group Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) in July 2007. This group is not included in our dataset because it is a merger of an already included rebel group (see MNJ in Niger) and a splinter group.<sup>2595</sup>

#### Ansar Dine

AKA: Harakat Ansar Al-Dine; Ansar Al-Dine; Ansar Al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Ansar ud-Dine; Defenders of the Faith

Ansar Dine was a Tuareg rebel group led by Iyad Ag-Ghali (aka Iyad Ag-Ghaly), a seasoned Tuareg rebel and former leader of MPLA and ADC;<sup>2596</sup> Ag-Ghali formed Ansar Dine sometime around December 2011 after he his request for a leadership position by MNLA was rejected due to his ambition to establish Sharia law throughout Mali, contrary to MNLA's secularist goals.<sup>2597</sup> Within the first year of its formation, Ag-Ghali began to recruit Islamists from around the region,<sup>2598</sup> increasing its original 40-member group to around 300 in April-May 2012, and close to 1000 by early 2013.<sup>2599</sup> It should be noted that there are a few sources that claim Ansar Dine formed in November 2011,<sup>2600</sup> which would coincide with the weeks following the initial MNLA meetings; however, the majority of sources, including the United Nations, indicate the group formed in December 2011, which is why Ansar Dine is coded for having formed in December 2011.

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<sup>2592</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Mali : Information Sur Le Front de Libération Des Régions Du Nord (FLN) [Aussi Appelé Forces de Libération Des Régions Du Nord, Front de Libération Du Nord et Front de Libération Nationale], y Compris Leurs Activités; Liens Avec Les Songhaïs; Traitement Réservé Par L'État Aux Membres Du Groupe Ainsi Qu'aux Personnes d'origine Songhaïe

<sup>2593</sup> Lecocq, *Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali*, 399.

<sup>2594</sup> Lecocq, 399.

<sup>2595</sup> Lecocq 398-399.

<sup>2596</sup> Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, *Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara* (Washington DC, United States: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 94.

<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=1164046>.

<sup>2597</sup> William Lloyd-George, "The Man Who Brought the Black Flag to Timbuktu," *Foreign Policy* (blog), October 22, 2012, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/22/the-man-who-brought-the-black-flag-to-timbuktu/>.

<sup>2598</sup> Lloyd-George.

<sup>2599</sup> "Ansar Dine," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/1157/0#generalinformation>.

<sup>2600</sup> Solomon, Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa*, (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan), 69.

Initially, Ansar Dine conquered territory in northern Mali alongside MNLA, including its first large attack on January 24, 2012 in which Ansar Dine and MNLA attacked a military base in Aguelhok resulting in the death of at least 128 soldiers.<sup>2601</sup> However, once the MNLA declared the secular independence of the Azawad on April 6, 2012,<sup>2602</sup> Ansar Dine began an armed conflict against the group and its secularist beliefs;<sup>2603</sup> this inter-rebel conflict culminated with Ansar Dine forcibly removing MNLA from Gao, where they had established their government offices, in June 2012.<sup>2604</sup>

On March 2, 2017 Ansar Dine merged with several rebel groups to form Jammāt Nusrat al-Islām wal Muslīmīn (JNIM), officially ending the independent group, Ansar Dine.<sup>2605</sup> However, up until then Ansar Dine was still launching attacks against the state,<sup>2606</sup> and therefore their “viable” and “viable\_merge” variable are coded as “1”

There are a number of coding decisions that warrant clarification. First, Ansar Dine enjoyed extensive military and financial support from AQIM since its conception, including some AQIM fighters joining Ansar Dine and a payment of 400,000 euros to Iyad Ag-Ghali from an AQIM leader; hence, the “other” variable in sources of funding is coded as “1”<sup>2607</sup> Though never confirmed, it is rumored that Ansar Dine also received funding from Qatar.<sup>2608</sup>

Second, Ansar Dine’s small attack is coded as February 2012 because in and around that month they participated in attacks on Tinzawaten, Aguelhok, and Kidal. Therefore, their first small attacks is likely to have occurred during those attacks. It should be noted that Ansar Dine’s first large attack occurred in late January 2012, however, the coder could only code this date as the large attack date and not the small attack date as well.

Third, Ansar Dine is coded as having an unknown location of formation. However, it is clear that Ag-Ghali was denied leadership in the initial MNLA meetings and subsequently formed Ansar Dine; since the initial MNLA meetings took place in a rural area, it is likely that Ansar Dine was also formed in a rural area, but such evidence is absent.

Fourth, Ansar Dine has attacked UN peacekeepers on multiple occasions,<sup>2609</sup> however this does not count as a civilian attack because the peacekeepers’ mission is to help the state regain control of the territory,<sup>2610</sup> making them effectively an arm/target of the state. Nonetheless, on July 30<sup>th</sup>, 2012, Islamists stoned a couple to death, in the town of Aguelhok, due to accusations that the couple had children outside of marriage.<sup>2611</sup> We attributed this civilian attack to Ansar Dine because they were the Islamist group that took control of Aguelhok in March 2012.<sup>2612</sup>

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<sup>2601</sup> “Investigating ‘massacre’ of Soldiers in Mali,” Al Jazeera, April 24, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/04/20134242218374249.html>.

<sup>2602</sup> Bate Felix, “Mali Rebels Declare Independent ‘Azawad,’” *Reuters*, April 6, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406>.

<sup>2603</sup> “Ansar Dine.”

<sup>2604</sup> “Government of Mali - Ansar Dine,” accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/11986/4>.

<sup>2605</sup> “Ansar Dine.”

<sup>2606</sup> “Ansar Dine,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed August 20, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-dine>.

<sup>2607</sup> “ANSAR EDDINE,” United Nations Security Council, accessed June 1, 2020, [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/ansar-eddine](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/ansar-eddine).

<sup>2608</sup> “Ansar Dine.”

<sup>2609</sup> “Ansar Dine.”

<sup>2610</sup> Kevin Sieff, “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission,” *Washington Post*, February 17, 2017, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/>.

<sup>2611</sup> Adam Nossiter, “Islamists in North Mali Stone Couple to Death - The New York Times,” *New York Times*, July 30, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/world/africa/couple-stoned-to-death-by-islamists-in-mali.html>.

<sup>2612</sup> Bill Roggio, “US, UN Add Ansar Dine to List of Terror Groups | FDD’s Long War Journal,” March 21, 2013, [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/us\\_adds\\_ansar\\_dine\\_t.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/us_adds_ansar_dine_t.php).



Fifth, the “current rebels” variable is coded as “1” because Alghabass Ag Intalla, the political chief of Ansar Dine,<sup>2613</sup> was a member of MNLA before joining Ansar Dine.<sup>2614</sup> Furthermore, the “former rebels” variable is coded as “1” due to Iyad Ag Ghali’s membership in MPLA and ADC. Similarly, the “current\_government” variable is coded as “1” because Ag Ghali was a consular official in the Malian embassy in Saudi Arabia in 2007.<sup>2615</sup>

Sixth, the earliest reference to Ansar Dine was a December 20, 2011 article citing the establishment of Ansar Dine.<sup>2616</sup>

The rural town of Kidal is used for coding “rural” variable because this is where Ansar Dine had its headquarters.<sup>2617</sup> It is coded as a “1.”

Last, there was no evidence found of contestation in the one year prior to Ansar Dine’s formation and therefore the contestation variables are coded as “0.”

#### **\* Centre de Réflexion et D’action (CRA)**

AKA: Centre for Reflection and Action

This is one of the six self-defense groups that formed the RPF.<sup>2618</sup> Not enough information could be found on this group to determine if it was a rebellion and it is therefore excluded from our dataset. Additional research using local sources would be desirable.

#### **\*Coalition du Peuple pour L’Azawad (CPA)**

AKA: Coalition of the People of Azawad

This group announced its creation on March 18, 2014 as a dissident group of MNLA.<sup>2619</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a splinter group of MNLA.

#### **Coordination des Mouvement de L’Azawad (CMA)**

AKA: Coordination of Movements for the Azawad

CMA formed as a rebel group specifically targeting the state on April 27<sup>th</sup>, 2015 after government forces attacked the town of Menaka on the same day.<sup>2620</sup> However, the group itself formed on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2014 as a merger between MNLA, HCUA, and MAA-D. This group is not included in our dataset because the majority of groups in its merger are already rebel groups.

#### **Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance II (CMFPR II)**

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<sup>2613</sup> “Ansar Dine,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed August 20, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-dine>.

<sup>2614</sup> L. Touchard, B. Ahmed, and Ch. Ouzani, “Mali : Iyad Ag Ghali, Rebelle Dans l’âme,” *JeuneAfrique.Com*, October 2, 2012, sec. News (General), <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/139884/politique/mali-iyad-ag-ghali-rebelle-dans-l-me/>.

<sup>2615</sup> Lloyd-George, “The Man Who Brought the Black Flag to Timbuktu.”

<sup>2616</sup> “A New Tuareg Islamist Group in Northern Mali Is Probably a Government-Backed Attempt to Draw off Islamist Support from AQIM.,” *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, December 20, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020151130e7ck0053i&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2617</sup> “Mali: France Pledges ‘short’ Campaign against Islamists,” *BBC News*, January 14, 2013, sec. Europe, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21007517>.

<sup>2618</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Mali : Information Sur Le Front de Libération Des Régions Du Nord (FLN) [Aussi Appelé Forces de Libération Des Régions Du Nord, Front de Libération Du Nord et Front de Libération Nationale], y Compris Leurs Activités; Liens Avec Les Songhaïs; Traitement Réservé Par l’État Aux Membres Du Groupe Ainsi Qu’aux Personnes d’origine Songhaïe

<sup>2619</sup> “Déclaration de Création de La Coalition Du Peuple Pour L’Azawad (CPA),” maliactu, March 24, 2014, <https://maliactu.net/declaration-de-creation-de-la-coalition-du-peuple-pour-lazawad-cpa/>.

<sup>2620</sup> “CMA: Communiqué No. 7-CMA-4-2015,” Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad, April 28, 2015, <http://www.mnlamov.net/actualites/434-cma-communique-n-7-cma-4-2015.html>.



AKA: Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements II

This group formed as a breakaway from CMFPR I in January 2014 due to leadership disagreements. CMFPR II consequently joined CMA; this group is excluded from our dataset because there is no indication that they truly supported autonomy or advocated for violence, rather they wanted to remain represented at peace negotiations.<sup>2621</sup>

### Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance III (CMFPR III)

AKA: Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements III

This group formed as a breakaway from CMFPR II due to clan disputes and rejoined CMFPR I in May 2015.<sup>2622</sup> This group is not included in our dataset because there is no evidence to suggest that between the time it broke from CMFPR II and joined again with CMFPR I, the leaders of CMFPR III had any interest in being an independent group.

### \*Force Armée Contre L'Occupation (FACO)

AKA: The Armed Force Against the Occupation

This is one of the six self-defense groups that formed the RPF.<sup>2623</sup> Not enough information could be found on this group and it is therefore excluded from our dataset. Additional research using local sources would be desirable.

### \*Forces de Libération des Régions Nord du Mali (FLN)

AKA: Liberation Forces of the Northern Regions

This group formed in 2012 as a self-defense group fighting to liberate Northern Mali from control of the rebels.<sup>2624</sup> Two of its leaders, Amadou Mallé and Moussa Maïga were former Malian soldiers, and clearly stated the need to liberate the North through violence, not dialogue.<sup>2625</sup> This group is believed to have between 700-1600 fighters, with bases in Gao region, Timbuktu, and Mopti.<sup>2626</sup> Although there are clear stated goals of violence, evidence of recruitment and training bases, we have decided to ultimately exclude this group from our dataset for the following reasons:

No evidence, both in ACLED and while researching, was found pointing to any violent attack, or concrete plan of violence, linked with this group. We determined that this lack of evidence suggests that the group armed itself and advocated for violence in order to be recognized by the state as a viable threat to peace; by being recognized as a formidable source, FLN hoped that it would be invited to negotiate during peace talks in which they can advocate for

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<sup>2621</sup> Ibrahim Maïga, "Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the Labels," June 2016, 12, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf>.

<sup>2622</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern Mali,"

<sup>2623</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Mali : Information Sur Le Front de Libération Des Régions Du Nord (FLN) [Aussi Appelé Forces de Libération Des Régions Du Nord, Front de Libération Du Nord et Front de Libération Nationale], y Compris Leurs Activités; Liens Avec Les Songhaïs; Traitement Réservé Par l'État Aux Membres Du Groupe Ainsi Qu'aux Personnes d'origine Songhaïe

<sup>2624</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Mali : Information Sur Le Front de Libération Des Régions Du Nord (FLN) [Aussi Appelé Forces de Libération Des Régions Du Nord, Front de Libération Du Nord et Front de Libération Nationale], y Compris Leurs Activités; Liens Avec Les Songhaïs; Traitement Réservé Par l'État Aux Membres Du Groupe Ainsi Qu'aux Personnes d'origine Songhaïe (2014-Juillet 2016)," Refworld, July 5, 2016, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/598c71694.html>.

<sup>2625</sup> "Camps de Volontaires de Mopti : CE SONT LES ARMES QUI MANQUENT LE PLUS (1)," maliactu, July 25, 2012, <https://maliactu.net/camps-de-volontaires-de-mopti-ce-sont-les-armes-qui-manquent-le-plus-1/>.

<sup>2626</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Mali : Information Sur Le Front de Libération Des Régions Du Nord (FLN) [Aussi Appelé Forces de Libération Des Régions Du Nord, Front de Libération Du Nord et Front de Libération Nationale], y Compris Leurs Activités; Liens Avec Les Songhaïs; Traitement Réservé Par l'État Aux Membres Du Groupe Ainsi Qu'aux Personnes d'origine Songhaïe

their community's interests. This strategy is bolstered by the fact that shortly after FLN's formation they coalesced with many other self-defense militias to form CMFPR: a bigger force, again with no attacks, yet increasingly likely to be invited to peace negotiations due to their size and threat they pose.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that this group launched attacks that simply did not get noticed by international or local media. For example, MAA, another self-defense militia, launched many attacks in remote areas of Mali yet they were covered/recognized extensively in the media and by their enemies alike.

In summation, because there is no evidence of FLN launching or planning any attacks, we determined that their true interests lay in being represented at peace negotiations and therefore do not have earnest intentions to commit violence.

#### **Forces Patriotiques de Résistance (FPR)**

AKA: Patriotic Resistance Forces; RPF; Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements; CMFPR; CMFPR I

This group formed on July 21, 2012 as a merger between Ganda Koy, Ganda Iso, FLN, ACRT, FACO, and CRA in order to liberate the North from the rebels.<sup>2627</sup> Although this group clearly stated goals to violently challenge the rebel stronghold of the North, we have excluded it from our dataset for the following reasons:

No evidence, both in ACLED and while researching, was found pointing to an attack linked with this group. We determined that this lack of evidence suggests that the group armed itself and advocated for violence in order to be recognized by the state as a viable threat to peace; by being recognized as a formidable threat, CMFPR hoped that it would be invited to negotiate during peace talks in which they can advocate for their community's interests. This strategy is bolstered by the fact that many self-defense militias formed CMFPR: a bigger force, again with no attacks, yet increasingly likely to be invited to peace negotiations due to their size and threat they pose.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that this group launched attacks that simply did not get noticed by international or local media. For example, MAA, another self-defense militia, launched many attacks in remote areas of Mali yet they were covered/recognized extensively in the media and by their enemies alike. Moreover, GATIA, another self-defense militia, launched numerous attacks against MNLA and the CMA, and these were well documented by media, rebels, and ACLED.

In summation, because there is no evidence of CMFPR launching any attacks, we determined that their true interests lay in being represented at peace negotiations and therefore do not have earnest intentions to commit violence.

#### **Front National de Libération de L'Azawad (FNLA)**

AKA: National Liberation Front; National Liberation Front of Azawad; FLNA; Mouvement Arabe De l'Azawad (MAA); Arab Movement of Azawad

FNLA is the official name for an Arab ethnic self-defense militia in Timbuktu that announced its name and creation on April 8, 2012 after the fall of Timbuktu to rebels, both Ansar Dine and MNLA.<sup>2628</sup> Upon its creation, the military commander for the FNLA claimed that the group had 500 fighters and the necessary resources to fight;<sup>2629</sup> most of its members come from

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<sup>2627</sup> "Les « Forces Patriotiques de Résistance » Annoncent La Reconquête Du Nord Du Mali," RFI, July 21, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20120721-forces-patriotiques-resistance-annoncent-reconquete-nord-mali-gao>.

<sup>2628</sup> Bate Felix and Adama Diarra, "New North Mali Arab Force Seeks to 'Defend' Timbuktu," Reuters, April 9, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-north-idUSBRE8380MB20120409>.

<sup>2629</sup> "Mali: Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé Dans Le Nord," Europe 1, April 8, 2012, <https://www.europe1.fr/international/Mali-nouveau-groupe-arme-cree-dans-le-Nord-799488>.

the Berabiche and Kounta Arab tribes.<sup>2630</sup> On April 27, 2012 FNLA took control over the majority of Timbuktu.<sup>2631</sup>

In June 2012 during a Berabiche community meeting, FNLA leaders were criticized for willingly handing over control of Timbuktu to AQIM as well as being called out for known drug-trafficking activities.<sup>2632</sup> The leaders criticized were most likely Oumar Ould Ahmed, Dina Ould Daya, Moulay Ahmed, and Mohamed Lamine Ould Sidatt: the first three are wealthy businessmen known in the cannabis resin smuggling industry who handed over Timbuktu to AQIM directly preceding FNLA's founding;<sup>2633</sup> the fourth individual was the first named Secretary General of FNLA.<sup>2634</sup> These meetings led to a name change from FNLA to MAA and changes in leadership.<sup>2635</sup> Though unconfirmed, these leadership changes most likely included the appointments of individuals willing to publicly denounce cooperation with Islamists in the region, a concern of the Berabiche community leaders;<sup>2636</sup> one such leader could be Boubacar Ould Talib who publicly suggested that it was illogical to cooperate with the Islamists in February 2013;<sup>2637</sup> Talib is a known leader of MAA, but it is unclear if he was appointed as such during the leadership changes.

Despite initial public statements that advocated for peace, MAA attacked MNLA at its base in In-Khalil on February 23, 2013,<sup>2638</sup> and then followed up with subsequent attacks in Tessalit.<sup>2639</sup> These two cities are in the Kidal region, which MNLA has clear control over and is hence the de facto state in the region,<sup>2640</sup> which is why this is not considered inter-rebel conflict, but rather MAA challenging the authority of the state. The attack on In-Khalil was twofold. First, the MAA accused MNLA of abusing Arabs in the region;<sup>2641</sup> second, In-Khalil represents a key strategic position in drug-smuggling routes, which is how MAA mainly finances its operations.<sup>2642</sup>

Regional fighting between the MAA and MNLA continued until the MAA split in June 2014; one faction joined "The Platform," a pro-government coalition, and one faction joined the

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<sup>2630</sup> "Guide to Post-Conflict Mali," C4ADS, August 25, 2013, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/56af8ac2b209430ed4794712/1454344904029/Guide+to+Post-Conflict+Mali.pdf>.

<sup>2631</sup> "New Armed Group Takes Control of Timbuktu," *Agence France Presse*, April 27, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020120427e84r005kg&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2632</sup> Wehrey and Boukhars, *Perilous Desert*, 77.

<sup>2633</sup> Wehrey and Boukhars, 77.

<sup>2634</sup> Mali: Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé Dans Le Nord" April 8, 2012.

<sup>2635</sup> Mali: Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé Dans Le Nord" April 8, 2012.

<sup>2636</sup> "Mali: La Communauté Arabe s'oppose Aux Groupes Islamistes," RFI, June 5, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20120605-mali-arabe-tombouctou-aqmi-ansar-dine-mnla-fnla-mauritanie-dicko-ua-yayi>.

<sup>2637</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "French Cooperation with Tuareg Rebels Risks Arab Rising in Northern Mali," Refworld, March 8, 2013, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/513d9e922.html>.

<sup>2638</sup> "Mali: Ce Que l'on Sait Des Affrontements Entre Touaregs et Groupes Armés à Il Khalil," RFI, February 23, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20130223-mali-incertitudes-affrontements-touaregs-groupes-armes-il-khalil-mnla-maa-mujao-tchad-hollande>.

<sup>2639</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "French Cooperation with Tuareg Rebels Risks Arab Rising in Northern Mali,"

<sup>2640</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "French Cooperation with Tuareg Rebels Risks Arab Rising in Northern Mali,"

<sup>2641</sup> "Mali: Ce Que l'on Sait Des Affrontements Entre Touaregs et Groupes Armés à Il Khalil," RFI

<sup>2642</sup> "Mali: Ce Que l'on Sait Des Affrontements Entre Touaregs et Groupes Armés à Il Khalil," RFI

rebel CMA coalition (which included MNLA),<sup>2643</sup> it is rumored that this split was directly related to conflict regarding the control of drug-smuggling routes amongst its leaders.<sup>2644</sup>

FNLA's first civilian attack is coded as an attack perpetrated by CMA on October 8, 2016 when they opened fire on a village, wounding 3 and abducting many others.<sup>2645</sup>

The coder coded FNLA, "1", for the "current\_security" variable because its first military commander, Houssein Khoulam, was a defected Malian lieutenant-colonel.<sup>2646</sup>

The coder coded FNLA, "1", for the "former\_rebel" variable because Secretary General Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed, the second secretary general of FNLA, was a member of the rebel group FIAA which existed before 1997.<sup>2647</sup>

The coder coded FNLA, "1," for the "former\_govt" variable because Secretary General Mohamed Lamine Ould Sidatt was the mayor of Ber, in Timbuktu.<sup>2648</sup>

FNLA is coded as viable due to CMA offensives against the state 3+ years after HCUA's formation.<sup>2649</sup> The "viable\_merge" and "viable\_splinter" variables are coded as "1" because of a splinter of FNLA merging into CMA.

SCAD recorded a qualifying local protest in 2011/2012.

The "clandestine" variable is coded as "1" because there was a substantial gap between group formation and their first attack, and during that gap the group ostensibly advocated for peace.

The large attack variables are coded as not applicable because no large attack was found that was perpetrated by FNLA or CMA. The large attack variables are coded as not applicable rather than unknown because CMA was very well documented, and the coder determined that a large attack would have been detected; similarly, the coder determined that a large attack would have been detected for FNLA prior to its merger, which it was not.

Last, FNLA initially advocated for non-secessionist goals and defense from armed groups,<sup>2650</sup> therefore, none of the initial goal variables are coded as "1."

#### Front pour la Libération du Macina (FLM)

AKA: Macina Liberation Front, MLF, Katibat Macina, Katiba Macina

This group was led and formed by Amadou Kouffa, a radical preacher from the central region of Mopti in Mali.<sup>2651</sup> In 2012, Kouffa joined Ansar Dine and its offensive in the Azawad; during his membership he was mentored by Iyad Ag Ghali, the well-known Tuareg rebel, Islamist, and founder of Ansar Dine.<sup>2652</sup> After Kouffa and the other Islamist rebels were ousted

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<sup>2643</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern Mali," The Jamestown Foundation, January 27, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/anarchy-azawad-guide-non-state-armed-groups-northern-mali/>.

<sup>2644</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern Mali,"

<sup>2645</sup> "Tracking Conflict Worldwide," Crisis Group, accessed August 24, 2020, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/print>.

<sup>2646</sup> Mali: Nouveau Groupe Armé Créé Dans Le Nord" April 8, 2012.

<sup>2647</sup> "Cable: 08BAMAKO623\_a," Wikileaks, July 3, 2008, [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAMAKO623\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAMAKO623_a.html).

<sup>2648</sup> Paul N'guessan, "Tombouctou : Mohamed Lamine Ould Sidatt, Maire de Ber et Chef Du FNLA," *Maliweb*, April 30, 2012, <https://www.maliweb.net/insecurite/tombouctou-mohamed-lamine-ould-sidatt-maire-de-ber-et-chef-du-fnla-63664.html>.

<sup>2649</sup> "Tracking Conflict Worldwide."

<sup>2650</sup> "Guide to Post-Conflict Mali."

<sup>2651</sup> Pauline Le Roux, "Confronting Central Mali's Extremist Threat," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 22, 2019, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-central-malis-extremist-threat/>.

<sup>2652</sup> Le Roux.

form their strongholds by the French Operation Serval in January 2013,<sup>2653</sup> it is likely he began to recruit followers for the formation of FLM.

Kouffa recruited members through two main channels. First, he was able to attract rebels from previous Islamist groups such as MUJAO and Al-Murabitun.<sup>2654</sup> Second, and more significantly, Kouffa recruited many fighters from the Peul/Fulani people, a semi-nomadic ethnic group of herders to which he belongs.<sup>2655</sup>

Kouffa recruited Fulani fighters in multiple ways. First, he was able to offer incentives such as money and weapons training.<sup>2656</sup> Second, he exploited the ethnic tensions between the Peul/Fulani herders, and the Dogon farmers in central Mali;<sup>2657</sup> these tensions include farm expansion by the Dogon into Fulani pastoral lands, unequal distribution of resources from the government,<sup>2658</sup> and feelings of abandonment from the government including compensation to those who have stolen their lands and non-representation in peace talks.<sup>2659</sup> Kouffa's message resonated with the Fulani and their feeling of oppression, and subsequently turned them towards his radical religious/political goal: the return of the Macina Empire.<sup>2660</sup> This was a Peul, Islamic empire that ruled in central Mali from 1818-1862, and which many Peul consider the Golden Age of their ethnic group.<sup>2661</sup> It is unclear if Kouffa truly wanted the restoration of the Macina Empire, or rather used this as a recruiting tactic in his quest to establish Sharia law. Given Kouffa's ties to other Islamist groups in the region seeking to establish Sharia law,<sup>2662</sup> the coder felt more confidently that Kouffa was interested in Sharia law rather than the revival of the Macina Empire; hence, the "goal\_take" variable is coded as "1" and the "goal\_secession" variable is coded as "0." Kouffa utilized his great talent to communicate via radio in order to recruit the Fulani,<sup>2663</sup> delivering sermons<sup>2664</sup> and having cassettes of those sermons sold in the markets;<sup>2665</sup> These efforts were well documented as early as January 2015,<sup>2666</sup> and a November 2015 article cites FLM's membership to be anywhere between a couple hundred to 4,000 fighters.<sup>2667</sup>

FLM is coded as having an unknown date of formation because there was no evidence about concrete meetings for plans to establish the group. Moreover, Kouffa is the only founder of this group and could have recruited membership for this group from the time the North was re-controlled by the French in early 2013 until the group's first attack on January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2015. I coded

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<sup>2653</sup> "France in Mali: A Year of Hunting Jihadists in West Africa," France 24, January 11, 2014, <https://www.france24.com/en/20140111-france-mali-military-intervention-operation-serval-anniversary-timeline>.

<sup>2654</sup> Le Roux, "Confronting Central Mali's Extremist Threat."

<sup>2655</sup> "Speaking with the 'Bad Guys': Toward Dialogue with Central Mali's Jihadists," International Crisis Group, May 28, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/276-speaking-bad-guys-toward-dialogue-central-malis-jihadists>.

<sup>2656</sup> "Speaking with the 'Bad Guys.'"

<sup>2657</sup> "Speaking with the 'Bad Guys.'"

<sup>2658</sup> "Speaking with the 'Bad Guys.'"

<sup>2659</sup> Le Roux, "Confronting Central Mali's Extremist Threat."

<sup>2660</sup> Jacob Zenn, "The Sahel's Militant 'Melting Pot': Hamadou Kouffa's Macina Liberation Front (FLM)," The Jamestown Foundation, November 13, 2015, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-sahels-militant-melting-pot-hamadou-kouffas-macina-liberation-front-flm/>.

<sup>2661</sup> "Speaking with the 'Bad Guys.'"

<sup>2662</sup> Zenn, "The Sahel's Militant 'Melting Pot.'"

<sup>2663</sup> Zenn.

<sup>2664</sup> Conor Gaffey, "Mali Hotel Attack: What Is the Macina Liberation Front, Mali's Boko Haram," Newsweek, November 24, 2015, <https://www.newsweek.com/mali-hotel-attack-who-are-macina-liberation-front-malis-boko-haram-397727>.

<sup>2665</sup> "Government of Mali - FLM," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/14610/4#2015>.

<sup>2666</sup> "Mali: Macina Empire," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed August 20, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/13611/1>.

<sup>2667</sup> Zenn, "The Sahel's Militant 'Melting Pot.'"

the “planning\_inside” variable as missing because it is possible Kouffa had hid in Niger, like many Islamists had following the French operation,<sup>2668</sup> and planned the formation of FLM then.

In March 2017, FLM, Ansar Dine, AQIM, and Al-Murabitun joined to form JNIM, ending FLM’s existence as an independent group.<sup>2669</sup>

FLM’s first attack was on January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2015 when they attacked an army base in Nampala, killing several officials.<sup>2670</sup> Kouffa also urged his recruits in his sermons to target French interests.<sup>2671</sup> FLM’s first large attack is coded as JNIM’s first large attack in Mali when they killed at least 29 Malian soldiers at an army base in Tarkin on March 19, 2020.<sup>2672</sup> The first civilian attack is coded as January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2015, however there was an earlier attack on a local chief,<sup>2673</sup> however, it is unclear if this chief was given civil-governing authority by the state and would therefore not be considered a civilian.

It is rumored that FLM might be part of AQIM’s larger plan to spread its influence to central/southern Mali,<sup>2674</sup> and, if true, AQIM might have been considered a parent group of FLM. However, this rumor is based on an AP report on documents found in Timbuktu detailing AQIM’s strategy for the spread of Sharia in Northern Mali. According to the report, the documents’ writer was giving instructions to sub-groups on how to spread Sharia in the North, as well as criticism for spreading Sharia too fast.<sup>2675</sup> However, it is unlikely that these documents apply to FLM for two reasons. First, FLM is centered in central Mali, not the north; second, the report was written in February 2013, which means that the documents’ criticism of the rapid spread of Shariah in the North likely refers to the Islamists takeover of the North, in which Kouffa was a member of Ansar Dine and had not even formed FLM.

The earliest record the coder found that referenced the group by the name FLM was a Human Rights Watch report in April 2015,<sup>2676</sup> which is the subsequent date of the name variable.

The “clandestine” variable is coded as missing because although there are no public statements announcing the group’s name and goals, the HRW report indicates that fighters had been referring to themselves as FLM,<sup>2677</sup> however, since the date of formation is unknown for FLM, the coder could not confidently infer if the group initially intended to be clandestine.

The “current\_rebels” variable is coded as “1” due to Kouffa’s membership in Ansar Dine.

FLM became viable due to JNIM launching attacks against state targets in 2018,<sup>2678</sup> which is three years after FLM’s latest plausible date of formation (January 2015). The “viable\_merge” variable is coded as “1” due to FLM merging with other groups to form JNIM.

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<sup>2668</sup> Le Roux, “Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat.”

<sup>2669</sup> “Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wal-muslimeen>.

<sup>2670</sup> “Government of Mali - FLM.”

<sup>2671</sup> AFP, “Mali Islamists Armed Group Push Fighting beyond Conflict-Hit North,” The Telegraph, September 23, 2015, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/11884570/Mali-Islamists-armed-group-push-fighting-beyond-conflict-hit-north.html>.

<sup>2672</sup> Caleb Weiss, “JNIM Kills Dozens in Mali Base Attack,” longwarjournal, March 22, 2020, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/03/jnim-kills-dozens-in-mali-base-attack.php>.

<sup>2673</sup> Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population

<sup>2674</sup> Zenn, “The Sahel’s Militant ‘Melting Pot.’”

<sup>2675</sup> Rukmini Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, al-Qaida Left behind a Manifesto” (Associated Press, February 14, 2013), <https://www.pulitzer.org/files/2014/international-reporting/callimachi/04callimachi2014.pdf>.

<sup>2676</sup> “Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population,” Human Rights Watch, April 14, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/mali-lawlessness-abuses-imperil-population>.

<sup>2677</sup> “Mali.”

<sup>2678</sup> “Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen,” Stanford CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation, accessed August 20, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wal-muslimeen>.



### **Ganda Iso Ethnic Militia**

AKA: Ganda Iso; Ganda Izo Ethnic Militia

This group formed as a breakaway/successor movement to Ganda Koy.<sup>2679</sup> While exact numbers of leaders and members who broke away are unknown, multiple sources citing Ganda Iso as a breakaway movement was enough to consider this a splinter of Ganda Koy. Furthermore, the founder of Ganda Iso was known to be a prominent leader in Ganda Koy. Due to Ganda Iso being a splinter of Ganda Koy, it is excluded from our dataset.

### **Ganda Koy Ethnic Militia**

AKA: Ganda Koy

This group formed from 1994-1995 in order to protect the semi-nomadic Songhai and Peul/Fulani from Tuareg, Arab, Mauritanian civilians, referred to in Mali as “the whites.”<sup>2680</sup> This groups is not included in our dataset because it formed before 1997 and its main targets are non-state actors.

### **Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Allies (GATIA)**

AKA: Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group; Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group

This group formed on August 14, 2014 as a self-defense group meant to protect the Imghad community, the largest Tuareg tribe in northern Mali, and their allies from other armed groups operating in the region. GATIA is excluded from our dataset because it receives funding, weapons, and troops from the government, and is therefore a state actor.<sup>2681</sup>

### **Groupe des Mourabitounes de L’Azawad (GMA)**

AKA: The Mourabitoune Group of Azawad; Al-Mourabitoun;

This group formed on August 23, 2013 as a merger between El Moulathamoune and MUJAO,<sup>2682</sup> both splinter groups of AQIM.<sup>2683</sup> This group is not included in our dataset because it is a, “merger of former splinter groups.”

### **Groupe Salafite pour le Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)**

AKA: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

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<sup>2679</sup> Andrew McGregor, “‘The Sons of the Land’: Tribal Challenges to the Tuareg Conquest of Northern Mali,” The Jamestown Foundation, April 20, 2012, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-sons-of-the-land-tribal-challenges-to-the-tuareg-conquest-of-northern-mali/>.

Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” 41, [https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/The\\_roots\\_of\\_Malis\\_conflict.pdf](https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/The_roots_of_Malis_conflict.pdf).

Marc-André Boisvert, “Failing at Violence: The Longer-Lasting Impact of Pro-Government Militias in Northern Mali since 2012,” *African Security* 8, no. 4 (October 2015): 272–98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.1100505>.

<sup>2680</sup> McGregor, “‘The Sons of the Land.’”

<sup>2681</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | Mali: Situation of the Tuareg in Southern Mali, Including Bamako; Treatment of Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie in the Army; the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-Defence Group (Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés, GATIA) and Its Connection with the Gendarmerie; the Obligation for Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie to Assist GATIA and Their Treatment If They Refuse to Do so” Refworld, May 10, 2017, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/598c6ed94.html>.

<sup>2682</sup> “Le Mujao et El Moulathamoune Forment El Mourabitoune,” *Le Matin d’Algérie*, August 23, 2013, <https://www.lematindz.net/news/12349-le-mujao-et-el-moulathamoune-forment-el-mourabitoune.html>.

<sup>2683</sup> “Al Mourabitoun.”

This group is not included in our dataset for two main reasons. First, it is a splinter group of GIA: Armed Islamic Group.<sup>2684</sup> Second, although this group has operated in Mali, its origin and base are in Algeria.<sup>2685</sup>

#### Haut Conseil de L'Azawad (HCA)

AKA: High Council of Azawad

This group formed on May 2, 2013 in Kidal as an organization dedicated to negotiating a peaceful solution to the conflict in Azawad.<sup>2686</sup> This group is not included in our dataset because it is not violently challenging the authority of the state/planning to commit violence.

#### Haut Conseil pour L'Unité de L'Azawad (HCUA)

AKA High Council for the Unity of Azawad

This group formed on May 19, 2013 in Kidal as a merger between the Haut Conseil de L'Azawad (HCA) and Mouvement Islamique de L'Azawad (MIA);<sup>2687</sup> During the time of HCUA's formation, Kidal was already controlled by Tuaregs, mainly the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de L'Azawad (MNLA). Upon its conception, Intalla Ag Attaher became its President,<sup>2688</sup> a former prominent MNLA rebel and Amenokal (highest traditional chief) of the Ifoghas Tuaregs.<sup>2689</sup> The Secretary General of HCUA at the time of its creation was Mohamed Ag Intalla (Ag Attaher's son).<sup>2690</sup> Intalla Ag Attaher's second son and prominent Ansar Dine rebel, Alghabass Ag Intalla, also joined the movement.<sup>2691</sup> The vast connections of HCUA leadership to other rebel groups, politics, and spiritual authority, gave the group unprecedented authority in Kidal. One Malian Minister claimed that, "If there is an election tomorrow, [HCUA] will win it."<sup>2692</sup>

In June 2013, HCUA was one of two rebel groups to sign the Ouagadougou Agreement with the Malian government, which paved the way for Presidential elections and future peace talks.<sup>2693</sup> However, the agreement was slow to progress and Malian troops began to enter and attack rebel bases in Kidal in late 2013;<sup>2694</sup> this angered HCUA and MNLA and they threatened to forcefully retaliate if tensions continued to rise.<sup>2695</sup> In November 2013 HCUA merged with

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<sup>2684</sup> "Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)," Anti-Defamation League, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/mobilehatesymbols/t-symbol-30.html#name-variations>.

<sup>2685</sup> "THE ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB," United Nations Security Council, accessed June 1, 2020, [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic).

<sup>2686</sup> "Mali : Des Touaregs Créent Un Haut Conseil de l'Azawad Pour Négocier Avec Bamako – Jeune Afrique," JeuneAfrique, May 6, 2013, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/170970/politique/mali-des-touaregs-cr-ent-un-haut-conseil-de-l-azawad-pour-n-gocier-avec-bamako/>.

<sup>2687</sup> "Mali: Le Haut Conseil de l'Azawad Met En Place Ses Instances," RFI, May 20, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20130520-mali-haut-conseil-azawad-instances-intalla-ag-attaher-alghabass-ag-intalla>.

<sup>2688</sup> "Mali: Le Haut Conseil de l'Azawad Met En Place Ses Instances," RFI

<sup>2689</sup> Rémi Carayol, "Mali : Les Liaisons Dangereuses Du HCUA."

<sup>2690</sup> "Mali: Le Haut Conseil de l'Azawad Met En Place Ses Instances," RFI

<sup>2691</sup> "Mali: Le Haut Conseil de l'Azawad Met En Place Ses Instances," RFI

<sup>2692</sup> "Mali: Le Haut Conseil de l'Azawad Met En Place Ses Instances," RFI

<sup>2693</sup> "Security Council Press Statement on Mali," United Nations, June 20, 2013, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11040.doc.htm>.

<sup>2694</sup> "Malian Rebel Groups Threaten 'Offensive Action' Following Attacks on Bases," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 14, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130914e99e002s1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2695</sup> "Mali's Tuareg Rebels Threaten Renewed Attacks against Army," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, November 1, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP00020131101e9b1001md&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

MNLA and the Mouvement Arabe de L'Azawad (MAA),<sup>2696</sup> in what would later officially become the Coordination of Movements of the Azawad (CMA).<sup>2697</sup> However, the HCUA did not launch an attack until May 21, 2014 when they played a key role in the defeat of the Malian army<sup>2698</sup> in Kidal.<sup>2699</sup> Between their formation and this attack, which came when HCUA was already a part of the CMA, the coder determined that HCUA was a peaceful group, was not making concrete plans to target the state, and therefore excluded it from our dataset.

The coder reached that conclusion for the following reasons. Because Tuareg rebels were in control of Kidal and HCUA represented one of the main authorities in Kidal, there was no reason for HCUA to intentionally go outside of the city in search of attacking government forces;<sup>2700</sup> therefore, until Tuaregs' control of Kidal was challenged, HCUA would not have made concrete plans to violently challenge the authority of the state. This inference coincides with HCUA's first attack being in 2014, when Kidal was seriously challenged by the state for the first time. Although HCUA threatened to attack in 2013 if troops infringed on Kidal, there was no evidence that they were making concrete plans to attack the state. Last, merging with MNLA and MAA when tensions were rising, and not before, is further proof that as an independent group HCUA was not prepared to violently challenge the state, but rather only after they merged resources and manpower were deliberations beginning over potential attacks. In summation, during the time HCUA was an independent group from May 2013 to November 2013, there is no evidence that they were making plans to violently challenge the authority of the state and therefore they are excluded from our dataset.

#### Mouvement Arabe de L'Azawad (MAA-D)

AKA: Arab Movement of Azawad-Dissident

MAA-D was a splinter group of MAA that joined the CMA in June 2014.<sup>2701</sup> This group is excluded from our dataset because it is a splinter group of MAA.

#### Mouvement Islamique de L'Azawad (MIA)

AKA: Islamic Movement of Azawad; IMA

This group formed in January 2013 as a split from Ansar Dine with the goal of peacefully negotiating a resolution to the conflict in Azawad.<sup>2702</sup> This group is not included in our dataset because it is both a splinter and not violently challenging the authority of the state/has initial plans to commit violence.

#### Mouvement National pour la Liberation de L'Azawad (MNLA)

AKA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad; National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad

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<sup>2696</sup> "Rebel Groups from North Mali Agree to Unite," *Reuters News*, November 4, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020131104e9b4000ym&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2697</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern Mali,"

<sup>2698</sup> Rémi Carayol, "Mali : Les Liaisons Dangereuses Du HCUA,"

<sup>2699</sup> Mossa Ag-Attaher, "URGENT: FIERCE FIGHTING PITS AZAWAD FORCES AGAINST THE MALIAN ARMY AND AFFILIATED MILITIAS," Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad, July 11, 2014.

<sup>2700</sup> Interview with Brian McQuinn 8.27.20.

<sup>2701</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern Mali,"

<sup>2702</sup> "New Mali Rebel Faction Calls for Negotiations," *Al Jazeera*, January 24, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/2013124223130722857.html>.

MNLA was a Tuareg led rebel group operating in the Azawad, a region in northern Mali that consists of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.<sup>2703</sup> MNLA formed on October 7, 2011<sup>2704</sup> as a merger between MNA (Mouvement national de l'Azawad) and MTNM (Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali),<sup>2705</sup> and was subsequently led by Mohamed Ag Najem, Hama Ag Sid'Ahmed, and Bilal Ag Acherif;<sup>2706</sup> MNLA also consisted of many of many Tuaregs who served in the Libyan military and subsequently deserted their posts following the death of Muammar al-Gaddafi.<sup>2707</sup> MNLA was founded after a series of meetings in Zakak, an oasis town in the hills of Northern Mali,<sup>2708</sup>

Upon its creation, MNLA explicitly stated that their goal was to secede and create an independent state of Azawad;<sup>2709</sup> this goal led to a majority of their attacks being perpetrated against the government in order to gain control of northern cities and regions, such as their first attack on January 17, 2012 in which they attacked the military base in Ménaka; this is coded as MNLA's first small attack.<sup>2710</sup> Eventually, these attacks culminated in their declaration of an independent Azawad on April 6, 2012.<sup>2711</sup> MNLA enjoyed early success in part due to political instability caused by a coup attempt in March 2012, as well as alliances with powerful Islamist rebel groups such as Ansâr ud-Dîn;<sup>2712</sup> however, due to ideological differences they were abandoned by their Islamist allies and lost a majority of their territory to the Islamists by November 2012.<sup>2713</sup> For the next two years, MNLA fought, conquered and exchanged territories between itself and the Malian government as well as other rebel groups periodically.<sup>2714</sup> In June 2014, MNLA and HCUA (Le Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad), and MAA (Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad) merged to form CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad), resulting in the end of MNLA as an independent rebel group.<sup>2715</sup>

We considered MNLA to be a merger of three distinct groups: MNA, MTNM, and Tuaregs coming from Libya. MNA consisted of students who promoted peaceful, non-violent, negotiations with the government and therefore are not "violently challenging the authority of the state."<sup>2716</sup> MTNM consists of remnants of Ibrahim Ag-Bahanga's ATNMC,<sup>2717</sup> and is therefore

<sup>2703</sup> Jeremy Keenan, "Mali's Tuareg Rebellion: What Next?," March 20, 2012, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123208133276463.html>.

<sup>2704</sup> "Statement Number One," Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad, October 17, 2011, <http://www.mnlamov.net/ar/index.php/pel/74-mna.html>.

<sup>2705</sup> Keenan, "Mali's Tuareg Rebellion."

<sup>2706</sup> Tom Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2016-2017*, 2020, <https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/political-handbook-of-the-world-2016-2017/book249343>.

<sup>2707</sup> "CMA," UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1158>.

<sup>2708</sup> Andrew Lebovich, "Reconstructing Local Orders in Mali: Historical Perspectives and Future Challenges," *Brookings*, Local Orders papers Series, July 2017, 10, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/lebovich\\_mali.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/lebovich_mali.pdf).

David Lewis and Adama Diarra, "Insight: Arms and Men out of Libya Fortify Mali Rebellion," *Reuters*, February 10, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-libya-idUSTRE8190UX20120210>.

<sup>2709</sup> Baz Lecocq and Georg Klute, "Tuareg Separatism in Mali," *International Journal* 68, no. 3 (2013): 424–34, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24709398>.

<sup>2710</sup> "Situation in Mali," International Criminal Court, accessed June 1, 2020, [https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53\\_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf](https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf).

<sup>2711</sup> "Azawad Scholars Statement in the Aftermath of the First General Forum of Scholars, Frameworks, Notables and Notables of the Azawadi People," Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad, April 26, 2012, <http://www.mnlamov.net/ar/index.php/pel/183-2012-04-27-13-01-17.html>.

<sup>2712</sup> Lecocq and Klute, "Tuareg Separatism in Mali," 430–431.

<sup>2713</sup> Lecocq and Klute, 431.

<sup>2714</sup> Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2016-2017*.

<sup>2715</sup> "CMA."

<sup>2716</sup> "The Constitutive Statement of the National Movement of Azawadi," Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad, November 1, 2010, <http://www.mnlamov.net/ar/index.php/pel/45-2010-11-01.html>.

<sup>2717</sup> "CMA."

categorized as a splinter group. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Tuaregs coming from Libya did so as an organized group. Since MNLA is a merger where the majority of subgroups are not rebel groups, it is coded as a new group.

MNLA was coded for not being clandestine, despite a gap of 3 months between their formation and first attack, because they organized protests against the government during that gap under their name.<sup>2718</sup>

The “viable\_merge” variable is coded as “1” because of MNLA’s merger into CMA. Similarly, MNLA is coded as viable due to CMA offensives against the state 3+ years after MNLA’s formation.<sup>2719</sup>

MNLA’s first civilian attack is coded as an attack perpetrated by CMA on October 8, 2016 when they opened fire on a village, wounding 3 and abducting many others.<sup>2720</sup> Their first large attack was on January 24, 2012 when they executed dozens of Malian soldiers.<sup>2721</sup>

The rural town of Gao (pop< 100k) satisfies the “rural” variable because that is where MNLA’s first reported headquarters were.<sup>2722</sup>

The “former\_rebels” variable is coded as unknown because Mohamed Ag Najem participated in the Tuareg rebellion in 1990 led by Iyad Ag Ghali and his MPLA.<sup>2723</sup>

Last, there was no evidence found of contestation in the one year prior to MNLA’s formation and therefore the contestation variables are coded as “0.”

#### Mouvement Populaire de Libération de L’Azawad (MPLA)

AKA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

This group was founded by a group of Tuareg refugees migrating from Libya in 1988. Their first major attack was against the Malian army stationed at the prison and garrison at Ménaka in 1990. However, MPLA is not included in our dataset because it is founded before 1997 (formed in June 1988).<sup>2724</sup>

#### Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de L’Oust (MUJAO)

AKA: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa

MUJAO formed after members and leaders of AQIM split from the group due to internal dissent and possible ideological differences.<sup>2725</sup> This group is not included in our dataset because it is a splinter group of AQIM.

#### Platform

This is a coalition created on June 14, 2015 made up CMFPR I, a faction of MAA, and GATIA. This group is not included in our dataset because its formation was to more easily

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<sup>2718</sup> Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.”

<sup>2719</sup> “Tracking Conflict Worldwide.”

<sup>2720</sup> “Tracking Conflict Worldwide.”

<sup>2721</sup> Keenan, “Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion.”

<sup>2722</sup> “Islamists Seize Mali’s Northern Town from Separatists,” *APANEWS*, June 28, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENE020120628e86s0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2723</sup> “Rébellion Du MNLA Au Mali : Ag Najem, Ou La Soif de Vengeance,” *JeuneAfrique.Com*, January 27, 2012, sec. News (General), <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/143212/politique/r-bellion-du-mnla-au-mali-ag-najem-ou-la-soif-de-vengeance/>.

<sup>2724</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | War and Peace - Mali Repeats the Cycle,” Refworld, March 29, 2012, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f799d6a2.html>.

<sup>2725</sup> “MUJAO,” UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1161>.

organize pro-government and pro-separatist groups during peace negotiations in Algiers that took place between February 2014 and June 2014.<sup>2726</sup>

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<sup>2726</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | Mali: Situation of the Tuareg in Southern Mali, Including Bamako; Treatment of Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie in the Army; the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-Defence Group (Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés, GATIA) and Its Connection with the Gendarmerie; the Obligation for Tuareg Members of the Gendarmerie to Assist GATIA and Their Treatment If They Refuse to Do so”



## Mauritania

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**Background:** Mauritania is a sparsely populated country that has seen a large amount of political instability in the time period that our dataset covers. Until 2005, the country had been under the rule of Oud Taya, who had begun his rule in 1984. In 2005, a coup took place in which Ely Ould Mohamed Vall came to power. Following two years in power, Vall handed power off to a democratically elected government, which was in turn toppled by a coup in the following year. His government was in turn replaced by that of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who has remained in power ever since.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** Although the country has seen coups and witnessed repressive actions carried out by the central government, there has been little homegrown rebel activity. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has carried out some attacks, but they are excluded due to the fact that they did not originate in Mauritania. The majority of violent actions in ACLED are perpetrated by the government.

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### Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Group excluded as it was founded in Algeria.<sup>2727</sup>

### Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)

Group excluded as it was founded in Senegal.<sup>2728</sup>

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<sup>2727</sup> Sage, Andre Le., and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Strategic Forum No. 268. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2011.

<sup>2728</sup> Clark, Kim Mahling. "Ripe or Rotting: Civil Society in the Casamance Conflict." *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 1, no. 2 (2011): 153-72. Accessed May 27, 2020. doi:10.2979/africonfpeacevi.1.2.153.

## Morocco

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**Narrative Summary:** Morocco has experienced a significant amount of violence since 1997, both as a result of territorial disputes and the diffusion of jihadist ideologies and organizations across the southern Mediterranean. There has been consistent violence against the Moroccan government related to the territorial status of Western Sahara, originally beginning with conflict with Algeria over the region and becoming a fight by residents of Western Sahara to achieve autonomy. Additionally, groups like Al-Qaeda and AQIM have established a violent presence in the country and have inspired violence from other homegrown jihadist groups. There also appears to be spillover violence from other Islamist groups in North Africa, such as GIA and Ansar Al-Sharia. These groups and their adherents in Morocco have engaged in violence targeting both the central state – this in an attempt to institute a more Islamic/Sharia government – and other religious groups, most notably the Jewish population.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Moderate

**Explanation:** The sheer volume of Islamic/Jihadist/Salafist activity occurring in Morocco during the time frame leaves the possibility of other unidentified groups open, particularly if they engaged in violence claimed fraudulently by another group. The Moroccan government also works hard to downplay the threat of rebellion and violence, and has been recorded making oversimplifications, and errors when describing these groups and their threats. Although not definite, it is distinctly possible that a group(s) meeting the rebel group criteria for inclusion is not listed in this dataset.

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### Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a group named for violence in Morocco in ACLED. It is unclear whether or not these events are actions taken by Al-Qaeda or the affiliated yet separate Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an Islamic jihadist organization with roots in older Algerian Salafi-jihadist movements.<sup>2729</sup> Regardless, evidence points to representatives from Al-Qaeda and AQIM traveling to Morocco in order to establish domestic “cells.”<sup>2730</sup> These cells, although somewhat autonomous in operation, appear to meet our codebook definition of a “franchise” splinter organization, and thus Al-Qaeda as named in ACLED is excluded from our dataset for Morocco.

### Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

As noted above, some instances of violence in Morocco attributed to Al-Qaeda may indeed be more accurately attributed to AQIM, but AQIM is also named independently as responsible for some violence in Morocco. However, AQIM formed from a reorganization of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) under the “mother” group of Al-Qaeda,<sup>2731</sup> so they meet our codebook criteria for a splinter group and are thus excluded from our dataset.

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<sup>2729</sup> Alta Grobbelaar and Hussein Solomon, “The Origins, Ideology and Development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” *Africa Review* 7, no. 2 (July 3, 2015): 151, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870>.

<sup>2730</sup> Rogelio Alonso and Marcos García Rey, “The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 4 (October 8, 2007): 579, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550701606580>.

<sup>2731</sup> “FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” accessed June 25, 2020, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/aqim>.

### Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

MUJAO is a rebel group born in September 2011 after a splinter with AQIM; therefore, they are excluded from our dataset as a splinter group.<sup>2732</sup>

### Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)

English: Armed Islamic Group

GIA was a rebel group formed in 1992 centered on overthrowing the Algerian government and “establishing an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law.”<sup>2733</sup> This group is not a Moroccan rebel group, and will ultimately be excluded from the dataset entirely as it was formed prior to 1997.

### Salafia Jihadia (Jihad for Pure Islam)

AKA: Al-Salafia Al-Jihadia

Salafia Jihadia is named for violence in Morocco in ACLED, but explicit information about the group is not forthcoming. Whether or not the group qualifies as a rebel group under our criteria is unclear, given that Human Rights Watch refers to the organization as a “loose organization of militants” spread across Morocco and other North African countries.<sup>2734</sup> Some sources do specifically treat the group as an organized group with a specific religious founder (Mohamed Fisazi) and pinpoint a specific start date of 1992.<sup>2735</sup> However, other sources claim that Fisazi was not “radicalized” until “the late 1990s,”<sup>2736</sup> so it’s possible he formed the group sometime after 1997. Excluded due to lack of information; additional research and contacts with local experts would be beneficial to determine whether this group counts as a rebel group for the definition of this dataset and if the group did in fact form within our timeline of interest.

### Polisario Front

The Polisario Front is a named group in ACLED having committed violence against Moroccan citizens (event 167MOR). The group is a liberation movement hoping to end Moroccan presence in the disputed territory of Western Sahara, but they have been in conflict with the Moroccan government since just after the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco in 1975.<sup>2737</sup> Because the group was clearly founded before 1997, they are excluded from our dataset.

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<sup>2732</sup> “Terrorist Designations of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Hamad El Khairy, and Ahmed El Tilemsi,” U.S. Department of State, accessed June 25, 2020, //2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201660.htm.

<sup>2733</sup> “FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Groupe Islamique Arme,” accessed June 24, 2020, [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/groupe-islamique-arme#text\\_block\\_19484](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/groupe-islamique-arme#text_block_19484).

<sup>2734</sup> “Morocco: Marrakesh Bombing Abhorrent,” Human Rights Watch, April 29, 2011, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/29/morocco-marrakesh-bombing-abhorrent>.

<sup>2735</sup> ISSAfrica.org, “Chapter 3: Terrorism in Morocco,” ISS Africa, accessed June 24, 2020, <https://issafrica.org/chapter-3-terrorism-in-morocco>.

<sup>2736</sup> “Moroccan King Attends Prayers Led by Reformed Salafi-Jihadist,” Al Arabiya English, March 28, 2014, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/03/28/Morocco-king-attends-prayers-led-by-reformed-Salafi-jihadist.html>.

<sup>2737</sup> Edith M. Lederer, “Morocco and Polisario at Odds over Disputed Western Sahara,” *Associated Press Newswires*, October 30, 2019, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020191030efau0187q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

### The February 20 Movement

The February 20 movement is a Moroccan protest movement inspired by the various uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring; the group calls for an increase in democratic rule and a clamp-down on corruption in the monarchical Moroccan government.<sup>2738</sup> There is no evidence that the group has ever engaged in coordinated violence against the state in pursuit of their demands, so for that reason they are excluded from our dataset of rebel groups.

### Al-Shabiba al-Islamiyah

This group is difficult to ascertain information on; this could be a result of a number of different spellings complicating search engines and resources (the above spelling is the name as recorded in ACLED, also spelled Shabiba Islamiyah, Shabiba Islamiya, and Shabiba Islamiyya;). However, sources appear to indicate the founding of this group as having occurred sometime in the 1970s,<sup>2739,2740</sup> so this group is excluded from our dataset given it more than likely formed prior to 1997.

### Popular Movement

Morocco's Popular Movement is a party in Moroccan parliament founded in 1959<sup>2741</sup> and its elected members are constituents in the current governing majority in Moroccan government.<sup>2742</sup> Supports of PM are named for instances of violence in ACLED (event ID 51504) but there is no evidence that the party is supporting separate, "non-state" actors challenging the authority of the state, so the group is excluded from our dataset.

### Ansar al-Sharia

Ansar al-Sharia is an Islamic militant group seeking to impose strict Sharia law in Libya, officially formed in 2012 in the wake of the 2011 uprising.<sup>2743</sup> This group will ultimately be excluded in the dataset for Morocco as it was formed in and targets the Libyan government. See Libya.

### Al Adl Wa Al Ihsane

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<sup>2738</sup> Ahmed Zakarya Mitiche, "Morocco's February 20 Movement: 'Demands Still Alive,'" accessed June 25, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/02/morocco-february-20-movement-demands-alive-170222063934604.html>.

<sup>2739</sup> Alonso and García Rey, "The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco," 267.

<sup>2740</sup> "Moroccan King Appoints Islamist Leader as New Prime Minister," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, November 29, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020111129e7bt003h2&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2741</sup> Tarek Bazza, "Morocco's Popular Movement Party Re-Elects Laenser for 9th Term," *Morocco World News* (blog), October 1, 2018, <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/10/254415/moroccos-popular-movement-party-re-elects-laenser-for-9th-term/>.

<sup>2742</sup> "Morocco," European Forum, accessed June 26, 2020, <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/morocco>.

<sup>2743</sup> Faisal Irshaid, "Profile: Libya's Ansar al-Sharia," *BBC News*, June 13, 2014, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589>.

There is some evidence that this group intends to violently challenge the state power in Morocco, as some followers of the group have been linked to “terrorism-related activities” and the group purports to “internalize jihad” in its followers,<sup>2744</sup> however the group was founded by religious leaders in 1973. As they were formed before 1997, this group is excluded from our database.

### Ansar al-Mehdi

Ansar al-Mehdi was a group discovered and stopped by the Moroccan government in 2006 prior to large-scale attacks aimed at toppling the existing Moroccan regime.<sup>2745</sup> The allegations are of a plan to commit violence against the state are contested by some, but appear to be backed up by reporting from various news sources, as well as Moroccan and British intelligence agencies.<sup>2746</sup> Excluded due to lack of information, although additional evidence from local sources would be desirable.

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<sup>2744</sup> Tamba François Koundouno, “Al Adl Wa Al Ihsane, the Lampshade in Morocco’s Experience of ‘Tolerant Islam’?,” *Morocco World News* (blog), March 20, 2019, <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/03/268449/al-adl-wa-al-ihsane-lampshade-morocco-tolerant-islam/>.

<sup>2745</sup> JOHN THORNE, “AF GEN Morocco Terror Plot,” *Associated Press Newswires*, September 29, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020060929e29t001vt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2746</sup> Ian Black and Middle East editor, “International: Mass Trial of Islamists Accused of Terror Plot Begins in Morocco: 50 Charged with Planning to Overthrow Monarchy: Court to Hear of Alleged Suicide Bomb Campaign,” *The Guardian*, March 22, 2007, sec. Guardian International Pages, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=GRDN000020070322e33m000gt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

## Mozambique

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**Narrative Summary:** *After decades of fighting first between Frelimo rebels and the Portuguese colonial forces and then between the new Frelimo government and Renamo rebels, Mozambique has been much more peaceful since the 1992 peace agreement between the Frelimo government and rebel group Renamo. Renamo's renunciation of the agreement in 2013 led to renewed fighting in 2013-2014 and intermittent clashes following the 2014 general election but not on the scale of the earlier civil war. The two sides have maintained an uneasy truce as talks continue. While MDM and other opposition parties have emerged in Mozambique's Frelimo-dominated politics, none of the new parties have engaged in armed rebel activity, and there seem to be no indications of any new rebel groups.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** *Renamo and the government were the initiators for nearly 70 percent of the 325 Mozambican events in ACLED from 1997 through 2015. Many of the 60 events attributed to unidentified Mozambican groups appear related to the conflict between the two major actors. It is unlikely that these unidentified actors were actually new, unidentified rebel groups. Accounting for the vast majority of attacks in the country, Renamo is the only named group in GTD during the time period under study. Renamo militants and supporters were also prominent in SCAD.*

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### Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO)

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), waged a rebellion against the Portuguese colonial government from its 1962 founding until the country achieved independence following Portugal's 1974 coup. Frelimo has been Mozambique's ruling party since 1975.<sup>2747</sup> Excluded as a pre-1997 rebel group and as the government's ruling party over the entire period under study.

### Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM)

Beira mayor Daviz Simango and his supporters left Renamo, Mozambique's largest opposition party, and founded Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), in 2008. MDM has achieved some political success by marketing itself as a nonviolent opposition alternative to Renamo.<sup>2748</sup> None of the 20 ACLED events involving MDM from 2008 to 2014 indicate any MDM violent activity beyond some election violence attributed to its supporters. Excluded as a political party.

### Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)

Backed first by the Rhodesian government and then by South Africa's apartheid government, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), was the primary rebel group fighting Mozambique's Frelimo government in the country's civil war from 1976 through the 1992 peace agreement. Renamo has been Mozambique's second largest political party after the ruling Frelimo and the dominant opposition party since the 1994 elections.<sup>2749</sup> However, Renamo continued to maintain separate forces and

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<sup>2747</sup> "Frelimo," in *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., June 9, 2017), <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Frelimo>.

<sup>2748</sup> Susan Njanji and Jinty Jackson, "Mozambique Opposition Promises Non-Violent Alternative," *Mail & Guardian Online*, October 14, 2014, <https://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-14-mozambique-democratic-movement-promises-a-non-violent-alternative>.

<sup>2749</sup> "Renamo," in *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., October 24, 2014), <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Renamo>.



resumed its armed rebellion in 2013-14, and both government and Renamo forces engaged in violence sporadically following Frelimo's declared victory in the 2014 elections.<sup>2750</sup> In May 2017, Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama announced that Renamo would indefinitely extend its truce with the government as talks between the two sides continued.<sup>2751</sup> Excluded as a pre-1997 rebel group.

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<sup>2750</sup> Tom Bowker, Simon Kamm, and Aurelia Sambo, "Mozambique's Invisible Civil War," *Foreign Policy* (blog), May 6, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/mozambiques-invisible-civil-war-renamo-frelimo-dhlakama-nyusi/>.

<sup>2751</sup> Reuters, "Mozambique Rebel Movement Renamo Extends Truce Indefinitely," *Voice of America News* (blog), May 4, 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/mozambique-rebel-movement-renamo-extends-truce-indefinitely/3838230.html>.

## Namibia

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**Narrative Summary:** *Following World War I, South Africa administered the former German colony of South West Africa, initially as a League of Nations mandate and later directly. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), founded in 1960, waged an armed struggle against South African rule from 1966 on. Since negotiations led to the South African forces' withdrawal and South West Africa's independence as Namibia in 1990, SWAPO has dominated the country's politics, with SWAPO's Hage Geingob winning the 2014 presidential election with more than 86 percent of the vote. While Angola's lengthy MPLA-UNITA civil war was intertwined with SWAPO's independence struggle (SWAPO operated from Angolan bases, and South African forces backed UNITA), Namibia has seen relatively little organized nonstate violence since 1990. Secessionist agitation in the country's northeastern Caprivi Strip, culminating in the UNITA-backed Caprivi Liberation Army's 1999 attack on Caprivi's capital Katima Mulilo, is the only exception, but there has been no repeat of the 1999 attack, and the now defunct CLA is the only Namibian rebel group in our dataset.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *Namibia did not witness many unattributed attacks that might have been the work of unannounced rebel organizations between 1997 and 2015. ACLED listed unidentified Namibian armed groups as the initiators of only 23 of Namibia's 152 events. GTD identified UNITA as responsible for 23 of the 28 Namibian attacks, with the remainder attributed to unknown actors. SCAD's 18 events likewise do not indicate any additional rebel activity beyond that of the Caprivi secessionists and UNITA.*

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### Aakwanyama Ethnic Militia (Namibia) and Aandonga Ethnic Militia (Namibia)

Involved in 2014 clashes over cattle (527NAM and 528NAM), did not challenge the state. Excluded.

### All People's Party (APP)

Opposition political party that shows up in only one ACLED incident (252NAM), as the target of 2008 riots/protests. Excluded.

### Berseba Communal Militia (Namibia)

Fighting in 2013 among the Berseba over land rights (482NAM and 488NAM) did not target the state. Excluded.

### Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA)

The Caprivi Strip (Zambezi Region) of Namibia is a salient that extends northeast from the rest of Namibia between Angola and Botswana and bordering Zambia to the east.

While GlobalSecurity.org dates the formation of the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), also known as the Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM) or Caprivi Liberation Front (CLF), to 1994, the surveyed sources provided no evidence to back up that claim, and coverage of the group's 1999 attack identifies 1998 as the group's launch date.<sup>2752</sup> If CLA formed earlier than 1998, it appears that it was not initially an armed group planning violent insurrection. The 1994 date

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<sup>2752</sup> "Caprivi Liberation Front / Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM)," GlobalSecurity.org, July 11, 2011, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/caprivi.htm>; Kevin Shimo and Tabby Moyo, "Lozis Join Caprivi Secessionist War.," *All Africa*, August 4, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dv850138n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

lacks support, but there is no agreed upon date for the group's founding. For our dataset, we list 1998 as its start year due to the group's public emergence under duress later that year.

The first mention of an active, armed Caprivi secessionist group came in 1998. *New Era* newspaper reported on August 17 that Mishake Muyongo, the president of the opposition party Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), and Mafwe Chief Boniface Mamili participated in a secret meeting in Pretoria, South Africa, to plan Caprivi's secession from Namibia.<sup>2753</sup> On August 25, the DTA's executive committee suspended Muyongo from the party's presidency, and several groups totaling several hundred, including Muyongo, Mamili, and heavily armed Caprivi secessionist fighters, crossed into Botswana within the next week.<sup>2754</sup> While Reuters reported on November 2 that Muyongo's "secessionist plans have been known for some time," there are no media reports in the surveyed sources prior to the August 17 *New Era* story, and the first media mention of the CLA/CLM/CLF name was a November 10 story. The group's existence and name were only revealed due to its members' claiming asylum in Botswana as the Namibian government arrested other suspected members while still in Namibia.<sup>2755</sup>

There is clear evidence that the group was clandestinely organizing. The Namibian government seized weapons in raids in Caprivi and located a CLA training camp in Caprivi, while the October 1998 CLA asylum seekers in Botswana crossed the border with heavy weaponry.<sup>2756</sup> Both the Namibian government and the opposition DTA claimed that Muyongo's goal was the secession of Caprivi, and the CLA members seeking asylum in Botswana in 1998 also identified themselves as secessionists in their interviews with UNHCR officials.<sup>2757</sup>

The identity of the group's initial membership is somewhat unclear. Earlier speculation that those fleeing with weapons to Botswana were Namibian soliders trying to avoid being sent to fight DRC rebels turned out to be incorrect.<sup>2758</sup> The Namibian government claimed that the rebels included police officers, Ministry of Education officials, a Ministry of Transportation official, and veterans of the South West Africa Territorial Force and the Koevoet which fought with the South African forces against the rebel South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in the 1980s.<sup>2759</sup> The AFP characterized the CLA members seeking asylum in Botswana as "farmers, students and men who fought for the South African armed forces in the days when Namibia was

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<sup>2753</sup> "Cabinet Warns against Secession.," *All Africa*, August 20, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107du8l00q1k&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2754</sup> "Namibia-Politics Opposition Leader Suspended.," *All Africa*, August 25, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107du8p00p7x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2755</sup> "UNHCR Says Caprivi 'Secessionists' at Risk If Extradited to Namibia.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, November 9, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010922dub9000mw&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Botswana to Appeal for Help with Namibian Refugees," *Agence France-Presse*, November 11, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915dubb0115t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2756</sup> "Small Namibian Group Plans Secession in North-Army.," "Government Says It Has Unearthed Plan for 'Rebellion' in Caprivi.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, November 2, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010922dub20021u&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Namibia Calls for Caprivi Rebels to Be Returned from Botswana," *Associated Press Newswires*, November 8, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010917dub800lnr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2757</sup> "Government Says It Has Unearthed Plan for 'Rebellion' in Caprivi.," "Namibian Asylum-Seekers in Botswana Are Secessionists: UNHCR," *Agence France-Presse*, November 2, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915dub200wey&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Caprivi Secessionists Pour into Botswana," *Agence France-Presse*, November 6, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915dub600v5z&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2758</sup> "Asylum Seekers in Botswana Are Caprivi Secessionists: UNHCR (ADDS Comment from Namibian Government, Background)," *Agence France-Presse*, November 2, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915dub200wjr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2759</sup> Chirspin Inambao, "Muyongo, Mamili Flee to Botswana.," *All Africa*, November 2, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dub300aty&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

administrated by Pretoria.”<sup>2760</sup> The CLA was also connected with the United Democratic Party, the separatist party formed by Muyongo in 1985 and which later joined the DTA opposition alliance.<sup>2761</sup> While the DTA refused to expel UDP in November 1998, after expelling Muyongo over his secession plotting, two UDP candidates for regional elections, including Caprivi Governor John Mabuku, were among the CLA asylum seekers in Botswana, and it seems reasonable that at least a third of the CLA’s membership had previously been associated with the UDP.<sup>2762</sup> In later trials of suspected CLA leaders, the Namibian government claimed UDP, which left DTA in 1999, had decided to create CLA and characterized the rebel group as UDP’s armed wing.<sup>2763</sup> Muyongo’s supporters, the CLA’s recruits, and its leaders were of the Mafwe ethnicity, one of the tribes of the Lozi people who are in the majority in eastern Caprivi but a minority nationally.<sup>2764</sup>

There are no cities which meet our definition of an urban area in the Caprivi Strip, where the initial planning likely took place. Despite allegations of initial CLA training in Angola, the government’s discovery of a CLA training camp in the Caprivi Strip in late 1998, the fact that the initial CLA fighters crossed from Caprivi into Botswana, and the government’s claims that key planning meetings took place in Caprivi point toward Caprivi rather than Angola or other foreign countries as being the primary site of the initial planning.<sup>2765</sup> Therefore, Caprivi satisfies the “rural” variable as a 1, although there was no source that explicitly mentioned a location of meetings planning the formation of the group. After late 1998 exodus of CLA fighters and Caprivi civilians to Botswana, it appears that training and planning activities may well have taken place on rebel UNITA territory in Angola. Angolan rebel group UNITA provided support to CLA, and seven UNITA soldiers were arrested in Caprivi in the aftermath as Namibian forces reasserted control.<sup>2766</sup> Due to UNITA’s support, we code CLA as having “other” support.

Aside from the killing of alleged CLA deserter Victor Falali near Liyanti, Caprivi, in late October 1998, the CLA did not initiate any violent attacks during late 1998 as many of its members and sympathizers fled to Botswana.<sup>2767</sup> On August 2, 1999, CLA fighters launched a coordinated attack on Katima Mulilo with assaults on the Namibian military’s Mpacha military base, the local police station, and an office of the state-run Namibian Broadcasting Corporation.<sup>2768</sup> As many as thirteen people died in the attacks, including two or three Namibian

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<sup>2760</sup> “Caprivi Secessionists Pour into Botswana.”

<sup>2761</sup> “Formation of New Internal Party in Namibia,” *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, September 20, 1985, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020011205dh9k003tw&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2762</sup> Christof Maletsky, “DTA Refuses To Expel UDP,” *All Africa*, November 11, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dubc00bbr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2763</sup> “Mwilima Denies Knowing of Separatist Manifesto,” *All Africa*, October 4, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021004dya40099d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2764</sup> Max Weylandt, “Lesson Learned?,” *Insight* (blog), November 17, 2015, <http://www.insight.com.na/lessons-learned/>; Eric D. Smith, “The Origins of a War of Secession: A Comparison of Namibia and Botswana” (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2007), 34, [https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1377&context=utk\\_gradmiss](https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1377&context=utk_gradmiss).

<sup>2765</sup> Inambao, “Muyongo, Mamili Flee to Botswana.”; “Treason Trial Judgment Unfolds,” *New Era*, September 8, 2015, <https://newera.live.na/posts/treason-trial-judgment-unfolds>.

<sup>2766</sup> “Namibia Investigates UNITA’s Involvement in Conflict,” *Xinhua News Agency*, August 20, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=xnews00020010913dv8k01s1t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2767</sup> Inambao, “Muyongo, Mamili Flee to Botswana.”

<sup>2768</sup> Frauke Jensen, “FOCUS-Secessionists Attack Namibian Caprivi Town,” *Reuters News*, August 2, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010907dv8203ar4&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

soldiers and three to five police officers.<sup>2769</sup> After the Namibian forces retook the town, CLA never launched another notable attack against either state or civilian targets. In September 1999, Namibian forces killed three CLA fighters in a shootout at a CLA facility in the Caprivi village of Sibbanda, and trials of accused CLA leaders and members dragged on for many years after CLA's August 1999 attack.<sup>2770</sup>

The CLA's leaders included Muyongo, who had merged his secessionist Caprivi African National Union (CANU) into the larger rebel South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) but was expelled from SWAPO in 1980 over his continued advocacy for secession.<sup>2771</sup> Other leaders with government experience who sought asylum in Botswana were all opposition figures, including Caprivi regional governor John Mabuku and former MP Francis Sizimbo. Former DTA/UDP MP Geoffrey Mwilima was charged with treason in Namibia for his alleged involvement with CLA.<sup>2772</sup> The media mentioned John Sambona and Alex Chainda as military commanders in CLA, but their full backgrounds are unclear.<sup>2773</sup> At least Chainda, killed in the September 1999 shootout, and Bennet Mutuso, another accused CLA leader, had been members of the Namibian Defense Forces (NDF), Namibia's military.<sup>2774</sup> SCAD does not include any riots or demonstrations which meet our contestation definition for 1997 or 1998 prior to the CLA's emergence. The group did not become viable.

#### Concerned Caprivians Political Group

Unlike the CLA, with which it shares the political goal of Caprivi's secession from Namibia, the Concerned Caprivians Group is committed to using nonviolent means.<sup>2775</sup> ACLED does not list the group as being involved in any attacks. Excluded.

#### Herero Ethnic Militia (Namibia)

Involved in 2012 clashes over land rights (298NAM). Excluded.

#### Maharero Royal Traditional Authority

Involved in 2006 clashes within the Herero ethnic group (213NAM). Excluded.

#### MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

Angola's ruling party. Excluded.

#### RDP: Rally for Democracy and Progress

Opposition political party involved in election-related clashes. Excluded.

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<sup>2769</sup> "Fighting Erupts In Caprivi.," *All Africa*, August 3, 1999,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dv84012qc&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Security Forces 'Napping'.,," *All Africa*, August 3, 1999,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dv84012rr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2770</sup> "Treason Charges Withdrawn... for Now," *Namibian Sun*, July 15, 2018,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=NAMBSUN020180716ee7f0000e&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Namibian Security Forces Kill Three Rebels," *Agence France-Presse*, September 2, 1999,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dv9202rrx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2771</sup> Maletsky, "DTA Refuses To Expel UDP."

<sup>2772</sup> "Mwilima Denies Knowing of Separatist Manifesto."

<sup>2773</sup> "Namibia Ruling Party Youth Wing Vows to Kill Any Freed Separatists," *Agence France-Presse*, August 1, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010803dw81030m9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2774</sup> "Namibian Security Forces Kill Three Rebels"; Werner Menges, "Treason Trial Appeal to Go to Supreme Court," *All Africa*, May 3, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020160504ec540002v&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2775</sup> Catherine Sasman, "Namibia: 'Concerned Caprivians' Call for Political Solution," *The Namibian (Windhoek)*, June 5, 2012, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201206051030.html>.

**SWANU: South West Africa National Union Militia**

Supporters of opposition party SWANU were involved in 2010 election-resulted violence (272NAM). Excluded.

**SWAPO: South West Africa People's Organisation**

Ruling party supporters were involved in violence against other parties, not the state. Excluded.

**UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola**

Angolan rebel group. Excluded.

**Vigilante Militia (Namibia)**

ACLED incidents all involve attacks on civilians. No attacks against state targets with intent to challenge the state. Excluded.

## Niger

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**Narrative Summary:** *Following decades of military rule, the early 1990s saw the emergence of multiparty democracy in Niger. Despite the democratic model of government, some ethnic groups and regions faced exclusion from national resources and politics, resulting in both interethnic group violence and violence against the state itself, most prominently through the Niger Movement for Justice. Additionally, as jihadist and Salafist groups grew throughout the 2000s in the Middle East and North Africa, many of these groups began recruiting from and operating within Niger, including the AQIM, GSPC, and Boko Haram. Even though these groups were successful in establishing a presence and engaging in violence in Niger, the jihadist/Salafist ideology does not appear to have inspired any homegrown, organic Nigeran groups of the same strain from 1997-2015.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *The violence in Niger in ACLED appears to be well documented and there do not appear to be any regions or period for which violence is either unidentified by ACLED or not captured within the database. It seems that the only major violent challenges to state authority came from MNJ or the internationally-recognized Salafist/jihadist groups, and the reporting on such violence reasonably detailed.*

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**Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**



AQIM is a named terror/rebel group associated with violence in Niger according to ACLED. Their status as a “franchise” organization of Al-Qaeda may limit their ability to be included as a rebel group at all under the inclusion criteria of this database, but their existence as a rebranded Algerian Salafist group means that they are excluded as a Nigeran rebel group for this database.<sup>2776</sup>

### Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

AKA Salafist Group for Call and Combat

The GSPC are the aforementioned Algerian group which later became AQIM (see entry above) so, given that this group was not based in Niger, it is excluded from the Niger dataset here.<sup>2777</sup>

Boko Haram – See entry in Nigeria

### Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ)

The MNJ are named in ACLED for committing violence against military and state officials and facilities in Northern Niger. It appears that the group formed after 1997 and advocates for greater self-determination and control of natural resources for the ethnic groups in the North.<sup>2778</sup> This group has also clearly engaged in targeted violence against government and military officials and installations, and therefore this group does meet the inclusion criteria for this dataset.<sup>2779</sup>

MNJ began as and remained a relatively decentralized group,<sup>2780</sup> so the precise formation date of the group is difficult to discern; anger in the Touareg community had been fomenting for decades.<sup>2781</sup> Given this, we will assume that a rough estimate for the formation of the group as occurring around a month before they “came to the attention of the authorities” in Niger in February of 2007.<sup>2782</sup> Later that May, the group spoke publicly for the first time, naming itself and declaring that they were fighting a government that “[has left] us to live in poverty.”<sup>2783</sup>

Although the group appears to have waited to publicly name itself, there is no present evidence that MNJ or its members were instructed to operate in a clandestine manor in any meaningful way. The stated goals of MNJ

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<sup>2776</sup> Eric Ouellet, Jérôme Lacroix-Leclair, and Pierre Pahlavi, “The Institutionalization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI),” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 4 (September 2014): 650–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.745853>.

<sup>2777</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2778</sup> “Niger’s Nomads Fight for Rights,” accessed May 28, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/unrestsahara/2008/07/2008710121834923863.html>.

<sup>2779</sup> “Niger: Rebel Attack on Army Base Kills 13 - ProQuest,” accessed May 28, 2020, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/2223180740/3C6DF4987B2E4707PQ/1?accountid=11243>.

<sup>2780</sup> Ferdaous Bouhlel-Hardy, Yvan Guichaoua, and Abdoulaye Tamboura, “Tuareg Crises in Niger and Mali,” n.d., 9.

<sup>2781</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2782</sup> “Niger’s Nomads Fight for Rights,” accessed June 8, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/unrestsahara/2008/07/2008710121834923863.html>.

<sup>2783</sup> “New Touareg Rebel Group Speaks Out,” *The New Humanitarian*, May 17, 2007, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/72223/niger-new-touareg-rebel-group-speaks-out>.

appear to be to instigate a change in the national leadership. Specifically, the MNJ made calls for “democratization” in their demands of greater political representation and power for the regions and ethnic groups in the north of Niger, but they didn’t make any specific calls to operate more autonomously as a region.<sup>2784</sup> The Touareg and Fulani, an ethnic minority making up a substantial portion of MNJ’s fighting force, cite specific state-sanctioned discrimination as a result of this lack of representation an impetus for rebellion.<sup>2785</sup> Some sources point to a large portion of MNJ membership coming from Niger’s military forces – including some major leaders – but there is no substantial evidence that other organizational structures of the group originate in the Nigerien military.<sup>2786</sup> Ultimately, without clear evidence that substantial (more than 1/3 of the) initial membership came from the military or other relevant organization, this group will be coded as having come from no prior organizational structure – especially because there is fairly detailed evidence available about this group, so it likely would have been noted if it occurred.

It appears that most of the initial planning for the group occurred in the sparsely populated northern Air Mountains of Niger – proximate to the local military installations – rather than any large city or urban center.<sup>2787</sup> In the early months of MNJ’s activity, government officials insisted that the group was being supported logistically and financially by French mining company Areva after their head of security left the country following rumors of his involvement with MNJ.<sup>2788</sup> However, the group denies this support from foreign actors<sup>2789</sup>, and the government’s claims appear to be unsubstantiated and related to long-standing tensions with the company.<sup>2790</sup> Given the lack of evidence for the government’s claims, we code MNJ as not having made use of substantial support from any outside source.

The first attack attributed to MNJ forces occurred on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2007 in Iferouane, a small military base and village in Northern Niger; 3 soldiers were killed in that attack.<sup>2791</sup> The largest attack perpetrated by MNJ took place on June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2007 on a remote army post in Tazerzait, another military outpost in the mountains of Northern Niger.<sup>2792</sup> Our codebook requires a “large attack” to result in at least 25 casualties, so MNJ is coded as having never committed a “large attack” in our data set. Although many civilians were certainly caught in the crossfire between MNJ and the Nigerien government, researchers have yet to point to any specific attacks (beyond isolated incidents of supposed “banditry”) wherein civilians were the major target of the group’s violence. For that reason, MNJ is coded as having never committed a civilian attack. Ideally, further research would probe whether these “bandits” were operating in concert (or at the behest of) the MNJ.

There is evidence that a number of important leaders, including Mohamed Acharif, and foot soldiers of MNJ were former or recently defected members of the Nigerien military, but there is little evidence that leaders came from

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<sup>2784</sup> Amon Rimamtanung Stephen, “Understanding Tuareg Insurgency In Northern Niger: A Study Of Nigerien Movement For Justice (Mnj)” 03, no. 10 (2017): 8.

<sup>2785</sup> “Niger’s Nomads Fight for Rights.”

<sup>2786</sup> Stephen, “Understanding Tuareg Insurgency In Northern Niger: A Study Of Nigerien Movement For Justice (Mnj).”

<sup>2787</sup> Lydia Polgreen, “Battle in a Poor Land for Riches Beneath the Soil,” *The New York Times*, December 15, 2008, sec. World, [http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/356082/3580689/1247522985857/battle\\_in\\_a\\_poor\\_land\\_for\\_riches\\_beneth\\_the\\_soil.pdf?token=PdsPdY9rZnEAH4ZQJaL%2BELv9QFk%3D](http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/356082/3580689/1247522985857/battle_in_a_poor_land_for_riches_beneth_the_soil.pdf?token=PdsPdY9rZnEAH4ZQJaL%2BELv9QFk%3D).

<sup>2788</sup> “Areva Perd Son Monopole Sur l’uranium Du Niger,” *Le Monde.Fr*, August 4, 2007, [https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2007/08/04/areva-perd-son-monopole-sur-l-uranium-du-niger\\_941898\\_3234.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2007/08/04/areva-perd-son-monopole-sur-l-uranium-du-niger_941898_3234.html).

<sup>2789</sup> “New Touareg Rebel Group Speaks Out.”

<sup>2790</sup> Jeremy Keenan, “Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellion threaten Sahelian Conflagration,” *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 117 (2008): 449–66.

<sup>2791</sup> Keenan.

<sup>2792</sup> Keenan. “Rebels Attack Army Base in Niger,” June 22, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6232390.stm>.

other organizations including rebel groups (as defined by this dataset), government positions, or other organizations of concern.<sup>2793</sup>

In the early stages of conflict, MNJ and its members were frequently connected to the long history of unrest in Niger directed by the Touareg ethnic community.<sup>2794</sup> In what has been described as an attempt to distance themselves from that history, MNJ made concerted efforts to incorporate leaders from and address the additional grievances of other ethnic groups in Northern Niger, including the aforementioned Fulani, the Hausa and the Toubous.<sup>2795</sup> However, the Touareg leaders of MNJ seem to have only engaged in this inclusion effort nearly a year after their initial founding and attacks. Because of this delay between formation and ethnic integration, MNJ are coded as having ethnically homogenous leaders. Despite being a small portion of the overall population of Niger, the Touareg nomads appear to be the dominant in the pastoral mountains around Arlit (capital city of the Algadez Region) so the ethnicity of the surrounding civilians will be coded as homogenous, and the data will note that the ethnicities of the MNJ and surrounding civilians match up.<sup>2796</sup>

In August of 2009, following the peace formed between the Malian Touaregs and the Mali government, MNJ and other Touareg rebels in Niger committed themselves to disarmament and peace talks with the government, effectively ending their rebellion and activity as a group less than 3 years after initial formation.<sup>2797</sup> MNJ thus did not meet the criteria to be coded as becoming a viable rebel group.

On the SCAD, there was a type 1 and type 4 event that occurred in the year prior to MNJ's formation date (interpreted as January 1, 2007), but they were not local.

### Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

French: Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest

MUJAO is a splinter group of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb formed in 2011 and is named as a violent actor in Niger by ACLED.<sup>2798</sup> Per the codebook for this dataset, any splinter group (so long as the parent group has not become part of the government) is excluded from our dataset, so MUJAO is excluded from our data.

### Revolutionary Armed forces of the Sahara (FARS)

French: Forces révolutionnaires du Sahara

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<sup>2793</sup> "In Niger, Former Soldiers Defect to Rebel Group | Voice of America - English," November 10, 2009, <https://www.voanews.com/archive/niger-former-soldiers-defect-rebel-group>.

<sup>2794</sup> Keenan, "Uranium Goes Critical in Niger."

<sup>2795</sup> "Après Les Touaregs, Les Toubous – Jeune Afrique," *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), January 6, 2008, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/221924/archives-thematique/apr-s-les-touaregs-les-toubous/>.

<sup>2796</sup> "Tuareg Activist Takes on French Nuclear Company," accessed June 11, 2020, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/dark-side-of-natural-resources/minerals-in-conflict/48926-tuareg-activist-takes-on-french-nuclear-company.html>.

<sup>2797</sup> "The government of Niger and main Tuareg factions prepare for peace," Nationalia, accessed June 11, 2020, <https://www.nationalia.info/new/8911/the-government-of-niger-and-main-tuareg-factions-prepare-for-peace>.

<sup>2798</sup> "FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: MUJAO," accessed May 29, 2020, [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/mujao#highlight\\_text\\_8797](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/mujao#highlight_text_8797).

