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When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in Uganda

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ABSTRACT Among other shortcomings of decentralization reforms undertaken by developing countries since the 1980s, recent research finds that the reforms’ primary aim—devolution of authority to localities—has often not been achieved in practice. This article builds on that insight, examining an understudied pathway through which states that have undertaken decentralization can ultimately recentralize power: administrative unit proliferation. Rapid creation of numerous new subnational administrative units is an increasingly common occurrence in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This phenomenon, I argue, allows for recentralization by reducing the intergovernmental bargaining power and administrative capacity of each subnational unit, as well as by substantially expanding both the reach of the national executive’s patronage network and its ability to monitor emergent security threats on its periphery. The article illustrates these mechanisms with evidence from Uganda.

KEY WORDS: Decentralization, intergovernmental relations, administrative unit proliferation, district creation, Uganda

While global geopolitical shifts in the 1980s and 1990s brought forth a wave of promising decentralization reforms across the developing world, more recently, scholars have noted the uneven success of such reforms. Among other political and economic shortcomings, decentralization’s primary aim—devolution of authority to localities—has often not been achieved in practice (Falleti, 2010). Moreover, several states that had previously undertaken decentralization are now recentralizing (Dickovick and Eaton, 2004; Dickovick, 2011; Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran, 2012).

This article argues that an understudied pathway through which decentralizing states in the developing world can ultimately undergo recentralization occurs via administrative unit proliferation. Since undertaking decentralization reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, over half of sub-Saharan African counties—along with Brazil,
Indonesia, Morocco, Vietnam, and others—have substantially transformed the subnational organization of their state by creating numerous new local administrative units. While this rather widespread phenomenon is rarely noted in existing research, it transforms a broad range of governance relationships; in particular, citizens’ geographic and social proximity to local government officials and access points for public services, as well as local governments’ relations with the central government. The focus of this article is the latter: how rapid creation of subnational administrative units affects intergovernmental balance of power.

Drawing on logic from foundational theories of collective action, intergovernmental relations, and statebuilding, this article argues that even in the wake of decentralization reforms, administrative unit proliferation makes countries susceptible to recentralization of intergovernmental power. I propose four mechanisms through which this can occur, each of which suggests a distinct sphere of intergovernmental relations that is influenced by the creation of numerous new subnational units. First, because administrative unit proliferation decreases many units’ size relative to the centre and substantially increases the number of units overall, it diminishes individual units’ bargaining leverage with the centre as well as units’ joint capacity for acting collectively on behalf of policies that advance the interests of all localities. Thus a core area of intergovernmental bargaining, fiscal affairs, will be more likely to shift in favour of the centre following unit proliferation, leading to fiscal recentralization. Second, new units are, on average, quite low in administrative capacity, making them reliant on the centre for expertise and assistance with policy implementation. Thus the creation of numerous new units allows for administrative centralization. Third, political elites in new units are more likely to be beholden to patronage of the centre, likely generating political centralization. Finally, an increased quantity of smaller units gives the state deeper informational penetration of peripheral localities, allowing for enhanced opportunities for the centre to monitor potential security threats to its authority emanating from outlying areas, or security centralization. While security issues are often overlooked in existing research on decentralization, they play a fundamental role in centre-periphery relations and statebuilding in numerous contemporary African states due to weak institutions inherited from colonists and an attendant vulnerability to peripheral insurgencies.

To substantiate these arguments, the article examines temporal variation in the extent of decentralization and recentralization in Uganda. Uganda is an apt case for this undertaking because, like many African countries, in the 1980s it emerged from a post-independence period characterized by kleptocracy, centralized governance, and state weakness. In the early 1990s it democratized and undertook highly ambitious decentralization reforms and other statebuilding efforts while, at the same time, facing numerous rural insurgencies. In recent years, under the leadership of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and President Museveni—who has been in power for almost three decades—the state has become increasingly centralized. Using original evidence from fieldwork, newspapers, budget data, and scholarly and policy analyses on Uganda, I investigate the links between administrative unit proliferation—an outgrowth of Uganda’s decentralization reforms—and the national executive’s subsequent retrenchment of devolved control of intergovernmental fiscal, administrative, political, and security affairs.
In advancing the argument that subnational unit proliferation makes countries susceptible to recentralization, this article develops theory on subnational state organization, contributing in particular to a recent, growing literature on administrative unit proliferation. While much of this body of work focuses on the causes of this phenomenon (e.g. Green, 2010; Kimura, 2013), this article turns to its effects—specifically how it shapes the intergovernmental balance of power. In doing so, it expands on Grossman and Lewis (2014), which focuses primarily on the determinants of administrative unit proliferation but also argues that it diminishes the power of localities vis-à-vis the national executive. This article further develops the logic of why this is so and draws attention to how administrative unit creation influences states’ internal security affairs, an often overlooked aspect of intergovernmental relations.