FARS is a group named in ACLED for violence in Niger; very little information seems to exist about their activities there. However, some scholars have found that FARS was engaged in active rebellion beginning in 1996<sup>2799</sup>, so it can be inferred based on this research that this group formed in 1996 at the latest. For that reason, this group is excluded from the dataset.

#### National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)

The MNLA are named by ACLED for violence in Niger, however this group has already been included in this dataset as a rebel organization formed in Mali (see entry for MNLA under “Mali”), therefore, it is excluded from the dataset for Niger.

#### The Mourabitoune Group of Azawad (GMA)

French: Groupe Des Mourabitounes De L’Azawad

GMA have already been excluded from our dataset despite being named for violence in Niger. However, they are based in Mali, so see the entry for GMA under “Mali” for justification for the group’s exclusion.

#### Those Who Signed In Blood

Those Who Signed in Blood is identified as being an active rebel group in Niger by ACLED, however scholars in conflict analysis have identified the group as a “splinter group” of AQIM<sup>2800</sup>, another group already identified in this record of analysis. Because this group is a splinter group formed from an already existing rebel group, they will be excluded from this dataset.

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<sup>2799</sup> Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 5 (September 1, 1998): 621–34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343398035005005>.

<sup>2800</sup> Anna Louise Strachan, “Conflict Analysis of Algeria,” 2014, 23.

## Nigeria

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**Narrative Summary:** *Since the most recent transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has seen organized violence from several sources. Numerous ethnic conflicts which existed prior to democratization continue to cause tension, and many groups sought autonomy or national self-determination. Furthermore, the democratization of the country has given voice to the violence and exploitation in the southeast Niger Delta region, where a large share of the recorded organized violence over the last 20 years has taken place. This conflict includes the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, who clash with state authorities defending the interests of multi-national oil companies in the region. Additionally, a fundamentalist militant Islamic ideology has taken root to some degree in the last 10 years in the northeastern states, where a majority of the country's nearly 100 million Muslims live. This has led most notably to the formation of Boko Haram, a rebel group seeking to institute Sharia law across Nigeria, along with the growing influence of groups with origins in other countries, such as AQIM. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century the new government of Nigeria sought to establish an amnesty program for rebels fighting the government and each other in order to quell some of the violence (particularly in the Niger Delta), but these efforts do not seem to have reduced the total amount of violence between groups and committed by groups.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *Nigerian newspapers are relatively thorough, and any "unidentified" activity listed in ACLED appears clustered near where larger, named armed groups operated, so they are most likely associated with conflict stemming from the named armed groups. It is the case that many of the excluded groups, and some of those included, are the results of mergers and splits within the rebel communities; ideally local information would supplement the evidence we used to determine whether those groups were wholly new rebel organizations versus splinters/mergers.*

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A majority of the ACLED named groups responsible for violence in Nigeria are organized as ethnic militias which primarily engage in conflict with other ethnic groups, including the Kalo-Kato militia, the Eggon ethnic militia, the Bassa ethnic militia, and the Amagu communal militia. These groups are generally excluded from the dataset, and those which required more specific research to exclude are listed here. Other groups named in ACLED, such as the Viking Student Militia, the Black Beret Student Militia, and other such "student" militias may occasionally attempt to harm or kill agents of the state, but there is no evidence of any of these groups actively organizing behind a common goal to challenge the state, although they do often collaborate with groups such as MEND. All groups which required in-depth investigation for the coder's inclusion decision are listed below.

## Boko Haram

AKA Islamic State's West African Province, The Islamic State in West Africa, Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad)

Boko Haram, a terrorist organization based primarily in Northeastern Nigeria, meets all of our inclusion criteria. The group was founded in 2002 by cleric Mohammed Yousuf in 2002, originally as a non-violent group advocating for the implementation of Sharia law across Nigeria. The group eventually became violent in 2009 after the government's crackdown on the group and the execution of Yousuf.<sup>2801</sup> Although the group is considered a "decentralized" terrorist group, they do have a clear organization structure, made up of regional cells led by the group's head and a 30-person governing board, who then disperse orders to lower rung leaders.<sup>2802</sup> Although many consider BH to be a terrorist group and not necessarily a violent challenger to state authority, their explicit goals of controlling territory in Nigeria set up direct opposition to state control over a particular region, and they have engaged in violence explicitly targeting state officials, one example being the bombing of a governor's convoy in Northern Nigeria.<sup>2803</sup>

The existence of intensive public reporting by both local Nigerian and credible international media outlets provides a high (3) level of certainty of Boko Haram's existence as a rebel group operating in Nigeria.<sup>2804</sup> The group was originally founded by Mohammed Yusuf as a breakaway sect of the Salafi Islamic movement in 2002, although until 2009 the group and its members' activities were peaceful, and even included legitimate engagement in the liberal democratic system.<sup>2805</sup> However, Yusuf by nature of his beliefs was distrustful of the secular tendencies of liberal democracy, and "flirted with jihadist language"<sup>2806</sup> This changed when in 2008 the Nigerian government began investigating Boko Haram on reports that members were manufacturing armaments<sup>2807</sup>, but evidence to support claims of specific preparation for violence by Boko Haram or their denial of it in the months preceding the initial uprising is scarce and unverified. However, it's clear by June of 2009 that serious discussions of violence and rebellion were taking place amongst Yusuf and his colleagues after he delivered a sermon on June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2009 titled "Open Letter to the Federal Government of Nigeria" in which he called for uprising.<sup>2808</sup> For the purposes of this dataset, the time just before the delivery of this sermon is considered the "formation" of Boko Haram as a rebel group. But before this, the group had not operated clandestinely, and they had publicly named themselves as Boko Haram before (or for our purposes, on) this date. Furthermore, since the exact location of where Yusuf and his colleagues decided to turn violent is unknown.

The group initially established itself among the concentrated Muslim population in the north, specifically in the town of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, which is used for coding the "rural" variable. Yusuf was able to establish a mosque and an Islamic school, attracting not only worshipers from the half-million residents of

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<sup>2801</sup> "Boko Haram," Counter Extremism Project, accessed February 10, 2020,

<https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-haram>.

<sup>2802</sup> Ibid

<sup>2803</sup> "Bomb Targets Nigeria Governor's Motorcade In Maiduguri-AFP | Sahara Reporters,"

<http://saharareporters.com/2011/11/15/bomb-targets-nigeria-governors-motorcade-maiduguri-afp>.

<sup>2804</sup> Agence France-Presse, "Police Say 86 People Killed after Weekend Violence in Nigeria," *The Guardian*, June 24, 2018, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/police-say-86-people-killed-after-weekend-violence-in-nigeria>.

<sup>2805</sup> "Boko Haram: Behind the Rise of Nigeria's Armed Group," accessed April 1, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2016/11/boko-haram-rise-nigeria-armed-group-161101145500150.html>.

<sup>2806</sup> Alexander Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement*, 2019,

<http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781400888481>, 83-141.

<sup>2807</sup> Associated Press, "Nigeria Accused of Ignoring Sect Warnings before Wave of Killings," *The Guardian*, August



Maiduguri but from across the northern region of Nigeria and northern neighboring states.<sup>2809</sup> Outside of local contributions, the biggest financial support for Boko Haram in the year following its founding seems to be donations from al-Qaeda and other international insurgent/terrorist organizations that share Boko Haram's goals of establishing a regime of Sharia law free from Western influence.<sup>2810</sup> Thus, al-Qaeda is the "other" coded in the data for Boko Haram regarding finances.

The first attack Boko Haram engaged in was a series of coordinated bombings on July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2007 targeting police buildings, government offices and churches, among other targets<sup>28112812</sup>. The first "large attack" by the group occurred on Christmas Eve, 2010, when again the members detonated several explosives in churches and Christian neighborhoods.<sup>2813</sup> We note that this attack did not necessarily target explicitly political actors or institutions, but for the "first attack" variables, our codebook considers for inclusion any attack with intent to kill or severely harm "for a political purpose." Given the established intention of Boko Haram to institute Sharia law in Nigeria and elsewhere, we have determined that intentionally targeting these non-Islamic communities constitutes politically motivated violence. The aforementioned first attack by the group intentionally targeted civilians as well as government officials, so this date is also recorded as the first civilian attack for the group.

The leadership and development of Boko Haram came from primarily within the following Yusuf and other Islamist religious extremists had cultivated in Northern Nigeria. All of the leaders publicly named within the first year were either directly connected to Yusuf's community in Maiguduri or related extremist groups in the Middle East. However, the ties those leaders have to other extremist groups (and purported ties of other extremist leaders to Boko Haram), which is why the current rebels variable is coded as uncertain for Boko Haram.<sup>2814</sup> Additionally, there is reporting that Alhaji Buji Fai, a former state commissioner of religious affairs in the Borno state of Nigeria, worked as a leader for Boko Haram until his death.<sup>2815</sup>

Although exact demography of the group remains uncertain, it seems from reporting that a majority of the Nigerian-born militants of Boko Haram are ethnically Kanuri. This makes sense given that – even though the Kanuri are an ethnic minority in the African Islamic community – they make up 75% of the population of the Borno state in northeastern Nigeria, where the group was founded and has been most active.<sup>28162817</sup> Although the ethnic identities of some leaders of Boko Haram are a mystery, the evidence in existence suggests that the majority of the initial leaders of the group, including Yusuf, are or were ethnically Kanuri.<sup>2818</sup>

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<sup>2809</sup> "Boko Haram."

<sup>2810</sup> "Paying for Terrorism: Where Does Boko Haram Gets Its Money From?," *The Independent*, June 6, 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/paying-for-terrorism-where-does-boko-haram-gets-its-money-from-9503948.html>.

<sup>2811</sup> "FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Boko Haram," accessed July 6, 2020, [https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram#text\\_block\\_11860](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram#text_block_11860).

<sup>2812</sup> "Boko Haram Timeline: From Preachers to Slave Raiders," *BBC News*, May 15, 2013, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22538888>.

<sup>2813</sup> "Spiraling Violence," Human Rights Watch, October 11, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence/boko-haram-attacks-and-security-force-abuses-nigeria>.

<sup>2814</sup> "Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 24, 2014, <https://ctc.usma.edu/leadership-analysis-of-boko-haram-and-ansaru-in-nigeria/>.

<sup>2815</sup> "Gun Battles Follow Death of Islamic Sect Leader," *France 24*, July 31, 2009, <https://www.france24.com/en/20090731-gun-battles-follow-death-islamic-sect-leader->.

<sup>2816</sup> "Essay: Boko Haram's Campaign of Ethnic Cleansing," *USNI News* (blog), February 11, 2015, <https://news.usni.org/2015/02/11/essay-boko-harams-campaign-ethnic-cleansing>.

<sup>2817</sup> "Boko Haram and the Kanuri Factor – By Michael Baca," *African Arguments* (blog), February 16, 2015, <https://africanarguments.org/2015/02/16/boko-haram-and-the-kanuri-factor-by-michael-baca/>.

<sup>2818</sup> Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (September 2, 2016): 878–95, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208286>.

Evidence suggests that Boko Haram is still an active viable rebel group engaging in violence as late as 2016, more than 3 years after the group's initial formation.<sup>2819</sup>

Within the year prior to Boko Haram's formation, there are type 1, 2, and 4 events in the SCAD for Nigeria but none that are no local events.

### **Fulani Ethnic Militia (Nigeria)**

Although this group is responsible for a great deal of violence in post-reform Nigeria, the origin of the violence is primarily a challenge to other ethnic groups, not the state. The violence is mostly committed by herders and grazers in the rural, northern part of the country, and there is not evidence of an organizational structure. Furthermore, a majority of the violence committed by the Fulani Militia is targeted at civilians and militiamen from other ethnic groups, the violence committed against representatives of the state seems to be largely incidental, unplanned, and stemming from those original land/ethnic conflicts.<sup>2820</sup> For this reason, this group is excluded from our data set for Nigeria.

### **Berom Ethnic Militia**

The Berom Ethnic Militia has been credit with a significant amount of violence in the Plateau State in Nigeria, one of the bloodiest regions in the modern era of the country. However, a majority of their violence is connected to ethnic and religious conflicts with the Fulani and have no accompanying challenge to the political authority of the state, so for that reason they are excluded from this data set.<sup>2821</sup>

### **Tiv Ethnic Militia**

The Tiv Ethnic Militia has committed serious violence against soldiers, peacekeepers, and state officials in the Nigerian State of Benue.<sup>2822</sup> However, those soldiers were in place to stem the growing violence between the Tiv and other ethnic militias, and these conflicts stem from local issues and cultural clashes, not serious ambition to challenge the authority of the state. For that reason, this group is excluded from our data set.

### **Bajju Ethnic Militia**

Like the Tiv, the Bajju are an ethnic group in Nigerai whose violent forces are chiefly concerned with ethnic battles, as revealed by the targets of the attacks attributed to them (events 3094NIG, 3106NIG). Therefore, they are excluded from this dataset.

### **Ijaw Ethnic Militia**

The ACLED data for Nigeria includes violence attributed to the "Ijaw Ethnic Militia," but the Ijaw as an ethnic minority are the primary members of other active militia/rebel groups in southern Nigeria. Given evidence that

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<sup>2819</sup> "Who Are Boko Haram?," *BBC News*, November 24, 2016, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501>.

<sup>2820</sup> Hilary Matfess, "Fulani Militias in Nigeria: Declining Violence Not a Sign of Lasting Peace | Acled Data," October

5, 2018, <https://www.acleddata.com/2018/10/05/fulani-militias-in-nigeria-declining-violence-not-a-sign-of-lasting-peace/>.

<sup>2821</sup> France-Presse, "Police Say 86 People Killed after Weekend Violence in Nigeria."

<sup>2822</sup> "Nigeria: Soldiers Massacre Civilians in Revenge Attack in Benue State," Human Rights Watch, October 25, 2001, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/10/25/nigeria-soldiers-massacre-civilians-revenge-attack-benue-state>.

much of the violence associated with them would be better attributed with known militia groups in the region (MEND, NDPVF, NDV) this group as named in ACLED is excluded from our dataset.<sup>2823</sup>

### Federation of Niger Delta Ijaw Communities

This group, despite becoming one of the majority constituents of the MEND umbrella, operates more as a large communication structure for more localized Ijaw militias. This group – in its existence outside of MEND – didn't communicate instructions or create plans for violent attacks, they merely took on the role of spokespersons for the communities they represented.<sup>2824</sup> So, any affiliation with MEND notwithstanding, this group on its own fails to meet our criteria for inclusion as a rebel group.

### Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)

The NDPVF was founded by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, who didn't just oppose the federal government's partnership with oil companies in the Delta, but also believed that they were responsible for propping up the Niger Delta Vigilantes, another armed group operating in competing illicit activities in the region. The NDPVF has a public organizational structure, was founded after 1997, and engaged in violence against state authorities (or against perceived proxies of state authority i.e. NDV); therefore, this group will ultimately be included in our dataset.<sup>2825</sup>

The NDPVF formed out of the private militia of Asari just after the 2003 election in April, in what was essentially a rebuke by the Ijaw community of the results of the parliamentary elections.<sup>2826</sup> While the government was aware of the actions of Asari at that time and began monitoring and engaging with NDPVF forces and locations, they were not publicly named until September of 2004, when Asari declared an "all-out war" on the Nigerian state.<sup>2827</sup> There is no evidence that NDPVF attempted to be clandestine during its original formation; it was actively recruiting and was in conflict informally with other militias in the area (NDV) in the time between formation and public naming.

In Asari's public declaration of "war," he made clear explicitly group's goal of compelling the Nigerian government to cede control of the local oil fields to the Ijaw tribes; generally the NDPVF seek autonomy from the exploitation of the multi-national oil companies and the government and military support of the companies' operations.<sup>2829</sup> The structure and membership of NDPVF comes primarily from the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), an organization established in 1999 by Asari and others with the same functional goals as NDPVF, except for explicit appeals to non-violence; Asari started his pull away towards NDPVF by appealing for a "by any means

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<sup>2823</sup> Jennifer M. Hazen and Jonas Horner, "Annexe 6:: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)," *Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: (Small Arms Survey, 2007)*, JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10752.21>.

<sup>2824</sup> Judith Burdin Asuni, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2009, 16-18.

<sup>2825</sup> Asuni, 15.

<sup>2826</sup> Jennifer M. Hazen, "From Social Movement to Armed Group: A Case Study from Nigeria," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 2 (August 2009): 281–300, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903059906>.

<sup>2827</sup> Hazen.

<sup>2828</sup> "Violence in Nigeria's Oil Rich Rivers State in 2004 : Summary," accessed April 27, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/nigeria0205/1.htm>.

<sup>2829</sup> "Violence in Nigeria's Oil Rich Rivers State in 2004 : Summary."

approach” from IYC in regards to the government and oils companies.<sup>2830</sup> The IYC does not meet any of the criteria for a specific type of prior organization laid out in the codebook, but it is certainly a prior organization from which NDPVF appropriated structure, leadership, and membership to some degree. It is difficult to say exactly where NDPVF planning occurred, therefore it is difficult to code the “rural” variable. While Rivers State, the central state in the Niger Delta region, has major urban areas (Port Harcourt, in particular) which saw NDPVF action, the rural oil pipelines were also naturally central targets for the rebels. Which one of these locales served as the primary “planning” locales is unclear in the literature, but there was obvious organization happening within the state of Nigeria itself and not in a neighboring border country (“planning\_inside” coded as 1).

The main source of funds for the NDPVF in the year following their formation (and likely longer), as with other groups in the Niger Delta, was the practice of “bunkering.” Members of NDPVF or others will go to a pipeline owned by an oil company or the government and saw into it, creating an alert which triggers a slowdown of oil flow by the owners. When it comes back on, the bunkers have used the low-pressure time to attach a spigot, collecting and selling the stolen oil to raise revenue for weapons and other expenses. This process isn’t exclusive to NDPVF or rebel groups.<sup>2831</sup>

In the year leading up to the formation of NPDPF, there was mass contestation across Nigeria and in the southern/Niger Delta region specifically recorded in SCAD. There were protests, strikes, and demonstrations led primarily by the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) to bring attention to working conditions and treatment of Nigerian workers, particularly those associated with the oil trade.

No *affirmative* action or evidence of such action exists for this group when it comes to direct actualized violence prior to the group’s eventual merger into the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Given that, after the merger, the larger group did engage in violence codable as a “small attack,” those variables for NDPVF will match those for MEND (see citations for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta). However, this group, particularly given the way in which they organized for and called for explicit violence against the state allow this group to be considered still a viable rebel group for this dataset. Not only does this group become a major structural influence in future rebel groups (see citations for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), but their threats of violence, and their demonstrated ability to engage in violence with other rebel groups<sup>2832</sup> were a major influence in the amnesty program created by the government specifically to prevent the violence against civilians and the state threatened by the NDPVF<sup>2833</sup>. This explains why a majority of the ACLED data naming NDPVF as an actor in violence are observations of violence between the group and other groups, or military attacks (and subsequent defense) in an attempt to quell this violence as referenced in footnote 53.

As referenced earlier, the NDPVF grew as a militant movement in large part out of the relatively non-violent Ijaw Youth Council, so it follows that a majority of the leaders of the group come from the ethnic Ijaw communities – and said council – and this is further evidenced by their reported use of ethnic nationalism rhetoric in their calls for self-determination.<sup>2834</sup> However, as cited previously the greater Niger Delta region of Nigeria is populated with a number of significant ethnic minority groups, so the slight Ijaw majority in the region does not constitute

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<sup>2830</sup> “Profile: Nigeria’s Oil Militant,” October 4, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3713664.stm>.

<sup>2831</sup> Jon Gambrell and -Associated Press, “Oil Bunkering Threatens Nigeria’s Economy, Environment,” *Washington Post*, July 20, 2013, sec. National, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/oil-bunkering-threatens-nigerias-economy-environment/2013/07/18/e38cb4a0-e273-11e2-aef3-339619eab080\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/oil-bunkering-threatens-nigerias-economy-environment/2013/07/18/e38cb4a0-e273-11e2-aef3-339619eab080_story.html). Judith Burdin Asuni, “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta,” n.d., 20.

<sup>2832</sup> “Nigeria Deploys Troops to Quell Fighting in Main Oil Region,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, February 9, 2005, <https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/article/17244614/nigeria-deploys-troops-to-quell-fighting-in-main-oil-region>.

<sup>2833</sup> Iyabobola O. Ajibola, “Nigeria’s Amnesty Program: The Role of Empowerment in Achieving Peace and Development in Post-Conflict Niger Delta,” *SAGE Open* 5, no. 3 (July 10, 2015): 215824401558999, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015589996>.

<sup>2834</sup> Hazen and Horner, “Annexe 6.”

local ethnic homogeneity in the area the rebel group planned in and operated in for the purposes of this variable. Eventually, the NDPVF became absorbed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, but because MEND itself was viable as a group (with NDPVF as a constituent group in its formation, see MEND) NDPVF is still coded as “1” for the viability variable, and “1” for “merge.”

Because the variable “op\_planning\_location” is unknown and there is no certain formation location, the contestation variables are also unknown.

### **Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)**

MASSOB was founded in 1999 in the newly democratized Nigeria as an advocacy group for the rights of the ethnic Igbo minority in the country.<sup>2835</sup> This is also a revival of original Biafra secession and subsequent war during the late 1960s.<sup>2836</sup> Despite the genuine renewed calls for political succession following a number of events in the early 2000s (including the government crackdown on group members and the jailing of leaders of other similar ethno-nationalist movements), there is no evidence that this group engaged beyond their advocacy rhetoric in violence challenging the authority of the state, so they are excluded from our dataset.

### **The Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV)**

The NDV are a violent criminal element in the Niger Delta. They themselves were originally formed through the consolidation of a few youth gangs (Vikings, Icelandos, Greenlanders) by Ateke Tom in order to gain majority control of the illicit oil operation. Although they operated in essentially the same manner as other vigilante/militia groups in the region, the alleged connection between Ateke and the federal government is too strong to ignore. So, given that this group worked on behalf of the state instead of in opposition to it, this group will be excluded from our data set, even if some of their violence did incidentally target/kill state actors.<sup>2837</sup>

### **Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)**

MEND is a militia group in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria who aim to dismantle the partnership between the Nigerian state and multi-national oil companies, who they allege are exploiting the local peoples and communities. MEND was founded in November 2005 after a meeting of the leaderships from the Federation of Niger Delta Ijaw Communities and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force.<sup>2838</sup> Important for this research is that the Federation as a constituent group represents a majority of MEND membership while also failing to clear our inclusion criteria itself, therefore MEND does qualify for inclusion in the dataset. After those initial meetings, the first instance recorded of public use of the MEND moniker was in January of 2006 after the group launched

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<sup>2835</sup> Ike Okonta, “‘Biafra of the Mind’: MASSOB and the Mobilization of History,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 16, no. 2–3 (July 3, 2014): 355–78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2014.936710>.

<sup>2836</sup> “The Republic of Biafra,” accessed May 8, 2020, <https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/republic-biafra>.

<sup>2837</sup> Asuni, “Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta,” 10.

<sup>2838</sup> Kimiebi Imomotimi Ebienfa, *Oil, Militancy and Political Opportunities in the Niger Delta*. (Place of publication not identified: Lap Lambert Academic Publ, 2012).

coordinated attacks on oil workers throughout southern Nigeria.<sup>2839</sup> There is no evidence that this group attempted to or aimed to be clandestine when they initially formed. The group's main goal, outside of discrete demands e.g. the release of former NDPVF leaders from prison, is the withdrawal of Nigerian armed forces from the delta, with the ultimate goal of taking control of the resources from private government-supported firms and multi-national corporations.<sup>2840</sup> The group doesn't explicitly call for secession from Nigeria or control of the central government, so the goal for MEND is coded as autonomy. Specifically, MEND (like NDPVF) sought to force the government to cede greater control primarily over local resources and incidentally a greater amount of general political power.<sup>2841</sup>

The different leaders of MEND tend to maintain anonymity, so it is difficult to ascertain with great certainty if any prior organizational structure is being coopted into the MEND structure. Note that Asari of NDPVF was arrested on September 20, 2005 so he does not appear to have taken a significant leadership role in the formation of MEND and its initial operations.<sup>2842</sup> The group does *claim* via its media spokespeople that there are many former and current military figures in its ranks,<sup>2843</sup> however beyond these media statements there is no verifiable evidence of this, so it is not coded. However, some of the groups that become enveloped into the umbrella of MEND as a result of the initial 2005 meeting can be considered, for this database, to be "self-defense" organizations, as in local vigilante groups that do not meet our viability or inclusion criteria for rebel groups.<sup>2844</sup> Additionally, the aforementioned merger of NDPVF into MEND upon the latter's formation means "other\_rebels" additionally gets coded as "1." Although the operations and membership of the group are relatively dispersed and spread across the Niger Delta Region, the first few actions taken by the group in 2006 occurred in or around Port Harcourt in Rivers State according to the UMD START Global Terror Database. This is a major city in a major oil hub where the military and the many oil and gas MNCs have headquarters, so with some degree of certainty we can code that this group did start in an urban environment by our definition of urban.<sup>2845</sup> Despite there being no explicit evidence to suggest that MEND's formation necessarily was planned within the confines of Nigeria, there is no evidence to suggest the contrary, that the leaders met or made major plans outside of Nigeria. Given that this group formed out of meetings between smaller, local Niger Delta militias and groups, it seems defensible to code this group as having formed inside of the state they are targeting (Nigeria). Most of the funds received by MEND or funneled to MEND occur through the process of oil "bunkering," which essentially describes the theft and black market sale of crude oil directly from the MNC-owned pipelines, a widespread activity which in the early days of MEND's activity successfully reduced Nigeria's official oil output by 20%.<sup>2846</sup>

MEND's first real attack occurred across multiple days in January of 2006 against naval officers protecting a Royal Dutch Shell company complex near Warri; ultimately 14 soldiers and 2 civilians were killed while hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage was done to oil company assets, including the bombing of 2 pipelines

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<sup>2839</sup> "MEND: The Niger Delta's Umbrella Militant Group," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 10, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group>. "Militant Group Poses Threat to Nigerian Oil Industry," PBS NewsHour, March 10, 2006, [https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/africa-jan-june06-mend\\_03-10](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/africa-jan-june06-mend_03-10).

<sup>2840</sup> "MEND."

<sup>2841</sup> Asuni, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta," 6.

<sup>2842</sup> "Mujahid Dokubo-Asari: The Niger Delta's Ijaw Leader," Jamestown, accessed July 26, 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/mujahid-dokubo-asari-the-niger-deltas-ijaw-leader-2/>.

<sup>2843</sup> "Militant Group Poses Threat to Nigerian Oil Industry."

<sup>2844</sup> "MEND's Fluid Leadership Structure," Jamestown, accessed April 10, 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/mends-fluid-leadership-structure/>.

<sup>2845</sup> "Slum Demolition Plan Ups Tension in Nigeria Oil Hub," *Reuters*, October 28, 2010, <https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE69R2SF20101028>.

<sup>2846</sup> "Nigerian Military Says Has Reduced Delta Oil Theft," *Reuters*, October 6, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-delta-idUSL643426120081006>.



and an oil tanker.<sup>2847</sup> Notably, neither the ACLED database nor the Maryland START GTD record any single attacks by MEND which resulted in more than 75 casualties, where the intended targets were representatives of the state or state power. For the purposes of this data set, that means that MEND did not commit a “large attack.” The earliest instance of violence against civilians which can reasonably be attributed to MEND occurred in late 2010 when the group rigged a series of car bombs during a parade in Port Harcourt in Rivers State, killing at least 10 bystanders.<sup>2848</sup> A note that this dataset does not consider kidnappings and extortion as “civilian attacks” so the record here fails to accurately capture the violence imposed by MEND on civilians, particularly workers for the oil companies. Important to note that given the relationship between the oil companies operating in the Delta region and the Nigerian state institutions, any attack targeting the oil companies would be considered a de facto attack against “the state” in this dataset.

Although, as previously stated, MEND emerged primarily from the FNDIC and NDPVF but also drew some membership from other identified and unidentified groups and militias in the region, like the Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).<sup>2849</sup> The component leadership of the group comes mainly from those preexisting organizations’ leadership (such as Asari, mentioned above).<sup>2850</sup> These were groups formed mostly out of local citizens originally, further closing any possibility that the secretive leadership of MEND contains former military officers, political players, etc. In the year before MEND formed, citizens were engaged in protest/rioting activities not just in Nigeria, but in the Niger Delta region itself, with villagers frequently organizing and storming/holding oil pipelines and occasionally taking hostages.<sup>2851</sup>

When MEND formed in 2005, many of the groups comprising the initial meeting’s representation came from ethnically affiliated or ethnically homogenous groups, like the Ijaw National Congress or the MOSOP. Given the ethnic heterogeneity of the component groups of MEND, it seems reasonable despite the secrecy of the leadership of MEND to assert that they were not necessarily ethnically homogenous in their leadership, at least at the level needed to positively code ethnic homogeneity of leadership in this dataset. Furthermore, the incredible ethnic diversity of the Niger Delta region, where nearly every individual state has its own dominant ethnic minority, means that there is not any ethnic homogeneity among the civilians in the area of MEND’s early activity.

MEND was still a viable, active rebel group more than 3 years after formation, engaging in major attacks on the state like the Nigerian Independence Day parade bombing, which occurred nearly 4 years after the group’s initial formation and appears to have been an attempt to injure or kill members of the government and security forces present.<sup>2852</sup> Eventually, the ceasefire and amnesty program drawn up by the Nigerian government drew enough MEND militants away to end their operations, the group has not been involved with any violence against the state or civilians since August of 2015.

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<sup>2847</sup> U. Ukiwo, “From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants’: A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta,” *African Affairs* 106, no. 425 (October 1, 2007): 587–610, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm057>. 587.

<sup>2848</sup> “Nigeria Secret Service to Charge 5 over Bomb Attacks,” *Reuters*, October 19, 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-bombs-idUKLDE69I1N420101019>.

<sup>2849</sup> Ukiwo, “From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants,’” 603.

<sup>2850</sup> University of Houston Energy Fellows, “Oil And Violence In The Niger Delta Isn’t Talked About Much, But It

Has

A Global Impact,” *Forbes*, accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenenergy/2017/02/13/oil-and-violence-in-the-niger-delta-isnt-talked-about-much-but-it-has-a-global-impact/>.

<sup>2851</sup> “Protesters Occupy Oil Facilities in Troubled Niger Delta,” *The New Humanitarian*, December 6, 2004, <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/52336/nigeria-protesters-occupy-oil-facilities-troubled-niger-delta>.

<sup>2852</sup> “UK VIPs Avoided Nigeria Parade,” *BBC News*, October 2, 2010, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11458674>.

On the SCAD, there were type 1, 2, 3, and 4 events that occurred elsewhere in Nigeria in the year prior to group formation, but none were local events.

### Niger Delta Freedom Fighters

The Niger Delta Freedom Fighters have been referenced as an “affiliate” of MEND by researchers in the region and there are some accounts which attribute significant anti-state violence to them.<sup>2853</sup> However, there is very little public information available about this group, and the only violence attributed to them by ACLED is infighting between the NDFF and MEND (event 1892NIG). For these reasons, barring future developments, this group is excluded from our data base.

### Niger Delta Liberation Front (AKA Niger Delta People’s Liberation Front)

The Niger Delta Liberation Front is a named group in the ACLED database, referring to a collection of militants associated with leader John Togo. Although there is some violence associated with this group, including conflict with the Nigerian military,<sup>2854</sup> there is very little information available on any specific attacks instigated by the group, and media sources frequently conflate the NDLF with the umbrella group MEND.<sup>2855</sup> Given the lack of local information available on the group and the close relationship to and confusion with other well-reported rebel groups, the NDLF will ultimately be excluded from this dataset.

### Housa Ethnic Militia

The Housa Ethnic militia is a named group in the ACLED database who operate in the multiethnic state of Lagos, and a majority of the violence by the group recorded in ACLED database record conflict with other ethnic groups not representative of state authority. So, despite the organized violence committed by the group it has been excluded from this dataset.

### O’odua People’s Congress (OPC)

The OPC are a group which seeks the autonomy of the Yoruba people named in the ACLED database. The group has engaged violently with other ethnic militias and government forces and do seek to fundamentally challenge the central authority of the Nigerian state and local officials; however they were founded before 1997 so this group is excluded from our database.<sup>2856</sup>

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Delta <sup>2853</sup> Temitope Oriola, Kevin D. Haggerty, and Andy W. Knight, “Car Bombing ‘With Due Respect’: The Niger

Insurgency and the *Idea* Called MEND,” *African Security* 6, no. 1 (January 2013): 67–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2013.759477>.

<sup>2854</sup> “Nigerian Army Clashes with Militants in Oil Delta,” *Reuters*, May 11, 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-delta-idUSTRE74A87I20110511>.

<sup>2855</sup> “Nigerian Army Raids Militant Camps in Oil Delta,” *Reuters*, December 2, 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-nigeria-delta-20101202-idAFJOE6B100X20101202>.

<sup>2856</sup> “The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC): | Fighting Violence with Violence,” Human Rights Watch, February 28, 2003, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence>.

## Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville)

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**Narrative Summary:** *The Republic of the Congo experienced nearly a decade of political instability as groups fought for control of the former one-party system in the 1993-1994 and 1997-1998 civil war. These rebels came primarily from the private militias of prominent politicians and existed in large part prior to the 1997 conflict. Since the turn of the century, the Congo has had some relative peace and stability in government and has even served as a host to peace talks and armistice agreements for governments and rebel groups in other sub-Saharan African countries.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *Although the country has a recent history of armed rebellion and full-blown civil war, there is little evidence that violence unattributable to any of these groups associated with these conflicts exist. Only 8.4% of violent events in ACLED lack attribution to a named group (whether included or excluded) and the details of these incidents do not point to any unidentified rebel groups operating in the country.*

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### Cobra Militia

The Cobra Militia are a named group in the ACLED database as they were a belligerent actor against the state during the 1997 civil war. However, the militia itself was formed prior to 1997 by former president Sassou for personal protection and to fight in the prior 1993-1994 civil war.<sup>2857</sup> Therefore, this group is excluded from our dataset.

### Ninja Militia (Ninja Nsiloulous)

The Ninja Militia are a rebel group who have engaged in violence against the state as recently as 2016.<sup>2858</sup> Similarly to the Cobras, this group was formed by a politician in the aftermath of the fall of one-party rule, and they did engage in fighting against legitimate state authorities in the 1993-1994 civil war.<sup>2859</sup> Given that the group was formed before 1997, they are ultimately excluded from this dataset.

**Séléka Militia** – see entry for Central African Republic

### Anti-Bakala Militia

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<sup>2857</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Republic of Congo (Brazzaville): Information on the Human Rights Situation and the Ninja Militia,” Refworld, accessed May 13, 2020, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dedffab4.html>.

<sup>2858</sup> “Congo’s Ninja Militia Killed 23 People - Minister - ProQuest,” accessed May 19, 2020, [http://search.proquest.com/docview/1826026958?accountid=11243&rfr\\_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimio](http://search.proquest.com/docview/1826026958?accountid=11243&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimio).

<sup>2859</sup> Bruce A. Magnusson and John F. Clark, “Understanding Democratic Survival and Democratic Failure in Africa: Insights from Divergent Democratic Experiments in Benin and Congo (Brazzaville),” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47, no. 3 (July 2005): 552–82, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417505000253>.

The Anti-Bakala Militia are another groups named for violence in ACLED for the Republic of Congo, however like the Séléka militia they were engaged primarily in the Central African Republic civil war and were only physically present in the Congo for the purposes of engaging in peace talks facilitated in Brazzaville.<sup>2860</sup> Therefore – though this group is included as a CAR rebel group – they are excluded from our database in regards to the Congo.

#### Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda-Forças Armadas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)

FLEC-FAC (English: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda) are an offshoot of the original FLEC group for which ACLED records action and potential violence in the Republic of the Congo. However, as the name suggests, FLEC-FAC is primarily concerned with the independence of Cabinda, an enclave of Angola which borders the Congo.<sup>2861</sup> Therefore, this group is excluded from our database concerning the Congo.

#### Congolese Labour Party (PCT)

The PCT is a group associated with recorded violence in ACLED. However, as the name suggests they are not only a political party and often control the government of the Congo, but they also formed in the late 60s, before our window of concern for this database.<sup>2862</sup> For those reasons, this group is excluded.

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<sup>2860</sup> Shirley de Villiers, “An Overview of Conflict in Africa in 2014,” *African Security Review* 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 89–100, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2015.1011867>.

<sup>2861</sup> “Rebels Alive and Kicking in Angolan Petro-Province, Oil Workers Say,” *Reuters*, June 14, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/angola-oil-security-idUSL8N1952C9>.

<sup>2862</sup> John Ishiyama, “The Former Marxist Leninist Parties in Africa after the End of the Cold War,” *Acta Politica* 40, no. 4 (December 2005): 459–79, <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500124>.

## Rwanda

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**Narrative Summary:** *After decades of mounting tension between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups in Rwanda, extremist Hutu forces orchestrated a genocide of the Tutsi population in 1994. Following the onset of the genocide, a Tutsi rebel force called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, armed branch called the Rwandan Patriotic Army, RPA) made quick inroads into the country and seized power, causing a mass exodus of Rwandan Hutu into neighboring countries. Genocidaires fled freely with the refugees into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then-Zaire), where they organized a succession of Hutu rebel groups (sometimes with the support of the Congolese government). While none of these groups has come near a takeover of Kigali, the post-genocide regime used their persistent aggression as justification for successive invasions of the DRC and for support for Congolese rebel groups. Domestically, the post-genocide regime has maintained tight control over the country and remains highly repressive of opposition and dissent. As a result, most rebel activity is either foreign-based or clandestine. For the two rebel groups that have met our inclusion criteria, information has been often conflicting and incomplete.*

*Most Rwandan rebel groups are either successors or splinters to the original Hutu post-genocide rebel organization in the DRC circa 1994-1996 (first formally christened as the Rassemblement pour le retour des réfugiés et la démocratie au Rwanda, RDR). As a result, most groups listed in ACLED have been excluded, inter alia ALIR/ALIR I, RUD-Urunana, and the Rastas.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** *In and after 2008, nearly half of all attacks by unidentified armed groups are grenade attacks in the capital. It is unclear whether this activity is an existing rebel group that expanded attacks in Kigali, or if this activity represents additional, unidentified rebel groups. In addition, our research on groups we have successfully identified seems to indicate that the Rwandan government engages in public disinformation campaign regarding rebel groups. The state may have blocked reporting on small rebel groups.*

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### Armée pour la libération du Rwanda I (ALIR I)

AKAs: Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALiR; Peuple en armes pour la libération du Rwanda (political wing), People in Arms for the Liberation of Rwanda, Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda, Parti pour la libération du Rwanda, Party for the Liberation of Rwanda, PALIR; Front du Résistance Iturienne, FRI, Iturien Resistance Front

NOTE: ALIR I (ALIR1) and ALIR II (ALIR2) are two distinct groups. When ALIR is used without a “I” or “II”, it generally refers to ALIR I.

NOTE: Although not completely synonymous with ALIR, Rassemblement pour le retour des réfugiés et la démocratie au Rwanda (RDR, Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le retour au Rwanda, Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy to Rwanda, Rally for Democracy and the Return of Refugees to Rwanda) was a political predecessor group supported by armed elements which eventually became ALIR I.

The ex-Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR), Interahamwe, and other genocidaires sheltering in the DRC have a complicated organizational history, resulting to some degree in inconsistent accounts of ALIR’s formation. However, the most detailed accounts suggest a similar narrative. Proper refugee screenings were never set up at crossings into the DRC during the genocide’s exodus; as a result, ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and other genocidaires were able to cross the border, settle in refugee camps, and re-establish organizational structures. From the outset, they planned ongoing armed resistance against the

RPF/RPA.<sup>2863</sup> A government-in-exile was established in Bukavu in 1994.<sup>2864</sup> It was succeeded by the Rassemblement pour le retour des réfugiés et la démocratie au Rwanda (RDR) in APR 2005; the ex-FAR proclaimed its support for RDR and effectively became its armed wing.<sup>2865</sup>

At some point around NOV 1996 (accounts vary on whether it was before or after Rwandan attacks to disperse the refugee camps), a new political group, the *Peuple en armes pour la libération du Rwanda* (alternately, *Parti pour la libération du Rwanda* PALIR) formed; the armed resistance switched allegiance to this group. PALIR's armed wing was originally known as the *Front de Résistance Iturienne* (FRI), then was later known as ALIR.<sup>2866</sup>

Some sources indicate that ALIR formed in 1997 or later. I believe this information to be inaccurate: an Amnesty International report published in AUG 1996 already references PALIR.<sup>2867</sup> Moreover, a Human Rights

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<sup>2863</sup> Marina Rafti, "RWANDAN HUTU REBELS IN CONGO/ZAÏRE, 1994-2006: AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CIVIL WAR IN A WEAK STATE?," *L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs* 2005–2006 (2006): 56–57; Rakiya Omaar, "The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/Urunana," n.d., 36; Thomas Elbert, Harald Hinkel, et al., "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants" (World Bank, October 2013), 10, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/795261468258873034/pdf/860550WP0Box380LOGiCA0SGBV0DRC0Kivu.pdf>; Rebecca Feeley, "Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo (Strategy Paper)," *The Enough Project* (blog), June 3, 2008, 4, <https://enoughproject.org/reports/past-due-remove-fdlr-eastern-congo>; Anna Maedl, "Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC? The Victims' Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (2011): 134.

<sup>2864</sup> Rafti, "RWANDAN HUTU REBELS IN CONGO/ZAÏRE, 1994-2006: AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CIVIL WAR IN A WEAK STATE?," 57; Elbert, Hinkel, et al., "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants," 10; Omaar, "The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/Urunana," 37; ANASTASE SHYAKA, "The FDLR: Anatomy of a Conflict Fueling Group in the Great Lakes Region," *The New Times Rwanda*, accessed September 17, 2017, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/40579>.

<sup>2865</sup> Rafti, "RWANDAN HUTU REBELS IN CONGO/ZAÏRE, 1994-2006: AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CIVIL WAR IN A WEAK STATE?," 57; Elbert, Hinkel, et al., "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants," 10; Feeley, "Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo (Strategy Paper)," 4; Omaar, "The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/Urunana," 37; SHYAKA, "The FDLR: Anatomy of a Conflict Fueling Group in the Great Lakes Region."

<sup>2866</sup> Rafti, "RWANDAN HUTU REBELS IN CONGO/ZAÏRE, 1994-2006: AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CIVIL WAR IN A WEAK STATE?," 59; "Rwanda: Alarming Resurgence of Killings" (Amnesty International, August 12, 1996), 2, [https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story\\_id/Rwanda-%20Alarming%20resurgence%20of%20killings.pdf](https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Rwanda-%20Alarming%20resurgence%20of%20killings.pdf); Feeley, "Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo (Strategy Paper)," 4; Elbert, Hinkel, et al., "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants," 10; Maedl, "Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC?," 134; "IRIN Update No. 428 for Central and Eastern Africa," Text, ReliefWeb, June 2, 1998, <http://reliefweb.int/report/angola/irin-update-no-428-central-and-eastern-africa>; Tom Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration: Second Congo War, 1998–2003* (Helion and Company, 2013), 13, [https://books.google.com/books?id=3uXZAAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=great+lakes+conflagration+second+congo+war+ALIR&source=bl&ots=qTcmkqxabE&sig=9M1SyTin8enP7wdx8vS\\_SRLZCQ0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj8xZnZuK3WAhWDMGMKHSIkC3AQ6AEIMTAC#v=onepage&q=great%20lakes%20conflagration%20second%20congo%20war%20ALIR&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=3uXZAAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=great+lakes+conflagration+second+congo+war+ALIR&source=bl&ots=qTcmkqxabE&sig=9M1SyTin8enP7wdx8vS_SRLZCQ0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj8xZnZuK3WAhWDMGMKHSIkC3AQ6AEIMTAC#v=onepage&q=great%20lakes%20conflagration%20second%20congo%20war%20ALIR&f=false); "Consolidated Great Lakes Report Update #10, Jan 18-24, 1997," Text, ReliefWeb, January 24, 1997, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/consolidated-great-lakes-report-update-10-jan-18-24-1997>; Omaar, "The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/Urunana," 38; "Glossary of Main Rebel Groups Operating in the Great Lakes Region," Text, ReliefWeb, June 30, 1999, <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/glossary-main-rebel-groups-operating-great-lakes-region>; Aubrey Hamilton and Jana Wattenberg, "WARID: Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002" (Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung, September 14, 2015), [https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk\\_publicationen/Rwanda-RPF-1990-2002.pdf](https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publicationen/Rwanda-RPF-1990-2002.pdf); SHYAKA, "The FDLR: Anatomy of a Conflict Fueling Group in the Great Lakes Region."

<sup>2867</sup> "Rwanda: Alarming Resurgence of Killings," 2.



Watch report indicates that PALIR originally operated clandestinely, which may explain inconsistencies.<sup>2868</sup>

Excluded – formed before 1997

**Interahamwe Militia** – dates back to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.<sup>2869</sup> Although it may not originally have qualified (worked with the government after the fall of Habyarimana), it certainly did after the RPF drove it out of Rwanda and into the DRC (also in 1994).

#### **Armée pour la libération du Rwanda II (ALIR II)**

AKAs: Comité de Coordination de la Résistance (CCR), Resistance Coordination Committee, Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, see additional variations below)

NOTE: only included in ACLED as FDLR

The origins of this group were difficult to pinpoint, as many sources refer to ALIR I and ALIR II without indicating the origins of these two groups or how they came to be designated as such. Some sources imply or state outright that ALIR II/CCR is an outgrowth of ALIR I; the two organizations share origins or are connected.<sup>2870</sup> In particular, they indicate that the placement of ALIR on the United States list of terrorist organizations in 1998 motivated rebranding as CCR/FDLR.<sup>2871</sup>

We have concluded that ALIR II formed separately from ALIR I. The latter, as described above, evolved from the ex-FAR and Interahamwe who fled into eastern DRC following the genocide. ALIR II also contained former Rwandan officials and ex-FAR, but it drew leadership and membership from locations other than eastern DRC: Congo-Brazzaville, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, CAR, western DRC, Angola, and Sudan.<sup>2872</sup> The membership of ALIR II was said to be younger than that of ALIR I; apparently, most ALIR II membership (“hardly any”) had not participated in the Rwandan genocide.<sup>2873</sup> Other sources

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<sup>2868</sup> *Human Rights Watch World Report 1999* (Human Rights Watch, 1998), 62, <https://books.google.com/books?id=LdWZrfsdqAEC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=alir+armee+pour+la+liberation+du+rwanda&source=bl&ots=UHA0nwirIT&sig=Pl6a07BY7rAGf50MDbImkts-68&hl=en&sa=X&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwjJ7q7whd7UAhWBLyYKHRuxDs4Q6AEISjAG#v=onepage&q=alir%20armee%20pour%20la%20liberation%20du%20rwanda&f=false>.

<sup>2869</sup> Helen Vesperini, “Interahamwe: A Spent Force?,” *BBC News*, July 25, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1456900.stm>.

<sup>2870</sup> Hamilton and Wattenberg, “WARID: Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002”; Elbert, Schauer, et al., “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants,” 10; Maedl, “Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC?,” 134; “The War within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo,” 15.

<sup>2871</sup> Omaar, “The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/Urunana,” 309; Aloys Tegera, “Some DR Congo Ministers Helped in Creating ALIR-FDLR,” *Umuwugizi* (blog), September 5, 2013, <https://umuwugizi.wordpress.com/2013/09/05/fdlr-2/>; “A Welcome Expression of Intent: The Nairobi Communique and the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe” (Kigali: African Rights, December 2007), 19, <http://francegenocidetutsi.org/AfricanRightsReportNairobiCommunique9November.pdf>; SHYAKA, “The FDLR: Anatomy of a Conflict Fueling Group in the Great Lakes Region.”

<sup>2872</sup> “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration,” ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 23, 2003), 5, [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj38a-r2bvWAhUT5WMKHZpxAi4QFghnMAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmisat.prio.org%2Fmisc%2Fdownload.ashx%3Ffile%3D503&usg=AFQjCNE1oaaXSra1rZzYEby9mjK3RTV\\_Qg](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj38a-r2bvWAhUT5WMKHZpxAi4QFghnMAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmisat.prio.org%2Fmisc%2Fdownload.ashx%3Ffile%3D503&usg=AFQjCNE1oaaXSra1rZzYEby9mjK3RTV_Qg); Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14; Krause, *Small Arms Survey 2015*, 192.

<sup>2873</sup> “Letter Dated 1 April 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council” (United Nations Security Council, April 5, 2002), para. 25, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202002%20341.pdf>; Hamilton and Wattenberg, “WARID: Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002”; Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14; “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration.”

report that ex-FAR were included in CCR/ALIR II, especially among the leadership.<sup>2874</sup> Because it is unclear whether ex-FAR meet our one-third threshold – it seems unlikely if “hardly any” ALIR II had participated in the genocide – I have coded none and military as missing for organizational history.

Individuals named in the initial leadership of ALIR II/CCR include Hyacinthe Nsengiyumva Rafiki (alias John Muhindo, former Rwandan Minister of Public Works), Col. Tharcisse Renzaho (ex-FAR), Dr. Casimir Bizimungu (former Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Health), Col. Aloys Ntiwirigabo (or Ntiwiragaba, ex-FAR), and Col. Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza (ex-FAR).<sup>2875</sup> The leadership consisted of Rwandan Hutu.<sup>2876</sup> To the extent that I could find details of these individual’s whereabouts and activities from 1994 to 1998, they were not present in eastern Congo and/or not to the government-in-exile, RDR, or ALIR I.<sup>2877</sup> This corroborates the information that ALIR II drew leadership and membership from outside eastern DRC, as discussed above. However, I found no information accounting for the whereabouts and activities of some individuals, while gaps were present in those I could find. An expert on eastern DRC conflict whom we interviewed nonetheless assured us that ALIR I and ALIR II have separate origins.<sup>2878</sup> Because of this information, I have coded 1 for former government and former security under initial leadership.

The International Crisis Group offers the most detailed outline of CCR/ALIR II’s formation. With the onset of the Second Congolese War in AUG 1998, a Nairobi-based group of ex-FAR and former Rwandan politicians contacted Laurent- Désiré Kabila. On 10 AUG 1998, they sent a group of ex-FAR to Lubumbashi to meet with Kabila, but Kabila rerouted them to Kinshasa. On 10 SEPT 1998, the group reached an agreement with Kabila wherein the Rwandan exile group would mobilize 10,000 fighters against the Rwandan government/RPF and Kabila would provide material and logistical support. CCR/ALIR II’s Kabila-

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<sup>2874</sup> “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration,” 6.

<sup>2875</sup> Omaar, “The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/Urunana,” 309; Tegera, “Some DR Congo Ministers Helped in Creating ALIR-FDLR”; “A Welcome Expression of Intent: The Nairobi Communique and the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe,” 19; “Letter Dated 18 November 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/1096),” November 18, 1998, 12, [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/264263/files/S\\_1998\\_1096-EN.pdf?version=1](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/264263/files/S_1998_1096-EN.pdf?version=1); “Hyacinthe Nsengiyumva Rafiki,” *TRIAL International* (blog), June 14, 2016, <https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hyacinthe-nsengiyumva-rafiki/>; “Tharcisse Renzaho,” *TRIAL International* (blog), June 13, 2016, <https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/tharcisse-renzaho/>; “Casimir Bizimungu,” *TRIAL International* (blog), June 7, 2016, <https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/casimir-bizimungu/>; Fondation Hirondelle, “09.08.07 - ICTR/RWANDA - RWANDA SAYS IT IS READY TO ASSUME THE POST- MANDATE OF THE ICTR,” JusticeInfo.Net, August 9, 2007, <http://www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/407-collaboration-with-states/collaboration-with-states-rwanda/20693-en-en-090807-ictrrwanda-rwanda-says-it-is-ready-to-assume-the-post-mandate-of-the-ictr97449744>.

<sup>2876</sup> “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration,” 5; Krause, *Small Arms Survey* 2015, 192; “The War within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo,” 15.

<sup>2877</sup> “Hyacinthe Nsengiyumva Rafiki”; “Tharcisse Renzaho”; “Casimir Bizimungu”; “Casimir Bizimungu, Former Rwandan Foreign Minister, Transferred to Arusha,” United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, February 23, 1999, <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/casimir-bizimungu-former-rwandan-foreign-minister-transferred-arusha/>; “2 Rejected Genocide Convicts Transferred to Ghana,” KT Press, December 27, 2016, <http://ktpress.rw/2016/12/2-rejected-genocide-convicts-transferred-to-ghana/>; “Tracing Rwanda’s Most Dangerous Criminals Roaming Freely,” KT Press, July 3, 2015, <http://ktpress.rw/2015/07/tracing-rwandas-most-dangerous-criminals-roaming-freely/>; “Tharcisse Renzaho Given Life Sentence,” United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, July 14, 2009, <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/tharcisse-renzaho-given-life-sentence/>; “Rwanda: French Court Releases Genocide Suspect,” *The New Times (Kigali)*, September 30, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201109300551.html>; Fondation Hirondelle, “02.09.11 - FRANCE/RWANDA - FORMER RWANDAN MINISTER IN CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST 9,” JusticeInfo.Net, September 2, 2011, <http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/23698-en-en-020911-francerwanda-former-rwandan-minister-in-custody-since-august-91451314513.html>; “Un ex-ministre rwandais visé par une plainte pour génocide,” *Le Monde.fr*, January 7, 2012, [http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/01/07/un-ex-ministre-rwandais-vise-par-une-plainte-pour-genocide\\_1627135\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/01/07/un-ex-ministre-rwandais-vise-par-une-plainte-pour-genocide_1627135_3212.html).

<sup>2878</sup> Expert Interview.

backed units deployed in NOV-DEC 1998. According to ICG, "...the Rwandan rebels, backed up by Zimbabwean and Angolan artillery and aircraft, managed to hold onto the Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi fronts between November 1998 and August 1999." ICG's report reiterates that from 1998 to 2000, ALIR II/CCR remained organizationally distinct from ALIR/ALIR I because of the latter's genocidal reputation.<sup>2879</sup> Because of this information, I have coded formed date as 10 SEPT 1998.

Information from other sources dovetails with ICG's origins story, including its deal with the Kabila regime and its deployment timeline.<sup>2880</sup> For instance, the organization was apparently headquartered at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kinshasa.<sup>2881</sup> Several sources also indicate that CCR/ALIR II's troops were "practically integrated into FAC [Forces armées congolaises]".<sup>2882</sup> A United Nations report, albeit from several years later, further corroborates that ALIR II was "equipped with more sophisticated weapons than other groups, including light anti-aircraft guns," which we can assume resulted from the deal between the CCR/ALIR II and the Kabila regime.<sup>2883</sup> Because of this information, I have coded 0 for "rural", 1 for "planning\_border", and foreign government under initial resources. Although we do not have hard data on the volume of aid Kabila supplied ALIR II, I believe it very likely met our minimum threshold.

Several sources indicate that CCR/ALIR II operated clandestinely. ICG reports that, "As time went on, the CCR evolved into a politicomilitary operation called FDLR, although it remained strictly clandestine until its congress in Nasho in May 2000."<sup>2884</sup> Another source indicates that, "The FDLR had operated clandestinely since 1998," with FDLR as an outgrowth of ALIR II.<sup>2885</sup> Finally, as late as 2002, a United Nations report explains that, "ALIR II is believed to have at least one division with three brigades in the South Kivu and Katanga Provinces and headquarters in Lubumbashi. The existence of a second division remains unconfirmed. However, reports that there may be two or three more brigades in Katanga would, according to traditional military structures, tend to indicate the existence of a second division whose headquarters remain unknown."<sup>2886</sup> AllAfrica and Factiva searches for CCR (the name that the organization gave itself) return no results. As such, I have coded 1 for clandestine. The clandestine nature of CCR/ALIR II's operations explains why its origins are so obscured and why sources lacking in detail on the group's formation assume it to be an outgrowth of ALIR/ALIR I. In addition, one source suggests that the group was branded as ALIR II on Rwandan insistence, despite its lack of ties to ALIR/ALIR I, in order to discredit the CCR as genocidaires.<sup>2887</sup> This could also explain the confusion over CCR/ALIR II origins.

Clandestine operation meant I was unable to pinpoint information on any individual attacks for ALIR II. As such, I have coded NOV 1998 as small attack date with downgraded certainty (reflecting that this is when deployments began), and missing for large and civilian attacks. However, because this group and its successor FDLR are widely reported, and because of the agreement it reached with the Kabila regime, I feel confident in assuming that the group planned and conducted violence.

The stated objective of the original CCR/ALIR II-Kabila regime agreement was the protection of Rwandan refugees within the DRC, presumably from advancing Rwandan troops. However, ICG reports that the

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<sup>2879</sup> "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration," 5–6.

<sup>2880</sup> Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14.

<sup>2881</sup> "A Welcome Expression of Intent: The Nairobi Communique and the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe," 19.

<sup>2882</sup> Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14; "The War within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo," 15.

<sup>2883</sup> "Letter Dated 1 April 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," para. 26.

<sup>2884</sup> "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration," 6.

<sup>2885</sup> Rafti, "RWANDAN HUTU REBELS IN CONGO/ZAÏRE, 1994-2006: AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CIVIL WAR IN A WEAK STATE?," 61.

<sup>2886</sup> "Letter Dated 1 April 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," para. 26.

<sup>2887</sup> Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14.

implicit objective was retreat and overthrow of the new Rwandan regime.<sup>2888</sup> Since I found no documentation stating these goals outright, I left initial goals as 0s.

Some sources indicate that FDLR emerged from ALIR/ALIR I.<sup>2889</sup> However, the most detailed sources suggest that FDLR evolved from CCR/ALIR II and then later absorbed ALIR/ALIR I.<sup>2890</sup> The links between ALIR II and FDLR led us to code this group as viable (see the plethora of ACLED events, as well as ongoing presence in UN Panel of Experts reports). However, we also coded 1 for hide, as FDLR is based primarily out of eastern DRC. Finally, we code 1 for splinter, as FDLR has spun splinter organizations (for instance, see CNRD below).

While FDLR is in the GTD, CCR/ALIR II is not. Likewise, UCD contains FDLR but not CCR/ALIR II. In both cases, the FDLR does not show up until several years after CCR/ALIR II started, so we have coded both as 0. UCD does contain ALIR, but we assume this to be ALIR I (see note on nomenclature under ALIR above).

### Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Forces combattantes abacunguzi (Combatant Forces Abacunguzi, FOCA, FDLR-FOCA)

Some sources indicate that FDLR emerged from ALIR/ALIR I.<sup>2891</sup> However, the most detailed sources suggest that FDLR evolved from CCR/ALIR II and then later absorbed ALIR/ALIR I.<sup>2892</sup> Either way, it does not qualify for inclusion separately from these groups.

### \*Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie-Ubwiyunge (CNRD)

AKAs: Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie, CNRD-Ubwiyunge, National Council for Renewal and Democracy

This group is a significant splinter group of FDLR. According to the UN, the CNRD “broke away” from FDLR on 31 MAY 2016 and “took between one third and one half of FDLR with it, including at least 46 officers and the entirety of the South Kivu operational sector.”<sup>2893</sup> Several news sources and a communique from CNRD confirm that it is a splinter group from FDLR.<sup>2894</sup> Excluded.

<sup>2888</sup> “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration,” 5.

<sup>2889</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Rwanda: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda, FDLR),” Refworld, October 1, 2007, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/474e8955c.html>; Christoph Vogel, “The FDLR, a Never Ending Curse in Eastern Congo?,” *Suluhu* (blog), June 11, 2013, <https://suluhu.org/2013/06/11/the-fdlr-a-never-ending-curse-in-eastern-congo/>.

<sup>2890</sup> Tegera, “Some DR Congo Ministers Helped in Creating ALIR-FDLR”; Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14; Hamilton and Wattenberg, “WARID: Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002”; Elbert, Hinkel, et al., “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants,” 10; Maedl, “Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC?,” 134; Krause, *Small Arms Survey 2015*, 192; “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration,” 6.

<sup>2891</sup> Vogel, “The FDLR, a Never Ending Curse in Eastern Congo?”; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Refworld | Rwanda”; Stearns, “North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo,” 32.

<sup>2892</sup> Tegera, “Some DR Congo Ministers Helped in Creating ALIR-FDLR”; Cooper, *Great Lakes Conflagration*, 14; Hamilton and Wattenberg, “WARID: Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002”; Elbert, Hinkel, et al., “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants,” 10; Maedl, “Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC?,” 134; Krause, *Small Arms Survey 2015*, 192; “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration,” 6.

<sup>2893</sup> “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 2293 (2016),” para. 23, see also 8,12.

<sup>2894</sup> “RDC-Rwanda: Scission Au Sein Des FDLR - RFI,” RFI Afrique, June 3, 2016, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160603-rwanda-nouvelle-scission-sein-fdlr-cnr-d-victor-byiringiro-wilson-irategeka-mudacumu>; MPC, “COMMUNIQUE Du MOUVEMENT PATRIOTIQUE POUR LE CENTRAFRIQUE (MPC)”;

**\*Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Mandevu (FDLR-Mandevu)**

AKAs: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda-Mandevu

Although I was not able to find specific information on membership or leadership, this group is consistently reported as a splinter of FDLR.<sup>2895</sup> There is no reason to suspect otherwise. With reporting consistency and the implied splintering in the group's name, I have excluded it.

**\*Ralliement pour la unité et la démocratie (RUD)**

AKAs: AN-Imboneza, Ralliement pour la unité et la démocratie-Urunana, RUD-Urunana, Rassemblement uni pour la démocratie, Ralliement uni pour la démocratie, Rassemblement pour la unité et la démocratie, United Rally for Democracy, Rally for Unity and Democracy, Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda-RUD (FDLR-RUD, FDLR/RUD), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda-United Rally for Democracy

This is a splinter group of FDLR. Its leadership includes Brigadier General Damascène Ndibabaje (AKA Musare), Jean Marie Vianney Higiro, and Félicien Kanyamibwa, all formerly of FDLR. Musare joined RUD two years after Higiro and Kanyamibwa left FDLR, creating AN-Imboneza as RUD's armed wing. Higiro and Kanyamibwa are based in the US, but fighters affirm that they are affiliated. Most of the combattants also came from FDLR.<sup>2896</sup>

**\*Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Soki (FDLR-Soki)** – This group is consistently listed as a faction or splinter group of FDLR, as implied by its name (the UN said it splintered via RUD, another FDLR splinter group).<sup>2897</sup> One source indicated that FDLR tried to deny Soki's affiliation with FDLR, arguing that Soki instead originated as a criminal gang working on behalf of Kigali. However, the author implied that this denial fits within FDLR's public relations strategy to besmirch the Rwandan government, and should not be taken at face value.<sup>2898</sup>

**\*Front nationaliste pour la démocratie et la reconciliation au Rwanda-L'armée du roi (FRONADER)**

AKAs: Nationalist Front for Democracy and Reconciliation in Rwanda-Army of the King

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Sylidio Sebuharara, "FDLR General Wanted Dead or Alive, Now on His Way to Rwanda | KT PRESS," *KT Press*, February 28, 2017, <http://ktpress.rw/2017/02/fdlr-general-wanted-dead-or-alive-now-on-his-way-to-rwanda/>.

<sup>2895</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011)," paras. 100–102; "Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," October 31, 2013; "Militia Groups," Virunga National Park, August 18, 2012, <https://virunga.org/archives/militia-groups/>; Vogel, "The FDLR, a Never Ending Curse in Eastern Congo?"

<sup>2896</sup> "'You Will Be Punished': Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo," 50.

<sup>2897</sup> "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)," para. 135; "Global Insider: Weakened FDLR Still a Threat to Civilians in DRC," *World Politics Review*, September 12, 2013, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13213/global-insider-weakened-fdlr-still-a-threat-to-civilians-in-drc>; Bihibindi News, "At the Crossroads? The Scission of FDLR in Relation to CNRD-Ubwiye," *Medium* (blog), June 3, 2016, <https://medium.com/@BihibindiNews/at-the-crossroads-the-scission-of-fdlr-in-relation-to-cnrdu-biwiye-6b1099dbbc9e>; "The FDLR, a Never Ending Curse in Eastern Congo?," *Suluhi* (blog), June 11, 2013, <https://suluhi.org/2013/06/11/the-fdlr-a-never-ending-curse-in-eastern-congo/>; Eoin Young, "Congo-Kinshasa: Monuc Reports Several Ceasefire Violations in East," *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, June 19, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200806190916.html>; Christoph Vogel, "Congo-Kinshasa: End of an Era? What Next for the DR Congo Now the M23 Has Been Defeated?," *ThinkAfricaPress*, November 6, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201311061133.html>.

<sup>2898</sup> Julia Gallagher, *Images of Africa: Creation, Negotiation and Subversion* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 158–59, [https://books.google.com/books?id=IdfJCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA159&lpg=PA159&dq=FDLR+soki&source=bl&ots=uG2snTRifY&sig=N6uKBMP7xKjjZ-kUU\\_5Ldh1v7z8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjMyue\\_z-3UAhUPxCYKHTBYDtY4ChDoAQg6MAQ#v=onepage&q=FDLR%20soki&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=IdfJCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA159&lpg=PA159&dq=FDLR+soki&source=bl&ots=uG2snTRifY&sig=N6uKBMP7xKjjZ-kUU_5Ldh1v7z8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjMyue_z-3UAhUPxCYKHTBYDtY4ChDoAQg6MAQ#v=onepage&q=FDLR%20soki&f=false).



There's not a lot of information on this group, but both the United Nations and Rwandan government characterizes it as a splinter group of RUD.<sup>2899</sup> With no other information to go on, I have excluded this as a splinter group.

**\*Rassemblement populaire rwandais (RPR) –**

AKAs: Rassemblement du peuple rwandais, ARPR-Inkeragutabara (armed branch), Armée Rassemblement du Peuple Rwandais-Inkeragutabara, RPR-Inkeragutabara, RPR-Nkeragutabara, Popular Rwandan Rally, Rwandan People's Rally, Rally of the Rwandan People, Gathering of the Rwandan People, Assembly of the Rwandan People

Information on this group is not easy to find, although it does meet our threshold of at least three sources for inclusion. The main source of information is pro-government Rwandan newspaper *The New Times*; it is unclear how reliable this newspaper is as a source, although other sources corroborated rather than contradicted it. For some time after the group announced itself, both Rwanda and Uganda denied or downplayed its existence.<sup>2900</sup> As such, the lack of specific information on this group is hardly surprising. Because of missingness and contradictory information, I have downgraded certainty to 2.

The group appears to have primarily planned and operated in neighboring countries. In particular, the leadership seems to have been based in Kampala, Uganda. The group's initial press release was signed from Gisenyi (Rwanda), although the veracity of this signature's location seems doubted.<sup>2901</sup> Several RPR leaders (named below) are believed to have resided in Uganda.<sup>2902</sup> Moreover, Uganda arrested RPR members including named leadership in 2007.<sup>2903</sup> Other sources suggests that the group operated in both Uganda and eastern DRC, which would make sense given its cooperation with FDLR and RUD-Urunana (see below).<sup>2904</sup> Based on this information, I have coded the planning location as Kampala, Uganda – 0 for “rural”, 0 for “planning\_inside”, and 1 for “planning\_border”.

Two sources (IRIN article, UN Mission in DRC article) refer to RPR in passing as a dissident faction of FDLR.<sup>2905</sup> More often, however, sources note that it worked with FDLR as well as with FDLR splinter

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<sup>2899</sup> “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” paras. 123–124; Edmund Kagire, “Terror Suspects Denied Bail,” *The New Times Rwanda*, July 12, 2011, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2011-07-12/32918/>.

<sup>2900</sup> Guy Taillefer, “Un défi à Kagamé?,” *Le Devoir*, October 27, 2005, sec. Actualités internationales, <http://www.ledevoir.com/international/actualites-internationales/93541/un-defi-a-kagame>; James Munyaneza, “Uganda: ‘New Rwanda Rebel Leaders in Uganda,’” *The New Times*, October 10, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200510310571.html>; Magnus Mazimpaka, “Rwanda: No RPR Rebel Threat - Bazivamo,” *The New Times*, November 16, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200511160155.html>; F. Ahimbisibwe, “Uganda: Army Refutes Rwanda Rebel Reports,” *The New Vision*, November 2, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200511020399.html>.

<sup>2901</sup> Taillefer, “Un défi à Kagamé?”; Munyaneza, “Uganda: ‘New Rwanda Rebel Leaders in Uganda’”; “Rwandanet: RPR Inkeragutabara Un Nouveau Parti Politique Au Rwanda,” *Rwandanet* (blog), October 31, 2005, <http://ukoziwuzze.blogspot.com/2005/10/rpr-inkeragutabara-un-nouveau-parti.html>.

<sup>2902</sup> Munyaneza, “Uganda: ‘New Rwanda Rebel Leaders in Uganda’”; Richard Sezibera, “East Africa: Media Disinformation Campaign Hurting Rwanda-Uganda Relations,” *The Monitor*, March 31, 2006, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200603300740.html>.

<sup>2903</sup> “Uganda Hands over 10 Suspected Rebels to Rwanda,” *Agence France Presse*, March 12, 2007, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3cc6081d-a5ce-4a90-89da-15b2ac2a9beb/?context=1516831>; Alfred Wasike, “Rwanda: Kagame Lauds Rebel Handover,” *The New Vision*, March 14, 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200703141280.html>.

<sup>2904</sup> “Uganda Hands over 10 Suspected Rebels to Rwanda”; “Rwanda; Ex-Dissident Ntashamaje Returns After 10-Year Exile,” *The New Times (Kigali)*, August 4, 2011, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/95abe7a1-9bc0-4e5c-b88a-9488cfd5dce/?context=1516831>.

<sup>2905</sup> “Congo-Kinshasa: DDRRR - Monuc Launches an Appeal to the Ex Combatants of the RUD And RPR Groups,” *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, February 10, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200902100692.html>; “Rwandan Combatants in Voluntary Cantonment,” IRIN, August 5, 2008, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/79630/drc-rwanda-rwandan-combatants-voluntary-cantonment>.



group RUD-Urunana, but did not refer to RPR itself as a splinter group.<sup>2906</sup> To the extent that personal histories of the named leadership are known, they did not have previous ties to FDLR. As such, we do not believe this is a splinter group of FDLR.

This group announced itself on 19 OCT 2005.<sup>2907</sup> However, it is unclear exactly when the group formed. When extraditing RPR-linked individuals to Rwanda in 2007, Ugandan security officials suggested that the individuals had been recruiting in refugee camps in Uganda since 2004.<sup>2908</sup> In an interview with *The New Times*, however, Gerald Ntashamaje claims that he was involved in another group, Alliance Démocratique Rwandaise (ADR-Isangano), from 2005 into 2006, but *subsequently* left it “and linked up with other individuals... to form Rassemblement du Peuple Rwandais (RPR), a rebel group he led until he decided to denounce anti-Kigali schemes.”<sup>2909</sup> This source would imply that the group was not founded until later, possibly even 2006. Yet it also may contradict with other seemingly reliable sources indicating that the group must have formed by at least OCT 2005 or earlier. I do not have great confidence in either source, but as the interview with Ntashamaje contradicts other corroborated sources, I have listed 2004 as the founding date with downgraded certainty. Because certainty regarding when the group formed is so low, I left name\_time and name\_time2 as missing.

In the group’s press release announcing its existence on 19 OCT 2005, RPR “makes a solemn appeal to other formations... to undertake together this noble task of liberating the Rwandan people from the RPF yoke [translated].” It also states that “the PRP reserves the right to use all means including force” to achieve their stated ends.<sup>2910</sup> As such, I have coded takeover as initial goal.

Sources are notably consistent in naming group leadership. This leadership includes Francois Rukeba (Ruceba, Rucyeba), Maj. Wenceslas Nsengiyumba (alias Peter Kabasha, allegedly ex-FAR), Major Jackson Safari (Safari Amiable, allegedly ex-FAR), David Sano (RPR spokesperson), and Josue R. Rugamba (RDR coordinator).<sup>2911</sup> Ugandan authorities arrested Francois Rukeba and Jackson Safari, as well as Peter Kabagambe, Peter Bisamaza, Vedaste Lyarwema, Paul Rwangabo, Daniel Kazungu, Aloysius Badege, Ismail Salomo, and Asumani Rutigana for RPR activities, but not until 2007; it is unclear whether these latter individuals meet our criterion for initial leadership (within the first year).<sup>2912</sup> Several articles indicate that Gerald Ntashamaje, a former major in the Rwandan army who defected in 2000, was

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<sup>2906</sup> “Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)” (United Nations Security Council, May 25, 2010), para. 42, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/252](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/252); Georgina Holmes, *Women and War in Rwanda: Gender, Media and the Representation of Genocide* (I.B.Tauris, 2013), 19, <https://books.google.com/books?id=XGkBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA321&lpg=PA321&dq=rassemblement+populaire+rwandais&source=bl&ots=kZLVWensRx&sig=VtQX7Fbruzmh24671OY3IS34AYE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjF76uW9NvVAhWr7IMKHQu0DAkQ6AEIKzAB#v=onepage&q=rassemblement%20populaire%20rwandais&f=false>; Munyaneza, “Uganda: ‘New Rwanda Rebel Leaders in Uganda’”; Sezibera, “East Africa: Media Disinformation Campaign Hurting Rwanda-Uganda Relations”; “Congo-Kinshasa: A Small Step Towards Peace in the East,” *IRIN*, June 5, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200806051082.html>; “Rwanda: ‘FDLR Leader Cuts Through Uganda to DRC Positions,’” *The New Times*, November 9, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200511090765.html>; “Rwanda; Ex-Dissident Ntashamaje Returns After 10-Year Exile”; Felicien Kanyamibwa, “Le Congrès National Pour La Démocratie (CND) Rejette Le Rapport Du Groupe D’ Experts Des NU. | UMOYA,” *Umoja* (blog), December 18, 2009, <http://umoya.org/2009/12/18/le-congrnational-pour-la-dcratie-cnd-rejette-le-rapport-du-groupe-d-experts-des-nu/>.

<sup>2907</sup> “Rwandanet”; Munyaneza, “Uganda: ‘New Rwanda Rebel Leaders in Uganda.’”

<sup>2908</sup> “Uganda Hands over 10 Suspected Rebels to Rwanda.”

<sup>2909</sup> “Rwanda; Ex-Dissident Ntashamaje Returns After 10-Year Exile.”

<sup>2910</sup> “Rwandanet.”

<sup>2911</sup> Munyaneza, “Uganda: ‘New Rwanda Rebel Leaders in Uganda’”; Sezibera, “East Africa: Media Disinformation Campaign Hurting Rwanda-Uganda Relations”; “Rwandanet.”

<sup>2912</sup> Wasike, “Rwanda: Kagame Lauds Rebel Handover”; “Uganda Hands over 10 Suspected Rebels to Rwanda.”

president of RPR for some time; however, he is not named in any early reporting on the group.<sup>2913</sup> It is possible that he did not join until the group had already formed, which would also explain the discrepancies above.

Unknown sources in The New Times identified several RPR leaders as ex-FAR.<sup>2914</sup> However, the group's press release indicates that membership includes former members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Rwandan Patriotic Army, and the Rwandan Defense Forces.<sup>2915</sup> As far as I am aware, no sources independently verify this information. As such, I have left party, military, and no\_prior\_org as missing under organizational history. In light of the information above, I coded former security under initial leadership. I left current security missing, as the timeline of Gerald Ntashamaje's involvement was unclear, and left former rebels as missing, given the organization's unverified claim that it contains former RPF and RPA.

Also in its press release, the RPR claims that it draws membership from all ethnic groups of Rwanda.<sup>2916</sup> However, several other sources describe the group as mainly Tutsi (although not all are from the initial year).<sup>2917</sup>

The group continues to appear in public accounts at least three years after its founding. In 2009, it formed an alliance with RUD-Urunana called Congrès national pour la démocratie. A 2010 report indicated that the group still included "a few dozen combatants," and reports on the CND alliance.<sup>2918</sup> Finally, a CND press release shows up as late as 23 AUG 2014. None of these sources identify specific attacks carried out by RPR, but this does not necessarily mean they did not occur – reporting on *any* specific attacks for RPR are not forthcoming. On balance, I have left viability variables for RPR as missing.

I code 0 for all contestation variables. No matter whether the group was formed in 2004 or 2005, there are no qualifying events in SCAD.

#### \*Congrès national pour la démocratie (CND)

AKAs: National Congress for Democracy

This group is a coalition of RUD-Urunana and RPR-Inkeragutabara.<sup>2919</sup> Excluded – merge or coalition of previously established rebel groups.

#### \*Rasta

AKAs: Rastas, FDLR/Rastas, FDLR-Rastas

Information on this group and its origins are inconsistent. It is often cited as a splinter group of FDLR or as made up of ex-FDLR.<sup>2920</sup> However, it appears to have some local (Congolese) members, apparently employed

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<sup>2913</sup> "Rwanda; Ex-Dissident Ntashamaje Returns After 10-Year Exile"; "Why Opposition Is Suspicious of Uwizeyimana," The East African, March 1, 2014, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uwizeyimana-s-return-to-Rwanda--suspicious--/2558-2227006-mftkraz/index.html>.

<sup>2914</sup> Ahimbisibwe, "Uganda: Army Refutes Rwanda Rebel Reports."

<sup>2915</sup> "Rwandanet."

<sup>2916</sup> "Rwandanet"; Taillefer, "Un défi à Kagamé?"

<sup>2917</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 42; Taillefer, "Un défi à Kagamé?"; Jackson Mwankenja, "Invigorated by Recent Successes Against Rwandan Defense Forces, Rwandan Rebels Close in to Rwandan Border," *Enet* (blog), July 19, 2013, <http://electronicswithnetwork.blogspot.com/2013/07/invigorated-by-recent-successes-against.html>.

<sup>2918</sup> "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 42.

<sup>2919</sup> Kanyamibwa, "Le Congrès National Pour La Démocratie (CND) Rejette Le Rapport Du Groupe D' Experts Des NU. | UMOYA"; "Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009)," para. 42; Holmes, *Women and War in Rwanda*, 19.

<sup>2920</sup> Feeley and Thomas-Jenson, "Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo," 11, 12; "July/August Monthly Update — Eastern Congo," *Enough Project* (blog), July 31, 2007, <http://enoughproject.org/reports/julyaugust-monthly-update-eastern-congo>; "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Elections in Sight: 'Don't Rock the Boat,'" 10; "DRC: Behind the Violence in South Kivu," Text, ReliefWeb, August 6, 2007,

as guides.<sup>2921</sup> The balance of membership and leadership is not clear, although I found it cited as a splinter or group associated with FDLR more often than I found reference to local Congolese membership – this would make sense if they merely employed locals as guides. Moreover, some sources go so far as to call it a branch of the FDLR or “the same” as the FDLR, explaining that the side organization allows FDLR to commit heinous acts and raids that it does not want associated with its name.<sup>2922</sup> The Rastas seem to operate freely within FDLR territory and operate jointly with FDLR, at least at times.<sup>2923</sup> This group is excluded, as it is likely a splinter group or even operational unit within FDLR.

**Hutu Rebels** – This term is used in ACLED, but it is not entirely clear what it refers to. Hutu Rebels first appear as an actor in 1997 and last appear in JUL 2001. I think at least some of the events tagged as Hutu Rebels were carried out by FDLR: FDLR is not introduced as an actor in ACLED until NOV 2003, well after FDLR was established; Hutu Rebels never appears as a tag after FDLR is introduced. Not all Hutu Rebels-tagged events can be FDLR, however, as the term first appears before FDLR was formed. It is possible some ALIR events are tagged as Hutu Rebels, since ALIR appears fewer than half a dozen times in Rwandan ACLED events. However, ACLED may have also used it as a catch-all term for unidentified armed groups of suspected Hutu origin. Some additional, unnamed groups may be hiding under this tag; if so, we do not have the resources to identify these groups. Excluded – not an organization.

**Local Defense Forces (LDF)** – This group is only tagged in two events (274RWA and 278RWA) and in both cases was the victim of violence, not the perpetrator. As such, it is excluded.

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<http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-behind-violence-south-kivu>; “Congo-Kinshasa: Les Cas de Viol Se Multiplient Au Sud-Kivu,” *Le Potentiel*, June 4, 2009, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200906040677.html>; “Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007),” para. 51.

<sup>2921</sup> Feeley and Thomas-Jenson, “Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo,” 11, 12; “Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007),” para. 51; “DRC: Behind the Violence in South Kivu”; “Congo-Kinshasa: Les Cas de Viol Se Multiplient Au Sud-Kivu.”

<sup>2922</sup> “DRC: Behind the Violence in South Kivu”; Par Hilaire Kayembe, “Congo-Kinshasa: Sud-Kivu - Les Rastas Attaquent, 2 Personnes Tuées et Une Enlevée,” *Le Potentiel*, July 22, 2008, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200807220956.html>.

<sup>2923</sup> “Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1771 (2007),” para. 51; “DRC: Behind the Violence in South Kivu”; “DRC: Latest Killings in South Kivu Part of Long-Standing Abuses,” Text, ReliefWeb, May 26, 2005, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-latest-killings-south-kivu-part-long-standing-abuses>; Nina Yacoubian, “Congo-Kinshasa: Les Kivu - Des Progrès Sont Enregistrés Malgré de Petits Incidents (A. Doss),” *United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)*, March 12, 2008, AllAfrica, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200803121131.html>.

## Senegal

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**Narrative Summary:** Conflicts with southern secessionist rebel groups make up the bulk of threats against the state in Senegal. This conflict in the Casamance region of Southern Senegal began in 1985 and continues today. The rebel groups involved in this conflict either formed prior to 1997 or are splinters of these groups. Outside of this, all other acts of violence are related to election protests, tribal conflicts, and looting.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** Further research uncovered no gaps in ACLED data in the 1997-2015 period. There was an event in ACLED that could have possibly been included in this dataset. However, the attack on the Socialist party seemed to be more connected to election protests and there was a lack of information to suggest otherwise.

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### \*Front de Libération du Peuple Sénégalais

AKAs: Liberation Front of the Senegalese People

Formed in 1988 this inactive group is excluded from this dataset for a start date prior to 1997.<sup>2924</sup>

### Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC)

AKAs: Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance

Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance was founded in 1982, and officially began engaging in intrastate conflict against the Senegalese government in 1990.<sup>2925</sup> However, this group is outside the parameters of this study focused on rebel groups formed after 1997.<sup>2926</sup>

### \*Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance – Front Nord (MFDC-FN)

AKAs: Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance – North Front

Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance- Northern Front was formed in 1992 due to divisions in MFDC over the decision to sign a peace agreement with the Senegalese government. MFDC-FN represents the splinter portion of MFDC in favor of the peace agreement.<sup>2927</sup> As a group formed prior to 1997, they are excluded from the dataset.

### Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance – Sadio (MFDC-S)

AKAs: Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance – Sadio

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<sup>2924</sup>“GTD Search Results.”

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=2&search=senegal&count=100&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTID&od=desc#results-table>; “Liberation Front of the Senegalese People | Terrorist Groups | TRAC.” <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/liberation-front-senegalese-people>.

<sup>2925</sup> Refugees, “Refworld | Casamance Civilians Shelled by the Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement.”

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9c74.html>.

<sup>2926</sup> Refugees, “Refworld | Casamance Civilians Shelled by the Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement.”

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9c74.html>.

<sup>2927</sup> “Non-International Armed Conflict in Senegal | Rulac.” <http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/niac-in-senegal#collapse1accord>.

Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance- Sadio was formed in 1992 when MFDC splintered into MFDC-FN and MFDC-S.<sup>2928</sup> They were the main military wing of MFDC and have closer ties to Guinea Bissau.<sup>2929</sup> As a splinter group, and as a group formed prior to 1997, they are excluded from the dataset.

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<sup>2928</sup> “62. Senegal/Casamance (1982-Present).” <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/senegalcasamance-1982-present/>.

<sup>2929</sup> “62. Senegal/Casamance (1982-Present).” <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/senegalcasamance-1982-present/>.

## Sierra Leone

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**Background:** Sierra Leone is still recovering from the effects of a decades-long civil war. Here is an outline of its origins leading up to the time covered:

- 1991- In the predawn hours of March 23<sup>rd</sup>, rebel troops crossed from Liberia into Sierra Leone. These rebels were known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), but also contained large numbers of Liberian and Burkinabe mercenaries. They are led by a Corporal Foday Sankoh, who had spent time in Libya with Charles Taylor. Their efforts were supported by Charles Taylor in large extent to punish the Sierra Leonean government for supporting ECOWAS forces trying to oust him. Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) forces proved to be largely ineffective at stopping this onslaught, as the army found itself hamstrung by years of lack of funds. The RUF soon conquered around a fifth of the country in the southeast. However, they lacked the organizational capacity to attack large cities and their offensive bogged down around the middle of the year.
- 1992- In the morning of April 29<sup>th</sup>, a group of SLA soldiers arrived at the State House in Freetown and demanded to speak with President Momoh regarding low pay and poor conditions on the front lines.<sup>2930</sup> Momoh thought this to be a coup and fled to the residence of the Nigerian Ambassador.<sup>2931</sup> The SLA troops then decided to designate Captain Valentine Strasser as the head of their new government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).<sup>2932</sup> The NPRC government was viewed very favorably by the majority of the Sierra Leonean populace, who were angered by the Momoh government's feeble response to the RUF.
- 1993-1995- These years saw a transition in the tactics of the RUF, as it went from fighting the SLA in the open to operating in the bush and ambushing towns. In doing so they committed many atrocities against locals. In order to counteract this threat, the NPRC began relying on Kamajors, militias initially comprised mostly of local hunters in order to better counter the RUF. While they experienced some success, the conflict swung decisively in the government's favor through the employment of the South African mercenaries in the company Executive Outcomes.
- 1996- On January 16<sup>th</sup>, Strasser is disposed via coup and replaced by the vice council of the NPRC, Julius Bio.<sup>2933</sup>
- 1997- On May 25, a group of soldiers launch an early attack on Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, releasing Johnny Paul Koroma, a leader who had played a key role in a previous coup attempt. This action was accompanied by massive violence directed against the government and business interests in the country. Later that day, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) is proclaimed, and members of the government flee or go into hiding. The AFRC also invites the RUF into a coalition government, thereby ending the civil war.

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<sup>2930</sup> Waught, Colin M. *Charles Taylor and Liberia*. Zed Books, 2011.

<sup>2931</sup> Pham, John-Peter. *The Sierra Leonean Tragedy*, 89.

<sup>2932</sup> In launching this coup, Strasser became the world's youngest head of state at the age of 26.

<sup>2933</sup> After being exiled to Guinea, Strasser eventually received a UN scholarship to study law at Warwick University in the UK. While there, however, a daughter of a former APC official recognized him and started a campaign to get the university to expel the former dictator. He was eventually expelled and ended up homeless in London, where he survived off the assistance of Leonean diplomats. After the signing of the peace deal, he returned home to Sierra Leone where he resides with his mother as of 2020.

Editor, John Carvel Education. "Lecturers Will Boycott Ex-Dictator." *The Guardian*, May 6, 1997.



- June 1st- Nigerian head of state Gen. Sani Abacha decides to return Kabbah to power by conducting a naval bombardment of Freetown. The plan backfires, with the Nigerian garrison besieged.
- October 23<sup>rd</sup>- Conakry accords are signed. These allowed Kabbah to return to power in 6 months and gave immunity to all leaders in the May 25<sup>th</sup> coup. It also allowed for Sankoh to continue playing a role in politics.<sup>2934</sup>
- 1998- February- Nigeria decides to take the offensive in combatting the AFRC-RUF coalition government, and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops begin to engage with AFRC-RUF soldiers on the outskirts of Freetown. At the same time, ECOMOG forces begin to invade the country from Eastern Liberia. After days of battle with extensive use of artillery by ECOMOG, Freetown was retaken by ECOMOG. This paved way for the return of President Kabbah to Freetown on March 10<sup>th</sup>. His return to Sierra Leone coincided with a massive spike of AFRC-RUF violence against civilians in operation “No living thing,” which was in retribution to charges brought against Sankoh by the government.<sup>2935</sup> This is followed by a renewed AFRC-RUF offensive towards Freetown in the last few weeks of the year.
- 1999-On January 6<sup>th</sup>, AFRC-RUF forces re-entered Freetown after months of fighting with ECOMOG forces, and renewed their campaign of massive violence, torching the Nigerian High Commission and Fourah Bay College. This was also accompanied by widescale sexual violence as well as a targeted destruction of Sierra Leone’s legal system, with hundreds of policemen and judges killed.<sup>2936</sup> Upon retaking control of the city later on in February, Nigerian Forces mounted a harsh reprisal campaign against RUF with summary executions of suspected rebels.

#### ***Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: Medium***

***Explanation:*** Following the collapse of the AFRC in 1999, there was fracturing of the group and a general state of anarchy. Groups like the West Side Boys gained coverage in large part because it happened to be based near Freetown and interacted with outside observers quite a lot. However, I rate this as medium and not high as the majority of unknown groups would most likely be splinters of the AFRC or the RUF.

#### **Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)**

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was a Sierra Leonean insurgent group that took part in a coup on May 25<sup>th</sup>, 1997, when a small group of Sierra Leonean Army soldiers launched an attack on Pademba Road prison in Freetown. I coded the group as beginning in February of 1998.<sup>2937</sup> This is because this is when the group was pushed out of Freetown by Nigerian led ECOMOG forces. Since the group was already known before becoming a rebel group, I deemed it not clandestine.

I coded the group as developing out of the military. The group largely consisted of non-commissioned officers in the Sierra Leonean military who were concerned about their position within the Sierra Leonean state. The military had long held a privileged position in Sierra Leone, and many of its generals were angered by the power they had to give up in the newly formed civilian government.<sup>2938</sup> Furthermore, many of the lower ranks were paid low wages of around \$25, and were concerned about being thrust into abject poverty if they were discharged. In large part due to the fact the group took over Freetown, it had little need to acquire other sources of funding.

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<sup>2934</sup> Ibid, 131.

<sup>2935</sup> Ibid, 137.

<sup>2936</sup> Ibid, 140.

<sup>2937</sup> Hazen, Jennifer M. 2004. "How Conflict Networks Fuel and Finish Civil Wars." Ph.D. Dissertation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 102.

<sup>2938</sup> Pham, John-Peter. *The Sierra Leonean Tragedy*, 140.

I coded the group's leadership as primarily belonging to former armed forces. The group's leadership was primarily composed of lower ranking officers in the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces.<sup>2939</sup> One of the prisoners freed from the prison on May 25<sup>th</sup> was Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the former head of Valentine Strasser's security detail who was being held for participating in prior coup attempts.<sup>2940</sup> Koroma would go on to serve as the leader of the group. I coded this group as having no external funding. This is in large part due to the fact that the group stole most of what it needed from the city of Freetown following its takeover and then took this material with it into the countryside.<sup>2941</sup>

I decided to code the first large, small and civilian attack of the AFRC as taking place on February 17<sup>th</sup>, 1998 when the group attacked the town of Bo.<sup>2942</sup> There were reports of heavy casualties that occurred from the attack.<sup>2943</sup> There was extensive looting and reports of violence being carried out against civilians.<sup>2944</sup> Due to the fact that these attacks occurred within three months of the AFRC being formed, I coded the group as satisfying both of the "civ\_attack\_time" variables. While Bo is sometimes referred to as a city, it is quite a small one (pop around 150k during the time of this rebellion) so is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a 1.

I decided to code the group as satisfying the contestation variable, as there were large scale protests that had occurred throughout Sierra Leone in the year before the group's formation.<sup>2945</sup>

I did not decide to code the AFRC as not achieving viability. After the group's formation in February of 1998, they fought with ECOMOG forces, eventually making their way back to Freetown in January of 1999.<sup>2946</sup> ECOMOG forces counterattacked, destroying the AFRC as a cohesive fighting force. The group fell apart after its second attack on Freetown. A splinter group, the West Side Boys, was active in 2000, but they were destroyed following *Operation Barras* later on in that same year.<sup>2947</sup>

There were only type 2 events that occurred in the year prior to the AFRC's formation (interpreted as January 1, 1996). One was a civilian demonstration celebrating after Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's presidential victory. The other was involved advocates for female circumcision demonstrating for the government to ban groups against female circumcision. The latter event occurred in Freetown and also in Bo, where the AFRC formed, satisfying the local contestation variables.

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<sup>2939</sup> Mats Utas and Magnus Jörgel, "The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 492, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003388>.

<sup>2940</sup> Ibid, 91.

<sup>2941</sup> "POLITICAL & CIVIL UNREST; SIERRA LEONE." *Lloyd's Information Casualty Report*, May 27, 1997. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=llcasr0020011002dt5r006b2&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2942</sup> "ECOMOG Sending Troops to Countryside as Junta Fights Back." Accessed August 10, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=86050e81-14b9-4d58-9935-bbfe9a337c1f&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S1X-W1K0-0094-N53T-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=144245&pdteaserkey=sr10&pditab=allpods&ecom=gb63k&earg=sr10&prid=ba7fac32-6524-4eaa-8030-6934807f3d07>.

<sup>2943</sup> Bunce, Matthew. "FOCUS-Sierra Leone Rebels Leave Bo in Ruins." *Reuters News*, February 25, 1998. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926du2p014dg&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2944</sup> "Ex-Leader Vows to Return as Rebels Cornered; \* SIERRA LEONE AFRICA." Accessed August 10, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=3bf0bd23-3860-4ed3-9045-9bf2649683fe&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4P85-1CR0-TXN5-R3BM-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=314237&pdteaserkey=sr29&pditab=allpods&ecom=gb63k&earg=sr29&prid=61efe7d-f-c30a-4bb6-b62d-69bfd99df86f>.

<sup>2945</sup> "Sierra Leone Junta Warns Of Press Curbs, Price-Gouging." *Dow Jones International News*. June 10, 1997. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=dji0000020011006dt6a0487q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2946</sup> Mats Utas and Magnus Jörgel, "The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 492, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003388>.

<sup>2947</sup> Mats Utas and Magnus Jörgel, "The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 505, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003388>.

#### National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL):

Charles Taylor's forces during the first Liberian Civil War. INPFL led by Prince Johnson branched off from them. Excluded because they were formed before the beginning of the dataset in 1997 and were a primarily Liberian based organization.

#### West Side Boys (WSB)

AKA: West Side N\*\*\*az or West Side Junglers

I decided to ultimately discount The West Side Boys as a group as they are considered a splinter group of the AFRC. The majority of the foot soldiers and leadership of the organization had served in the AFRC prior to its routing from Freetown.<sup>2948</sup>

#### Revolutionary United Front (RUF):

Formed in 1991, this group is excluded as it formed before the start date. The RUF did enter a coalition with the AFRC in 1997 to govern Freetown, but the leadership of the groups did not merge.<sup>2949</sup>

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<sup>2948</sup> Mats Utas and Magnus Jörgel, "The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 492, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003388>.

<sup>2949</sup> Pham, John-Peter. *The Sierra Leonean Tragedy*.

## South Africa

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**Narrative Summary:** *Although the Union of South Africa obtained self-governing dominion status within the British Empire in 1910, its government remained under the control of its minority white population until its first inclusive democratic elections in 1994. When the National Party, predominantly backed by the Dutch-descended Afrikaners in the majority among South African whites, gained power in 1948, it began implementing extensive legislation that built on and greatly expanded existing legal and social segregation and exclusion along racial lines, a system known as apartheid, “apartness” in the Afrikaners’ Afrikaans language. Frustrated by the regime’s harsh repression of its civil disobedience campaigns, the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, launched its armed wing uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK, “spear of the nation” in the Xhosa language) in 1961. The more militant Pan African Congress (PAC) and later groups associated with the Black Consciousness movement also took up arms against the state.*

*As President F.W. de Klerk’s government and MK founder and longtime political prisoner Nelson Mandela and the ANC entered into negotiations to end apartheid and white rule, political violence spiked as organizations mobilized their supporters and armed wings, and fears grew of “Third Force” elements within the apartheid security apparatus manipulating the violence to prevent the transition to universal franchise with the majority black population finally receiving the right to vote. Since the overwhelming victory of Mandela’s ANC in the 1994, political violence has decreased, but several Afrikaner nationalist/separatist organizations have planned or carried out attacks on state and civilian targets. Only the Boere Party, a small group charged with plotting to attack the ruling ANC’s 2012 national conference, is in our dataset because higher-profile organizations such as the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), Boermag, and the Boere Attack Troop have pre-1997 origins. Despite the continued existence of Afrikaner nationalist militants willing to use force to challenge the state, they no longer pose the significant destabilizing threat they did in the run-up to the 1994 elections.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** *Fifty-one percent of South Africa’s 1,064 ACLED events involved unidentified armed groups. The vast majority of these incidents targeted civilians, not state targets, but their high number indicates a greater possibility that our dataset is missing groups which should be included, and many of the attacks were political in nature (e.g., targeted assassinations). In particular, the presence of additional small, unidentified militant Afrikaner nationalist groups along the lines of the Boere Party meeting our minimal inclusion criteria seems plausible, though only such groups as were founded from 1997 on and were neither mergers nor splinters of preexisting groups would enter the dataset.*

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### Abahwebi baKwaMashu

Group of South African tradespeople suspected of carrying out attacks on Somali shop owners in 2014 (5894SAF). Excluded.

### African National Congress (ANC)

Ruling party throughout the period examined. Excluded.

### African National Congress (Motlanthe Faction) and African National Congress (Zuma Faction)

Rival factions of the ruling ANC, backing President Jacob Zuma and Deputy President (and former caretaker president) Kgalema Motlanthe, clashed in 2012 ahead of the party’s annual

conference at which Zuma defeated Motlanthe for the party's presidency. Election-related violence. Excluded.

#### **African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL)**

Official arm of the ruling party. Excluded.

#### **Afrikaner Ethnic Militia (South Africa)**

The four ACLED events listing this actor as the main actor were all unconnected incidents of Afrikaner attacks against black civilians. Excluded.

ACLED also lists the Afrikaner Ethnic Militia as an allied actor in events 3700SAF – 3703SAF attributed to the Federal Freedom Party. These events involve a series of arrests in four different regions between December 16 and 17, 2012 of men plotting to establish an Afrikaner homeland and assassinate President Zuma. See the entry for the Boere Party below for more details.

#### **Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)**

Afrikaner white nationalist far-right group founded in 1973.<sup>2950</sup> Involved in numerous attacks and plots. Excluded due to pre-1997 founding.

#### **Agang**

Opposition political party involved in several election-related incidents. Excluded.

#### **Al Shabaab**

Foreign group. Excluded.

#### **Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) and National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)**

Rival labor unions involved in violent clashes in 2012 and 2013 in North West and Gauteng. Excluded.

#### **Bapo Ba Mogale Tribal Authority**

State-recognized traditional authority in North West Province. Its members beat a man who opposed a mining deal between the authority and the Lonmin corporation in August 2015 (6872SAF). Excluded.

#### **Boer National Warriors Militia (BNW)**

AKAs: Warriors of the Boer Nation, Krygers van die Boerevolk

During the weekend of November 9-10, 2002, a previously unknown group calling itself the "Warriors of the Boer Nation" ("Krygers van die Boerevolk" in Afrikaans) claimed responsibility for a series of October 30, 2002, bombings in the Soweto township outside Johannesburg.<sup>2951</sup> The police were investigating the previously unclaimed attacks as the work of the Boeremag, and National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi blamed the Boeremag, not the Warriors of the Boer Nation, for the attacks days after the latter's claim of responsibility.<sup>2952</sup> The group never issued another public statement nor did the government ever identify any individual as being a member

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<sup>2950</sup> Rosa Lyster, "The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Far Right," *The Outline*, October 30, 2017, <https://theoutline.com/post/2433/the-rise-and-fall-of-south-africa-s-far-right>.

<sup>2951</sup> "Afrikaner Group Reportedly Accepts Responsibility for Bomb Blasts.," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, November 11, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020021111dybb0058x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2952</sup> "Boeremag Was Behind Bombings - Selebi.," *All Africa*, November 14, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021114dybe00dm3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



of the group. Multiple media reports treated the Warriors' claim as if the Boeremag itself had taken responsibility. It seems likely that the Warriors were either one and the same as the Boeremag or emerged out of the older group.<sup>2953</sup> Excluded.

### Boere Attack Troop (BAT)

After a post-1994 lull in Afrikaner nationalist, far-right violence, the new Boere Attack Troop (1SAF, its only ACLED event) carried out a series of bombings beginning on December 24, 1996.<sup>2954</sup> At least one of its targets, a post office, was a state target. Excluded due to pre-1997 start.

### Boere Party\*

A police sting operation resulted in the December 17, 2012, arrests of four South Africans in Naboomspruit for allegedly planning acts of sabotage across the country, including preparations for a bomb attack on the ruling African National Congress's national conference in Mangaung.<sup>2955</sup> Although two of the accused were members of the recently formed Federal Freedom Party (FFP), established on a platform of peacefully pushing for a federal system that would include Afrikaner homelands, the government claimed that they planned to organize a new group called the Boere Party as the vehicle for their attacks, with the first public mention of the group's name coming in a December 18 media report.<sup>2956</sup> According to the government's sources, the group had been planning attacks since January 2012.<sup>2957</sup>

The group's name became public through the court proceedings around the arrest of its members. Johan Prinsloo, the founder of the Boere Party, and his associates clandestinely planned their activities such that more hardline Afrikaner nationalists thought he was not militant enough prior to his arrest.<sup>2958</sup> The clandestine planning took place within South Africa, with most of it occurring near Bloemfontein according to the government.<sup>2959</sup> However, due to Naboomspruit being the first identified location of operation planning, that town satisfies the "rural" variable as a 1. The group's political goals were "self-governance and independence" for the Boer people.<sup>2960</sup> The surveyed media sources did not discuss the Boere Party's funding sources, though it allegedly contacted the U.S.-based Ku Klu Klan and Aryan Nation.<sup>2961</sup> SCAD includes riots and demonstrations of sufficient size in 2011 to meet our contestation definition. SCAD includes six instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation in the year prior to group formation, but none of these occurred in Limpopo Province where the group formed. Four Type 2 events occurred during this time. Two of these, protests against the hiring of foreign workers at a state-owned power plant,

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<sup>2953</sup> Michael Dynes, "Mandela Target of 'Coups Plotters' .," *The Times*, May 17, 2003.

<sup>2954</sup> Ed O'Loughlin, "Bombs in S. Africa Put Light on White Right," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 10, 1997, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0110/011097.intl.intl.4.html>.

<sup>2955</sup> Andrew Beatty, "S.Africa Police Arrest Four in Anti-Terror Sting," *Agence France Presse*, December 17, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020121217e8ch007sr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2956</sup> Jon Gambrell, "Police: 4 Men Face Treason, Terror Charges in South Africa over Plot to Attack ANC Convention," *Associated Press Newswires*, December 18, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020121218e8ci0015q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2957</sup> SAPA, "Right-Wing Plot to Kill ANC Leaders," *Cape Argus*, December 19, 2012, E1 edition, sec. NWS.

<sup>2958</sup> Sally Evans, "Mangaung: Terrorist Threat or Flight of Fancy?," *Mail & Guardian Online*, December 21, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AIWMAG0020121221e8cl0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2959</sup> "Terror Group Planned to Eliminate SA Leaders," *Daily News*, December 19, 2012, E1 edition, sec. NWS.

<sup>2960</sup> Verashni Pillay, "Mangaung 'bomb' Part of Zuma Assassination Plot," *Mail & Guardian Online*, December 18, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AIWMAG0020121219e8ci00007&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2961</sup> Mogomotsi Selebi, "Right-Wingers Targeted ANC Top Brass," *Sowetan*, November 6, 2014, Sowetan edition, sec. News, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SOWT000020141106eab60000u&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Evans, "Mangaung."



did occur in Limpopo Province. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

All four accused men were active in various other Afrikaner nationalist organizations, with two of them being members and leaders of the Federal Freedom Party.<sup>2962</sup> The FFP's executive council denounced the Boere Party's espousal of violence and suspended Prinsloo, the FFP's operations manager, and Hein Boonzaaier, the FFP's president.<sup>2963</sup> While Prinsloo and Mark Trollip were ultimately convicted of high treason and sentenced to eight years in prison, charges were dropped against Boonzaaier due to lack of evidence and against Martin Kevy due to the latter's lack of mental fitness.<sup>2964</sup>

The group never launched any attacks against state or civilian targets and did not become viable.

#### **Boermag Militia**

The Boermag ("Boer Force") was a right-wing, white Afrikaner group aiming to overthrow South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) government which our surveyed sources first mention on August 26, 2002, in connection with 10 suspects apprehended in April and August for plotting a coup to take over the government and drive black South Africans out of the country.<sup>2965</sup> It is unclear when the group, an underground network of right-wing Afrikaners including current members of the South African security forces, began, though clearly some time before the April 5, 2002, arrests of Michael du Toit, his brother Andre du Toit, and associate Jacobus du Plessis.<sup>2966</sup> In its lengthy and ultimately successful case against the coup plotters, the prosecution alleged that Afrikaners opposed to the end of apartheid and the ANC's rise to power began Boermag in 1994 and started actively planning the coup attempt in 2000.<sup>2967</sup> While there is ample evidence that the Boermag's political goals and planning would otherwise meet our inclusion criteria, its likely pre-1997 founding is the reason we exclude it from our dataset.

#### **Bushbuckridge Residents Association (BRA)**

Group involved in vigilante attacks against suspected criminals in 2012 (3615SAF) and 2013 (3974SAF). Excluded.

#### **Benoni Taxi Association Militia (BTA) and Davyton/Kempton Park Militia (DKP)**

Only ACLED incident was a clash between rival militias in Gauteng in 2002 (598SAF). Did not challenge the state. Excluded.

#### **Chemical Workers Industrial Union Militia (CWIU)**

Labor union. Only ACLED event (139SAF) was attack against strikebreakers. Did not challenge the state. Excluded.

#### **Communication Workers' Union (CWU)**

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<sup>2962</sup> SAPA, "Right-Wing Plot to Kill ANC Leaders."

<sup>2963</sup> "Party Suspends Plot Suspects," *The Star*, December 20, 2012, E1 edition, sec. NWS.

<sup>2964</sup> "ANC WELCOMES JUDGMENT ON PRINSLOO CASE," *SAPA (South African Press Association)*, November 6, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SAPA000020141106eab6002mh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2965</sup> "Concern for Witnesses in Coup Case," *SAPA (South African Press Association)*, August 26, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=sapa000020020826dy8q001jz&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2966</sup> Allan Secombe, "Alleged White Extremists Appear in S.African Court.," *Reuters News*, April 8, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020020408dy4800lgt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2967</sup> Dynes, "Mandela Target of 'Coup Plotters'.," PHILLIP DE WET, "Boermag Planned Total Onslaught," *Mail & Guardian Online*, July 27, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AIWMAG0020120823e87r0000w&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Labor union. Only ACLED event (6629SAF) was attack against a strikebreaker. Did not challenge the state. Excluded.

#### Congress of South African Students (COSAS)

COSAS is an association of students associated with the ruling ANC.<sup>2968</sup> Excluded.

#### Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

With the ANC and the South African Communist Party, COSATU is part of South Africa's ruling tripartite alliance. The four ACLED events involving COSATU were a clash with opposition DA supporters and attacks targeting COSATU members. Did not challenge the state. Excluded.

#### Democratic Alliance (DA)

Opposition political party. Election-related violence. Excluded.

#### Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)

Opposition political party. Election-related violence. Excluded.

#### Federal Freedom Party (FFP)

This group is apparently distinct from the Freedom Front Plus.

Events 3700SAF – 3703SAF involve a series of arrests in four different regions between December 16 and 17, 2012 of four men plotting to establish an Afrikaner homeland and assassinate President Zuma. For all four events, the Federal Freedom Party is listed as the main actor, and Afrikaner Ethnic Militia is an allied actor.

#### Geloftevolk Republikeine

Splinter of the AWB. Excluded as splinter.

#### Hamsini Communal Militia (South Africa) and Ntsimbini Communal Militia (South Africa)

Men from two neighboring Eastern Cape villages clashed for unknown reasons on December 27, 2014. Excluded.

#### Hlubi Ethnic Militia (South Africa)

Clashed with members of the Xhosa ethnic group in Eastern Cape in December 2015 (7412SAF). Not targeted at the state. Excluded.

#### Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Opposition political party. The party's militia and supporters were involved in many election-related clashes with the ANC and the National Freedom Party, an IFP splinter. Excluded.

#### Jesurun Brotherhood

A media report described the Jesurun Brotherhood as "a right-wing Christian group which espouses racial separatism."<sup>2969</sup> 1824SAF, the group's only ACLED incident, was the 2009 arrest of 5 Jesurun Brotherhood members for "an earlier attack and weapons charge," an attack on a white farmer for refusing to fire his black employees. Excluded.

#### Khuleka Communal Militia (South Africa) and Masemeni Communal Militia (South Africa)

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<sup>2968</sup> Nikolaus Bauer, "Youth Leagues in SA: A Poverty of Options," *Mail & Guardian Online*, September 1, 2011, <https://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-01-youth-leagues-in-sa-a-poverty-of-options>.

<sup>2969</sup> Karen Breytenbach, "Right-Wing Sect Members up on Assault, Weapons Charges," *Cape Times*, January 12, 2010, E1 edition, sec. News.

Residents of the Eastern Cape villages of Khuleka and Masemeni clashed in July 2015 over jobs and a planned construction project. Excluded.

#### **KwaZulu-Natal Communal Militia (South Africa)**

Clashes in 2000 over cattle and a tribal conflict. Excluded.

#### **Labour Union Faction Militia**

Both ACLED events with this actor tag (8SAF in 1997 and 220SAF in 1999) involved attacks by union members on other members of the same union. Excluded.

#### **Mabaso Ethnic Militia (South Africa) and Mvelase Ethnic Militia (South Africa)**

September 2004 clash between members of different ethnic groups in Midlands area of KwaZulu-Natal (777SAF). Excluded.

#### **Magangangozi Communal Militia (South Africa) and Mhlwazini Communal Militia (South Africa)**

Burning of houses in a March 2008 (1221SAF) land dispute in KwaZulu-Natal. Excluded.

#### **Militia (Students)**

In April 1999, students arrested and held their school principal in Eastern Cape (202SAF and 203SAF). Excluded.

#### **Mkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans' Association (MKVMA)**

Organization of veterans of the ANC's armed wing during the anti-apartheid struggle. During the fiercely contested 2012 ANC leadership battle between President Zuma and ex-president Motlanthe, pro-Zuma MK veterans attacked Motlanthe supporters at an ANC meeting in Gauteng (ACLED event 3555SAF). Election-related violence in support of state leadership. Excluded.

#### **Msinga Communal Militia (South Africa)**

This ACLED code referred to 2015 Zulu clan-based violence (6455SAF, 6466SAF, 6646SAF, and 6644SAF) and 2005 police efforts to confiscate illegal weapons (832SAF). Excluded.

#### **Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)**

An anonymous caller claiming to represent the Islamist group MAGO took responsibility on behalf of MAGO for August 1998 bomb explosions at Planet Hollywood in a tourist area of Cape Town. The attack killed 2 and injured 27. The group later denied any involvement, and police linked the bombings to People Against Gangsterism and Drugs.<sup>2970</sup> Excluded.

#### **National Students Movement (NASMO)**

NASMO is the student organization of the opposition National Freedom Party. In March 2012, NASMO members clashed with ANC-backing students at the University of Zululand (2751SAF). Not an attack on state. Excluded.

#### **National Freedom Party (NFP)**

Splinter of the Inkatha Freedom Party opposition party. Excluded.

#### **National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)**

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<sup>2970</sup> "Police Chief Rules out International Links in Planet Hollywood Blast," *Agence France-Presse*, September 2, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010914du9203und&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Camps Bay Bomb Is the Latest of Many," *SAPA (South African Press Association)*, November 29, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=sapa000020010910dvbt0019i&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

NUMSA members engaged in a series of attacks against Cape Town workers who were not participating in the September 2013 general strike. Excluded.

**People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)**

Vigilante group active in the Cape Town area. Connected to a series of bombings against gangsters, tourist locations, and state institutions beginning in December 1996.<sup>2971</sup> Excluded due to pre-1997 founding (and likely not meeting other criteria as well).

**Pan Africanist Student Movement of Azania (PASMA) and South Africa Students Congress (SASCO)**

Members of rival student organizations clashed in Gauteng in April 2000. Excluded.

**Protesters (South Africa) and Rioters (South Africa)**

None of the ACLED actors coded as protesters or rioters met our criteria. Excluded.

**Palestine Solidarity Committee of South Africa (PSCSA)**

Palestinian activists were arrested outside the Israeli ambassador's residence in 2002 (505SAF). Not targeting the South African state. Excluded.

**Red Ants Militia**

Pro-state militia involved in evictions. Excluded.

**South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union (SATAWU)**

Members of the SAWATU were attacked in one instance (1669SAF in 2009) and abducted a key witness for an upcoming trial in another (4077SAF in 2013). Excluded.

**Shangaan Ethnic Militia (South Africa)**

Involved in what ACLED terms ethnic clashes with members of the Xhosa ethnic group in North West in 2000 and 2004 (357SAF, 358SAF, and 751SAF). Didn't target the state. Excluded.

**Shona Ethnic Militia (South Africa) and Sotho Ethnic Militia (South Africa)**

Illegal miners of the two ethnic groups clashed in the Free State in 2012 (2797SAF). Excluded.

**Transport Livelihood Militia (South Africa)**

Taxi drivers opened fire on rival Autopax buses in Gauteng in 2015 (6703SAF). Didn't target the state. Excluded.

**United Democratic Movement (UDM)**

Opposition political party. Election-related violence, primarily clashes with ANC supporters. Excluded.

**Unemployed Masses of South Africa (UMSA)**

A gang of unemployed miners who attacked working miners in Gauteng in 2000 (274SAF). Excluded.

**Union of Nationalists for Renewal (UNR)**

Foreign (DRC). Excluded.

**Vigilante Militia (South Africa)**

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<sup>2971</sup> "Camps Bay Bomb Is the Latest of Many."

ACLED incidents primarily involve attacks on civilians. No attacks against state targets with intent to challenge the state beyond local disputes with local officials. Excluded.

#### **Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie Party**

The VVK is a self-declared election commission for South African Afrikaners overseeing an Afrikaner-only voter list to elect representatives to negotiate on behalf of the Afrikaners with the central government regarding the creation of an independent Afrikaner homeland.<sup>2972</sup> Their only ACLED event was a member's alleged attack on a Stellenbosch University professor in 2011 (2313SAF). Unlike the Boere Party which meets our rebel group criteria and several other groups with entries above, the VVK does not appear to have planned or carried out violent attacks against state targets. Excluded.

#### **Xhosa Ethnic Militia (South Africa)**

Groups with this ACLED actor tag were primarily involved in ethnic/communal violence with members of other ethnic groups. Excluded.

#### **Xolobeni Communal Militia (South Africa)**

Groups with this ACLED actor tag were primarily involved in ethnic/communal violence with members of other ethnic groups. Excluded.

#### **Zulu Ethnic Militia (South Africa)**

Groups with this ACLED actor tag were primarily involved in ethnic/communal violence with members of other ethnic groups. Excluded.

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<sup>2972</sup> “DERBY-LEWIS TURNS DOWN VVK ELECTION NOMINATION,” *SAPA (South African Press Association)*, August 22, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SAPA000020110822e78m00209&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

**Narrative Summary:** *Since its 2011 independence, South Sudan has experienced multiple rebellions and internal conflicts. Following ACLED, we only include rebel activity under South Sudan if it took place on or after Independence Day. So, in addition to meeting all of our standard inclusion criteria, only groups which formed on or after July 9, 2011, enter our dataset. The dataset includes groups which otherwise meet our criteria but formed before that date (but on or after January 1, 1997) under Sudan rather than South Sudan, even if their activity continued after formal independence.*

*Even before the eruption of the new country's civil war in December 2013, one of the major early focuses of President Salva Kiir's government was settling localized conflicts with pre-independence roots. Kiir offered amnesty to the leaders of several ongoing insurgencies and agreed to integrate their fighters into the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) as the latter transitioned, at least on paper, to becoming the new country's national military. On the eve of the civil war in late 2013, David Yau Yau, a former commander in the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army in Jonglei State's Pibor County who had launched a new insurgency in 2012 (eventually SSDM/A-Cobra Faction) at least partly in response to neighboring ethnic militia attacks against his Murle ethnic group, was one of the only major rebel commanders still in the field.*

*However, the reduction in the number of rebellions against Kiir's ruling Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) masked deep divisions with the ruling party and continued ethnic tensions which South Sudan's leaders were well experienced in using to mobilize their support bases. In June 2013, Kiir sacked Vice President Riek Machar Teny, who had previously defected from the SPLM/A in 1991 to lead various rival groups until his return to the SPLM/A in 2002, and the rest of his cabinet in a major power shakeup. Machar and other prominent SPLM dissidents, including suspended party secretary general Pagan Amum, prepared to challenge Kiir's leadership at the party's December 2013 National Liberation Council meeting ahead of the upcoming 2015 presidential election, but in a still disputed series of events beginning the night of December 15-16, Kiir loyalist troops and pro-Machar forces clashed in Juba. Machar escaped northwards, and ethnic militias associated with Kiir's Dinka ethnic group launched a series of attacks on civilians from Machar's Nuer ethnic group living in Juba. Former and several current SPLA commanders who had been associated with Machar's and other earlier rebellions defected to join the nascent forces aligned against Kiir, and the Nuer militias known as the "White Army" struck back against the SPLA and the Dinka. The forces aligned with Machar have become known as the SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), sometimes contrasted with Kiir's SPLM/A-in-Government (SPLM/A-IG or simply SPLM/A).*

*Since December 2013, the two SPLM/A factions have waged a civil war in between fragile ceasefires and ineffective peace agreements. After the failure of multiple ceasefires and negotiations, Machar and Kiir finally signed the Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015, and Machar returned to Juba with a contingent of SPLA-IO soldiers in April 2016 to resume his prior role as vice president in accord with ARCSS. However, fighting between SPLA and IO troops broke out anew on July 8, 2016, amid allegations of an IO coup attempt and a plot to murder Machar, and Machar and his troops escaped to the DRC. SPLM/A-IO negotiator Taban Deng remained in Juba, and Kiir appointed him to replace Machar as vice president as the new government-recognized SPLM/A-IO leader, though the vast majority of IO forces remained loyal to Machar, under house arrest in South Africa since December 2016, and in opposition to Deng's leadership. The ongoing negotiations facilitated by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led to yet another Cessation of Hostilities (COH) agreement that went into effect on December 24, 2017. Whether or not this one will be any more successful than previous attempts remains to be seen.*

*While the SPLM/A-IO remains the largest and most influential rebel group in South Sudan, additional rebel groups have continued to form. Longtime opposition politician Lam Akol, the former Sudanese foreign minister and South Sudanese agriculture minister, formed the National Democratic*



*Movement (NDM) in late August 2016, and its armed wing is based in the former Upper Nile State. Less than one month after resigning from the SPLA, General Thomas Cirillo Swaka launched the Equatoria-based National Salvation Front (NAS) in March 2017, and his group quickly absorbed the remnants of SSDM-Cobra Faction and SPLM/A-IO dissidents. Akol and Cirillo cited ethnic favoritism by the Dinka-dominated government and a general lack of democracy in South Sudan among their grievances. Fighting has broken out among the various rebel factions as NAS and NDM fighters have clashed with SPLM/A-IO forces in Central Equatoria and Upper Nile, respectively.*

*Despite ongoing negotiations and periodic announcements of breakthroughs, rebel activity seems likely to continue for some time. With the rise of new actors, particularly NAS, conflict among the various rebel factions may become a larger part of the conflict than it was in the past, though the SPLM/A-IO remains the dominant rebel actor. Tensions within Kiir's SPLM government and his Dinka ethnic support base, heightened since the 2017 sacking and subsequent house arrest of SPLA Chief of Staff Paul Malong, raise the possibility that dissatisfied regime supporters who have long stood by with the government may defect to the existing rebel movements or launch new groups of their own. Given the proliferation of rebel groups, even a durable solution to the civil war between Machar's SPLM/A-IO and the central government would still leave multiple rebel groups in the field. [Note: This summary was written prior to the September 2018 peace agreements. The group descriptions primarily discuss groups active in the 2011-2015 period, but there are a few entries for groups formed in 2016 and 2017 although these are not included in the dataset, which only includes groups that formed before the end of 2015.]*

#### **Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: High**

**Explanation:** Unidentified actors and groups are prevalent in the public data available on conflict in South Sudan. From independence through 2015, more than a fifth (350 of 1,608) of the ACLED event listings for South Sudan, winnowed as described in our codebook, involved an unidentified South Sudanese armed group as a primary actor, and 43 of GTD's 111 South Sudan events (38.7 percent) during the same period included unknown individuals or groups as the primary actor. Furthermore, it is possible that the public databases understate the proportion of events associated with unknown actors. Amid the monitored media sources' significant coverage of South Sudan's conflicts, it is attacks in peripheral regions and unclaimed by any group, whether previously unknown or well established, that the English-language and largely foreign media sources may be the most likely to miss and which thus are most likely to be omitted from the databases. The relatively abundant media, governmental, and NGO reporting on South Sudan is simply not comprehensive enough to capture all attacks and announcements that may mark new rebel group formation.

**Note on SCAD's South Sudan data:** SCAD's coverage of non-combat protests and riots in independent South Sudan is very scant. Most events in the dataset, particularly after the start of the 2013 civil war, are conflict events rather than the riot and protest events (event types 1,3, and 4) that we use to code the contestation variables. For these reasons, the contestation variable codings for the later South Sudan groups may not be comparable with those for earlier South Sudanese groups and those from other countries.

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Foreign groups active in South Sudan included Al Shabaab, LRA: Lord's Resistance Army, **PDF: Popular Defence Forces** (Sudan pro-government militia), RSF: Rapid Support Forces (Sudan pro-government militia), and **SLM/A-Nur: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Abdul Wahid al-Nur Faction)**.

#### *Named South Sudanese groups*

**Agwelek Forces:** General Johnson Olonyi's rebel group was already in existence prior to South Sudan's July 9, 2011, independence as a splinter from Robert Gwang's 2010 rebellion. Following a failed

integration effort into the SPLA in late 2010 and early 2011, Olony aligned himself with George Athor Deng's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and continued fighting the SPLA.<sup>2973</sup> See the entries for the Gwang and Olonyi groups in our Sudan country section. In February 2012, the remnants of SSDM/A elected Olony as its new leader.<sup>2974</sup> In June 2013, after several months of back-and-forth with the government and the Shilluk king, Olonyi and his troops, the last faction of Gwang's rebellion in the field, finally accepted the presidential amnesty.<sup>2975</sup> Although Olonyi remained loyal to President Kiir's SPLM government during the early phases of the civil war against former vice president Riek Machar's SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) that began in December 2013, he and his forces defected from the SPLA and began coordinating with the SPLM/A-IO in May 2015. His spokesman announced that the group wanted to be known as the Agwelek Forces.<sup>2976</sup> Because of the Agwelek Forces' close alignment with the SPLM/A-IO from the beginning of their rebellion, an alignment highlighted by Machar's appointment of Olonyi as the 2017 SPLM/A-IO governor of Fashoda state, we have not included the group in our dataset.<sup>2977</sup>

**Arrow Boys Militia** and **Arrow Boys Militia (South Sudan)**: The Arrow Boys militia began as a self-defense force in the West Equatoria area of Sudan, bordering the Central African Republic, probably around 2009.<sup>2978</sup> They fought the LRA, which had crossed over from Uganda. In 2015, some of the West Equatoria Arrow Boys allied with the SPLM-IO in seizing Mundri.<sup>2979</sup> Various Arrow Boys fighters and commanders joined or coordinated with a number of South Sudanese rebel groups, including the SPLM/A-IO, REMNASA, SSNLM, and SSPF, and their involvement is discussed in those groups' entries. However, the Arrow Boys militia(s) do not themselves appear to have become a rebel group in their own right. Excluded.

**Collo Resistance Front (CRF)**: This was apparently a short-lived attempt to form a rebel group among the Collo (Shilluk) people to fight in support of the larger SPLM/A-IO rebellion. An earlier group called the Pacodo Battalion, possibly part of the SPLA/M-IO, was renamed the Collo Resistance Front in July 2014.<sup>2980</sup> In August 2014, the group issued a statement condemning the killing of

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<sup>2973</sup> "Abuses On Both Sides in Upper Nile Clashes [Press Release]," *All Africa*, April 19, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110420e74k00005&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," Issue brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, November 2013), 5–6, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB22-Pendulum-Swings.pdf>.

<sup>2974</sup> "Nation's Rebel Group Denies Peace Deal With the Government - Dismisses It As 'Defection,'" *All Africa*, February 29, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120229e82t000i1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2975</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 7; "South Sudan Rebel Movement Denies Amnesty Deal - Calls for Internationally Recognized Peace Talks," *All Africa*, May 6, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130506e95600001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2976</sup> "Johnson Olony's Forces Prefer Independent Command in Upper Nile State," *Sudan Tribune*, May 18, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150518eb5i0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2977</sup> "General Johnson Olony Appointed Governor of Fashoda State," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), July 28, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/general-johnson-olony-appointed-governor-of-fashoda-state>.

<sup>2978</sup> "Self-Defense Groups in Equatoria Say Ready to Fight LRA," *Sudan Tribune*, February 26, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020090226e52q0000l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2979</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Juba Admits New Rebel Group Captured Mundri Town on Friday," *Sudan Tribune*, May 26, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150526eb5q0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2980</sup> Gwado J. Ador, "Collo Community Deserves an Apology to Tip Balance for Peace in South Sudan," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), March 4, 2015, <http://nyamile.com/2015/03/04/collo-community-deserves-an-apology-to-tip-balance-for-peace-in-south-sudan/>.

Agieth Okambo, paramount chief of Upper Nile State's Kaka area.<sup>2981</sup> In April 2015, eight CRF members defected to the government.<sup>2982</sup> There is no mention of this group in any attacks. CRF allegedly failed to catch on among the Collo and was demobilized.<sup>2983</sup> Excluded as a splinter.

#### **Federal Democratic Party (FDP) and its armed wing South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF)**

AKAs: **SPLA/M-Gadet: Sudanese People's Liberation Army (Gadet Faction)**

On August 17, 2015, Gabriel Changson Chang, former minister of youth, culture, and sports and chairman of the SPLM/A-IO's national committee for finance and resource mobilization, announced the formation of a new opposition group. The new Federal Democratic Party, and its armed wing the South Sudan Armed Forces, were made up of SPLM/A-IO officers and politicians who opposed Riek Machar's decision to sign a peace agreement with President Kiir on August 17 (though Kiir himself would not sign for another week).<sup>2984</sup> A number of prominent SPLM/A-IO generals who had previously fought alongside Machar in the SSDF joined the FDP/SSAF in opposition to Machar's participation in negotiations with the government. The FDP claimed credit for a September 1 attack which destroyed three government barges and six gunboats on the Nile.<sup>2985</sup> However, the FDP/SSAF quickly splintered. In early January 2016, Changson dismissed General Gathoth Gatkuoth for leading an unauthorized peace delegation to negotiate with the government, and General Peter Gatdet Yak, formerly the SSAF's top commander, formed his own National Democratic Army (NDA) in April 2016.<sup>2986</sup> It remains an active rebel group, one of only three rebel groups beyond the SPLM-IO which Small Arms Survey's Young records as "claim[ing] to have military wings" as of October 2017.<sup>2987</sup> Excluded as a splinter group.

#### **Gatluak Gai Rebel Group**

Gatluak Gai was a low-level leader in the SPLM/A, possibly a member of the Unity State Prisons Guard, prior to his late May 2010 rebellion in Unity State. He was angered by the disputed victory of SPLM's Taban Deng over independent candidate Angelina Teny, wife of Riek

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<sup>2981</sup> "S. Sudan Opposition Group Deplores Killing of Paramount Chief," *Sudan Tribune*, August 26, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52178>.

<sup>2982</sup> "Shilluk Defectors Urge Warring Parties to Embrace Peace," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), April 16, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/shilluk-defectors-urge-warring-parties-to-embrace-peace>; "Breaking News: Members of Collo Community Defect SPLM-IO, Joint SPLM-Juba!!," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), March 6, 2015, <https://nyamile.co/2015/03/06/breaking-news-members-of-collo-community-defect-splm-io-joint-splm-juba/>.

<sup>2983</sup> Ador, "Collo Community Deserves an Apology to Tip Balance for Peace in South Sudan."

<sup>2984</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Defector Politician Says Will Fight Both President Kiir and Opposition Leader Machar," *Sudan Tribune*, August 20, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150820eb8k000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2985</sup> Verner Ayukegba, "Breakaway Armed Opposition Factions Increase Likelihood of Civil War Continuing in South Sudan," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, September 9, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020150909eb9900011&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2986</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Changson Dismisses Gathoth Gatkuoth as FDP Group Splits over Advance Team to Juba," *Sudan Tribune*, January 5, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160105ec150008f&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

SudanTribune.com, "Changson Chang Appointed Chair of S. Sudan Splinter Group," *Sudan Tribune*, April 17, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160417ec4h0008e&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2987</sup> John Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, October 2017), 42,

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-SPLM-IO-Update-Oct-2017.pdf>.

Machar.<sup>2988</sup> Although media reports referred to the group using its commander's name, Gai organized his forces under the banner SPLA for Unity.<sup>2989</sup> Gai signed a peace agreement with the SPLA on July 18, 2011, but was killed only days later.<sup>2990</sup> While his second-in-command purportedly took credit for Gai's death, many suspected SPLA involvement.<sup>2991</sup> Excluded (under South Sudan) due to its pre-independence founding. See entry under Sudan.

#### Islamic Movement for the Liberation of Raja (IMLR)

On June 25 and 26, 2016, an unknown armed group attacked Wau, South Sudan's second largest city located in the northwestern Bahr el-Ghazal near the border with Sudan. The attackers killed dozens of civilians and fought with government security forces, who did not regain full control of Wau until after the attackers withdrew on the afternoon of June 26. The attack followed President Kiir's June 24 removal of Governor Elias Waya, who had alleged that the regional SPLA commander was stealing his soldiers' salaries, and a day of attacks by men of the Dinka ethnic group against members of other groups, including the Fertit with whom the media associated the June 25-26 armed group.<sup>2992</sup> At a June 28, 2016, press conference, South Sudan Information Minister Michael Makuei Lueth blamed the June 25-26 attack on Wau on a recently formed rebel group called the Islamic Movement for the Liberation of Raja (IMLR).<sup>2993</sup> Although the government put the death toll at 39 civilians and 4 police, Father Rocco Taban, the Roman Catholic apostolic administrator of Malakal diocese, claimed there were as many as 400 dead, though his count may have included the events of June 24 as well.<sup>2994</sup> The attack is coded as a large attack. It is unclear where planning for the group took place, but based on the contestation ahead of its Wau attack, the coder infers that planning occurred in and around Wau. Therefore, the "rural" variable was coded using Wau as the relevant location.

Government spokesman Makuei identified Ali Tamim Fartak as IMLR's leader, and Sudan's government was providing significant support to the new group. Before South Sudan's independence, Fartak, a native of Raja (also called Raga) near Wau, was one of the only prominent southern Sudanese leaders in Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP). He did not publicly respond to South Sudan's allegations to either confirm or deny his connection to the Wau attack and IMLR. The rebel fighters were approximately 700 in number and allegedly included Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) fighters, members of Sudan's pro-government Arab

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<sup>2988</sup> "Gatluak Gai Rebellion, Unity State," Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, August 2010), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Gatluak-Gai-17-August-2010.pdf>.

<sup>2989</sup> Luk Riek Nyak, "Gatluak Gai Feared Dead Weeks After Agreeing Ceasefire," *Gurtong* (blog), July 24, 2011, <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5488/Gatluak-Gai-Feared-Dead-Weeks-After-Agreeing-Ceasefire.aspx>.

<sup>2990</sup> Simon Martelli, "South Sudan Rebel Leader Shot Dead," *Agence France Presse*, July 23, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020110723e77n006v9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "South Sudan Government, Rebel General Sign Accord," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, July 21, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020110721e7710035x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2991</sup> "Gai's Family Accuses SPLA of Standing Behind His Death in Unity State," *Sudan Tribune*, July 28, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110728e77s00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Bonifacio Taban Kuich, "South Sudan Militia Deputy Admits Killing of His Leader Gatluak," *Sudan Tribune*, July 26, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110726e77q00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>2992</sup> "We Are Governed by the Devils and Monkeys," *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, July 1, 2016, LexisNexis.

<sup>2993</sup> Darius Wani, "Dozens Killed during Clashes in Wau," *The Niles* (blog), June 29, 2016, <http://www.theniles.org/en/articles/society/20321/>; Charlton Doki, "South Sudan Says New Rebel Group Has Formed; 43 Said Killed," *AP News*, June 28, 2016, <https://apnews.com/e995e901a3fa4696939abb5f534d8d05/south-sudan-says-new-rebel-group-has-formed-43-said-killed>.

<sup>2994</sup> "We Are Governed by the Devils and Monkeys."



*Janjaweed* militias, and former SPLA troops.<sup>2995</sup> Given that LRA is believed to have shifted to the Central African Republic, significant LRA involvement seems unlikely.<sup>2996</sup> Makuei asserted that IMLR was an Islamic fundamentalist group, but, without any statements from the group itself, its precise political goals remained unclear.<sup>2997</sup> In the weeks and months following the attack on Wau, no one issued any statements on behalf of IMLR, nor did the government or any other rebel group attribute any additional attacks to the group, including those associated with ongoing conflict in Wau. According to an English summary of a January 2017 Dinka-language podcast from Australia's SBS, analyst Kuir Ĕ Garang identified IMLR as one of 10 active rebel groups in South Sudan.<sup>2998</sup> We code the group as never publicly naming itself. With no reported attacks in the surveyed sources after 2016, the group does not meet the viability threshold.

Although no media reports linked IMLR to an earlier June 15, 2016, attack on Lol state officials in Raja, Fartak's hometown and Lol's capital, the Global Terrorism Database cites government authorities as blaming the attack on IMLR and the LRA.<sup>2999</sup> It is unclear whether the Wau rebels were the same group as those that overran Raja.<sup>3000</sup> Although the attacks may have been related, the *Sudan Tribune* reports that the government only identified the unknown attackers as "bandits," and our dataset considers the June 25 attack as IMLR's first (and only) attack against state targets.<sup>3001</sup> The dataset codes rebel group certainty as "2" instead of the most certain "3" because of the dearth of information about this group, with the government's June 29, 2016 press conference as the primary source of information about the group. SCAD recorded qualifying anti-government riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding June 2016. However, none of these occurred in the Western Bahr el Ghazal region in which the group was formed.

**Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)** Darfuri rebel group. Included under Sudan.<sup>3002</sup>

#### **Kuburin Rebel Group**

AKAs: **Militia (David Kuburin)**

James Kuburin was a commander with David Yau Yau's rebels. He negotiated the surrender of the 200 Yau Yau rebels under his command on January 27, 2013, but a misunderstanding between his soldiers and SPLA troops in Jonglei's Pibor town led to clashes resulting in one

<sup>2995</sup> Doki, "South Sudan Says New Rebel Group Has Formed; 43 Said Killed"; "Over 40 People Killed in South Sudan's Town of Wau: Official," *Sudan Tribune*, June 28, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59450>.

<sup>2996</sup> Richard Wanambwa, "Kony's LRA Linked to New South Sudan Rebel Group," *Eagle*, June 29, 2016, <http://eagle.co.ug/2016/06/29/konys-lra-linked-to-new-south-sudan-rebel-group.html>.

<sup>2997</sup> Doki, "South Sudan Says New Rebel Group Has Formed; 43 Said Killed."

<sup>2998</sup> "Armed Opposition in South Sudan: Discussion with Kuir Ĕ Garang," SBS, January 20, 2017, January 20, 2017.

<sup>2999</sup> "Incident Summary for GTDID: 201606150025," Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed October 7, 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201606150025>.

<sup>3000</sup> "Cracks Widen in Peace Deal," *Africa Confidential*, July 8, 2016, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11711/Cracks\\_widen\\_in\\_peace\\_deal](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11711/Cracks_widen_in_peace_deal).

<sup>3001</sup> "South Sudan Armed Men Killed Several SPLA Officers in Raja," *Sudan Tribune*, June 16, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59315>.

<sup>3002</sup> "Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril)," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, n.d., <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf>.

SPLA and several civilian deaths the following day.<sup>3003</sup> Kuburin later was a top SPLA commander in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA).<sup>3004</sup> Excluded as a splinter group.

#### Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The Lord's Resistance Army is a rebel group which was founded in Uganda in 1987.<sup>3005</sup> Although the LRA forces fought against South Sudanese troops and reportedly linked up with SPLM/A-IO, overthrowing the government of South Sudan was not one of the LRA's primary goals.<sup>3006</sup> Excluded.

#### Mathiang Anyoor

Mathiang Anyoor is a pro-government militia associated with the Dinka ethnic group of President Salva Kiir. Formed by Kiir's backers in 2012 during clashes between Sudan and South Sudan, the militia carried out the massacre of Nuer in Juba in December 2013 which sparked Riek Machar's SPLM/A-IO rebellion and has fought against SPLM/A-IO alongside government forces.<sup>3007</sup> Excluded as a pro-government force.

#### Mabanese Defence Forces (MDF)

The Mabanese Defence Forces emerged in August 2014 as a pro-government militia fighting deserting SPLA Nuer troops and killing Nuer humanitarian aid workers in Upper Nile State's Maban County.<sup>3008</sup> Excluded as a pro-government force.

#### Militia (John Dueth Yiech)

In May 2012, Major General John Dueth Yiech and Brigadier General James Duoth Lam, and 215 soldiers under their command surrendered in Unity State and joined the SPLA.<sup>3009</sup> They defected from Gordon Kong's remnant of the Sudan-backed South Sudan Defense Forces to accept the general post-independence amnesty offered by the South Sudanese government.<sup>3010</sup> Excluded as a splinter.

#### National Defence Alliance (NDA)\*

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<sup>3003</sup> Michael Onyiego, "4 Civilians Die in South Sudan after Rebels, Military Clash, Officials Say," *Associated Press Newswires*, January 28, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020130128e91s001zg&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3004</sup> Mayank Bubna, "David Yau Yau and South Sudan's Internal Wager with Self-Determination," *African Arguments* (blog), January 23, 2015, <http://africanarguments.org/2015/01/23/david-yau-yau-and-south-sudans-internal-wager-with-self-determination-mayank-bubna/>.

<sup>3005</sup> Ledio Cakaj, "Joseph Kony and Mutiny in the Lord's Resistance Army," *The New Yorker*, October 3, 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/joseph-kony-and-mutiny-in-the-lords-resistance-army>.

<sup>3006</sup> "Ugandan LRA on a Move, Linking up with South Sudan Rebels and Khartoum Regime," *Sudan Tribune*, August 3, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52275>.

<sup>3007</sup> "Timeline: Formation of the 'Mathiang Anyoor' in South Sudan | Radio Tamazuj," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), March 9, 2015, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160417123159/https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/timeline-formation-%E2%80%98mathiang-anyoor%E2%80%99-south-sudan>.

<sup>3008</sup> "A Militia Group Carries out Targeted Killings in Upper Nile; Rebels Accuse Government of 'Complicity,'" *South Sudan News Agency* (blog), August 6, 2014, <http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/index.php/2014/08/06/a-militia-group-carries-out-targeted-killings-in-upper-nile-state/>.

<sup>3009</sup> "South Sudan Rebel Faction Abandons War against Juba," *Sudan Tribune*, May 8, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020120508e8580005o&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3010</sup> Joshua Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan-South Sudan Border," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, July 2013), 179–80, note 209, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP30-North-South-Border.pdf>.



In April 2016, Gabriel Changson Chang, newly appointed leader of the SPLM/A-IO splinter FDP/SSAF, accused General Peter Gatdet of forming his own National Defence Alliance and then trying to merge the FDP into the NDA.<sup>3011</sup> Gatdet had been a top SPLM/A-IO commander who seized Bor in December 2013 and then the commander of SSAF, the armed wing of the FDP.<sup>3012</sup> Supported by Sudan, Gatdet's group remains active and now appears to go by the name South Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM/A), the name of the rebel group led by the late General Paulino Matip Nhial from 1997 until it merged into the SPLA in 2006.<sup>3013</sup> Gatdet had been a leader, for a time, in Matip's group in Unity state. After staying in Khartoum for two years, Gatdet's forces engaged in a skirmish in late 2017 along Unity State's border with Sudan's South Kordofan.<sup>3014</sup> Excluded as a splinter group.

#### National Democratic Movement (NDM)\*

Agriculture Minister Lam Akol, one of the most prominent opposition politicians in South Sudan and the founder and leader of the Sudanese People's Democratic Movement – Democratic Change opposition political party, announced his resignation from both his cabinet position in President Kiir's Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and his SPLM-DC membership at an August 1, 2016, press conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He denounced President Kiir's government for failing to fully implement the 2015 ARCSS peace agreement.<sup>3015</sup> Akol, a member of the Shilluk ethnic group from Malakal in Upper Nile and long a prominent figure in southern Sudanese and South Sudanese politics, had bolted the SPLM/A to establish the SPLM/A-Nasir faction with Riek Machar and Gordon Kong Chuol in 1991, later served as Sudan's foreign minister from 2005 to 2007 in the unity government formed under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and finished a distant second behind Kiir as the SPLM-DC's nominee in the 2010 pre-independence presidential election.<sup>3016</sup> After meeting with various opposition groups in Nairobi and elsewhere, Akol announced the formation of the National Democratic Movement on August 31, but the group did not receive much press attention until a more prominent announcement in late September.<sup>3017</sup>

<sup>3011</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Changson Chang Appointed Chair of S. Sudan Splinter Group."

<sup>3012</sup> Saba Makeda, "Salva Kiir and Riek Machar Must Go If They Care the Future of South Sudan, Says FDP/SSAF," *Africa Express: Notizie Dal Continente Dimenticato* (blog), July 15, 2016, <http://www.africa-express.info/2016/07/15/salva-kiir-rieck-machar-must-go-care-future-south-sudan-says-ssfdp/>.

<sup>3013</sup> "Leader of South Sudan United Movement/Army Peter Gatdet Met with His Military Council in Khartoum.," *Wangdunkon Media* (blog), June 17, 2017, <https://wangdunkonmedia.org/2017/06/17/leader-of-south-sudan-united-movementarmy-peter-gatdet-met-with-his-military-council-in-khartoum/>; "Gen. Peter Gatdet Denies Having Talks with S. Sudan Government - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, September 20, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60299>; "Gen. Peter Gatdet Calls for Calm after Death of Paulino Matip," *Sudan Tribune*, August 27, 2012, [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=43723](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=43723).

<sup>3014</sup> "Low Expectations for Peace Talks," *Africa Confidential*, December 19, 2017, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12203/Low\\_expectations\\_for\\_peace\\_talks](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12203/Low_expectations_for_peace_talks).

<sup>3015</sup> AFP, "South Sudan Minister Resigns, Calls for Regime Change," *New Vision*, August 1, 2016, [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1431491/south-sudan-minister-resigns-calls-regime-change](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1431491/south-sudan-minister-resigns-calls-regime-change).

<sup>3016</sup> Fred Oluoch, "Former South Sudan Minister Forms New Political Party," *The East African*, September 24, 2016, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Former-South-Sudan-minister-forms-new-political-party/2558-3393844-sjb093z/index.html>; "Lam Akol," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, October 1, 2005.

<sup>3017</sup> "South Sudan's Lam Akol Forms New Rebel Movement," *Sudan Tribune*, September 25, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60345>; Oluoch, "Former South Sudan Minister Forms New Political Party"; "The National Democratic Movement," *Africans Press* (blog), September 23, 2016, <https://africanspress.org/2016/09/23/the-national-democratic-movement/>; "Dr. Lam Akol's New Political Vehicle: The National Democratic Movement (NDM)," *PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers* (blog), September 2, 2016, <https://paanluelwel.com/2016/09/02/dr-lam-akols-new-political-vehicle-the-national-democratic-movement-ndm/>; "South Sudan's Lam Akol Forms New Rebel Movement."

While Akol himself resides in Addis Ababa with the permission of the Ethiopian government, NDM armed forces operate in the former Upper Nile State.<sup>3018</sup> Given his own position as a longtime critic of Kiir and the SPLM/A, Akol's NDM has not attracted any significant number of SPLA defectors, but a number of rebel commanders and groups unaligned with Machar's SPLM/A-IO joined the new movement. Maj. Gen. Yohannes Okij, the commander of the Tiger Forces New Faction (TFNF), and at least some of his fighters, Maj. Gen. Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan (Tanginye) and his troops who had defected from the SPLM/A-IO in August 2015, and former SPLM/A-IO Brig. Gen. Chuol Gahga Yar joined NDM soon after its founding.<sup>3019</sup> NDM's forces within South Sudan remain based in Upper Nile. Despite Akol's initial statements that he intended to cooperate with SPLM/A-IO, NDM fighters have clashed much more with the SPLM/A-IO-aligned Agwelek Forces of Gen. Johnson Olonyi over territory in Upper Nile than with government troops; Tanginye and Okij died in January 2017 battles with Agwelek.<sup>3020</sup> Akol had previously tried to persuade Olonyi to bring the Agwelek Forces into NDM.<sup>3021</sup> Equatorians were also prominent in NDM's political leadership.<sup>3022</sup>

According to Small Arms Survey's John Young, NDM remains one of four opposition groups with military wings as of October 2017.<sup>3023</sup> Excluded because most of its membership came from preexisting rebel groups.

#### National Resistance Front/Army (NRF/A)\*

Cosmas Bidali Worikojo, governor of Yei State, defected from SPLM in October 2016, reportedly to SPLM/A-IO.<sup>3024</sup> In early January 2017, Bidali announced the formation of a new rebel group called the National Resistance Front (NRF), which he claimed was a separate group from the SPLM/A-IO. He denied that he or his forces had been part of the SPLM/A-IO between his October break with the government and the announcement.<sup>3025</sup> According to an English summary of a January 2017 Dinka-language podcast from Australia's SBS, analyst Kuir Ĕ Garang identified NRF/A as one of 10 active rebel groups in South Sudan.<sup>3026</sup> The group was not associated with any attacks in the surveyed sources and what limited information was available in English came primarily from South Sudanese blogs. NRF/A issued several public statements in

<sup>3018</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 31.

<sup>3019</sup> Young, 42.

<sup>3020</sup> "Deadly Clashes between NDM Rebels and SPLM-IO," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, January 13, 2017; "Another S Sudanese Rebel Commander Killed near Sudan Border," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), January 7, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/another-s-sudanese-rebel-commander-killed-near-sudan-border>.

<sup>3021</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard," 20.

<sup>3022</sup> International Crisis Group, 23.

<sup>3023</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 42.

<sup>3024</sup> Tito Justin, "More Defect From South Sudan's Troubled Yei River State," *South Sudan in Focus (VOA News)* (blog), October 27, 2016, <https://www.voanews.com/a/more-defect-from-south-sudan-yei-river-state/3568993.html>.

<sup>3025</sup> "New Rebel Group Formed as Instability Spreads in South Sudan," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), January 5, 2017, <http://nyamile.com/2017/01/05/new-rebel-group-formed-as-instability-spreads-in-south-sudan/>; "7 Killed in Armed Attack on Bus in South Sudan," *EFE News Service*, January 5, 2017, Factiva, <https://global-factiva-com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9MCD000400&an=WEFE000020170105ed150008g&cat=a&ep=ASI>; "Former Commissioner of Yei Forms New Rebel Group," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), January 4, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/v1/news/article/former-commissioner-of-yei-forms-new-rebel-group>.

<sup>3026</sup> "Armed Opposition in South Sudan: Discussion with Kuir Ĕ Garang."

2017.<sup>3027</sup> The NRF/A was not included in the ongoing peace negotiations and rejected the revitalized ARCSS peace deal.<sup>3028</sup>

Apparently another group claiming to be an alliance of all South Sudanese rebels announced its formation under the same National Resistance Front/Movement label in late October 2017.<sup>3029</sup> The connection between the groups announced in the January and October statements is unclear.

Excluded due to limited information on the group and the possibility that it was a splinter of SPLM/A-IO.

#### National Salvation Front (NSF)\*

Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, one of several key SPLA generals who resigned in February 2017 and denounced the government for corruption and favoritism toward members of President Kiir's Dinka ethnic group over others, announced the creation of the National Salvation Front (NAS) on March 6, 2017.<sup>3030</sup> Cirillo resides in Addis Ababa with the permission of the Ethiopian government, but most of his group's military forces are deployed in Equatoria.<sup>3031</sup> While two of his group's top five military commanders announced in April were fellow SPLA defectors, few SPLA soldiers joined Cirillo's new group.<sup>3032</sup> Khalid Butrus Bora, formerly a top commander in David Yau Yau's South Sudan Democratic Movement-Cobra Faction (SSDM-Cobra) who left the SPLA to lead a new SSDM-Cobra rebellion in September 2016, dissolved the new SSDM-Cobra and merged his fighters, predominantly of Pibor County's Murle ethnic group, into NAS.<sup>3033</sup> A number of SPLM/A-IO commanders, as well as key leaders of the expatriate SPLM-IO organization in the U.S., joined NAS, but brought few troops with them. According to Small Arms Survey's Young, Gen. Faiz Ismail Fatur, SPLM/A-IO's commander in Western Bahr el Ghazal, defected to NAS as an individual without any of his soldiers.<sup>3034</sup> In July, Lt. Gen. John Kenyi Loburon, the commander of SPLM/A-IO's forces in Central Equatoria, joined NAS with many of his soldiers.<sup>3035</sup> Fighting between Loburon's NAS forces and those remaining loyal to

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<sup>3027</sup> "Rebel Group Protests against Exclusion from IGAD Consultations," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), October 16, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/v1/news/article/rebel-group-protests-against-exclusion-from-igad-consultations>; Bidali Cosmas Worikojo, "South Sudan: The National Resistance Front/Army (NRF/A) – 'The Coalition of Clean Hands (CCH)' – (10.05.2017)," *MinBane* (blog), May 18, 2017, <https://minbane.wordpress.com/2017/05/18/httpwp-mep1xtjg-4k8/>; Bidali Cosmas Worikojo, "The South Sudan Crisis and the Policy of Fundamental Change: The NRF Way Forward," *Malakal Post* (blog), November 27, 2017, <http://www.malakalpost.com/706-2>.

<sup>3028</sup> Lako Jada Kwajok, "Opinion: Have the Opposition's 'Reservations' Been Addressed in the Revitalised Peace Agreement?," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), September 20, 2018, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/v1/news/article/opinion-have-the-opposition-s-reservations-been-addressed-in-the-revitalised-peace-agreement>; "Rebel Group Protests against Exclusion from IGAD Consultations."

<sup>3029</sup> "Another New Rebel Group Formed in South Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, October 28, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63869>.

<sup>3030</sup> Thomas Cirillo Swaka, "Declaration of National Salvation Front" (National Salvation Front, March 6, 2017), <http://www.gurtong.net/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JWZd6Jr3HAK%3d&tabid=124>.

<sup>3031</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 31.

<sup>3032</sup> Young, 43; Thomas Cirillo Swaka, "Provisional Appointments of NAS Military Leadership," April 14, 2017, <https://paanluelwel2011.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/thomas-cirilo-set-up-his-military-leadership.pdf>.

<sup>3033</sup> "SSDM-Cobra Faction Dissolved, Merged with Cirillo's Rebels," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), March 9, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/ssdm-cobra-faction-dissolved-merged-with-cirillo-s-rebels>; "South Sudan Dissident General Joins New Rebel Group," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 9, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020170309ed3900051&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3034</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 43.

<sup>3035</sup> "Thousands of Machar-Led Fighters 'Defect' to New Rebel Group," *Sudan Tribune*, July 30, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020170730ed7u000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "South Sudan Army Captures Rebel-Held Town, Senior Rebel Defects," *Reuters News*, July 28, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA000020170728ed7s00f15&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Machar broke out following the former's defection and has been much more significant than any NAS opposition to Kiir's government; Small Arms Survey's John Young was unable to find evidence of a single verifiable NAS attack against the SPLA as of October 2017.<sup>3036</sup> According to Young, NAS is one of four South Sudanese opposition groups with military wings as of October 2017.<sup>3037</sup> Excluded because most of its membership came from preexisting rebel groups.

#### National Youth Union (NYU) and Greater Equatoria Youth Leadership (GEYL)

These two South Sudanese youth organizations, based in Ethiopia (NYU) and Sudan (GEYL), signed a memorandum of understanding on August 1, 2014, to coordinate their resistance to President Salva Kiir's regime and their support for former vice president Riek Machar's SPLA-IO insurgency.<sup>3038</sup> There is no clear evidence that groups planned or carried out any attacks against the government. Excluded.

#### Olonyi Rebel Group

AKAs: South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army-Upper Nile (SSDM/A-Upper Nile)\*  
Initially fighting under Robert Gwang, General Johnson Olonyi became one of the leading commanders of George Athor Deng's SSDM/A. After Deng's successor, Peter Kuol Chol Awan, surrendered on March 8, 2012, Olonyi renounced the Awan-negotiated peace agreement with the SPLA and continued fighting in Upper Nile State from his bases in South Kordofan.<sup>3039</sup> In June 2013, after several months of back-and-forth with the government and the Shilluk king, Olonyi and his troops, the last faction of Gwang's rebellion in the field, finally accepted the presidential amnesty.<sup>3040</sup> See entry for Agwelek Forces under South Sudan and entries for the Gwang and Olonyi rebel groups under Sudan for more information. Excluded as a splinter group.

#### Peter Gadet Rebel Group

In March 2011, Gen. Peter Gatdet (or Gadet) defected from the SPLA again and announced the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).<sup>3041</sup> He became the commander of the SSLM's armed wing, the South Sudan Liberation Army. In early August 2011, Gatdet and his colleague Col. Bol Gatkuoth Koal, the SSLM/A's spokesperson who had joined the group alongside Gatdet, rejoined the SPLA following President Kiir's declaration of amnesty. The SSLM/A leadership denounced the pair as acting only on their own behalf and vowed to continue its resistance.<sup>3042</sup> Gadet's defecting faction is excluded as a pro-government splinter group of SSLM/A. The SSLM/A itself is included in the dataset under Sudan due to its pre-independence founding.

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<sup>3036</sup> "Split among Rebel Forces," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, August 25, 2017, LexisNexis; Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 43; "No Let-up in Southern Fighting," *Africa Confidential*, November 3, 2017.

<sup>3037</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 42.

<sup>3038</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "S. Sudan Youth Organisations Vow to Join Struggle against Regime," *Sudan Tribune*, August 1, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51884>; "The National Youth Union and Greater Equatoria Youth Leadership Joint Declaration On Memorandum of Understanding [Press Release]," *All Africa*, July 28, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140728ea7s000tm&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3039</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 3.

<sup>3040</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 7; "South Sudan Rebel Movement Denies Amnesty Deal - Calls for Internationally Recognized Peace Talks."

<sup>3041</sup> Bonifacio Taban Kuich, "Unity State Condemns 'Defection' of SPLA Maj. General Peter Gatdet - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, March 30, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Unity-state-condemns-defection-of,38441>.

<sup>3042</sup> Military High command of South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SSLM/A), "Rebel South Sudan Liberation Army Distance Themselves from Peter Gadet" (*Sudan Tribune*, August 4, 2011), <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-Liberation-Army,39732>.



### Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASAS)

On January 9, 2015, a group of SPLA officers defected and launched a Western Equatoria-based rebellion against the government. The group reportedly seized weapons and ammunition after overrunning SPLA forces in Maridi, Western Equatoria, on January 9 and attacked the SPLA's "production unit" in Mankakara, 8 kilometers east of Maridi, on January 19.<sup>3043</sup> On January 29, Major Losuba Loduru Wongo released an official statement to the media announcing a new rebel group called the Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASAS). As REMNASAS's commander, Loduru took responsibility for the January 19 Mankakara attack and a subsequent January 27 attack on Maridi SPLA troops, which he claimed killed 6 SPLA soldiers, a claim disputed by local government officials.<sup>3044</sup> A South Sudanese cabinet minister anonymously confirmed the existence of the REMNASAS rebellion and the leadership of Loduru to the *Sudan Tribune* and estimated the group's strength as 100 to 200 men.<sup>3045</sup> Defense minister Kuol Manyang Juuk subsequently confirmed Loduru's leadership of the group and noted that Loduru, formerly defense ministry's research director, had been one of the SPLA officers sent abroad (in his case, to the University of Liverpool) for further studies.<sup>3046</sup>

In public documents such as Loduru's January 27 statements and subsequent statements released by Colonel John Sunday Martin, the group's official spokesperson, REMNASAS articulated a clear set of grievances and objectives. REMNASAS denounced the country's inter-ethnic violence, President Kiir's "dictatorial" rule, and government corruption as well as the ongoing civil war. According to the group, SPLM/A-IO had failed to improve the situation in the country, and the various peace talks ignored the underlying problems. REMNASAS declare its first objective as "[e]stablish[ing] a political/military peoples' movement to dislodge the genocidal President Salvatore Kiir in order to bring the much needed reforms and services to the people of Sudan."<sup>3047</sup> Given that Loduru and the defecting SPLA officers were reportedly stationed in Juba before launching their rebellion, it seems likely that REMNASAS's planning occurred in Juba.<sup>3048</sup>

Although REMNASAS advanced a non-sectarian vision for a future South Sudan with a federal system and true multi-party democracy, its leadership and membership were primarily Equatorians, and it was based and active in the former Western Equatoria state in western South Sudan (coded as 0 for "rural" because of its high population of over 1 million). Losuba and his troops were largely from Central Equatoria, a fact which caused some of the local population around Maridi viewed them as outsiders and weakened REMNASAS.<sup>3049</sup>

REMNASAS struggled to gain traction as an independent rebel group. Its efforts to secure outside support from Sudan and Uganda failed, and reports mentioned no other significant

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<sup>3043</sup> Losuba Loduru, "Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASAS) – New Rebel Group Formed in South Sudan" (SouthSudanNation.com, January 29, 2015), <http://www.southsudannation.com/revolutionary-movement-for-national-salvation-remnasa-new-rebel-group-formed-in-south-sudan/>; "Breaking News: Major Army Defection Hit South Sudan's SPLA!," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), January 10, 2015, <http://nyamile.com/2015/01/10/breaking-news-major-army-defection-hit-south-sudans-spla/>.

<sup>3044</sup> Loduru, "Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASAS) – New Rebel Group Formed in South Sudan."

<sup>3045</sup> "South Sudan Admits Emergence of New Rebel Movement," *Sudan Tribune*, January 29, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150130eb1t0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3046</sup> "S. Sudan Army Worries over Defections in W. Equatoria State," *Sudan Tribune*, January 31, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150131eb1v000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3047</sup> REMNASAS Information Department, "Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASAS): Its Objectives" (SouthSudanNation.com, February 2, 2015), <http://www.southsudannation.com/revolutionary-movement-for-national-salvation-remnasa-its-objectives/>.

<sup>3048</sup> "Breaking News," January 10, 2015.

<sup>3049</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 31.

financial backers.<sup>3050</sup> REMNASA claimed a series of small attacks on SPLA forces in Western Equatoria in spring and summer of 2015, though local media frequently could not verify their reports. Sources such as ICG reported that the group sometimes claimed attacks which had not occurred, and in late May, Col. Martin disputed SPLM/A-IO's claim of responsibility for a May 19 attack on an SPLA convoy in Western Equatoria's Mvolo County attack and insisted that the attack had instead been carried out by REMNASA forces.<sup>3051</sup> There did not appear to be any REMNASA claims of responsibility for attacks on civilians nor any outside reports of such attacks, at least in English-language media. SCAD does not record any qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding January 2015.

The Equatorian rebellion faltered. Although some Arrow Boys active in fighting against cattle raiders of the Dinka ethnicity joined up with REMNASA, most of them later abandoned the group.<sup>3052</sup> The Small Arms Survey observed that REMNASA "never truly got off the ground."<sup>3053</sup> On October 28, 2015, REMNASA announced that it had merged with SPLA-IO, and no further independent REMNASA attacks occurred.<sup>3054</sup> Machar appointed Loduru to SPLM/A-IO leadership.<sup>3055</sup> While the surveyed sources did not mention any large REMNASA attacks, SPLA-IO, then including former REMNASA elements, carried out numerous large attacks following the breakdown in the peace arrangements in 2016. Because the SPLA-IO characterized their fierce clashes with SPLA troops in and outside Juba as defensive, our dataset counts the SPLA-IO and White Army unsuccessful offensive in Jonglei on August 19, 2016, as REMNASA's first large attack; with at least 153 killed, it seems likely that there were at least 25 SPLA fatalities.<sup>3056</sup> Because SPLA-IO carried out multiple attacks against state targets in the year following January 9, 2018, REMNASA meets our viability criteria.<sup>3057</sup>

#### South Sudan Armed Forces/South Sudan Federal Democratic Party (SSAF/SSFDP)

<sup>3050</sup> International Crisis Group, 31.

<sup>3051</sup> John Sunday Martin, "REMNASA Would like to Repulse Claims of SPLM-IO on the Destruction of the SPLA Convoy in Mvolo County, Western Equatoria State on 19th, May 2015" (Bieh Telegraph, May 25, 2015), <https://thebiehtelegraph.wordpress.com/2015/05/25/remnasa-would-like-to-repulse-claims-of-splm-io-on-the-destruction-of-the-spla-convoy-in-mvolo-county-western-equatoria-state-on-19th-may-2015/>; International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 30; "REMNASA, the Nyarango Boys, and the 'Non-Existent' Western Equatoria Rebellion," *Map East Africa* (blog), July 23, 2015, <http://mapeastafrica.com/2015/07/remnasa-the-nyarango-boys-and-the-non-existent-western-equatoria-rebellion/>.

<sup>3052</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 31.

<sup>3053</sup> Alan Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, July 2016), 6, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/HSBA-Conflict-in-WES-July-2016.pdf>.

<sup>3054</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "South Sudan's Rebel REMNASA Merges with SPLM-IO," *Sudan Tribune*, October 28, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020151028ebas000b7&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "REMNASA Joins SPLM/SPLA-IO," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), October 28, 2015, <http://nyamile.com/2015/10/28/remnasa-joins-splmspla-io/>.

<sup>3055</sup> "Riek Machar Appoints Wife As Defense 'Minister,'" *The Nation Mirror*, December 9, 2015, <http://www.thenationmirror.com/featured-stories/1722-riek-machar-appoints-wife-as-defense-minister>.

<sup>3056</sup> wubaoshu, "At Least 153 Killed in Clashes between South Sudan Rival Factions," *Xinhua News Agency*, August 23, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=XNEWS00020160823ec8n00a6q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3057</sup> "South Sudan Rebels Accused of Attacking Government Positions," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, August 23, 2018, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020180823ee8n000ul&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "South Sudan's Warring Sides Accuse Each Other of Attacks, 18 Killed," *Reuters News*, July 2, 2018, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020180702ee7200hfw&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "S. Sudan Government Accuses Rebels of Attacking Pagak," *Sudan Tribune*, May 5, 2018, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020180505ee550005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



A previously unknown group of armed men in a convoy of military vehicles seized the Idolu police station, 35 kilometers east of former Eastern Equatoria State's capital of Torit, without any reported injuries on December 3, 2015. The police reportedly joined the new group. Through spokesperson Col. Mario Bertino, a new rebel group called the South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) took responsibility for the attack. According to Bertino, Major General Anthony Ongwaja, who had defected from the SPLA along 50 soldiers under his command at a post near Torit, was SSAF's commander, and police and area youth had joined the group since the original defection.<sup>3058</sup> The International Crisis Group's statement that the group emerged out of the SPLM/A-IO is inconsistent with the Radio Tamazuj and *Sudan Tribune* reports cited above which portray the new rebellion as being driven by SPLA defectors.<sup>3059</sup> For the purposes of our dataset, we consider the group as a rebel group rather than a splinter, in line with the contemporary media reports, though with a confidence level of "2" rather than the full "3" that its press coverage would otherwise justify.

Days after its opening attack, SSAF attacked and occupied at least part of an SPLA base in Longiro, north of Torit, on December 6. The rebels seized weapons, freed prisoners, and either captured or killed several SPLA soldiers.<sup>3060</sup> SPLA and SSAF forces clashed throughout the following week, culminating in fierce fighting which reportedly destroyed the village of Oguruny the next weekend. As the SSAF launched attacks on the roads from Torit, the SPLA's offensive targeted suspected SSAF bases near Oguruny. By one report, at least 31 people, including civilians, died in the fighting.<sup>3061</sup> The presence of SSAF bases in rural Oguruny village led me to code the "rural" variable as a 1. None of the SSAF's independent attacks caused 25 enemy deaths, our dataset's threshold for a large attack, so the group's values for the dataset's large attack variables are from reported SPLA-IO counterattacks around Juba in late July 2016 after the renewed peace deal broke down and after SSAF merged into SPLM/A-IO.<sup>3062</sup> We also did not find any media reports associating the SSAF with attacks on civilians, but the group's brief existence as an independent force and the lack of media coverage of events in Eastern Equatoria may have obscured this. Therefore, the SSAF's values for our dataset's civilian attack variables are from reported SPLM/A-IO attacks on civilians in early 2016 after SSAF merged into the larger rebellion.<sup>3063</sup>

As the military wing of the also previously unannounced Federal Democratic Party (FDP), the SSAF's objectives included the establishment of a multi-party federal system and the overthrow of President Kiir's government.<sup>3064</sup> Like the Tiger Faction New Forces which came into being about a month before the SSAF, the latter group also strongly opposed President Kiir's

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<sup>3058</sup> "New Rebel Faction Overruns Police Post near Torit," *Sudan Tribune*, December 4, 2015, <http://dev.sudantribune.com/SouthSudan/Article/Index/12-4-2015-New-rebel-faction-overruns-police-post-near-Torit-57243>; "Armed Group in Torit County Overruns Police Station," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), December 3, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/armed-group-in-torit-county-overruns-police-station>.

<sup>3059</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 30.

<sup>3060</sup> "New Rebel Faction Overruns Police Post near Torit"; "Armed Group Takes over SPLA Outpost in Eastern Equatoria," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), December 8, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/armed-group-takes-over-spla-outpost-in-eastern-equatoria>.

<sup>3061</sup> "S. Sudanese Army to Pursue Rebels in Eastern Equatoria," *Sudan Tribune*, December 15, 2015, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57370>; "Clashes Reported in Eastern Equatoria State," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), December 14, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/clashes-reported-in-eastern-equatoria-state>.

<sup>3062</sup> "Heavy Fighting Reported around Juba, as SPLA-IO Claims Closing In," *Sudan Tribune*, July 31, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160731ec7v0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3063</sup> "South Sudan Rivals Talk Peace While Killing Civilians: U.N.," *Reuters News*, February 19, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020160219ec2j01wo9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3064</sup> "Clashes Reported in Eastern Equatoria State"; "S. Sudan's Otuho Rebels Unveil Objectives for Armed Struggle," *Sudan Tribune*, December 4, 2015, <http://dev.sudantribune.com/SouthSudan/Article/Index/12-5-2015-S.-Sudan-s-Otuho-rebels-unveil-objectives-for-armed-struggle/57257>.

Decree 36/2015, which dissolved the 10 states listed in the constitution and replaced them with 28 new states.<sup>3065</sup> The group's leadership and membership were predominantly from the Lakuta (Otuho) ethnic group, the main ethnic group in the area.<sup>3066</sup> It seems unlikely that the group had outside financial backing, particularly given their merger into the SPLM/A-IO after less than two months of existence. SCAD does not record any qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding November 2015.

Despite its emergence only months after prominent SPLM/A-IO defectors launched the Federal Democratic Party and its armed wing also called the South Sudan Armed Forces, the Equatorian SSAF and FDP denied any links with the earlier group and referred to its political movement as the South Sudan Federal Democratic Party (SSFDP) to distinguish the Equatorian SSAF/SSFDP from the higher-profile SSAF/FDP.<sup>3067</sup> ICG views SSAF/SSFDP, or SSAF-Equatorias (SSAF-E), as "different from though related to" the other SSAF launched by the SPLM/A-IO dissident generals but provides no details.<sup>3068</sup> The fact that SSAF/FDP eventually splintered into factions which made peace with the government and which continued fighting as a separate rebellion while the SSAF/SSFDP quickly merged into the SPLM/A-IO provides support for viewing the two almost identically named groups as separate. With Peter Oyoyo Kleto, deputy head of the SPLM/A-IO's diplomatic mission to Tanzania, as mediator, SSAF/SSFDP entered into negotiations with the SPLM/A-IO in January 2016 and merged into the larger rebellion shortly thereafter.<sup>3069</sup> Both Bertino and Ongwaja became generals in the SPLA-IO, and media reports do not mention any separate attacks under the SSAF/SSFDP banner since the merger.<sup>3070</sup> Because the SPLM/A-IO has more or less followed the September 2018 ceasefire agreed to with the government, with ongoing rebel attacks associated instead with General Cirillo's National Salvation Front, SSAF/SSFDP does not meet our threshold criteria, which would have required that SPLA-IO carry out two or more attacks against state targets in any given year after November 2018 (three years from SSAF/SSFDP's founding). The SPLM/A-IO was still negotiating with the government over the terms of the formation of a renewed government of national unity, and its forces were implicated in attacks on civilians after November 2018.<sup>3071</sup>

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<sup>3065</sup> Janet McKnight, "South Sudan — January 2016 Update," *Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project* (blog), January 22, 2016, <http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/south-sudan-january-2015-update/>; "Armed Group in Eastern Equatoria Rejects Appointment of 28 State Governors," *Sudan Tribune*, December 31, 2015, 28, <http://dev.sudantribune.com/All/Article/Index/12-31-2015-Armed-group-in-Eastern-Equatoria-rejects-appointment-of-28-state-governors/57537>.

<sup>3066</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 30; "S. Sudan's Otuho Rebels Unveil Objectives for Armed Struggle."

<sup>3067</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "South Sudanese Rebel Group Sacks Top Official," *Sudan Tribune*, January 10, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57644>.

<sup>3068</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 30 (note 149).

<sup>3069</sup> Douglas H. Johnson and Guma Kunda Komey, "This Year in South Sudan (Part 2)," *Rift Valley Institute* (blog), May 26, 2016, <http://riftvalley.net/news/year-south-sudan-part-2#.WiH7CTdrxPY>; Tekle, "South Sudanese Rebel Group Sacks Top Official"; Anthony Osuru Ongwaja, "South Sudan Armed Forces/South Sudan Federal Democratic Party Dismisses Allegiance Against Ambassador Peter Oyoyo Kleto" (Nyamilepedia, January 9, 2016), <http://nyamile.com/2016/01/08/south-sudan-armed-forcessouth-sudan-federal-democratic-party-dismisses-allegiance-against-ambassador-peter-oyoyo-kleto/>.

<sup>3070</sup> "South Sudan's Rival Forces Clash despite Ceasefire Declaration," *Sudan Tribune*, May 24, 2017, <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article62531>; Oliwa Mario Bertino, "Ten Suspects Held By SPLA-IO Forces In Eastern Equatoria Are Safe But Under Investigation" (Nyamilepedia, May 24, 2016), <http://nyamile.com/2016/05/23/ten-suspects-held-by-spla-io-forces-in-eastern-equatoria-are-safe-but-under-investigation/>.

<sup>3071</sup> International Crisis Group, "A Major Step Toward Ending South Sudan's Civil War" (International Crisis Group, February 25, 2020), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/major-step-toward-ending->

#### South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army\*

AKAs: South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDA), George Athor Deng Rebel Group, Militia (Gen. Peter Kuol Chol)

General George Athor Deng launched his rebellion in 2010 after losing the Jonglei state gubernatorial election that year. Athor was killed in December 2011, and Gen. Peter Kuol Chol Aswan replaced him as commander-in-chief of SSDM/A.<sup>3072</sup> Excluded as a pre-independence group. See its entry in the Sudan section for more details.

#### South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army – Cobra Faction (SSDM/A-CF)

David Yau Yau, an opposition candidate of the United Democratic Front (UDF) for a Jonglei state assembly seat in the April 2010 general election, first came to prominence when clashes erupted in May 2010 between his supporters and SPLA forces following his April 2010 electoral defeat.<sup>3073</sup> Yau Yau is a member of the Murle ethnic group, the predominant ethnicity in his home area of Pibor County in Jonglei. A former theology student with no known military experience prior to his insurgency, he alleged electoral fraud on behalf of the declared winner, the SPLM nominee, and led his youth supporters in armed resistance against the SPLM/A.<sup>3074</sup> He and his forces aligned themselves with George Athor's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A).<sup>3075</sup> In June 2011, Yau Yau made peace with the government. The terms of the deal made Yau Yau a major in the SPLA and guaranteed the eventual integration of his 200 fighters into the SPLA.<sup>3076</sup>

Yau Yau traveled to Nairobi on medical leave in April 2012 and thereafter stayed in Khartoum until he returned to Pibor County in July. He initially reentered South Sudan with just 41 others, including his former second-in-command James Arezen Kong Kong and Murle soldiers previously serving in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).<sup>3077</sup> Its Jebel Boma Declaration, a document released April 7, 2013, which set forth the group's goals, identifies the rebels as the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), the same name as Athor's earlier

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south-sudans-civil-war; "Clashes Leave 15 Dead and Five Wounded in South Sudan," *Dpa International Service in English*, August 5, 2019,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DPAEN00020190805ef850053d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3072</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 1, 3.

<sup>3073</sup> "Fresh Clashes Occur in Jonglei's Pibor County between SPLA and Youth," *Sudan Tribune*, May 25, 2010, <https://web.archive.org/web/20110315043023/http://www.sudantribune.com/Fresh-clashes-occur-in-Jonglei-s,35184>.

<sup>3074</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Tribal Champion or Proxy Warrior? A Profile of South Sudan's David Yau Yau | Aberfoyle International Security," *Aberfoyle International Security* (blog), May 30, 2013, <http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=278>.

<sup>3075</sup> "SSDM/A-Athor," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 6, 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/ssdma-athor.html>; "Renegades Coordinate Attacks on South Sudan Army," *Reuters*, May 31, 2010, Factiva.

<sup>3076</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, June 4, 2013), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Yau-Yau.pdf>.