Additionally, the article contributes to a burgeoning literature on the conditions under which decentralization reforms in developing countries ultimately fail to bring about substantial de facto power devolved to localities, and even lead to recentralization. Doing so promises to shed light on recent developments in political and economic welfare outcomes in Africa, as well as unintended consequences of decentralization reforms. International development agencies had strongly encouraged such reforms; for example, between 1990 and 2007 the World Bank spent about 7.4 billion dollars for decentralization programs in 20 developing countries (Independent Evaluation Group, 2008; Treisman, 2007). While the primary scholarly work on recent recentralization in African and Latin American states stresses the importance of external factors like national economic crises in creating conditions ripe for recentralization (Dickovick, 2011), it does not examine internal change to the state, such as transformation of the subnational state structures, as a source of similar shifts.

The article proceeds as follows. First, it reviews existing work on decentralization and administrative unit proliferation, and presents a logic of why administrative unit proliferation increases the likelihood of recentralization. It then provides background on decentralization reforms in Uganda. Third, it examines evidence linking administrative unit proliferation with recentralization in Uganda. The article concludes by discussing what this recentralization may mean for trajectories of democratization and statebuilding in Uganda and beyond.

Administrative Unit Proliferation in Africa and Related Research

Administrative unit proliferation occurs when a large number of subnational government units, such as districts or provinces, split into two or more new units—a rump or ‘mother’ district and at least one new unit of equal administrative standing—over a relatively short period. Grossman and Lewis (2014) demonstrate the prevalence of this phenomenon throughout Africa, showing that over half of (non-island) sub-Saharan African states have increased their subnational administrative units by at least 20% since 1990. For example, between 1990 and 2010, Burkina Faso expanded its number of provinces from 30 to 45; Congo-Brazzaville and Ethiopia increased their districts from 79 to 101 and 556 to 736, respectively; and South Africa divided its former 53 municipalities into 284 new ones. Other studies have highlighted similar cases of subnational unit proliferation in countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa—for example in Brazil, Indonesia, Hungary, Morocco, and Vietnam (Dickovick,
2011; Ilner, 1999; Kimura, 2013; Malesky, 2009). In short, a rather dramatic reorganization of the subnational state has occurred in numerous developing states in Africa and beyond.

Although administrative unit proliferation and decentralization are distinct phenomena, the former has typically occurred in African states following the initiation of decentralization reforms. The reason why administrative unit proliferation generally follows decentralization is straightforward; without authority devolved to localities, there would be little policy rationale, nor demand from citizens, for increasing the number of local governments. Therefore, when new resources and authorities are devolved to localities—typically the centerpiece of decentralization reforms—such units are imbued with increased value for local citizens and elites.

Such value generates demand ‘from below’ for the production of new localities, suggests a new, growing literature that examines the determinants of administrative unit proliferation. Kimura (2013), Grossman and Lewis (2014), Malesky (2009), and Pierskalla (2013) show that local territorial politics—political, economic, or identity-based relationships among localities—generates variation in the extent of local demand for new administrative units. These works are in dialogue with Green (2010), Hassan (2014), and Kasara (2006), which emphasize the top-down nature of new district creation, driven by national elites who seek an opportunity to develop and strengthen patronage networks that were weakened in the wake of structural adjustment reforms. This article builds on insights from both veins of this literature, moving from this foundation about why administrative unit proliferation occurs and turning to its consequences for intergovernmental relations.

In doing so, this article also contributes to a more expansive body of research that examines outcomes of the wave of decentralization reforms undertaken in developing countries since the 1980s. In particular, this literature assesses the conditions under which decentralization yields the ends that theories since The Federalist Papers have proffered; improving the quality of democracy and the efficiency of public service provision by increasing rates of civic engagement in politics and thereby generating more responsive and accountable local governments. This research has generally found that decentralization’s record across the developing world is disappointing, often because the assumptions of the prior theories that had trumpeted decentralization were not met in practice (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke, 2010; Treisman, 2007). In shedding light on the mixed record of decentralization in Latin America, Falleti (2010) makes a crucial observation: decentralization reforms often fail even to bring about their core aim of devolving power to localities. To explain why this is the case, Falleti (2010) and others focus on subtle aspects of the timing and substance of reforms. This article instead highlights how a distinct, institutional factor—the quantity of new units created amidst decentralization reforms—can subvert the original intent of those reforms, allowing the state to recentralize intergovernmental authority.