<sup>3077</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 6, 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/de/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/ssdma-cobra-faction.html>.

movement with which Yau Yau's first rebellion had been affiliated.<sup>3078</sup> Although the *Sudan Tribune* published an April 15, 2012, press release allegedly from the Jonglei state leadership of the old SSDA and South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) which named Yau Yau as the SSDA and SSLA commander in Jonglei state, Lt. Gen. Peter Kuol Chol, Athor's successor as the SSDM/A's commander, denounced Yau Yau's return to violence in September 2012.<sup>3079</sup> By mid-2013, the Yau Yau group's name was the SSDM/A – Cobra Faction, with the Cobra Faction addition signifying that Yau Yau's group was distinct from the old SSDM/A.<sup>3080</sup> Although Small Arms Survey noted the name in its November 2013 report on the group, the media sources we searched didn't mention a the group's public self-identification of Yau Yau's group as the Cobra Faction until the group's January 30, 2014, peace agreement with the government, though its spokesman James Kuburin referred to the SSDA's "Cobra units" in a May 6, 2013 statement.<sup>3081</sup> We code the Jebel Boma Declaration as the first instance of the group naming itself, though with the lowest degree of certainty because it is possible the group identified itself publicly in 2012 but that our sources didn't pick it up. SCAD does not record any qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding July 2012.

Possible motives for Yau Yau's second defection included his frustration over not receiving the rank of major general, which he had held within Athor's SSDM/A, within the SPLA and over SPLA brutality in its 2012 campaign to disarm Pibor County households.<sup>3082</sup> In the April 2013 Jebel Boma Declaration, the group's leadership cited the tribalism, corruption, and undemocratic nature of the SPLM government. The Cobra Faction called for the dissolution of the current government and an institution of a federal system that would give greater autonomy to local, democratically elected governments.<sup>3083</sup>

Yau Yau's forces ambushed an SPLA convoy on August 22 and/or 23, 2012, and killed many SPLA soldiers. Initial media reports cited the SPLA's claim that 24 of its soldiers died in the fighting, but later reports from the *Sudan Tribune* and the Small Arms Survey listed the SPLA's fatalities as more than 40 and more than 100, respectively.<sup>3084</sup> That attack is the first reported large attack by the Cobra Faction. In the first small attacks recorded in our media sources, the Yau Yau forces shot at SPLA troops in Likuangle on August 27 and again on August 30.<sup>3085</sup> While the first mention of a Yau Yau attack on civilians referred to government claims of the group's September 23 assault on Gumuruk market near Pibor County's border with Bor County after a fight with SPLA troops, a September 5 *Sudan Tribune* op-ed already included

<sup>3078</sup> David Yau Yau et al., "THE JEBEL BOMA DECLARATION: Federalism for South Sudan" (SouthSudanNation.com, April 9, 2013), <http://www.southsudannation.com/the-jebel-boma-declaration-federalism-for-south-sudan/>.

<sup>3079</sup> SSDA and SSLA military leadership, Jonglei, South Sudan, "SSLA and SSDA Appointed Maj. Gen. David Yau Yau as Jonglei Commander" (*Sudan Tribune*, April 15, 2012), <http://www.sudantribune.com/SSLA-AND-SSDA-APPOINTED-MAJ-GEN,42347>; Flora Henry Jembi, "South Sudan: SSDM Chairman Condemns Violence by Yau Yau in Jonglei State," *The Citizen*, September 1, 2012, AllAfrica, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201209020300.html>.  
<sup>3080</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3081</sup> "Agreement on a Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defense Army, Cobra Faction" (Radio Tamazuj, January 30, 2014), <https://radiotamazuj.org/uploads/media/58efabc27ad3c.pdf>; "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction"; "SPLA Denies Jonglei Rebels' Claim On Capture of Boma," *Sudan Tribune*, May 8, 2013, Factiva, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46490>.

<sup>3082</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3083</sup> Yau Yau et al., "THE JEBEL BOMA DECLARATION."

<sup>3084</sup> "Rebels Killed at Least 24 South Sudan Soldiers: Officials," *Agence France Presse*, August 26, 2012, Factiva; "South Sudanese Army Pledge to Clear Jonglei From Rebels," *Sudan Tribune*, August 28, 2012, Factiva, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43726>; "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 3.

<sup>3085</sup> "UN Concerned over Violence in South Sudan," *India Blooms News Service*, September 1, 2012, Factiva.

allegations of the group's attacks on civilians.<sup>3086</sup> Because of its reliance on local Murle support, the Cobra Faction made efforts to limit civilian casualties and suffering. Fighters claimed that they warned civilians to leave ahead of their initial attacks on the SPLA, and the International Crisis Group noted "relatively few human rights abuses associated with the SSDA-CF."<sup>3087</sup> According to Human Rights Watch, Cobra Faction forces included many child soldiers, and the group ultimately released 1,755 child fighters after negotiations with UNICEF and the government.<sup>3088</sup>

Because his second rebellion included very few commanders or fighters from his first, Yau Yau's Cobra Faction is included in our dataset as a new rebel group.<sup>3089</sup> Most of the commanders and fighters from his previous rebellion were surprised by his re-defection and remained in Juba and in their integration site in Western Bahr el Ghazal, respectively. As mentioned above, Kong Kong was one of the few exceptions. Kong Kong sold the government-provided vehicles the Yau Yau faction had received following its surrender before heading to Kampala and getting in touch with the Sudanese embassy which arranged his transportation to Khartoum to join Yau Yau.<sup>3090</sup> Kong Kong's actions suggest that there was some planning for Yau Yau's second rebellion in South Sudan in addition to the main planning in Khartoum. Although Yau Yau defected from the SPLA, most of his fighters were from Murle ethnic militias and self-defense forces, organized by age-set.<sup>3091</sup> Most of his fighters were Murle youths, and the Small Arms Survey estimated the Cobra Faction strength as 3,000 to 6,000 total fighters, including 500 to 1,000 based at its main camp Pibor county (a rural area used for coding the "rural" variable); its top commanders, aside from Yau Yau and Kong Kong with their background in the 2010-11 rebellion, had experience in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).<sup>3092</sup>

Yau Yau made peace with the government in 2014.<sup>3093</sup> As part of the May 9 agreement, the government created the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) as an autonomous government unit with more power than the Pibor County administration had had but less than a full state would have had. President Kiir appointed Yau Yau as GPAA's chief administrator on July 30.<sup>3094</sup> In 2015, a splinter of Yau Yau's Cobra faction (labeled Cobras Militia in ACLED) defected to the SPLM/A-IO, but most of the SSDM/A-CF forces remained loyal to the government.<sup>3095</sup> However, Kiir passed over Yau Yau to appoint SPLM politician and Jonglei State deputy governor Baba Medan as the first governor of the newly created Boma state, which

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<sup>3086</sup> "Jonglei Peace Undermined by Yauyau's Rebellion - UN," *Sudan Tribune*, September 24, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43998>.

<sup>3087</sup> "Yauyau Forewarned of Jonglei Attack and Making Advances Claim Rebels," *Sudan Tribune*, August 27, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43722>; "South Sudan: Jonglei – 'We Have Always Been at War,'" December 22, 2014, 16, note 92, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-jonglei-we-have-always-been-war>.

<sup>3088</sup> "'We Can Die Too': Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in South Sudan" (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 2015), 18, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/14/we-can-die-too/recruitment-and-use-child-soldiers-south-sudan>.

<sup>3089</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3090</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3091</sup> "South Sudan," 17.

<sup>3092</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3093</sup> "South Sudan Government, Yau Yau Group Reach Peace Agreement," *Sudan Tribune*, March 28, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50468>.

<sup>3094</sup> Claudio Todisco, "Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administration Area," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, March 2015), 35, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP35-Greater-Pibor.pdf>.

<sup>3095</sup> "Murle Faction Announces Defection to S. Sudan Rebels," *Sudan Tribune*, February 13, 2015, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article53980>.

included GPAA's territory and dissolved GPAA in late 2015.<sup>3096</sup> In January 2016, Yau Yau announced the dissolution of the Cobra Faction and the merger of its leadership and membership into the SPLM.<sup>3097</sup> Yau Yau later served as the deputy defense minister and then the deputy labor minister in the national government. Although former Cobra commander Khalid Butros tried to revive the Cobra Faction in September 2016 and then merged his forces into the new National Salvation Front (NAS) in March 2017, Yau Yau himself remained loyal to Kiir's government.<sup>3098</sup> It was unclear how large a proportion of the old SSDM/A-CF was active in Butros's revival, so our dataset codes the original Cobra Faction as having become inactive before becoming viable and not to have merged into NAS.

#### SSLM/A: South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army [ACLED mistake for event 25SSD]

General Gatdet launched the SSLM/A in March 2011 but returned to the SPLA in August. Excluded due to its pre-independence founding. See its entry in the Sudan section for more details.

#### South Sudan National Liberation Movement/Army (SSNLM/A)\*

In the aftermath of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), President Kiir sought to strengthen his control over the Equatorias and sacked Western Equatoria Governor Joseph Bakosoro, a former SPLA commander and the country's only governor elected as an independent rather than an SPLM nominee, on August 16, 2015.<sup>3099</sup> The pro-Bakosoro Arrow Boys self-defense units in Yambio, the capital of Western Equatoria located just north of the border between South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other area residents clashed with the SPLA, and heavy fighting broke out between a group of the local Arrow Boys self-defense units under Alfred Fatuyo's command in November 2015. Although the exact date of formation is unknown, SPLA officers led by 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Victor Wanga deserted and formed a second anti-SPLA group with non-Fatuyo Arrow Boys at some point after the Yambio fighting began.<sup>3100</sup> Wanga's group, based south of Yambio in Gangura (used for coding the "rural" variable), chose not to follow Fatuyo's lead by affiliating with SPLM-IO but instead pursued separate negotiations with Major General Patrick Zamoi, Bakosoro's replacement as governor of Western Equatoria and then, after Kiir's controversial decision to subdivide South Sudan's 10 constitutionally listed states into 28 new states, of Gbudwe in what used to be western Western Equatoria.<sup>3101</sup>

<sup>3096</sup> "GPAA Official Downplays Alleged Military Tension in Pibor County," *Sudan Tribune*, January 2, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57563>; "Yau Yau Says His Removal against Peace Deal, Kiir Did Not Consult Him," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), January 2, 2016, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/yau-yau-says-his-removal-against-peace-deal-kiir-did-not-consult-him>.

<sup>3097</sup> "Pibor's Yau Yau Joins SPLM," *Sudan Tribune*, January 13, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57671>.

<sup>3098</sup> John Tanza, "Former Rebel Chief Joins National Salvation Front in South Sudan," *Voice of America Press Releases and Documents*, March 9, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=VOA0000020170310ed3900008&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3099</sup> Alan Boswell, "Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of the ARCSS and New Conflict along the Equatorias-DRC Border," Issue brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, May 2017), 10, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB28-Spreading-Fallout.pdf>; "Kiir Sacks Two Equatorial Governors," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), August 16, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-sacks-two-equatorial-governors>.

<sup>3100</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 33; Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 12.

<sup>3101</sup> Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 12–13.



As with the group's founding, it is also unclear when the group launched its first attacks on the SPLA or other government targets. The International Crisis Group noted that Wanga's group was the "most active" anti-SPLA group in Western Equatoria "through much of 2015."<sup>3102</sup> The group appears to have operated clandestinely for its first weeks or months of operation, only naming itself as the South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) upon beginning negotiations with Zamoï and only appearing in English-language press releases and media reports about the resulting November 16 ceasefire.<sup>3103</sup> SCAD does not record any qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding September 2015.

Most of the initially unnamed group's leaders and fighters were of the Zande ethnic group, the predominant ethnicity of Yambio and the surrounding region.<sup>3104</sup> Wanga, his fellow SPLA defectors, and the Arrow Boys who allied with them did not publicly advocate for the overthrow of the Kiir regime or Equatorian secession or autonomy but instead articulated more localized political goals. Unlike Fatuyo's forces, they refused to ally with Riek Machar's SPLM/A-IO because of Machar's involvement in bringing the LRA to Western Equatoria in the 1990s.<sup>3105</sup> Following the November 16 agreement, Wanga told the news media that SSNLM began as an effort to force the government to pay attention to the group's concerns.<sup>3106</sup> According to Radio Tamazuj, SSNLM grievances mentioned by Wanga included "government forces['] . . . killing [of] innocent civilians with impunity and undermining peace processes"; the government's "falsely accusing his group of being associated with" SPLM/A-IO; the government's "[failure] to appreciate the successful struggle of the people of Western Equatoria to defend against the Lord's Resistance Army and the Ambororo Arab militia"; and "inequitable distribution of power sharing and promotion in the ranks in SPLA to Equatorians."<sup>3107</sup> Like the smaller Equatorian rebel group REMNASA which also formed in 2015, SSNLM may have tried and failed to secure support from the Ugandan and Sudanese governments.<sup>3108</sup> The group received revenue from its control of the Nabiapai market, an important market on the South Sudan-DRC border southeast of the group's base in Gangura.<sup>3109</sup> As of February 2016, the group reportedly had 5,000 fighters.<sup>3110</sup>

The November 16, 2015 ceasefire did not permanently end the conflict between the SPLA and SSNLM forces. Disagreement between Zamoï and the powerful SPLA Chief of Staff Paul Malong delayed negotiations for a permanent peace, and the SPLA launched an attack on the SSNLM Gangura base on January 21, 2016. Wanga died in his subsequent counterattack on

<sup>3102</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 33.

<sup>3103</sup> International Crisis Group, 33; "S. Sudan Signs Peace Deal with Armed Faction in W. Equatoria," *Sudan Tribune*, November 18, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020151118ebbi0002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>; UN Mission in South Sudan, "Government Signs Peace Agreement with Armed Group in Western Equatoria" (Relief Web, November 16, 2015), <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/government-signs-peace-agreement-armed-group-western-equatoria>.

<sup>3104</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 32.

<sup>3105</sup> International Crisis Group, 33; Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 5, 12.

<sup>3106</sup> "S. Sudan Signs Peace Deal with Armed Faction in W. Equatoria."

<sup>3107</sup> "W Equatoria Militia in Talks with S Sudan Govt to End Hostilities," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), November 18, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/w-equatoria-militia-in-talks-with-s-sudan-govt-to-end-hostilities>.

<sup>3108</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 31.

<sup>3109</sup> Boswell, "Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of the ARCSS and New Conflict along the Equatorias-DRC Border," 9.

<sup>3110</sup> "The Fight Moves South," *Africa Confidential*, February 19, 2016, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/11515/The\\_fight\\_moves\\_south](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/11515/The_fight_moves_south).

Yambio, one of 15 fatalities over the several days of fighting.<sup>3111</sup> The SPLA attacked the group again on February 5, and only after Zamoi's "personal lobbying" of Malong was a peace agreement finally concluded on April 2.<sup>3112</sup> Under the agreement, the government and the SSNLM agreed that the former rebels would be integrated into the SPLA; many of the Arrow Boys would demobilize and enter school or vocational training programs.<sup>3113</sup> Although full integration had not happened as of October 2017, the government has provided some weapons and support to the SSNLM fighters and uses them as a pro-government militia.<sup>3114</sup> According to ICG, some former SSNLM fighters joined the SPLM/A-IO-aligned Arrow Boys, and another faction "remains independent" of the main group which signed the peace treaty.<sup>3115</sup> An SPLA task force killed James Kabila, a senior SSNLM commander and his bodyguards in September 2017 after he allegedly refused to come in for questioning about the recent murder of World Vision staff in Yambio.<sup>3116</sup> Included.

### South Sudan National Movement for Change

Led by former Western Equatoria Governor Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro.<sup>3117</sup> Dr. Lokuji identifies the movement as one of four non-"briefcase" rebel groups with an actual presence.<sup>3118</sup> While Bakosoro's group has been active in condemning the government's actions and coordinating with other opposition groups, there is little evidence in English-language media that his group has engaged in or planned attacks against government targets. Bakosoro aimed to include armed and non-violent groups in negotiations with the government but told Voice of America that he supports nonviolent action.<sup>3119</sup> He currently lives in the United States and has said that his movement has never had a military wing.<sup>3120</sup> However, *Africa Confidential* identified former

<sup>3111</sup> Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 12; Rocco Nuri, "Congolese Refugees Flee New South Sudan Fighting [Press Release]," *All Africa*, January 28, 2016,

[http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020160128ec1s000pg&cat=a&ep=ASE](http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020160128ec1s000pg&cat=a&ep=ASE;);

"S/Sudan: Clashes broken out in Yambio city," *APANEWS*, January 21, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENF020160121ec1l000mb&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3112</sup> Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 12–13; "S. Sudan Gov't, SSNLM/A Rebels Sign Final Accord in Yambio," *Sudan Tribune*, April 3, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160403ec430005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3113</sup> "Disarmament and Reintegration of Child Soldiers on in W. Equatoria," *Sudan Tribune*, October 16, 2017,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020171016edag0002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "SSNLM Forces Arrive to Training Site in Yambio County," *Sudan Tribune*, June 18, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160619ec6i00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Reintegration and Empowerment Project Launches in Yambio," *Sudan Tribune*, June 15, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160616ec6f0005n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3114</sup> "Ex-Rebel Fighters' Integration into Army Stalled in Yambio," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), August 19, 2017,

<https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/ex-rebel-fighters-integration-stalled-over-logistical-challenges-in-yambio>; UN Mission in South Sudan, "Transforming Yambio from a 'Culture of War to a Culture of Peace'" (Relief Web, August 17, 2017), <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/transforming-yambio-culture-war-culture-peace>; Boswell, "Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of the ARCSS and New Conflict along the Equatorias-DRC Border," 10.

<sup>3115</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 33.

<sup>3116</sup> "Senior Rebel Commander Killed in S. Sudan's Gbudue State," *Sudan Tribune*, September 11, 2017,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020170911ed9b0005m&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3117</sup> SudanTribune.com, "S. Sudan Opposition Sets Conditions for 'Meaningful' Dialogue," *Sudan Tribune*, May 1, 2017, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020170501ed510005n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3118</sup> Alfred Sebit Lokuji, "Perspectives On Opposition Unity And The Path To Peace," *Gurtong* (blog), May 4, 2017, <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/20478/Perspectives-On-Opposition-Unity-And-The-Path-To-Peace.aspx>.

<sup>3119</sup> Jason Patinkin, "Activists Abroad Seek Path to Peace in South Sudan," *Voice of America* (blog), January 13, 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/activists-abroad-seek-path-to-peace-south-sudan/3675721.html>.

<sup>3120</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 42.

SPLA commander Abraham Wani as the head of Bakosoro's forces in Western Equatoria and reported that Wani's fighters clashed with SPLM/A-IO troops in November 2017.<sup>3121</sup> Excluded due to the lack of clear attacks or planned attacks against government targets.

#### South Sudan Patriot Army (SSPA)

##### Agany Ayii Akol Rebel Group

Brigadier General Agany Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol defected from the SPLA in March 2016 and allied himself with the forces of fellow SPLA defector General Peter Gatdet. His forces were concentrated in the Northern Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil) region.<sup>3122</sup> Defecting units from both sides in the civil war reinforced his army; 100 SPLM/A-IO troops under Colonel James Deng Mayar joined Ayii Akol's group in July 2016, and 85 SPLA-aligned Mathiang Anyoor militiamen under Captain Martin Malek followed in October 2016.<sup>3123</sup> In June 2017, a spokesman for Gen. Ayii Akol's group announced that group's name was the South Sudan Patriot Army and declared that it had seized territory and towns in Northern Bahr el Ghazal.<sup>3124</sup> Several blog reports included speculation that recently sacked SPLA chief of staff General Paul Malong Awan, a native of Aweil, was involved in the new group.<sup>3125</sup> According to an English summary of a January 2017 Dinka-language podcast from Australia's SBS, analyst Kuir Ē Garang identified Gayar and Akol's group as one of 10 active rebel groups in South Sudan.<sup>3126</sup> Excluded as a splinter/merger on the basis of most of its initial membership coming from Agany Ayii Akol's original forces which were first associated with General Gatdet's rebels rather than directly from SPLA defections.

#### South Sudan People Patriotic Front (SSPF)

The SSPF, sometimes abbreviated as the SSPPF, was a rebel group based in West Equatoria and headed by Charles Kisanga, the former SPLM-DC secretary general and Western Equatoria state's information minister until President Kiir sacked Western Equatoria Governor Joseph Bakosoro in August 2015.<sup>3127</sup> The group formed in November 2015, and Kisanga issued a press release declaring himself its political head and Alfred Futiyo Karaba as the military commander.<sup>3128</sup> According to SSPF, Futiyo's Arrow Boys militia formed the bulk of the new group's military forces; Futiyo had earlier claimed to command 10,000 fighters.<sup>3129</sup> However, Futiyo denied any association with Kasanga and insisted that he and his forces remained loyal to

<sup>3121</sup> "Low Expectations for Peace Talks."

<sup>3122</sup> "S. Sudanese Army, Armed Men Clash in N. Bahr El Ghazal," *Sudan Tribune*, April 28, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58791>.

<sup>3123</sup> "South Sudan Army Downplays Significance of Defection in Aweil," *Sudan Tribune*, October 11, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60501>; "S. Sudanese Army, Armed Men Clash in N. Bahr El Ghazal."

<sup>3124</sup> Nyamilepedia, "BREAKING: A New Rebel Group Emerges in Northern Bhar El Ghazal, Hometown to Sacked Chief of General Staff," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), June 15, 2017, <http://nyamile.com/2017/06/15/breaking-a-new-rebel-group-emerges-in-northern-bhar-el-ghazal-hometown-to-sacked-chief-of-general-staff/>.

<sup>3125</sup> Chol Mawel, "PHOTOS: Rebel Group Starts in Sacked Army Chief Malong's State," *Tower Post* (blog), June 16, 2017, <http://thetowerpost.com/2017/06/16/photos-rebel-group-starts-in-sacked-army-chief-malongs-state/>; Nyamilepedia, "BREAKING."

<sup>3126</sup> "Armed Opposition in South Sudan: Discussion with Kuir Ē Garang."

<sup>3127</sup> "SPLM-DC and Some Independent Candidates Seek Jobs from NCP," *Kimatong News* (blog), April 15, 2010, <http://98.131.177.60/News/today15news3.html>; "More than 100 Killed as South Sudan Fuel Tanker Explodes," *The Irish Times*, September 17, 2015, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/more-than-100-killed-as-south-sudan-fuel-tanker-explodes-1.2355372>.

<sup>3128</sup> Charles Barnaba Kisanga, "Formation of A New Rebellion in WES and Calls For Alliance with SPLM-IO" (Nyamilepedia, November 24, 2015), <https://nyamile.co/2015/11/24/formation-of-a-new-rebellion-in-wes-and-calls-for-alliance-with-splm-io/>.

<sup>3129</sup> "New South Sudan Rebel Faction Seeks Alliance against Government," *Sudan Tribune*, November 24, 2015, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57150>.

Riek Machar's SPLM/A-IO; according to Small Arms Survey, Kisanga then "fled the country."<sup>3130</sup> After Kisanga signed a peace agreement with the government in 2016, 1,100 SSPF fighters reportedly defected to the FDP/SSAF.<sup>3131</sup> According to an English summary of a January 2017 Dinka-language podcast from Australia's SBS, analyst Kuir Ĕ Garang identified Kisanga's SSPF as one of 10 active rebel groups in South Sudan.<sup>3132</sup> Very little information is available on this group and whether or not it ever actually planned or executed attacks. Excluded because most of what fighters it may have had, even if many fewer than claimed by Kisanga, appear to have come from a preexisting rebel group, namely Arrow Boys previously aligned with the SPLM/A-IO.

**South Sudan Resistance Movement/Army (SSRM/A):** Although the term South Sudan Resistance Movement (SSRM) was apparently sometimes used to refer to former vice president Riek Machar's SPLM-IO rebels in the early months of the group's existence after the December 2013 fighting in Juba, this entry refers a separate entity which split from the SPLM-IO in 2015. Then-SPLM-IO spokesperson General Lul Ruai Koang announced the creation of a new group called the South Sudan Resistance Movement and Army (SSRM/A) in February 2015.<sup>3133</sup> Lul returned to Juba and declared his group's goal to be negotiations with the government to create an autonomous area in Akobo state similar to the autonomous Greater Pibor Area which the SPLM/A agreed to grant to former rebel commander David Yau Yau.<sup>3134</sup> In March 2015, Lul congratulated SPLA forces on recent victories and announced his intention to attack SPLM-IO forces in his home territory of Lou Nuer.<sup>3135</sup> The SSRM/A has been largely absent from English-language reports since that press release, and President Kiir appointed Lul as the SPLA's official spokesperson in March 2016.<sup>3136</sup> Excluded as a splinter group and as a pro-government group.

#### **South Sudan United Liberation Movement/Army**

Supposedly launched on November 26, 2017 by General Zachariah Monyjiiek Baguot Kiir in Ruweng State.<sup>3137</sup> Excluded due to its recentness.

#### **SPLA/M: Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement**

<sup>3130</sup> Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 12.

<sup>3131</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Over 1,000 Rebels Defect to Changson Chang's Faction," *Sudan Tribune*, August 18, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160818ec8i000b6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3132</sup> "Armed Opposition in South Sudan: Discussion with Kuir Ĕ Garang."

<sup>3133</sup> Denis Dumo, "South Sudanese Rebel Quits, Returns to Government Territory," *Reuters News*, February 19, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020150219eb2j00joe&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Ariik Atekdit, "SPLA-IO Military Spokesperson Defects, Forms Own Movement. > Gurtong Trust > Editorial," *Gurtong* (blog), February 19, 2015,

<http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/16215/SPLA-IO-Military-Spokesperson-Defects-Forms-Own-Movement.aspx>; "Former Rebel Spokesperson Arrives in Juba after Defection," *Sudan Tribune*, February 19, 2015, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54045>.

<sup>3134</sup> "S. Sudanese Rebels Refute Defection of Their Forces in Akobo - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, February 18, 2015, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54030>.

<sup>3135</sup> "Former Rebel Spokesman Vows to Reclaim Lou Nuer Area," *Sudan Tribune*, March 8, 2015, [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=54230](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=54230).

<sup>3136</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Kiir Appoints Former Rebel Spokesperson as New South Sudan Army Spokesman," *Sudan Tribune*, March 19, 2016,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020160319ec3j0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3137</sup> Fred Oluoch, "More Rebels Emerge as Igad Dithers over South Sudan," *The East African*, December 2, 2017, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/More-rebels-South-Sudan-/2558-4211976-p48vk9/index.html>; "New Rebel Group Emerges in South Sudan near Sudan Border," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), November 26, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/new-rebel-group-emerge-in-south-sudan-near-sudan-border>.

Founded in 1983, the SPLM/A was the main rebel force during the second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). The SPLM officially entered the Sudanese government as the dominant force in the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and has governed South Sudan since its 2011 independence. Many of the other rebel groups listed under Sudan and South Sudan began as SPLM/A splinters, and a number of commanders and fighters rejoined and defected from the organization multiple times. For the purposes of this project, SPLM/A is considered a rebel organization prior to the CPA, a Sudanese state actor between the CPA and independence, and a South Sudanese state actor since independence. Post-independence SPLM/A splinters that also meet our other criteria are included. The SPLM/A itself is excluded due to its pre-independence founding.

#### **Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement-In Opposition (SPLA/M-IO)**

From its inception in December 2013 until the present, former Vice President Riek Machar's rebel group has represented the most significant threat to President Kiir's government. Known as SPLA/M-IO to distinguish the group from the ruling SPLA/M-IG (In Government), Machar's group has absorbed several other rebel groups while also suffering splinters of its own.

The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) has experienced numerous splinter groups and defections during its decades-long existence, including Dr. Riek Machar's defection in 1991 and his subsequent struggle against SPLM/A for most of the next decade before rejoining the main group in 2002. South Sudan's first president, SPLM leader Salva Kiir, offered amnesty and other incentives to bring most remaining non-SPLM/A rebel groups and commanders, at least nominally, under the government's authority in 2011. However, as the 2015 presidential elections approached, some senior SPLM leaders became dissatisfied with Kiir's increasingly authoritarian leadership style, and both Vice President Riek Machar and SPLM General Secretary Pa'gan Amum Okiech openly prepared to challenge Kiir for control of SPLM and the presidential nomination. In response, Kiir consolidated his power by firing Machar, Okiech, and his entire cabinet on July 23, 2013.<sup>3138</sup> Machar and other SPLM dissidents, including Okiech and Rebecca Garang, organized themselves to challenge Kiir at the December meeting of the party's National Liberation Committee and held a December 6 press conference in Juba to publicly denounce Kiir's "dictatorial" leadership.<sup>3139</sup> Accusing the president (and party chair) of frustrating attempts at dialogue between the factions, Kiir's SPLM opponents withdrew from the NLC meeting on December 14 and renewed their plans to hold a public rally in the coming days.<sup>3140</sup>

As the internal tensions within the SPLM escalated, violent clashes broke out between SPLA units in Juba on the night of December 15.<sup>3141</sup> Kiir's government claimed that loyal SPLA units had defeated a coup attempt by Machar and his allies, but subsequent reporting cast doubt on the government's narrative. Fighting began between the new Republican Guard, a newly formed elite SPLA unit from Kiir's Dinka ethnic group, and the more established Presidential Guard, made up primarily of soldiers from the Dinka and Machara's Nuer ethnic groups. Presidential orders to arrest Machar and other SPLM dissidents, or at least rumors of such orders, appear to have triggered the fighting.<sup>3142</sup> The majority of the estimated 500 deaths in the first two days of fighting were Nuer soldiers and civilians, predominantly in Juba; Machar and his wife

<sup>3138</sup> "A Power Struggle, Not a Coup," *Africa Confidential*, August 1, 2013.

<sup>3139</sup> "Ruling Party Leaders Warn Kiir against Dictatorial Behaviour," *Daily Nation*, December 7, 2013, sec. Africa, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DAYNA00020131207e9c70000g&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3140</sup> "SPLM Leaders Pull out of NLC Meeting over 'Lack of Dialogue Spirit,'" *Sudan Tribune*, December 14, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020131228e9ce0005y&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3141</sup> "Heavy Gunfire Rocks South Sudan Capital," *Al Jazeera English*, December 15, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AJAZEN0020131216e9cg0000b&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3142</sup> "Salva Kiir Plays the Sorcerer's Apprentice," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 20, 2013, LexisNexis; "From Power Struggle to Uprising," *Africa Confidential*, December 19, 2013, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5163/From\\_power\\_struggle\\_to\\_uprising](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5163/From_power_struggle_to_uprising).



fled the capital, and SPLA forces killed most of his guards.<sup>3143</sup> Small Arms Survey researcher John Young concluded that, contrary to President Kiir's narrative, Machar and his SPLA troops did not attempt to plan a coup and that it was instead the massacre of Nuer in Juba that was the catalyst for the new group's formation.<sup>3144</sup>

The early days of the SPLM/A-IO were chaotic, and most of its senior military leadership were former generals in the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), the rebel group which had integrated into the SPLA in 2006; former SSDF General Peter Gadet and General James Koang, the only early SPLM/A-IO military commander with no SSDF affiliation, were the only major active SPLA generals who defected to Machar as his rebellion took shape.<sup>3145</sup> The irregular Nuer "White Army" self-defense forces and SPLA defectors, predominantly of Nuer ethnicity, formed the bulk of the SPLM/A-IO's early forces.<sup>3146</sup> As more SPLA units defected and the rebel forces became more organized, fighting spread across much of the country. By early 2014, Machar expressed driving Kiir from power as the new rebellion's goal.<sup>3147</sup> The intervention of the Ugandan military played a key role in blunting the insurrection's momentum and stabilizing Kiir's position.

It is difficult to pinpoint the first time the new rebel group publicly named itself as the SPLM/A-IO. The first reference in the surveyed sources was a draft ceasefire between the government and Machar's rebel group, dated January 15, 2014, which Professor Eric Reeves posted on his blog on January 20.<sup>3148</sup> A January 22 op-ed by Reeves in the *Sudan Tribune* was the first mention of the group's name in the Factiva media database.<sup>3149</sup> The grouping of SPLM dissenters challenging Kiir's authority reportedly agreed on the SPLM/A-IO name around the time of their December 6, 2013 press conference in Juba, but the composition of that group was very different from what would become the leadership of the new rebel group that emerged from the mid-December Juba clashes.<sup>3150</sup> However, as late as early February, some media reports did not refer to the group as SPLM/A-IO; for example, a February 3 VOA piece on an interview with Machar about launching his new group claimed its name was "SPLM/SPLA."<sup>3151</sup> Our dataset considers January 20 as the first use of the SPLM/A-IO name but with confidence only that the first use was likely some time that month.

Given the lack of central organization as SPLM/A-IO emerged as a new movement in late 2013 and the early months of 2014, it is difficult to pin down the dates of the first attacks because it is unclear exactly which troops at which point actually identified with Machar and

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<sup>3143</sup> Daniel Howden, "South Sudan's Former Vice President Denies Plotting Coup: Machar 'forced to Flee for His Life' from the Capital: Two Days of Factional Violence Leave 500 Dead," *The Guardian*, December 19, 2013, sec. Guardian International Pages; "Riek Machar," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 20, 2013, LexisNexis.

<sup>3144</sup> John Young, "A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, September 2015), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP39-SPLM-IO.pdf>.

<sup>3145</sup> Young, 17–18.

<sup>3146</sup> Young, 17.

<sup>3147</sup> "The SPLM-in-Opposition," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, May 2014), 4, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/south-sudan/HSBA-SPLM-IO-May-2014.pdf>.

<sup>3148</sup> Eric Reeves, "'Final Draft' of South Sudan 'CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES' Agreement," *Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy* (blog), January 20, 2014, <http://sudanreeves.org/2014/01/20/final-draft-of-south-sudan-cessation-of-hostilities-agreement/>.

<sup>3149</sup> Eric Reeves, "The Last Chance to End Violence in South Sudan Is Slipping Away," *Sudan Tribune*, January 22, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140122eal1m0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3150</sup> "The SPLM-in-Opposition," 9.

<sup>3151</sup> John Tanza, "Riek Machar Announces South Sudan 'Resistance' Movement," *Voice of America* (blog), February 3, 2014, <https://www.voanews.com/a/south-sudan-machar-resistance-movement-formed/1843597.html>.



intended to function as rebel troops in support of him against Kiir's government. For the purposes of our dataset, Gadet's December 18 attack on Bor counts as the first large attack because he clearly announced his support for Machar and attacked SPLA forces in Bor with the intent of driving them out of the area. According to the UN, at least 66 soldiers, in addition to civilians, lost their lives in the Bor fighting.<sup>3152</sup> The attack by Gadet's forces on civilians in Bor that same day killed at least 20 and is included as the first SPLM/A-IO attack on civilians.<sup>3153</sup> While it would be difficult to single out the first small attack against government targets, we code the date of the group's first small attack as December 16, 2013, around the time of alleged pro-Machar reprisal attacks on SPLA forces. While alternative cases can be made for attacks on earlier dates (e.g., December 15 according to the government narrative that pro-Machar troops initiated the Juba violence in an attempt to overthrow the government), our dates for all three initial attack categories would only be off by a day or two, as it is very clear that nascent SPLM/A-IO forces had engaged in small and large attacks against government targets and against civilians within a week of the initial clashes.

Although Machar spoke the rhetoric of national unity, individuals of his own Nuer ethnic group formed the majority of both his emerging organization's leadership and soldiers.<sup>3154</sup> While SPLM/A-IO would come to include other groups, its strongholds and headquarters remained in areas predominantly populated by Nuers.<sup>3155</sup> Although group leaders, such as Machar, had been in Juba in December 2013 when violence was taking place, it is unclear if he was performing any operational planning in Juba. As the Small Arms Survey notes, it is highly unlikely that Machar planned a coup during that time. Furthermore, following the outbreak of violence Machar fled the capital. Therefore, the more reliable location to code for the "rural" variable is the Upper Nile state. SCAD recorded qualifying anti-government protests but not riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding December 2013. SCAD records two Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation events in the form of violent anti-government protests during the year prior to the formation of the group (see Event IDs 6260023 and 6260025). However, these events did not occur in Upper Nile State where the group was formed. No Type 2 contestation events occurred during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

The SPLM/A-IO denies receiving any support from other countries in the region despite credible reports of support from Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.<sup>3156</sup> According to the Small Arms Survey, Sudan initially provided the group with "military support and rear bases" but remained somewhat ambivalent and did not throw its full weight behind Machar.<sup>3157</sup> Conflict Armament Research identified Sudanese-supplied arms and ammunition in Jonglei in 2014.<sup>3158</sup> Following Machar's flight from Juba in July 2016 and Kiir's subsequent recognition as Taban Deng as SPLM/A-IO leader and vice president, South Sudan and the United States worked to persuade

<sup>3152</sup> Amos Machel, "UN Puts Death Toll at 500, Hundreds More Wounded," *Daily Monitor*, December 19, 2013, sec. National, 500,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DAYMO00020131219e9cj00005&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3153</sup> "Mutinying Soldiers Kill 20 People in Bor As Unrest Worsens," *All Africa*, December 19, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131219e9cj000wl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3154</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Rick Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 31–32; Young, "A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO," 30; "The SPLM-in-Opposition," 6.

<sup>3155</sup> "The SPLM-in-Opposition," 6.

<sup>3156</sup> Conflict Armament Research, Ltd., "Dispatch from the Field: Weapons and Ammunition Airdropped to SPLA-IO Forces in South Sudan," Dispatches from the Field (London: Conflict Armament Research, Ltd., June 2015), [http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weapons\\_and\\_ammunition\\_aidropped\\_to\\_SPLA-io\\_forces\\_in\\_South\\_Sudan.pdf](http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weapons_and_ammunition_aidropped_to_SPLA-io_forces_in_South_Sudan.pdf); "The SPLM-in-Opposition," 10–11.

<sup>3157</sup> Young, "A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO," 53–54.

<sup>3158</sup> Siobhán O'Grady, "Is Khartoum Sending Weapons to Rebels in South Sudan?," *Foreign Policy: Passport* (blog), June 2, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/02/is-khartoum-sending-weapons-to-rebels-in-south-sudan/>.

Ethiopia and Sudan to cut off support for Machar and the majority of the SPLM/A-IO aligned with him, with some success. Both countries refused to allow Machar to take up long-term residency after his retreat to the DRC in 2016. Additionally, the Nuer diaspora is a limited source of funds, and most of the Nuer diaspora organizations have continued to back Machar over Deng.<sup>3159</sup>

The SPLM/A-IO and Kiir's government have signed a series of broken ceasefires and agreements since their first Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement in January 2014. The two sides finally signed the Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015, and Machar returned to Juba with a contingent of SPLA-IO soldiers in April 2016 to resume his prior role as first vice president in accord with ARCSS.<sup>3160</sup> Spurred by SPLA attacks on civilians, fighting increased in Equatoria and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Kiir's October 2, 2015, decision to unilaterally increase the number of the country's states from 10 to 28 also undermined the deal. Fighting between SPLA and IO troops broke out anew in Juba on July 8, 2016, amid allegations of an IO coup attempt and a plot to murder Machar, and Machar and his troops fled again and escaped through Equatoria to the DRC.<sup>3161</sup> SPLM/A-IO negotiator Taban Deng remained in Juba, and Kiir appointed him to replace Machar as vice president as the new government-recognized SPLM/A-IO leader, though the vast majority of IO forces remained loyal to Machar in opposition to Deng's leadership. Because SPLM/A-IO was still planning and carrying out attacks against state targets more than three years after its founding, the group is coded as viable in our dataset. While various groups and commanders have defected from and merged into SPLM/A-IO during its existence, the primary group under Machar's leadership remains the most significant rebel force in South Sudan. See the entries for FDP/SSAF and SSRM/A for examples of splinters from SPLM/A-IO and those for REMNASA and SSAF/SSFDP for examples of groups that merged into the larger rebellion. Ongoing negotiations led to additional ceasefires and ultimately to the September 2018 peace agreement whose implementation remains in doubt.<sup>3162</sup>

#### Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement-In Opposition (Weluba Faction) [SPLA/M-In Opposition-Weluba]

Wesley Weluba, also rendered Welebe, was a top Arrow Boys militia commander and SPLM official in the Mundri area of West Equatoria state when several prominent Mundri SPLM officials declared for Machar's SPLM/A-IO in early 2014, and he soon became involved in organizing resistance to the SPLA.<sup>3163</sup> In early 2015, the Mundri resistance to SPLA became a full rebellion, and the South Sudanese government declared Weluba to be behind the new rebellion in West Equatoria with Sudanese backing, but SPLA/M-IO claimed him as one of their own. The Arrow Boys were a major source of his recruits.<sup>3164</sup> Claiming to be defending his people against cattle raiders, Welebe initially denied he was part of SPLM/A-IO or even a rebel, but Machar officially appointed him a major general in SPLM/A-IO in September 2015. SPLM/A-IO sources told Small Arms Survey that Welebe had been secretly affiliated with their larger rebellion in the early stages of his rebellion, with seems consistent with his allies'

<sup>3159</sup> International Crisis Group, "South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard," 5; Young, "A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO," 32–33; Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016–17," 32.

<sup>3160</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016–17," 16–19.

<sup>3161</sup> Young, 24–25.

<sup>3162</sup> International Crisis Group, "Salvaging South Sudan's Fragile Peace Deal," ICG Africa Reports (Juba/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 13, 2019), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/270-salvaging-south-sudans-fragile-peace-deal>.

<sup>3163</sup> Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 8.

<sup>3164</sup> SudanTribune.com, "Juba Admits New Rebel Group Captured Mundri Town on Friday"; SudanTribune.com, "Juba Accuses Sudan of Supporting New Insurgency in Western Equatoria," *Sudan Tribune*, May 26, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150526eb5q000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

SPLM/A-IO affiliation and his own later public embrace of the group.<sup>3165</sup> Excluded as either a splinter or part of the main SPLA/M-IO.

#### **SPLM-DC: Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (Democratic Change)**

Lam Akol founded the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement – Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) in 2009 to contest the 2010 general elections.<sup>3166</sup> The party changed its name to the Democratic Change Party in January 2016.<sup>3167</sup> The group functions as a political party rather than an armed rebel group, and founder Akol claimed the his decision to resign from the party in August 2016 and found the more militant National Democratic Movement (NDC) was driven by his original party's refusal to endorse violence.<sup>3168</sup> Excluded.

#### **SPLM-FD: Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Former Detainees**

Splinter from the ruling SPLM/A.<sup>3169</sup> Formed by seven former SPLM leaders who were released from South Sudanese custody in February 2014 and entered the peace negotiations as a third party rather than as allies or SPLM or SPLM-IO.<sup>3170</sup> They do not have an armed wing.<sup>3171</sup> Excluded.

#### **SPLM-N: Sudan People's Liberation Movement (North)**

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North is a rebel group in Sudan which formed in 2011 from those SPLM/A forces based in territory that remained part of Sudan under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).<sup>3172</sup> For more detailed information, see the group's listing under Sudan. Excluded as a foreign group under South Sudan.

#### **Tiger Faction New Forces (TFNF)**

General Yoanes Okij, also known as Johannes Okiech, announced the formation of the Tiger Faction New Forces in late October 2015. The group opposed President Kiir's decree 36/2015 which expanded the number of South Sudan's states from 10 to 28. TFNF also claimed that the order placed territory of the Shilluk ethnic group in Upper Nile state under the rule of Kiir's Dinka ethnic group.<sup>3173</sup> Like fellow Shilluk Johnson Olonyi, Okij had been an SPLA commander; while he remained in the SPLA until October 2015, he had publicly made favorable comments about Olonyi following the latter's May 2015 defection from SPLA.<sup>3174</sup> Although the

<sup>3165</sup> Boswell, "Conflict in Western Equatoria," 9.

<sup>3166</sup> "Democratic Change Party," Sudan Tribune, accessed August 22, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/+SPLM-DC-Sudan-People-s-Liberation,148-+>.

<sup>3167</sup> "SPLM-DC Party Rebrands to 'Democratic Change' Party," *Africans Press* (blog), January 7, 2016, <https://africanspress.org/2016/01/07/splm-dc-party-rebrands-to-democratic-change-party/>.

<sup>3168</sup> Oluoch, "Former South Sudan Minister Forms New Political Party."

<sup>3169</sup> "SPLM Groups Sign Reconciliation Agreement," *The New Vision*, July 27, 2017, sec. Top Stories, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WC58224020170728ed7s001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3170</sup> Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "SPLM Seven Join Addis Ababa Talks, Form Third Bloc - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, February 13, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49947>.

<sup>3171</sup> Young, "Isolation and Endurance: Riek Machar and the SPLM-IO in 2016-17," 44.

<sup>3172</sup> Claudio Gramizzi, "At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, December 2013), 7, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP31-Blue-Nile.pdf>.

<sup>3173</sup> "New Rebel Group Formed in South Sudan against Creation of 28 States," *Sudan Tribune*, October 31, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020151031ebav00003&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3174</sup> "The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing Events through 8 March 2016," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, March 2016), 6, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/HSBA-Conflict-Upper-Nile-March-2016.pdf>.

*Sudan Tribune* identified TFNF as a splinter from Olonyi's forces, other sources such as Small Arms Survey and the International Organization for Migration labeled TFNF as a splinter from the SPLA comprised of Okij's former SPLA troops, primarily of the Shilluk ethnicity.<sup>3175</sup> Okij and the 90 soldiers who reportedly rebelled with him were not long-time SPLA regulars but members of a local militia who had only recently and incompletely integrated into the SPLA when Ayok Ogat, its commander, became an SPLA major general. While Ogat was stationed in Juba, Okij was in command of his former troops back in Upper Nile.<sup>3176</sup> Once Olonyi took up arms against the SPLA in May 2015, fighting broke out between the Okij-commanded forces of Ogat and pro-Olonyi forces.<sup>3177</sup> This provides support for considering TFNF to be a new rebel group formed by SPLA defectors, albeit ones who had formerly been associated with Olonyi's forces in the earlier Shilluk rebellion initiated by Robert Gwang, rather than defectors from Olonyi's 2015 rebellion. We thus include TFNF in our dataset. Unlike Okij, Ogat did not subsequently abandon the SPLA over Kiir's creation of new states, and he continued to deny rumors of his defection.<sup>3178</sup> SCAD does not record any qualifying anti-government protests or riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding October 2015.

Virtually all accounts agree that TFNF came into being in late October 2015 with Okij's defection from the SPLA. Verifying TFNF claims to have taken possession of Manyo County's capital Wedokona, Upper Nile's information minister, Yor Akec, said that the TFNF attack began on October 29, 2015, the first recorded allegation of an attack by the group.<sup>3179</sup> The TFNF declared its existence in a statement under Okij's name on October 29 and contacted the *Sudan Tribune* on October 30.<sup>3180</sup> The SPLA launched heavy assaults, with forces including helicopter gunships, against TFNF positions in late November 2015.<sup>3181</sup> TFNF spokesperson Brigadier General Otowang Achwang claimed that rebel forces fighting SPLA troops near Wedokona in early February 2016 were TFNF and not SPLM/A-IO as the larger rebel group had claimed.<sup>3182</sup> The searched media sources did not include reference to any TFNF actions which met our 25-fatality threshold to qualify as large attacks. While we also failed to find any media reports on

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<sup>3175</sup> "Tiger Faction of Ethnic Shilluk Kingdom Dismisses Integration into SPLM-IO," *Sudan Tribune*, March 11, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58273>; "The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing Events through 8 March 2016," 6; "IDPs Movement Tracking - Renk County" (International Organization of Migration South Sudan, November 3, 2015),

<http://iomsouthsudan.org/tracking/sites/default/publicfiles/documents/IDPs%20Movement%20Tracking%20Trend%20-%20Renk.pdf>; Lako Jada Kwajok, "Presidential Decree 36/2015 Jeopardized National Unity!," *Nyamilepedia* (blog), November 12, 2015, <http://nyamile.com/2015/11/11/presidential-decree-362015-jeopardized-national-unity/>.

<sup>3176</sup> "Fighting among SPLA Forces at Wadakona in Upper Nile Thursday," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), October 30, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/fighting-among-spla-forces-at-wadakona-in-upper-nile-thursday>.

<sup>3177</sup> "Fighting among Shilluk Militia North of Fashoda after Olony's Defection," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), May 17, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/fighting-among-shilluk-militia-north-of-fashoda-after-olony-s-defection>.

<sup>3178</sup> "Shilluk SPLA General Denies Defection to Machar Forces," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), July 12, 2016, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/shilluk-spla-general-denies-defection-to-machar-forces>.

<sup>3179</sup> "S. Sudan Rebel Group Hold Hostage Manyo County Commissioner," *Sudan Tribune*, October 31, 2015, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Wrv6ki3EMkEJ:www.sudantribune.com/spip.php%3Farticle56903+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.

<sup>3180</sup> "New Rebel Group Formed in South Sudan against Creation of 28 States"; Yoannes Okij, "Press Statement: Two Shilluk Generals Defect from the Gov't and Form a New Rebel Movement," *PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers* (blog), October 29, 2015, <https://paanluelwel.com/2015/10/29/press-statement-two-shilluk-generals-defect-from-the-govt-and-form-a-new-rebel-movement/>.

<sup>3181</sup> "The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing Events through 8 March 2016," 17; "Upper Nile Rebel Faction Accuses Gov't of Provocative Attacks," *Sudan Tribune*, November 29, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020151129ebbt0008h&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3182</sup> Otowang Achwang, "Breaking News: Government Forces Attacked Tiger Faction New Forces In Upper Nile State" (*Nyamilepedia*, February 9, 2016), <http://nyamile.com/2016/02/09/24025/>.

TFNF civilian attacks, our relative lack of information about the group is the reason for coding the civilian attack variables as missing.

Okij and the TFNF publicly articulated their political goals from the group's first public announcement on October 30, 2015. As mentioned earlier, Okij denounced Kiir's decree 36/2015 and the creation of 28 states instead of 10 states existing in the constitution. In particular, the TFNF viewed the way in which Kiir's plan subdivided the former Upper Nile State into Western Nile, Eastern Nile, and Latjoor states as evidence that the government was discriminating against the Shilluk ethnic group in favor of the Padang Dinka ethnic group. The Padang Dinka are part of the Dinka, South Sudan's most populous ethnicity and President Kiir's ethnic group. Although many Shilluk had considered Malakal, South Sudan's second most populous city and the capital of the former Upper Nile State, as part of their domain, the new state system placed Malakal in Eastern Nile State, which was dominated by the Padang Dinka. Additionally, the plan gave Eastern Nile a strip of land stretching northwest of Malakal to the Sudanese border, bisecting Western Nile, where the Shilluk are the predominant ethnic group.<sup>3183</sup> TFNF's public statements reiterated the reversal of 36/2015 as its main goal.<sup>3184</sup> Although such a reversal would actually reduce the number of subnational units rather than create or empower existing ones, the TFNF's explanation of its goals stress that the reversal would increase autonomy for the Shilluk people by giving greater ability to influence the fate of the territory they claim. Thus, our dataset codes greater autonomy as one of the TFNF's political goals.

As of March 2016, TFNF fighters still controlled the northern stretch of the White Nile's west bank, in Manyo County.<sup>3185</sup> Due to Manyo County being the location of first attack and where TFNF had clear control, Manyo County is coded for the "rural" variable.

In March 2016, SPLM/A-IO's Commander-in-Chief Riek Machar attempted to bring TFNF into its fold by appointing Okij as commander of SPLM/A-IO's Special Brigade One, but the TFNF commander refused, and TFNF spokesperson Achwang asserted that TFNF would not participate in the peace process until the government reversed the creation of new states and restored lands to Shilluk control.<sup>3186</sup> Nonetheless, the Panel of Experts tasked to investigate activities in South Sudan on behalf of the UN Security Council's Sudan Sanctions Committee and other sources have identified Okij and TFNF as elements of SPLM/A-IO rather than a separate force.<sup>3187</sup> Given the TFNF's own denial of an alliance, Okij's subsequent affiliation with the NDM, and the number of credible sources (including International Crisis Group and Small Arms Survey, and local media sources, cited above, as well as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) which treat TFNF as a separate group or even explicitly mention the group as not being part of SPLM/A-IO, TFNF enters our dataset as a rebel group rather than being excluded as a constituent element of SPLM/A-IO.<sup>3188</sup> While in the SPLA, Okij's forces functioned alongside

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<sup>3183</sup> "The 28 States System in South Sudan," Briefing Notes (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, August 9, 2016), 7–8, [https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson\\_StatesBriefingNote\\_9Aug16.pdf](https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson_StatesBriefingNote_9Aug16.pdf).

<sup>3184</sup> "Shilluk Militia Says They'll Stop Fighting If '28 States' Cancelled," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), April 24, 2016, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/shilluk-militia-says-they-ll-stop-fighting-if-28-states-cancelled>; Achwang, "Breaking News"; Otowang Achwang, "Press Statement - the Tiger Faction New Forces (TFNF) - 28/11/2015" (Pachodo.org, November 28, 2015), <https://pachodo.org/latest-news-articles/pachodo-english-articles/11564-press-statement-the-tiger-faction-new-forces-tfnf-28-11-2015>; Okij, "Press Statement."

<sup>3185</sup> "The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing Events through 8 March 2016," 4.

<sup>3186</sup> "Tiger Faction of Ethnic Shilluk Kingdom Dismisses Integration into SPLM-IO"; International Crisis Group, "South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias," 21.

<sup>3187</sup> Payton Knopf et al., "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015)" (New York: United Nations Security Council, January 22, 2016), 22, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/70](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/70).

<sup>3188</sup> Øystein H. Rolandsen and Nicki Kindersley, "South Sudan: A Political Economy Analysis" (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 13,

Olonyi's forces, as they had done in previous conflicts before the integration process began. When Olonyi bolted the SPLA in May 2015, Okij's decision to stay put could be viewed as a defection of sorts from Olonyi, but under our criteria, that would not count as a splinter from an existing rebel group because Okij and the fighters who would become TFNF remained in SPLA before, during, and for five months after Olonyi's re-defection.

There has been very little news about TFNF since early 2016 (as of late 2018). On April 24, 2016, Okij reiterated TFNF's demand for the reversal of Kiir's subdivision of the existing states into 28 new ones and also declared his group's intention to cease hostilities and enter negotiations with the government following such a reversal.<sup>3189</sup> None of the sources we monitored mentioned any attacks by or against TFNF in the following months nor were there any official declarations of TFNF's dissolution, merger into another rebel group, or peace with the government, as happened with similar groups experiencing such events. At some point between the National Democratic Movement's September 2016 founding and his January 2017 death, Okij aligned himself with Lam Akol's NDM. It is unclear whether or not TFNF's forces officially merged into NDM or not. A source contacted by the *Sudan Tribune* identified Okij as the commander of NDM's military forces at the time of his death.<sup>3190</sup> On January 6 or 7, Okij and at least 20 of his soldiers died in northern Upper Nile when Olony's Agwelek Forces, part of the SPLA-IO, counterattacked in response to an NDM attack several days earlier.<sup>3191</sup> Absent new evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to conclude the remnants of TFNF are now part of NDM. The participation of Lam Akol and NDM in the September 2018 peace agreement and ongoing negotiations meant an end to NDM attacks on state targets prior to the three-year anniversary of TFNF's October 2015 founding, so TFNF would not meet our viability threshold even if its forces are now part of the NDM.

### United Democratic Front (UDF)

The United Democratic Front is a South Sudanese opposition party, originally formed in 2003 as a breakaway faction of the United Democratic Salvation Front.<sup>3192</sup> On November 4, 2011, SPLA troops attacked an alleged rebel camp in West Equatoria and, after a brief shootout, arrested UDF chairman Peter Abdelrahman Sule.<sup>3193</sup> Sule had disappeared from Juba three weeks prior, and the government alleged that he was organizing a new rebel militia.<sup>3194</sup> The UDF denied any connection to Sule's alleged rebel activities and elected a new chairman.<sup>3195</sup> President Kiir pardoned Sule, along with other alleged rebel leaders, in October 2013, and the government

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[https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2460927/NUPI\\_rapport\\_+South+Sudan\\_Rolandsen\\_Kindersley.pdf?sequence=2](https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2460927/NUPI_rapport_+South+Sudan_Rolandsen_Kindersley.pdf?sequence=2).

<sup>3189</sup> "Shilluk Militia Says They'll Stop Fighting If '28 States' Cancelled."

<sup>3190</sup> "South Sudanese Rebel Commander Killed after Squabbles with Other Faction," *Sudan Tribune*, January 5, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61311>.

<sup>3191</sup> "Deadly Clashes between NDM Rebels and SPLM-IO," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, January 13, 2017, sec. POLITICS & POWER,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020170126ed1d0000d&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Another S Sudanese Rebel Commander Killed near Sudan Border."

<sup>3192</sup> "W. Equatoria Governor Addresses the State Assembly On State Security," *All Africa*, November 11, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS0002011111e7bb000jm&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3193</sup> "South Sudan Arrests Opposition Leader Turned Rebel," *Agence France Presse*, November 4, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020111104e7b4006se&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3194</sup> Richard Ruati, "Governor Warns Rebel Groups Not to Attack W. Equatoria," *All Africa*, November 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020111110e7ba00160&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3195</sup> Ater Garang Ariath, "UDF Elects Professor Jambi Interim Chairman," *All Africa*, November 17, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020111117e7bh000uv&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "UDF Denies Supporting Rebels in South Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, November 14, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020111114e7be0002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



released the opposition leader. Sule denied he had ever organized rebel activities and announced his return to electoral politics.<sup>3196</sup> In August 2015, Sule disappeared for some days and was killed in unsuspicious circumstances. While an early news account called his death an assassination, *Indian Ocean Newsletter* reported that South Sudan had executed him after Uganda extradited him.<sup>3197</sup> There is no evidence that the UDF engaged in rebel activity, and there is not enough information about Sule's alleged 2011 activities to include any nascent group he may have been forming. Excluded.

#### Yau Yau Rebels

David Yau Yau launched a rebellion in Pibor County in 2010 before making peace with the SPLA in 2011.<sup>3198</sup> He re-defected in 2012 and launched a new rebel group called the SSDM/A – Cobra Faction. Because his second rebellion included very few commanders or fighters from his first, Yau Yau's Cobra Faction is included in our dataset under a separate entry above.<sup>3199</sup> Yau Yau's first rebellion is included under the Sudan section due its pre-independence founding. See the entry in the Sudan section for details.

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<sup>3196</sup> "South Sudanese Authorities Release Opposition Leader," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, October 16, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020131016e9ag000p2&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3197</sup> "Who Okayed the Abduction of Dong Luak and Aggrey Idri?," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, February 10, 2017, sec. POLITICS & POWER, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020170224ed2a0000c&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "S/Sudan Opposition Leader Assassinated," *APANEWS*, August 24, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENE020150824eb8o0008z&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3198</sup> "Fresh Clashes Occur in Jonglei's Pibor County between SPLA and Youth - Sudan Tribune."

<sup>3199</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

**Narrative Summary:** Sparked by southern army officers' mutiny, Sudan's first civil war (1955-1972) between southern rebels and the central government began even before the country's January 1, 1956 independence. Key issues included the role of Islamic law and Islam in the new country's government and the extent to which power would be concentrated in the central government in Khartoum or spread in a more federal system of government. The southern rebels, known as the Anya Nya, opposed efforts to impose sharia law in the south, largely populated by Christians and animists rather than Muslims, and supported greater regional autonomy and eventually secession. The first civil war ended when the rebels and the government signed the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. The agreement granted southern Sudan political autonomy and guaranteed a referendum for the disputed territory of Abyei, on the border of the new Southern Sudan Autonomous Region (SSAR) and the rest of Sudan, to determine its political status.

President Jaafar Nimeiri, whose government had signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, subsequently repudiated it in 1983 when he dissolved the SSAR, canceled Abyei's referendum, and declared Sudan to be an Islamic state with sharia law across the entire country, including the south. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) with its armed wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), emerged as the key rebel forces in the south challenging the central state and its allies in Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005). The SPLM/A and the government reached a 1989 peace agreement that suspended sharia law in the south, but General Omar al-Bashir's military government, which took power in a June 1989 coup covertly backed by prominent Islamist Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front (NIF), denounced the deal, and the civil war resumed. As SPLM/A made gains on the ground, John Garang consolidated his authority as SPLM/A's leader, and internal opponents led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol issued the Nasir Declaration in 1991 challenging Garang and split from his forces. Their defection split the southern Sudanese rebels and contributed to interethnic conflict between Garang's Dinka and Machar's Nuer, the two most populous ethnicities in southern Sudan. Fighting in groups under various labels, the SPLM/A dissidents made peace with the Sudanese government in a series of agreements and declarations in the mid-1990s and frequently fought as pro-government militias against Garang's SPLA fighters. The SPLM/A and President al-Bashir's government moved toward negotiations. The process outlined in the 2002 Machakos Protocol culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that saw Garang become president of the newly created Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and vice president in the central government and gave southern Sudan the right to an eventual independence referendum. Machar and Akol had already rejoined SPLM in 2002 and 2003, respectively; most of the remaining government-allied militias in the Southern Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) were integrated into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba Declaration.

After Garang's death in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005, just weeks after becoming vice president, longtime SPLA commander Salva Kiir took his place as vice president, GoSS president, and SPLM/A leader. Unlike Garang who had called for a united, democratic Sudan, Kiir supported southern Sudanese secession. The SPLM/A's domination of southern Sudanese politics, highlighted by allegations of electoral fraud in the April 2010 GoSS elections which saw Kiir reelected president with 93 percent of the vote, gave rise to a number of new rebellions in the south in the 2010-11 period, with former SPLA lieutenant general and defeated independent gubernatorial candidate George Athor Deng's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) as the most prominent. Southern Sudan voted overwhelming to secede in January 2011 and officially became independent on July 9, 2011. Through a combination of force and amnesty, Kiir and the SPLA neutralized these rebellions between mid-2010 and early 2012. Refer to the South Sudan country summary for additional information on rebel activity in post-independence South Sudan.

South Sudan's secession did not end rebel activity within Sudan, nor was the second civil war in the south the only major conflict in Sudan during the 1997-2015 period of our study. A second significant rebellion had broken out in the western region of Darfur. Although founded in 2001, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) came to national and international prominence in early 2003 as they proclaimed their struggle against the marginalization of Darfur, and particularly its non-Arab residents, and the attacks on non-Arab villages by Arab militias. After achieving initial successes against government forces, the two groups faced heavy counterattacks and mass government-backed mobilization of Darfuri Arab militias known as the Janjaweed and associated with systematic atrocities against Darfuri civilians. SLM/A split into two factions in 2004 led by its chairman Abdel Wahid al-Nur and military commander Minni Arku Minawi, respectively, and many more splinter groups have emerged since then. JEM has also experienced several splinteres beginning in 2004, and new rebel groups, including several associated with Darfuri Arabs opposed to the government, also entered the field. Minni Minawi's SLM/A faction was the only major rebel group to sign the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, and the agreement did not stop the fighting among the rebel factions and between pro-government and rebel forces. After losing ground during his cooperation with the government, Minni Minawi relaunched his rebellion in 2010. The two most important Janjaweed commanders, Musa Hilal and Hemeti, each turned on the government at various times, with Hilal still imprisoned after a 2017 fight between his Sudan Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC) troops and Hemeti's government Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Beyond Darfur and South Sudan, Sudan has faced rebellions in various other peripheral areas. The government concluded the 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement with the Eritrea-back Eastern Front rebels, an alliance of the Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions. Along the border with present-day South Sudan, the states of South Kordofan, home to the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile State have been the bases for several rebellions. The SPLA had units operating in these states during the second civil war, and the SPLM/A-North formally became a separate political party and armed force upon South Sudan's independence. As al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) government reasserted full political control over these two states, fighting resumed. While it is beyond the scope of this summary to detail all rebel groups and rebellions past or present in Sudan, both ACLED's data and the surveyed sources highlight Sudan's experience of heavy rebel activity both in terms of the number of attacks and number of groups.

#### **Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: High**

**Explanation:** There is strong reason to believe that groups may have been mistakenly excluded given both data limitations and the many groups with complicated histories of both pro- and anti-government activity, merging and splintering, and relationships with other actors, most notably the SPLM/A, with their own changing relationships to state power. Nearly one quarter of all Sudan's ACLED incidents (1,394 of 5,673) involved unidentified Sudanese armed groups as the primary initiating or targeted actor, twice as many as involved the most common named rebel group, the SPLM/A. Likewise, unknown actors initiated 38 percent (242 of 630) of GTD's recorded attacks. Although violence in Sudan, and its Darfuri and southern conflicts in particular, has received extensive international press coverage, the distance of many reporters from the actual conflict zones and our limitation of sources to English-language media means that we likely missed numerous attacks launched by new, small rebel groups, even with the assistance of ACLED incidents drawn from Arabic sources and BBC Monitoring coverage of non-English media. Our data sources simply could not capture the array of new groups, splinter groups, and mergers of small groups not otherwise mentioned in our sources. Furthermore, our reliance on particular organizations' in-depth, credible reporting, most notably the Small Arms Survey in the case of Sudan, resulted in the inclusion of some rebel groups where the SAS backgrounder was virtually their only mention, while similar groups missed by SAS were not included in our dataset.

However, even if the largely ACLED-derived list of armed actors included every group that might potentially count as a rebel actor, the nature of conflict in Sudan and the secession of South Sudan would still have made it difficult to accurately categorize the listed groups for inclusion and exclusion. The relation of many actors to the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A's own shifting relationship with the Sudanese

state makes it difficult to determine when a group should be considered as a rebel splinter (excluded) or a defection from state or state-allied forces (included). For the purposes of this study, the SPLM/A, while not itself included due to its pre-1997 founding, counts as a rebel group from the beginning of the studied period in 1997 through its signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. All splinters and defections from the SPLM/A in those years are excluded from our dataset. Following the signing of the CPA, the SPLM/A formally, if even incompletely and haltingly, became part of the Sudanese state as the dominant force in the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan and its leader as a national vice president in al-Bashir's NCP government and with some of its forces at least theoretically operating alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) in both southern and northern Sudan. Splinters and defections from the SPLM/A from the signing of the CPA until South Sudan's 2011 independence, if meeting the other inclusion criteria, are included in our dataset as Sudanese rebel groups. Splinters and defections from the SPLM/A after South Sudan's 2011 independence, if meeting the other inclusion criteria, are included in our dataset as South Sudanese rebel groups. Considering the SPLM/A as de facto state actor before the CPA or as a rebel group after it would lead to different inclusion decisions.

[Note: This country summary and nearly all of the group entries below and the associated coding decisions were written in 2018-19 prior to the protests that drove President Bashir from power in April 2019.]

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### Foreign actors

ADF-NALU: Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

Al Qaeda [no attacks]

Ansar Dine

ANCD: National Alliance for Change and Democracy [foreign: Chad]

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army [foreign, pre-1997]

Militia (Mohamed Sa'id Atom)

ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front [foreign, pre-1997]

SPLA/M-In Opposition: Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement-In Opposition

TPDM: Tigray People's Democratic Movement [foreign]

UFDD: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development [foreign Chadian group, 2008]

UNRF II: Uganda National Rescue Front II [foreign]

UFR: Union of Forces for Resistance [possibly foreign Chadian group, 2009]

WNBf: West Nile Bank Front [foreign]

### Domestic actors

#### Abyei Liberation Front (ALF)\*

This group formed in 2008 to oppose the SPLM/A administration of Abyei and fight for Abyei to remain in Sudan under the central government's control. The group's membership were largely Missiriya Arabs.<sup>3200</sup> The SPLA claimed that Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officers were involved in organizing Missiriya forces and that Sudan was actively backing ALF.<sup>3201</sup> Excluded as pro-government.

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<sup>3200</sup> "Armed Entities around Abyei," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, December 2010), 2, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/abyei/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Abyei.pdf>.

<sup>3201</sup> "Allies and Defectors: An Update on Armed Group Integration and Proxy Force Activity," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, May 2008), 5, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-11-allies-defectors.pdf>; "Sudan: Fresh

### Al Jundi al Mazloun (“Neglected Soldiers”)

Al Jundi al Mazloun was “a spontaneous, uncoordinated movement of dissatisfied paramilitaries who accused the government of not making good on promises of financial compensation.”<sup>3202</sup> In 2007, disgruntled Arab janjaweed fighters formed groups to attack government targets and demand the government respond to their grievances.<sup>3203</sup> Excluded as a mutiny lacking broader political goals.

**Al-Takfir wal Hijrah** ACLED identifies this group as the actor behind a 2000 election attack and the target of a 2012 government strike. The original Al-Takfir wal Hijrah was an Islamist group founded in Egypt in the 1960s. The independent Sudan chapter has been behind at least 7 attacks since 1994.<sup>3204</sup> Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

### Arab Spring Forces

Relatively little is known about this group, which is why the certainty about this group’s existence is only coded at level 2 out of 3. The only original English-language reporting mentioning it was a February 2014 Radio Dabanga article covering the group’s initial announcement, subsequently picked up by AllAfrica.<sup>3205</sup>

A new rebel militia launched two attacks near Abu Karinka in East Darfur, on February 9, 2014. The group, calling itself the Arab Spring Forces, first attacked and robbed two commercial vehicles, injuring two people, and clashed with Sudanese military forces when they arrived on the scene. The Arab Spring Forces then surrounded the military garrison and Abu Karinka and demanded the soldiers return a vehicle which the rebels claimed had been stolen. At least one government soldier died, and four were wounded in the rebels’ attack. Radio Dabanga identified Gido Jadada as the group’s leader, but no other information is available regarding the group’s leadership, membership, sources of funding, founding, goals (beyond the return of the vehicle), or additional attacks. However, none of these Type 2 events occurred in the state local to group formation, East Darfur. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. According to the limited information available, the Arab Spring Forces did not become a viable rebel group. Due to initial attacks being in Abu Karinka, we assumed that operational planning happened near there. That town satisfies the “rural” variable as a 1.

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Fighting in Disputed Oil-Rich Abyei Region Kills 90,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, March 3, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020080303e433000gq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3202</sup> “Al Jundi al Mazloun (‘The Neglected Soldiers’),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, November 2010), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/arab/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Jundi.pdf>.

<sup>3203</sup> Julie Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2009), 37, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf>; Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 2nd ed., African Arguments (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2008), 257.

Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 37.<sup>3204</sup> Hayder Mili, “Jihad Without Rules: The Evolution of al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra,” *Terrorism Monitor* 4, no. 13 (June 29, 2006), <https://jamestown.org/program/jihad-without-rules-the-evolution-of-al-takfir-wa-al-hijra/>.

<sup>3205</sup> “Casualties as ‘Arab Spring’ Routs East Darfur Army Garrison,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), February 9, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/casualties-as-arab-spring-routs-east-darfur-army-garrison>; “Casualties As ‘Arab Spring’ Routs East Darfur Army Garrison,” *All Africa*, February 10, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140210ea2a000k7&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



### Bedouin Movement\*

On September 25, 2012, Sudanese military forces ambushed the Bedouin Movement, a new group of Darfuri Arab rebels, east of Hashaba, North Darfur. In the ensuing fighting, Yassin Kaci Shayeb, the group's chairman, was killed, and the rebels destroyed two government vehicles. The rebels were reportedly en route to Hashaba to join the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF).<sup>3206</sup> Nasrallah Hassan Koko, the group's new commander, claimed credit for a January 22, 2013, attack on a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) base in the Fata Barno displaced persons camp in North Darfur.<sup>3207</sup> Excluded due to the likelihood that the group was a faction of SRF rather than a preexisting independent group that merged into the SRF.

### Beja Congress (BC)

Political party formed in 1958 to as a vehicle to politically organize the Beja people of eastern Sudan. Participated in 1976 coup attempt with other Libya-based opposition forces. After joining the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of opposition groups, the BC began launching attacks against Sudanese government targets near the border with Eritrea.<sup>3208</sup> Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

### Darfur Joint Resistance Forces

According to Radio Dabanga in 2014, "The Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid El Nur, the SLM faction under the command of Minni Minawi, and the Liberation Movement for Justice led by Taher Hajar and commanded in the field by Ali Karbino are since recently cooperating in Darfur under the name of the 'Darfur joint resistance forces.'"<sup>3209</sup> Excluded as an alliance of preexisting rebel groups.

### Democratic Popular Front Army (DPFA)

The Democratic Popular Front Army was a predominantly Arab anti-government militia founded in 2004. Although possibly involved in earlier warfare among Darfur's Arab tribes, it did not engage in major combat with government forces until August 2007.<sup>3210</sup> While most of the group's members were reportedly from the Rizeigat, Habbaniya, Terjem, Beni Halba, and Taasha ethnic groups, all largely Arab, there were also fighters from the non-Arab Fellata tribe, and some commanders were from the non-Arab Zaghawa.<sup>3211</sup> According to Human Rights Watch, intra-Arab fighting between pro-government PDF and Arab rebels such as those in the DPFA began in January 2007.<sup>3212</sup>

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<sup>3206</sup> "Dozens Killed in Clashes between Government and Rebels," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), September 25, 2012, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/dozens-killed-in-clashes-between-government-and-rebels>.

<sup>3207</sup> "Gunmen Attack Army Base in N. Darfur Camp, 2 Killed," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), January 22, 2013, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/gunmen-attack-army-base-in-n-darfur-camp-2-killed>.

<sup>3208</sup> John Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007), 22–23.

<sup>3209</sup> Radio Dabanga, "Child Killed, Villagers Injured in North Darfur Air Raid," *ReliefWeb* (blog), March 7, 2014, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/child-killed-villagers-injured-north-darfur-air-raid>.

<sup>3210</sup> Stephanie Hancock, "Arab-Led Darfur Rebels Say Are Victimized Too," *Reuters News*, August 20, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070820e38k000vc&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Adam Wolfe, "'Upcoming Peace Talks Will Not Solve the Complex Darfur Problem' [Analysis]," *All Africa*, October 4, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020071004e3a4000xl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3211</sup> Hancock, "Arab-Led Darfur Rebels Say Are Victimized Too"; Opheera McDoom, "Darfur Arab Rebels Say Captured 12 Sudan Soldiers," *Reuters News*, August 13, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070813e38d001fm&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3212</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design: Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID" (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 19, 2007), 34, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/19/darfur-2007-chaos-design/peacekeeping-challenges-amis-and-unamid>.



DPFA released what appears to be its first public statement to the media on August 13, 2007. DPFA Secretary-General Osama Mohamed al-Hassan claimed credit for an August 11 attack on government troops in Soja in Wadi Saleh in West Darfur. According to him, DPFA forces captured 12 soldiers, including an officer, and eight military vehicles.<sup>3213</sup> While the Sudanese army publicly denied DPFA's claims, Secretary-General Mohammad Ibrahim Mohammad Brima of United Revolutionary Force Front (URFF), another previously obscure Darfurian Arab rebel group only mentioned in one earlier (July 2007) article in the Factiva database, took credit for the attack.<sup>3214</sup> Al-Hassan clarified to Reuters that URFF was part of DPFA, but he acknowledged some "small differences" of opinion within the larger group.<sup>3215</sup> Researcher Alex De Waal identified URFF commander Yassin Yousif as the head of the Democratic Popular Front, which De Waal characterized as stronger than the Popular Forces Army.<sup>3216</sup> Reuters, the independent Sudanese newspaper *Al-Ayyam* (picked up by BBC Monitoring), and Human Rights Watch all attest to the DPFA's existence.<sup>3217</sup> However, the government's immediate denial, the apparently lack of follow-up attacks, and the unclear relationship between the URFF and DPFA cast sufficient doubt on the latter group's claims to merit a rebel group certainty coding of 2 out of 3. As far as political goals, al-Hassan called on the government to stop using Arab militias to fight back the main Darfur rebel groups and asserted that the Darfurian Arabs had been "marginalized."<sup>3218</sup> However, there is no evidence of the DPFA stating its political goals within one year of its alleged 2004 formation. SCAD includes one qualifying Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation event and no Type 2 contestation events in the year prior to group formation. This event, Event ID 6250125, began as a student protest against teacher strikes, but devolved into riots resulting in the burning down of the state education ministry. However, this event occurred in Blue Nile State and not West Darfur, the region in which the group formed. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. There appears to be no other information available regarding the group's leadership, membership, sources of funding, founding, or actual attacks launched. Based on the group's 2007 goals and the context of its anti-government mobilization, it is reasonable to think that at least one third of the group's initial membership came from self-defense organizations, including pro-government militias and paramilitary organizations.

Media reports identified the Democratic Popular Front (DPF), likely the same as or parent organization of the DPFA, as one of nine rebel groups, along with six SLM/A factions, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, and the JEM-Field Revolutionary Command, which agreed at a November 13, 2007, in Juba to merge their organizations into one rebel group called the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A).<sup>3219</sup> Nothing more is known about Siddig Mohamed

<sup>3213</sup> "Sudan: Army Denies New Darfur Rebel Group Captured 12 Soldiers," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, August 14, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020070814e38e001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; McDoom, "Darfur Arab Rebels Say Captured 12 Sudan Soldiers."

<sup>3214</sup> Hancock, "Arab-Led Darfur Rebels Say Are Victimised Too"; Scott Baldauf, "Can Darfur's Disparate Rebels Unite?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 13, 2007, sec. WORLD, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CHSM000020070712e37d00007&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3215</sup> Hancock, "Arab-Led Darfur Rebels Say Are Victimised Too."

<sup>3216</sup> Alex De Waal, "Peace in Darfur: Next Steps after Arusha," *Online Africa Policy Forum (Center for Strategic and International Studies)* (blog), August 21, 2007, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/peace-darfur-next-steps-after-arusha>.

<sup>3217</sup> McDoom, "Darfur Arab Rebels Say Captured 12 Sudan Soldiers"; "Sudan," August 14, 2007; Human Rights Watch, "Darfur 2007."

<sup>3218</sup> McDoom, "Darfur Arab Rebels Say Captured 12 Sudan Soldiers."

<sup>3219</sup> "Sudan: Unification of Nine Darfur Rebel Factions Hailed," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, November 15, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020071115e3bf001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Nine Darfur Rebel Factions Reunite under One Structure," *Sudan Tribune*, November 14, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24751>.

Abdelrahman, who signed on behalf of DPF. The merger did not appear to hold, and the DPFA was still issuing its own public statements at least as late as November or December 2008.<sup>3220</sup> According to the limited information available, the DPFA did not become a viable rebel group. Due to the claimed initial attack in Soja, Soja is coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1.

#### Democratic Unionist Party-Unionist Movement (DUP-UM)

The Unionist Movement was a faction within eastern Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party, a longstanding political party and part of NDA prior to 2004 accommodation with government which gave the DUP control of Red Sea State’s deputy governorship.<sup>3221</sup> The UM left DUP in 2011 over the party’s decision to join the ruling National Congress Party’s government and subsequently signed a memorandum of understanding with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front rebels, reaffirmed in 2014.<sup>3222</sup> While the DUP-UM cooperated with rebels, the limited media reporting on the splinter does not show that the group planned or carried out attacks on state targets. Excluded.

#### Eastern Front

After other elements of the National Democratic Alliance made peace with the Sudanese government and entered parliament, the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions formed the Eastern Front in February 2005.<sup>3223</sup> The Eastern Front received significant support from the Eritrean government.<sup>3224</sup> On October 14, 2006, the Eastern Front signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government.<sup>3225</sup> Excluded as a merger of two existing rebel groups.

#### Equatoria Defence Force (EDF)

Self-defense groups fighting the SPLA in the southern Equatoria region formed the Equatoria Defence Force in 1995. The EDF signed an agreement with the Sudanese government in 1996 and subsequently became part of the government-aligned Southern Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) and continued as an independent faction within SSDF until the 2006 Juba Declaration.<sup>3226</sup> It also battled the LRA, the context in which EDF appeared in ACLED. Excluded as a pro-government force.

#### Freedom Eagles of Africa

AKAs: Falcons for the Liberation of Africa

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<sup>3220</sup> Andrew Heavens, “Up to 250 Killed in Darfur Tribal Clashes - Peacekeepers,” *Reuters News*, December 15, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020081215e4cf000rw&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Opheera McDoom, “UPDATE 1-Darfur Rebels Condemn AU on ICC Warrant,” *Reuters News*, July 22, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020080722e47m00199&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3221</sup> Young, “The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization,” 40.

<sup>3222</sup> “Sudanese Security Arrest Dozens of Unionists,” *Sudan Tribune*, January 2, 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45061>; “Darfur Peace Process Chronology,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, August 29, 2014), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/HSBA-Darfur-Peace-Process-Chronology-2014.pdf>.

<sup>3223</sup> Young, “The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization,” 30–32.

<sup>3224</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 250.

<sup>3225</sup> Young, “The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization,” 37–43.

<sup>3226</sup> Mareike Schomerus, “Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan’s Central and Eastern Equatoria,” Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, June 2008), 21, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-08-LRA.pdf>.

The Freedom Eagles of Africa, a previously unknown rebel group, claimed responsibility for 2009 kidnappings of French aid workers in Darfur and Chad.<sup>3227</sup> Its name is also translated as Falcons for the Liberation of Africa.<sup>3228</sup> The group demanded that France retry six French workers from the NGO Zoe's Ark who were pardoned after being convicted of abducting children in Chad and later demanded that France stop interfering in Darfur.<sup>3229</sup> There is no evidence that the group ever planned or carried out attacks on Sudanese state targets. Excluded due to the lack of attacks against the state.

**Galweng Militia** SPLA commanders in Bahr el-Ghazul created, armed, and trained the Galweng ("defenders of cattle") self-defense militia in 1999.<sup>3230</sup> ACLED includes several Galweng-related events in 2000. Excluded due to its close SPLA ties which make it unlikely that it was an independent rebel organization.

#### **Gatluak Gai Rebel Group**

Gatluak Gai was a low-level leader in the SPLM/A, possibly a member of the Unity State Prisons Guard, prior to his late May 2010 rebellion in Unity State. He was angered by the disputed victory of SPLM incumbent Taban Deng over independent candidate Angelina Teny, wife of Riek Machar, in the Unity gubernatorial election.<sup>3231</sup> Deng had previously denied Gai an appointment as a county commissioner, and so Gai had served as one of Teny's campaign managers, likely in hope of receiving his appointment in the event of victory.<sup>3232</sup> Although media reports referred to the group using its commander's name, Gai organized his forces under the banner SPLA for Unity.<sup>3233</sup> Gai signed a peace agreement with the SPLA on July 18, 2011, but was killed only days later.<sup>3234</sup> While his second-in-command purportedly took credit for Gai's death, many suspected SPLA involvement.<sup>3235</sup>

One SPLA source told the *Sudan Tribune* that the SPLA had been monitoring the movements of Gai and "his loyalists" for three weeks prior to his initial attack on May 28, 2010.<sup>3236</sup> This suggests that Gai was taking secret steps to prepare for his rebellion, even though

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<sup>3227</sup> "French Aid Worker Released after Three Months in Captivity," *Sudan Tribune*, February 7, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100207e627000dz&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Darfur Kidnappers Say Freed Western Aid Workers," *Reuters News*, April 29, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020090429e54t00133&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3228</sup> Guillaume Lavalée, "Kidnapped Darfur Aid Workers Alive and Well-Treated: Hostage," *Agence France Presse*, April 12, 2009,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020090412e54c009f9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3229</sup> Guillaume Lavallée, "Darfur Group Says It Took Three Hostages to Pressure France," *Agence France Presse*, November 27, 2009,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020091127e5br0066j&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Darfur Kidnappers Demand Retrial of Zoe's Ark 'Criminals,'" *Reuters News*, April 12, 2009,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020090412e54c000co&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3230</sup> Simon Denyer, "Sudan Rebels Say Foil Marauding Arab Horsemen.," *Reuters News*, July 8, 1999,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010907dv78050kd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3231</sup> "Gatluak Gai Rebellion, Unity State," 1.

<sup>3232</sup> "Gatluak Gai's Rebellion, Unity State," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, July 2011), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Gai-Unity-state-July-2011.pdf>.

<sup>3233</sup> Nyak, "Gatluak Gai Feared Dead Weeks After Agreeing Ceasefire."

<sup>3234</sup> Martelli, "South Sudan Rebel Leader Shot Dead"; "South Sudan Government, Rebel General Sign Accord."

<sup>3235</sup> "Gai's Family Accuses SPLA of Standing Behind His Death in Unity State"; Kuich, "South Sudan Militia Deputy Admits Killing of His Leader Gutluak."

<sup>3236</sup> "SPLA Clashes with a Renegade Colonel in Unity State," *Sudan Tribune*, May 30, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100530e65u0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

they were apparently not sufficiently clandestine. The SPLA surveillance of Gai's pre-attack activities focused on his movements within Unity State, so it appears that he planned his rebellion within the state, where no town had a population of 100,000 or greater.<sup>3237</sup> It is likely that Gai was conducting initial operational planning in Unity State and therefore the "rural" variable is coded as 1. Gai launched his rebellion in a May 28, 2010 attack on the SPLA base at Warpiny in Abiemnhom County, Unity State, wounding one SPLA soldier.<sup>3238</sup> Although his forces continued to attack SPLA units over the next year, none of the surveyed sources identified any of his subsequent attacks as killing 25 or more SPLA or affiliated security personnel. Gai's forces were implicated in a number of attacks on civilians, although it is likely that some of the civilian deaths attributed to them were actually caused by the SPLA or other militant groups. Machien Luoi of Gurtong Trust blamed Gai for 35 deaths, many of them civilians, in Koch County, Unity State, between April and November 2010.<sup>3239</sup> While Gai may have been responsible for civilian deaths before starting his rebellion, our dataset codes May 2010 as the date of the first civilian attack. In November 2010, the Unity state government agreed to compensate farmers for damages caused by Gai's fighters.<sup>3240</sup>

The surveyed sources mention three leaders in the group: Gai himself; Marko Chuol Ruei, his second-in-command who took responsibility for Gai's killing; and Peter Duop Gatluak, also referred to as the group's commander after Gai's death.<sup>3241</sup> Prior to becoming a colonel in the Unity State prison guards, Gai was active as a fighter in pro-Sudan militias.<sup>3242</sup> Unfortunately, there is very little information provided on the other two commanders. After Gai's death, Duop Gatluak's comments to Unity Gov. Taban Deng implied that he and many of the soldiers had previously been in SPLA and other security forces and defected over the SPLA's "bad system of leadership."<sup>3243</sup> Because it is unclear whether Gai or the other commanders were active in the SPLA prior to the CPA (the point at which we consider the SPLM/A a state actor), the leadership variable *former\_rebels* is coded as missing for this group. Gai's troops included defecting SPLA and other security personnel that Gai recruited as well as allegedly members of Sudan's ruling National Congress Party sent south by the Sudanese government.<sup>3244</sup> Gai was Nuer and primarily recruited from the Nuer, the most populous ethnicity in his birthplace Koch County, throughout southern Unity State, and in Unity State as a whole.<sup>3245</sup>

<sup>3237</sup> "SPLA Clashes with a Renegade Colonel in Unity State."

<sup>3238</sup> Nyak, "Gatluak Gai Feared Dead Weeks After Agreeing Ceasefire."

<sup>3239</sup> Machien Luoi, "Koch County Insurgency Is a National Security Issue," *Gurtong* (blog), November 18, 2010, <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/4395/Koch-County-Insurgency-is-a-National-Security-Issue.aspx>.

<sup>3240</sup> Bonifacio Taban Kuich, "Unity State to Compensate Farmers for Rebel Damage," *All Africa*, September 20, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110920e79k00170&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3241</sup> Bonifacio Taban Kuich, "Governor Taban Meets Unity's Rebels After Death of Their Leader," *All Africa*, August 2, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110802e782000fm&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Mathew Stein, "The Fateful Agreement," *All Africa*, August 8, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110808e788000gz&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3242</sup> "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," Issue brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, November 2011), 6, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-18-Armed-insurgencies-Greater-Upper-Nile.pdf>.

<sup>3243</sup> Kuich, "Governor Taban Meets Unity's Rebels After Death of Their Leader."

<sup>3244</sup> "Gatluak Gai's Rebellion, Unity State."

<sup>3245</sup> Joshua Craze and Jérôme Tubiana, "A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–15," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, December 2016), 8–9, 18–21, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP42-Unity-Dec-2016.pdf>; James

As with the contemporaneous SSDM/A-aligned rebellions of David Yau Yau and Robert Gwang, the media almost exclusively referred to Gai's rebellion using its commander's name. Only one source, Gurtong Trust's Luk Riek Nyak, claimed that Gai had named his group "SPLA for Unity" in an article on Gai's death with no mention of when this name came into use.<sup>3246</sup> Similarly, several sources referred to Gai's group as the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) because that is apparently how his second-in-command, Marko Chuol Ruei, referred to the group in his interviews claiming responsibility for the killing of Gai, but there is no mention of the name before then nor is there any evidence, other than their loose participation with the SSLM/A as two groups under Athor's SSDM/A umbrella, that Gai's troops were part of the more famous SSLM/A.<sup>3247</sup> Gai did not publicly espouse clear political goals other than his opposition to the SPLM's rigging of the gubernatorial election. His coordination with Athor might suggest broader goals, but the surveyed sources do not mention Gai's group ever publicly expressing any.<sup>3248</sup>

Given his past involvement with Sudan-backed militias, it is not surprising that Gai likely received support from Sudan. The SPLA and the Government of Southern Sudan claimed that the NCP sent Misseriya Arab fighters from South Kordofan and that ex-militia commanders attached to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) also supported Gai.<sup>3249</sup> SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and a few instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to May 2010. Primarily organized by the SPLA, these protests devolved into riots after police intervention. One of these Type 2 Events, Event ID 6250257, occurred Unity State, the same location as group formation. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

The specific circumstances of the alleged SPLM vote-rigging and politics which sparked Gai's rebellion arose in Unity State, and it does not appear that Gai was operating as a subordinate or Athor Deng or any of the other southerners who also took up arms against the SPLM/A in 2010-11 when he formed his group. Athor told the *Sudan Tribune* as early as May 31 that Gai had joined his SSDM/A, but it seems likely Gai maintained a high degree of independence.<sup>3250</sup> The SPLA claimed to have defeated Gai's insurgency by early June, but Gai and his surviving troops remained at large for months. They attacked SPLA positions on January 7, 2011, and were implicated in various attacks on civilians.<sup>3251</sup> Gai entered into peace negotiations on his own rather than as a part of the SSDM/A. In exchange for his cessation of hostilities, Gai accepted the government's offer of the rank of lieutenant general in the SPLA and the integration of his troops into the SPLA.<sup>3252</sup> Ruei alleged that Gai was planning to pull out of his deal with the government and was actively in communication with the Sudanese government regarding obtaining munitions when Ruei and other pro-peace officers tried to meet with him and killed him in the ensuing shootout.<sup>3253</sup> Gai's group does not appear to have long outlived him and did not become viable.<sup>3254</sup>

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Copnall, "South Sudan Rebel Leader Killed," *BBC News*, July 23, 2011, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14261525>; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Sudan, "Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan" (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Sudan, December 24, 2009), <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bea5d622.pdf>.

<sup>3246</sup> Nyak, "Gatluak Gai Feared Dead Weeks After Agreeing Ceasefire."

<sup>3247</sup> Kuich, "South Sudan Militia Deputy Admits Killing of His Leader Gutluak."

<sup>3248</sup> John Arterbury, "Murder of South Sudanese Rebel Leader Puts Juba's Amnesty Program at Risk," *Militant Leadership Monitor* 1, no. 11 (November 2010), <https://jamestown.org/brief/november-2010-briefs/>.

<sup>3249</sup> "Gatluak Gai's Rebellion, Unity State," 1.

<sup>3250</sup> "Athor Says Coordinating with Other Renegade Southern Sudan Generals," *Sudan Tribune*, June 1, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100601e6610008f&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3251</sup> Luoi, "Koch County Insurgency Is a National Security Issue"; "Gatluak Gai's Rebellion, Unity State," 1-2.

<sup>3252</sup> "Gatluak Gai's Rebellion, Unity State," 2.

<sup>3253</sup> Kuich, "South Sudan Militia Deputy Admits Killing of His Leader Gutluak."

<sup>3254</sup> "Gatluak Gai's Rebellion, Unity State," 3.

### Hamza Combat Group Against Atheism and Heresy

On July 19, 2014, unidentified gunmen forced their way into the Khartoum offices of newspaper *El Tayyar* and severely beat its editor, Osman Mirghani. A previously unknown group calling itself the Hamza Combat Group against Atheism and Heresy claimed responsibility for the attack and gave Mirghani's support for regularizing diplomatic relations with Israel as the reason behind its attack.<sup>3255</sup> The National Consensus Forces, a coalition of Sudanese opposition parties, claimed that elements of the government were behind the attack.<sup>3256</sup> Mirghani likewise denied the existence of the Hamza Combat Group and identified the newspaper's investigations into government corruption as the real reason for the attack.<sup>3257</sup> Although an August 2 statement from the Hamza Combat Group claimed it would also target three Sudanese intelligence officers involved in combatting jihadist activity, pro-government Darfur Arab leader Musa Hilal, and several Shiite clerics, that statement was the last public communication from the group, and no such attacks materialized.<sup>3258</sup> Given the widespread suspicion that the Hamza Combat Group may have been linked to the government, that single statement is not sufficient evidence that the group ever planned attacks on Sudanese state targets. Excluded due to the lack of attacks against the state.

### Islamic Movement (IM)

Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP) created the Islamic Movement (IM) in 1999 after leading Islamist Hassan al-Turabi and his followers broke from the then ruling coalition. It is not a rebel group, and the only ACLED event with which it is associated was its eighth general conference in November 2012.<sup>3259</sup> Excluded as a pro-government political organization.

### Islamic Army of South Sudan

AKAs: "Islamic Army in South Sudan"<sup>3260</sup>

The SPLA announced the rebellion of Major General Abd-al-Baqi Akol, a former militia commander in Paulino Matiep's SSDF who became an advisor to Salva Kiir in 2007, in late March 2011, though Akol apparently did not announce his new rebel group called the Islamic Army of South Sudan until an Islamic memorial service on July 1, 2011 on the eve of South Sudan's independence.<sup>3261</sup> He claimed to have 18,000 fighters battling the Government of Southern Sudan and called on the Muslims in attendance to join his movement. He denounced GoSS for not appointing Muslims in proportion to their share of the population.<sup>3262</sup> Akol, who had been fired from GoSS, was already connected with various other rebel militia commanders and had previously been named vice president of their Athor-chaired coordinating council in late

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<sup>3255</sup> "Unknown Group Claims Attack On Sudan Newspaper," *All Africa*, July 22, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140722ea7m0016o&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3256</sup> "'Government Responsible for Attack On El Tayyar' - Sudan Opposition," *All Africa*, July 23, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140723ea7n0017p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3257</sup> "'Hamza Combat Group Does Not Exist' - Editor-in-Chief Sudan's El Tayyar," *All Africa*, July 28, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140728ea7s0010s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3258</sup> "Hamza Group to Target Sudan Security Officers, Pro-Shiite Figures," *All Africa*, August 4, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140804ea84000qt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3259</sup> "Islamic Movement Conference to Kick off in Charged Climate," *Sudan Tribune*, November 15, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44542>.

<sup>3260</sup> "Rebel Leader Announces Formation of 'Islamic Army' in South Sudan," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, July 2, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNf0020110702e77200335&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3261</sup> "Ex-Advisor for Salva Kiir Launches New Rebellion in South Sudan," *Sudan Tribune*, March 24, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110324e73o0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3262</sup> "Rebel Leader Announces Formation of 'Islamic Army' in South Sudan."



April 2011.<sup>3263</sup> He apparently reconciled quickly with the government, and Small Arms Survey's John Young referred to the Islamic Army in South Sudan as Akol's "supposed rebellion."<sup>3264</sup> An August 2011 report picked up by BBC Monitoring indicated that Akol had suspended ongoing talks with the government over the lack of movement on his demands for greater Muslim representation in the GoSS.<sup>3265</sup> While Akol was active in prior and subsequent rebellions, there is no evidence in ACLED or the surveyed sources that the Islamic Army in South Sudan carried out or planned any attacks on state targets. Key sources such as the Small Arms Survey make no mention of this group, only discussed in a handful of articles. In the absence of such evidence of attacks or plans to attack, it does not meet the attack inclusion criteria. Excluded.

### Janjaweed

The Sudanese central government mobilized Darfuri Arab fighters to form pro-government militias and paramilitary forces to oppose the nascent Darfuri rebellion beginning in 2003.<sup>3266</sup> The later rebellions of prominent Janjaweed commanders Musa Hilal and Hemeti have their own entries as the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council and Quwat al Wa'd al Sadiq, respectively. Excluded as pro-government forces.

### Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

While the the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) that would soon become known as the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was first Darfuri rebel group to make its presence publicly known in the region in February 2003, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) "announced itself within weeks of the SLA."<sup>3267</sup> Like the SLM/A, JEM emerged as the result of a lengthy clandestine planning and organizational phase and would subsequently splinter into multiple rebel groups and has also resulted in several splinters.

JEM founder Khalil Ibrahim, a Darfuri doctor from the Zaghawa tribe, had held of number of subnational state posts in the NIF government and was an ally of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamist organizer of the 1989 coup who had been forced out of the ruling National Congress Party in 1999 by his former ally President Omar al-Bashir.<sup>3268</sup> Ibrahim and most of the other founding members of JEM were subsequently active in al-Turabi's opposition Popular National Congress Party (PCP).<sup>3269</sup> Having been engaged in earlier secret discussions about how to reform the ruling NIF/NCP government as early as 1993, Ibrahim and his associates began to clandestinely oppose the NCP government, first through the distribution of anti-government

<sup>3263</sup> "Six Rebel Factions Name Athor President of Coalition Council," *Sudan Tribune*, April 29, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Six-rebel-factions-names-Athor>,38738.

<sup>3264</sup> John Young, *The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process* (Zed Books Ltd., 2012), 315.

<sup>3265</sup> "Kiir's Ex-Advisor Announces Suspending Talks with South Sudan Government," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, August 1, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020110801e781001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3266</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 21–28.

<sup>3267</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 99.

<sup>3268</sup> Flint and De Waal, 105–10.

<sup>3269</sup> Jérôme Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, March 2011), 61, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement.pdf>.

literature culminating in their illegal 2000 creation and distribution of the *Black Book* detailing the lengthy history of Darfuris' marginalization by Sudan's political elites.<sup>3270</sup>

While the *Black Book* generated significant controversy and achieved surprisingly wide distribution, it did not change the ethnic power imbalances it described. Its authors decided to take up arms against the state. As with the other major Darfuri rebel movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), different sources reported different dates for JEM's founding. De Waal and Flint date the move from a clandestine opposition group to an armed rebel group in 2002, a claim also made by Human Rights Watch.<sup>3271</sup> The Small Arms Survey even dated the group to 2003 when it announced itself more publicly and launched its first attack.<sup>3272</sup> However, a number of credible sources place the group's founding in 2001, and JEM is coded as starting in April 2001 in line with El-Tom's 2011 Ibrahim biography and as going public with its name in August 2001 when Ibrahim announced its launch in the Netherlands as per Tanner and Tubiana's Small Arms Survey report.<sup>3273</sup> The announcement did not receive contemporary coverage in the English-language sources included in Factiva. Sources that date JEM's founding earlier than 2001 focus on nonviolent activities, primarily the writing and distribution of the *Black Book*, from the period before Ibrahim and his colleagues turned to armed opposition and thus did not constitute a rebel group by our criteria.<sup>3274</sup> It is also possible that Ibrahim's initial announcement in the Netherlands minimized the militant aspects of the group's beliefs as, in the first recorded mention of JEM among Factiva sources, the Sudanese vice-chair of national security mentioned Ibrahim's group, which the official labeled the Party for Justice and Equality, as cooperating with the DLF rebels rather than being an armed force in its own right.<sup>3275</sup> SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and several instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to April 2001. Because the datasheet lists no group formation location, the coder recorded contestation\_local as unknown. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. The coder notes that although there is significant anti-government action, during this timeframe, there is one protest, Event ID 6250075, in which tens of thousands organized against rebel victories.

JEM initially was a smaller and militarily weaker organization than DLF and did not begin launching attacks against state targets until March 2003. At the time of the group's first attacks, it may have had as few as 100 fighters.<sup>3276</sup> According to De Waal and Flint, rebels, presumed to be JEM because the operation took place in Ibrahim's home area, seized the garrison

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<sup>3270</sup> Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, July 2007), 32, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-06-Darfur-rebels.pdf>; Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, *Darfur, JEM and the Khalil Ibrahim Story* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2011); Caity Bolton, "JEM's Black Book and the Language of Resistance: Transcribing Tyranny," *African Arguments* (blog), June 8, 2010, <http://africanarguments.org/2010/06/08/transcribing-tyranny/>.

<sup>3271</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 104; Georgette Gagnon, Leslie Lefkow, and Jemera Rone, "'If We Return, We Will Be Killed': Consolidation of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Sudan" (Human Rights Watch, November 2004), 32, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/darfur1104/darfur1104.pdf>.

<sup>3272</sup> "Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril)," 1.

<sup>3273</sup> El-Tom, *Darfur, JEM and the Khalil Ibrahim Story*, 211; "Factbox: Who Are the Justice and Equality Movement?," *Reuters*, February 23, 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-jem-factbox/factbox-who-are-the-justice-and-equality-movement-idUSTRE61M38I20100223>; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 32.

<sup>3274</sup> "Who Are Sudan's Jem Rebels?," *Al Jazeera*, May 15, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/05/20095721141953829.html>.

<sup>3275</sup> "Security Aide Denies 'Direct Link' between Opposition, Darfur Clashes.," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, March 6, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcmep0020030306dz36002mj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3276</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 31.

town of Tine.<sup>3277</sup> In later interviews with the Small Arms Survey, JEM commanders asserted that first attack had been earlier, in early March near Kabkabiya, North Darfur.<sup>3278</sup> JEM's first major attack was the April 25, 2003, joint attack with the SLA on the Sudanese air force base in al Fasher, North Darfur.<sup>3279</sup> The attack resulted in between 32 and 70 SAF deaths, the destruction of multiple military aircraft, and the capture of an air force general.<sup>3280</sup> Coupled with other rebel successes in the first half of 2003, the al Fasher attack provoked heavy SAF retaliation and spurred the central government to begin organizing Arab fighters into the pro-government militias that would become known as the Janjaweed.<sup>3281</sup>

While government forces and pro-government militias have been responsible for the vast majority of attacks against Darfur civilians during the conflict, both JEM and SLM/A, and their resulting splinter groups, have been implicated in attacks against civilians.<sup>3282</sup> Flint and De Waal date the start of Darfuri rebel attacks on civilians to mid-2003, but IRIN associated July 2003 attacks with the SLA fighters, not JEM.<sup>3283</sup> JEM did not feature prominently in early accounts of rebel violence against civilians. One of the earliest reported JEM attacks on civilians came in November 2003 when JEM forces killed civilians in and around the West Darfur town of Kulbous and burned seven nearby villages.<sup>3284</sup>

Unlike the DLF, JEM was adamantly anti-secession from the beginning. The group released a 5-point manifesto in early 2003 opposing secession and wanted Bashir's government toppled as a way to dissuade the South and other regions from seceding.<sup>3285</sup> On the basis of the JEM founders' background within the opposition PCP and their consistent focus on a national solution to Darfur's problems, the coder infers that their goal of regime change was present within a year of their founding. With the past association of many of its initial leaders and members with al-Turabi and his Islamist PCP, JEM had Islamist tendencies but itself rejected the label. Other Sudanese rebel groups' perceptions of JEM's Islamism contributed to their decision to deny JEM's entrance into the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) even as they welcomed SLM/A in 2004.<sup>3286</sup>

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<sup>3277</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 118.

<sup>3278</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 31.

<sup>3279</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 119–21; "Sudanese Opposition Sources Describe Attack on Western Provinces Capital.," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, April 26, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcmep0020030426dz4q006hd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3280</sup> "Clash in Sudan's Darfur Kills 32 Troops, 20 Rebels.," *Reuters News*, April 26, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020030426dz4q00a6p&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sudanese Opposition Sources Describe Attack on Western Provinces Capital.," Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 23; Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 18–19.

<sup>3281</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 19–24; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 23–24.

<sup>3282</sup> Leslie Lefkow, "Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan," Human Rights Watch (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 2004), 36, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/sudan0404.pdf>; "Sudan: International Community Must Act Now to Guarantee the Protection of Civilians" (Amnesty International, February 17, 2004), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=AFR54%2f016%2f2004&language=en>.

<sup>3283</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 122; "Widespread Insecurity Reported in Darfur," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)*, July 30, 2003, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-widespread-insecurity-reported-darfur>.

<sup>3284</sup> Lefkow, "Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan," 36.

<sup>3285</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 101, 105; "Sudan's Darfur Rebels Say Not Fighting for Secession," *Agence France-Presse*, March 6, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020030306dz3600811&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3286</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 30–31.

Unlike SLM/A, JEM's initial leadership had government experience in the NIF/NCP government prior to the 1999-2000 Bashir/Turabi split.<sup>3287</sup> Ibrahim himself served as a minister in the Blue Nile and North Darfur state governments, and early JEM leaders also included a former West Darfur governor and a former member of West Darfur's parliament.<sup>3288</sup> Because Ibrahim had served as a doctor in the government's paramilitary Popular Defense Forces for four months, the leadership team is coded as having at least one leader with experience in the current regime's security forces.<sup>3289</sup> The early membership of JEM included many former PCP members.<sup>3290</sup> JEM was initially much smaller than DLF/SLA, and its core initial members were young, educated individuals from Ibrahim's Kobe clan within the Zaghawa tribe.<sup>3291</sup>

JEM would later receive significant external support from Chad, Libya, and Eritrea, but it does not appear to have received such during its first year of existence. In December 2002, Ibrahim and other Darfuri leaders met with Chadian President Idriss Déby, but he refused to back a Darfuri insurrection.<sup>3292</sup> Chadian soldiers of Zaghawa ethnicity were involved with JEM and SLA early on, but not with the permission of the Chadian government, whose intelligence service worked actively with the Sudanese government to disrupt JEM and SLA by fomenting splits.<sup>3293</sup> President Déby had come to power by leading his Sudan-backed rebel forces from Darfur to the Chadian capital of N'Djamena in 1990, and the two countries subsequently agreed to not allow each other's rebels to operate on their territory. Despite pressure from the Chadian Zaghawa, Déby tried to honor his commitment until Sudan-based Chadian rebels attacked Chad in December 2005.<sup>3294</sup> Déby thereafter allowed Darfuri rebels to operate from Chadian territory in exchange for an understanding they would support his government against the Chadian rebels and also provided significant direct support to JEM and SLA-Minni Minawi.<sup>3295</sup> JEM forces in Chad played a key role in turning back Chadian rebels' advance on N'Djamena in February 2008.<sup>3296</sup> The support provided by Chadian Zaghawa within Chad's military was important in the early stages of both Darfuri rebel groups but was not official foreign support.<sup>3297</sup> While JEM would later work with other Sudanese rebel groups, including the SLM/A and the Rashaida Free Lions, it did not receive initial support from SPLM/A as the DLF/SLA did because of disagreements between SPLM/A leader John Garang and Ibrahim over the proper role of Islam in Sudanese

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<sup>3287</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 108–9.

<sup>3288</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 32–33.

<sup>3289</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, 32.

<sup>3290</sup> Lefkow, "Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan," 11; "Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril)," 1; Andrew McGregor, "Terrorism and Violence in the Sudan: The Islamist Manipulation of Darfur," *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor* (blog), June 17, 2005, <https://jamestown.org/program/terrorism-and-violence-in-the-sudan-the-islamist-manipulation-of-darfur/>; Martin Plaut, "Who Are Sudan's Darfur Rebels?," *BBC News*, May 5, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3702242.stm>.

<sup>3291</sup> "Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril)," 1; Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 110–12.

<sup>3292</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 20.

<sup>3293</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 112–13.

<sup>3294</sup> International Crisis Group, "To Save Darfur," ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 17, 2006), 9–10, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/save-darfur>; Julie Flint, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, January 2010), 15, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-19-The-Failure-to-Resolve-the-Darfur-Conflict.pdf>; Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement," 11.

<sup>3295</sup> Flint, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict," 38–39.

<sup>3296</sup> Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement," 17.

<sup>3297</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 20–21.

politics.<sup>3298</sup> JEM received crucial early support from sympathizers in the Zaghawa diaspora and possibly also from PCP financiers.<sup>3299</sup>

Although its main grouping remained more cohesive than SLM/A, JEM also splintered. In early 2004, the Chad-backed National Movement for Reform and Democracy (NMRD) was the first group to split off from JEM.<sup>3300</sup> ACLED includes three additional splinters with JEM in their names. JEM splinters have merged into various other rebel organizations as the war in Darfur has continued.<sup>3301</sup> JEM's military strength increased greatly in the years after its initial 2003 attacks.<sup>3302</sup> In May 2008, a major Chad-backed JEM offensive reached Omdurman, across the Nile from Khartoum, before government forces turned the rebels back in fierce fighting.<sup>3303</sup> A Sudanese air strike killed Khalili Ibrahim on December 25, 2011, and his brother Jibril Ibrahim succeeded him as JEM chairman in January 2012.<sup>3304</sup> JEM remains an active rebel group and met the viability criteria by still conducting attacks against state targets well after three years from its founding.

There was no location found within a year of formation that satisfied the “rural” variable and therefore the “op\_planning\_location” is coded as unknown/missing.

#### Justice and Equality Movement (Bashar Faction) [JEM-Bashar]

AKAs: JEM-Sudan: Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan Faction)

Excluded as a JEM splinter.<sup>3305</sup>

#### Justice and Equality Movement (Peace Faction) [JEM-PF]

Excluded as a JEM splinter.<sup>3306</sup>

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<sup>3298</sup> Young, “The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization,” 30–31; “Western Rebels Join the NDA,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, February 21, 2004, LexisNexis; Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 104.

<sup>3299</sup> Gérard Prunier, “Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia” (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Operations), Berlin, February 2008), 3, [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5382~v~Armed\\_Movements\\_in\\_Sudan\\_Chad\\_CAR\\_Somalia\\_Eritrea\\_and\\_Ethiopia.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5382~v~Armed_Movements_in_Sudan_Chad_CAR_Somalia_Eritrea_and_Ethiopia.pdf); Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 33; Omer Ismail and Maggie Fick, “Darfur Rebels 101” (Washington, D.C.: Enough Project, January 2009), 2, <https://enoughproject.org/files/Darfur%20Rebels%20101.pdf>; “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” 3.

<sup>3300</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 113–14; Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 60–61; “West Sudan Group Demands Inclusion in Peace Deal,” *Reuters News*, June 4, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020040604e064001uu&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Sudan-Chad Proxy War Chronology,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, March 2011), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war/HSBA-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War-Chronology.pdf>.

<sup>3301</sup> Skye Wheeler, “Darfur Rebel Factions Reunite under One Banner,” *Reuters*, November 13, 2007, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-idUSL1312790320071113>.

<sup>3302</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 51–52.

<sup>3303</sup> “Battle of Omdurman,” *Africa Confidential*, May 23, 2008, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/2616/Battle\\_of\\_Omdurman](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/2616/Battle_of_Omdurman).

<sup>3304</sup> “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” 1.

<sup>3305</sup> “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” 2; “More than 1000 Ex-JEM Rebels Await Integration into Sudan Army,” *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), June 29, 2014,

<https://radiotamazuj.org/en/v1/news/article/more-than-1000-ex-jem-rebels-await-integration-into-sudan-army>.

<sup>3306</sup> “Sudan: Hassabo Informed On Efforts of JEM-Peace Faction for Supporting Peace in Darfur,” *Sudan News Agency (Khartoum)*, December 16, 2016, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201612160160.html>.

### Justice and Equality Movement (Unity Faction Nur) [JEM-UFN]

Excluded as a JEM splinter.<sup>3307</sup>

### Kordofan Alliance for Development\*

While this group, “[f]ormed in April 2006 by educated Kordofanians in the diaspora,” did not rule out armed struggle as a means to promote change in Kordofan, that was not its emphasis, and Small Arms Survey analyst Jerome Tubiana referred to the group as “less violent” than the Shahama rebels.<sup>3308</sup> KAD reportedly had ties to Darfur’s United Revolutionary Forces Front and also signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Redemption Front alliance of Darfuri rebel groups.<sup>3309</sup> In 2007, the group threatened to launch an armed rebellion but apparently did not do so.<sup>3310</sup> Excluded due to lack of attacks or plans for attacks against state targets.

### Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)

Darfuri rebel coalition formed by the February 2010 merger “for negotiating purposes” of two existing coalitions of rebel groups, mostly SLM/A splinters.<sup>3311</sup> JEM initially opposed the “smaller” LJM’s formation, but the two later participated in negotiations with Sudan together.<sup>3312</sup> Excluded as a merger.

### Marginalised Combat Movement

In August 2014, *El Tareeq* online newspaper reported that a group of Border Guards and Sudanese troops announced their support for the Darfuri rebels’ goals and their intention to fight the East Darfur government. In English-language media, Radio Dabanga covered the story, which was then carried by AllAfrica and two IHS Daily Insight reports.<sup>3313</sup> The surveyed sources

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<sup>3307</sup> “Sudan: Darfur Rebel Leader Reportedly Killed by Rival Forces,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, July 1, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020080701e471001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3308</sup> “Armed Entities around Abyei,” 3; Tubiana, “Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement,” 61.

<sup>3309</sup> “Armed Entities around Abyei,” 3; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2007” (Heidelberg: Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, 2007), 32.

<sup>3310</sup> International Crisis Group, “A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan,” ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 26, 2007), 12, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfur-revitalising-peace-process>; Zachary Ochieng, “Darfur Crisis Blanks Out Many Unresolved Conflicts [Analysis],” *All Africa*, August 7, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020070807e387001cf&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3311</sup> “Liberty and Justice Movement,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, October 8, 2012), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-LJM-8-Oct-2012.pdf>.

<sup>3312</sup> Douglas Hamilton Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace Or Truce*, Revised (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2011), 179.

<sup>3313</sup> “New Rebel Group to Target East Darfur State Govt.,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), August 13, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/new-rebel-group-to-target-east-darfur-state-govt>; “New Rebel Group to Target East Darfur State Govt.,” *All Africa*, August 14, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140814ea8e000hy&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

“Formation of New Sudanese Rebel Group Highlights Increasing Risks to Oil Operations and Expatriates in Darfur,” *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, August 14, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020151130ea8e006wp&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

“Election 2015: Sudanese President’s Likely Bid for a Fourth Term Raises Violence and Coup Risks,” *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, August 29, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020151130ea8t006wo&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



provided no evidence of any attacks or efforts to follow through on the initial statement. Excluded.

### Men Around the Prophet (Rijal hawl el Rasool)

AKAs: the Dinder group

During the decades of Islamist rule since the 1989 coup, multiple groups of Islamist fighters have emerged in or relocated to Sudan. While many of these have been largely pro-government, focused on external targets, and/or comprised of foreign members, a new group known as *Rijal hawl el Rasool* (“Men Around the Prophet”) clashed with Sudanese security forces in eastern Sudan in late 2012. Because the group’s main targets were governments outside of Sudan and because of the limited data available on its background and activities, we have coded it as a rebel group with certainty of 2 out of 3. The Sudanese government had been monitoring this small group of armed men in Khartoum as a small radical cell before they had escaped surveillance to establish their base of operations in El Dinder National Park in Blue Nile State and claimed they were training to wage jihad in Somalia or Mali.<sup>3314</sup> The El Dinder National Park satisfies the “rural” variable as a “1.” They launched two attacks on the Wildlife Guards’ Galgu camp in late October or early November and took weapons, including a cannon that they used to take out a telecommunications tower, and explosives from the camp’s police storage.<sup>3315</sup> The fighters suffered 13 dead in November 30 clashes with a Sudanese Armed Forces special brigade, which also suffered casualties, in the Al-Sibayra area.<sup>3316</sup> Government forces ultimately captured 25 Islamists, including their leaders, as they pursued the fighters.<sup>3317</sup> Although some of the suspected members escaped arrest, no new attacks were reported in the months and years following the arrests. The government released 23 of the Dinder group detainees on June 20, 2014, in a move *Africa Confidential* portrayed as aimed at building unity between the government and alienated Islamists.<sup>3318</sup> The group did not resume its anti-government activities. It did not become a viable rebel organization.

Although the media reports did not mention any public statement from the group announcing goals, the group’s reported aims of waging jihad in other countries and their seizure of the Wildlife Guards’ weaponry allow us to infer that one of their goals was to increase Sudanese government support for external jihadi activities. The group’s main leaders were educated young men. Usama Abdel Salam, the primary leader, had earned his Ph.D. in chemistry in the U.S. and was a lecturer at the University of Juba, while his deputies Omer Mohamed el Gizouli and Omer Mohamed el Gizouli were a Sudan University engineering graduate and a Bahri University medical student, respectively.<sup>3319</sup> Sinnar state’s governor identified the arrested members as radicalized university students ranging in age from 19 to 25.<sup>3320</sup> While the members may have previously belonged to a religious organization of some kind, none of the sources mentioned one, so we code the group’s membership as having no prior organization in common. While no media reports identified any foreign governmental sponsors of the group, it was allied

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<sup>3314</sup> “Sudanese Authorities Kill 13 Islamist Extremists in the East after Heavy Gun Battle: Sources,” *Sudan Tribune*, December 1, 2012, 13, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44704>; “Unhappy Birthday,” *Africa Confidential*, June 27, 2014, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5681/Unhappy\\_birthday](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5681/Unhappy_birthday).

<sup>3315</sup> “Sudanese Authorities Kill 13 Islamist Extremists in the East after Heavy Gun Battle: Sources,” 13; “Sudanese Security Forces Capture ‘25 Islamic Extremists,’” *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, December 3, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020121203e8c3002mh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3316</sup> “Sudanese Authorities Kill 13 Islamist Extremists in the East after Heavy Gun Battle: Sources.”

<sup>3317</sup> “Sudanese Security Forces Capture ‘25 Islamic Extremists.’”

<sup>3318</sup> “Unhappy Birthday.”

<sup>3319</sup> “Unhappy Birthday.”

<sup>3320</sup> “Officials Disclose New Information on Capture of Islamist Extremists’ Cell in Sudan,” *Sudan Tribune*, December 3, 2012, [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=44731](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=44731).

with the Egyptian jihadist group Al-Takfir wal Hijrah.<sup>3321</sup> Men Around the Prophet reportedly received aid from supporters in Khartoum and smuggled weapons into the country under the guise of humanitarian aid.<sup>3322</sup> SCAD identifies both protests and riots in Sudan, including a number involving university students in Khartoum, which qualify as public contestation in the year prior to the group's announcement. One of these Type 1, 3, or 4 events was listed as nationwide, satisfying the contestation\_local requirement. However, only national contestation and not local contestation occurred with respect to Type 2 events during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. While there was the not sufficient information to establish the group leaders' ethnicity, the populations of Sennar and Blue Nile states are ethnically heterogeneous.<sup>3323</sup>

#### Militia (Gabriel Tang)

Commander Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan ("Tang-Ginye") was a senior commander of pro-government forces battling the SPLA under various labels. Following the 2006 peace between the SSDF and the SPLA, he remained allied with Sudan and was appointed a major general in the Sudan Armed Forces. He was associated with two ceasefire-violating clashes between SAF and SPLA forces within the Joint Integrated Units (JIU). Clashes broke out again as Tang-Ginye stalled in honoring his October 2010 agreement to integrate his SAF-affiliated forces into the SPLA ahead of South Sudan's independence, and, after a fight, he surrendered to SPLA forces in late April 2011 and subsequently was placed under house arrest in Juba. While he may have planned to lead his forces into an alliance with Geoge Athor and other rebelling generals, his close and official association with the Sudanese military and the confusion around some of his actions in 2010-11 make it difficult to cleanly characterize his militia as a rebel group by our criteria.<sup>3324</sup> It was a close judgment call, but we excluded Tang-Ginye's militia from our dataset. Lam Akol's National Democratic Movement, of which Tang-Ginye later served as military commander until his January 2017 death, is discussed in the South Sudan country section.

#### Militia (Osman Mohamed Ibrahim)

Group implicated in January 2013 attacks on civilians in North Darfur. Radio Dabanga reported that Ibrahim had signed "an internal peace agreement with the government of North Darfur in 2012."<sup>3325</sup> The surveyed sources do not provide additional information to determine whether or not his group was a rebel group prior to the agreement, but the accounts of the 2013 attacks make it more likely that it was a group more interested in banditry than directly challenging the state. Excluded.

#### Militia (Yousef Al Saer)

<sup>3321</sup> ACLED lists Al-Takfir wal Hijrah as an ally of the Men Around the Prophet in both events associated with the latter, 4487SUD and 4493SUD.

<sup>3322</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Briefs: Sudanese Security Forces Raid Islamist Training Camp in National Park," *Terrorism Monitor* 10, no. 23 (December 14, 2012): 1; "Unhappy Birthday."

<sup>3323</sup> Research and Evidence Facility of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), "Cross Border Analysis and Mapping Field Report for Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan (Blue Nile and Sennar States)" (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 2016), 6, <https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/file118787.pdf>.

<sup>3324</sup> "Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan ('Tang-Ginye')," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2011); "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 2, 3, 9.

<sup>3325</sup> "Militia Raids On North Darfur Road 'Halting Traffic Flow, Rising Prices,'" *All Africa*, January 31, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130131e91v00095&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Gunmen Beat and Loot 18 Passengers By North Darfur Road," *All Africa*, January 28, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130128e91s0008a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

ACLED records only one event (4676SUD in January 2013) involving this group. The incident in question involved the militia's attack on a vehicle and the looting of its passengers in Central Darfur between Nertiti and Nyala. Militia commander Yousef al Saer's brother, the owner of the vehicle, may have planned the attack. The militia is mentioned only in connection with banditry and attacks on civilians, not state targets.<sup>3326</sup> No evidence of rebel activity.

#### National Consensus Forces (NCF)

Coalition of opposition political parties which has ties to and signed the 2013 New Dawn Charter with the Sudan Revolutionary Front rebels but does not appear to have carried out or planned its own attacks against state targets.<sup>3327</sup> Excluded.

#### National Democratic Alliance (NDA)

Following Omar Bashir and Hassan Al-Turabi's successful 1989 coup against the Sudanese government and the new government's decision to ban political parties, opposition forces formed the National Democratic Alliance in Asmara in 1989. The NDA's armed wing, including the SPLA during its membership in the NDA from 1995 to 2005, attacked Sudanese government targets from its Eritrean bases. Excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.<sup>3328</sup>

#### National Islamic Front (NIF)

AKAs: National Congress Party (NCP)

The National Islamic Front was an Islamist party led by Hassan Al-Turabi and came to power in the successful 1989 coup orchestrated by Al-Turabi and Omar Bashair.<sup>3329</sup> NIF was associated with the broader Muslim Brotherhood movement.<sup>3330</sup> It officially became the National Congress Party (NCP) in 1998.<sup>3331</sup> NIF/NCP was Sudan's ruling party during the entire 1997-2015 period under study. Excluded.

#### National Liberation Army (NLA)

No surveyed source other than ACLED mentions a Sudanese rebel or other political group by the name of the National Liberation Army (NLA). ACLED identified December 1997 fighting between the NLA and the Sudanese military (ACLED event 203SUD), but media accounts cited both rebel and government sources identifying the rebels as part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).<sup>3332</sup> This may be an ACLED coding error. Excluded.

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<sup>3326</sup> "Militia Leader's Brother Suspected to Plan Attack On Own Vehicle," *All Africa*, January 29, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130129e91t00061&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3327</sup> "Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF)," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 8, 2012), 2–3,

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/arab-armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-SRF-2012.pdf>; Claudio Gramizzi, "At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, December 2013), 22, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP31-Blue-Nile.pdf>.

<sup>3328</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 22.

<sup>3329</sup> Young, 34.

<sup>3330</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2017), 3, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-27-Sudanese-paramilitary-forces.pdf>.

<sup>3331</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, vii.

<sup>3332</sup> "Sudanese Army Clashes with Eritrean-Based Rebels," *Agence France-Presse*, December 9, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011005dtc903ljb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Opposition Radio Says Rebel Forces Killed Nine Government Soldiers," *BBC Monitoring Service: Middle East*, December 8, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcme00020010929dtc800169&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

### National Liberation and Justice Movement (NLJM)

Excluded as a splinter of the LJM.<sup>3333</sup>

### National Movement for the Elimination of Marginalization\*

Ali Abdul Rahim, one of the first Darfuri Arab rebel leaders, led fighters under this label until his death in a 2005 car crash.<sup>3334</sup> However, it was not a distinct rebel group but part of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM).<sup>3335</sup> Excluded.

### National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)

Excluded as a splinter of JEM.<sup>3336</sup>

### National Revolutionary Front\*

Relatively little is known about this group, which is why the certainty about this group's existence is only coded at level 1 out of 3. A November 2010 Small Arms Survey group summary appears to be the only English-language source mentioning the group.<sup>3337</sup>

Spokesman Sharaf el Din Idriss announced the group's formation shortly after the October 13, 2010, announcement of the Nomads and Herders Movement. The National Revolutionary Front, based in Jebel Marra, claimed to have four Land Cruisers and 700 to 800 fighters and to be in alliance with the SLA forces in Darfur's Jebel Marra (Jebel Mountains) and the United Revolutionary Forces Front. Jebel Marra is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a 1. The pastoralist Abbala, a camel-herding Darfuri Arab ethnic group, were the main group backing the new organization. The Small Arms Survey noted that Abbala fighters had significantly contributed to the government's counterinsurgency campaign in the initial 2003-04 period of the Darfur rebellion. Thus, like the Nomads and Herders Movement, it may have emerged from local Arab paramilitary groups and militias armed by the government earlier in the Darfur conflict. According to Din Idriss, the group's goals were "to defend our rights as Arab tribes against marginalization by the government and all other parties, and especially to lobby for participation in the peace process."<sup>3338</sup> There appears to be no other information available regarding the group's leadership, membership, sources of funding, founding, or actual attacks launched. SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and a few instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to December 2010. Some of these events were organized by the SPLA, and protests devolved into riots after police intervention. Two Type 1, 3, or 4 riot events occurred in refugee camps in West Darfur, the same state as group formation. No Type 2 events occurred locally. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. According to the limited information available, the National Revolutionary Front did not become a viable rebel group.

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<sup>3333</sup> "LJM's Abu Garda to Participate in Sudan Elections," *Sudan Tribune*, February 2, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150202eb220002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3334</sup> Julie Flint, "The Arab Lion Bares Its Head in Darfur's Ongoing War," *Daily Star*, December 22, 2006, sec. OPED, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DSTAR00020061221e2cm0000i&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3335</sup> "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, December 2006), 5, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-04-Darfur.pdf>.

<sup>3336</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, 1st ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), 266; "West Sudan Group Demands Inclusion in Peace Deal."

<sup>3337</sup> "National Revolutionary Front," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, November 2010), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/arab/HSBA-Armed-Groups-NRF.pdf>.

<sup>3338</sup> "National Revolutionary Front."

### National Redemption Front (NRF)

Excluded as a coalition of preexisting rebel groups including SLM-Nur, JEM, and Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance.<sup>3339</sup>

### National Umma Party (NUP)

Former Sudanese prime minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's National Umma Party has been a key opposition party since he was removed from the power by the 1989 coup. According to Human Rights Watch, the party's armed wing, the Umma Liberation Army, "became active when the Umma Party joined the [National Democratic Alliance] in 1995 and inactive when the Umma returned from exile to Sudan in 2000."<sup>3340</sup> While the NUP issued joint statements with armed rebel groups in 2014 while withdrawing from the government-led National Dialogue process, neither ACLED nor other sources surveyed provide any evidence of NUP rebel activity.<sup>3341</sup> In response to government allegations after the Paris Agreement that NUP was preparing for a violent uprising, NUP leadership publicly proclaimed their commitment to nonviolent mobilization.<sup>3342</sup> Excluded a political party founded prior to 1997. The ULA's rebel activity has its own entry below.

### New Sudan Brigade (NSB)

Faction of the SPLA formed in 1995 to expand the southern rebellion into the north.<sup>3343</sup> Excluded.

### Nomads and Herders Movement\*

Relatively little is known about this group, which is why the certainty about this group's existence is only at level 2 out of 3. The only sources mentioning it were an October 2010 Radio Dabanga article covering the group's initial announcement and a November 2010 Small Arms Survey group summary largely based on the Radio Dabanga information.<sup>3344</sup>

Claiming to speak for a group of Darfurian Arab nomads with 1,500 fighters in the field, spokesman Ahmed Abdul-Jabbar announced the formation of the Nomads and Herders Movement on October 13, 2010. He denounced the ruling National Congress Party for dividing and exploiting the Darfurian Arabs for its own ends. The Nomads and Herders Movement declared war on the NCP government and planned to coordinate with other Darfur rebel groups.

<sup>3339</sup> Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 267; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 53–59.

<sup>3340</sup> Jemera Rone, "Sudan, Oil and Human Rights" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 34, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/>; "Northern Sudan Rebels Report Attack Near Strategic Town," *Dow Jones International News*, December 9, 1997,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=dji0000020011006dtc909ge0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3341</sup> "SPLM-N & NUP Call for Unifying Opposition Forces to Topple Regime," *Sudan Tribune*, June 12, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140612ea6c00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "JEM, NUP Sign Agreement on Comprehensive Political Solution," *Sudan Tribune*, June 24, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140624ea6o00006&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Opposition Parties Sign for Toppling Regime," *All Africa*, August 12, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140812ea8c000fp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3342</sup> "Sudan's Umma Party Mobilising for 'National Uprising,'" *All Africa*, August 15, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140815ea8f0013q&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3343</sup> "Rebels Say Guerrilla Wing Formed to Hit Khartoum.," *Reuters News*, March 14, 1995,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011104dr3e00ckh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3344</sup> "Nomads and Herders Movement," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, November 2010), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/arab/HSBA-Armed-Groups-NHM.pdf>; "Group of Arab Nomads in Darfur Declare War on the Government," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), October 14, 2010, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/group-of-arab-nomads-in-darfur-declare-war-on-the-government>.



According to Small Arms Survey, the new group was based in Kass in South Darfur. As such, Kass is coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1. It may have emerged from local Arab paramilitary groups and militias armed by the government earlier in the Darfur conflict. Although the group’s leadership and membership were Darfuri Arabs (tribe unspecified), the non-Arab Fur are the predominant ethnicity of Kass locality.<sup>3345</sup>

While the group clearly planned to attack government targets, there are no English-language media reports of it doing so. No information is available about Abdul-Jabbar, and the Dabanga and Small Arms Survey reports don’t identify any other leaders. SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and a few instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to December 2010. Some of these events were organized by the SPLA, and protests devolved into riots after police intervention. No events occurred in South Darfur, the same state as group formation. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. According to the limited information available, the Nomads and Herders Movement did not become a viable rebel group.

#### Oppressed Soldiers Rebel Group

This West Darfurian Arab rebel group fought Sudanese troops in July 2012. The “Oppressed Soldiers” group was a splinter from the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) following LJM’s conclusion of a peace agreement with the government in Doha. The referenced Radio Dabanga article, picked up by All Africa and cited by ACLED, may be the only English-language source on the group.<sup>3346</sup> Excluded as a splinter.

#### People's Struggle Movement

The People’s Struggle Movement (PDSM) kidnapped four peacekeepers from the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in April 2010.<sup>3347</sup> PDSM’s leadership blamed the kidnapping on a field commander who was unaware of the group’s April 10 peace agreement with the government. PDSM was a splinter of SLM-Free Will, itself one of the many SLM/A splinters.<sup>3348</sup>

#### Philip Bepan Rebel Group

Philip Bepan Machar led a rebel militia attack on SPLA forces in Unity State in May 2010. However, media reports make it clear that Bepan was a commander within Peter Gatdet’s rebel

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<sup>3345</sup> Ahemed Abbo et al., “Rapid Needs Assessment Report: South Darfur State - Locations of Kass, Kailek, Kabum and Kalma Camp - Sudan” (CARE Sudan, March 30, 2004), 3, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/rapid-needs-assessment-report-south-darfur-state-locations-kass-kailek-kabum-and-kalma>.

<sup>3346</sup> “Fighting Breaks out between ‘Oppressed Soldiers’ and SAF in West Darfur,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), July 3, 2012, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/fighting-breaks-out-between-oppressed-soldiers-and-saf-in-west-darfur>.

<sup>3347</sup> “Darfur Rebel Group Says Responsible for Kidnapping 4 Peacekeepers,” *Xinhua News Agency*, April 15, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=XNEWS00020100415e64f003eg&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3348</sup> “Darfur Former Rebels Pledge to Release Peacekeepers,” *Sudan Tribune*, April 16, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100416e64g0005o&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



SSLM/A rather than an independent rebel commander.<sup>3349</sup> Bepan had previously defected from SPLA to the SSUA/SSDF rebels in 2006.<sup>3350</sup> Excluded.

#### Popular Defence Forces (PDF)

The National Islamic Front (NIF) formed the Popular Defence Forces after coming to power in the 1989 coup.<sup>3351</sup> Excluded as a pro-government group.

#### Popular Democratic Front\*

The Popular Democratic Front emerged as a new rebel group in South Darfur in 2010 but disappeared after claiming credit for several attacks on state officials. On September 30, unknown gunmen assassinated Kamal Isaag Sam, the executive director of South Darfur's Shataya Locality, in an ambush attack on the road between Kass and Shataya. They also killed a policeman in the attack and kidnapped three surviving security officers and then subsequently ambushed 16 civilians but let them go with a letter for South Darfur Governor Hamid Musa Kasha which demanded the release of Harun Imam Hassan, the imprisoned Deputy Nazir of the Misseriya tribe. Kasha had ordered Hassan's arrest amid ongoing strife between the Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes.<sup>3352</sup> In an October 5 story, Radio Dabanga reported that Al Sayer Ali Ali Sayer contacted the media as the spokesperson of a hitherto unknown rebel group calling itself the Popular Democratic Front. The group had staged several other kidnapping attacks to bring their total number of hostages up to 19, excluding the security officers taken on September 30.<sup>3353</sup> Because the attacks on civilians appear to only have involved abductions without intent to kill, the group is coded as not having committed any civilian attacks. Radio Dabanga is a generally reliable media source, and its identification of the Popular Democratic Front makes it unlikely that the group was the same as the 2008 SLM/A splinter of the same name associated with the late Field Commander Siddiq Massalit or a misidentification with Abu Sura's Popular Forces Army or the government-backed Popular Defense Forces (PDF).<sup>3354</sup>

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<sup>3349</sup> Simon Martelli, "Rebel Raid Leaves 82 Dead in South Sudan State: Army," *Agence France Presse*, May 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020110510e75a006vr&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Scores Dead in South Sudan Cattle Raid," *Al Jazeera English*, May 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AJAZEN0020110516e75a0005x&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Bonifacio Taban Kuich, "SPLA 'kill 84' in Attacks on Gatdet's Militia in Unity State," *Sudan Tribune*, May 10, 2011, <http://ns3041535.ip-149-202-216.eu/spip.php?article38854>.

<sup>3350</sup> David De Chand, "SSUDA/SSDF Welcomes and Congratulates General Philip Machar" (*Sudan Tribune*, December 4, 2006), <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19085>.

<sup>3351</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 3; Jago Salmon, "A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-10-Paramilitary-Revolution.pdf>.

<sup>3352</sup> "Locality Executive Killed in South Darfur Ambush," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), October 2, 2010, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/locality-executive-killed-in-south-darfur-ambush>.

<sup>3353</sup> "Armed Group Claims Responsibility for Killing Darfur Executive Official," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), October 5, 2010, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/armed-group-claims-responsibility-for-killing-darfur-executive-official>.

<sup>3354</sup> United Nations Mission in Sudan Public Information Office, "Media Monitoring Report," Media Monitoring Report (Khartoum: United Nations Mission in Sudan, December 10, 2008), 2, <https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/mmr-dec10.pdf>; Julie Flint, "The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2010), 36, footnote 74, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-22-The-Other-War-Inter-Arab-Conflict-in-Darfur.pdf>; Asylum Research Consultancy, "West and South Kordofan COI Query Response" (Asylum Research Consultancy, September 20, 2016), 31, Refworld, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57f3c8494.pdf>.

The two Radio Dabanga reports cited above contain all the information we have about the group. The only other credible source reporting the Popular Democratic Front's formation mentioned the group only in passing and relied entirely on the Radio Dabanga report, which is why rebel certainty variable for the group's existence is coded as 2 out of a maximum 3.<sup>3355</sup> Given that the Popular Democratic Front's only stated political goal, the release of the imprisoned Misseriya tribal leader, stemmed from the government interference in the Misseriya-Rizeigat clashes, the coder infers that the Popular Democratic was most likely predominantly Misseriya. SCAD includes multiple protest and riot events involving large numbers of protesters in Sudan in the year prior to September 30, 2010. SCAD records several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and one instance of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to September 2010. None of these events occurred in South Darfur, the state in which group formation occurred. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. Furthermore, because Popular Democratic Front's initial attack occurred inbetween Kass and Shataya, the "rural" variable is coded as a "1."

#### Popular Forces Army\*

AKAs: Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front (RDFF)<sup>3356</sup>, Popular Forces Troops (PFT)<sup>3357</sup>

The claims of the Democratic Popular Front Army to have started in 2004 (though without launching any attacks on government forces until 2007) notwithstanding, Salah Mohamed Abdel Rahman's Popular Forces Army is commonly recognized as the first Darfuri Arab rebel group in the Darfur conflict that has been raging since 2003.<sup>3358</sup> Abdel Rahman, known as Abu Sura, was a founding SLA member who left in 2005 amid rising infighting between Minni Minnawi and Abdel Wahid.<sup>3359</sup> He had previously been involved in the Sudan Alliance Forces and the SPLA.<sup>3360</sup> Abu Sura and Ibrahim Mohamed el Zubaidi co-founded the Popular Forces Army, also known as the Revolution Democratic Forces Front, as a rebel group to represent Darfuri Arabs. Both Abu Sura and Zubaidi were from the Rizeigat, the most prominent Darfuri Arab tribe.<sup>3361</sup> Yassin Yousif, from the Eregat group within the larger Rizeigat tribe, was the PFA's initial field commander and also had previous experience in the SPLA.<sup>3362</sup> While both Abu Sura and Yousif had been involved with other rebel groups, most of the PFA rank and file had not been. The pastoralist Baggara of South Darfur, angry at the government's indifference to the suffering inflicted on them by pro-government janjaweed militias, formed the base of the group's early members.<sup>3363</sup> It seems likely that many PFA fighters were formerly in self-defense forces, either

<sup>3355</sup> Patrick S. Wegner, *The International Criminal Court in Ongoing Intrastate Conflicts: Navigating the Peace-Justice Divide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 113.

<sup>3356</sup> Richard A. Lobban Jr., *Global Security Watch--Sudan*, Global Security Watch (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 99.

<sup>3357</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman, "Chaos in Darfur Rises as Arabs Fight With Arabs," *The New York Times*, September 3, 2007, sec. Africa, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/03/world/africa/03darfur.html>; "Darfur Arabs Create a Rebel Group, Repulse Army Attack," *Sudan Tribune*, December 6, 2006, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19124>.

<sup>3358</sup> "Popular Forces Army," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 2010), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/arab/HSBA-Armed-Groups-PFA.pdf>; Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur"; Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 125.

<sup>3359</sup> "Another Darfur Rebel Group Reintegrates SLM-AI-Nur," *Sudan Tribune*, May 11, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Another-Darfur-rebel-group,38869>.

<sup>3360</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 63.

<sup>3361</sup> "Another Darfur Rebel Group Reintegrates SLM-AI-Nur."

<sup>3362</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 63.

<sup>3363</sup> "Popular Forces Army."

local militias or government-backed Janjaweed. Although a 2011 *Sudan Tribune* article identifies 2005 as the start date, all other sources point to a late 2006 founding.<sup>3364</sup> The “Group of 19” SLM/A splinter, later SLA-Unity, was in contact with the PFA as early as November or even September 2006, and the two groups were allies.<sup>3365</sup> The pre-announcement meetings of PFA leadership with G-19 also provide evidence of clandestine organizing ahead of the group’s public announcement.

In its first public statement, issued December 5, 2006, the PFA claimed to have destroyed the government garrison in Alzubair, 90 kilometers from South Darfur’s capital of Nyala, and to have inflicted “heavy casualties” on the government forces attacking a PFA position on Kas-Zallangi Road in South Darfur.<sup>3366</sup> Given the lack of specific casualty figures and the fact that statement described the government losses at the hands of the PFA defense rather than their Alzubair attack, the Alzubair attack is included in our dataset as PFA’s first small attack. While the group was almost certainly involved in other attacks, possibly including some that would qualify as “large” (25 or more deaths) in our dataset, neither ACLED nor the surveyed English-language sources mentioned any other specific attacks. As mentioned below, we code a large attack carried out in 2012 by SLM-AN as the PFA’s first large attack due to the two groups’ 2011 merger. The PFA’s political goals were also somewhat ambiguous. Denouncing the government-backed Janjaweed, the PFA’s first public statement pledged cooperation with other rebel groups “until all demands of Darfur and other marginalized parts of the Sudan are fully realized,” a statement we code as support for greater autonomy for Darfur.<sup>3367</sup> How much the PFA aimed to fight government forces was an open question, such that some observers even suggested that the group might be pro-government.<sup>3368</sup> In March 2007, Abu Sura said his goal was pull the Janjaweed away from the government and cause Darfur’s Arabs to become neutral in the larger conflict.<sup>3369</sup> Yassin even claimed in February 2007 to have met with Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal in August 2006 and that the latter pledged not to attack fellow Arabs.<sup>3370</sup> As early as April 2007, NGO and media reports identified the PFA as a Chad-based group, so we assume that much of the initial planning took place across the border in Chad as well.<sup>3371</sup> There is not enough information to determine how populated the area of initial planning was. Since no precise location of planning in Chad could be identified, the “rural” variable is coded as unknown but the “op\_planning\_location” and “planning\_border” variables are coded as “Chad” and “1” respectively. Chad’s official support for Abu Sura did not reach the level necessary to count as a

<sup>3364</sup> “Another Darfur Rebel Group Reintegrates SLM-Al-Nur”; “Popular Forces Army”; Rob Crilly and Jebel Mara, “Why Janjawid Commander Switched to the Other Side,” *The Times*, May 11, 2007, sec. Overseas news, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=T000000020070511e35b00046&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Flint, “The Arab Lion Bares Its Head in Darfur’s Ongoing War”; “Darfur Rebel Commander Confident in SLM Unity,” *Sudan Tribune*, December 10, 2006, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19185>.

<sup>3365</sup> Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 267; Flint, “The Arab Lion Bares Its Head in Darfur’s Ongoing War”; “Darfur Rebel Commander Confident in SLM Unity.”

<sup>3366</sup> International Crisis Group, “Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process,” ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 30, 2007), 14, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfur-revitalising-peace-process>; Flint, “The Arab Lion Bares Its Head in Darfur’s Ongoing War”; “Darfur Arabs Create a Rebel Group, Repulse Army Attack.”

<sup>3367</sup> Flint, “The Arab Lion Bares Its Head in Darfur’s Ongoing War.”

<sup>3368</sup> Robert S. Kramer, Richard A. Lobban Jr, and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, “Darfur Movements,” in *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan* (Scarecrow Press, 2013), 122.

<sup>3369</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 63.

<sup>3370</sup> Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 33.

<sup>3371</sup> Rob Crilly, “In Darfur, Some Arabs Now Fight alongside Rebels,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 22, 2007, sec. WORLD, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CHSM000020070521e35m00006&cat=a&ep=ASE>; International Crisis Group, “Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process,” 14.

source of the PFA's funding. Small Arms Survey reported that Chad supplied his only vehicle but little more, but the International Crisis Group suggested that promises of additional Chadian support never materialized.<sup>3372</sup> Other Darfuri rebel groups were more supportive, and G-19/SLA-Unity provided a supply of weapons.<sup>3373</sup> The PFA sought to gain support from the Arab tribes by "negotiating unrestricted passage along *marahil* (stock routes) closed by . . . [JEM and SLA] . . . and by encouraging the re-opening of markets where Arabs and non-Arabs could trade together in the foothills of the SLA stronghold, Jebel Marra."<sup>3374</sup> Yassin Yousif helped open Fur-Arab markets in west Jebel Marra, an area controlled by Abdel Wahid's SLA faction, and also arranged "restitution of 120 looted camels to the Eregat for payment to the Eregat."<sup>3375</sup> SCAD includes a few instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and no instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to September 2006. Because group formation occurred in Chad, none of these events are local to the region of group formation. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

The PFA participated in October 2007 peace talks in Sirte, Libya.<sup>3376</sup> However, Yassin Yousif's defection to the United Revolutionary Forces Front (URFF) in mid-2007 greatly weakened the PFA.<sup>3377</sup> The SLA estimated the PFA's strength at fewer than 400 fighters by 2008.<sup>3378</sup> Zubaidi, an opponent of the Doha talks with the government, was killed in a government ambush in 2010.<sup>3379</sup> Abu Sura merged what was left of PFA/RDFF into SLM-AI-Nur in 2011.<sup>3380</sup> While the PFA/RDFF existed for more than three years from its founding to its merger, it is not clear from the sources consulted whether the group launched any attacks on government targets in that time. However, the SLM-AI-Nur continued to do so after the merger, and given that Abu Surrah was still an active commander several years afterwards, it is reasonable to conclude that former PFA/RDFF fighters participated in SLM-AI-Nur attacks.<sup>3381</sup> We code SLM-AI-Nur's November 23, 2012, attack on a Sudanese military camp in North Darfur, the first post-merger SLM-AI-Nur attack in ACLED that meets our large attack 25-

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<sup>3372</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 33; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 63; International Crisis Group, "Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process," 14, footnote 91.

<sup>3373</sup> Flint, "The Arab Lion Bares Its Head in Darfur's Ongoing War."

<sup>3374</sup> "Popular Forces Army."

<sup>3375</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 63.

<sup>3376</sup> "Who's Who in the War and Peace Talks," *Africa Confidential*, August 24, 2007, [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/2290/Who's\\_Who\\_in\\_the\\_war\\_and\\_peace\\_talks](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/2290/Who's_Who_in_the_war_and_peace_talks); "Factbox: Who Is Attending Darfur Talks and Who Is Not," *Reuters*, October 27, 2007, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-players/factbox-who-is-attending-darfur-talks-who-is-not-idUSFOR74357120071027>.

<sup>3377</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 33. Whether Yassin founded the URFF, it was a preexisting group, or it emerged from the Democratic Popular Front Army (DPFA), or some combination of the preceding options is unclear.

<sup>3378</sup> "Popular Forces Army."

<sup>3379</sup> "Revolutionary Forces Front Leader Killed in Battle in W. Darfur," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), October 7, 2010, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/revolutionary-forces-front-leader-killed-in-battle-in-w-darfur>. Confusingly, Radio Dabanga report and Small Arms Survey identified Zubeidi with the URFF rather than the PFA/RDFF as the *Sudan Tribune* did. See Flint, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict," 39; "Another Darfur Rebel Group Reintegrates SLM-AI-Nur."

<sup>3380</sup> "Another Darfur Rebel Group Reintegrates SLM-AI-Nur."

<sup>3381</sup> International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process," ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 27, 2014), 21, footnote 109, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-s-spreading-conflict-iii-limits-darfur-s-peace-process>.

fatality threshold, as the first PFA large attack in our dataset.<sup>3382</sup> PFA meets our viability threshold because of its fighters' continued attacks as part of SLM-AI-Nur.

#### Popular Front of Sudan

UPF: United Popular Front (ACLED)

Sudanese People's Front (GTD)

On April 18, 2014, unidentified gunmen attacked the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company's Kanar oilfield in South Kordofan and kidnapped eight workers, including two Chinese and one Algerian. They also killed eight Sudanese security forces personnel during the attack.<sup>3383</sup> JEM denied involvement and blamed forces loyal to JEM defector Abu Ki'aan, who had left the rebels in 2012 to join a pro-government militia.<sup>3384</sup> Ki'aan claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the Popular Front of Sudan.<sup>3385</sup> Excluded as a JEM splinter.

Although ACLED also identifies the United Popular Front as involved in the attack, the Popular Front of Sudan was distinct from either SLM-Nur's student wing by the same name or the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice (UPFLJ), a coalition of eastern Sudanese opposition groups which joined SRF but without independent military capacity.<sup>3386</sup>

#### Popular National Congress Party (PNC)

AKAs: Popular Congress Party (PCP)

After President Bashir removed Hassan al-Turabi and his allies from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in 2000, al-Turabi formed the opposition Popular National Congress Party, which soon became known as the Popular Congress Party (PCP).<sup>3387</sup> Although the PCP signed an agreement with the SPLM in 2001 and some of the JEM and Shahama rebels had ties to the party, the party does not have a prominent armed wing.<sup>3388</sup> PNC's three ACLED events (788SUD, 949SUD, 1240SUD) involve election violence and attacks by party members in response to repressive state actions rather than planned rebel attacks. Excluded.

#### Quwat al Wa'd al Sadiq\*

By mid-2007, discontent over the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the government's handling of the Darfuri Arabs' concerns was widespread within the pro-government Arab militias and paramilitaries, crucial to Khartoum's war against Darfur's rebels. Mohamed Hamdan Doglo

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<sup>3382</sup> Ian Timberlake, "Darfur Rebels 'seize' Sudan Army Base," *Agence France Presse*, November 24, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020121124e8bo00712&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "SLM-AN Claims Killing 83 Sudanese Soldiers," *All Africa*, November 24, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121124e8bo000z7&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3383</sup> "Popular Front of Sudan Claims Abduction Oil Engineers in West Kordofan," *All Africa*, April 24, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140424ea4o00105&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3384</sup> Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, "Africa Business in Brief Issue: 59," *Mondaq Business Briefing*, April 30, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBPUB00020140430ea4u000k1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3385</sup> "Popular Front of Sudan Claims Abduction Oil Engineers in West Kordofan."

<sup>3386</sup> "Sudan: Pro-Rebel Students Charged over Khartoum Clashes," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, October 5, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020071005e3a5001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Andrew McCutchen, "The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its Formation and Development," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2014), 16,

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP33-SRF.pdf>.

<sup>3387</sup> Mohamed Osman, "Islamist Leader Forms New Party, Thousands Gather in Support," *Associated Press Newswires*, June 27, 2000,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010803dw6r0dffj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3388</sup> Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad-Sudan Rapprochement," 61; "Sudan's Turabi Signs Understanding with Civil War Rebels," *Reuters News*, February 21, 2001,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010713dx2104zr9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

(known as “Hemeti”), nephew of the traditional leader of the Awlad Mansour branch of the Mahariya section of the Northern Rizeigat Arabs and a cousin of Border Guard and janjaweed commander Musa Hilal, was in command of several thousand Mahariya fighters and turned against the government for several months and extracted concessions before making peace in February 2008.<sup>3389</sup> According to a Small Arms Survey report, his brief rebellion was “the most significant shift in the military balance in Darfur since the conflict began.”<sup>3390</sup> Hemeti called his group Quwat al Wa’d al Sadiq (“The Promise of Truth Forces”).<sup>3391</sup>

The precise date when Hemeti broke with the government was unclear, beginning with rumors in August 2007.<sup>3392</sup> Prior to his defection, Hemeti clandestinely plotted his rebellion for some time, pledging to participate in an SAF assault on SLA and JEM forces in Haskanita in exchange for “vehicles, heavy weapons, communications equipment, money, and fuel” and then defecting once he received the resources.<sup>3393</sup> While elements within Chad’s government were in contact with Hemeti, Chad did not provide him with significant support that would count for our “foreign” resource base variable.<sup>3394</sup> Chad, Libya, the U.S., and the U.N. all refused to provide support to the rebellion.<sup>3395</sup> Though he had reached agreements with JEM and Abdel Wahid’s SLA faction even before his rebellion, Hemeti ultimately saw JEM as working for foreign interests and Abdel Wahid as “unreliable” and did not join forces with either.<sup>3396</sup> Hemeti’s main source of support were the government-provided funds and other resources he received before rebelling and that his accommodation with the government occurred once those supplies and funds were exhausted.<sup>3397</sup> Hemeti was primarily at his rural home base near Um al Qora in South Darfur and elsewhere “in the desert” during the rebellion, and presumably that was also where much of the planning for his defection took place.<sup>3398</sup> However, since there is no explicit evidence of him being there during meetings that took place to plan the formation of the group, Um al Qora is used for coding the “rural” variable as a “1.”

Quwat al Wa’d al Sadiq had political goals beyond simply securing government funds. Hemeti claimed to be “fighting for justice for Arabs,” neglected by the state even as Zaghawa rebel leader Minni Minawi entered the government following the 2006 DPA.<sup>3399</sup> He later explained the group’s goals as follows: “We just wanted to attract the government’s attention, tell them we’re here, in order to get our rights: military ranks, political positions and development in our area.”<sup>3400</sup> The group thus had political goals, though they did fit within any of our three coded goals.

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<sup>3389</sup> “Darfur’s Arab Armed Groups,” Small Arms Survey Human Security Baseline Survey for Sudan and South Sudan, November 2010, [http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/nc/de/archive/sudan/darfur/darfurs-armed-groups/darfurs-arab-armed-groups.html?sword\\_list%5B0%5D=hemeti](http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/nc/de/archive/sudan/darfur/darfurs-armed-groups/darfurs-arab-armed-groups.html?sword_list%5B0%5D=hemeti).

<sup>3390</sup> Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 36.

<sup>3391</sup> Flint, 36.

<sup>3392</sup> Flint, 35.

<sup>3393</sup> Flint, 36.

<sup>3394</sup> Tubiana, “Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement,” 15; Jérôme Tubiana, “The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality,” Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, April 2008), 46, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf>.

<sup>3395</sup> Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 38.

<sup>3396</sup> Flint, 32; Alex De Waal, “Making Sense of Darfur’s Arabs,” *African Arguments* (blog), March 12, 2008, <http://africanarguments.org/2008/03/12/making-sense-of-darfurs-arabs/>.

<sup>3397</sup> Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 38.

<sup>3398</sup> Flint, 38.

<sup>3399</sup> Flint, 36.

<sup>3400</sup> Jérôme Tubiana, “Out for Gold and Blood in Sudan,” *Foreign Affairs*, May 1, 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sudan/2014-05-01/out-gold-and-blood-sudan>.



In early October, his forces assembled near the village of Bulbul and threatened to attack Nyala, the nearby capital of South Darfur, unless they received their pay from the government.<sup>3401</sup> Although the threatened assault never occurred, Hemeti did not come to terms with the government for several months. In November, he claimed to be affiliated with another Darfuri Arab rebel group, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) led by Anwar Khater of the Mahameed clan of the northern Rizeigat, not to be confused with the later 2011 SRF formed by the merger of other rebel groups.<sup>3402</sup> Hemeti claimed that he was the SRF's commander-in-chief and Khater was the secretary-general, but Khater denied that he was working with Hemeti and refused to merge their groups.<sup>3403</sup> The Sudanese Armed Forces launched a largescale assault, including aerial attacks, on the rebel forces but failed to destroy them.<sup>3404</sup> Despite the threatened October attack on Nyala, the surveyed sources recorded no evidence that Hemeti's forces carried out attacks on state or civilian targets, but, given the general lack of information about his rebellion, it is possible that his fighters did launch such attacks.

After Hemeti failed to find significant backing from potential foreign sponsors or more established rebel groups, he struck a deal with Khartoum as his money ran out.<sup>3405</sup> On February 29, 2008, Hemeti signed a deal with Khartoum that reportedly included the integration of 2,500 of his men into the armed forces and other government positions.<sup>3406</sup> Hemeti would become the leading figure in the Rapid Support Forces, a new paramilitary organization established in 2013 as a vehicle for bringing Arab pro-government militias under closer government control.<sup>3407</sup> Although there have been moments of tension, Hemeti has not re-defected since the February 2008 agreement, and there has been no effort to reconstitute Quwat al Wa'd al Sadiq as an independent rebel force. As part of his deal with the government, he became an advisor to South Darfur's governor; he became a brigadier general in 2013.<sup>3408</sup> Long since re-absorbed into the pro-government militias by October 2010, the group did not meet our viability criteria.

### Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

The Sudanese central government formed the RSF as a paramilitary force in 2013.<sup>3409</sup> Excluded as a pro-government force.

### Rashaida Free Lions\*

The Rashaida are "an Arab pastoralist tribe that migrated from the Arabian Gulf to [eastern] Sudan in the mid-19th century."<sup>3410</sup> Rashaida have demanded land rights from the central government and also protested the government's confiscation of 400 vehicles gifted to

<sup>3401</sup> "Enraged Militia Reportedly Threatens South Darfur Capital," *Sudan Tribune*, October 9, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24161>; "Darfur's Largest City under Imminent Threat of Attack," *M2 Presswire*, October 10, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=MTPW000020071010e3aa0033b&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 35.

<sup>3402</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 35–36.

<sup>3403</sup> Flint, 36, 38, 56, note 82.

<sup>3404</sup> "Darfur's Arab Armed Groups"; "Sudanese Army Denies Shelling Rebel Positions in Southern Darfur," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, December 1, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020071201e3c10030d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3405</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 38.

<sup>3406</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 306, note 70.

<sup>3407</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 5.

<sup>3408</sup> International Crisis Group, "Sudan and South Sudan's Merging Conflicts," ICG Africa Reports (Addis Ababa/Juba/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 29, 2015), 2, note 6,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/sudan-and-south-sudan-s-merging-conflicts>.

<sup>3409</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 5–6.

<sup>3410</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 15.

the Rashaida group by the UAE for the tribe's support of Kuwait, contrary to Sudan's backing of Iraq, following the Gulf War.<sup>3411</sup> Harnessing Rashaida anger over the vehicle confiscation, Mabrouk Salim, "a former DUP [Democratic Unionist Party, a regional party based in Eastern Sudan] member of the Sudanese parliament, a chief, and a wealthy trader," founded a new rebel group called the Rashaida Free Lions in November 1999 with Eritrea's backing.<sup>3412</sup> Given Eritrea's general support for the National Democratic Alliance coalition of Sudanese rebel groups and opposition parties, it was not surprising that the Free Lions joined the NDA, though they appear to have maintained operational independence.<sup>3413</sup> The Free Lions primarily engaged in small-scale attacks on soft government targets.<sup>3414</sup> Because of the nature of the Free Lions' military activities and limited English-language press coverage of the eastern Sudan conflict, there is very little information about specific attacks. Free Lion forces participated in the NDA's Eritrea-backed eastern offensive against the government in October 2002, coded (without any certainty) as the group's first large attack.<sup>3415</sup>

The earliest English-language reference to the Free Lions in both LexisNexis and Factiva was a March 16, 2000, AFP story.<sup>3416</sup> However, given that the article mentions the Rashaida Free Lions in passing as a constituent party of NDA, it seems likely that they had been mentioned in public earlier. SCAD includes one instance of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and a few instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to November 1999. Because group formation occurred in Eritrea, none of these events are local to the region of group formation. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. The coder notes that two demonstrations occurred against rebel groups during this time for the bombing of an oil pipeline, one authentic (Event ID 6250066) and one staged by the government (Event ID 6250068).

Unlike the more institutionalized Beja Congress, the Free Lions remained firmly under Mabrouk Salim's control with a minimal organizational structure.<sup>3417</sup> While accounts disagree about how widespread Rashaida support for the rebels was, the group does not appear to have emerged out of an earlier organization.<sup>3418</sup> In his Small Arms Survey report, Young estimated that the group had only a few hundred fighters.<sup>3419</sup> Much of its fighting force consisted of part-time fighters.<sup>3420</sup> The Free Lions were explicitly and strongly associated with the Rashaida ethnicity from the group's inception, but the Rashaida were in the minority in eastern Sudan. Opponents of the central government among the more numerous Beja people, whose land rights

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<sup>3411</sup> Young, 21.

<sup>3412</sup> Young, 21; International Crisis Group, "Sudan: Saving Peace in the East," ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 5, 2006), 17, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-saving-peace-east>; Robert S. Kramer, Richard A. Lobban Jr, and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, "Free Lions," in *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan* (Scarecrow Press, 2013), 167.

<sup>3413</sup> Carol Pineau, "Influential Umma Party Walks out of Sudan Opposition Parley," *Agence France-Presse*, March 16, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010803dw3g014j7&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 168; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 60.

<sup>3414</sup> Saskia Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 87.

<sup>3415</sup> International Crisis Group, "Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan's Peace Process," ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 18, 2002), 6, footnote 25, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/power-and-wealth-sharing-make-or-break-time-sudans-peace-process>.

<sup>3416</sup> Pineau, "Influential Umma Party Walks out of Sudan Opposition Parley."

<sup>3417</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 28.

<sup>3418</sup> Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan*, 92; Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 28.

<sup>3419</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 28.

<sup>3420</sup> Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan*, 92.

the government formally recognized (unlike those of the Rashaida, with the lack of recognition as a source of long-running disputes), already had the Beja Congress as a vehicle for rebel activity.<sup>3421</sup>

While supporting greater autonomy for eastern Sudan, the Free Lions and the BC were not formally secessionist. They shared the NDA's goal to overthrow Sudan's government.<sup>3422</sup> During the 2004 Egypt-facilitated negotiations between the NDA and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), the Rashaida Free Lions and Beja Congress did not believe that the talks were taking their interests into account and so walked out.<sup>3423</sup> While several NDA member groups made peace with the government and subsequently participated in the Sudanese elections and parliament, the Free Lions and BC formed the Eastern Front in January 2005 to continue their struggle against the Sudanese state.<sup>3424</sup> The Free Lions were the smaller of the Eastern Front's two components.<sup>3425</sup>

From their inception through their membership in the NDA and later Eastern Front, the Free Lions received significant Eritrean backing.<sup>3426</sup> Eritrea provided "military, financial, and political support."<sup>3427</sup> The Free Lions had three camps along the Sudan-Eritrea border.<sup>3428</sup> Aside from Eritrean support, the group likely supported itself through smuggling and trading activities.<sup>3429</sup> The SPLA also provided support.<sup>3430</sup> JEM signed a memorandum of understanding with the Free Lions in 2004 and participated in several small joint attacks.<sup>3431</sup> Given the strong initial Eritrean support for the Free Lions, our dataset codes at least some of the group's initial planning as occurring across the border in Eritrea, as indeed *Africa Confidential* reported, but there is not enough available information to determine whether significant planning took place in Sudan or how populous the location of any initial planning was.<sup>3432</sup> The "rural" variable is coded as unknown because specific locations in Eritrea were not found. The "op\_planning\_location" and "planning\_border" variables are coded as Eritrea and "1" respectively.

The Eastern Front's "low level military activity" against the central government continued until a mid-2006 ceasefire.<sup>3433</sup> The Comprehensive Peace Agreement's terms for a January 2006 withdrawal of SPLA forces from the east and Eritrea's desire for better relations with Sudan put pressure on the Eastern Front to negotiate. With Eritrea acting as mediator, the Eastern Front and Sudan signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) on October 14, 2006. The Eastern Front agreed to dissolve its military, which would be integrated into the SAF, and Sudan pledged form a development fund for eastern Sudan and, while not granting the region significant autonomy, to allow for a new regional council to facilitate coordination among the eastern states. The Eastern Front parties received state and national legislative seats and executive appointments.<sup>3434</sup> Although the government has not fully implemented the ESPA, the

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<sup>3421</sup> International Crisis Group, "Sudan: Saving Peace in the East," 17–18.

<sup>3422</sup> Lobban, *Global Security Watch--Sudan*, 67.

<sup>3423</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 30.

<sup>3424</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 168.

<sup>3425</sup> Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 356, note 25.

<sup>3426</sup> Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 59–60; Lobban, *Global Security Watch--Sudan*, 67.

<sup>3427</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 250.

<sup>3428</sup> Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan*, 87.

<sup>3429</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 28–29.

<sup>3430</sup> Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 59–60.

<sup>3431</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 30–31.

<sup>3432</sup> "Dangerous Abundance of Rebels," *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, October 30, 2004, Lexis Uni, <https://www.africaintelligence.com/ion/corridors-of-power/2004/10/30/dangerous-abundance-of-rebels,12055013-art>.

<sup>3433</sup> Douglas Hamilton Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Old and New Wars*, 3rd ed. (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2016), 168.

<sup>3434</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 37–41.

Free Lions and the BC have not resumed their armed struggle, separately or in concert as the Eastern Front.<sup>3435</sup>

### Robert Gwang Militia\*

AKAs: Chollo Land Defense Forces

Robert Gwang was a prisons or wildlife officer in Upper Nile State prior to announcing his opposition to the SPLM/A even before the April 2010 elections had taken place.<sup>3436</sup>

The SPLA identified him as part of Lam Akol's opposition SPLM-DC, which elected four ethnically Shilluk candidates to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly whom the SPLM arrested and refused to recognize.<sup>3437</sup> The facts that Gwang announced his rebellion prior to rather than after the April elections and that Lam Akol and the SPLM-DC strenuously denied having any armed wing (and Akol in fact would later break from the SPLM-DC over his backing of armed force to found the National Democratic Movement) provide some support for treating Gwang's group as distinct from the SPLM-DC.<sup>3438</sup>

On June 25, 2010, forces believed to be commanded by Gwang attacked South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) officers guarding oil revenue money earmarked for local development on a barge near Fashoda, killing three.<sup>3439</sup> Subsequent clashes between Gwang's forces and the SPLA resulted in 30 further deaths in July.<sup>3440</sup> There was no specific mentions of Gwang's troops attacking civilians during the rebellion's first months, but given the limited information about the group and the rise in banditry following its formation, it can't be ruled out.<sup>3441</sup> Our dataset lists March 6, 2011, as the group's first civilian attack because of the mention of Olonyi's forces, the remnant of Gwang's group which merged with Athor's SSDM/A after a failed integration process in March 2011, indiscriminately killing civilians during fighting in the Owachi area of Upper Nile State.<sup>3442</sup> While it is similarly possible that Olonyi's forces carried an operation that would qualify as a "large" attack, the surveyed sources provided no definitive mention.

Gwang, Johnson Olonyi, and Ayok Ogat were three leaders of the Shilluk ethnicity, the predominant ethnic group in Upper Nile State's westernmost counties, reported to have taken up arms against the government ahead of the 2010 elections.<sup>3443</sup> The exact relationship, if any, among the three officers was unclear, but they shared common grievances against the Dinka-led SPLM/A's marginalization of the Shilluk.<sup>3444</sup> Key issues of contention with the SPLM-dominated Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) included "disputes between the Shilluk

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<sup>3435</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Development Deferred: Eastern Sudan after the ESPA," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, May 2015), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP36-Development-Deferred-Eastern-Sudan.pdf>.

<sup>3436</sup> Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border," 136; Andrew McGregor, "'A Doctorate in Fighting': A Profile of Shilluk Militia Leader General Johnson Olony Thubo," *Aberfoyle International Security* (blog), October 5, 2016, <http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=3726>.

<sup>3437</sup> Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border," 135.

<sup>3438</sup> Oluoch, "Former South Sudan Minister Forms New Political Party."

<sup>3439</sup> Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border," 135–36.

<sup>3440</sup> "Over 21,000 Residents of Fashoda Require Relief in Sudan's Upper Nile State," *Sudan Tribune*, July 26, 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35773>.

<sup>3441</sup> "SPLM/A–Shilluk Conflict in Upper Nile," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, April 2011), 2, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Shilluk-Conflict-Upper-Nile-April-2011.pdf>.

<sup>3442</sup> "Abuses On Both Sides in Upper Nile Clashes [Press Release]."

<sup>3443</sup> Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border," 136; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Sudan, "Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan."

<sup>3444</sup> Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border," 136; "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 7.

community and the government of Upper Nile over land and county boundaries” and “the 2010 disarmament campaign in which the SPLA 7th Division reportedly committed large-scale abuses.”<sup>3445</sup> While the Small Arms Survey mentions Gwang’s April 2010 declaration of his rebellion, it did not specify what political goals, if any, he articulated.<sup>3446</sup> The SPLA initially viewed Gwang as the greatest threat.<sup>3447</sup> The Small Arms Survey characterized Olonyi as one of Gwang’s deputies prior to the latter’s peace agreement with the SPLM/A and noted subsequent close cooperation between the forces of Olonyi and Ogat, former Fashoda County commissioner.<sup>3448</sup> The surveyed sources provided the least background information on Ogat or his forces, which would eventually leave the SPLA after incomplete integration to become the nucleus of the Tiger Faction New Forces (see separate entry under South Sudan). It is possible that Ogat’s rebellion met all criteria to enter our dataset as a separate group, but it is difficult to make that call based on the limited information available. One local blog referred to Gwang’s forces as the Chollo Land Defense Forces, but it is not clear whether the group itself used that name.<sup>3449</sup> None of the other surveyed sources referred to Gwang’s rebels as the CLDF or used any other official name for the group.

The background of Gwang’s fighters was also unclear. While government alleged that were SPLM-DC’s armed wing, SPLM-DC’s chairman and presidential nominee Lam Akol denied these claims, as did Olonyi.<sup>3450</sup> Given a lack of information on their past backgrounds, including information on how many, if any, of the fighters had followed Gwang out of SPLA or other security forces, their background variables are coded as missing due to this lack of information. Of the only two named commanders, Gwang worked in the security forces as either a prisons or wildlife officer, and Olonyi had been a fighter in Lam Akol’s SPLM-United before returning to trading.<sup>3451</sup> The surveyed sources did not provide information on Gwang’s sources of financing or other support. SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and a few instances of Type 2 contestation in the country in the year prior to May 2010. Primarily organized by the SPLA, these protests devolved into riots after police intervention. However, because the group formation location is unknown, *contestation\_local* is missing. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Gwang signed the Fashoda Agreement with the SPLA on August 27, 2010 and became an SPLA major general; the SPLA pledged to integrate his forces and agreed to work toward resolution of tribal border disputes.<sup>3452</sup> However, not all of Gwang’s forces were integrated into the SPLA in accord with the agreement. Olonyi and his forces waited for integration with the SPLA but, after a March 2011 fight with SPLA forces sparked by rape allegations, relocated to

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<sup>3445</sup> “SSDM/A-Upper Nile Faction,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 6, 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/ssdma-upper-nile.html>.

<sup>3446</sup> “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile,” 7.

<sup>3447</sup> Rebecca Hamilton, “Sudan Dispatch: Can the South Reach Its Full Potential?,” *The New Republic*, January 28, 2011, <https://newrepublic.com/article/82317/sudan-south-malakal-referendum>.

<sup>3448</sup> “Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan,” 2; Mayak Deng Aruei, “Shilluk Kingdom: The Monarchy Belittled and Betrayed by Its Own Sons,” *SouthSudanNation.Com* (blog), May 3, 2015, <http://www.southsudannation.com/shilluk-kingdom-the-monarchy-belittled-and-betrayed-by-its-own-sons/>.

<sup>3449</sup> Peter Karlo, “A Call for a Political Settlelement to the Land Grabbing Conflicts in the Chollo Kingdom,” *Pachodo.Org* (blog), October 8, 2010, <https://pachodo.org/latest-news-articles/pachodo-english-articles/1755-a-call-for-a-political-settlelement-to-the-land-grabbing-conflicts-in-the-chollo-kingdom>.

<sup>3450</sup> “SPLM/A–Shilluk Conflict in Upper Nile”; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 313.

<sup>3451</sup> Craze, “Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border,” 136; McGregor, “A Doctorate in Fighting”; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 312.

<sup>3452</sup> Craze, “Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border,” 136; “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile,” 7; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 312.

South Kordofan and operated as part of Athor's SSDM/A.<sup>3453</sup> In June 2013, after several months of back-and-forth with the government and the Shilluk king, Olonyi and his troops, the last faction of Gwang's rebellion in the field, finally accepted the presidential amnesty.<sup>3454</sup> Gwang's group did not become viable.

### Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF)

AKAs: Sudanese Allied Forces (SAF)

Rebel group formed in 1994 by former Brigadier Abd al-Aziz Khalid. Early members included ex-military from Nuba and southern Sudan; later gained support in Blue Nile and eastern Sudan. Active in guerrilla operations in eastern Sudan in mid- and late 1990s.<sup>3455</sup> At Eritrea's urging, the National Democratic Alliance admitted the SAF. The SAF had bases in Eritrea and coordinated its attacks in eastern Sudan with the Beja Congress and the SPLA.<sup>3456</sup> It later merged into the SPLA.<sup>3457</sup> Excluded due to pre-1997 founding.

### Sudan Army Movement-Revolutionary Forces (SAM-RF)\*

In August 2017, pro-government militia commander Abdelallah Raziqallah rebelled after the central government ordered his forces to merge into Mohamad Hamdan Daglo's Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Raziqallah, sometimes rendered as Rizballah and also known as Savannah (also spelled as Savanna or Safana in reports), is a member of the Mahameed clan of Darfur's Rizeigat Arabs.<sup>3458</sup> While the *Sudan Tribune* identifies Hemeti as a fellow Mahameed, the Small Arms Survey identifies him with the neighboring Mahariya.<sup>3459</sup> Radio Tamazuj places the SAM-RF's founding as October and identifies it as part of Musa Hilal's larger rebellion, but the other media reports cited below treat Savannah's rebels as a separate formation.<sup>3460</sup> With credible sources divided on whether SAM-RF started in August or October, our dataset lists the group's start as August 2017 but with certainty only for the year, not month.

Prior to beginning active pro-government operations in 2013, Savannah and his forces had been part of the SLA-Minni Minnawi rebel faction.<sup>3461</sup> Even after switching to the government's side, he clashed with the leaders of other pro-government militias and was more closely aligned with Musa Hilal than Hemeti.<sup>3462</sup> Multiple sources identified Savannah's fighters as part of Hilal's Border Guards prior to the formation of SAM-RF.<sup>3463</sup> In April 2016, following an ambush of his forces "by rival militias, which allegedly included Hemmeti's Mahariya tribe,"

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<sup>3453</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 5–6.

<sup>3454</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 7; "South Sudan Rebel Movement Denies Amnesty Deal - Calls for Internationally Recognized Peace Talks."

<sup>3455</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 138.

<sup>3456</sup> Johnson, 104.

<sup>3457</sup> Jok Madut Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007), 101.

<sup>3458</sup> "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia," *Sudan Tribune*, November 3, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63914>.

<sup>3459</sup> "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia"; "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 8.

<sup>3460</sup> "Sudan Govt Captures Darfur Rebel Leader," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), November 13, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/sudan-govt-captures-darfur-rebel-leader>.

<sup>3461</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 8.

<sup>3462</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 14, note 60.

<sup>3463</sup> McGregor, "Musa Hilal: Darfur's Most Wanted Man Loses Game of Dare with Khartoum... For Now," *Aberfoyle International Security* (blog), December 12, 2017, <http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4096>; "Clashes As RSF, Border Guards Tensions Erupt," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), November 10, 2017, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201711110070.html>; Mohammed Amin, "Sudan Captures Rebel Leader in Darfur," *Anadolu Agency* (blog), November 12, 2017, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-captures-rebel-leader-in-darfur/963189>.