This article thus follows recent work noting that recentralization is occurring in many developing countries that had recently decentralized (Dickovick and Eaton, 2004; Dickovick, 2011; Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran, 2012). Focusing on Brazil and South Africa, Dickovick (2011) posits that national economic crises, such as those brought on by hyperinflation, create windows of opportunity for centralization
because the centre’s bargaining power with localities is strengthened during such crises. This argument does not, however, travel well to Uganda, where economic crises have been absent in recent decades. Economic growth in Uganda has been consistent since 1987; its annual gross domestic product growth has not dipped below 3.4% in that period, according to Economist Intelligence Unit data. While Uganda did face a macroeconomic crisis in 1986 and 1987, this was precisely when the government initiated decentralization reforms and was almost a decade prior to when it began recentralizing.

This article instead identifies a different type of shock to intergovernmental relations—administrative unit proliferation—that favours the centre. Given that administrative unit proliferation is quite widespread in Africa, its potential role in recentralization there should not be overlooked. Additionally, while prior work on recentralization tends to focus exclusively on intergovernmental fiscal relations, this article has a broader theoretical scope, arguing that political, administrative, and security components of intergovernmental authority are also affected by administrative unit proliferation.

How Administrative Unit Proliferation Enables Centralization

Why and how does administrative unit proliferation allow for centralization of intergovernmental power? The framework proposed here to understand this process is summarized in Figure 1. It follows foundational theories of federalism and intergovernmental bargaining (e.g. Riker, 1964) in assuming that the central state will always seek to maximize its political and economic control over its peripheral areas; the question, then, becomes one of understanding the logic of how the creation of multiple new subnational administrative units allows the centre to do so.5

An elemental reason that administrative unit proliferation creates new opportunities for enhanced central control stems from an uncontroversial assertion: a local unit’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the centre is increasing in its territorial size. By design, subnational unit creation makes the average territorial size of subnational units in a state smaller. Thus, while unit proliferation brings local governments ‘closer to the people,’ it also means that the leverage of the many newly split localities will be diminished relative to their former bargaining power as a larger, single unit. Additionally, core theories of collective action indicate that free rider problems are increasing in the number of units that are potentially acting collectively (Olson, 1965). As the number of subnational units in a state increases, the more severe will be free rider problems among those units and the higher will be their transaction costs of coordinating to bargain with the centre on matters of mutual interest among all localities. The foremost of such matters is the extent of their control over the state’s fiscal apparatus; authority to levy taxes, collect taxes, and spending these funds are typically equivalent among localities and are often the most rancorous issue in intergovernmental struggles for power. The dynamics of extensive unit creation thus lend themselves to increased fiscal centralization.

Second, new local units and the people who staff them are likely to have little experience in local administration, and will thus be lower in administrative capacity than older, more established units. As Ziblatt (2004) argues, the administrative or
‘infrastructural’ capacity of local units to provide public goods plays a critical role in determining the dispensation of power between the centre and periphery, with the centre more likely to seize power where peripheral areas lack capacity. By this logic, the tendency for centralization will be particularly marked following the rapid creation of numerous new units, when a substantial quantity of administrative units has had little time to build institutional capacity. Furthermore, new units are likely to be highly weak in administrative capacity in the most rural, marginalized areas of African states, where new units are most likely to be formed (Grossman and Lewis 2014). Such areas are likely to have poor infrastructure and lack a pool of civil servants with the experience and technical skills required to carry out complex budgeting and planning tasks (Wunsch, 2001: 279). In such contexts, new units are likely to be particularly dependent on the centre for planning and implementation of providing public services and goods, leading to administrative centralization.

Beyond their size, quantity, and capacity, a defining feature of new subnational administrative units is that they create numerous local employment opportunities. However, those who fill new positions tend to owe their employment to the central government, which must legally sanction the creation of new units. In particular, unit creation generates numerous new positions for civil servants; in unitary states—as are most African states—these are positions of employment with the central government. This feature of new subnational units generates extensive opportunity for the centre to use these positions as a form of political patronage, offering them only to ruling party loyalists. Expanding the quantity of people beholden to the incumbent central government—its patronage coalition—thus allows for political centralization, and has been shown (with respect to cabinet positions) to extend African national leaders’ tenure in office (Arriola, 2009). Furthermore, because citizens generally benefit from living in a new unit, for example because it limits their transportation costs to access points for public services, they may reward the ruling party of the national executive with their electoral allegiance, allowing for further political centralization.
This territorial and numerical expansion of people employed by, and beholden to, the centre points to a final attribute of administrative unit proliferation that contributes to centralization: it extends the reach of the centre’s ‘eyes and ears’ into the periphery, enhancing the centre’s capacity to identify and monitor emergent security threats. While security issues are rarely the focus of scholarship on intergovernmental relations, projecting authority over peripheral territories and addressing the emergence of internal armed groups in peripheral areas has arguably been the central state-building challenge in post-independence African states (Bates, 2008; Herbst, 2000). Administrative unit proliferation allows the state to better monitor emergent threats in its peripheral areas—presenting an opportunity to end them before they become stronger and more costly to manage—since it allows the central state to better physically penetrate peripheral areas. As Fearon and Laitin contend in their classic argument about state capacity diminishing the likelihood of civil war onset, “Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency . . . are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas” [italics added] (2003: 80). The physical, institutionalized presence of the centre in formerly remote areas acts not only as a monitoring device, but also as a deterrent to would-be challengers of the state. In such areas, prior to new unit creation, remoteness from the centre would have enabled nascent armed groups to operate in obscurity. This change that comes with administrative unit proliferation thus allows for security centralization; or as Kimura (2013: 134) puts it, creating new subnational units “is akin to creating new spokes on a wheel, where the spokes strengthen the wheel, making it less likely to fly apart or break down.”

In sum, there are several good reasons to expect that administrative unit proliferation—an increasingly common phenomenon in African states— influences several aspects of intergovernmental balance of power in a manner that advantages the centre. I return in the article’s conclusion to the matter of whether this is a normatively appealing or concerning characteristic of administrative unit proliferation. First, I turn to illustrating this logic by examining decentralization, administrative unit proliferation, and then recentralization in Uganda since 1986.

Decentralization and Administrative Unit Proliferation in Uganda

Until recently, Uganda had long been heralded as a model decentralizing reformer. While the early independence period in Uganda—along with the rest of Africa—had seen a series of largely successful efforts by governments to consolidate power through centralization, the late 1980s and 1990s brought significant governance reforms. In particular, with the rise to power of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986, Uganda entered a new phase of increasingly decentralized governance.

The NRM began as an armed, revolutionary group in the early 1980s. Soon after seizing the central government in January 1986, the group turned to advancing decentralized governance and market-driven reforms that the international development community had strongly encouraged. In particular, the 1987 Resistance Council and Committee Statute extended throughout the country the resistance council (RC) system of local governance that the NRM had developed in territories they held as a
rebel group in prior years. The NRM had originally been designed to mobilize civilians on behalf of the rebels. After 1986, as they spread throughout the country, they enabled the central government to reach remote areas. The RCs were initially highly participatory and quite popular throughout most of Uganda, and in the month after the NRM seized power, a local paper praised the RCs, explaining that they “would enable the people to participate in the affairs that determine their own destiny.” Outside observers from the international donor community generally also looked favourably upon the system.

RCs were later renamed Local Councils (LCs) and institutionalized a complex set of linkages between the central government and the periphery. The system was formalized and strengthened by the 1993 Resistance Council Statute and the 1995 Constitution, and persists to this day as a five-tiered system of democratic local government, with districts (LC5) as the largest, most powerful level of local government, followed by counties (LC4), sub-counties (LC3), parishes (LC2), and villages (LC1). The LC system combines a number of intergovernmental functions, including passing information and orders from the centre downwards, democratizing and legitimizing local government, and channeling support upwards from the people by promoting local participation.

In the early and mid-1990s, in accordance with advice from the international donor community, this institutionalization of the LC system was reinforced by extensive de jure devolution of power to the new five tiers of localities. Starting with the Local Governmental Decentralisation Programme in 1992, a number of responsibilities, such as primary and secondary education, health, and water services, were devolved to the district. A phased fiscal decentralization process was also implemented nationwide after 1993, during which responsibilities and resources were divided between the central and local governments and annual transfers of funds from the centre to the LCs were formalized. Importantly, districts became responsible for handling all funds from the central government and were granted new powers to raise taxes and legislate bylaws. Then, the Local Government Act of 1997 increased the powers of the districts to generate local revenue while formalizing the distribution of district revenue to be allocated to the various LC levels. Further, it established that most LC executive positions, including the district chairperson, were to be locally elected or appointed by the elected officials. The head of the LC bureaucracy, the chief administrative officer (CAO), was to be appointed by the elected district chairperson. It also empowered the District Service Commission, whose members are appointed by the locally elected District Council, to hire and fire all local civil servants.