Savannah's troops attacked the house of East Darfur's governor and killed two members of Sudan's powerful National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).<sup>3464</sup> Dabanga Radio reported that an armed group believed to be associated with Savannah had ambushed and inflicted casualties on a Sudanese army detachment in early July. They again clashed with security forces loyal to the governor in May 2016, and an unknown armed group suspected to be associated with Savannah ambushed and inflicted casualties on a Sudanese army detachment two months later.<sup>3465</sup> As these incidents appear to be limited revenge attacks related to in-fighting within the pro-government forces rather than a planned act of rebellion, our dataset follows local media sources by dating the actual break with the government to the second half of 2017.<sup>3466</sup>

The SAM-RF rebellion was short-lived and unsuccessful. His troops, which had formerly fought with him on the government's side and before that as SLA-MM rebels, allegedly attacked the town of Kutum in North Darfur on October 23, but RSF claimed to have repelled their assault.<sup>3467</sup> Due to a lack of information about RSF casualties, this attack is listed as SAM-RF's first small attack in the dataset. The government reported on November 3 that al-Haj Widdaha Mohamed had defected from SAM-RF with 300 fighters in exchange for promised integration into RSF; Radio Dabanga estimated that the defectors numbered 120.<sup>3468</sup> Rizqallah continued the struggle, but RSF announced on November 11 that it had captured him and several of his followers following two days of clashes southwest of Kutum.<sup>3469</sup> There do not appear to have been any further reports in the surveyed sources of SAM-RF activity since its leader's capture. Kutum is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1."

The sources surveyed offered relatively few details on the SAM-RF, with the *Sudan Tribune*, Radio Tamazuj, and Aberfoyle International Security being the only notable ones to even refer to the organization by that name.<sup>3470</sup> There was not information to determine how clandestine the group's formation was or what its funding sources were. Media reports identify opposition to the government's announced merger of the Border Guards into the RSF given as the motivation behind Rizqallah's decision to form the SAM-RF, but there is no mention of any broader political goals.<sup>3471</sup> The group did not become viable.

### Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC)

AKAs: Sudanese Al-Sahwa Revolutionary Council, Militia (Musa Hilal)

Through spokesman Ahmed Mohamed Babiker, notorious *janjaweed* commander and Darfuri Arab leader Musa Hilal announced his resignation from Sudan's ruling National Congress Party and the formation of the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC) on January 4, 2014.<sup>3472</sup> According to the *Sudan Tribune*, the new group declared its goal as the establishment of "civil and democratic state under the rule of law" and its openness to working with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel coalition. The group also claimed to be "committed to securing human rights, power and wealth sharing, development and settling down of nomadic

<sup>3464</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 8.

<sup>3465</sup> "Sudanese Soldiers Injured in Clash with Rizeigat 'Savannah' Militants," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), May 11, 2016, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/soldiers-injured-in-clash-with-riezeigat-savannah-militants>; "Sudanese Soldiers Clash with Militants in East Darfur," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), accessed July 15, 2018, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-soldiers-clash-with-militants-in-east-darfur>.

<sup>3466</sup> "Sudan Govt Captures Darfur Rebel Leader"; "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia."

<sup>3467</sup> "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia"; "Clashes As RSF, Border Guards Tensions Erupt."

<sup>3468</sup> "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia"; "Clashes As RSF, Border Guards Tensions Erupt."

<sup>3469</sup> "Sudan Govt Captures Darfur Rebel Leader."

McGregor, "Musa Hilal"; "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia."<sup>3470</sup> McGregor, "Musa Hilal"; "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia"; "Sudan Govt Captures Darfur Rebel Leader."

<sup>3471</sup> McGregor, "Musa Hilal"; "Clashes As RSF, Border Guards Tensions Erupt"; "300 Darfur Rebels Join Sudan Government Militia."

<sup>3472</sup> "Darfur Peace Process Chronology," 1.

tribes, compensating victims of the armed conflict, reconciliation among Darfur tribes, dialogue, and legalizing status of Arab militias within a framework of security arrangements.”<sup>3473</sup> While there is reason to doubt the SARC’s sincerity in wishing to form a new, more inclusive national government based on its subsequent accommodations with the NCP, its initial announcement is sufficient evidence to count regime change as an initial political goal.

As the traditional leader of the 300,000-strong Mahamid branch of Darfur’s Northern Rizeigat Arabs since 1985 and one of the commanders most associated with the pro-government janjaweed militias and their human rights abuses, Musa Hilal has been a dominant figure in Darfur’s conflicts and, like many of the other actors involved, has acted both in concert with and against the central government at various times.<sup>3474</sup> After initially hesitating to use Arab militias in the early days of the Darfur rebellion and arresting Musa Hilal and other Darfuri Arab leaders in August 2002, President Omar al-Bashir released Hilal from house arrest in the wake of the major April 25, 2003, SLA/JEM victory in their attack on the Sudanese Air Force’s Fasher base. With government support and funding, Hilal took charge of raising the janjaweed militias from among Darfur’s Arabs.<sup>3475</sup> Hilal, however, was not a reliable ally of Khartoum. While under house arrest in 2003, he had reached out to an ally of SLA chairman Abdel Wahid Mohamed al Nur, and in December 2007 he had proposed attending a SPLA-convened rebel conference in Juba before al-Bashir named him a special adviser to the Ministry of the Federal Affairs the following month.<sup>3476</sup> In addition to his adviser position, Hilal was elected to National Assembly as an NCP candidate in 2010.<sup>3477</sup>

Hilal reportedly began preparations for his rebellion in 2013 amid rising tensions with the government. He returned to Mustareeha in northwestern North Darfur from Khartoum in mid-2013 and began reestablishing his personal authority over many of the Border Guards, a move that influenced the central government’s decision to place senior Border Guard commander Mohamad Hamdan Dogolo (Hemeti) of the rival Mahariya branch of the Rizeigat Arabs in charge of the newly formed Rapid Support Forces (RSF).<sup>3478</sup> In an unverified September 2013 recording of a speech, Hilal denounced North Darfur Governor Osman Mohamed Youssef Kibir and other government officials for ethnic violence in Darfur and further claimed that Kibir’s Berti ethnic group had monopolized North Darfur’s government positions.<sup>3479</sup> At a subsequent September meeting chaired by Kibir, the NCP refused to recognize an August Hilal-facilitated peace deal between the Rizeigat and Bani Husayn Arabs, who had been warring over control of North Darfur’s gold mines because it contravened NCP procedures and institutions.<sup>3480</sup> Hilal had earlier

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<sup>3473</sup> “Janjaweed Leader Defects from NCP, Establishes New Political Movement & Seeks Rebel Alliance,” *Sudan Tribune*, January 5, 2014,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140105ea1500007&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3474</sup> Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 18.

<sup>3475</sup> Flint, 17–21.

<sup>3476</sup> Flint, 18–19.

<sup>3477</sup> “Janjaweed Leader Wins Parliament Seat in Sudan,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), April 26, 2010, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/janjaweed-leader-wins-parliament-seat-in-sudan>.

<sup>3478</sup> Sudan Democracy First, “Musa Hilal’s ‘Awakening’: Khartoum’s Worst Nightmare?,” *Sudan Tribune*, April 22, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020150422eb4m000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3479</sup> “Janjaweed Leader Issues Warning to North Darfur Governor,” *Sudan Tribune*, September 8, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020130908e99800001&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, “Janjaweed Leader Hilal and His Search for a New Tribal War in Darfur [Opinion],” *All Africa*, September 16, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130916e99g000s2&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3480</sup> “Sudan’s NCP Refuses to Recognize Recent Tribal Truce in North Darfur State,” *Sudan Tribune*, September 12, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020130912e99c000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Two Tribes Sign Reconciliatory Peace Deal in Sudan’s North Darfur,” *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, August 20, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020130820e98k00439&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

rejected a separate peace process initiated by Kibir.<sup>3481</sup> In December, reports surfaced that Hilal had left the NCP to ally with NCP dissident Ghazi Salah-al-Din al-Attabani's new Reform Now party, but both the NCP and Hilal denied that he had done so.<sup>3482</sup> Hilal's activities in late 2013 as he laid the groundwork for SARC qualify as "clandestine" in our dataset. SCAD includes no instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and many instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to January 2014. However, none of these events occurred in North Darfur, the state in which group formation occurred. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. Most of the planning for SARC appears to have taken place in rural Misteriya, Musa Hilal's home area and his janjaweed base in North Darfur's Saraf Omra locality. As such, Misteriya is coded as "rural" = 1.

The SARC fighters were primarily janjaweed fighters who been subsequently integrated into the Border Guards.<sup>3483</sup> These were the janjaweed most formally connected to the government and had received government salaries.<sup>3484</sup> With Hemeti's forces becoming the RSF, the remaining Border Guards remained closely identified with Hilal after the SARC's founding and up through Hilal's November 2017 arrest. Although established by Hilal with leaders of other North Darfuri Arab tribes, the SARC is closely associated with Hilal's Mahamid clan.<sup>3485</sup> There is relatively little information on specific members of SARC's leadership beyond Hilal, its chairman. Ismail Aghbash, the SARC's chief negotiator with the SPLM/A-N in 2014 and a "close aide" of Hilal arrested in May 2017, had been an MP.<sup>3486</sup> The SARC leaders captured with Hilal in November 2017 included his sons and brothers; at least one of his sons was a Border Guards captain, and it is likely that the other sons and brothers were involved in the Border Guards and janjaweed before the SARC's founding as well.<sup>3487</sup> Gold from the Jebel 'Amer mines was a major funding source, earning Hilal as much as \$54 million annually (though the Small Arms Survey argues that number is likely much less).<sup>3488</sup> The SARC also collected taxes from

<sup>3481</sup> "North Darfur Governor Says Backed by Sudanese President to End Tribal Clashes," *Sudan Tribune*, September 17, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020130917e99h0008d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3482</sup> "Sudan's Ruling Party Denies That Janjaweed Leader Mutinied Against the State," *All Africa*, December 16, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131216e9cg000qg&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Prominent Figure Reportedly Defects Sudanese Ruling Party," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, December 12, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020131212e9cc003ux&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3483</sup> Sudan Democracy First, "Musa Hilal's 'Awakening.'"

<sup>3484</sup> "The Democratic Sudan Liberation Movement (DSLM) ('SLA-Carabino')," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, March 2011), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/saf-and-allied-forces/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Border-Guards.pdf>; Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 21–22, 25.

<sup>3485</sup> "Musa Hilal Tribe Opposes Darfur Arms Collection," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), August 11, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/revolutionary-council-opposes-darfur-arms-collection>; "Revolutionary Council Takes Control of North Darfur Gold Mine," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), July 23, 2015, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/revolutionary-council-takes-control-of-north-darfur-gold-mine>.

<sup>3486</sup> "Sudan's SPLM-N and Ex-Janjaweed Leader Sign a Memo of Understanding," *Sudan Tribune*, July 12, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140712ea7c0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Top Government Officials Request a Meeting with Darfuri Tribal Leader," *Sudan Tribune*, March 17, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140317ea3h00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3487</sup> "Musa Hilal, Revolutionary Awakening Council Leadership Arrested in Darfur," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), November 27, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/musa-hilal-revolutionary-awakening-council-leadership-arrested-in-darfur>; "11 Killed as Musa Hilal Troops and Tama Nazir Guards Clash in North Darfur," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), March 3, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/11-killed-as-musa-hilal-troops-and-tama-nazir-guards-clash-in-north-darfur>.

<sup>3488</sup> Colum Lynch, "Russia Blocks U.N. Report Linking Alleged Sudanese War Criminal to Gold Profiteering," *Foreign Policy* (blog), April 4, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/04/russia-blocks-u-n-report-linking-alleged->

the areas under their control, such as fees imposed on public transit and vehicles passing through.<sup>3489</sup> Chadian President Idriss Deby married Hilal's daughter Amani in 2012, paying him a \$25 million as dowry, and reportedly tried to mediate between Hilal and al-Bashir in March 2014, but the surveyed sources provide no evidence in the reports that Chad backed SARC in its first year of existence.<sup>3490</sup> Hilal's links with Libyan Islamists developed after the first year, with an alleged 2016 payment of \$6 million to the SARC chairman in exchange for the provision of 5,000 fighters.<sup>3491</sup> Our data thus shows SARC as receiving resources from gold and "other" sources but not foreign governments during its first year.

The SARC was an active rebel movement from its founding through its accommodation with the government in mid-2015 and again in 2017 with its violent opposition to government decisions to merge the Border Guards into the RSF and conduct a mass disarmament campaign in North Darfur. While some of Hilal's local commanders had worked with Darfuri rebels and attacked state targets during past episodes of tension between him and Khartoum, the International Crisis Group identifies the first SARC attack on a state target as a February 28, 2014, ambush of a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) convoy sent by Gov. Kibir near Karama, North Darfur, killing 15 SAF soldiers.<sup>3492</sup> However, according to Radio Dabanga, an earlier, and closely related, SARC attack took place on February 26 when a force linked to Hilal attacked Central Reserve Forces (Abu Tira) troops guarding the Jebel 'Amer gold mines; the Abu Tira troops surrendered, and the attackers seized 13 Land Cruisers.<sup>3493</sup> Soldiers reported that Hilal had warned the soldiers to withdraw on February 25, one day after they arrived in the area to secure the gold mines.<sup>3494</sup> A Radio Dabanga story, also carried by AllAfrica, covered a February 28 attack by an estimated 375 of Hilal's fighters on Abu Tira troops fleeing toward Kutum that killed 34, the first reported large SARC attack.<sup>3495</sup> With government forces having fled from nearby Saraf Omra, the rebel militias ransacked the town on March 8 and killed or injured at least 50 residents, mostly from the Gimri tribe.<sup>3496</sup> While Hilal and the janjaweed were associated with many prior attacks on civilians, the March 8 attack was the first covered by the surveyed sources since the announcement of the SARC and is coded as the group's first attack on civilians in our dataset.

Following its successful offensives against Governor Kibir's government forces in late February and early March 2014, the SARC controlled a large area of western North Darfur.

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sudanese-war-criminal-to-gold-profiteering/; "Musa Hilal's Council Forms 'Jebel 'Amer Administration', Calls for Intifada in Sudan," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), December 16, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/musa-hilal-s-council-forms-jebel-amer-administration-calls-for-intifada-in-sudan>; "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 9.

<sup>3489</sup> "Militia Leader Installs Council in North Darfur Locality," *All Africa*, March 21, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140321ea3100042&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3490</sup> "Sudan's Capital Gripped in Nuptials of Chad's Deby, Daughter of Darfur Militia Leader," *Sudan Tribune*, January 20, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-capital-gripped-in,41358>; "Sudan's Bashir Arrives in Chadian Border Town for Darfuri Forum," *Sudan Tribune*, March 30, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140330ea3u00003&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3491</sup> "Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and pro-Government Militias," 11.

<sup>3492</sup> "Darfur Peace Process Chronology," 7; International Crisis Group, "The Chaos in Darfur," Africa Briefing (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 22, 2015), 11, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/chaos-darfur>.

<sup>3493</sup> "Abu Tira Troops Ambushed in North Darfur," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), February 27, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/abu-tira-troops-ambushed-in-north-darfur>.

<sup>3494</sup> "Abu Tira, Police Forces on the Run Killed in North Darfur," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), February 28, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/abu-tira-police-forces-on-the-run-killed-in-north-darfur>.

<sup>3495</sup> "Musa Hilal Warns North Darfur Citizens of 'Operations,'" *Radio Dabanga* (blog), March 2, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/musa-hilal-warns-north-darfur-citizens-of-operations>.

<sup>3496</sup> "Musa Hilal's Militias Plunder, Burn, Take Control of North Darfur's Saraf Omra," *All Africa*, March 10, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140310ea3a001dv&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Musa Hilal replaced the government appointees with his own administration in Saraf Omra locality in March and claimed in May to govern five of North Darfur's western localities.<sup>3497</sup> According to a rebel source, his troops fought alongside two SLA factions battling RSF forces in March 2014.<sup>3498</sup> There appears to have been less fighting between the SARC and government forces after the initial clashes, though Hilal blamed Gov. Kirir for renewed fighting between Beni and Rizeigat herders in mid-2014.<sup>3499</sup> On June 14, SARC representative Ismail Aghbash and SPLM/A-N representative Jagoud Mikwar Murada signed a memorandum of understanding between their two groups and pledged to work together to overthrow the national government and install a democratic replacement.<sup>3500</sup> However, Hilal rejected the MoU with the SPLM/A-N after the signing.<sup>3501</sup> Although al-Bashir's government attempted to negotiate with Hilal as early as March 2014, the SARC chairman was not reconciled with the government until early to mid-2015, a process highlighted by the SARC's March endorsement of the April elections in Darfur and Hilal's attendance at al-Bashir's swearing-in ceremony in Khartoum on May 30.<sup>3502</sup> Hilal was not appointed governor of North Darfur despite his desire for the position and his strident criticism of Kibir both before and after the launch of SARC.<sup>3503</sup> Tensions remained; in July 2015, SARC forces occupied the Jebel 'Amer gold mining area after fellow Border Guards commander Hemeti, Hilal's cousin and rival, had announced that RSF would be overseeing the area.<sup>3504</sup>

The central government sought to reassert its authority in North Darfur in 2017 by launching a largescale disarmament campaign and by seeking to dissolve various pro-government militias and paramilitary forces and integrate their fighters into Hemeti's RSF. The SARC appealed to Darfuri Arabs to not cooperate with the government on May 31 and later claimed that the disarmament campaign was targeted at SARC, Hilal, and the Mahameed.<sup>3505</sup> On August 17, Hilal told Radio Dabanga that his Border Guards would not merge into the RSF.<sup>3506</sup> Several clashes between the RSF and Border Guards broke out in August and September near the Sudan-Libya border as RSF sought to assert control, and the SARC claimed in early October that

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<sup>3497</sup> "Musa Hilal Establishes His Administration in North Darfur," *All Africa*, March 20, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140320ea3k000lj&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sudanese Tribal Chief Claims Control of Five Areas in Darfur," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, May 6, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020140506ea56003bj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3498</sup> International Crisis Group, "The Chaos in Darfur," 11.

<sup>3499</sup> "Ex-Janjaweed Leader Accuses North Darfur Governor of Fueling Tribal Conflicts.," *Sudan Tribune*, August 28, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140828ea8s0002w&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "6 People Killed in Renewed Tribal Clashes in North Darfur," *Sudan Tribune*, June 25, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020140625ea6p0005o&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3500</sup> Mohammed Amin, "Sudan Rebels, Janjaweed Create New Anti-Government Alliance," *Africa Review*, July 11, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFRNNW0020140714ea7b0000f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sudan: SPLM-N, Musa Hilal's Revolutionary Council Sign MuO," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), July 11, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-splm-n-musa-hilal-s-revolutionary-council-sign-muo>.

<sup>3501</sup> International Crisis Group, "The Chaos in Darfur," 11, note 48.

<sup>3502</sup> "Mosa Hilal: Sahwa Council Decided Support for Elections, Al-Bashir Best Option for Sudan's People," *Sudan News Agency (SUNA)*, March 20, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDNWA0020150321eb3k000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Former Janjaweed Leader 'Reconciled' with Sudanese Govt.," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), June 7, 2015, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/former-janjaweed-leader-reconciled-with-sudanese-govt>.

<sup>3503</sup> "Musa Hilal Warns North Darfur Citizens of 'Operations.'"

<sup>3504</sup> "Revolutionary Council Takes Control of North Darfur Gold Mine."

<sup>3505</sup> "Call for Arab Tribes 'Not to Participate in Sudan's Divide-and-Rule Policy,'" *Radio Dabanga* (blog), May 31, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/call-for-arab-tribes-not-to-participate-in-sudan-s-divide-and-rule-policy>; "Musa Hilal Tribe Opposes Darfur Arms Collection."

<sup>3506</sup> "Musa Hilal: 'Darfur Border Guards Will Not Integrate with RSF,'" *Radio Dabanga* (blog), August 17, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/musa-hilal-darfur-border-guards-will-not-integrate-with-rsf>.

Khartoum was using the RSF to capture or assassinate Hilal and defeat his forces.<sup>3507</sup> As more RSF forces deployed to North Darfur and closed in on Misteriya, SARC forces ambushed an RSF convoy carrying captured Border Guards and killed 9 RSF troops on November 26. They subsequently attacked RSF Brig. Gen. Abd al-Rahim Gumma and his forces in Mistiriya, killing the general. These attacks, more than three years after SARC was founded, mean that the group meets our viability criteria. RSF captured Hilal and other SARC leaders on November 26 or early the next day and rounded up many Mahameed men in Mistiriya.<sup>3508</sup> In early December, the RSF seized armed vehicles and heavy weaponry in the Misteriya area as it continued its disarmament campaign.<sup>3509</sup> Hilal's controversial military trial began in May 2018.<sup>3510</sup> The SARC was still issuing public statements as of July 2018, but the RSF military victory and capture of most of its leadership in November 2017 appears to have greatly weakened its power.<sup>3511</sup>

### Shahama Movement

In late 2004, a new rebel group known as Al Shahama (often translated as “the valiant” from Arabic) emerged in West Kordofan, a state which borders Darfur and South Sudan and includes the disputed border district of Abyei. Musa Ali Hamadein, a former leader in the pro-government Popular Defense Forces (PDF) militia and a former member of Hassan Turabi's Popular Congress Party (PCP), founded Al Shahama. Prior to the split in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) between Turabi and President Bashir, Hamadein had been an NCP member and served as the commissioner for Rashad locality in South Kordofan.<sup>3512</sup> Bashir sacked Hamadein because of his support for Turabi.<sup>3513</sup> Former PCP members were prominent in Shahama.<sup>3514</sup> Many members were also ex-members of the PDF.<sup>3515</sup>

Shahama's leadership and membership were Missiriya Arabs, one of the Baggara Arab tribes, from Kordofan.<sup>3516</sup> The Small Arms Survey reported that the group “vow[ed] to fight for the ‘neglected rights’ of the Misseriya.”<sup>3517</sup> Shahama not only challenged the oil industry for not sharing its profits with Kordofan's people but also actively opposed the planned 2005 dissolution of West Kordofan as a separate state, one of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace

<sup>3507</sup> “Sudan's RSF Detain Musa Hilal Militiamen on Darfur-Libya Border,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), August 13, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-rsf-detain-musa-hilal-militiamen-on-darfur-libya-border>; “26 Dead as Sudanese Militia, Human Traffickers Clash,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), September 24, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/26-dead-as-sudanese-militia-human-traffickers-clash>; “Sudan Govt. Accused of Planning to Kill Musa Hilal,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), October 9, 2017, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-govt-accused-of-planning-to-kill-musa-hilal>.

<sup>3508</sup> McGregor, “Musa Hilal”; “Musa Hilal Arrested after Murder of Sudan's RSF Commander in Darfur,” *Sudan Tribune*, November 27, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64110>.

<sup>3509</sup> “Rapid Support Forces Detect Unlicensed Military Vehicles and Heavy Weapons in Mustariha,” *Sudan News Agency (SUNA)*, December 4, 2017,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDNWA0020171205edc40005s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3510</sup> “Darfur Militia Leader Hilal's Military Trial Begins,” *AllAfrica*, May 4, 2018,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020180504ee54001e7&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Darfur Lawyers Denounce Musa Hilal's Military Trial,” *AllAfrica*, May 22, 2018,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020180522ee5m000mq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3511</sup> “Sudan's Revolutionary Awakening Council Call for Leader's Release,” *Radio Dabanga* (blog), July 5, 2018, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-revolutionary-awakening-council-call-for-leader-s-release>.

<sup>3512</sup> Pact Sudan, “Conflict Threats & Peace Assessment: Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kadugli, Kauda & Abyei,” June 2007, 73, note 21, <http://sabresquadronsudan.blogspot.com/2009/05/1-conflict-threats-peace-assessment.html>.

<sup>3513</sup> “Dangerous Abundance of Rebels.”

<sup>3514</sup> Tubiana, “Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement,” 61.

<sup>3515</sup> “Armed Entities around Abyei,” 2.

<sup>3516</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups,” 35.

<sup>3517</sup> “Armed Entities around Abyei,” 1.



Agreement between Sudan and the SPLM/A.<sup>3518</sup> No reports mentioned overthrowing the central government or secession as Shahama's goals within its first year.

The group's first recognized attacks were likely against rural police outposts in September and October 2004, so rural is coded as 1.<sup>3519</sup> The earliest date for any explicitly Shahama-associated attack was a September 22, 2004, assault on the town of Ghibaish in North Kordofan. Shahama fighters robbed several banks, attacked the police station, freed local prisoners, and battled security forces. Amnesty International reported there were no civilian casualties but did not give a figure for casualties among the rebel and security forces.<sup>3520</sup> Although the first English-language media report in Factiva mentioning Shahama was an October 21 AFP story, the group identified itself during the September 22 attack and so the earlier date enters our dataset as the group's first mention.<sup>3521</sup> The group and its splinters almost certainly carried out attacks on civilian targets, including oil industry installations, but there is not enough available information to determine even a definitive year.<sup>3522</sup> Forces of the Shahama splinter which merged with JEM participated in JEM's May 10, 2008 attack on Omdurman, which is the first large attack with mentions of Shahama involvement.<sup>3523</sup>

The surveyed sources did not mention any foreign support for Shahama. Other rebel groups seem to have provided some backing. JEM established links with Shahama as early as 2004.<sup>3524</sup> The Sudanese government claimed Shahama's fighters were based in Bahr el-Ghazal, partially under SPLM/A control, and indeed Musa Ali Hamardain passed away in Warawar, a northern Bahr el-Ghazal town under the SPLM/A's authority.<sup>3525</sup> The coder infers that JEM and the SPLM/A provided additional support and so have coded Shahama as receiving "other" support. The sources reviewed did not mention anything about the initial planning, though the apparent lack of foreign support suggests that it took place within Sudan.

The surveyed sources describe Shahama's membership as Missiriya.<sup>3526</sup> The one dissenting report, from the International Crisis Group in 2008, mentions that the inclusion of many non-Missiriya in the group was one reason why Missiriya tribal leadership opposed it, but it may describe a later state of affairs from that of Shahama's early days.<sup>3527</sup> The Missiriya are a major ethnic group in various parts of Kordofan, particularly in West Kordofan where Shahama was active.<sup>3528</sup> The coder infers that in at least parts of West Kordofan where the initial planning for Shahama most likely took place the Missiriya comprised two thirds of the population.

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<sup>3518</sup> "Armed Entities around Abyei," 1; International Crisis Group, "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 8, 2005), 13, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfur-failure-protect>.

<sup>3519</sup> International Crisis Group, "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," 13.

<sup>3520</sup> "Sudan: No One to Complain to - No Respite for the Victims, Impunity for the Perpetrators," December 2, 2004, 20, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=af54%2f138%2f2004&language=en>.

<sup>3521</sup> "Khartoum Says New Islamist Rebellion Emerges in Central Sudan," *Agence France Presse*, October 21, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020041021e0a1004xv&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3522</sup> "Armed Entities around Abyei," 2.

<sup>3523</sup> "Armed Entities around Abyei," 2; "Battle of Omdurman."

<sup>3524</sup> Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad-Sudan Rapprochement," 61.

<sup>3525</sup> "Khartoum Says New Islamist Rebellion Emerges in Central Sudan"; International Crisis Group, "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," 13.

<sup>3526</sup> Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad-Sudan Rapprochement," 61; International Crisis Group, "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," 13.

<sup>3527</sup> International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?," ICG Africa Reports (Addis Ababa/Juba/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 21, 2008), 16, note 104, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-s-southern-kordofan-problem-next-darfur>.

<sup>3528</sup> Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, "New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, March 2013), 61–62, note 59, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP29-S.Kordofan.pdf>; Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence*, 104.

Hamadein died on November 30, 2004, apparently from natural causes though at least some in Shahama later claimed the government assassinated him.<sup>3529</sup> In his absence, the group splintered. The faction led by Mohammad Bahr Ali Hamadein, the founder's nephew, allied itself with Darfur's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), while the faction led by Babo Adam Joda "continued attacking oil installations and oil company employees to dramatize the damaging impact of oil on pastoralist livelihoods and the absence of development from oil revenues."<sup>3530</sup> Shahama commander Muhammad Abd-al-Rahman al-Safi signed a peace agreement with the government on August 2, 2005, but whether or not he represented a third faction, the agreement did not end Shahama's involvement in fighting.<sup>3531</sup> Subsequent reports of Shahama as a pro-government militia and attacks on Ngok Dinka civilians in Abyei suggest that at least some Shahama fighters allied with the Sudanese government after the 2005 agreement.<sup>3532</sup> The younger Hamadain merged his faction into JEM and became the deputy president of JEM and the secretary of its Kordofan sector in June 2007.<sup>3533</sup> In its efforts to expand the war to Kordofan and build support among the Missiriya, JEM successfully recruited former Shahama and PCP members into its ranks.<sup>3534</sup> The Small Arms Survey noted in 2010 and 2011 that Shahama was no longer an active force in Abyei.<sup>3535</sup> Due to the continued anti-state attacks by JEM after late 2007, three years after Shahama's founding, Shahama is coded as viable.

### South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF)

AKAs: **SSDF-Machar: South Sudan Defence Forces (Machar Faction)**

Multiple southern Sudanese rebel groups signed a peace treaty in April 1997 Khartoum Agreement with the Sudanese government and announced their unification into the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). While the main SPLM/A continued its rebellion, several of the involved groups were SPLM/A splinters, most prominently Riek Machar's South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol's SPLM/A-Bahr al Ghazal, and Machar became the SSDF's commander.<sup>3536</sup> The SSDF primarily comprised those rebel forces who had

<sup>3529</sup> International Crisis Group, "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," 13; Public Information Office, "Media Headlines, 5th December 2006" (United Nations Mission in Sudan, December 5, 2006), 3, [https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/mmr-dec05\\_0.pdf](https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/mmr-dec05_0.pdf).

<sup>3530</sup> "Armed Entities around Abyei," 2.

<sup>3531</sup> "Sudanese Govt, Western Kordofan Rebels Sign Cease-Fire Agreement," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, August 2, 2005, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNF0020050802e1820040h&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sudan Pledges to Honour Pact with Rebels," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, September 7, 2005, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020050907e197001up&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3532</sup> Akol Meyan Kuol, "Abyei Issue and the Way Forward By Akol Meyan Kuol," *SudaneseOnline.Com* (blog), September 19, 2006,

[http://sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Articles\\_and\\_Analysies\\_12/Abyei\\_Issue\\_and\\_the\\_Way\\_Forward\\_By\\_Akol\\_Meyan\\_Kuol\\_1256\\_printer.shtml](http://sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Articles_and_Analysies_12/Abyei_Issue_and_the_Way_Forward_By_Akol_Meyan_Kuol_1256_printer.shtml); Tracy D. Cook, "Searching for a Path to Peace: Reaction to the Death of John Garang and One Year of the CPA: Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women Across Southern Sudan and the Three Areas" (Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, April 12, 2006), 23.

<sup>3533</sup> Sudan Justice and Equality Movement, "Shahama of Kordofan Unites with JEM: Statement No. 1"

(SudaneseOnline.com, October 27, 2009), [http://sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Press\\_Releases\\_5/Shahama\\_of\\_Kordofan\\_Unites\\_with\\_JEM.shtml](http://sudaneseonline.com/en2/publish/Press_Releases_5/Shahama_of_Kordofan_Unites_with_JEM.shtml); "Armed Entities around Abyei," 2.

<sup>3534</sup> Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, "Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, July 2012), 73, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-28-Forgotten-Darfur.pdf>.

<sup>3535</sup> " Militarization in and around Abyei," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2, 2011), 4, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/abyei/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Militarization-Abyei.pdf>; "Armed Entities around Abyei," 1.

<sup>3536</sup> "South Sudanese Factions Unite," *Agence France-Presse*, April 29, 1997, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011005dt4t00kln&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

remained loyal to Machar during the Khartoum negotiations.<sup>3537</sup> The ACLED events associated with SSDF-Machar involved 1999 clashes between SSDF and SAF forces and within SSDF forces in Unity State over the presence of SAF troops in Unity State, an area reserved for SSDF by the Khartoum Agreement.<sup>3538</sup>

While Machar himself defected from SSDF in 2000 and rejoined SPLM/A in 2002, SSDF continued as a key group within the pro-government camp.<sup>3539</sup> Most SSDF fighters reintegrated into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba Declaration.<sup>3540</sup> Gordon Kong Chol, a longtime rebel commander who had been involved in 1999 plot to remove Machar as SSDF's commander, led a holdout SSDF faction which refused to integrate into the SPLA and again became an active threat to the Government of Southern Sudan in Upper Nile in early 2011.<sup>3541</sup> Excluded as a merger of (former) rebel groups.

### South Sudan Defence Forces (Byel Faction) [SSDF-Byel]

AKAs: Byel Militia

Tito Byel (also Biel) was a commander in Riek Machar's pro-government SSDF but led his forces against fellow SSDF commander Paulino Matiep and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers in oil-rich Unity State in May 1999. Byel was reportedly working with the SPLA and subsequently rejoined the main southern Sudanese rebel group led by John Garang.<sup>3542</sup> Possibly

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<sup>3537</sup> Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence*, 242–43.

<sup>3538</sup> Alfred Taban, "Khartoum Seeks to Heal Rift with Rebel Allies," *Reuters News*, May 20, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010908dv5k00hes&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Split in Ranks behind Khartoum's Chief for South Sudan, Machar," *Agence France-Presse*, June 2, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dv6201mz9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Alfred Taban, "Pro-Government Groups Fight in South Sudan," *Reuters News*, July 6, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010907dv76054i0&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Alfred Taban, "New Militia Violence Kills 10 People in Sudan," *Reuters News*, September 4, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010907dv94015rs&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Alfred Taban, "Sudan Government Militia Says It Fought Faction," *Reuters News*, November 4, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010909dvb400ke4&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3539</sup> "South Sudan Group to Keep Alliance with Khartoum," *Reuters News*, February 9, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010821dw2908due&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Khartoum's Proxies," *Africa Confidential*, December 15, 2006.

<sup>3540</sup> "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 3; Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 169.

<sup>3541</sup> Alfred Taban, "Southern Sudan Leader Faces Ouster Attempt," *Reuters News*, June 4, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010907dv6406y4w&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "UPDATE 1-South Sudan Militias, Army Clash, Killing Seven," *Reuters News*, February 6, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020060206e226001cm&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Skye Wheeler, "South Sudan Army Integrates Largest Militia," *Reuters News*, June 10, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070610e36a0005q&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Renegade Commander Vows to Return to South Sudan, Seize Oil Wells," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, May 13, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020110513e75d0048t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Republic of South Sudan," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, January 1, 2011, sec. Country Profile; "SSDF and Affiliates," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 6, 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/ssdf.html>; "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 7–8.

<sup>3542</sup> "Pro-Government Sudanese Militia Commander Defects to SPLA," *Agence France-Presse*, May 17, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dv5h01ebb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Alistair Lyon, "INTERVIEW-Ex-Rebel Says Sudan Must Implement Accord," *Reuters News*, May 20, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010908dv5k00jfj&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Alfred Taban, "Calm Reported Restored in Oil-Rich Sudan State," *Reuters News*, May 9, 1999,

affiliating with the SSLM/A in late 1999, he then rejoined Machar when the latter bolted the SSDF in 2000.<sup>3543</sup> Unlike Machar, Byel returned to SSDF in 2002.<sup>3544</sup> Excluded as a group which attached itself to various larger groups rather than establishing itself as an independent rebel force following its split from the SSDF.

#### South Sudan Defence Forces (United) [SSDF-United]

After attempting to force Riek Machar from SSDF's leadership, Gordon Kong Chol, the SSDF's Upper Nile commander, broke away to form SSDF-United in June 1999. In July, SSDF troops, backed by the SPLA, reportedly assaulted SSDF-United positions in Upper Nile state.<sup>3545</sup> Neither ACLED nor the survey sources refer to SSDF-United after the July clashes, and Kong's forces remained on the pro-government side.<sup>3546</sup> By 2005, Kong and his troops were back in SSDF, and he led an SSDF faction that refused to integrate into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba Declaration.<sup>3547</sup> Excluded as a pro-government splinter.

#### South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A)

AKAs: George Athor Deng Rebel Group, Olonyi Rebel Group

General George Athor Deng launched his rebellion in 2010 after losing the Jonglei state gubernatorial election that year. Running as an independent after failing to obtain the SPLM nomination in a party selection process marked with irregularities, Athor pledged to return to the SPLM if victorious, but official returns showed SPLM incumbent Kuol Manyang Juuk defeating Athor by nearly 98,000 votes out of 250,000 cast in the April 11-15 general elections.<sup>3548</sup> On April 29, days after the announcement of results, men identified in some reports as SPLA soldiers attacked the SPLA base at Doleib Hill, southwest of Blue Nile State's capital of Malakal. The attack killed 7 or 8 SPLA defenders, and some of the captured attackers claimed to be acting on Athor's orders.<sup>3549</sup> Athor denied ordering the attack and instead claimed that a fight broke out at

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<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010908dv5901c9e&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Split in Ranks behind Khartoum's Chief for South Sudan, Machar."

<sup>3543</sup> Douglas H. Johnson, "The Nuer Civil Wars," in *Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa: Volume II: Sudan, Uganda, and the Ethiopia-Sudan Borderlands*, ed. Günther Schlee and Elizabeth E. Watson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 44, <http://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/SchleeChangingII>.

<sup>3544</sup> "Sudan: Special Report Iv: Who Is Who," *All Africa*, March 11, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020040311e03b000bh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3545</sup> "Factional Fighting in Upper Nile," *Agence France-Presse*, July 23, 1999,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dv7n029xc&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3546</sup> "Sudan," March 11, 2004.

<sup>3547</sup> "Southern Sudan Militia Groups Urged to Reconcile - UN Report," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, July 1, 2005, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020050701e171003pe&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Wheeler, "South Sudan Army Integrates Largest Militia."

<sup>3548</sup> "Amum Admits 'Irregularities' in SPLM's System of Nominations," *Sudan Tribune*, February 10, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100210e62a0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Jonglei's Independent Governor Candidate Pledges a U-Turn to SPLM," *Sudan Tribune*, March 2, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100302e6320002v&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Jonglei Election Results: Kuol Manyang Wins Governorship," *Sudan Tribune*, April 26, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100426e64q0002x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3549</sup> "At Least 7 Died in Attack on South Sudan Base: Spokesman," *Agence France Presse*, April 30, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020100430e64u006hd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "BREAKING NEWS: Discontented SPLA Forces Attack Army Barrack," *Sudan Tribune*, April 30, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100430e64u000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Defeated Candidate Launches Destructive Attack on South Sudan Army in Jonglei," *Sudan Tribune*, May 1, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100501e6510002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

the base after a group of pro-Athor soldiers refused SPLA orders to arrest the candidate.<sup>3550</sup> Whether Athor actually ordered the attack or not, the incident likely marked the first attack by his nascent rebel group against the SPLA. Though denying ordering the attack, Athor announced that his forces were armed and demanded that Governor Manyang be removed and that his fighters receive amnesty to rejoin their units.<sup>3551</sup> Athor broke off initial negotiations with Salva Kiir's SPLM government after SPLA troops allegedly attacked his troops on May 6.<sup>3552</sup> Because Athor initially denied the April 29 attack and then relocated with his soldiers to a more remote location before making his demands, "clandestine" is coded as 1. Athor reportedly took his troops near the border of Jonglei and the Upper Nile state<sup>3553</sup> SCAD records a number of anti-government protests of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding April 2010. However, none of these events (SPLA-organized election protests) occurred in Upper Nile State, local to the group's formation. Two contestation events, an election protest and a women's rights protest occurred, but again were outside of Upper Nile State. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. Athor received support from Sudan and Eritrea.<sup>3554</sup> However, it appears that the initial planning for his rebellion took place in the rural area outside of Malakal and near his home base of Khorfulus, Jonglei.<sup>3555</sup> Khorfulus is subsequently coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1" because it is likely Athor made operational plans there, as well as likely being the location where Athor took his troops after denying the April 29 attack. This was inferred because Khorfulus is in Jonglei near the border with Upper Nile, and the one source puts Athor specifically in Khorfulus days after Athor himself confirmed he was along the border of Jonglei and Upper Nile state. Athor himself was a member of the Dinka ethnic group, but most of his initial fighters were Nuer.<sup>3556</sup> The Lou Nuer are the most populous ethnicity in the areas of Jonglei where his forces were initially located.<sup>3557</sup> Athor's initial forces primarily consisted of SPLA defectors from the SPLA's 8<sup>th</sup> Division (Jonglei) and 3<sup>rd</sup> Division (Northern Bahr el Ghazaal), some of presumably had pre-CPA experience in the SPLA.<sup>3558</sup> In addition to Athor's background as a senior SPLA commander, other SSDM/A leaders had backgrounds as former rebels (SPLA, SPLA-United) and as civilian government officials and SPLM party members under the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Johnson

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<sup>3550</sup> "General Athor Distances Himself from Attack on SPLA Barrack," *Sudan Tribune*, May 2, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100502e6520005m&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3551</sup> Skye Wheeler, "Defeated Sudan Candidate Says Armed, Makes Demands," *Reuters News*, May 3, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020100503e653001co&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3552</sup> Opheera McDoom, "Renegade S.Sudan General Says Talks off after Attack," *Reuters News*, May 7, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020100507e657001fh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3553</sup> "General Athor Distances Himself from Attack on SPLA Barrack"; Wheeler, "Defeated Sudan Candidate Says Armed, Makes Demands."

<sup>3554</sup> "SSDM/A-Athor."

<sup>3555</sup> "Sudan's SPLA Barrack Reportedly Comes under 'Attack,'" *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, April 30, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMNf0020100430e64u001md&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Philip Thon Aleu, "South Sudan's Jonglei Population Breakdown," *Sudan Tribune*, July 10, 2009, <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-s-Jonglei-population,31775>.

<sup>3556</sup> "Rebel Militias Unite in Threat to Fledgling Southern Sudan," *McClathy-Tribune*, March 28, 2011, sec. Asia World, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SCMCOM0020110328e73s00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3557</sup> "My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-Tribal Violence in Jonglei," Issue brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, October 2012), 6, [http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal\\_violence\\_in\\_Jonglei.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB21-Inter-tribal_violence_in_Jonglei.pdf); Rachel Gordon, "In the Eye of the Storm: An Analysis of Internal Conflict in South Sudan's Jonglei State," Working paper, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium Working Papers (London: Feinstein International Center, March 2014), 2–3, <https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/In-the-Eye-of-the-Storm-an-Analysis-of-Internal-Conflict-in-South-Sudans-Jonglei-State.pdf>; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Sudan, "Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan."

<sup>3558</sup> Craze, "Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan–South Sudan Border," 179, note 208.

Olonyi, the last SSDM/A commander to surrender, fought in previous rebellions under Lam Akol in SPLA-United and was already a commander in Robert Gwang's rebellion when he joined Athor.<sup>3559</sup> Athor's successor, Peter Kuol Chol Awan, had served as a senior advisor to Jonglei's governor and lost a bid to become speaker of the Jonglei assembly.<sup>3560</sup> Abraham Thon Chol, a leader on several Athor negotiation teams, was the former Baliet County commissioner.<sup>3561</sup>

The rebels continued to clash with the SPLA in subsequent months as other rebellions, triggered at least in part by SPLM vote rigging in the April elections, broke out in southern Sudan. While Athor claimed his forces had killed more than 25 SPLA fighters after several 2010 battles, none of these enter the dataset as the group's first large attack because those claims were unverified by media reports, strongly disputed by the SPLA, and almost always claimed in descriptions of defensive victories rather than attacks.<sup>3562</sup>

On February 9, 2011, the SPLA announced a major Athor attack on Fangak and Bor in Jonglei. The number of fatalities reported ranged from 100 to 205 and included many civilians but likely at least 25 SPLA and other security forces. Although Athor again claimed to have been attacked, the SPLA's reporting of its own high casualties makes this a more believable account than the rebel commander's claims about earlier battles.<sup>3563</sup> In the first report of attacks on civilians in the surveyed sources, a Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly representative from Blue Nile's Twic County alleged in a June 21, 2010, *Sudan Tribune* story that Athor's forces had killed 16 civilians over the course of the previous two months.<sup>3564</sup>

Athor aimed to unite all the disparate southern rebellions under his leadership and announced as early as May 2010 that rebel commanders David Yau Yau and Gatluak Gai had joined his group.<sup>3565</sup> It is unclear how much say Athor had over the other commanders, who tended to retain operational control over their forces and entered into negotiations with the government on their own. For example, Yau Yau opened separate negotiations and agreed to a ceasefire in September 2010.<sup>3566</sup> In early October, President Kiir officially announced his offer of pardons to Athor, Gai, Robert Gwang, and former SSDF and SAF officer Tang-Ginye if they would return to the SPLA, an offer Athor hailed without immediately taking.<sup>3567</sup> Although Gwang also reached an agreement with the government, Athor and others remained in the field.

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<sup>3559</sup> McGregor, "A Doctorate in Fighting"; "SSDM/A-Upper Nile Faction."

<sup>3560</sup> "Jonglei Elects New Speaker," *Sudan Tribune*, September 19, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020090919e59j00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3561</sup> Ngor Arol Garang, "Rebel General Athor to Send High Level Delegation to Meet SPLM," *Sudan Tribune*, December 13, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020101213e6cd00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3562</sup> McDoom, "Renegade S.Sudan General Says Talks off after Attack"; "Seventy Said Killed in Clashes between Southern Sudan Army, Militia," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, June 5, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBGMNF0020100605e665000ul&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Athor Says His Forces Clash with SPLA Forces, Army Spokesman Denies It," *Sudan Tribune*, June 22, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100622e66m00004&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3563</sup> Jeremy Clarke, "At Least 211 Killed in Clashes in South Sudan," *The Independent*, February 16, 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/at-least-211-killed-in-clashes-in-south-sudan-2216128.html>;

"South Sudan 'Massacre Killed 200,'" *BBC News*, February 15, 2011, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12465366>.

<sup>3564</sup> "Jonglei's Twic East County in Sudan Witnesses Insecurity Caused by Athor's Forces," *Sudan Tribune*, June 21, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100621e66l00004&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3565</sup> "Renegades Coordinate Attacks on South Sudan Army."

<sup>3566</sup> "South Sudan Agrees to Ceasefire with Rebel Fighter: Army," *Agence France Presse*, September 23, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020100923e69n006hj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3567</sup> "South Sudan President Pardons Rebel Army Officers," *Sudan Tribune*, October 7, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020101007e6a70005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Renegade General Welcomes Southern Sudan President's Amnesty to Rebels," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, October 11, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEMP0020101011e6ab000rz&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



On March 28, 2011, Athor informed the media that five rebel factions had united under his leadership into a single force known as the Southern Sudan Defense Movement (SSDM). Moving far beyond Athor's original demands for a new Jonglei governor and amnesty, Athor declared the SSDM/A's intentions to march on Juba and institute a more inclusive government for southern Sudan.<sup>3568</sup> Despite the ambitions of Athor and the SSDM/A, no such offensive materialized, and Athor denied reports of his involvement as president in a new Khartoum-allied council of southern rebels in late April.<sup>3569</sup> His spokesman defected and announced his intention to negotiate with the government in late April.<sup>3570</sup>

Athor was killed in December 2011, and Gen. Peter Kuol Chol Awan replaced him as commander-in-chief of SSDM/A.<sup>3571</sup> After Awan surrendered on March 8, 2012, General Johnson Olonyi, a former Gwang subordinate who had led his forces into the SSDM/A after a failed reintegration process in early 2011, renounced the Awan-negotiated peace agreement with the SPLA and continued fighting in Upper Nile State from his bases in South Kordofan.<sup>3572</sup> Claiming to have been elected the SSDM/A's new commander-in-chief to replace Awan, Olonyi was the last major SSDM/A commander in the field.<sup>3573</sup> In June 2013, after several months of back-and-forth with the government and the Shilluk king, Olonyi and his troops finally accepted the presidential amnesty.<sup>3574</sup> The surveyed sources did not include mention of any SSDM/A attacks after April 29, 2013, three years from Athor's initial attacks, so SSDM/A did not become a viable rebel group. Because the Olonyi was in negotiations until his June peace agreement, we code viable\_negotiate as "1".

#### South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A)

AKAs: South Sudan Liberation Army (Gadet Faction) [SSLA-Gadet]

Gen. Peter Gadet defected from the SPLA in March 2010 and founded the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) as a rebellion against the SPLM/A Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) was the movement's armed wing. Gadet, a prominent figure in both the SPLA and multiple splinters from it, had earlier been a commander in the SSUM/A in the 1990s and re-integrated into the SPLA following the 2006 Juba Declaration.<sup>3575</sup> Gadet served as SPLA air defense commander in Juba and became deputy commander of the SPLA's 3<sup>rd</sup> Division in Northern Bahr el-Ghazaal in November 2010. Like other Nuer officers in the SPLA, he was frustrated by a wave of promotions and reassignments granted by President Kiir to Dinka officers in late October 2010, and the Small Arms Survey suggests that this was likely a major contributing factor to decision to re-defect.<sup>3576</sup>

<sup>3568</sup> Wheeler, "Defeated Sudan Candidate Says Armed, Makes Demands"; "Rebel Militias Unite in Threat to Fledgling Southern Sudan."

<sup>3569</sup> "Renegade General George Athor Denies Formation of Coalition Government," *Sudan Tribune*, May 2, 2011, [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=38759](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=38759).

<sup>3570</sup> Ngor Arol Garang, "Athor's Spokesman Splints to Negotiate With South Government," *All Africa*, April 29, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110429e74t000pr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3571</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 1, 3.

<sup>3572</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 3.

<sup>3573</sup> "Nation's Rebel Group Denies Peace Deal With the Government - Dismisses It As 'Defection.'"

<sup>3574</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 7; "South Sudan Rebel Movement Denies Amnesty Deal - Calls for Internationally Recognized Peace Talks."

<sup>3575</sup> "Peter Gadet's Rebellion," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, June 3, 2011), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Gadet-June-2011.pdf>.

<sup>3576</sup> "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 4.

While there is no exact date for the founding of the SSLM/A, there is clear evidence for Gadet's clandestine plans. After receiving permission to visit Nairobi in March 2010, Gadet instead traveled to Khartoum. On March 27, an SPLA spokesman denied there was any truth to rumors that Gadet had launched a new rebellion.<sup>3577</sup> However, just days later, the SPLA conceded that Gadet had defected, a claim that the Sudanese government rejected, but had done so on his own without any other soldiers.<sup>3578</sup> In early April, the SPLA arrested six of his SPLA bodyguards, who were believed to be seeking air transport to follow their commander to Khartoum.<sup>3579</sup> On April 11, Gadet publicly announced the formation of the SSLM/A under his leadership with the release of the Mayom Declaration. The Mayom Declaration, named after Gadet's home county in Unity state, called for the overthrow of the southern Sudan's SPLM government and the establishment of new, inclusive government of national unity to oversee new, fair elections.<sup>3580</sup>

[Gadet's SSLM/A was apparently not directly related to earlier groups which had used the name. In early 2000, a group of Nuer who turned against the Sudanese government and Riek Machar in December 1999 following reconciliation meetings between Dinka and Nuer leaders labeled themselves as the South Sudan Liberation Movement, the name of an earlier "organization formally allied with no one" and the final name for the southern Anyanya rebels during the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-72).<sup>3581</sup> Dr. Michael Wal Duany, formerly an academic at Indiana University in the U.S., was the group's leader.<sup>3582</sup> In 2002, SSLM/A signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese government, and the group subsequently battled SPLA fighters around Akoko in Jonglei state.<sup>3583</sup> The limited sources on this earlier SSLM/A identify it clearly as a pro-government militia from 2002 on, but it is unclear whether it launched any attacks against Sudanese government forces in the interim.<sup>3584</sup> As a result, the older SSLM/A is not included in our dataset.]

The initial SSLM/A members included several other predominantly Nuer militias operating in Mayom County and nearby areas of Unity State, including those commanded by Kolchara Nyang, James Gai Yoach, Matthew Puljang, Bapiny Monytuil, and Karols Kuol, who

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<sup>3577</sup> Ngor Arol Garang, "Defection of General Peter Gadet Is a 'Rumour' - South Sudan Army," *Sudan Tribune*, March 28, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110328e73s0005o&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3578</sup> "Khartoum Distances Itself From New Dissidences in South Army," *All Africa*, March 30, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110330e73u000nh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3579</sup> "Peter Gadet's Bodyguards Arrested by South Sudan Security Intelligence in Wau," *Sudan Tribune*, April 8, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110408e7480002u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3580</sup> "New Rebel Group Calls to Overthrow South Sudan Government," *All Africa*, April 14, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110414e74e0015w&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "The Mayom Declaration," *Sudan Tribune*, April 18, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110418e74i00007&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

"South Sudanese Group Forms New Movement in Upper Nile Region," *Associated Press Newswires*, February 1, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010803dw2102gfm&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Rone, "Sudan, Oil and Human Rights," 248, note 680.<sup>3581</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 125.

<sup>3582</sup> Rone, "Sudan, Oil and Human Rights," 13.

<sup>3583</sup> Alfred Taban, "Sudan Hails Peace Deal, Opposition Wants Democracy," *Reuters News*, July 21, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020020721dy7100s8s&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Government Casts Doubt Over Talks," *All Africa*, October 25, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021025dyap0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sudan Pro-Government Militia Says Recaptures Town," *Reuters News*, February 2, 2003,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020030202dz2200fwd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3584</sup> Rone, "Sudan, Oil and Human Rights," 248, 252-53; John Young, "Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace," *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (2003): 433; "Pro-Government Militias Database," RATE (Repression and the escalation of violence), 2014, <http://www.sabinecarey.com/militias>.

quickly affiliated with Gadet.<sup>3585</sup> An SSLM/A spokesman claimed that many SPLA soldiers had defected to the new rebel group during the fighting around Mankien in April 2011.<sup>3586</sup> The SSLM/A was known for using child soldiers.<sup>3587</sup> While the exact proportion of fighters between SPLA defectors, existing rebel militias, and new fighters is unknown, the increased strength of Gadet's forces and the SPLA's increased focus on their activities relative to the preexisting rebel formations which joined suggest that Gadet was able to attract a significant number of SPLA defectors. As a result, we include the SSLM/A in our dataset rather than excluding it as a merger of preexisting groups.

The first recorded SSLA attack in the surveyed sources took place on April 19 in Unity State and killed 2 to 20 SPLA soldiers.<sup>3588</sup> As the new group sought to establish itself on the ground, its forces attacked Mankien, the main town of Mayom County, on April 21.<sup>3589</sup> The SSLA claimed to have inflicted hundreds of SPLA fatalities, but even the SPLA admitted that their death count from Gadet's offensive was 26.<sup>3590</sup> Attacks on civilians also accompanied SSLM/A's arrival. As early as April 20, Unity State government accused forces of Gadet and Gatluak Gai of burning the Mayom County village of Bong.<sup>3591</sup> Due to the sporadic attacks across Mayom County, as well as Gadet's clear connection to Mayom County, Mayom County is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1." SCAD records a handful of anti-government contestation events in the year prior to group formation in March 2011. While no Event Type 1, 3, or 4 events occurred in Unity State, the region local to group formation, one election-related Type 2 protest did occur during this time (SCAD ID 6250257). No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Unsurprisingly given Gadet's planning for his rebellion in Khartoum, the rebels had direct support from Sudan. The SSLM/A forces received "food supplies, weapons, vehicles, uniforms, and tents" from the Sudanese government.<sup>3592</sup> Although Gadet's forces operated in Unity State in the vicinity of key oil fields, the surveyed sources did not allege that the group received direct funding from oil sales. Gadet, his commanders, and most of his fighters were of the Nuer ethnicity, the most populous ethnicity in Mayom County, Unity State.<sup>3593</sup>

Gadet led the SSLM/A's fight against the SPLA from mid-April through August 2011, when he signed a peace treaty w/ South Sudan's government.<sup>3594</sup> In early August 2011, Gadet and SSPLM/A spokesperson Col. Bol Gatkuoth Koal rejoined the SPLA following President Kiir's declaration of amnesty. Many of Gadet's forces followed his orders to await reintegration into the SPLA, but several of his commanders, including Yoach, Puljang, Monituel, and Chara

<sup>3585</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 8.

<sup>3586</sup> "Peter Gatdet's Forces Claim Victory Over South Army," *All Africa*, April 25, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110425e74p001if&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3587</sup> "'We Can Die Too': Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in South Sudan."

<sup>3588</sup> Alan Boswell, "New Rebel Group Opens Offensive in Southern Sudan," *McClatchy Newspapers*, April 19, 2011, <https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24624328.html>.

<sup>3589</sup> "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 5.

<sup>3590</sup> "Peter Gatdet's Forces Claim Victory Over South Army"; "UPDATE 1-South Sudan Clashes Kill 165 in a Week - Army," *Reuters News*, April 25, 2011, 165,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020110425e74p000m2&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3591</sup> Shao Jie, "South Sudan's Unity State Expels Northerners Working at Oil Fields," *Xinhua News Agency*, April 20, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=XNEWS00020110420e74k008vi&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3592</sup> "SSLM/A," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Armed Groups (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 6, 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/sslma.html>; James Copnall, *A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and Incomplete Divorce* (London: Hurst & Co, 2014), 164.

<sup>3593</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 8; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Sudan, "Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan."

<sup>3594</sup> "Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan," 8–9.

Nyang, announced that Gadet did not speak for them and that would continue the struggle under the SSLM/A banner.<sup>3595</sup> The remaining SSLM/A militias fought on until accepting a presidential pardon and re-integration deal on April 24, 2013.<sup>3596</sup> Because the last report of SSLA attacks in the surveyed sources came on February 5, 2013, just short of the three-year mark from the group's likely founding in March 2010, the SSLM/A thus did not meet our viability criteria.<sup>3597</sup> Given that negotiations ahead of the group's surrender were likely ongoing, viable\_negotiate is coded as 1.

#### Southern Sudan Independence Army/Movement (SSIA)

Riek Machar announced in September 1994 that the SPLM/A-United rebel group he, Lam Akol, William Nyuon, and Kerubino Kwanyin Bol had launched in April 1993 would be renamed the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), but Lam Akol and his forces broke with Machar and retained the separate SPLM/A-United label.<sup>3598</sup> The SSIM/A and other rebel groups formed the Southern Sudan Defense Forces under Machar's leadership after signing the April 1997 Khartoum Agreement with the Sudanese government.<sup>3599</sup> Excluded as a pre-1997 rebel group.

#### Southern Sudan United Army (SSUA)

AKAs: Militia (Matiep)

Paulino Matiep and his forces split from Riek Machar's SSDF in 1998 and formed the Southern Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM/A).<sup>3600</sup> SSUM/A and SSDF clashed in Al-Wihda state in 1998 and 1999.<sup>3601</sup> After Machar left SSDF in 2000, Matiep again became a prominent SSDF commander and eventually the group's chief of state in 2002.<sup>3602</sup> He presided over the reintegration of the large majority of SSDF into SPLA following the 2006 Juba Declaration.<sup>3603</sup> Excluded as a splinter of the mostly pro-government SSDF.

#### Southern Sudan United Army (Gadet Faction) [SSUA-Gadet]

This group tag may be an ACLED coding error. Gadet, formerly a commander in Paulino Matiep's SSUA before defecting to the SPLA in 1999, commanded the SPLA, or at least SPLA-allied, troops against the SSUA in Unity State, but ACLED lists the SPLA and SSUA-Gadet as

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<sup>3595</sup> Military High command of South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SSLM/A), "Rebel South Sudan Liberation Army Distance Themselves from Peter Gadet"; "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 5.

<sup>3596</sup> "SSLM/A."

<sup>3597</sup> "Sudanese Army Says SPLA Are Still in Disputed Areas," *Sudan Tribune*, February 5, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020130205e9250005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3598</sup> Buchizya Mseteka, "Sudan Rebels Say Government Violates Truce," *Reuters News*, April 13, 1993, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011120dp4d04dyz&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Hugh Nevill, "Southern Sudanese Resistance Splits," *Agence France-Presse*, December 29, 1994, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011028dqct04blt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3599</sup> "South Sudanese Factions Unite"; Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence*, 242–43.

<sup>3600</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 126.

<sup>3601</sup> "Faction Fighting in Southern Sudan Kills 49," *Agence France-Presse*, July 15, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010914du7f03a2l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Pro-Government Factions Reach Ceasefire in Southern Sudan," *Agence France-Presse*, July 21, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010914du7l03cps&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3602</sup> "Armed Groups in Sudan: The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Aftermath of the Juba Declaration," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2006), 14, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-02-SSDF.pdf>.

<sup>3603</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 169.

opponents for event 745SUD of September 1, 2000.<sup>3604</sup> It appears ACLED should have identified the combatants as SPLA (or SPLA-Gadet) and SSUA, as it did for the preceding day's 744SUD. Excluded.

#### Sudan Liberation Forces (SLF)

2014 merger of the Liberation Movement for Justice (LMJ-TH) and two SLM/A splinters.<sup>3605</sup> LMJ was itself an umbrella group of 10 smaller groups formed in 2010.<sup>3606</sup> Excluded as a merger.

#### Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice (SLMJ)

Excluded as an LMJ splinter.<sup>3607</sup>

#### Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice (Taher Hajar Faction) [SLMJ-TH]

Either an SLMJ splinter or another name for SLMJ following Taher Hajar's assumption of power within the group.<sup>3608</sup> Excluded.

#### Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

AKAs: Darfur Liberation Front

Even as Sudan moved toward negotiations with the predominantly southern rebels of the SPLM/A, a new rebel movement emerged in the western border region of Darfur. Initially called the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) mobilized support from several of Darfur's major non-Arab ethnic groups in response to attacks by pro-government Arab militias and paramilitary forces and the central state's longstanding neglect of the region. Although the SLM/A soon splintered, its major factions remain key forces in the Darfur conflict.

Following Arab militia attacks on their settlements with no significant government efforts to punish the attackers, members of Darfur's Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa ethnic groups began organizing self-defense militias between the late 1980s and late 1990s.<sup>3609</sup> Determining when these self-defense efforts and anti-government organizing actually led to the formation of a new rebel group is difficult to do with any precision, but we follow De Waal and Flint in recognizing the July 21, 2001, meeting of Fur and Zaghawa leaders, including Fur lawyer Abdel Wahid al-Nur, as a crucial event in the process. We code that date, when the leaders "met in Abu Gamra and swore a solemn oath on the Quran to work together to foil Arab supremacist policies in Darfur," as the start of what would become the SLM/A.<sup>3610</sup> The International Crisis Group also dates the group's emergence to 2001.<sup>3611</sup> The rebels met with some of the Masalit in November 2001 and made preparations for the training of the new group's fighters; they further decided not

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<sup>3604</sup> Alfred Taban, "Pro-Government Militia Claims Victory in South Sudan," *Reuters News*, September 3, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010821dw9309bm7&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3605</sup> "New 'Sudan Liberation Forces' Unites Three Darfur Rebel Factions," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), July 15, 2014, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/new-sudan-liberation-forces-unites-three-darfur-rebel-factions>.

<sup>3606</sup> "Darfur Rebels Factions Unite under New Umbrella in Doha," *Sudan Tribune*, February 24, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100224e62o0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3607</sup> "New Opposition Army Announced," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), January 30, 2011, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/new-opposition-army-announced>.

<sup>3608</sup> "Rebels Claim Attack On Military Convoys in North Darfur," *All Africa*, July 10, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140710ea7a000h6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3609</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 73–81.

<sup>3610</sup> Flint and De Waal, 81–82.

<sup>3611</sup> International Crisis Group, "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis," Africa Report (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 25, 2004), 19, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfur-rising-sudans-new-crisis>.

to go public until better prepared and equipped.<sup>3612</sup> The location of this meeting of operational planning was not identified, and therefore this meeting was not used for the “rural” variable. The SLM/A’s founders clearly organized clandestinely ahead of their first attacks and public statements.

Following training of Fur and Zaghawa fighters in the mountainous Jebel Marra area of Darfur, the DLF’s first attack took place on February 25, 2002. Jebel Marra is the first identifiable location of operational planning, as it is the location of training, and it therefore satisfies the “rural” variable as a “1.” DLF forces attacked a Sudanese army garrison south of Jebel Marra between Nyala and Tur and successfully drove out the soldiers and captured their weapons.<sup>3613</sup> While the surveyed sources did not directly pick up any public statements from the rebels until February 2003, the government knew of Abdel Wahid’s rebellion as early as mid-2002, and *Africa Confidential* reported in November 2002 that government sources were already aware of the group’s name, the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF).<sup>3614</sup> Following the DLF’s successful February 25, 2003 attack on Golo, the major town in Jebel Marra province, the group established a civilian administration headed by Abdalla Korah, who issued a statement the following day calling on “townspeople to support him to end the marginalization and injustice that he said was depriving Darfur of development.”<sup>3615</sup> De Waal and Flint note that some SLA leaders later told them that they had publicly claimed credit for the June 2002 attack on Golo’s police station, but any such earlier claim did not reach major media outlets.<sup>3616</sup> SCAD records both an anti-government protest and an anti-government riot of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding July 2001. While no Type 1, 3, or 4 events occurred in South Darfur, the state local to group formation, two Type 2 protests over the arrest of opposition leaders did occur in that state during this time. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Following the DLF’s February 26, 2003 statement on the Golo attack, the group continued to engage with journalists and outside observers. Abdel Wahid told researchers days later that the DLF name would be changed to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army.<sup>3617</sup> In March 2003, the DLF indeed changed its name to the SLM/A.<sup>3618</sup> On March 16, SLM/A released its initial political manifesto demanding the replacement of Islamist rule with a secular government and greater autonomy for Darfur.<sup>3619</sup> However, because the manifesto was issued after the group’s first year, all of the political goals variables are coded as 0. Prior to the manifesto launch, the group’s main goals appeared to be resistance to government and pro-government militia attacks on non-Arab Darfuri villages. The initial February 2002 attack

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<sup>3612</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 82.

<sup>3613</sup> Flint and De Waal, 83; Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 22.

<sup>3614</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 81; “Death in Darfur,” *Africa Confidential*, November 22, 2002, <https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/1092/>.

<sup>3615</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 90; “New Rebel Group Seizes West Sudan Town,” *Agence France-Presse*, February 26, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020030226dz2q00948&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3616</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 292, note 16.

<sup>3617</sup> Flint and De Waal, 90–91.

<sup>3618</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, 2016, 232; “Darfur Rebels Adopt New Name: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army,” *Agence France-Presse*, March 14, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020030314dz3e008hm&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 90; International Crisis Group, “Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan,” Africa Report (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2004), 23, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfur-deadline-new-international-action-plan>.

<sup>3619</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 90–91.



took place before SLM/A had a clear political platform.<sup>3620</sup> Despite reports that DLF had secessionist goals, as its name might suggest, prior to the SLM/A rebrand in March 2003, it is not clear that was the case within the group's first year.<sup>3621</sup>

As the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the other major Darfuri rebel group, also became increasingly active, the two groups initially collaborated to challenge the government forces and their allies. Both groups' first large (25 or more fatalities among state forces) attack was their joint April 25, 2003, assault on the Sudanese air force base in al Fasher in North Darfur.<sup>3622</sup> The attack resulted in between 32 and 70 SAF deaths, the destruction of multiple military aircraft, and the capture of an air force general.<sup>3623</sup> Coupled with other rebel successes in the first half of 2003, the al Fasher attack provoked heavy SAF retaliation and spurred the central government to begin organizing Arab fighters into the pro-government militias that would become known as the Janjaweed.<sup>3624</sup>

While government forces and pro-government militias have been responsible for the vast majority of attacks against Darfur civilians during the conflict, both JEM and SLM/A, and their resulting splinter groups, have also been implicated in attacks against civilians.<sup>3625</sup> In July 2003, the UN's IRIN news service reported on a growing trend of SLA attacks on civilians and unprotected villages. Although these attacks' primary aim was to loot supplies, the SLA fighters sometimes killed civilians as well. A July 19, 2003, SLA attack on Tawila town, mentioned in the IRIN report, killed two police officers and two civilians and does not seem to have been directed at state targets such as the police station.<sup>3626</sup> There may well have been earlier SLM/A attacks on civilians, but they received more attention starting in July 2003. Flint and De Waal date the start of Darfuri rebel attacks on civilians to mid-2003.<sup>3627</sup> As the rebel group became larger and its commanders and factions more independent, reports of civilian attacks became more common. The SLM/A's top representative to the African Union Ceasefire Commission admitted in December 2004 that the group's forces had been involved in some attacks against civilians, though he declared that they would cease doing so.<sup>3628</sup>

Most of the initial SLA commanders came from Fur and Zaghawa self-defense groups formed to fend off Darfuri Arab attacks beginning in the late 1980s.<sup>3629</sup> At a November 2002 meeting, the rebels agreed to divide the group's top three posts among the three major non-Arab tribes of most of its members with lawyer and activist Abdel Wahid (Fur) as chairman, Abdallah Abbakar Bashir (Zaghawa) as military commander, and the deputy chairman position reserved

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<sup>3620</sup> Flint and De Waal, 83.

<sup>3621</sup> "Darfur Liberation Front / Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) / Sudan Liberation Army," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed August 15, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm>; Asim Qureshi, *Insurgency & International Law: The Case of Darfur* (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2006), 16; M.A. Mohamed Salih, "Understanding the Conflict in Darfur," Occasional Paper Series (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, May 2005), 14, [https://teol.ku.dk/cas/publications/publications/occ\\_papers/muhammed\\_salihsamletpaper.pdf](https://teol.ku.dk/cas/publications/publications/occ_papers/muhammed_salihsamletpaper.pdf); Mika Vehnamäki, "Darfur Scorched: Looming Genocide in Western Sudan," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 65–67, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520600552868>.

<sup>3622</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 119–21.

<sup>3623</sup> "Clash in Sudan's Darfur Kills 32 Troops, 20 Rebels."; "Sudanese Opposition Sources Describe Attack on Western Provinces Capital."; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 23; Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 18–19.

<sup>3624</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 19–24; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 23–24.

<sup>3625</sup> Lefkowitz, "Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan," 36; "AFR 54/016/2004."

<sup>3626</sup> "Widespread Insecurity Reported in Darfur."

<sup>3627</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 122.

<sup>3628</sup> Somini Sengupta, "Leader of Darfur Rebels Resorts to Damage Control," *The New York Times*, December 5, 2004, Late Edition-Final edition, sec. Foreign Desk; SECT1.

<sup>3629</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 73.

for the Masalit.<sup>3630</sup> After Abbakar's death in January 2004 amid the government's counteroffensive, his fellow Zaghawa and assistant Minni Arku Minawi, a former schoolteacher and Chadian customs official with no military experience, succeeded him.<sup>3631</sup> Several key early commanders came from a military background as Khamis Ahmad Osman was a 21-year veteran of the army and Abdallah Abbakar Bashar had served in the Chadian military.<sup>3632</sup> Most of the rank-and-file members also came from the self-defense groups, which had themselves become better equipped and organized in the late 1990s and early 2000s.<sup>3633</sup> Darfuri fighters in the SPLA also joined SLM/A.<sup>3634</sup> Relatively few initial members of SLM/A came from the military.<sup>3635</sup>

Although the SLM/A factions would subsequently receive significant support from Chad, the original group did not receive substantial early support from the Chadian government. Chadian soldiers of the Zaghawa ethnicity were involved with JEM and SLA early on, but not with the permission of the Chadian government, whose intelligence service worked actively with the Sudanese government to disrupt JEM and SLA by fomenting splits.<sup>3636</sup> President Idriss Déby of Chad had come to power by leading his Sudan-backed rebel forces from Darfur to the Chadian capital of N'Djamena in 1990, and the two countries subsequently agreed to not allow each other's rebels to operate on their territory. Despite pressure from the Chadian Zaghawa, Déby tried to honor his commitment until Sudan-based Chadian rebels attacked Chad in December 2005.<sup>3637</sup> Déby thereafter allowed Darfuri rebels to operate from Chadian territory in exchange for an understanding they would support his government against the Chadian rebels and also provided significant direct support to JEM and SLA-Minni Minawi. After early work in trying to facilitate peace talks, Libya also provided some support to SLA factions within the "Tripoli group" of rebels formed in 2009.<sup>3638</sup> Unlike Chad and Libya, Eritrea supplied important early aid to the SLM/A at least early as 2003-04, some of it through the SPLA.<sup>3639</sup> However, because the Chadian and Libyan support came later and even the earlier Eritrean support likely was not present during the DLF's first year starting July 2001, SLM/A is coded as not receiving foreign support. The SLM/A eventually levied taxes in the areas it controlled, but it did not control any territory until 2003.<sup>3640</sup>

The SLM/A collaborated with other rebel groups, most notably JEM in 2003. It was part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) until several key constituent groups of the NDA made peace with the government in 2004 and thereafter did not work closely with the Eastern Front groups, also former NDA members still in rebellion, to coordinate a broad front.<sup>3641</sup> SPLM/A appears to have been involved in the early years of the DLF/SLA and allegedly trained

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<sup>3630</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 22; Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 77–79, 85.

<sup>3631</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 24.

<sup>3632</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 71–75; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 22.

<sup>3633</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 73–81.

<sup>3634</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 21.

<sup>3635</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 115.

<sup>3636</sup> Flint and De Waal, 112–13.

<sup>3637</sup> International Crisis Group, "To Save Darfur," 9–10; Flint, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict," 15; Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement," 11.

<sup>3638</sup> Flint, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict," 38–39.

<sup>3639</sup> Tubiana, "Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement," 52; Tanner and Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," 22.

<sup>3640</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 154.

<sup>3641</sup> Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization," 30.

as many as 1,500 fighters in early 2002 as well as edited the initial SLM/A manifesto.<sup>3642</sup> The Fur living elsewhere in Sudan and in Chad and the broader diaspora were a source of early funding.<sup>3643</sup> The SPLM/A and diaspora support is coded as “other” in our dataset.

Under pressure from the government counteroffensives, ethnic and personality tensions increased within the SLM/A. Disputes between the movement’s Fur and Zaghawa members had emerged early on and contributed to Abbaker’s decision to shift his operations to predominantly Zaghawa areas.<sup>3644</sup> Minawi and Abdel-Wahid were also increasingly at odds. Minawi’s refusal to assist Abdel-Wahid’s cornered forces in early 2004 forced Eritrea and the SPLA to airlift the latter commander to safety, and Minawi and his forces attempted violently seize power within SLM/A in June 2004 but were pushed back.<sup>3645</sup> That led to the first, and most significant, of many splits in the movement with the resulting factions referred to as SLM/A-Abdel Wahid al Nur (SLM/A-AW) and SLM/A-Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM). Numerous additional factions have subsequently split off from these groups, both of which themselves still exist under their original leaders. ACLED lists 8 splinter groups with SLM/A as part of their name, and a 2012 Small Arms Survey list also included 8 SLM/A splinters.<sup>3646</sup> Some SLM/A splinters merged into new coalitions and groups as the conflict continued. JEM splinters have merged into various other rebel organizations as the war in Darfur has continued.<sup>3647</sup> Minawi was the only major rebel leader to sign the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and led SLM/A-MM into alliance with Khartoum until late 2010 when he announced the resumption of his rebellion over the DPA’s failed implementation.<sup>3648</sup> The major SLM/A factions were still attacking state targets more than three years after the group’s beginning, so the SLM/A is coded as viable in our dataset.

#### **Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Free Will (SLM/A-FW)**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3649</sup>

#### **Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Karbino Faction) [SLM/A-Karbino]**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3650</sup>

#### **Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minnawi Faction) [SLM/A-Minnawi]**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3651</sup>

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<sup>3642</sup> International Crisis Group, “Darfur Rising,” 20; Omer Ismail, “A Political Settlement for Darfur: A Practical Roadmap,” *The Enough Project* (blog), October 13, 2009, <https://enoughproject.org/reports/political-settlement-darfur-practical-roadmap>; Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 21–22.

<sup>3643</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 17–18, 24; Prunier, “Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia,” 6.

<sup>3644</sup> Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 26.

<sup>3645</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 162–63; Tanner and Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” 26.

<sup>3646</sup> Small Arms Survey, “Darfur’s Armed Opposition Groups,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, October 6, 2012, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/darfurs-armed-groups/darfurs-armed-opposition-groups.html#cl123>.

<sup>3647</sup> Wheeler, “Darfur Rebel Factions Reunite under One Banner.”

<sup>3648</sup> “Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, September 6, 2011), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-SLA-MM.pdf>.

<sup>3649</sup> “No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur,” 5.

<sup>3650</sup> “The Democratic Sudan Liberation Movement (DSL) (SLA-Carabino).”

<sup>3651</sup> Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 265–66; “No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur,” 5.

**Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Abdul Wahid al-Nur Faction) [SLM/A-Nur]**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3652</sup>

**Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Ahmed Abdel Shafi Faction) [SLM/A-Shafi]**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3653</sup>

**Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Second Revolution [SLM/A-SR]**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3654</sup>

**Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Unity Faction) [SLM/A-Unity]**

**SLM/A-G19 (Group of 19)**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter.<sup>3655</sup>

**Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Wing of Peace Faction) [SLM/A-Wing of Peace]**

Excluded as an SLM/A splinter which accepted integration into the Sudanese Armed Forces in 2008.<sup>3656</sup>

**Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF)**

Riek Machar, who broke with the SPLM/A in 1993, broke his alliance with Sudan in January 2000 and left the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) to form a new group called the Sudan People's Defense Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF).<sup>3657</sup> As early as May 2001, after three months of negotiations, SPDF and SPLA announced their intention to merge.<sup>3658</sup> In 2002, Machar and SPDF officially rejoined SPLA, and the SPDF's command structure was merged into the SPLA in 2003.<sup>3659</sup> The classification of the SPDF within our framework is a close judgment call. The group itself meets virtually of the inclusion criteria except possibly the splinter criteria. SPDF was a splinter from state security forces, and Machar was one of Sudan's three vice presidents before he resigned, so from one perspective, SPDF was a new rebel group formed by defectors from the Sudanese state, which would justify its inclusion in our dataset. However, the SSDF had maintained its separate identity under its 1997 peace agreement with the government and remained a threat to the Sudanese state.<sup>3660</sup> Thus, in defecting from SSDF which itself was a successor to his initial and other SPLM/A splinters, Machar and the SPDF were simply resuming

<sup>3652</sup> "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur," 5.

<sup>3653</sup> "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur," 5.

<sup>3654</sup> "Sudan Liberation Movement-Second Revolution Launched in Darfur," *All Africa*, June 26, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140626ea6q000oe&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3655</sup> Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 267; "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur," 5.

<sup>3656</sup> "Sudan: Over 1,200 Rebel Group Elements Join Regular Army," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, July 2, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020080702e4720053h&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3657</sup> Alfred Taban, "Sudan Militia Leader Said to Join Southern Rebels.," *Reuters News*, May 4, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010821dw54015hh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3658</sup> "Southern Sudan's Two Rival Movements Announce Merger," *Agence France-Presse*, May 28, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010709dx5s0356s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3659</sup> "Ten Years after Split, Sudanese Rebel Groups Re-Merge," *Agence France-Presse*, January 7, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020020107dy1700d4g&cat=a&ep=ASE>; John Young, "The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, November 2006), 17, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-01-SSDF.pdf>; "Liberation Movements Finally Unite Under One Command.," *All Africa*, May 14, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020030514dz5e001c6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3660</sup> Young, "The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration," 17.

his previous rebellion. The SPLA and SPDF presented their merger as the healing of the 1991 rift.<sup>3661</sup> Excluded as a splinter of the SSDF (and indirectly of the SPLM/A).

#### **Sudan People's Front (SPF)**

Radio Tamazuj reported on the October 2015 agreement of Al Nazeer Juma Mahmoud's Sudan People's Front rebels to join West Kordofan government.<sup>3662</sup> Aside from a prominent Sudanese official's public acknowledgement that same month that West Kordofan "armed movements" had joined the peace process, the surveyed sources provided no additional information on the SPF or Mahmoud.<sup>3663</sup> Excluded due to lack of information.

#### **Sudan People's Liberation Front (SPLF)**

In late 2014, a new faction emerged from existing SLM/A groups in North Darfur, with its first reported clash with government troops in mid-December.<sup>3664</sup> Excluded as a splinter.

#### **Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)**

Excluded as alliance/merger of existing rebel groups.<sup>3665</sup> Formed in 2011 and distinct from the Anwar Ahmad Khater's Sudanese Revolutionary Front described below.

#### **Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)**

Founded in 1983, the SPLM/A was the main rebel force during the second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). The SPLM officially entered the Sudanese government as the dominant force in the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and has governed South Sudan since its 2011 independence. Many of the other rebel groups listed under Sudan and South Sudan began as SPLM/A splinters, and a number of commanders and fighters rejoined and defected from the organization multiple times. For the purposes of this project, SPLM/A is considered a rebel organization prior to the CPA and as a state actor afterwards; this means that pre-CPA splinters are excluded from our dataset, while post-CPA splinters that also meet the other criteria are included. SPLM/A itself is excluded due to its pre-1997 founding.

#### **Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (Bahr al Ghazal Faction) [SPLA/M-Bahr al Ghazal]**

Former senior SPLA commander Kerubino Kwanyin Bol defected to Riek Machar's rebellion in the early 1990s, but Machar expelled him from SSIM/A in 1995, and he subsequently formed SPLA-Bahr al Ghazal. Machar, Bol, and the Sudanese government signed a peace treaty in 1996, but the SPLA-Bahr al Ghazal name continued to be used by Kerubino's troops among the pro-government forces, including by those who did not follow him when he turned on the government and rejoined the SPLA in 1998.<sup>3666</sup> Excluded as a pre-1997 splinter generally aligned with the government.

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<sup>3661</sup> "Ten Years after Split, Sudanese Rebel Groups Re-Merge."

<sup>3662</sup> "Rebel Group Announces Joining W Kordofan Government," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), October 6, 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/v1/news/article/rebel-group-announces-joining-w-kordofan-government>.

<sup>3663</sup> "Speakers at SUNA Forum Affirm Importance of Dialogue for Patching Rift in Social Fabric," *Sudan News Agency (SUNA)*, October 8, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDNWA0020151009eba80005s&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3664</sup> "Reports of New Clashes in Central and North Darfur States," *Sudan Tribune*, December 13, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article53329>.

<sup>3665</sup> McCutchen, "The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its Formation and Development."

<sup>3666</sup> Luke Odhiambo, "Sudanese Rebel Group Sacks Two Top Commanders for Collaboration," *Agence France-Presse*, January 25, 1995,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011024dr1p00d8f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sudan and

### Sudanese People's Liberation Army (Gadet Faction) [SPLA/M-Gadet]

In September 1999, General Peter Gadet and his troops defected from Paulino Matiep's faction of pro-government South Sudan United Army (SSUA) and allegedly killed General Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, a founding SPLA member and key SSDF commander who had returned to the SPLA in 1998 but then returned to the pro-government side.<sup>3667</sup> Gadet had been Matiep's operations commander but grew disaffected with the SSUA and Sudanese government over unpaid salaries and a failure to share oil revenue.<sup>3668</sup> While the Small Arms Survey reported that Gadet and his forces were not reintegrated into the SPLA until 2006, credible news reports mentioned Gadet's intention to reconcile with the SPLA as soon as he defected.<sup>3669</sup> Some reports described his forces as an SPLA-allied militia, while others mention him commanding SPLA troops.<sup>3670</sup> Alternate reports describe his group as an independent rebel militia or linked to Machar's 2000 defection from SSDF.<sup>3671</sup> In 2002, Gadet re-defected to the government side.<sup>3672</sup> While the exact relationship between Gadet's group and the SPLA between 1999 and 2002 was unclear, the surveyed sources make clear that Gadet at least appeared to intend to reintegrate and that at a minimum he coordinated closely with the SPLA before eventually returning to the government side. He and his forces rejoined the SPLA following the 2006 Juba Declaration.<sup>3673</sup> Excluded as a likely though poorly integrated faction within the SPLA rather than an independent rebel group.

### Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement Joint Integrated Units [SPLA/M-Joint Integrated Units]

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Two Rebel Factions Sign Peace Charter.,” *Reuters News*, April 10, 1996, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011018ds4a09eq1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Alfred Taban, “Pro-Government Ally Splits from Sudan Coalition,” *Reuters News*, October 11, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021113duab01nn9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3667</sup> Alfred Taban, “Sudan Ruling Party Confirms Warlord Dead,” *Reuters News*, September 16, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010907dv9g00kya&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3668</sup> Alfred Taban, “Sudan Town Shelled by Renegade Militia,” *Reuters News*, October 21, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010909dval01jj4&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3669</sup> “Peter Gadet’s Rebellion,” 1; Richard Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond,” Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, November 2010), 14, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-23-SPLA-Transformation-2006-10-and-Beyond.pdf>; Taban, “Sudan Ruling Party Confirms Warlord Dead”; “Sudanese MP Says Militia Leader behind Ex-Rebel’s Assassination,” *Agence France-Presse*, September 14, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dv9e02wek&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3670</sup> “Death of 140 Rebels in Clash with Pro-Government Forces in South Reported,” *BBC Monitoring Service: Middle East*, August 2, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcme00020010804dw82005gx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Sudan Pro-Government Southern Rebels End Feud,” *Reuters News*, November 15, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010926dubf04itl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Sudan, Oil Companies Play down Rebel Attack Claims,” *Reuters News*, October 22, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020011022dxam00h00&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3671</sup> “South Sudan Group to Keep Alliance with Khartoum.”; “Sudan Says 25 Soldiers Killed in Faction Fighting,” *Reuters News*, November 2, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020010909dvb200rb8&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “New Sudanese Armed Opposition Group Formed,” *Agence France-Presse*, December 4, 1999, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dvc403zok&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3672</sup> “Sudan,” March 11, 2004; Mohamed Osman, “Sudanese Rebel Commander in Oil Fields Area Defects,” *Associated Press Newswires*, December 12, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020021212dycc00spd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
<sup>3673</sup> “Peter Gadet’s Rebellion,” 1; Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond,” 14.



The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) called for the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) comprised of SPLA and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) troops to be stationed throughout southern Sudan, in the border areas between southern Sudan and the north, and in Khartoum.<sup>3674</sup> The JIU forces, including the SPLA contingents, were state actors and not rebels under our criteria. Excluded.

#### Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (United Faction) [SPLA/M-United]

In April 1993, SPLM/A dissident factions under Riek Machar, Lam Akol, William Nyuon, and Kerubino Kwanyin Bol formed SPLM/A-United under Machar's leadership.<sup>3675</sup> While Machar announced in September 1994 that the movement would be renamed the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), Lam Akol and his forces retained the separate SPLM/A-United label.<sup>3676</sup> Excluded as a pre-1997 rebel splinter.

#### Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (North) [SPLM-N]

While the SPLM/A had always been primarily a southern organization, it had fighters and supporters in areas of Sudan north of the southern region covered by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement's secession referendum, and its northern branch would continue to challenge the Sudanese state following South Sudan's independence.<sup>3677</sup> During the period between the signing of the CPA and the July 9, 2011, independence of South Sudan, the SPLM-Northern Sector contested elections as a recognized political party, and northern SPLA fighters participated in Joint Integrated Units with Sudanese military forces. SPLM/A-Northern Sector was strongest in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains.<sup>3678</sup> In the 2010 elections, SPLM's Malik Aggar Eyre Gandof was elected governor of Blue Nile State, the only one of the 10 northern state governors to not be from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).<sup>3679</sup> Following the final meeting of the united SPLM in Juba on July 8, 2011, the SPLM-N formally became a fully independent entity on July 9, 2011, as South Sudan became independent.<sup>3680</sup> Because we consider the SPLM/A to have been part of the Sudanese government from the CPA through South Sudan's secession, the SPLM-N is included in our dataset as emerging from government forces rather than a splinter from a prior rebel group.

As in southern Sudan, the CPA did not end conflict in those northern areas with a strong SPLA presence, and violence increased as the official split between the Sudans approached. Renewed clashes between the SPLM/A-N forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began in South Kordofan in early June 2011.<sup>3681</sup> Because we consider SPLM-N to have still been a state actor as a component of the larger SPLM/A at that point, SPLM-N became a publicly announced rebel group by our criteria on July 9 as soon as it officially separated from its southern leadership.

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<sup>3674</sup> "Neither 'Joint' nor 'Integrated': The Joint Integrated Units and the Future of the CPA," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA) Issue Briefs (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, March 2008), 1, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-10-JIUs.pdf>.

<sup>3675</sup> Mseteka, "Sudan Rebels Say Government Violates Truce"; "(KHARTOUM)," *Agence France-Presse*, April 19, 1993, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011031dp4j00zv&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3676</sup> Nevill, "Southern Sudanese Resistance Splits."

<sup>3677</sup> Jok Madut Jok, *Breaking Sudan: The Search for Peace* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017), 33–39.

<sup>3678</sup> Copnall, *A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bltter and Incomplete Divorce*, 52–53.

<sup>3679</sup> "SPLM's Aggar Elected Governor of Blue Nile State," *Sudan Tribune*, April 23, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100423e64n00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3680</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 2011, 180; "S. Sudan Ruling Party Holds Last Meeting before Split," *Agence France Presse*, July 8, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020110708e778006sk&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3681</sup> Simon Martelli, "Clashes in Sudan's Kadugli Kill Six, Thousands Flee: UN," *Agence France Presse*, June 7, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020110607e767007px&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

The NCP's efforts to monopolize power in Sudan and continued SPLM/A support for its former northern fighters left no room for peaceful compromise.

While the SPLM-N and SAF were in conflict from the beginning of the former's independent existence, the violence started later in Blue Nile State as Sudan worked to depose SPLM-N Governor Agar. Amid escalating tension, Sudan officially banned the SPLM-N and removed Governor Agar from office on September 2.<sup>3682</sup> In allying with various Darfuri rebel factions and other northern rebels in a series of meetings in August and September 2011, the SPLM-N publicly committed itself to overthrowing Sudanese government and establishing a secular state even while still seeking talks with the NCP government.<sup>3683</sup> SCAD records a number of organized anti-government protests and riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding July 2011. No Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation events occurred in the state local to Ab Garin, the site of group formation, during this time. No Type 2 events occurred in this locality either. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

Although the SPLM-N units may well have carried out attacks against state targets earlier (but still post-independence) as part of the ongoing clashes in South Kordofan, the first attack mentioned in the surveyed sources took place on September 2 when retreating Blue Nile SPLM/A-N forces regrouped and took Ab Garin from the SAF before being forced to withdraw after 2 days of fighting.<sup>3684</sup> Ab Garin is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1" because it is the location of initial attacks and regrouping of operational leaders. Although the "rural" variable is not always coded as location of first attacks, in this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation. Per the codebook, the coder used this location to code the "rural" variable. SPLM-N and SAF were thereafter in open warfare, including numerous rebel attacks. On September 4, SPLM-N attacks took Geissan, Kolink and Al Bao in South Kordofan.<sup>3685</sup> On October 3, 2011, SPLM-N claimed to have killed 47 SAF and pro-government militia soldiers during a South Kordofan attack on government forces in revenge for earlier rapes and cattle looting, the first large SPLM/A-N attack mentioned in the surveyed sources.<sup>3686</sup> As in South Sudan, the war caused many civilian casualties. Although there were likely earlier incidents, the first post-independence civilian attack mentioned was the August 24, 2011 killing of Gamer Ali, a civilian in El-Farshaya village of South Kordofan as documented by African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies.<sup>3687</sup>

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<sup>3682</sup> "Sudan Bans Opposition Party, Seizes Offices," *CNN Wire*, September 6, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CNW00020110906e796007ka&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Gramizzi, "At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile," December 2013, 21.

<sup>3683</sup> "SPLM-North and JEM Agree to Work against Sudan's NCP," *Sudan Tribune*, August 8, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020110808e7880005n&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Darfur, S. Kordofan Rebels Agree to Overthrow Sudanese Government, JEM Rebuffs Alliance," *All Africa*, August 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110810e78a0014y&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "SPLM-N to Hold Summit With Darfur Rebel Groups," *All Africa*, August 29, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110829e78t000ge&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "SPLM-N Vows to Buck Blue Nile's 'Coup,'" *All Africa*, September 4, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110904e7940005r&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3684</sup> Gramizzi, "At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile," December 2013, 19.

<sup>3685</sup> "SPLA: In Control of Several Blue Nile Areas," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), September 6, 2011, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/spla-in-control-of-several-blue-nile-areas>.

<sup>3686</sup> "SPLA Clashes with Sudanese Army in S Kordofan," *Radio Dabanga* (blog), October 3, 2011, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/spla-clashes-with-sudanese-army-in-s-kordofan>.

<sup>3687</sup> African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, "Continuing Violations of Human Rights in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States: 24 August - 8 September 2011," September 26, 2011, 5, <http://www.africancentreforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/26-09-11-Continuing-Violations-of-Human-Rights-in-South-Kordofan-and-Blue-Nile-States.pdf>.

SPLM-N's key leaders, including secretary-general Yasir Said Arman, former Blue Nile governor Malik Agar, and former South Kordofan deputy governor Abdul-Aziz Al-Hilu, had experience involved in both rebellion and government. Similarly, the SPLM -N's rank-and-file fighters and members had been SPLA fighters and SPLM members prior to July 9, 2011, and thus had also prior experience as rebels and as part of the SPLA when it was technically under the CPA-unified Sudanese government. As demonstrated by the clashes along ethnic lines following the SPLM-N's 2017 splinter, both the rebel movement itself and the areas where it operated were multiethnic.<sup>3688</sup>

The SPLM-N had significant quantities of both foreign weapons previously supplied to SPLA and arms and ammunition seized from the SAF.<sup>3689</sup> Sudan has frequently alleged South Sudanese support for the SPLM/A-N, but both the rebels and South Sudan deny such ties.<sup>3690</sup> At a minimum SPLM-N forces have often moved freely across the border with South Sudan and sometimes shared equipment, and the SPLM-N's fighting with the SAF intersected with SPLA-SAF clashes over disputed border territory.<sup>3691</sup> There was reason to believe that South Sudan provided some direct support, especially in the SPLM-N's early days, likely enough to qualify under the "foreign\_support" variable.<sup>3692</sup>

The SPLM/A-N participated in several rebel alliances, notably playing a leading role in the Sudan Revolutionary Front, but never fully merged with its allies into an integrated rebel force.<sup>3693</sup> In 2017, the group splintered when Al-Hilu resigned as deputy chairman claiming that he and the South Kordofan elements had been marginalized within the movement. The question of self-determination for the Nuba Mountains was a related key flashpoint.<sup>3694</sup> The two splinter groups, which have failed to reunite after several attempts at negotiations, are often referred to by their leaders' names, SPLM-N-Agar and SPLM-N-Al-Hilu.<sup>3695</sup> Because SPLM/A-N was still

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<sup>3688</sup> Suliman Baldo, "A Question of Leadership: Addressing a Dangerous Crisis in Sudan's SPLM-N" (Enough Project, July 2017), 12–15, [https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/QuestionofLeadership\\_July2017\\_Enough\\_web.pdf](https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/QuestionofLeadership_July2017_Enough_web.pdf).

<sup>3689</sup> Leff and Emile LeBrun, "Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan," Working paper, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Papers (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, May 2014), 93, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP32-Arms-Tracing.pdf>; "Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk Report: Comparable SPLM-N Arms and Ammunition Stocks in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, April 2013," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, May 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/arms-ammunition-tracing-desk/HSBA-Tracing-Desk-SPLM-N-April-2013.pdf>.

<sup>3690</sup> Ngor Arol Garang, "SPLM-N Denies Getting Support From South Sudan and Members Arrested," *All Africa*, September 9, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110909e799000pf&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3691</sup> International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan," ICG Africa Reports (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 14, 2013), 23–24, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-s-spreading-conflict-i-war-south-kordofan>.

<sup>3692</sup> Jenn Christian, "Field Dispatch: South Kordofan and Blue Nile: The Key to Peace Between the Two Sudans?" (Enough Project, June 2012), 2, [https://enoughproject.org/files/Christian-SK\\_BN-Field-Dispatch.pdf](https://enoughproject.org/files/Christian-SK_BN-Field-Dispatch.pdf); "US Warns South Sudan on Support to SPLM-N," *Sudan Tribune*, November 21, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article40796>; Gramizzi and Tubiana, "New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan," 9.

<sup>3693</sup> McCutchen, "The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its Formation and Development," 26–27.

<sup>3694</sup> John Young, "SPLM-NORTH: What Went Wrong?," *Sudan Tribune*, April 3, 2018, [https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=65091](https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=65091).

<sup>3695</sup> "SPLMN-Agar Says Al-Hilu's Decisions Affecting Reunification Efforts," *Radio Tamazuj* (blog), August 14, 2017, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/splmn-agar-says-al-hilu-s-decisions-affecting-reunification-efforts>.

actively attacking state targets more than three years after its 2011 separation from the main SPLM/A, it meets our viability criteria.

#### Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (Peace Faction) [SPLM-Peace]

The founders of SPLM-Peace, also referred to as SPLM-Peace Stream or SPLM-Peace Wing, broke away from SPLM-N to form a new political party opposed to the latter's ongoing armed resistance in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. SPLM-Peace's founding convention took place in Khartoum, with the ruling NCP's support, on June 9, 2012.<sup>3696</sup> Excluded as a splinter.

#### Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF)\*

In or shortly after December 2006, Anwar Ahmad Khater, a charismatic young Darfuri Arab with a history of challenging the government, announced the formation of a new rebel group, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF). This group existed as an independent force for only slightly more than a year and does not appear to have been related to the later, broad-based Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of Sudanese rebel groups formed in 2011.<sup>3697</sup> While enough other sources, cited when relevant below, mention Khater's SRF in passing to code our certainty about the group's existence at the highest level of certainty, the vast majority of information on the group in our surveyed sources came from joint and independent reporting by Alex De Waal and Julie Flint.<sup>3698</sup>

As were most of the SRF's fighters, Khater was a member of the Mahameed clan of the Miseriya Arab ethnic group, the same clan as janjaweed leader and sometime rebel Musa Hilal. Khater's anti-government activities began with protests "against the underdevelopment of his region" when he was a college student in Khartoum and continued with his 2004 formation of an opposition group after the government refused him permission to study in the U.S.<sup>3699</sup> The government arrested him three times within 18 months, so upon his third release, he "hijacked a government vehicle and went to Chad, where Deby's government gave him three more vehicles."<sup>3700</sup> After his return to Darfur, apparently sometime in 2006, he began making efforts to convince Darfuri Arabs to oppose Khartoum. Chad's provision of three vehicles for Khater in 2006 is sufficient to code SRF as receiving foreign support. SCAD records a number of anti-government riots and one anti-government protest of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding December 2006. Two of these Type 1, 3, or 4 events, refugee camp riots, occurred in the mountains northeast of Zalingei in West Darfur, and as a result the coder indicated contestation\_local as a 1. Notably, these were riots over a peace treaty signed by rebels and the current government. However, no Type 2 contestation events, national or local, occurred during this time period. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation. As De Waal and Flint recount, "In December 2006 Anwar was warned that the government was planning to kill him. He escaped to a mountainous area north of Zalingei, announced the SRF and was soon joined by almost 250 militiamen from Misteriha – with their weapons."<sup>3701</sup> This location is coded as satisfying the "rural" variable as a "1." Given Misteriha's status as Hilal's main janjaweed base and Khater's kinship ties to the Mahameed, it is

<sup>3696</sup> "SPLM-N Splinters Form Anti-War Party in Khartoum," *Sudan Tribune*, June 11, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020120611e86b0005n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3697</sup> McCutchen, "The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its Formation and Development."

<sup>3698</sup> Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 35–36, 38; Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 261–62; De Waal, "Making Sense of Darfur's Arabs"; Julie Flint, "Feature: Darfur Rebel Arabs under Sudan Assault," *Sudan Tribune*, January 1, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25410>.

<sup>3699</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 261.

<sup>3700</sup> Flint and De Waal, 261.

<sup>3701</sup> Flint and De Waal, 261.

likely these initial SRF recruits and subsequent fighters had been fighters in the various pro-government militias and paramilitary forces, such as Hilal's Border Guards. The sources surveyed provided no information on SRF's leaders beyond Khater, but at least those leaders of the 250 militiamen had likely been part of pro-government militias and paramilitary forces. While it seems clear that Khater and the SRF had political goals—De Waal and Flint summarize his 2006 argument to Darfuri Arabs as “the government is using you” and emphasize that his vision was to lead a broad-based Darfuri Arab movement rather than Mahameed ethnic rebellion—they do not seem to have included the specific goals of secession or autonomy for Darfur. Given that SLM/A founder Abdel Wahid reportedly saw Khater as the potential leader of a unified Darfuri Arab rebellion and that the Sudanese government took the threat of SRF very seriously, it seems possible that the group had announced political goals of seeking to overthrow the government, but the surveyed sources do not provide enough information one way or the other to code the “goal\_take” variable. Despite Khater's dream of a detribalized Arab resistance, most of his fighters appear to have been Mahameed Misteriya. The inhabitants of Zalingei Province and those around his rebel base who helped his fighters fleeing after a December 2006 government attack were primarily of the non-Arab Fur ethnic group.<sup>3702</sup>

The media and NGO sources surveyed contained no information on any SRF attacks against either state or civilian targets. While the SRF was clearly formed as an anti-state rebel group with the intention of militarily challenging the state, it is possible that they never actually reached the point of attacking the government. This may have been partly because the government aggressively responded to the SRF threat. The government paid Hilal to capture Khater in either 2006 or 2007 (De Waal and Flint's 2008 book appears to place the capture after the formation of SRF, while Flint's feature on the government attacks against Arab rebels dates this episode to 2006 prior to Khater's rebellion), and Khater was then detained in Khartoum for three months.<sup>3703</sup> Security forces subsequently arrested and interrogated many of Khater's relatives to pressure him into his eventual February 2008 agreement with the government.<sup>3704</sup> In December 2007, government forces launched a major attack against one of his camps in Jebel Kengo northeast of Zalingei, killing at least 26 SRF fighters and forcing the rest to flee in panic.<sup>3705</sup> Government forces also attacked the rebelling militia of Mohamed Hamdan Doglo, popular known as Hemeti, near Nyala, South Darfur; Hemeti had issued a statement claiming to be the commander of the SRF's military wing with Khater identified as secretary-general, and liberal Sudanese newspaper *Al-Sahafah* identified his forces as SRF.<sup>3706</sup> However, Khater refused to join forces with Hemeti, a decision which split the SRF.<sup>3707</sup> While Khater came to terms with the government in February 2008, these SRF splinters presumably account for the identification of the SRF as one of 9 Darfur rebel groups who announced their decision to merge into a new Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) at a November 2007 meeting and for the February 2008 report that 500 SRF fighters led by Babiker Abakr Hassan Hamadein had joined forces with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).<sup>3708</sup> While the government's pressure on Khater's family likely influenced his decision to make peace, his distrust of JEM's inadequately pro-Darfur

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<sup>3702</sup> Flint, “Feature: Darfur Rebel Arabs under Sudan Assault”; Julie Flint, Jemera Rone, and Leslie Lefkowitz, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,” Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, May 2004), 5, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/index.htm>.

<sup>3703</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 261–62.

<sup>3704</sup> Flint and De Waal, 306, note 70; Flint, “Feature: Darfur Rebel Arabs under Sudan Assault.”

<sup>3705</sup> Flint, “Feature: Darfur Rebel Arabs under Sudan Assault.”

<sup>3706</sup> “Sudanese Army Denies Shelling Rebel Positions in Southern Darfur.”

<sup>3707</sup> Flint, “Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur,” 36, 38.

<sup>3708</sup> Opheera McDoom, “Rebels Clash with State in Darfur Town, Five Dead,” *Reuters News*, February 2, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020080202e422000am&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Sudan,” November 15, 2007.

motives and perception of SLA as unreliable prevented him from allying with either major rebel faction.<sup>3709</sup>

The SRF came to terms with the government within 15 months of its founding and possibly never attacked state targets despite its clear intentions to do so. More likely, its attacks were not covered in the surveyed sources. It did not meet our viability criteria. While the SRF splintered prior to the peace agreement, the sources surveyed provide no clear evidence of the non-Khater faction's participation in attacks of their own or, after merging with JEM, subsequent attacks as part of JEM or even confirmation that the Hamadein SRF was a splinter from Khater's group. As a result, there is not enough evidence to code SRF as viable on the basis of its possible splinter faction's post-merger actions in JEM.

#### Ummah Liberation Army (ULA)

The Umma Liberation Army was the armed wing of former prime minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi's opposition Umma Party, part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Although the surveyed media sources do not mention any ULA attacks until December 1997, Human Rights Watch reports that the ULA "became active when the Umma Party joined the NDA in 1995 and inactive when the Umma returned from exile to Sudan in 2000."<sup>3710</sup> Excluded as a pre-1997 rebel group.

#### United Revolutionary Forces Front (URFF)

AKAs: Revolutionary United Movement<sup>3711</sup>

Predominantly Darfuri Arab rebel group which emerged in 2007 as a splinter from the Popular Forces Army rebellion, which it would come to overshadow.<sup>3712</sup> Excluded as a splinter.

#### Western Equatoria Community Defence Force

This ACLED tag referred to local self-defense groups which formed in early 2009 to fight the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) fighters fleeing into Western Equatoria following an offensive by the Ugandan military.<sup>3713</sup> They fought alongside SPLA and Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and did not become a rebel group. The South Sudan country section notes several rebel groups which later recruited self-defense "Arrow Boys" fighters. Excluded.

#### Yau Yau Rebels

David Yau Yau launched a rebellion in Pibor County in 2010 before making peace with the SPLA in 2011. Yau Yau, an opposition candidate of the United Democratic Front (UDF) for a Jonglei state assembly seat in the April 2010 general election, first came to prominence when clashes erupted in May 2010 between his supporters and SPLA forces following his April 2010 electoral defeat.<sup>3714</sup> Yau Yau is a member of the Murle ethnic group, the predominant ethnicity in his home area of Pibor County in Jonglei State. A former theology student and secretary of the

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<sup>3709</sup> De Waal, "Making Sense of Darfur's Arabs."

<sup>3710</sup> Rone, "Sudan, Oil and Human Rights," 34; "Northern Sudan Rebels Report Attack Near Strategic Town."

<sup>3711</sup> "Sudan: A Who's Who of the Darfur Groups in Sirte" (IRIN, November 1, 2007), Reliefweb, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-whos-who-darfur-groups-sirte>.

<sup>3712</sup> "United Revolutionary Forces Front," Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Facts & Figures (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 2010), <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/arab/HSBA-Armed-Groups-URFF.pdf>; Flint, "Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur," 33.

<sup>3713</sup> "Ugandan Rebels Kill Two People in Southern Sudan," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, February 20, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020090220e52k00051&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Hunted Ugandan Rebels Strike Two Villages in South Sudan," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, March 14, 2009, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMF0020090314e53e000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3714</sup> "Fresh Clashes Occur in Jonglei's Pibor County between SPLA and Youth - Sudan Tribune."



South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission with no known military experience prior to his insurgency, he alleged electoral fraud on behalf of the declared winner, the SPLM nominee, and led his youth supporters in armed resistance against the SPLM/A.<sup>3715</sup> On April 25, 2010, youth supporters of Yau Yau, angry at his electoral loss, launched an attack on Lokurnyang, outside of Pibor town.<sup>3716</sup> While the sources are not clear whether the attack was against state targets, that is a reasonable inference because an alternative account of the events describes SPLA-initiated clashes between SPLA troops and Yau Yau supporters in Lokurnyang.<sup>3717</sup>

Yau Yau and his forces quickly aligned themselves with George Athor's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A).<sup>3718</sup> While Yau Yau did not receive direct support from Sudan, George Athor Deng provided weapons and other support, much of which he had received from Sudan, to Yau Yau.<sup>3719</sup> This support is coded as "other" rather than "foreign govt". As with other commanders coordinating with Athor, Yau Yau maintained operational independence and ultimately pursued separate peace negotiations, though his group's relationship to the SSDM/A may have been closer due to the two group's geographic proximity and size mismatch.<sup>3720</sup>

Yau Yau did not demand a separate Murle state during his first rebellion.<sup>3721</sup> However, he later mentioned the lack of power-sharing between the Jonglei state government in Bor and the Murle community in Pibor as one of his motivations; it's not clear if Pibor autonomy was a goal within the first year of his rebellion.<sup>3722</sup> The broader SSDM/A, which included Yau Yau's forces as one of the five factions under its umbrella, called for the overthrow of the SPLM government with its official launch in late March 2011, but there is not clear evidence that that was one of Yau Yau's goals.<sup>3723</sup>

Unlike during his second rebellion (see the South Sudan entry for the SSDM/A-Cobra Faction), surveyed sources do not mention any large Yau Yau attacks against the SPLA.<sup>3724</sup> Nor does the Small Arms Survey report on Yau Yau's rebellions mention the same complaints about attacks on non-supportive civilians which accompanied his second one.<sup>3725</sup> In August 2010, Jonglei's governor claimed that bandits allied to Yau Yau were blocking roads and harassing civilians; the BBC summary of the Sudanese newspaper story did not provide more specifics but does not suggest that the Yau Yau forces killed or intended to kill the civilians.<sup>3726</sup> The *Sudan Tribune* noted in October that his troops had killed several SPLA soldiers and also attacked transport routes in Pibor.<sup>3727</sup> As a result, his first rebellion is coded as not launching any large attacks, and the civilian attack data is left missing. SCAD includes several instances of Type 1, 3, or 4 contestation and a few instances of Type 2 contestation in the year prior to May 2010. Primarily organized by the SPLA, these protests devolved into riots after police intervention.

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<sup>3715</sup> McGregor, "Tribal Champion or Proxy Warrior?"; "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 1.

<sup>3716</sup> "Three People Killed in an Attack in Pibor," *Sudan Tribune*, May 29, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020100529e65t0000h&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Renegades Coordinate Attacks on South Sudan Army."

<sup>3717</sup> "Fresh Clashes Occur in Jonglei's Pibor County between SPLA and Youth - Sudan Tribune."

<sup>3718</sup> "SSDM/A-Athor"; "Renegades Coordinate Attacks on South Sudan Army."

<sup>3719</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 1.

<sup>3720</sup> "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile," 8.

<sup>3721</sup> Todisco, "Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administration Area," 19.

<sup>3722</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3723</sup> "Rebel Militias Unite in Threat to Fledgling Southern Sudan."

<sup>3724</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 1.

<sup>3725</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion."

<sup>3726</sup> "Security Situation Tense in Southern Sudan's Jonglei State," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, August 7, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEP0020100807e687000um&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3727</sup> Thon Philip, "Jonglei Chiefs Call for Peace Talks with David Yauyau," *Sudan Tribune*, October 27, 2010, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUDTRI0020101027e6ar00003&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

However, none of these events occurred in Jonglei State, where group formation occurred. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

There is very little information available about Yau Yau's fighters or other leaders in his group. According to the Small Arms Survey, he had little support outside of his own age-set, and his fighters numbered about 200 when he surrendered in June 2011.<sup>3728</sup> Given that Yau Yau himself had no previous fighting or political experience, it is plausible that most of his first rebellion's fighters did not come from a preexisting organization. If so, that would be a notable distinction between Yau Yau's forces and those of the other rebel commanders coordinating with the SSDM/A. The only leaders mentioned in the surveyed sources were Yau Yau himself and James Arezen Kong Kong, his second-in-command.<sup>3729</sup> Yau Yau had worked in government as the Pibor County secretary of the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.<sup>3730</sup> Kong Kong had earlier been affiliated with the Sudan-backed Pibor Defense Forces (PDF), aligned with the SSDF, during the second civil war.<sup>3731</sup> However, the surveyed sources provide little evidence of direct support from former PDF commander Sultan Ismail Konyi or PDF veterans for Yau Yau's first rebellion.<sup>3732</sup>

In June 2011, Yau Yau made peace with the government. The terms of the deal made Yau Yau a major in the SPLA and guaranteed the eventual integration of his 200 fighters into the SPLA.<sup>3733</sup> Yau Yau's group did not become viable. Following his June 2011 peace with the government, his fighters were integrated into the SPLA and, with the exception of Kong Kong and a few of his older commanders who escaped arrest in Juba, were generally not involved in the launch of his second, much more serious rebellion in 2012.<sup>3734</sup> His forces eventually took the name SSDM/A-Cobra Faction to distinguish his new group from the original SSDM/A with which his first rebellion had been associated.<sup>3735</sup>

Pibor County is used for "rural" variable because that is the location of initial attacks. In this case the first attack location was the only location information the coder could find about the initial phases of group formation.

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<sup>3728</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 1.

<sup>3729</sup> Todisco, "Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administration Area," 25.

<sup>3730</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 1.

<sup>3731</sup> Emile LeBrun, "Small Arms and Armed Violence in Sudan and South Sudan: An Assessment of Empirical Research Undertaken since 2005" (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, October 2016), 28, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/others/HSBA-Synthesis-Report-2016.pdf>.

<sup>3732</sup> Todisco, "Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administration Area," 17–18.

<sup>3733</sup> "David Yau Yau's Rebellion," 1.

<sup>3734</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

<sup>3735</sup> "SSDM/A-Cobra Faction."

## Swaziland (eSwatini)

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**Narrative Summary:** *Swaziland's King Mswati III is one of the world's last absolute monarchs. Banned opposition political parties and organizations have tried to use both violent and nonviolent means to force political liberalization but to little avail. The royal government's control over information within the state, which has only one independent newspaper (Times of Swaziland), and the natural incentives for groups to remain secret or deny their involvement in violent acts makes it difficult to come to firm conclusions about Swaziland's rebel groups. Longtime banned opposition party PUDEMO and its youth wing SWAYOCO have both been implicated in violent acts against the state, though PUDEMO has been publicly adamant about its commitment to nonviolence.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** *medium*

**Explanation:** *Both rebel groups in our dataset from Swaziland, the Tigers and Umbane, emerged suddenly in 1998 and 2008, respectively, to claim responsibility for anti-government bombings but without much other information about their leadership, plans, or relationship to other groups. Either or both may have been fronts for preexisting organizations, and several media sources tie Umbane to PUDEMO. Umbane also claimed responsibility (in 2008) for the 1998 bombings associated with the Tigers. Some of the relatively large number of unattributed bombings and attacks, on government targets and civilians, are likely related to or at least inspired by the activities of the various opposition groups, but this cannot be determined with any great certainty.*

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### Swaziland named groups

#### Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)

Founded from the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 1994, ACTSA is a regional advocacy organization which fights for democracy and human rights across southern Africa.<sup>3736</sup> The only event with which it is identified in ACLED (event 60SWA) is the same September 2008 SFTU march mentioned above that turned violent. ACTSA is not a rebel group or even a Swazi group though it works closely with organizations opposed to the Swazi monarchy. Excluded.

#### People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO)

Students at the University of Swaziland founded PUDEMO in 1983 to push for multiparty democracy.<sup>3737</sup> The Swazi government recognizes no opposition political parties, so PUDEMO's has always existed as an illegal, underground organization. PUDEMO has officially rejected violent means in its struggle against the Swazi monarchy, though at times its statements have used aggressive, provocative language. In 1996, PUDEMO declared that it would make Swaziland "ungovernable" for the royal government through mass strikes and civil disobedience.<sup>3738</sup> On May Day 2003, PUDEMO secretary-general Bonginkhosi Dlamini announced a plan to pursue more "offensive" means in struggle with the Swazi state but provided

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<sup>3736</sup> "ACTSA - About Us," Action for South Africa official website, accessed April 2, 2017, <http://www.actsa.org/page-1002-aboutus.html>.

<sup>3737</sup> Joshua Bheki Mzizi, "Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy in Swaziland," Research report, EISA Research Reports (Johannesburg, South Africa: EISA, 2005), 16, <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/rr18.pdf>.

<sup>3738</sup> "Pro-Democracy Group Threatens to Make Swaziland Ungovernable," *Agence France-Presse*, January 4, 1996, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011012ds1400doa&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

few specifics.<sup>3739</sup> The government has blamed many attacks in the country on PUDEMO and arrested and indicted its leaders various times. PUDEMO's actual level of involvement in violent attacks on the government remains uncertain, but the organization's continued insistence that it is not involved, even in the face of significant repression, in the violence has some credence. PUDEMO itself does not meet the criteria to be considered a rebel group but appears to be involved with two militant groups, its own youth wing SWAYOCO and the more recent Umbane People's Liberation Army.<sup>3740</sup> Excluded.

#### Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU)

The SFTU formed in 1983 and has worked with PUDEMO and other organizations to push for multiparty democracy. Its leaders have been arrested numerous times for their anti-government activities. The SFTU's secretary general, Jan Sithole, strongly denounced the bomb explosion and violence which accompanied a September 2008 protest march, the only time (event 60SWA) in the ACLED database where SFTU is listed as the primary actor in a violent conflict event.<sup>3741</sup> While the SFTU as a group is opposed to the current government system, it does not violently attack the state and thus does not count as a rebel group. Excluded.

#### Swaziland People's Liberation Army (Umbane)\*

There is much less publicly available information about the Swaziland People's Liberation Army (Umbane) than PUDEMO and SFTU. Umbane is not mentioned by name in ACLED or SCAD but is in GTD (events 200808070018 and 200808070019).<sup>3742</sup> This group first emerged in 2008 with a pair of bridge bombings on August 7 in the run-up to the September 2008 elections and released an official statement denouncing the upcoming elections as undemocratic and demanding multiparty elections and the legalization of the banned political movements. The group also claimed responsibility for past bombings going back to 1998.<sup>3743</sup> In November 2008, the Swazi government declared Umbane, along with PUDEMO, SWAYOCO, and the Swazi Solidarity Network to be terrorist organizations.<sup>3744</sup> Umbane has not publicly taken responsibility for any attack since the 2008 pre-election violence, but South African Amos Mbedzi was convicted in September 2012 for a September 2008 explosion in a traveling car, which killed a Swazi and a South African. The court found that Mbedzi, allegedly a member of Umbane and the South African Communist Party, and the deceased had planned to plant the bomb on a bridge of the Lozitha Royal Palace in Manzini with the intent to kill King Mswati III as he passed over the

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<sup>3739</sup> "Political Group to Use 'More Offensive' Tactics," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, May 3, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020030503dz5300335&cat=a&ep=ASE>; People's United Democratic Movement of Swaziland (PUDEMO), "Piet Retief Declaration on the Decade of Liberation in Swaziland," May 1, 2003, <http://pudemo.org/images/Docs/piet%20retief%20declaration%20april%202003.pdf>.

<sup>3740</sup> This conclusion is at odds with ACLED's coding, which identify PUDEMO as an actor in several attacks on government individuals and properties. It appears to me that ACLED's coder put more credence in the government's assignment of blame and less credence on PUDEMO's repeated denials of violence. ACLED also doesn't identify Umbane as an actor at all. The status of PUDEMO is worth returning to, probably in conversation with an expert.

<sup>3741</sup> "Bomb Blast Kills Two," *All Africa*, September 23, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020080923e49n00014&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3742</sup> GTD's two Umbane-associated events of August 7, 2008, are missing from ACLED altogether.

<sup>3743</sup> "Swazi Govt Denounces Group Believed Responsible for Explosions," *Agence France Presse*, August 11, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020080811e48b0046l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3744</sup> "Swaziland Premier Declares Four Parties 'Terrorist Formations,'" *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, November 16, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMF0020081116e4bg001me&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Swaziland 'criminalises' Four Political Organisations," *Morning Star Online*, November 16, 2008, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=MOSTAR0020081116e4bg00033&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

bridge later that day, an event prevented by the bomb's premature explosion in their vehicle.<sup>3745</sup> Umbane remains banned by the Swazi government as a terrorist organization.<sup>3746</sup>

Umbane's relation to other opposition actors remains unclear. An alleged *Times of Swaziland* article from August 31, 2008, reported that PUDEMO leaders had acknowledged Umbane as the official armed wing of PUDEMO and SWAYOCO at a rally.<sup>3747</sup> Reputable media have also referred to Umbane as PUDEMO's "military wing" and "a secret militant group linked to" PUDEMO.<sup>3748</sup> In a report cited by BBC Monitoring, the *Times of Swaziland* covered anonymous sources' claims that Umbane had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to receive funds and training from the South Sudanese rebel group.<sup>3749</sup> For the purposes of our database, Umbane is considered to be a new rebel group which emerged out of PUDEMO, with some funding from SPLA and/or South African groups.<sup>3750</sup>

### Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO)

SWAYOCO is the youth arm of the banned political party PUDEMO, the People's United Democratic Movement.<sup>3751</sup> It was founded in 1991 and first came to prominence with youth protests against the royal government in 1991 and 1992.<sup>3752</sup> By 1995, SWAYOCO had significant support among Swazi college students.<sup>3753</sup> The organization has consistently opposed the royal government since its inception, but it has grown more militant over time. As early as 1995, SWAYOCO allegedly took credit for a bomb attack on Parliament and was associated with pamphlets calling for violent resistance to the state.<sup>3754</sup> In July 2003, SWAYOCO ordered its

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<sup>3745</sup> Sapa, "SA Man Sentenced over Botched Bomb for Swazi King," *Mail & Guardian*, September 18, 2012, <https://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-18-sa-man-sentenced-over-botched-bomb-for-swazi-king/>.

<sup>3746</sup> "Swaziland to Review Its Definition of Terrorism - PM," *APANEWS*, January 13, 2016, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APASENE020160113ec1d000mc&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3747</sup> "PUDEMO Declares War, Endorses Umbane," *Times of Swaziland (Alleged but Unverified)*, August 31, 2008, <http://swazilandsolidaritynetworkcanada.wikispaces.com/PUDEMO+declares+war,+endorses+umbane>. Note that this article is presently (4/3/2017) available online only via opposition websites and not the *Times* itself.

<sup>3748</sup> Makhosi Magongo, "Over 30 Govt Employees Face the Axe," *Times of Swaziland*, March 29, 2009, <http://www.times.co.sz/feed/news/5317-over-30-govt-employees-face-the-axe.txt>; "Swaziland Convicts S. African for Bomb Intended for King," *Agence France Presse*, August 29, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020120829e88t0059k&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3749</sup> "Banned Swazi Group Reportedly Signs MOU with Ex-Southern Sudan Rebel Movement," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, February 2, 2009, [http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\\_T25617453770&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,A,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\\_T25617207160&cisb=22\\_T25617207159&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=14](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T25617453770&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,A,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T25617207160&cisb=22_T25617207159&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=14).

<sup>3750</sup> It would not drastically change the database if instead we coded PUDEMO as a preexisting political party which only became a violent rebel group in the 2000s and considered Umbane to be part of PUDEMO.

<sup>3751</sup> Mzizi, "Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy in Swaziland," 24.

<sup>3752</sup> Theresa M. Debly, "Culture and Resistance: Swaziland 1960-2011" (MA thesis, Fredericton, Canada, University of New Brunswick, 2011), 104; Richard Levin, *When the Sleeping Grass Awakens* (Witwatersrand University Press, 1997), 218-19.

<sup>3753</sup> Carolyn Dempster, "Student Unrest Rocks Swaziland Royal Rulers; Southern Africa," *Times Higher Education Supplement*, March 24, 1995, LexisNexis.

<sup>3754</sup> "SWAZILAND YOUTH CONGRESS REPORTEDLY CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTACK ON PARLIAMENT.," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, February 8, 1995,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020011102dr28008u4&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"MBABANE PAMPHLETS CALL FOR 'VIOLENT REVOLUTION' AGAINST GOVERNMENT.," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, October 28, 1995,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020011102dras003ut&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

members to attack the Swazi state.<sup>3755</sup> The *Times of Swaziland* cited anonymous sources tying SWAYOCO, PUDEMO, and the Swaziland Solidarity Network to the Swaziland People's Liberation Army and its alleged 2009 Memorandum of Understanding with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement for financial aid and training.<sup>3756</sup> SWAYOCO remains banned in Swaziland. Although it fits our definition of a rebel group, its participation in violent resistance to the Swazi state began before 1997. Excluded.

#### Tigers Militant Organization

On November 20, 1998, two bombs exploded, one near an army barracks in Bethany and one at the Deputy Prime Minister's office in Mbabane. The latter explosion killed one security guard and injured as many as nine other individuals. An anonymous caller to the *Times of Swaziland* claimed responsibility on behalf of a previously unknown group called "the Tigers" for the fatal attack and a previous bombing of a bridge outside Mbabane on October 28 just hours after King Mswati III passed over it.<sup>3757</sup> There are no subsequent mentions of the Tigers after these two possible assassination attempts and the anonymous call, and we have coded the data for many of the variables as missing for the Tigers. It is striking that, unlike the similarly secretive Umbane, the Tigers were never formally banned by the Swazi government, likely a function of their extremely brief existence.<sup>3758</sup> It appears they were an organized group that sought to challenge the state. Included.

#### Vigilante Militia (Swaziland)

A vigilante militia, associated with ACLED event 142SWA, attacked a journalist who was reporting on a dispute that broke out at a funeral.<sup>3759</sup> It does not qualify as a rebel group. Excluded.

#### Unidentified groups

ACLED, GTD, and SCAD include a number of events not associated with named groups. Many of these attacks involved clearly non-governmental or ambiguous targets, but a number clearly targeted elements of the government, including a tribal office, police barracks, and MPs' houses. The Swazi government accused PUDEMO, SWAYOCO, and, to a lesser extent, SFTU of being responsible for some of these attacks. The state tried opposition leaders in periodic treason trials, including 1991, 2002-03, 2005-06, and 2013, the latter two specifically related to waves of petrol bombings for which no group publicly claimed responsibility.

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<sup>3755</sup> Michael Wines, "Swazi King Encounters Stormy Weather," *The New York Times*, September 7, 2003, sec. 1.

<sup>3756</sup> "Banned Swazi Group Reportedly Signs MOU with Ex-Southern Sudan Rebel Movement."

<sup>3757</sup> "Tigers Claim Swazi Bomb," *Mail & Guardian*, November 22, 1998, <https://mg.co.za/article/1998-11-22-tigers-claim-swazi-bomb/>.

<sup>3758</sup> "Swazi Govt Denounces Group Believed Responsible for Explosions."

<sup>3759</sup> Richard Rooney, "Mob Attacks Journalist at Funeral," *Swazi Media Commentary* (blog), January 9, 2013, <http://swazimedia.blogspot.com/2013/01/mob-attacks-journalist-at-funeral.html>.



## Tanzania

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**Narrative Summary:** Tanzania has experienced much less organized violence than most of its neighbors.

Conflict events in Tanzania since 1997 have included election-related violence, local clashes over land, violence against suspected witches and people with albinism, and the activities of Burundian rebels in western Tanzania's refugee camps and near the Burundian border. Much of the country's organized non-state violence has taken place in semi-autonomous Zanzibar, the heavily Muslim isles whose union with the mainland has always been tenuous. Supporters of the opposition political party Civic United Front (CUF) have clashed with government forces and the supporters of the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and Islamist secessionists from Uamsho and other organizations have strongly advocated for greater regional autonomy and ultimately independence for Zanzibar, including the establishment of a legal code which more closely aligns with a strict interpretation of Islamic law. Uamsho was implicated in a series of Zanzibar bombings, fires, and acid attacks between 2004 and 2014, but the organization has consistently denied any responsibility. The extent of links, if any, between Uamsho and other groups, including Kenya's Mombasa Republican Council and Somalia's Al-Shabaab as well as larger transnational terrorist networks, remain unclear. Although not on the same level as in Kenya, Al-Shabaab has also actively expanded into Tanzania, with major government operations against militants associated with the group in 2013 and Al-Shabaab publicly taking credit for a string of 2014 and 2015 violent attacks on police stations across the country. There have also been several bombings in the country for which no group has taken responsibility.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** Although ACLED listed fewer events for Tanzania than any of its neighbors except Malawi, the majority of Tanzania's ACLED events involved unidentified armed groups. Of named groups, only Uamsho and Al-Shabaab were close to meeting the criteria for inclusion as rebel groups. Based on the timing of its rise and the admittedly limited reporting on its activities, Tanzania's Al-Shabaab organization appeared too closely connected to the larger Al-Shabaab to be considered an independent group and thus was not included in our dataset. Concluding on balance that Uamsho was likely responsible for at least some of the attacks attributed to it, Uamsho is the only Tanzanian rebel group in our dataset. However, it is possible that the attacks blamed on Uamsho were actually the work of other clandestine Zanzibar-based secessionist or Islamist organizations. The large proportion of attacks which remain unattributed to any named group, many of which involved homemade bombs, may indicate the presence of other mainland and Zanzibari rebel groups. The vast majority of GTD's Tanzanian incidents also involved unidentified actors.

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### **Tanzanian named groups**

**Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)** [170TAZ, 177TAZ, 189TAZ, 365TAZ, 456TAZ, 513TAZ]: CCM ("Party of the Revolution") came into being in 1977 with the merger between the Tanganyika African Union (TANU), the ruling party in mainland Tanzania, and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the ruling party in Zanzibar, and has been in power continuously ever since. The attacks associated

with its members and supporters did not challenge the state but often sought to weaken the opposition.<sup>3760</sup> Excluded.

**Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Chadema)** [315TAZ, 318TAZ, 319TAZ, 347TAZ, 559TAZ, 606TAZ, 623TAZ]: Founded by Edward Mtei in 1992 following Tanzania's decision to allow multi-party elections, Chadema is one of the major opposition parties in Tanzania. In September 2011, a crowd of Chadema supporters, including two MPs, allegedly verbally and physically assaulted the Iganga district commissioner for allegedly attending a secret meeting of ruling party CCM members.<sup>3761</sup> While arguably an attack on the state, this conflict event was related to the upcoming Iganga bye-election rather than an effort to overthrow the government. The police also arrested Chadema's secretary-general Willibrod Slaa and other leaders and banned a planned Dar es Salaam rally in 2011.<sup>3762</sup> During the 2012 Arumeru bye-election campaign, Chadema supporters attacked a CCM motorcade in Meru.<sup>3763</sup> Police arrested Arumeru MP Joshua Nassari (Chadema) for his involvement in a December 2014 incident where Chadema supporters allegedly beat up Makiba Ward Executive Officer Neemani Ndudu over claims of election fraud in recent ward elections.<sup>3764</sup> Chadema members beat students at a May 2015 election rally, claiming they were not supposed to be there, and Chadema and ruling party CCM youth supporters, armed with machetes clashed in Mwanza in the final days before the 2015 general election.<sup>3765</sup> Virtually all incidents of violence connected to Chadema are election-related and not part of a violent challenge to state authority. Like CUF, Chadema is a political party aiming to achieve its goals through the political process rather than a rebel group. Excluded.

**Civic United Front (CUF)** [28TAZ, 31TAZ, 124TAZ, 195TAZ, 197TAZ, 198TAZ, 630TAZ]: CUF is a Tanzanian political party founded in 1992 with much of its support in Zanzibar and Tanzania's

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<sup>3760</sup> Marc Nkwame, "Two Nabbed Over Chadema Rally Disturbances," *All Africa*, June 3, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130603e963000g0&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "One Killed in Tanzania Political Rally Clash," *Agence France Presse*, July 15, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020120715e87f0053i&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Five Injured as Campaign Violence Rocks Zanzibar," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 16, 2005, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020050916e19g000ru&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3761</sup> "DC's Humiliation By Mob Unacceptable [Editorial]," *All Africa*, September 19, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110919e79j000fm&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Boniface Meena and Daniel Mjema, "Tension As Chadema's Accused MPs Are Shifted," *All Africa*, September 19, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110919e79j0008n&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Joas Kaijage, "Two Chadema MPs Seized After Assault On Igunga DC," *All Africa*, September 19, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110919e79j000xt&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Police Probe Chadema MPs, Others Over Attack On DC," *All Africa*, September 17, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110917e79h0008g&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3762</sup> "Tanzania Police Bans Protests," *Agence France Presse*, November 10, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR00002011110e7ba0063h&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tanzania Police Arrest Opposition Party Members," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, November 9, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020111109e7b9000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Peter Saramba, "Chadema Leaders Arrested, Charged," *All Africa*, November 9, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020111109e7b90000l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3763</sup> Daily News Reporters, "Tanzania: Police, CCM Decry Foul Play in Arumeru," *Tanzania Daily News (Dar Es Salaam)*, March 20, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201203200166.html>.

<sup>3764</sup> Yasinta Amos, "Nassari Arrested for Leading Poll Violence in Arumeru," *All Africa*, December 18, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020141218eaci000pq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3765</sup> "Ecstasy As CCM Campaigns End," *All Africa*, October 26, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020151026eba000ih&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Chadema Followers Attack Students," *All Africa*, May 11, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150511eb5b000hs&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Indian coast. The clashes between supporters of CUF and Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party, in 2000 were related to the approaching election.<sup>3766</sup> A 2004 attack by CUF supporters on CCM's Zanzibar headquarters injured a CCM official and damaged his car but did not rise to the level of a planned attack to overthrow the state and likely had more to do with tensions ahead of the 2005 elections.<sup>3767</sup> CUF supporters were involved in violence in Lindi after their incumbent MP lost his 2015 reelection bid.<sup>3768</sup> While it has supported greater autonomy for Zanzibar as a political goal, CUF is a political party aiming to achieve its goals through the political process. Excluded.

**Green Guards** and **Red Brigades** [344TAZ and 345TAZ]: These groups were the illegal party militias the police alleged that CCM and Chadema were using to intimidate opponents in the 2012 Arumeru bye-election.<sup>3769</sup> Excluded.

**Islamist Militia** [329TAZ, attack on Zanzibari couple who had unsuccessfully sought asylum in UK]: The January 2012 gun and acid attack was attributed to Islamic fundamentalists who disagreed with Zanzibar's government.<sup>3770</sup> While not a direct attack on the state, this forms part of the larger context of Islamist violence in Zanzibar. Excluded.

**Muslim Militia** [293TAZ, clash between Muslims and Christians in Arusha after Christian revival meeting]: This appears to have been a fairly spontaneous reaction to the preacher's condemnation of Islam.<sup>3771</sup> Not an attack on the state. Excluded.

**Muslim Militia (Tanzania)** and **Christian Group (Tanzania)** [432TAZ, beheading of Christian pastor]: Violent protests by Muslims demanding the closure of Christian butcher shops culminated in the beheading of a Christian pastor in Buseresere in the western Geita Region.<sup>3772</sup> Does not appear to have been related to any rebel activity. Not an attack on the state. Excluded.

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<sup>3766</sup> "Five Injured as Ruling Party Members Pelted with Stones in Zanzibar.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, September 12, 2000,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010804dw9c006z8&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tanzania's Ruling Party Supporters Clash with Opposition Rivals," *Agence France-Presse*, October 9, 2000,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010803dwa90460c&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tension Rising in Zanzibar Ahead of Election Day.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, October 10, 2000,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010804dwa004ef&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3767</sup> "Zanzibar President Warns Opposition CUF Party against 'Threats,'" *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 12, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040712e07c000ul&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zanzibar President Accused of Making 'Baseless' Threats against Opposition," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 13, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040713e07d000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zanzibar Wing of Ruling CCM Party Protests Opposition's Attack on Party Offices," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 13, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040714e07e000ji&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3768</sup> "Observers Say 'Poll Rules Were Respected' in Tanzanian Elections," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 27, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020151027ebar00231&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3769</sup> Marc Nkwame, "Tanzania: Police Ban Political Party 'Armies,'" *Tanzania Daily News (Dar Es Salaam)*, March 29, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201203290032.html>.

<sup>3770</sup> Laura Elvin, "Failed Asylum Seeker Is Shot; ATTACK: BROTHER-IN-LAW SAYS VICTIM'S CONCERNS WERE IGNORED," *Leicester Mercury*, January 20, 2012.

<sup>3771</sup> "Tanzanian Religious Sects Must Avoid 'Preaching Hate' - Paper," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 2, 2011, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020110302e732000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3772</sup> Deodatus Balile, "Tanzania Forms Inter-Faith Committee to Review Slaughtering Rules," *All Africa*, February 20, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130220e92k00066&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Tanzanian Government to Investigate Religious Violence in Buseresere," *All Africa*, February 18, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130218e92i0001f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Pastor

**Uamsho: Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation** [366TAZ, 382TAZ, 386TAZ by name in ACLED; also attributed 110TAZ – 114TAZ (series of March 2004 Zanzibar bombings), 400TAZ (acid attack on moderate Muslim cleric), and 467TAZ (2013 acid attack on two British Jewish volunteers)]: Officially called Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislam Zanzibar (JUMIKI, generally translated as the Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation), Uamsho (“awakening” in Kiswahili) began as an Islamic charity sometime between the 1960s and 1980s and formally registered as a non-governmental organization in 2001.<sup>3773</sup> Although at least one report links Uamsho’s founding imams with the Zanzibar- and Coast-based Islamist opposition party Civic United Front’s Blue Guards youth wing and some media sources discuss alleged later ties between CUF and Uamsho, there is not enough evidence to claim that at least one third of Uamsho’s initial membership came from the party.<sup>3774</sup> Therefore, our dataset codes the group as emerging from a religious organization but not a political party.

Uamsho became increasingly politically active in advocating both for greater adherence to conservative Islamic practice and for the political separation of Zanzibar from mainland Tanzania. Our dataset lists March 2004, though with certainty only on the year, as the start date for when Uamsho became an anti-state actor meeting our definition of a rebel group. In March 2004, which we code as the start date for Uamsho as an anti-state actor, police banned a planned Uamsho march in Zanzibar town and then later forcibly suppressed an unauthorized demonstration against the ban.<sup>3775</sup> Regardless of whether Uamsho started calling on its supporters to kill secular leaders, as an assistant police commissioner claimed in justifying banning the March 5 march, or whether its apparent turn toward violence came in response to state efforts to suppress dissent, early March 2004 marked the onset of major, reported violence between the state and actors identified, at least in media and state reports, with Uamsho.<sup>3776</sup> During the unauthorized march, Uamsho supporters threw stones at the police and burned tires, and police arrested 32 marchers.<sup>3777</sup> Days later, a spokesman for Zanzibar’s Grand Mufti Sheikh Harith bin-Halef, the officially recognized head of Zanzibar’s Muslims and the target of much of Uamsho’s anger, denounced the group as political rather than religious and banned future public lectures and events organized by Uamsho on the basis that the group had not sought the required permits

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Beheaded in Clashes in Tanzania,” *All Africa*, February 14, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130214e92e00006&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Meddy Mulisa, “Tag Pastor Beheaded in Religious Skirmishes,” *All Africa*, February 12, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130212e92c00006c&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3773</sup> Stephanie M. Burchard, “Violent Extremist Organizations and the Electoral Cycle in Africa: A Framework for Analyzing the 2015 Tanzanian Elections” (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, February 2015), 5, [https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA\\_Documents/IAD/2015/D-5428.pdf](https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/IAD/2015/D-5428.pdf); Roman Loimeier, *Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills: The Politics of Islamic Education in 20th Century Zanzibar*, Islam in Africa (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2009), 130.

<sup>3774</sup> Deogratius Mshigeni, “Globalization and the Rise of Militant Islamic Social Movement Organizations: The Case of UAMSHO (Awakening) Group in Zanzibar.” (Ph.D. dissertation, Las Vegas, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2016), 65–68, <https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/2884>; Erick Kabendera, “Tanzania – Zanzibar: Secessionism Reignites,” *The Africa Report*, July 11, 2012, <https://www.theafricareport.com/6923/tanzania-zanzibar-secessionism-reignites/>.

<sup>3775</sup> “Tanzania: Police Probing Protestors’ Link to Opposition Party,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, March 9, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200403090001.html>.

<sup>3776</sup> Ali Sultan, “Police Ban Zanzibari Muslim Group from Holding Rally, Citing Concerns of Violent Extremism,” *Associated Press Newswires*, March 2, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020040302e032008qx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3777</sup> “Police Fire Tear Gas to Disperse Rioting Muslims in Zanzibar,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 7, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040307e03700105&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

from the Mufti.<sup>3778</sup> Zanzibar's government also began looking at deregistering Uamsho as an NGO after the violent protests, although the NGO was still registered as of June 2004.<sup>3779</sup> During the weeks following the demonstrations, Zanzibar experienced a series of small-scale attacks against both state and non-state targets. While Uamsho's leaders denied any responsibility for the attacks, many contemporary media reports linked the attacks to Uamsho or cited government authorities' allegations to that point.<sup>3780</sup> For the purposes of the dataset, the March 20, 2004, bomb planted at Zanzibar Transport Minister Zubeir Ali Maulid's house counts as Uamsho's first small attack on a state target, and the grenade attack on the Mercury Club while foreign diplomats were dining that same evening counts as its first attack on a civilian target.<sup>3781</sup> Police initially arrested five Uamsho leaders after the banned demonstration took place and then, after subsequent attacks, arrested another 39 individuals, including additional Uamsho members.<sup>3782</sup> In April 2004, the Zanzibar government arrested Sheikh Khalid Azzan, Uamsho's deputy director, and charged him with public incitement related to the March demonstrations and attacks, but the prosecution dropped the charges in late May due to a lack of compelling evidence.<sup>3783</sup> No single attack attributed to Uamsho approached our large attack threshold of 25 fatalities. SCAD records both anti-government protests and anti-government riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding March 2004. Though no location of origin is recorded, group activity and political objectives led the coder to consider Zanzibar as the area of formation when coding local contestation variables. Both protests and riots in the Type, 1, 3, and 4 categories occurred in this locality of Zanzibar. Though no Type 2 contestation events occurred nationally or locally during this time, patriotic activity such as a march to commemorate independence took place. This is potentially relevant to the overall contestation picture during this time period. It should also be noted that due to ambiguity on the formation month, the coder included one Type 4 riot event (Event ID 5100058) that occurred a few days outside of one year prior to group formation. The coder deemed this event relevant because it was a response to police conduct in a Type 4 event (Event ID 5100055) that transpired in the local area during the time window of the year prior to group formation.

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<sup>3778</sup> "Zanzibar: Mufti Denounces Islamic Group Uamsho as 'Political Organization,'" *BBC Monitoring Africa*, March 14, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040314e03e000m9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3779</sup> "Zanzibar Deputies Want Islamic Party Deregistered," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, June 29, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020040629e06t003e9&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Zanzibar's Militant Muslim Group Faces Deregistration - Official.," *Agence France Presse*, March 12, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020040312e03c000o4&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3780</sup> Sukhdev Chhatbar, "Zanzibar Probing Local NGO Over 'Hooligan' Violence," *All Africa*, March 30, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020040330e03u001xl&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"UPDATE 1-Police Suspect Muslim Militants in Zanzibar Blasts.," *Reuters News*, March 22, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020040322e03m001e2&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Police

Hold Muslim Militants over Zanzibar Blasts.," *Reuters News*, March 22, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020040322e03m001cp&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Ali

Sultan, "Unknown Assailants Plant Bombs Outside Homes of Zanzibar's Top Muslim Leader and Transport Minister; Bomb Found in Bar," *Associated Press International*, March 21, 2004; "Home of Zanzibar's Top Muslim

Cleric Hit by Explosive - Police.," *Agence France Presse*, March 20, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020040320e03k000y3&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3781</sup> Sultan, "Unknown Assailants Plant Bombs Outside Homes of Zanzibar's Top Muslim Leader and Transport Minister; Bomb Found in Bar."

<sup>3782</sup> Ali Sultan, "Police Release Leader of Zanzibari Muslim Group," *Associated Press Newswires*, April 1, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020040401e041009n7&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3783</sup> "Zanzibar Drops Sedition Charge on Muslim Cleric.," *Reuters News*, June 1, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020040601e061001br&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Ally

Salleh, "Zanzibar Militant Group Leader on Sedition Charge.," *Reuters News*, April 13, 2004,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020040413e04d001up&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



While Zanzibar is a multi-ethnic society, early Uamsho members identified with Islam and an Islamic, deracialized, non-ethnic “Zanzibari” label, a salient sociopolitical category in the isles.<sup>3784</sup> Given the centrality of the Zanzibari category and the distinction between Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland in Zanzibar’s politics, I code both ethnicity of the Uamsho’s leaders and most Zanzibaris as one and the same.

After the March 2004 demonstrations and attacks, Uamsho continued to demonstrate and agitate but with fewer accusations of violence for some years. The group endorsed an April 2004 Zanzibar Assembly bill to criminalize homosexuality, denounced tourists’ public kissing and sex acts in 2005, demonstrated against the desecration of the Quran at the U.S. Guantanamo Bay prison (with a government permit after several denials), and forced the 2006 cancelation of a planned celebration of deceased Zanzibar-born Queen lead singer Freddie Mercury’s birthday.<sup>3785</sup> The government threatened to deregister Uamsho in October 2005 because its imams allegedly called for violence against CCM at a September 30 prayer gathering ahead of the upcoming general election, an allegation which Uamsho’s Khalid Azzan denied.<sup>3786</sup> In 2006, police arrested Ghazali Abdallah Ali, a prominent Uamsho cleric on Pemba, and charged him with incitement for calling for Muslims to demonstrate against a senior Agriculture Ministry official’s decision to forbid women in his office to wear hijabs.<sup>3787</sup>

Uamsho next rose to public prominence in August 2011 when Uamsho cleric Sheikh Abdallah Said announced the group’s support for the recent burning of 10 Zanzibar bars during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan but denied any Uamsho involvement in the actual arson. Said also called for the government to enforce a ban on daytime eating by non-Muslims during Ramadan and for women to dress more conservatively in public, a recurring complaint of the group.<sup>3788</sup> As the Tanzanian constitutional commission began its work of soliciting Tanzanians’ opinions as a preliminary step in drafting a new constitution, Uamsho held weekly public rallies calling for an end to the union of Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) in early and mid-2012, and its leaders’ harsh anti-union rhetoric drew rebukes and warnings from government officials, including Zanzibar President Dr. Ali Mohammed Shein.<sup>3789</sup> After police arrested an

<sup>3784</sup> Mshigeni, “Globalization and the Rise of Militant Islamic Social Movement Organizations,” 109–15.

<sup>3785</sup> “Muslim Threats Force Cancellation of Freddie Mercury Birthday Bash on Zanzibar,” *Agence France Presse*, August 31, 2006,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020060831e28v003dd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Zanzibar Allows Anti-US Protest over Alleged Koran Desecration,” *Agence France Presse*, July 8, 2005,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020050708e1780048b&cat=a&ep=ASE>; William Maclean, “No Kissing Please, Zanzibar Islamists Tell Tourists,” *Reuters News*, May 4, 2005,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020050504e154002j1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Ally Salleh, “Zanzibar Outlaws Gay Relationships: Hot Spot for Homosexuals: Jail Terms up to 25 Years for Men, 7 Years for Women,” *National Post (Canada)*, April 15, 2004, All but Toronto edition, sec. World, LexisNexis.

<sup>3786</sup> “Muslim NGO in Zanzibar Threatened with Ban,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 11, 2005,

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<sup>3787</sup> “Zanzibar Cleric Charged over Call for Hijab Protest,” *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 3, 2006,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020060203e223000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3788</sup> Hamoud Said, “Torching of Bars Continues,” *All Africa*, September 9, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110909e799000bd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Ten Bars Torched in Zanzibar Anti-Alcohol Protest,” *Agence France Presse*, August 30, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020110830e78u005ke&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3789</sup> “Separatist Fever in Zanzibar,” *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, May 12, 2012, sec. POLITICS & POWER,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IOLET00020120525e85c0000b&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Issa

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<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120503e85200027&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Issa



Uamsho leader in late May, hundreds of supporters clashed with police at the Stone Town police station where he was being held and burned two churches; police arrested 30 Uamsho members, but the group issued a formal statement denying any involvement in the clashes or church burnings.<sup>3790</sup> Uamsho leaders rejected Dr. Shein's banning of future political rallies and demanded a referendum on secession.<sup>3791</sup> In July 2012, Uamsho distributed pamphlets in Zanzibar calling on Zanzibaris to end the union between the isles and the mainland and clashed with police at a public gathering ostensibly to mourn those who died in the ferry *MV Skagit/Kalama's* sinking.<sup>3792</sup> The sudden disappearance of Uamsho leader Sheikh Farid Hadi in October 2012, who did not reappear for 4 days and later claimed to have been kidnapped and questioned by the police, sparked violent protests in Zanzibar; supporters, identified by police as Uamsho members, hacked a policeman to death.<sup>3793</sup> Police arrested 49 individuals on charges related to the violence, including 6 individuals for the policeman's death and 6 top Uamsho leaders.<sup>3794</sup> A string of Zanzibar acid attacks between November 2012 and September 2013 harmed and disfigured a moderate Muslim cleric employed as the Zanzibar Mufti's chief secretary, a local government official, two U.K. Jewish volunteers, and a Catholic priest. The police arrested 15 individuals, allegedly al-Shabaab sympathizers planning to leave Tanzania and fight alongside the Somali group, for the acid attacks, but Sheikh Fadhil Soraga, the Mufti's injured secretary, blamed Uamsho.<sup>3795</sup> In February 2014, Zanzibar witnessed three small bomb attacks, two at churches and one at a tourist restaurant; a June 2014 bomb explosion killed a moderate Muslim imam recently arrived from mainland Tanzania and injured 7. Although no group claimed responsibility for any of these attacks and Uamsho denied involvement, media

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Yussuf, "Zanzibaris Shun Constitution Commission," *All Africa*, April 15, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120416e84f00047&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3790</sup> "Zanzibar Islamists Burn Churches, Riot - Police," *Reuters News*, May 27, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020120527e85r0007f&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zanzibar Appeals for Calm after Independence Protests," *Agence France Presse*, May 27, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020120527e85r003eb&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3791</sup> "Tanzania: Uamsho Demands Dissolution," *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 49, no. 6 (July 1, 2012): 19321A-19322A, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2012.04549.x>; Abdulwakil Saiboko, "Uamsho Group Vows to Defy Shein's Order," *All Africa*, June 4, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120605e864000n2&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3792</sup> Issa Yussuf, "43 Arrested in Zanzibar for Causing Disorder," *All Africa*, July 22, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120723e87m00004&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Zanzibar Police Disperse Protest by Pro-Secessionists," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 21, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120721e87l001p5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zanzibar Police Clash with Islamist Mourners," *Reuters News*, July 20, 2012,

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<sup>3793</sup> Issa Yussuf, "Zanzibar Pursues Policeman's Killers," *All Africa*, October 19, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121019e8aj00112&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"UPDATE 1-Zanzibar Islamists Fight Police in Leader Protest-Witnesses," *Reuters News*, October 18, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020121018e8ai000w1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3794</sup> Issa Yussuf, "Zanzibar Chaos Suspects to Appear in Court," *All Africa*, October 22, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121022e8am0006u&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3795</sup> Mwinyi Sadallah, "15 Arrested in Zanzibar after Acid Attack on Church Official," *The Citizen*, September 17, 2013, sec. National,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CITTAN0020130917e99h0000h&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Katrin Bennhold, "Priest in Zanzibar Is Burned in Another Attack on Clergy," *NYTimes.Com Feed*, September 14, 2013, sec. World; Africa,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=NYTFEED020130914e99e0005l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Muslim Cleric Injured in Acid Attack," *All Africa*, November 7, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121107e8b7000by&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

reports continue to mention Uamsho as the possible perpetrators.<sup>3796</sup> In November 2014, Zanzibar Second Vice President Seif Ali Idi (CCM) banned the flying of the Uamsho flag as contrary to Tanzanian law.<sup>3797</sup> Because the 2013-14 attacks, some of which targeted state actors, took place more than three years after Uamsho's 2004 turn toward anti-state activity, Uamsho meets our viability standard.

Although Uamsho has subsequently publicly declared its support for Zanzibari secession, it is not clear that secession was one of its political goals in the year following March 2004. Only one contemporaneous account among the surveyed sources, an IHS Global Insight analysis, appears to identify Uamsho as one among "numerous smaller groups" on Zanzibar who "advocate for a complete secession" of the isles without citing any specific sources, and even the earlier IHS Global Insight report specifically covering the March 5 demonstration and its aftermath lists Uamsho's demands as "stricter adherence to Islamic code, and the adoption of Shari'a law."<sup>3798</sup> Surveyed sources' other mentions of Zanzibari secession as among Uamsho's goals occurred years after March 2005, largely following Uamsho's advocacy for secession during Tanzania's constitutional reform process initiated in 2011.<sup>3799</sup> As a result, our dataset does not code secession as one of Uamsho's initial political goals. The group's support for Shari'a law is coded as a goal to change the regime.

Various reports suggest that Uamsho has received funding from Gulf-based Islamists, particularly Saudi Arabia. Some sources making the claim, such as Iran's state-tied Fars News Agency, might be biased.<sup>3800</sup> However, numerous other reports also mention government and elite perceptions that Uamsho receives external funding from Salafist Muslim sources, official and private, in the Gulf.<sup>3801</sup> Uamsho is therefore coded as receiving foreign external funding.

There are still many unanswered questions about Uamsho. The group consistently denies responsibility for any of the attacks and violent clashes attributed to it, and it is difficult to know with any certainty which of the various bombings and acid attacks in Zanzibar were launched by

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<sup>3796</sup> Robert Besseling, "Domestic Groups Unlikely to Stage Large-Scale Militant Attacks but Sectarian Violence Raises Risk of Damage to Commercial Assets in Tanzania," *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*, February 27, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020140227ea2r0001h&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Bomb Blasts at Zanzibar Cathedral and Tourist Bar: Police," *Agence France Presse*, February 24, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020140224ea2o001bs&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3797</sup> Issa Yussuf, "Seif Orders Removal of UAMSHO Flags in ISL," *All Africa*, November 4, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020141104eab4000kp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3798</sup> Olly Owen, "Explosions Cause Widespread Damage in Tanzania," *WMRC Daily Analysis*, March 25, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020040325e03p0001s&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Gus Selassie, "Militant Muslims Riot in Zanzibar," *WMRC Daily Analysis*, March 8, 2004, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WDAN000020040308e03800040&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3799</sup> "Constitution Debate Needs Transparency," *All Africa*, April 4, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120405e8440004i&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Separatist Fever in Zanzibar"; "Islamic Cleric Demands Secession of Zanzibar," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, June 2, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMF0020120602e862001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tanzania: Uamsho Demands Dissolution."

<sup>3800</sup> "Made in Saudi Arabia: Salafist Radicalism in Africa," *FARS News Agency*, December 29, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=FARSNA0020131230e9ct0018n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3801</sup> Mshigeni, "Globalization and the Rise of Militant Islamic Social Movement Organizations," 75–76, 79; Danja Bergmann, "Threatened Paradise: Growing Religious and Political Violence on Zanzibar" (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, October 25, 2013), 5, [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_35865-1522-2-30.pdf?131025203028](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35865-1522-2-30.pdf?131025203028); Ioannis Gatsiounis, "After Al-Shabaab," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, December 27, 2012), <https://hudson.org/research/9774-after-al-shabaab>; Daniel Bowden, "Trouble in Paradise as Radical Islam Grows in Zanzibar," *The Independent - London*, October 30, 2012, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/trouble-in-paradise-as-radical-islam-grows-in-zanzibar-8231626.html>; Drazen Jorgic, "Zanzibar Unrest Reflects Anger along Swahili Coast," *Reuters News*, October 25, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020121025e8ap001sf&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

Uamsho, Uamsho sympathizers, or entirely separate groups or individuals. Uamsho enters our dataset with the rebel\_certainty variable coded as “2” instead of the maximum “3” to indicate uncertainty about whether or state and media reports incorrectly attributed attacks by others to Uamsho. The relationship, if any, between Uamsho and mainland Tanzanian attacks is also unclear. Even two of the three events ACLED identifies with Uamsho (382TAZ and 386TAZ) are more related to Sheikh Ponda’s October 2012 march on Agritanza in a Dar es Salaam land dispute than Uamsho’s usual concerns. While the media has tied Ponda to Uamsho, the links between his organization and Uamsho also remain unclear. Similarly, the existence of any relationship between Al-Shabaab and Uamsho is uncertain.<sup>3802</sup> Tanzanian courts have frequently released Uamsho leaders or dismissed the cases against them when they have been arrested on charges of incitement and terrorism, and Uamsho has continued to function publicly as a legitimate NGO with lawyers, public statements, and rallies.

### ***Foreign groups operating in Tanzania***

**Al Qaeda** [14TAZ, 361TAZ]: Osama Bin Laden founded al Qaeda in 1988 as an organization to enable the mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan to expand their struggle to other countries.<sup>3803</sup> ACLED lists the actor behind the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam as an unidentified armed group of “suspected Muslim fundamentalists linked to Osama Bin Laden”; both SCAD and GTD identify Al Qaeda as the culprit, as did contemporary media reports.<sup>3804</sup> Tanzanian police arrested a German national associated with al Qaeda in 2012.<sup>3805</sup> There was no evidence in either incident to suggest that al Qaeda was involved in planning an attack on the Tanzanian state; the activities of al Qaeda’s sometime affiliate al-Shabaab are addressed under its own heading below. Excluded.

**Al Shabaab** [480TAZ, 484TAZ, 570TAZ, 572TAZ, 575TAZ, 584TAZ, 603TAZ]: The Somali group Al Shabaab formed in the early 2000s as the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union, a broad Islamist coalition seeking to restore order to anarchic Somalia, and emerged as an independent force following ICU’s 2006 military defeat by Ethiopian forces.<sup>3806</sup> The group became increasingly active in East Africa beyond Somalia, with high-profile attacks in Kampala in 2010 and at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in 2013. Tanzanian police broke up two groups of Al-Shabaab militants, or at least sympathizers, in Mtwara and Tanga in 2013. Tanzanian police arrested 13 individuals in Mtwara and 69 in Tanga. The former group were doing military drills together and had Al-Shabaab materials, and the latter group alleged ran a child indoctrination camp.<sup>3807</sup> BBC

<sup>3802</sup> Burchard, “Violent Extremist Organizations and the Electoral Cycle in Africa: A Framework for Analyzing the 2015 Tanzanian Elections,” 14; Bergmann, “Threatened Paradise: Growing Religious and Political Violence on Zanzibar,” 2.

<sup>3803</sup> Mapping Militant Organizations Project, “Al Qaeda”; Bajoria and Bruno, “Al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida).”

<sup>3804</sup> NEUMEISTER, “Second Bombing Suspect Arrives in U.S.; Said to Blame Bin Laden.”

<sup>3805</sup> Anne Robi, “East Africa: Police Grill Terrorism Suspect,” *Tanzania Daily News (Dar Es Salaam)*, June 14, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201206140188.html>.

<sup>3806</sup> Mapping Militants Project, “Al Shabaab”; Masters and Sergie, “Al-Shabab.”

<sup>3807</sup> Deodatus Balile, “Tanzania Dismantles Al-Shabaab Child Indoctrination Camp in Tanga Region,” *All Africa*, November 18, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131118e9bi000iz&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Deodatus Balile, “Al-Shabaab Presence in Mtwara Raises Security Alarm in Tanzania,” *All Africa*, October 18, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131018e9ai000fk&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Two More Arrested in Connection to Al-Shabaab Military Training in Mtwara,” *All Africa*, October 21, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131021e9al000ec&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

Monitoring cited Mary John's reporting in *The East African* on possible links between Al Shabaab and other recent attacks, including the Zanzibar killing of a Roman Catholic priest.<sup>3808</sup> In a February 2015 online video, an individual who identified himself as Kais bin Abdullah claimed to be the leader of al-Shabaab in Tanzania, "threatened the police, prime minister, government, and non-Muslims," and took responsibility for several 2014 attacks on police stations around the country, including the January 2015 attack on Ikwiriri Police Station in the Coastal Region in which unknown assailants killed two police officers and stole guns and ammunition.<sup>3809</sup> In February 2015, the police and security forces tried to drive Al-Shabaab fighters from the Amboni caves near Tanga; one soldier died and two police officers were injured in the ensuing fighting.<sup>3810</sup> In April 2015, police arrested 10 suspected Al-Shabaab militants, found in possession of dynamite and the Al-Shabaab flag, in a mosque near Morogoro, and a vigilante mob killed another suspected militant.<sup>3811</sup> Al Muhajiroun, a new Kenya-based affiliate of Al-Shabaab which announced itself in early 2015, proclaimed that it would work to protect Tanzanian Muslim sheikhs from government harassment.<sup>3812</sup> Al Shabaab's expansion into Tanzania was part of its larger strategy to spread across East Africa.<sup>3813</sup> Although Al Shabaab elements in Tanzania constituted a hierarchical group or groups with goals to challenge the Tanzanian state and which actually carried out a number of attacks, they did not appear to have been a preexisting group developed in Tanzania which later affiliated with al Shabaab but rather a group associated with and supported by al Shabaab from its inception or very shortly thereafter. Excluded. See further discussion of Al Shabaab in the Kenya section.

**Allied Democratic Forces and National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU)** [231TAZ, Ugandan navy intercepted ADF speedboat with heavy weaponry on Lake Victoria]: Not sure if Tanzania is even the correct country tag here, but if it is, then its only relation to this event is that it may have taken place in Tanzanian territorial waters.<sup>3814</sup> Not an attack on the Tanzanian state. Excluded.

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"Tanzanian Police Arrest 11 for Undergoing Al-Shabaab Military Training," *All Africa*, October 9, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020131009e9a90003v&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3808</sup> "Zanzibar Priest's Killing Linked to Somali Terror Group Al-Shabab - Paper," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 24, 2013,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130224e92o00003&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3809</sup> "Tanzanian Soldier Killed by Suspected 'Terrorists' 13 February," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 16, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150216eb2g000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Bandits Attack Tanzania Police Post, Kill Two Officers," *All Africa*, January 23, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150123eb1n00064&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3810</sup> "Tanzanian Soldier Killed by Suspected 'Terrorists' 13 February"; "Tanga Shootout Leaves Uniformed Officers Injured," *All Africa*, February 16, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150216eb2g000en&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Ludovick Kazoka, "Army Denies Taking Over From Police in Tanga Gangster Chase," *All Africa*, February 16, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150216eb2g000x0&cat=a&ep=ASE>;

"Tanzanian Army Officer Killed, Five Injured in Fire Exchange," *Xinhua General News Service*, February 15, 2015, LexisNexis.

<sup>3811</sup> "Five Injured in Hand Grenade Blast in Tanzania's Morogoro Region," *Xinhua General News Service*, May 2, 2015; Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, "Tanzanians Lynch Suspected Somali Militant, Police Arrest 10 Others," *Reuters News*, April 15, 2015,

<http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020150415eb4f00mat&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3812</sup> Caroline Hellyer, "ISIL Courts Al-Shabab as al-Qaeda Ties Fade Away," *Al Jazeera*, March 23, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/isil-eyes-east-africa-foments-division-150322130940108.html>.

<sup>3813</sup> IGAD Security Sector Program and Sahan Foundation, "Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat."

<sup>3814</sup> "Ugandan Army Intercepts Rebel ADF Arms on Lake Victoria," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, December 29, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020071229e3ct000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

**Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)** [229TAZ, appears to be the same incident as 228TAZ above]: Same attack as above.<sup>3815</sup> Not an attack on the Tanzanian state (though the FDLR opposed the post-genocide Rwandan state). Excluded.

**Hutu Rebels** [often listed together with **Unidentified Armed Group (Burundi)**; 22TAZ, 66TAZ, 67TAZ, TZA77 – TZA88, TZA92, TZA93]: In addition to attacks associated with CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL by name, ACLED includes a number of events associated with Burundian Hutu rebels not identified with any specific group.<sup>3816</sup> Excluded.

**Interahamwe Militia** [228TAZ, attack on Rwandan refugees in western Tanzania]: Interahamwe militiamen, hiding in Tanzania and associated with the 1994 Rwandan genocide, attacked a group of Rwandan nationals living in Tanzania's Kagera region, killing 3 and wounding 3.<sup>3817</sup> Not an attack on the Tanzanian state (though the Interahamwe opposed the post-genocide Rwandan state). Excluded.

**Movement for Solidarity and Development** [326TAZ, Tanzanian government arrested Burundian rebel leader in Dar es Salaam at request of Burundi]: Tanzanian police arrested Alexis Sinduhije, president and founder of the Burundian rebel group Movement for Solidarity and Development.<sup>3818</sup> Not an attack on the state. Excluded.

**National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)** [26TAZ, 55TAZ, 94TAZ – 98TAZ]: This Burundian rebel group was founded in 1994.<sup>3819</sup> It was active along the Tanzania-Burundi border and among Burundian refugees in Tanzania.<sup>3820</sup> Its focus was on challenging the Burundian state rather than Tanzania. Excluded.

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<sup>3815</sup> Robert Mukombozi and Richard Ruhimbana, "FDLR Attacks Rwandan Refugees in TZ, Kill Three," *All Africa*, January 25, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020070125e31p000q6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3816</sup> "Tanzanian Forces Kill Some 40 Burundi Rebels, Seize 56 Guns," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, March 20, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020020320dy3k004mp&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "24 Burundian Refugees Killed," *All Africa*, January 31, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021113dy1v00j4t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Two Burundian Rebels Said Killed by Tanzanian Forces," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, June 26, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020010710dx6q006f1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3817</sup> "Rwandan Militia Kill Three in Tanzania," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 20, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020070120e31k001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3818</sup> "Tanzanian Police Reportedly Arrest Burundian Opposition Member," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 14, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120114e81e000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Burundi Opposition Leader Arrested in Tanzania," *Agence France Presse*, January 13, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020120113e81d006cd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3819</sup> Willy Nindorera, "The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle," trans. Nancy Du Plessis, Berghof Transitions Series (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2012), 15, [http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions\\_Series/transitions10\\_burundi.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions10_burundi.pdf).

<sup>3820</sup> "Tanzanian Minister 'Rejects' Idea of Intervention Force along Border," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, July 23, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020020723dy7n00461&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tanzania Snubs Burundi's Idea on International Observers on Border [Corrected 07/22/02]," *Agence France-Presse*, July 22, 2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020020722dy7m007vj&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Army Spokesman Reiterates Accusation about Tanzanian Backing for Rebels," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, July 17, 2002,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020020717dy7h0005m&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Rebels, Rwandan Militiamen 'Preparing New Attacks' from 'Tanzania'," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, July 16,



**National Forces for Liberation-Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU-FNL)**

[26TAZ, 65TAZ, 2000 fighting between Tanzanian troops and Burundian rebels, with Tanzania listed as the primary actor]: This Burundian rebel group formed in the 1980s among Burundian refugees in western Tanzania.<sup>3821</sup> FNL, PALIPEHUTU's armed wing, was active along the Tanzania-Burundi border and among Burundian refugees in Tanzania.<sup>3822</sup> Its focus was on challenging the Burundian state rather than Tanzania. Excluded.

**Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)**

[42TAZ, 2001 attack on private Congolese boats]: The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) emerged in the DRC in 1998 in opposition to Laurent Kabila.<sup>3823</sup> This event was not an attack on the Tanzanian state, and the attackers appear to have been bandits who primarily wanted to rob the passengers.<sup>3824</sup> Excluded.

**Unidentified Armed Group (Burundi)**

[328TAZ, Tanzanian military increases presence to battle Burundian rebels in western Tanzania]: Not an attack on the Tanzanian state.<sup>3825</sup> Excluded.

**Unidentified Armed Group (Burundi)**

[73TAZ, attack on Tanzanian civilian boat, 4 dead]: Unidentified Burundian rebels (probably part of the FDD, FNL, or the Congolese Mayi Mayi militia) fired rockets at a Tanzanian boat in Lake Tanganyika.<sup>3826</sup> Not an attack on the Tanzanian state. Excluded.

**Unidentified Armed Group (Rwanda)**

[312TAZ]: According to ACLED's summary, Rwandan pastoralists crossed into Tanzania to raid Tanzanian cattle. Not an attack on the state. Excluded.

**Unidentified Tanzanian groups**

Many of the 178 Tanzanian events in ACLED which involved at least one unidentified actor include many attacks outside the scope of this study. These include attacks on individuals with albinism, mob attacks against suspected witches, pastoralist-farmer clashes, robberies, clashes between common criminals and police, Burundian rebel activity in western Tanzania, and most of the unattributed election-related violence.

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2002, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020020716dy7g0025t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Sukhdev Chhatbar, "Burundian Rebels Raid Refugee Center in Tanzania, Kill One, Abduct 36," *Associated Press International*, February 12, 2001, LexisNexis.

<sup>3821</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, "Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People- PALIPEHUTU (Parti Pour La Libération Du Peuple Hutu), Including the Date of Its Creation, Founders, Its Involvement in Human Rights Abuses and Its Links with the Rebels Hutus and How Its Members Are Treated by the Actual Government" (Refworld, June 1, 2000), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c74.html>.

<sup>3822</sup> "Rebels Reportedly Recruiting Young Refugees in Tanzania.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, June 4, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010710dx64004zp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3823</sup> French, "2 Sides Prepare to Battle over Congo's Capital."

<sup>3824</sup> "Four Congolese, Tanzanian Arrested after Boat Raid in Lake Tanganyika," *Agence France-Presse*, January 10, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010709dx1a00ld8&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3825</sup> Joas Kaijage, "Govt Tightens Security On Border With Burundi," *All Africa*, January 20, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120120e81k00120&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3826</sup> "Four Killed in Attack on Tanzanian Boat.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, September 6, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcap00020010906dx9600335&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Lake Tanganyika Rocket Attack on Tanzanian Boat Leaves Four Dead," *Agence France-Presse*, September 6, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010906dx96009f3&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Security 'Not Worse Than Other Times'." *All Africa*, September 8, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021107dx98026o1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



Several other events are potentially relevant and would be worth more detailed examination. In addition to those discussed above in the Al-Shabaab and Uamsho sections, other such events include Islamist crowds' clashes with security forces<sup>3827</sup>; bomb attacks on bars and beer depots in Tanga and Zanzibar, probably Islamist-associated<sup>3828</sup>; likely Islamist attacks on Christians, Jews, and moderate Muslims, concentrated in Zanzibar but also elsewhere<sup>3829</sup>; church burnings and bombings<sup>3830</sup>; and other bombings and attacks, especially of police stations.<sup>3831</sup>

<sup>3827</sup> Beatrice Moses, "Ponda: Risasi Ilinichanganya," *Mwananchi*, August 13, 2013, <http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/Ponda--Risasi-ilinichanganya/1597578-1947064-g4c3ys/index.html>; "Threat to Invade Police Station as Bomb Rocks CCM Office in Dar.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, August 27, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020010827dx8r000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Robert Rweyemamu, "Tanzania: Rule of Law Must Not Be Cast to the Winds," *The East African (via AllAfrica.Com)*, February 23, 1998, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/lvacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3S6D-8D90-0040-T45C&csi=8320&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>.

<sup>3828</sup> "Suspected Islamists Attack Bars in Tanzanian Resort of Zanzibar," *Agence France-Presse*, February 24, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020030224dz2o00ctd&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Police Suspect Muslim Militants in Zanzibar Blasts.," *Reuters News*, February 24, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020030224dz2o00x6u&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Bomb Blast at Alcoholic Dispensing Outlet.," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, December 31, 2001, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbc00020011231dxcv000ma&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3829</sup> Ephrem Rugiririza, "Eight Hurt in Tanzania Tourist Restaurant Bombing," *Agence France Presse*, July 8, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020140708ea780058x&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Daily News Reporter, "Arusha Bomb Blast Injures Muslim Clerics," *All Africa*, July 7, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140707ea77001ka&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Marc Nkwame, "Bakwata Condemns Arusha Cleric Acid Attack," *All Africa*, March 6, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140306ea360009k&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Mkinga Mkinga, "Maimed Priest 'Reported Threats to Police,'" *The Citizen*, September 15, 2013, sec. National, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CITTAN0020130915e99f00008&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Katy Lee, "British Teens Arrive Home after Zanzibar Acid Attack," *Agence France Presse*, August 9, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020130809e989007kc&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "'Pray for Peace' - Tanzania Primate After Attack," *All Africa*, March 25, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130325e93p0016a&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Unknown Gunmen Kill Catholic Priest in Zanzibar," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 19, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020130219e92j0002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Catholic Priest Shot in Zanzibar," *All Africa*, December 27, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121227e8cr0006z&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tanzania: Religious Harmony Should Prevail," *The Citizen (Dar Es Salaam)*, August 19, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200808190324.html>.

<sup>3830</sup> Meddy Mulisa, "Criminals Wreaking Havoc On Houses of Worship," *All Africa*, September 25, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150925eb9p000o1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Unknown People Burn Three Churches in Northwestern Tanzania," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, September 23, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020150923eb9n000xe&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Pinda Deplores Torching of Prayer Houses," *All Africa*, May 12, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140512ea5c000m8&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Mkunazini, "Two Bombs Detonated Outside Christ Church Anglican Cathedral, Zanzibar," *All Africa*, February 26, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140226ea2q000s5&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Pinda Leads Mourners At Arusha Church Bombing Burial," *All Africa*, May 13, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130513e95d000nb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zanzibar Protestant Church Set Ablaze," *All Africa*, February 21, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130221e921000bs&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3831</sup> Jimmy Lwangili, "Police Apprehend 38 Terror Suspects in Dar, Coast," *All Africa*, September 1, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150901eb91000wy&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Jimmy Lwangili, "Thugs Kill Police Officers at Vikindu," *All Africa*, April 1, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020150401eb4100090&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Five

Media and government sources sometimes attempted to link series of unattributed incidents together, with allegations of well-coordinated campaigns of violence by either Islamist terrorists or a nationwide criminal network.<sup>3832</sup> As discussed earlier, available information is not sufficient for us to make a judgment on the truth of these allegations.

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Injured in Hand Grenade Blast in Tanzania's Morogoro Region"; Joyce Joliga, "Polisi Aliyejeruhiwa Kwa Bomu Afanyiwa Upasuaji Wa Mkono," *Mwananchi*, December 28, 2014, [null/habari/Kitaifa/Polisi-aliyejeruhiwa-kwa-bomu/1597296-2571136-632k68/index.html](http://null/habari/Kitaifa/Polisi-aliyejeruhiwa-kwa-bomu/1597296-2571136-632k68/index.html); "Minibus Grenade Attack Reportedly Kills Three near Tanzanian Town," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, August 23, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020140823ea8n0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tanzanian Police Offer 10-Million Shilling Reward After Second Bomb Found in Arusha," *All Africa*, April 17, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140417ea4h0005x&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Deodatus Balile, "Zanzibar Ramps Up Security After Acid Attacks, Foiled Bombing," *All Africa*, September 26, 2013, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020130926e99q0008f&cat=a&ep=ASE>.<sup>3832</sup> Daniel Finnan, "Tanzania - Attack in Arusha Carried Out By Tanzanians, Says Home Affairs Minister," *All Africa*, July 9, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140709ea79000e3&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Marc Nkwame, "Two Arrested Over Arusha Blast," *All Africa*, July 9, 2014, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020140709ea79000d9&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zanzibar Priest's Killing Linked to Somali Terror Group Al-Shabab - Paper."