As a USAID report on Uganda summarized, “By the late 1990s, a strong legal framework for decentralization was in place, and local governments quickly became among the most empowered and best financed in Africa” (Smoke, Muhumuza, and Ssewankambo, 2010: v). Districts also became central to the country’s poverty reduction efforts. Uganda’s districts gained responsibility for making local policy as well as activities including regulating the delivery of services, formulating local development plans, and hiring and supervising public service providers, such as teachers and local engineers. The central government retained responsibility for the formulation of national policies and standards, and it determines, to a large extent, each district’s level of funding through earmarked transfers to local government. The central government
also pays the wages of the service provider staff directly and procures inputs such as drugs for local hospitals.

Alongside this legal devolution of power to localities, another form of local governmental transformation emerged in the mid-1990s: new districts were formed, carved out of old ones by ‘promoting’ counties to the level of a district. From 1990 to 2000, the number of districts increased by over 160%, from 34 to 56 districts. In this initial decade of unit creation, it drew little attention or concern—in instead, it was praised by outside observers and heartily encouraged by national and local politicians, who rhetorically tied unit creation to themes of decentralization. For example, President Museveni remarked to villagers about district creation that, “The central government is remote . . . it is power far away. You need to have power where you are to defend your interests and get services.”

Indeed, for each new district, the central government commits to building a new headquarters that houses offices of 11 administrative departments staffed by civil servants; new roads to the headquarters are typically also paved or substantially improved.

Then, in the subsequent decade, the number of Ugandan districts continued growing dramatically, doubling from 56 to 112 districts by 2010. New districts were created throughout the entire country, affecting all regions of Uganda. This explosion of districts has increasingly attracted attention and criticism. Prominent international donors who had advocated for decentralization began publicly denouncing the creation of new districts in 2008; more recently, one expert on Uganda cited the country’s “obsessive focus on the creation of new local government units” as a primary reason for Uganda’s decentralization failures (Green, 2013). Several other studies have voiced skepticism about the wisdom of such a dramatic increase in districts, and most recently, in early 2013, the central government announced that it would stop or slow the creation of new districts due to their high expense.

Analysis: Administrative Unit Proliferation and Recentralization in Uganda

Debate continues and further analysis is needed to determine whether or not administrative unit proliferation in Uganda will ultimately improve the quality of democracy and service delivery there. Recent findings suggest that while increasing a state’s quantity of subnational units can improve the quality of local public service provision, service quality tends to diminish in countries—such as Uganda—with the largest number of units (Grossman and Pierskalla, 2014). Regardless, several changes associated with administrative unit proliferation have already influenced the balance of intergovernmental power there—all favouring the centre. The following demonstrates that despite its ambitious 1990s decentralization reforms, Uganda has since become increasingly centralized across the four dimensions of intergovernmental relations described in the theoretical framework above.

Fiscal Centralization

After the first wave of large-scale administrative unit creation in the 1990s took place alongside major decentralization reforms, the prospects for sustained devolution of power to localities in Uganda began to recede. A dramatic shift occurred, in particular...
in districts’ ability to raise their own revenues. In the 1990s, each district had been able to raise roughly 85% of its revenue locally, via the graduated personal tax, essentially a personal income tax on all adult men and employed adult women (Manyak and Katono, 2009). However, in 2001, national regulations limited the per capita amount of this tax that districts could collect, and then in 2005 the central government eliminated the graduated tax entirely. This move was strongly opposed by individual district officials, but there was no strong, coordinated effort among the districts to block this move. By 2005, there were 78 districts in Uganda; over half were new districts, created within the prior decade, with limited capacity or experience in coordinating to bargain with the centre. One study published in the aftermath of this fiscal shift argued that “The abolition [of the graduated tax] has virtually paralyzed local governments, which depended on it for general administration” (Cammack et al., 2007: 34). Today, about 90–95% of districts’ revenues come from central government transfers.