**Narrative Summary:** *The Gambia was ruled by President Yahya Jammeh from 1994 to January 2017. There have been several coup attempts, most of which originated from within the state or military. State-sponsored or pro-government violence is common, especially attacks on journalists since 1999. In addition, violence from the Camasance region in Senegal often spills over into southern Gambia, although it has not systematically targeted the Gambian state.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** *medium*

**Explanation:** *There were two groups that may have been of interest but information was insufficient to determine inclusion. ACLED records notably few events for Gambia. It did not include the 2006 or 2014 coup attempts, the latter of which received substantial international media attention, as well as significant student protests turned violent in 2000.*

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**Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance** – started in 1982 and based in Senegal. Its activities slowed following a peace agreement in 2004. With the death of its leader in 2007, conflict has resumed and multiple factions have formed (number of factions reported ranges), although none seem to be named or have clearly broken away to form a coherent new organization.<sup>3833</sup> As such, I have excluded it.

**Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction** – dominant political party, came to power in 1996.<sup>3834</sup> State actor. Excluded.

**Junguleurs Militia** – The ACLED sourcing on this group is Human Rights Watch. The only reference I could find among HRW materials was to “Jungulers,” a state-sponsored paramilitary force. The same report also references the assassination of journalist Deyda Hydara; the date and victim description match one event described in ACLED involving the Junguleurs.<sup>3835</sup> It appears that state forces were complicit in the assassination, if not the perpetrators.<sup>3836</sup> It appears that the “Junguleurs Militia” is a state actor and have therefore excluded it.

The HRW report mentioning the Jungulers also provided several other leads, referencing 50 West African nationals detained and killed in 2005 for supposedly plotting a coup, as well as alleged coup attempts in 2006 and 2014. The only reference I could find to the 2005 coup attempt were to the arrest of supposed perpetrators (no evidence or details). The other two are discussed below.

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<sup>3833</sup> Christophe Châtelot, “Boundaries of Casamance Remain Blurred after 30 Years of Conflict,” *The Guardian*, June 19, 2012, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/19/casamance-guinea-bissau-gambia-senegal>; “No End in Sight to Casamance Conflict,” IRIN, February 17, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/94895/senegal-no-end-sight-casamance-conflict>; “Casamance | Region, Senegal | Britannica.Com,” accessed February 22, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Casamance>.

<sup>3834</sup> “The Gambia | History - Geography | Britannica.Com,” accessed February 22, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/place/The-Gambia>.

<sup>3835</sup> Human Rights Watch, “State of Fear,” Human Rights Watch, September 16, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/16/state-fear/arbitrary-arrests-torture-and-killings>.

<sup>3836</sup> “Case Watch: Who Killed Deyda Hydara?,” Open Society Foundations, accessed February 22, 2017, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/case-watch-who-killed-deyda-hydara>.

**United Democratic Party** – opposition political party, dates back to 1996 presidential elections.<sup>3837</sup> Supporters of the UDP committed several recorded acts of arson in the leadup to the 2000 election.<sup>3838</sup> However, these events do not qualify the group for inclusion for three reasons: (1) it was violence aiming to influence the outcome of the election, (2) in some cases, the violence was spontaneous, resulting from gradual escalation from peaceful rallies, and (3) in cases where it was not known to be spontaneous violence, there is not sufficient information to qualify the group (i.e. evidence of organization and planning, details on members, etc.).

**\*The Gambia Freedom League** – This incident is not in ACLED but I initially found it while searching for the Junguleurs militia. On 30 DEC 2014, an unidentified armed group attacked the Gambian State House. Early reports attributed the attempted coup to “disaffected soldiers,” making it sound like an internal governmental power struggle.<sup>3839</sup> However, the real story slowly emerged. It is well documented, as the FBI investigated and charged several members under the Neutrality Act.<sup>3840</sup>

The Gambian Freedom League involved about 10-20 people. Named participants include Chern Njie, Lamin Sanneh, Banka Manneh (was expelled from group before first attack), Papa Faal, Njaga Jagne, Alagie Barrow, Bai Lowe, Dawda Bojang, Moudou Njie, and Mustapha Faal (left before the attack). Participants were mainly Gambian expats in the United States, but the group also included several expats in Germany and some contacts from within Gambia. Several had served in the U.S. military/National Guard and some in the Gambian military.<sup>3841</sup> However, it seems that most of them did not meet in one particular setting, so prior organization is coded as none.

The group’s main leaders were Lamin Sanneh and Chern Njie. Sanneh had previously served in the Gambian military and commanded an elite unit that protected the president. He fell out with his commander/the president and sought asylum in summer 2013 the United States, where he had previously pursued military studies. He was ethnic Mandinka.<sup>3842</sup>

Chern Njie was a Gambian living in Austin, Texas. He had become a successful real estate developer, earning enough from his business Songhai Development to purchase a lavish waterfront villa.<sup>3843</sup> He was not well known in the expat community for political action, but had previously funded opposition media including expat newspapers and a radio station broadcasting into the Gambia from Senegal.<sup>3844</sup> Njie bankrolled the

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<sup>3837</sup> “Elections in The Gambia,” accessed February 22, 2017, <http://africanelections.tripod.com/gm.html>.

<sup>3838</sup> Sheikh Al-Kinky, “Gambia: How Ousman Was Killed in Pre-Election Campaign,” October 22, 2001, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200110220138.html>; Baba Galleh Jallow, “Gambia: Unprecedented Violence Marks Run-up to Presidential Poll,” *AllAfrica.Com*, October 16, 2001, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200110160515.html>.

<sup>3839</sup> Agence France-Presse, “Gambian Soldiers Attempt Coup While President Is Abroad,” *The Guardian*, December 30, 2014, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/gambia-capital-banjul-gunfire-reported-coup>.

<sup>3840</sup> Andrew Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator,” *The Guardian*, July 21, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/21/how-former-us-army-officer-launched-disastrous-coup-the-gambia>; Simon Allison, “The Gambia Coup Didn’t Just Fail, It Backfired,” *The Guardian*, January 7, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/gambia-failed-coup-encourage-president-jammeh>; Stuart A. Reid, “Let’s Go Take Back Our Country,” *The Atlantic*, March 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/03/lets-take-back-our-country/426852/>.

<sup>3841</sup> Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator”; Allison, “The Gambia Coup Didn’t Just Fail, It Backfired”; Reid, “Let’s Go Take Back Our Country”; “Gambia ‘Coup Plot’: Inside Story of a Failed Takeover,” *BBC News*, January 6, 2015, sec. Africa, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30694726>.

<sup>3842</sup> Reid, “Let’s Go Take Back Our Country”; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3843</sup> Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator”; Reid, “Let’s Go Take Back Our Country”; Allison, “The Gambia Coup Didn’t Just Fail, It Backfired.”

<sup>3844</sup> Reid, “Let’s Go Take Back Our Country”; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

operation, the total budget of which exceeded \$220,000.<sup>3845</sup> The group purchased extensive equipment in the United States, inter alia Kevlar helmets, body armor, night vision goggles, CamelBaks, satellite phones, rifles, pistols, machine guns, sniper rifles, and sights.<sup>3846</sup>

Most of the planning occurred in the United States remotely/over electronic media. Participants met every other week on conference calls to plan.<sup>3847</sup> They maintained extensive documentation, apparently primarily on Google Drive, including a budgetary spreadsheet and documents entitled “Military Strategy for Operation Gambian Freedom” and “Gambia Reborn: A Charter for Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy”.<sup>3848</sup> The planning was detailed, including documentation of ways, means, ends, and assumptions on which the operations hinged.<sup>3849</sup> The group’s goal was clearly takeover. Its planning included four possible scenarios for capturing or killing Gambian President Jammeh and also outlined a two-year political transition period to follow the takeover.<sup>3850</sup>

I recorded the group’s start date as April 2014, as this seems to be when Njie agreed to finance the use of force that Manneh and Sanneh believed were necessary, i.e. when the core leadership all agreed to move forward with a plan for violence.<sup>3851</sup> I am not sure when the Gambian Freedom League was christened. As such, formed certainty is recorded as 1.

The group’s operations were clearly clandestine. Members used codenames and possessed files that they labelled “TOP SECRET”.<sup>3852</sup> Their activities attracted the attention of the FBI several times prior to their 30 DEC assault, but members changed tactics, lied, or refused to engage the FBI in order to throw them off and keep the operation going.<sup>3853</sup> Members shipped the necessary weaponry to West Africa under aliases concealed in barrels full of clothing, shoes, and linens.<sup>3854</sup> They told Gambians who saw the barrels that they were planning to start a business.<sup>3855</sup> To avoid detection, members entered the Gambia from Senegal separately and avoided checkpoints.<sup>3856</sup> The name date is recorded as never occurred, since the plot was only revealed after several members were captured/arrested.

Most members headed to West Africa in late December, entering the Gambia via Senegal. They planned and aborted attacks several times before moving forward with an attack on the Presidential Villa on 30 DEC that failed.<sup>3857</sup> Members either died in the attack or were dispersed.<sup>3858</sup> The group never conducted any large attacks or attacks on civilians. In addition, viable and viable\_civ are coded as 0. I listed the attack date, 30 DEC 2014, as the name date and coded 1 for name\_duresss, as the group was only publicly named after members will killed and capture following their failed attack.

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<sup>3845</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3846</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; “Gambia ‘Coups Plot.’”

<sup>3847</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3848</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3849</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country.””

<sup>3850</sup> Reid.

<sup>3851</sup> Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3852</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3853</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

<sup>3854</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country””; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator”; “Gambia ‘Coups Plot.’”

<sup>3855</sup> Reid, ““Let’s Go Take Back Our Country.””

<sup>3856</sup> Reid.

<sup>3857</sup> Reid.

<sup>3858</sup> Reid; Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa’s Most Absurd Dictator.”

**Unnamed armed group** – responsible for 2006 coup. Appeared to be from within government, included soldiers.<sup>3859</sup> Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (96GAM)** – appears just to be an armed robbery, attacked shopkeepers and took a lot of cash in various currencies. No political targets. Excluded.<sup>3860</sup>

**Unidentified armed group (76GAM)** – the reference I could find seems to be a bit before this date (on 23 OCT 2009 versus ACLED's 28 OCT) but the descriptions match. The clashes occurred the Casamance region, which has been a hotbed of rebel activity in Senegal. My guess would be these are Senegalese rebels. By the event descriptions, it seems they have been conducting armed robberies in the Gambian bush just across the border to get food, other supplies, and money. May just be armed robbers.<sup>3861</sup> Either way, not of interest to us. Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (55GAM)** – This arson attack on The Independent seems to have been the latest in a string of attacks on independent press in Gambia: IRIN called The Independent "Gambia's most outspoken newspaper," and the attack was widely condemned including by the US Embassy, the British High Commission, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, and other NGOs.<sup>3862</sup> Articles suggest the state was encouraging or complicit in the attack.<sup>3863</sup> Not an attack on state authority. Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (53GAM)** – attack on independent media, not the state (see above)

**Unidentified armed group (40GAM)** – appears to just be repeated armed robberies of the shop in one village, no suggestions otherwise.<sup>3864</sup> No targeting state authority. Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (36GAM)** – A self-proclaimed "Imam Mahdi" (as prophesied in the Quran) and his two followers declared jihad and began attacking villagers with cutlasses and committing arson at Mandinari. The three evidently maintain that their mission was to restore Islam to its purest form and to target non-

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<sup>3859</sup> "Gambia Ex-Military Chiefs Charged over 'Coup Plot,'" *BBC News*, June 18, 2010, sec. Africa, <http://www.bbc.com/news/10354204>; Sanna Jawara and Sidiq Asemota, "Gambia: 'I Told Lang Tombong About the 2006 Coup Plot,'" *The Daily Observer (Banjul)*, July 30, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201007300279.html>; Human Rights Watch, "State of Fear."

<sup>3860</sup> Ebrima Gillen and Bakary Samatch, "Gambia: Armed Robbers Attack Panchang Village," *The Point (Banjul)*, March 11, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201403111605.html>; Aji Fatou Faal, "Gambia: In the Wake of Armed Robbery in CRR - Lawmakers Want Security to Be Beefed Up," *The Daily Observer (Banjul)*, March 17, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201403172199.html>; Omar Wally, "Gambia: Armed Robbers Run Amok in CRR," *The Daily Observer (Banjul)*, March 11, 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201403111318.html>.

<sup>3861</sup> Pateh Baldeh, "Gambia: Are They Casamance Rebels Or Bandits? The People and the Senegalese Army," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, October 28, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910280316.html>.

<sup>3862</sup> "Gambia: Newspaper Printing Press Burned for Second Time in Six Months," *IRIN*, April 16, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404160822.html>; "Gambia: CPJ Condemns Arson Attack on Newspaper," *Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)*, April 13, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404130737.html>; Lamin Fatty, "Gambia: Independent Receives Public Sympathy; Condemnation Overwhelming," *The Independent (Banjul)*, April 27, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404271008.html>; Karamo David & lamin, "Gambia: More Solidarity With the Independent," *The Independent (Banjul)*, April 27, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404271045.html>; "Gambia: Int'l Writers Petition Jammeh," *The Independent (Banjul)*, April 27, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404271030.html>; Lamin Gassama, "Gambia: Of Violence And Lax Security," *The Independent (Banjul)*, April 27, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404271037.html>; "Gambia: We Are Back in Business!," *The Independent (Banjul)*, April 27, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404270994.html>.

<sup>3863</sup> Operation Self-Destruct, "Gambia: Talk All Leave None," *The Independent (Banjul)*, April 27, 2004, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404271038.html>.

<sup>3864</sup> Momodou Bah, "Gambia: Border Village Wary of Armed Robbers," *The Independent (Banjul)*, August 13, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200208130320.html>.



believers. They were apprehended and detained by security forces, but their names and backgrounds were not revealed.<sup>3865</sup> Beyond two early articles from the Independent, I could find no additional references. Excluded – no organizational structure, no violence directed against the government.

**Unidentified armed group (19GAM)** – could not find. Men with AK-47s attack and loot village of Dongoro Ba. ACLED gives no source. This event occurred near the border with Senegal's Casamance region; it may be Senegalese rebels in search of supplies (fits subsequent patterns). Excluded. Follow up research using local sources would be desirable.

**Unidentified armed group (14GAM)** – There were arson attacks on Radio One FM's broadcasting station and one of the staff's home in early AUG 2000. Although Radio One FM was the station from which Jammeh announced his 1994 coup, it had recently attracted the ire of Jammeh and his supporters for broadcasting independent and sometimes critical coverage of the regime.<sup>3866</sup> The regime benefited from the regime even if it wasn't behind it, so this does not represent an attack on state authority. Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (5GAM)**: Unidentified armed men, some dressed in military fatigues, attacked soldiers guarding banks in Banjul's banking district on 20 DEC 1999. It appears they may have been targeting the Central Bank, the Assets Management and Recovery Corporation, or the Trust Bank. Anonymous soldiers speaking to an independent newspaper claimed that there is a secret armory located beneath one of the buildings, and the attackers must have had inside military knowledge to know of its existence and target it. Officially, the Interior ministry denied that the attack was politically motivated. The assailants escaped after wounding one soldier.<sup>3867</sup> It seems that this may have been type of group we are interested in, but it has been excluded for two reasons: (1) lack of information, and (2) the garb of the assailants and knowledge required for the attack seem to make it likely that assailants came from within the state.

**Unidentified armed group (2MAG)** – attack on military barracks at Kartung in July 1997. Perpetrators came from within the military.<sup>3868</sup> Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (Terror suspects)** – This collection of individuals came to my attention while searching for another event on ACLED. Sixteen persons, including both Gambian and Senegalese nationals, were

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<sup>3865</sup> Pa Ousman Darboe, "Gambia: Banjul 'Jihadists' in NIA Custody," *The Independent (Banjul)*, July 23, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200207230491.html>; Jalamang Jammeh, "Gambia: 'Imam Mahdi' Arrested With Two Followers," *The Independent (Banjul)*, July 19, 2002, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200207190222.html>.

<sup>3866</sup> "Gambia's Radio One FM Attacked," BBC News, August 11, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/876630.stm>; "Gambia: As President Jammeh Attends Millennium Summit, Gambians in New York Demonstrate," *The Independent (Banjul)*, September 8, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200009080234.html>; Alhagie Mbye, "Gambia: General Public Condemns Radio 1 FM Arson Attacks," *The Independent (Banjul)*, August 25, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200008250344.html>; Lamin Waa Juwara, "Gambia: Radio 1FM - Waa Urges IGP to Explain," *The Point (Banjul)*, October 13, 2000, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200010130216.html>.

<sup>3867</sup> "West Africa: IRIN-WA Update of Events in West Africa," *IRIN*, December 21, 1999, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199912210206.html>.

<sup>3868</sup> Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 1998 - Gambia," Refworld, January 1, 1998, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9f770.html>; David Perfect, *Historical Dictionary of The Gambia*, 5th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 140, <https://books.google.com/books?id=9MknDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA140&lpg=PA140&dq=gambia+kartong+attack+on+military+barracks+july+1997&source=bl&ots=ec5HqoXDvv&sig=9Nj1BqugSiNIS06NonIBAdzvFXc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiJ8vvF8fTTAhVKeyYKHai5CigQ6AEIKzAB#v=onepage&q=gambia%20kartong%20attack%20on%20military%20barracks%20july%201997&f=false>.

arrested in 2009 on terrorism. The details of their offenses were never specified.<sup>3869</sup> Their names are Alasan Thomas Jarju, Maulud Badjie, Lasana Prosper Sambou, Ousman Jarju, Mansour Jatta, Sedat Jatta, Fabia Nyafuneh, Pap Ousman Badjie, Abdoulie Jatta, Muminu Bah, Abdoulie Jarju, and Sedat Jarju, Senegalese and Samsideen Jammeh, Kebba Secka, Kemo Konteh and Sam Kambai.<sup>3870</sup> Their trial suffered multiple setbacks.<sup>3871</sup> As of 2011, twelve of them had been acquitted and discharged.<sup>3872</sup> This group was excluded because it's unclear that they are actually an organized group and unclear whether they actually planned any violence (case seems like it might be phony).

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<sup>3869</sup> "Gambia: Human Rights Reports: Gambia," *United States Department of State (Washington, DC)*, April 23, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304231194.html>; Kebba Camara, "Gambia: 16 Youths Charged With Terrorism," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, July 13, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200907130315.html>.

<sup>3870</sup> Camara, "Gambia: 16 Youths Charged With Terrorism."

<sup>3871</sup> Sidiq Asemota, "Gambia: 16 Alleged Terrorists' Trial Commences," *The Daily Observer (Banjul)*, January 22, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201001220284.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: New Charges Against 'Terror' Suspects," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, November 19, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200911190737.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: State May Discharge Some Terrorism Suspects," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, October 30, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910301039.html>; Sidiq Asemota, "Gambia: Defence Expresses Concern Over the Sixteen 'Terrorists,'" *The Daily Observer (Banjul)*, October 26, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910261404.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: Court to Consider Bail for Terrorism Suspects If..." *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, October 23, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910231061.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: Detainees Held for Long Now Charged With Terrorism," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, September 28, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200909281616.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: Terrorism Accused Persons Yet to Secure Lawyers," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, September 25, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200909250811.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: Lack of Lawyers Hinders Terrorism Case," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, September 16, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200909160674.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: Four Locals, 12 Senegalese in Court for Terrorism," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, September 1, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200909010320.html>; Fabakary B. Ceesay, "Gambia: 12 Senegalese, Four Gambians Charged With Terrorism," *FOROYAA Newspaper (Serrekunda)*, June 26, 2009, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200906260988.html>; Buya Jammeh, "Gambia: Alleged Terrorist Case Suffers Another Setback," *The Daily Observer (Banjul)*, October 19, 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200710190907.html>.

<sup>3872</sup> "Gambia."

## Togo

**Narrative Summary:** Togo has had only two rulers during our period of interest: (1) Eyadéma Gnassingbé, in power from 1967 until his death in 2005, and (2) his son Faure Gnassingbé. Togo has held elections regularly since 1993. However, lack of term limits, gerrymandering, and military loyalty make turnover of power from current leader Faure Gnassingbé unlikely.<sup>3873</sup>

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** High

**Explanation:** There were two additional groups that possibly met our criteria and one additional that likely met our criteria, excluded because of lack of information. Nothing about the perpetrators was ever known, so it would not be possible to code any information about the groups except small attack date.

**Rally of the Togolese People (RPT)** – Ruling political party in Togo since 1979.<sup>3874</sup> I found references to RPT militias, but since this is the ruling party, these militias would not challenge state authority. Excluded.

**Union of Forces for Change (UFC)** – Union of main opposition parties in Togo.<sup>3875</sup> Excluded.

**\*Rally for the Support for Development and Democracy (RSDD)** – A Togolese opposition party. Earliest participation in elections was 2002, but I found an earlier reference in 2001.<sup>3876</sup>

*Notice that searches in French revealed references to RPT militias, but not UFC militias.*

**Unidentified armed group (20TOG)** – An unidentified armed group killed the local head of the Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR) in Yoto. ACLED has falsely tagged this as involving civilians from Central African Republic. According to Amnesty, Kegbé Mathieu Koffi was extrajudicially executed by a group “close to the RPT [ruling party], whose members wear military fatigues... with the complicity of the security forces.”<sup>3877</sup> I could find no further information on this incident. It is excluded because of lack of information, and because it appears pro-state (killing opposition leaders). Follow up research using local sources would be desirable.

<sup>3873</sup> “Togo | Country Report | Freedom in the World | 2016,” Freedom House, accessed May 16, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/togo>.

<sup>3874</sup> “Togo - History,” Encyclopædia Britannica, June 12, 2015, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Togo/History>.

<sup>3875</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa, “Togo: Union Des Forces de Changement (UFC), Leaders and Activities,” Refworld, July 1, 1998, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac0a20.html>; Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa, “Togo: The Situation of Opposition Parties, Including the Union of Forces for Change (Union Des Forces de Changement, UFC), Particularly during and after the October 2007 Election; the Participation of the UFC in Political Life since October 2007 (October 2007 - July 2008),” Refworld, July 31, 2008, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/49b92b22c.html>; Ekoutiamé Ahlin, Tyson Roberts, and Kim Yi Dionne, “Most Togolese Support Term Limits. But They Just Re-Elected Their President for a Third Term,” Washington Post, accessed February 23, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/03/most-togolese-support-term-limits-but-they-just-re-elected-their-president-for-a-third-term/>.

<sup>3876</sup> “Elections in Togo,” African Elections Database, December 4, 2010, <http://africanelections.tripod.com/tg.html>; “La Détention de Trois Opposants à La Une Des Journaux,” PANA Press, August 31, 2001, <http://www.panapress.com/La-detention-de-trois-opposants-a-la-une-des-journaux--13-615653-17-lang4-index.html>.

<sup>3877</sup> “TOGO: Rule of Terror” (Amnesty International, May 4, 1999), 32, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr57/001/1999/en/>.

**Unidentified armed group (21TOG)** – On 16 AUG 1998, an unidentified armed group fired shots from Ghana into Togo. The government blamed the attack on supporters of opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio, living in self-imposed exile in Ghana.<sup>3878</sup> Olympio called the entire incident a farce, a “put-up show by the Togo government,” used to justify a political crackdown. He said it was “stupid” and inconsistent with the opposition strategy, which was to appeal to the European Union for their support. The EU had denounced the June 1998 election as “unfair,” and many believed that Olympio had actually won the election.<sup>3879</sup> I was inclined to believe Olympio’s claim that the whole incident was a farce for the following reasons: (1) The government never offered any evidence. In fact, they never even named the six people who were arrested in the incident.<sup>3880</sup> (2) The government’s explanation of the fighting is massively inconsistent. In some reports, Ministry of Interior and Security claims that assailants never made it past the border post at Afflao.<sup>3881</sup> AFP reports that the Ministry claims that assailants crossed over the border and were fighting in the Kodoviakope neighborhood, with some reports indicating that they were responsible for burning of three prominent UFC (opposition) members’ homes (located in Kodoviakope).<sup>3882</sup> Yet other reports say that the assailants from the border attack weren’t responsible for the arson, but someone else took

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<sup>3878</sup> John Zodzi, “Togo Links Exiled Politician to Border Shooting.,” *Reuters News*, August 19, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021216du8j014lq&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Minorities at Risk Project, “Chronology for Kabre in Togo,” Refworld, 2004, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38e9c.html>.

<sup>3879</sup> Harry Mouzalas, “Opposition Leader Says Togo ‘Attack’ Stage-Managed.,” *Reuters News*, August 18, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021216du8i00zir&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Francis Ahouadi, “Gunmen Battle with Togolese Troops in Capital Lome (ADDS Second Attack, Olympio Quote, Background),” *Agence France-Presse*, August 16, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010914du8g03m98&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “West Africa: Olympio Refutes Involvement in Togo Shooting Incident,” *Ghana Focus*, August 18, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199808180153.html>; “West Africa: Togolese Opposition Leader Denies Knowledge Of Incursion,” *Pan african News Agency (Dakar)*, August 17, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199808170163.html>.

<sup>3880</sup> “West Africa: Ghana Denies Involvement in Shooting Incident on Togo Border,” *Ghana Focus*, August 17, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199808170161.html>; “Ghana and Togo Make Arrests after Border Shooting.,” *Reuters News*, August 16, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021113du8g0370z&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “West Africa: Ghana Denies Role In Sunday’s Incursions Into Togo,” *Pan african News Agency (Dakar)*, August 17, 1998, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199808170162.html>; “Ghana Disavows Shooting Incident on Togo Border.,” *Reuters News*, August 17, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=lba0000020021216du8h00xot&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3881</sup> COMBIETE COMBEY, “Gunfire in Lome, Cross-Border Shelling from Ghana,” *Associated Press Newswires*, August 16, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=aprs000020010915du8g0f9vb&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Communique Thanks Ghanaian Leader for ‘Solidarity’ .,” *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, August 18, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010922du8i0039n&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3882</sup> “Capital Said Calm Again after Gunfire.,” *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, August 18, 1998, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010922du8i0039l&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Ahouadi, “Gunmen Battle with Togolese Troops in Capital Lome (ADDS Second Attack, Olympio Quote, Background);” “Attack on Togolese Border Post (ADDS More Quotes),” *Agence France-Presse*, August 16, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010914du8g03m46&cat=a&ep=ASE>; “Normal Life Resumes in the Togolese Capital after Weekend Attack,” *Agence France-Presse*, August 17, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010914du8h03mti&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Togo: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2000), <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/276.htm>.

advantage of the chaos to burn the homes.<sup>3883</sup> It would make no sense whatsoever for the assailants to burn the UFC members' homes if they were supporters of Olympio, as UFC is his party. Moreover, Amnesty International pins the arson attacks on Togolese security forces.<sup>3884</sup> Based on available information, I find it unlikely that this incident represents an organized attack on state security; if it were, we have insufficient information to code it. Follow up research using local sources would be desirable. Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (27TOG)** – An armed group attacked journalists at a press conference in the Be neighborhood of Lome. Attackers claimed to be part of 'Patriotic Youth of the Gulf,' but I could find no other reference to this group in either French or English language sources. Excluded because (1) the target was not a state official, and (2) information on the group is insufficient. Follow up research using local sources would be desirable.

**Unidentified armed group (54TOG)** – A fire burned the home of Chief Kpeni Aklesso in the Baguida neighborhood of Lome. The chief was a member of the ruling RPT, and the RPT claimed that the fire was part of an opposition-backed violent attack in Baguida aimed at acquiring secret stocks of voter cards. However, witnesses from among the chief's neighbors have signed affidavits alleging the fire was an accident not caused by an armed group. Opposition denied involvement in the attack.<sup>3885</sup> Excluded because it seems like an accident and because of lack of information.

**Unidentified armed group (69TOG)** – A group was arrested for throwing Molotov cocktails at a gendarme unit in Lome, and members of the group apparently confessed that opposition leader Harry Olympio ordered the attack.<sup>3886</sup> From reporting on the incident, there's three possible scenarios: (1) Harry Olympio actually authorized the attack – which he denies, (2) Olympio's supporters took it on themselves to organize the attack, and/or (3) the state planned or manipulated the event to target the opposition. After the event, Olympio went into exile and, as best I can tell, a warrant remains for his arrest in Togo. If scenarios one or two is true, we may want to include this armed group. Additional information would be ideal, as the level of planning/organization is unclear and there is insufficient information to code a group if it qualified. Excluded.

**Unidentified armed group (73TOG)** – Opposition politician Atsutse Kokouvi Agbobli was found dead, but circumstances surrounding his death remain sketchy at best. The government originally claimed he drowned, but after an autopsy claimed it was suicidal drug overdose. His family disputes that he was suicidal, and some claim that he was murdered by the National Intelligence Agency, with his body

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<sup>3883</sup> "Government Says Attacks on Political Leaders' Property Will Be Punished.," *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, August 20, 1998,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010922du8k003b6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3884</sup> "TOGO: Rule of Terror," 5.

<sup>3885</sup> Ebow Godwin, "Togo: Ethnic Colour in Togo Presidential Elections?," *Ghanaian Chronicle (Accra)*, April 6, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200504060759.html>.

<sup>3886</sup> "Togo : Harry Olympio Recherché," BBC News, March 15, 2006,

[http://www.bbc.co.uk/french/highlights/story/2006/03/060315\\_togo\\_harry.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/french/highlights/story/2006/03/060315_togo_harry.shtml); iciLome, "Règlements de Comptes à Lomé : L'opposant Harry Olympio En Fuite," iciLome, March 10, 2006,

<http://www.icilome.com/nouvelles/viewarticle.asp?idnews=6716>; amkiwi, "TOGO/ Attaque à Cocktail Molotov Contre La Gendarmerie. Harry Olympio Reconnaît Enfin Les Faits.," *Amkiwi: Le Blog de Kiwi* (blog), January 15, 2015, <https://amkiwi.wordpress.com/tag/harry-olympio-passe-aux-aveux/>; Jérôme Sossou, "Harry Olympio Dans Le Collimateur d'un Grand Officier de l'armée Togolaise," *Africetime.com*, May 13, 2013,

<http://fr.africetime.com/togo/articles/harry-olympio-dans-le-collimateur-dun-grand-officier-de-larmee-togolaise>; Abdel Moustapha, "HARRY OLYMPIO Rattrapé Par l'histoire," *Abdel Moustapha* (blog), March 28, 2013, <http://abdelinvestigateur.overblog.com/harry-olympio-rattrap%C3%A9-par-l-histoire>.



showing signs of torture. Either way, it seems safe to assume this was not the work of non-state actors.<sup>3887</sup> Exclude.

**Unidentified armed group (129TOG, 133TOG)** – Over several successive days in January 2013, arsonists destroyed major markets in Lomé and Kara, as well as smaller markets throughout the country. Again, it was never clear who set the fires – investigations dragged on and eventually stalled – but the government accused the opposition and arrested multiple opposition leaders.<sup>3888</sup> The attacks were clearly systematic and planned; the question is by whom. I could not determine this despite extensive searching. Follow up research using local sources would be desirable. Excluded due to lack of information.

**Unidentified armed group (205TOG)** – This ACLED event reports an attack on an STT meeting in Dapaong on 15 MAR 2015 by an armed group wielding studded clubs and machetes.<sup>3889</sup> STT appears to be a union of civil service workers, the focus in this case being on teachers. The attack on the meeting would be considered pro-government (STT teachers strike regularly in Dapaong). However, the attack was apparently in retaliation for a previous attack: on either 12 or 13 MAR, STT members attacked the director of the Public Primary School (EPP) Camp Gendarmerie. Reports on the attack vary: Some reference a car or caravan, while others say the attack occurred at the school itself. Some reports make it sound spontaneous, occurring because the director had failed to cooperate with STT objectives, while others say the assailants specifically targeted him to prevent him from submitting a list of striking

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<sup>3887</sup> Dominique Mataillet, “Atsutsè Agbobli A-t-Il Été Assassiné ?,” *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), November 17, 2008, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/188492/societe/atsuts-agbobli-a-t-il-t-assassin/>; iciLomé, “Togo - De Quoi Est Mort Atsutsé Agbobli ?,” *iciLomé*, August 16, 2016, <http://news.icilome.com/?idnews=826617&t=de-quoi-est-mort-atsutse-agbobli-?>; Sophie, “Togo : Assassinat d’ Atsutsé Kokouvi Agbobli En 2008 Par l’ANR. Les Auteurs de Crime Crapuleux, Toujours Libre Sous Le Régime de Faure Gnassingbé... | Actualité Au Togo, Afrique et Monde,” *27avril.Com* (blog), August 13, 2014, <http://www.27avril.com/blog/actualites/politiques/togo-assassinat-d-atsutse-kokouvi-agbobli-en-2008-les-auteurs-de-crime-crapuleux-courent-toujours-sous-le-regime-de-faure-gnassingbe>; “TOGO: Troublantes Révélation Sur l’assassinat de Atsutsé Agbobli,” *KOACI.com*, August 22, 2011, <http://koaci.com/togo-troublantes-revelations-l%E2%80%99assassinat-atsutse-agbobli-70022.html>.

<sup>3888</sup> RFI, “Togo: Le Bâtiment Principal Du Grand Marché de Lomé Ravagé Par Le Feu - RFI,” *RFI Afrique*, January 12, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130112-togo-grand-marche-lome-ravage-feu-incendie>; RFI, “Togo: Coup de Théâtre Dans l’enquête Sur Les Incendies de Lomé et Kara - RFI,” *RFI Afrique*, March 25, 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130325-togo-enquete-incendies-lome-kara-agbeyome-kodjo>; RFI, “Togo: 3 Ans Après l’incendie Du Marché de Lomé, Personne n’a Été Jugé - RFI,” *RFI Afrique*, January 14, 2016, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160114-togo-3-ans-apres-incendie-marche-lome-personne-ete-juge>; Jeune Afrique, “France - Togo : Incendies de Kara et Lomé, Le Rapport Qui Dérange,” *JeuneAfrique.Com* (blog), April 18, 2013, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/137727/politique/france-togo-incendies-de-kara-et-lom-le-rapport-qui-d-erange/>; AFP, “Suspicious Fires Fan Political Flames in Togo Vote,” *Text.Article*, Fox News, July 24, 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/24/suspicious-fires-fan-political-flames-in-togo-vote.html>; “Mémorandum de Synergie-Togo, Deux Ans Après Les Incendies Des Marchés,” *Fabbikouassi’s Blog* (blog), January 27, 2015, <https://fabbikouassi.wordpress.com/2015/01/27/memorandum-de-synergie-togo-deux-ans-apres-les-incendies-des-marches/>.

<sup>3889</sup> iciLomé, “Dapaong : Des fonctionnaires membres de la STT attaques par des miliciens,” March 16, 2015, <http://news.icilome.com/?idnews=803255&t=violentes-explosions-sur-une-base-des-fmm-a-mora>; “TOGO: Des Enseignants Blessés Par Des Gens Armés de Gourdins Cloutés et de Machette à Dapaong,” March 16, 2015, [http://www.togosite.com/index.php/togo/1065-togo-des-enseignants-blesses-par-des-gens-armes-de-gourdins-cloutes-et-de-machette-a-dapaong?fb\\_comment\\_id=825736564187513\\_826239017470601#f19eab3f5a98e84](http://www.togosite.com/index.php/togo/1065-togo-des-enseignants-blesses-par-des-gens-armes-de-gourdins-cloutes-et-de-machette-a-dapaong?fb_comment_id=825736564187513_826239017470601#f19eab3f5a98e84); Kofi Yamgnane, “GOUVERNEMENT TOGOLAIS= GOUVERNEMENT VOYOU!,” March 16, 2015, <http://www.sursauttogo.org/2015/03/gouvernement-togolais-gouvernement-voyou.html>; Afreepress, “Le Gouvernement Ferme « temporairement » Les Établissements Scolaires de Dapaong,” *Agence Afreepress*, March 16, 2015, <http://afreepress.info/archives/index.php/world/technology/item/1581-le-gouvernement-ferme-temporairement-les-%C3%A9tablissements-scolaires-de-dapaong>.



teachers to the Ministry of Education.<sup>3890</sup> It is unclear whether the attack was planned or spontaneous. There were only local reports. Given that little information could be verified, this event is excluded. The STT and students acting in support of STT have been associated with other violence, especially in Dapaong, but most of it seems to be spontaneous, either retaliatory or while demonstrating.<sup>3891</sup>

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<sup>3890</sup> iciLome, “Dapaong : Des fonctionnaires membres de la STT attaques par des miliciens”; “DAPAONG : L’autre Version Des Évènements.,” focusInfos, March 17, 2015, <http://www.focusinfos.net/index.php/2014-03-03-12-54-33/item/506-dapaong-l-autre-version-des-evenements>; Togoface, “Election Présidentielle Du 25 Avril 2015 ODDH et Société Civile Craignent Des Impacts Fâcheux de La Grogne de La STT Sur Le Scrutin,” *Togoface* (blog), April 6, 2015, <http://togoface.blogspot.com/2015/04/election-presidentielle-du-25-avril.html>; “TOGO: Des Enseignants Blessés Par Des Gens Armés de Gourdins Cloutés et de Machette à Dapaong.”

<sup>3891</sup> Afreepress, “Le Gouvernement Ferme « Temporairement » Les Établissements Scolaires de Dapaong”; Yamgnane, “GOUVERNEMENT TOGOLAIS= GOUVERNEMENT VOYOU!”; MTN, “Tensions Sociales: Le Ministre BISSOUNE NABAGOU Agressé À Mango ; Un Élève Mort À Dapaong.,” *Mouvement Pour Un Togo Nouveau*, April 15, 2013, <http://mtn-togo.org/?p=2808>; “Bissoune Nabagou Blessé À Barkoissi,” *BNN - Africa News, Blog & Notes*, April 15, 2013, <https://africanews.mivasocial.com/actualites-afrique/2013/04/15/bissoune-nabagou-blesse-a-barkoissi/>; “Des Centaines D’élèves Armés Dans Les Rues de Lomé.,” March 17, 2015, <http://www.focusinfos.net/index.php/2014-03-03-12-54-33/item/505-des-centaines-d-eleves-armes-dans-les-rues-de-lome>; “Violente Manifestation À Dapaong, Yark Damehame Gifle Un Enseignant - Togoactualite,” *Actualité Togo*, accessed February 24, 2017, <http://www.togoactualite.com/violente-manifestation-a-dapaong-yark-damehame-gifle-un-enseignant/>.

## Tunisia

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**Background:** Tunisia saw relatively little instability in the years leading up to 2011. However, following the ouster of longtime leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011 in the Arab Spring, increased instability occurred. Following Independence, however, there was a marked rise in Salafist groups in the country, led by Anshar Al-Sharia in Tunisia. These took advantage of the much freer landscape to advocate for their beliefs. After that group's banning in 2013, the momentum switched over to other radical groups, including branches of Al-Qaeda and ISIL. Due in large part to the secularism of the country, many of Tunisia's radicals have focused outwards, and fought in conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and most recently Syria and Libya.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** low

**Explanation:** Prior to 2011, there was very little rebel activity in Tunisia, in large part due to Ben-Ali's strong surveillance state. Events in Tunisia are covered widely by international and domestic media. Due to this intensive press coverage, I had little concern of missing a group in the post Arab spring period.

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### Al-Qaeda

Excluded as it was formed in Pakistan and before the start date of this dataset.

### Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST)

Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia was a Tunisian Islamist organization that began in the post 2011 environment in which many religious organizations were legalized. The group was originally founded as a Salafi political (nonviolent) pressure group April 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011, following the revolution that overthrew Ben Ali.<sup>3892</sup> However, I did not use April, 2011 as the start date for attacks in the codebook because I found no evidence showing that the group had initially intended on being violent on its start date.

I decided to code the group as starting in September of 2012, as they would carry out their first attack later on the US Embassy that month.<sup>3893</sup> This was the first time I was able to find of them planning to taking part in violence aimed against the state. The group had perpetrated *hisba* moral policing attacks before this event, but these were not directed against the state and instead generally aimed at various civil society/political groups. The group had been operating out in the open prior to becoming violent (it was not clandestine).<sup>3894</sup>

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<sup>3892</sup> "The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia's Nascent Democracy." *UMCI News*. December 9, 2011.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=UMCIN00020111208e7c900001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3893</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 141. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3894</sup> "The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia's Nascent Democracy." *UMCI News*. December 9, 2011.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=UMCIN00020111208e7c900001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

The AST sought to create an Islamic State in Tunisia.<sup>3895</sup> However, rather uniquely for a Salafist group, it sought to first re-introduce Islam to the country following decades of secular governance before taking steps to establish an Islamic State. AST had previously been founded as a peaceful Salafist political organization that sought to remake Tunisia more in line with Islamic law.<sup>3896</sup>

Due to the fact that the group's leadership was centered in Tunis, I coded the "rural" variable as a "0".<sup>3897</sup> I coded the group as satisfying the "planning\_inside" variable, because I found no evidence saying that AST was founded or planned from outside of Tunisia. The group did not receive support from other countries nor oil or diamonds, or other outside sources.

The group's first small attack appears to have been their attack against the US embassy in 2012, which was conducted in response to release of the Anti-Islamic movie *The Innocence of Muslims*.<sup>3898</sup> Even though a number of *hisba* moral policing attacks had been carried out prior to this event, these were not directed against the state. This was in large part due to the fact that AST did not seek to alienate the moderate Islamist El-Ennahda party, and went after targets on the secular left instead. Even though no deaths took place in this attack, parts of the mob nearly killed members of the embassy motor pool as well as inadvertently cause a mass casualty event due to the fact that the embassies densely packed safe room filled up with smoke.<sup>3899</sup>

I did not code the group as perpetrating a large attack since I found no evidence of it engaging in any attack that led to the deaths of over 25 people. I decided to code the first civilian attacks as taking place on October 28<sup>th</sup> 2012, when AST members tried to stab alcohol vendors.<sup>3900</sup> I did not decide to code the attacks aimed at the embassy drivers as civilian attacks because they were attacked as employees of the US embassy.

Members of AST leadership had taken part in global jihadist conflicts ever since the 1980s. Some, such as Sami Isid Bin Khamis, having fought with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.<sup>3901</sup> Others, such as Mahdi Kamun, fought in Chechnya.<sup>3902</sup> Most, however, had served within the Tunisian Combatant Group in the early 2000s. There were a large number of protests throughout Tunisia in the yearlong period before the formation of the group according to ACLED.<sup>3903</sup>

The organization largely ceased to exist after the Tunisian government declared it illegal in late August of 2013.<sup>3904</sup> While its online propaganda arm continued to exist for about a year afterwards, it was banned from organizing events in Tunisia, and many of its leaders were arrested the following year.

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<sup>3895</sup> "The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia's Nascent Democracy." *UMCI News*. December 9, 2011.

<sup>3896</sup> "The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia's Nascent Democracy." *UMCI News*. December 9, 2011.

<sup>3897</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 159. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3898</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 141. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3899</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 160. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3900</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 169. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3901</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 47. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3902</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 51. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

<sup>3903</sup> ACLED \_\_\_\_\_ INSTERT CITATION.

<sup>3904</sup> Zelin, Aaron Y. *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad*. New York, UNITED STATES: Columbia University Press, 2020: 177. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gwu/detail.action?docID=5763882>.

### Jund Al-Khalifa (Algeria) *Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria*

Group founded in Algeria as Algerian branch of ISIL in 2014 from dissatisfied members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.<sup>3905</sup> Even though it operates in Algerian-Tunisian borderland, it was primarily viewed as an Algerian group, and I decided to code it as such.

### Jund Al-Khalifa (Tunisia) *Soldiers of the Caliphate in Tunisia (JAK)*

AKA Jund Al-Khilafah

Jund Al-Khalifa, Tunisia was an ISIL affiliate that operated in Tunisia during the 2010s.<sup>3906</sup> Excluded because it began as a splinter group of OIB over the debate of what direction that Islamism should take following the rise of ISIL.<sup>3907</sup>

### League for the Protection of the Revolution

Excluded as group served as armed as it was reported to be an armed force of the Islamicist Ennahdha political party, which was in government at the time.<sup>3908</sup> Due to the fact that the group did not operate against the government, I decide not to code it as a rebel group force.

### Mujahideen Tunisia Kairouan (MTK)

The group appears to have been founded as part of the general upswing of ISIL affiliated activity in Tunisia that took place following the declaration of the caliphate in Iraq in June of 2014.<sup>3909</sup> The group published a video announcing its existence on May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2015.<sup>3910</sup> Due to limited information about this group, several variables are coded as missing.

We included this group because it sought to overthrow the Tunisian government and create a caliphate on behalf of ISIL.<sup>3911</sup> I was unable to code any of the variables regarding organization history because I lacked detailed information about members of the group. The group has some connection to

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<sup>3905</sup> "Algerian Paper Report on 'Splits' among 'Terrorist' Groups in the Country." *BBC Monitoring Middle East*. September 14, 2014.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMEP0020140914ea9e004jy&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3906</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 106. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

<sup>3907</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 106. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

<sup>3908</sup> "Tunisia: Assassination Roils Tunisia." *Asia News Monitor*, Feb 11, 2013. <http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/1285370426?accountid=11311>.

<sup>3909</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 106. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

<sup>3910</sup> "Tunisia Terrorist Cell Promises More Attacks in Video." Accessed July 25, 2020.

EDT, Simon Speakman Cordall On 6/29/15 at 12:24 PM. "Tunisian Terror Cell Promises More Bloodshed in New Video." *Newsweek*, June 29, 2015. <https://www.newsweek.com/tunisia-terror-attacktunisia-tourist-massacretunisia-beach-massacreisis-603049>.

<sup>3911</sup> EDT, Simon Speakman Cordall On 6/29/15 at 12:24 PM. "Tunisian Terror Cell Promises More Bloodshed in New Video." *Newsweek*, June 29, 2015. <https://www.newsweek.com/tunisia-terror-attacktunisia-tourist-massacretunisia-beach-massacreisis-603049>.

Kairouan, such as including the city in its name. This connection to Kairouan is further reinforced by the fact the assailant responsible for the group's only attack, Seifeddine Rezgui, was a student at the University of Kairouan.<sup>3912</sup> I lacked enough information to code any of the variables relating to initial resource base.

MTK's first attack appears to be on June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2015 as fulfilling the small attack, large attack, and civilian attack variables. I decided to code this attack as a civilian attack because it targeted Western tourists on vacation at a hotel in Sousse.<sup>3913 3914</sup> Even though this attack did not target employees of the Tunisian government, it appears to have been a political attack. MTK, like other Tunisians groups, attacked tourists to weaken the government and economy.<sup>3915</sup> This also counted as a large attack as there were 39 casualties.

Some sources, including GTD, attributed the attacks to Jund Al-Khalifa. This is in large part because JAK released a tweet claiming responsibility for the Sousse attack. However, because MTK later released a video featuring Rezgui prior to the attack, I am much more inclined to view them as responsible for the attack.<sup>3916</sup> I did not find enough information to determine what the prior backgrounds of the group leadership had. There were numerous riots as well as protests that took place in Tunisia in the lead up to the group's formation.<sup>3917</sup>

### Okba Ibn-Nafaa Brigade (OIB)

Excluded because I determined it is a splinter of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a group that originates from Algeria.<sup>3918</sup> Several media reports reported the group as being a branch of AQIM.<sup>3919</sup> These corroborated reports from the Tunisian government, which also viewed the group as a subgroup of AQIM in the country.<sup>3920</sup> Moreover, it was reported that the group was founded when the leader of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdal, sent representatives to Tunisia to help organize a branch of the group there

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<sup>3912</sup> EDT, Simon Speakman Cordall On 6/29/15 at 12:24 PM. "Tunisian Terror Cell Promises More Bloodshed in New Video." Newsweek, June 29, 2015. <https://www.newsweek.com/tunisia-terror-attacktunisia-tourist-massacretunisia-beach-massacreisis-603049>.

<sup>3913</sup> EDT, Simon Speakman Cordall On 6/29/15 at 12:24 PM. "Tunisian Terror Cell Promises More Bloodshed in New Video." Newsweek, June 29, 2015. <https://www.newsweek.com/tunisia-terror-attacktunisia-tourist-massacretunisia-beach-massacreisis-603049>.

<sup>3914</sup> Watanabe, Lisa. "Islamic State in North Africa: Still There, Struggling to Expand." *Middle East Policy* 24, no. 2 (2017): 140. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12274>.

<sup>3915</sup> EDT, Simon Speakman Cordall On 6/29/15 at 12:24 PM. "Tunisian Terror Cell Promises More Bloodshed in New Video." Newsweek, June 29, 2015. <https://www.newsweek.com/tunisia-terror-attacktunisia-tourist-massacretunisia-beach-massacreisis-603049>.

<sup>3916</sup> EDT, Simon Speakman Cordall On 6/29/15 at 12:24 PM. "Tunisian Terror Cell Promises More Bloodshed in New Video." Newsweek, June 29, 2015. <https://www.newsweek.com/tunisia-terror-attacktunisia-tourist-massacretunisia-beach-massacreisis-603049>.

<sup>3917</sup> The Strauss Center. "Database." Accessed August 10, 2020. <https://www.strausscenter.org/ccaps-research-areas/social-conflict/database/>.

<sup>3918</sup> Sage, Andre Le., and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Strategic Forum No. 268. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2011.

<sup>3919</sup> Souissi, Mounir. "Tunisia Links Two Wanted Jihadist Groups to Al-Qaeda." *Agence France Presse*. May 7, 2013. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020130507e9570054g&cat=a&ep=ASE>.  
Bouazza, Bouazza Ben. "Tunisia Arrests 32 Suspected of Plotting Attacks." *Associated Press Newswires*. February 8, 2015. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020150208eb28002xl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3920</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 106. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

following the overthrow of Ben Ali regime in 2011.<sup>3921</sup> This decision is further reinforced by the fact that OIB was led by Algerians, which suggests that it was not a homegrown group but instead a branch of AQIM operating in Tunisia.<sup>3922</sup>

In 2013, the spokesperson of AQIM, Ahmed Abu Abdullah Al Djazairi, claimed that the group was not a branch of AQIM ran by Algerians, but instead a homegrown Tunisian group.<sup>3923</sup> However, it is in AQIM's interest that Tunisians viewed OIB as a homegrown group rather than one led by foreigners, which casts doubt on this claim, especially given the evidence above pointing in the opposite direction.

### Tunisian Islamic Combatant Group (TICG)

The TICG acted as a group which sought to give opportunities for Tunisians in the diaspora to wage jihad abroad in Afghanistan.<sup>3924</sup> Excluded because it did not take actions to challenge the power of the Tunisian state.

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<sup>3921</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 104. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

<sup>3922</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 104. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

<sup>3923</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 105. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.

<sup>3924</sup> Lounnas, Djallil. "The Tunisian Jihad: Between al-Qaeda and ISIS." *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 99. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12403>.



## Uganda

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**Background:** As of 2018, Uganda has been ruled by Yoweri Museveni and his National Revolutionary Movement since 1986, when he took power from Milton Obote following the conclusion of the Ugandan Bush War. After 1986, there was continued insurgency in the north of the country with the national military (the Uganda People's Defense Force – UPDF) fighting the Lord's Resistance Army and other insurgent groups. Most of these groups are not counted in our dataset, however, since they began before 1997. There is a fair degree of politicization regarding reporting on insurgent forces in Uganda, with the government oftentimes tying opposition members to supposed insurgent groups. This often takes place along ethnic lines.

### **Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups: Medium**

**Explanation:** Throughout the research, there was very little information in ACLED on certain groups that emerged in Eastern Uganda in response to the referendum scheduled in the year 2000. Given this possibility, it is possible that another group mobilized during this time with the goal of achieving some sort of autonomy from the Ugandan state. Furthermore, due to the nature of very small Ugandan rebel groups popping up from time to time, I rule it as possible that another small group popped up, especially in an area where the Ugandan state's control was weaker.

#### **Allied Democratic Forces (ADF):**

Excluded as it was founded in 1995, before the start of the dataset. The organization is Islamist in nature.<sup>3925</sup>

#### **ADF-NALU:**

Excluded as group formed in 1996 before the start of the dataset.<sup>3926</sup>

#### **Anti-Referendum Army (ARA)**

Group that was started in the latter half of 1999 in response to the Ugandan Parliament's passage of the bill finalizing the 2000 referendum.<sup>3927</sup> This group is ultimately excluded since it did not appear to conduct violence against the state.

#### **Citizen's Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP)<sup>3928</sup>**

Coding this group was a challenge due to the relative lack of information on it. The group was first named when it left a note stating its name and its goal after its first attack on a police station near the town of

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<sup>3925</sup> "ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF) | United Nations Security Council," accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/entity/allied-democratic-forces-%28adf%29>.

<sup>3926</sup> Rubin, Barry M. *Chronologies of Modern Terrorism* /. Armonk, N.Y. :, c2008: 152. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015073669718>.

<sup>3927</sup> *World Report 2000*. Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

<sup>3928</sup> Day, Christopher R. "The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda." *Comparative Politics* 43, no. 4 (2011): 439-58. Accessed May 14, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/23040638](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23040638).

Lira on May 31, 1999.<sup>3929</sup> I decided to give the group a lower certainty of occurrence, even though it was mentioned in multiple news reports, due to the fact that some in the Ugandan media were suspicious of its existence.<sup>3930</sup> Due to the fact that the group stated in its letter that it was seeking to restore multiparty politics to Uganda, I coded its goal as “goal\_take.” I was unable to find any information on what the group originated from or how it got its funding, so I marked these variables as unknown. The only other defining information I was able to find out about the group was in regard to its leadership. The group was reportedly led by Smith Opon Acak, who was formerly the Ugandan Military Chief of Staff under Obote.<sup>3931</sup> Due to this, I decided to code the group’s leaders as consisting of former security. Acak had been in exile in Kenya before returning to Uganda, but I was unable to find any information regarding his time in exile. Acak was killed in a raid on the group’s supposed headquarters, where 43 rebels were. The group’s 60 remaining members surrendered on December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1999 in Lira.<sup>3932</sup> Lira is coded as satisfying the “rural” variable as a 1. In the reports regarding the surrender, there was no information divulged regarding the formation of the group, nor anything regarding the group members. Due to the lack of reference to any group with that name following 1999, I decided to code the group as not achieving viability.<sup>3933</sup> The decision to include this group, and its non-viability, is corroborated by Lewis (2020).

According to the SCAD, there was only one event involving action against the military/ government that occurred in Uganda in the year prior to the group’s formation (interpreted as January 1, 1999). This was a type 4 event, where Sudanese POWs rioted and alleged illegal detention. There were no local events.

### Equatorial Nile People's Liberation Army (ENPLA)

Excluded as group appears to be founded in 1996. Primarily derived support from Karamoja in Western Uganda.<sup>3934</sup> Unclear if it committed violence against the Ugandan state.

### Lord's Resistance Army:

Excluded as the group was formed in 1987, before dataset started.<sup>3935</sup>

### March 23 Movement (M-23):

<sup>3929</sup> “Uganda; Rebels’ Invade Lira, Kill Cop.” Accessed August 2, 2020. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=c9448714-ebf9-4c57-82ce-08d0fb028576&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3WM4-V590-0040-T1BP-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=8320&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecom=gb63k&earg=sr0&prid=e1d939c2-2ceb-4925-b594-59bedfb88cd8>.

<sup>3930</sup> Akaki, Sam. “Govt’s Master ‘Plan to Rig Again’ - (PRA).” *All Africa*. December 10, 2004. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020041212e0ca000g0&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3931</sup> “Slain Ex-Army Chief ‘Planning Attack,’” *The New Humanitarian*, July 21, 1999, <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/1999/07/21/slain-ex-army-chief-planning-attack>.

<sup>3932</sup> “Overall Commander of Northern-Based Rebel Group Reportedly Surrenders.” *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, December 13, 1999. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010901dvcd002bn&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3933</sup> “Overall Commander of Northern-Based Rebel Group Reportedly Surrenders.” *BBC Monitoring Service: Africa*, December 13, 1999. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=bbcaf00020010901dvcd002bn&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3934</sup> “Horn of Africa Review July 20 - August 30 1996.” Accessed April 22, 2020. [http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue\\_web/hoa0896.htm](http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/hoa0896.htm).

<sup>3935</sup> Dunn, Kevin C. “Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army.” *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 99 (2004): 139. Accessed April 22, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/4006946](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006946).

Excluded as main area of operation was D.R. Congo, not Uganda.<sup>3936</sup>

#### National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU):

Excluded as it formed in 1988, before the beginning of the dataset.<sup>3937</sup>

#### National Democratic Army (NDA)

Excluded as group was in existence in 1995.<sup>3938</sup>

#### People's Redemption Army (PRA)

The PRA is a supposed Ugandan rebel group that was based out of the Eastern Congo.<sup>3939</sup> Deciding whether to include it or not in the dataset was a challenging decision. However, the coder decided to discount it as he could find no evidence of it planning attacks against the government or taking any offensive action in general. The Ugandan government, and the UPDF in particular, have made it a point to emphasize the potential threat posed by the PRA. This has been coupled with the claims being made that members of the opposition and media have links to this group.<sup>3940</sup>

#### Revolutionary Movement of the Congo (MRC):

Excluded as group's main area of operation was D.R. Congo, not Uganda.<sup>3941</sup>

#### Sabaot Land Defense Forces:

Excluded as group was founded in Kenya<sup>3942</sup>.

#### Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA):

Group excluded as base of operations in Sudan/South Sudan.

#### Uganda National Freedom Movement (UNAFREMO)

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<sup>3936</sup> "Q&A: Who Are DR Congo's M23 Rebels?," accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/201382411593336904.html>.

<sup>3937</sup> PRUNIER, GÉRARD. "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo (1986–99)." In *Readings in the International Relations of Africa*, edited by Tom Young. 181–91. Indiana University Press, 2015. Accessed April 22, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19dzd3j.19](http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19dzd3j.19).

<sup>3938</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Refworld | The Leader in Refugee Decision Support," Refworld, accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.refworld.org/>.

<sup>3939</sup> "People's Daily Online -- Uganda Deploys Troops along on Congo Border," accessed April 22, 2020, [http://en.people.cn/200412/02/eng20041202\\_165928.html](http://en.people.cn/200412/02/eng20041202_165928.html).

<sup>3940</sup> "Uganda / Anti-Terrorist Unit Holding Radio Journalist Who Disappeared Two Weeks Ago." *African Press Organisation Database of Press Releases Related to Africa*, Jul 26, 2011. <http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/878945624?accountid=11311>.

<sup>3941</sup> CRG. "Coalitions and Defections in a Context of Uncertainty – A Report from Ituri (Part II)." Congo Research Group | Groupe d'Etude Sur le Congo. Accessed August 2, 2020. <http://congoresearchgroup.org/coalitions-and-defections-in-context-of-27/>.

<sup>3942</sup> "Kenya: Army and Rebel Militia Commit War Crimes in Mt. Elgon." Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2008. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/02/kenya-army-and-rebel-militia-commit-war-crimes-mt-elgon#>.

## Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II)

**Ugandan Patriotic Front (UPF)**

There were attempts to link regional northern politicians, including Norbert Mao, to the group.<sup>3946</sup> However, these charges were soon dropped, and Museveni himself stated that he did not suspect any Ugandan politicians of being tied to the movement. While the group was counted as having a large number of automatic weapons, including sub machine guns and assault rifles, this is not particularly noteworthy in Northern Uganda. The region has a large number of weapons circulating throughout it largely due to the LRA insurgency.<sup>3947</sup>

### Uganda Salvation Front (USF):

Excluded: determined to be a splinter of the LRA.

<sup>3949</sup> This is not to be confused with the Ugandan Branch of the Salvation Army, a Christian nonprofit organization. The fact that both of these organizations operate in Uganda caused some initial confusion for the coder.

In the first media report on the group from January of 1997, the group's spokesman, Richard Matsanga, claimed that the group is received funding from three Asian Ugandans who are dissatisfied with the Museveni government because they lost money trying to get their land back that had been confiscated from them by Idi Amin.<sup>3950</sup> Matsanga also served as a spokesman for the LRA during this time period.

The next time we hear about the group is over a year later, when the group was reported to carry out its first attack against a prison in August of 1998 in the Sironko district of Eastern Uganda in which it abducted 110 prisoners.<sup>3951</sup> When they claimed responsibility for this assault, however, they instead claimed they had launched this attack to protest the Museveni regime's militarism.<sup>3952</sup> The next mention of the group comes 8 months later in April of 1999, when David Matsanga announced that he was no longer affiliated with the LRA and instead had control of his own rebel group, the USF. He made no mention of Asian backers and simply talked about how he wanted to remove the Museveni regime from power.<sup>3953</sup>

In coverage of his announcement that he was not giving up his position, Matsanga received a lot of criticism from fellow members of the LRA affiliated Ugandan émigré community in London. He was portrayed as someone who was obsessed with self-publicity, and those affiliated with the LRA denied he was ever a spokesperson for the group.<sup>3954</sup>

#### West Nile Bank Front (WNBf):

Excluded as group formed in 1994, before the start of the dataset.<sup>3955</sup>

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<sup>3950</sup> "Bodies of Abducted Uganda Officials Recovered." *Agence France-Presse*, January 27, 1997.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020011009dt1r0099j&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3951</sup> "Hostile to Democracy," accessed April 28, 2020, [https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uganda/Uganweb-09.htm#P1390\\_303363](https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uganda/Uganweb-09.htm#P1390_303363).

<sup>3952</sup> "Ugandan Security Forces Arrest 31 over Raids on Jail, Police." *Agence France-Presse*, September 10, 1998. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010915du9a004sn&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3953</sup> "Top Ugandan Rebel Official Quits by Anna Borzello." *Agence France-Presse*, April 5, 1999.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afpr000020010825dv4500tmu&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3954</sup> "Kony Names Woman PRO." *All Africa*, May 27, 1999.

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=afnws00020021113dv5r0080m&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3955</sup> Pike, John. "Military." West Nile Bank Front [WNBf]. Accessed April 22, 2020.

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/wbnf.htm>.

## Western Sahara

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**Narrative Summary:** *Western Sahara is not a country formally recognized by the UN, and exists today officially as a disputed territory, with roughly 20% of the area being controlled by the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, with the remainder being under the administrative control of neighboring Morocco. The region was formerly a Spanish colony; after the Spanish transferred administrative control to Morocco the government of Mauritania declared war over the territory based on their own claims to the area. At the same time, the militant Polisario Front began fighting both countries and declared themselves a government in exile for the SADR in Algeria. In 1991, the UN helped broker a deal for the Moroccan government and the SADR to share administrative responsibility for the territory. In the years since, a vast majority of anti-government violence in Western Sahara has been from the Polisario Front and other pro-autonomy and pro-independence citizens in the territory. No UN member state officially recognizes Morocco's claim to the region.*

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** *Only one event in ACLED was associated with an unidentified group, as is described below. It appears that all instances of anti-government violence observed within the territory can be attributed to the Polisario Front, unaffiliated pro-independence individuals/groups, or representative persons/cells of international Jihadist/Salafist groups.*

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### Saharawi Jihadi Front

The timeline for the formation of this group (named for violence along the Moroccan/Western Saharan border) is unclear, although multiple media sources have noted that it may be a “cell” closely linked to the Polisario Front and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM).<sup>39563957</sup> This appears to be part of a concerted effort by an alliance between the Polisario and AQIM to support and engage in violent activity against the Moroccan government and its claims to sovereignty over the region.<sup>3958</sup> Because this group is likely operating a splinter or cell of one of these two organizations, they are excluded from the dataset.

### Al Qaeda

Likely splinter or franchise cell – see Morocco, Libya.

### Polisario Front

The Polisario Front is a named group in ACLED having committed violence Western Sahara citizens (event 167MOR). The group is a liberation movement hoping to end Moroccan presence in the disputed territory of Western Sahara, but they have been in conflict with the Moroccan government since just after the annexation of

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<sup>3956</sup> “New Revelations about Polisario Element, Member of Busted Terror Cell | The North Africa Post,” accessed July 5, 2020, <https://northafricapost.com/22297-new-revelations-polisario-element-member-busted-terror-cell.html>.

<sup>3957</sup> “Morocco Busts 3-Member Terrorist Cell Including Polisario Member | The North Africa Post,” accessed July 5, 2020, <https://northafricapost.com/22283-morocco-busts-3-member-terrorist-cell-including-polisario-member.html>.

<sup>3958</sup> “Unlikely Bedfellows: Are Some Saharan Marxists Joining al Qaeda Operations in North Africa? – Foreign Policy,” accessed July 5, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/03/unlikely-bedfellows-are-some-saharan-marxists-joining-al-qaeda-operations-in-north-africa/>.



Western Sahara by Morocco in 1975.<sup>3959</sup> Because the group was clearly founded before 1997, they are excluded from our dataset.

#### Unidentified Armed Group (event 183MOR)

ACLED recorded a group of youths who threw Molotov cocktails at police officers in Western Sahara as an unidentified armed group.<sup>3960</sup> The AP bulletin cites on-going pro-independence demonstrations by Saharawi people in connection with the incident, but there is no evidence that this attack is anything but an isolated incident of violence. There is evidence of other Islamist groups fomenting dissent in the territory<sup>3961</sup> so the aggressors may have been associated with these groups.

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<sup>3959</sup> Lederer, “Morocco and Polisario at Odds over Disputed Western Sahara.”

<sup>3960</sup> JOHN THORNE, “3 Police Officers Treated for Burns after Attack in Western Sahara,” *Associated Press Newswires*, July 2, 2007,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070702e37200dyt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3961</sup> “Unlikely Bedfellows: Are Some Saharan Marxists Joining al Qaeda Operations in North Africa? – Foreign Policy.”

## Zambia

**Narrative Summary:** President Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) governed Zambia from independence until their loss in the 1991 general elections, the first multiparty elections since Zambia had become a one-party state in 1973. Zambia witnessed peaceful transitions of power from UNIP to Frederick Chiluba and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) in 1991 and from MMD to Michael Sata and the Patriotic Front (PF) in 2011. Unsuccessful coup attempts took place in 1982 and 1997, but they neither resulted from nor led to the creation of rebels outside the state apparatus. Aside from unsubstantiated government claims about rebels organizing for Barotseland's secession, Zambia has not had any major domestic rebel activity, though its geographic proximity to and involvement in regional conflicts and civil wars has periodically led to foreign rebel activity within its borders.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Low

**Explanation:** Despite the lack of publicly named rebel groups during the period of question, 32.5 percent of Zambia's 200 events in our winnowed ACLED dataset involved unidentified Zambian armed groups. Many of the unidentified groups' events clearly were not attacks targeting the Zambian state, though several involved attacks on politicians and election-related violence. All but 2 of the 16 GTD incidents recorded from 1997 to 2015 involved Angolan UNITA rebels. SCAD also does not include any events suggestive of Zambian rebel activity other than the January 2011 riots in Mongu which saw police and supporters of political autonomy for Barotseland engage in violent clashes. The apparent lack of actual rebel attacks on state targets does not rule out the possibility that small Zambian groups meeting our inclusion criteria formed but only planned attacks without carrying them out, most likely extremists within the broader Barotse separatist movement, but there is not substantial evidence pointing toward such unidentified rebel organizations.

### Barotseland Freedom Movement (BFM)

Emerging in late 2010, the Barotseland Freedom Movement (BFM), also referred to as the Barotse Freedom Movement, is a group dedicated to achieving political autonomy or full independence for Barotseland, the western region of Zambia.<sup>3962</sup> While the police fired on Barotse protesters, killing several, in January 2011 and arrested Barotse secessionist leaders in September 2012, the surveyed sources did not report any instances of the BFM or other Barotse secessionist groups violently challenging the state.<sup>3963</sup> The BFM was part of the Groups Liaison Committee (GLC) which sought to negotiate with the government for the restoration of the 1964 Barotseland Agreement, which had guaranteed the area some political autonomy.<sup>3964</sup>

President Michael Sata, who had pledged to restore the Barotseland Agreement during his 2011 presidential campaign, deployed the army to Western Province after alleging that the Barotseland Liberation Army (BLA) was recruiting hundreds of former soliders, police officers,

<sup>3962</sup> "Litunga Disowns Secessionists," *All Africa*, October 26, 2010,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020101026e6aq000ru&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3963</sup> "13 Barotse Activists Arrested," *All Africa*, September 11, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120911e89b000jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Whitney Mulobela, "Who Gave Police Authority to Shoot," *All Africa*, November 4, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS0002011104e7b4000v1&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Bob Sianjalika, "Barotse Shooting - Was Death Avoidable? [Analysis]," *All Africa*, March 4, 2011,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020110304e7340014c&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3964</sup> Kaiko Namusa, "Mbundas, Nkoyas Hail Ngambela Resignation," *All Africa*, November 16, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020121116e8bg000ra&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

and poachers in preparation for an armed uprising.<sup>3965</sup> The BFM and other peaceful Barotse groups rejected Sata's claims. The BLA itself, if it ever existed, never issued any public statements or carried out any attacks, nor did the state ever publicly present conclusive evidence of the group. Excluded.

#### Christian Militia (Zambia)

In 2014, a Christian bishop and his followers attacked a Zambian magistrate and her husband in a land dispute (852ZAM). Excluded.

#### Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)

The FDD is an opposition political party. The only incident in ACLED was an election-related clash between FDD and MMD supporters in September 2001 (82ZAM). Excluded.

#### Lunda Ethnic Militia (Zambia) and Luvale Ethnic Militia (Zambia)

Militias of the Lunda and Luvale ethnic groups clashed over school language policy in 2015, killing a ward councilor (943ZAM). Excluded.

#### Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MDD)

Ruling party from 1991 to 2011. ACLED incidents involved election-related violence and actions in support of the state. Excluded.

#### Patriotic Front (PF)

Former opposition political party which has been in power since the 2011 elections. No violence targeted at challenging the state. Most ACLED incidents were election-related violence. Excluded.

#### Rally for Congolese Democracy (Kisangani) [RCD-K]

Congolese rebel group. Excluded.

#### Tongas under Oath

In mid-2012, a previously unknown group calling itself Tongas under Oath sent letters to President Michael Sata and other Zambian leaders demanding that all members of the Bemba ethnic group be removed from the country's Southern Province unless the president returned the Chirundu and Itezhi-Tezhi districts back to the province by June 30. In an August 14 letter to President Sata, the group, claiming to be comprised of members of the Tonga ethnic group which is the most numerous in the Southern Province, declared "war" on the Bemba and claimed to have already killed several.<sup>3966</sup> The opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) and others had already denounced the February 2012 decision to transfer the districts.<sup>3967</sup> The government denounced the group, with a ruling Patriotic Front official linking it to the UPND, and pledged to investigate the alleged killings, which had not been confirmed.<sup>3968</sup> While Tongas

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<sup>3965</sup> Arthur Simuchoba, "Barotse Tensions See Army Deployed," *The Sunday Times*, December 9, 2012, ExpressMain edition, sec. Zimbabwe, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SUNTIM0020121210e8c90000p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3966</sup> Kaiko Namusa, "Tonga Group Slammed Over 'War' Threats," *All Africa*, September 5, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120905e895000rx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3967</sup> "Zambia: Police to Deal with Youth Planning to Protest against Realignment Issue," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 25, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020120225e82p000ul&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Sata Ticks Off Hichilema, Sinyinda," *All Africa*, February 13, 2012,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120213e82d000q1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3968</sup> Namusa, "Tonga Group Slammed Over 'War' Threats."

under Oath did not carry out any further killings, if it had even carried out its claimed killings, PF leaders continued to tie the group to the UPND, charges the opposition rejected.<sup>3969</sup> While challenging President Sata's decision to transfer the two disputed districts, the group did not attack or claim to be planning to attack state targets. Excluded.

**National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)**

Angolan rebel group. Excluded.

**United Party for National Development (UNPD)**

AKAs: **UPND: United Party for National Development**

Opposition political party. Party supporters were involved in numerous election-related violent clashes. Excluded.

**Vigilante Militia (Zambia)**

ACLED incidents all involve attacks on civilians. Excluded.

**Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)**

Ruling party of Zimbabwe. Excluded.

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<sup>3969</sup> Chila Namaiko and Kaiko Namusa, "Hakainde Hichilema Lying About Attempt On His Life - State," *All Africa*, September 10, 2012, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020120910e89a000gx&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Katuta Kalebwe, "Its Fabrication for Chama and PF to Lie That HH Hates Bembas Like Me - Percy Chanda [Opinion]," *All Africa*, December 31, 2015, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020151231ebcv000pl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

**Narrative Summary:** Rhodesia, formerly Southern Rhodesia until Northern Rhodesia became independent as Zambia in 1964, had been a self-governing crown colony of Britain since 1923, but the minority white settlers dominated the government. Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front (RF) government issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965 amid frustration with British refusal to grant independence to Rhodesia without majority rule rather than existing white rule. As Rhodesia became increasingly isolated internationally, the Rhodesian security forces battled the rebel fighters of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique further weakened the Rhodesian government, and Smith and the RF accepted majority rule as the condition for peace in negotiations. After ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) won the 1980 general elections ahead of Nkomo's Patriotic Front-ZAPU (PF-ZAPU), Mugabe became the first prime minister of independent Zimbabwe and remained in power as prime minister until 1987 and then as president until his removal in a coup in 2018. Fighting between ZAPU and ZANU forces broke out as early as November 1980, and Mugabe used security forces to carry out reprisals, mass arrests, and massacres in western Zimbabwe's Matabeleland, home of Nkomo's Ndebele coethnics, until Nkomo finally agreed to ZAPU's merger into ZANU-PF in 1987.

Mugabe's rule became increasingly dictatorial, and the ZANU-PF regime repressed both political opposition and incipient rebel groups such as Armando Mabache's short-lived, Mozambique-based Chimwenje in the mid-1990s. In November 2003, British activist Peter Tatchell announced the existence of a new rebel group called the Zimbabwe Freedom Movement (ZFM) and shared a video statement purportedly from the group, but ZFM never released any additional statements or claimed any attacks. As Zimbabwe's economy stagnated, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led the successful opposition in the 2000 referendum on ZANU-PF-backed constitutional reforms and gained significant support in the 2004 general elections. State allegations in 2006 that the ZFM, Mozambique's Renamo rebels, and prominent MDC leaders had plotted to assassinate Mugabe and seize control fell apart in court. Following electoral fraud and state coercion in the 2008 general elections, MDC's main faction led by presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai boycotted the presidential run-off, and international and domestic pressure forced Mugabe and Tsvangirai to form a government of national unity with Mugabe retaining the presidency (and control of the state security apparatus) and Tsvangirai becoming prime minister. With continued electoral fraud and helped by opposition infighting, Mugabe and ZANU-PF took back full control of the government in 2013. With his ailing health sparking succession discussions, Mugabe's move to sack longtime ZANU-PF loyalist Emmerson Mnangagwa from the vice presidency and the positioning of his wife Grace Mugabe as successor triggered a November 2017 military coup which brought Mnangagwa to the presidency. Internal ZANU-PF and state actors, rather than either the political opposition or rebel groups, deposed Mugabe after 37 years in power, and Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF retained control in the narrow, and again disputed, 2018 elections.

**Probability of Additional, Unidentified Groups:** Medium

**Explanation:** Although ZFM is the only Zimbabwean group in our dataset and is included with a degree of uncertainty about its existence, the event databases included numerous incidents of violence against civilians and state targets during the 1997-2015 period. Only 9 percent of Zimbabwe's ACLED events included unidentified Zimbabwean armed groups, but they amounted to 302 events. ZANU-PF elements and sympathizers and state actors appear to be responsible for many of these incidents, including attacks on opposition leaders and supporters and ZANU-PF dissidents. However, incidents such as a string of bomb scares against state targets in 1999 and several attacks on state media have involved anti-state actors. Similarly, the GTD lists unknown perpetrators, primarily pro-state, as responsible for 15 of the 26 attacks in Zimbabwe. SCAD records significant protests against ZANU-PF and state policies. Zimbabwe's restrictions on freedom of the press and general repression of dissidents limit the media's

*ability to accurate report on events in the country and make it more likely that the media sources used to build ACLED and other databases missed some anti-state attacks. Mugabe's government had numerous opponents, including former ZAPU sympathizers, white farmers, and frustrated political opposition. Whether or not ZFM actually existed, any Zimbabwe-based rebel groups which may exist or have existed would seem unlikely to take credit for attacks or publicly announce existence in the repressive political climate.*

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#### **African National Congress (ANC)**

South Africa's ruling party. Members attacked Zimbabwean journalists during ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema's 2012 visit to Harare (4680ZIM). Excluded.

#### **Aggrieved Affiliates Workers' Union (AAWU)**

Group involved in 2005 attack on human rights activists in Harare (2546ZIM). Excluded.

#### **Anti-Senate Militia**

In 2006, the leading Zimbabwe opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), "split over over participation in elections for a new Senate in November" 2006.<sup>3970</sup> In February 2006, members of MDC's anti-Senate faction clashed with MDC's pro-senate faction as pro-Senate MDC candidates filed their nomination papers (2599ZIM). Election-related violence within the opposition. Excluded.

#### **Chipangano Militia**

Militia involved in supporting the ruling party ZANU-PF and attacking political opponents. Excluded.

#### **Duma Clan Militia (Zimbabwe) and Rozvi Clan Militia (Zimbabwe)**

Land clashes in 2013 between rival groups, not targeting the state (4881ZIM). Excluded.

#### **Johanne Marange Apostolic Sect**

Pro-Mugabe church members occupied a large dairy farm in Chipinge in 2011 (4311ZIM). Excluded.

#### **Movement for Democratic Change (Biti Faction) [MDC-Renewal]**

AKAs: **MDC: MDC-Renewal: Movement for Democratic Change (Biti Faction)** [duplicate ACLED code]  
Faction of Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. Excluded.

#### **Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)**

Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. While its supporters were involved in election-related violence, often as the victims of state repression, and in anti-government protests, the party primarily tried to work through Zimbabwe's political system and does not meet our definition of a rebel group. Excluded.

#### **Movement for Democratic Change (Mangoma Faction)**

Faction of Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. Excluded.

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<sup>3970</sup> "Zimbabwe Security Min Orders Probe Of US-Opposition Ties," *Dow Jones International News*, February 7, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DJI0000020060207e227000pr&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zimbabwe: Nominations for Upcoming Polls Held 'without Any Hitches,'" *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 6, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020060206e2260002t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.



#### Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Pro-Senate Militia

Faction of Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. Excluded.

#### Movement for Democratic Change (Mutambara Faction) [MDC-M]

Faction of Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. Excluded.

#### Movement for Democratic Change (Ncube Faction) [MDC-N]

Faction of Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. Excluded.

#### Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai Faction) [MDC-T]

Faction of Zimbabwe's main opposition political party. Excluded.

#### Militia

Four ACLED events with this tag, all of which involved pro-ZANU-PF militia. Excluded.

#### Nyau Communal Militia (Zimbabwe)

Only ACLED-tagged event was a 2013 attack on a civilian (4887ZIM). Excluded.

#### Top Six Militia

Youth militia backing ruling ZANU-PF. Excluded.

#### Upfumi Kuvadiki

Youth militia backing ruling ZANU-PF. Excluded.

#### Vigilante Militia (Zimbabwe)

ACLED incidents primarily involved attacks on civilians suspected of criminal activity and white farm owners. No attacks against state targets with intent to challenge the state beyond local disputes with local police. Excluded.

#### Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)

Zimbabwe's ruling party since independence. Excluded.

#### Zimbabwe Freedom Movement\*

British human rights activist Peter Tatchell, involved in challenging Mugabe's government for human rights abuses and defending LGBTQ rights worldwide, publicly announced the Zimbabwe Freedom Movement's existence in a London press conference on Thursday, November 13, 2003; at the conference, he played a video from the ZFM leadership. Media reports described the group as "new" and "newly formed" but did not provide additional details on the timing of its formation relative to the press conference.<sup>3971</sup> In late November 2003, Tatchell confirmed that the ZFM had been in touch with him for the previous 18 months.<sup>3972</sup> SCAD records both anti-government protests and anti-government riots of sufficient size to count as contestation in the year preceding May 2002. Both Type 1, 3, and 4 contestation events and Type 2 contestation events occurred nationally and locally during this time. There was a high level of contestation during this period,

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<sup>3971</sup> Michael McDonough, "Human Rights Activist Announces Creation of Armed Movement to Oust Zimbabwe's President," *Associated Press Newswires*, November 13, 2003,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020031113dzbd002jk&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "New Armed Group Vows to Capture Zimbabwe Leader," *Agence France Presse*, November 13, 2003, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020031113dzbd0018b&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3972</sup> Oliver Owen, "Freedom Fighters - or Trap Set by Mugabe?," *Independent On Sunday*, November 23, 2003.

most of which was related to backlash against the Mugabe regime. No pro-government violence was waged nationally or locally in the year prior to group formation.

We include the group because, especially according to their video statement shown by Tatchell, the ZFM had clear political goals. Self-proclaimed ZFM commander Charles Black Mamba declared the movement's intention to oppose the current government through armed struggle and kill or arrest then-President Robert Mugabe and other senior Zimbabwean officials.<sup>3973</sup> Also, as noted below, the group had collected arms and there appears to be evidence of planning for attacks.

The ZFM commanders' use of pseudonyms in the video, Tatchell's claim to have smuggled the video out of Zimbabwe, and the British government's claim that ZFM members tried to contact the British embassy in Harare is sufficient evidence for us to code the group as "1" for clandestine.<sup>3974</sup> ZFM at one point ran a website registered in the Cayman Islands, but it was not accessible as of November 2007 (and likely had not been for some time).<sup>3975</sup> I have coded the certainty of this group's existence as a "2" rather than the maximum "3" despite its mention in multiple, credible sources because most of the information about the group appears to come from either British human rights activist Peter Tatchell or the Zimbabwean government. On the basis of the British government's confirmation of being contacted by ZFM in Harare and Tatchell's claims that the taped interview with ZFM leadership took place outside Harare – a rural area outside of the capital city – coded as "1" for the "rural" variable.<sup>3976</sup>

There is no report of any actual ZFM small or large attacks against state targets or any attacks against civilians. Even the government's attempt to charge individuals associated with the opposition political party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) for ZFM activities involved an arms cache and alleged plots for attacks, not any actual attacks.

According to Tatchell, ZFM was "a network of cells throughout the country and thousands of members, primarily soldiers, police and members of the security services disillusioned with Mr Mugabe" and unconnected with MDC.<sup>3977</sup> In the 2006 arrests and trial of alleged ZFM members related to an alleged ZFM arms cache and plot to assassinate Mugabe, the Zimbabwean government claimed that MDC leaders such as MDC shadow defense minister Giles Mutsekwa and prominent MDC MP Roy Bennett were involved in the rebel group and that the ZFM was the MDC's armed wing.<sup>3978</sup> Tatchell denied that he had anything to do with the alleged plot or indeed with ZFM itself after November 2003.<sup>3979</sup> Given the the Zimbabwean government's longstanding campaign of using legal and extralegal measures to repress dissent, there is strong reason to doubt its claims. Despite the gravity and detail of the government's claims, it ultimately freed seven of the eight charged suspects before trial and was only able to convict businessman Peter Hitschmann on weapons charges related to the arms cache rather than

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<sup>3973</sup> "New Armed Group Vows to Capture Zimbabwe Leader."

<sup>3974</sup> "New Armed Group Vows to Capture Zimbabwe Leader."; McDonough, "Human Rights Activist Announces Creation of Armed Movement to Oust Zimbabwe's President."

<sup>3975</sup> "Zimbabwean Weapons Expert Cleared of Treason Charge," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, July 4, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCAP00020070704e37400335&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3976</sup> McDonough, "Human Rights Activist Announces Creation of Armed Movement to Oust Zimbabwe's President"; "New Armed Group Vows to Capture Zimbabwe Leader."

<sup>3977</sup> McDonough, "Human Rights Activist Announces Creation of Armed Movement to Oust Zimbabwe's President"; Ewen MacAskill, "Zimbabwe Armed Rebel Group 'Thousands Strong,'" *The Guardian*, November 14, 2003, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/14/politics.foreignpolicy>.

<sup>3978</sup> "Zimbabwe Charges 8 with Anti-Mugabe Plot," *Reuters News*, March 12, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020060312e23c0006y&cat=a&ep=ASE>; Dumisani Muleya, "Zimbabwe Manhunt for Bennett," *Sapa-DPA*, March 14, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020060314e23e0015z&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3979</sup> "Tatchell Dismisses Zimbabwe Coup Plot Claims," *Agence France Presse*, March 14, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020060314e23e003sg&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

the treason charge tying him to ZFM. South Africa granted Bennett asylum.<sup>3980</sup> The accused plotters alleged that Zimbabwean security forces had tortured them during interrogations.<sup>3981</sup>

The leadership of ZFM was unknown except for the commander and deputy commander who appeared in the video Tatchell showed. Tatchell claimed not to be a member or personally involved with the group otherwise than as the bearer of its message. Commander Charles Black Mamba and Deputy Commanders Ntukuzo Fezela and Daniel Ngwe, all pseudonymous, claimed to have fought in Zimbabwe's independence struggle, so they are classified as former rebels and, on the basis of Tatchell's claims about ZFM members' security ties, part of the current regime's military.<sup>3982</sup> As discussed above, Zimbabwe's claims of MDC leaders' involvement in ZFM are not credible. Although Zimbabwe claimed that Bennett had visited several neighboring countries asking for support, that Tatchell and Hitschmann had opened a bank account in Mozambique for the plotters' activities, and that Mozambique's former Renamo rebels were involved in the plot to assassinated Mugabe, the surveyed media sources provided no credible information on ZFM's funding.<sup>3983</sup>

ZFM did not become viable, and Factiva's last mention of it is dated July 5, 2007.<sup>3984</sup> The group did not issue any more public statements after November 2003.<sup>3985</sup> There is no evidence that ZFM played any role in the successful 2018 coup that toppled Mugabe but kept ZANU-PF in power.

#### Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA)

Funded by ZANU-PF, pro-government. Excluded.

#### Zimbabwe National Youth Service (ZNYS)

Part of the state. Excluded.

#### Zimbabwe Republic Police Militia (ZRP)

State police officers. Excluded.

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<sup>3980</sup> "Zimbabwean Weapons Expert Cleared of Treason Charge"; Peta Basildon, "Bennett Finally Wins Political Asylum in SA," *Weekend Argus*, May 13, 2007, sec. News,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WEEKA00020070514e35d0000r&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3981</sup> Dumisani Muleya, "Country Defends Rights Record to AU Body," *All Africa*, November 21, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020061121e2bl000it&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Arms-Cache Accused Denies Trying to Topple Mugabe," *ISI Emerging Markets Africawire*, October 26, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LQAF000020061027e2aq0003a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3982</sup> McDonough, "Human Rights Activist Announces Creation of Armed Movement to Oust Zimbabwe's President"; MacAskill, "Zimbabwe Armed Rebel Group 'Thousands Strong.'"

<sup>3983</sup> Tawanda Kanhema, "Racists Still Seek to Unseat Government," *All Africa*, March 13, 2006, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020060313e23d0005y&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Tatchell Dismisses Zimbabwe Coup Plot Claims"; Dumisani Muleya, "Mugabe to Seek Life Terms for Plotters," *All Africa*, March 28, 2006,

<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020060328e23s000h6&cat=a&ep=ASE>; "Zimbabwe Charges 8 with Anti-Mugabe Plot."

<sup>3984</sup> Tichaona Sibanda, "Hitschmann Cleared of Assassination Plot Against Mugabe," *All Africa*, July 5, 2007, <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFNWS00020070705e375000ih&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

<sup>3985</sup> "Zimbabwean Weapons Expert Cleared of Treason Charge."