Districts’ relative loss of fiscal control to the centre over this period of administrative unit proliferation is also quite clear when viewing the relationship between the quantity of districts over in Uganda and the portion of central government transfers to districts that is earmarked. In Uganda, non-earmarked funds are known as ‘unconditional’ transfers to districts. Districts aim to minimize the earmarked share of central government transfers, whereas the centre seeks the opposite. As Figure 2 shows, the share of central government transfers that is unconditional (i.e. not earmarked) has significantly declined over time as new districts have formed. Furthermore, the total funds allocated by the centre to all districts has declined over time; districts received almost 20% of the national budget in the 2003–04 fiscal year, but received only about 15% by 2010–11 (Grossman and Lewis, 2014).

Administrative Centralization

Turning to administrative centralization, there is substantial evidence that new districts have highly weak administrative capacity, which has contributed to the central
government’s reclaiming of authority for key positions and processes of local administration. New districts’ headquarters often take several years to build after the creation of a new district, which also typically operates with only a partial staff for years after being formed. According to the Uganda Local Governments Association, in 2012 districts were operating at, on average, 55% of full staffed capacity.\textsuperscript{14} This problem is particularly severe in new districts; in 2007, the 12 districts that had been created in the previous year had only succeeded in filling 9% of their vacant posts (Nsamba, 2009). This shortfall is in part due to a lack of qualified technical staff to fill posts in the mostly rural areas where new districts are created; a Ugandan study in 2007 pronounced that those who did fill new local government positions were “not qualified” (Asiimwe and Musisi, 2007: 317). There is also evidence that this lack of staff capacity negatively affects service delivery. For example, a study of local drug delivery found that, “Within the newly created districts, the weak institutional and human resource capacities have compromised the procurement, distribution and use of medicines . . . Uganda needs to put a break on the proliferation of districts” (EPRC, 2010: xi).

In 2008, justified in part by the weak capacity of new districts, the centre took a series of steps to place important administrative positions and bodies under its control. Crucially, an amendment to the Local Government Act stripped the power to appoint the CAO—the head administrator and accountant in the district—and other senior level administrators away from the directly elected district chairperson. In place of the district chairperson, the central government’s Public Service Commission was granted the power to appoint senior level administrators including the CAO, thereby insulating the position from local politics and attendant potential for corruption\textsuperscript{15}—and also bringing it under the direct supervision and control of the central government.

Further, another Local Government Act amendment disbanded tender boards comprised of locally elected officials, which had been responsible for selecting and disbursing local government contracts. In their place, it created a new committee to perform this function that is composed entirely of administrative and technical personnel who are selected and chaired by the CAO. These changes, while also ostensibly motivated by local corruption and lack of capacity, effectively removed the technical administration of the district from locally elected officials and placed it instead under the purview of the central government (Tripp, 2010: 119–120). This tendency for administrative recentralization also affected forestry management. The central government—which had previously, in 1998, devolved substantial management of national forest land to districts and subcounties—subsequently gave authority for most forests back to the centre or privatized them, leaving localities with little land to manage (Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson, 2006).

**Political Centralization**

The existence of numerous district-level positions of employment—many of which the central government controls and all of which are made more numerous when new districts are formed—create a strong, centripetal pressure on Ugandan politics. Numerous recent studies argue that these local jobs as well as opportunities for local contracts generate an expansive patronage network favouring the increasing consolidation of
national political power under the NRM (Barkan, 2011; Green, 2010; Manyak and Katono, 2009; Tripp, 2010). One study argues that the use of patronage has expanded over the course of Museveni’s reign, leading to upward pressure on the price of fealty, or “inflationary patronage” (Barkan, 2011: 18–19). Foremost of the positions that are beholden to the centre is the resident district commissioner (RDC), a powerful political appointee who serves as the central government’s lead representative in the district. Tripp (2010: 117) argues of the RDC position that “Such political appointments ensure that political control is maintained. These are generally not people with experience in administration; their main qualification is their allegiance to the NRM.” Presumably because of the RDC position’s highly partisan role, the primary opposition candidate in the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections promised to abolish it (Green, 2008). Beyond the RDC and CAO positions, numerous civil service positions are created in new districts.

Furthermore, even elected leaders in new districts tend to support the NRM. This has been the case even in areas that were dominated by opposition parties prior to gaining district status; for example, in Maracha county, located in the West Nile region of north western Uganda, numerous high-profile members of the main opposition party switched to join the NRM in 2010, on the day that their county was granted district status. A similar pattern occurred when Serere was carved out of Soroti district in eastern Uganda. The increasing number of these leaders may even decrease the power of those in districts that are not new. As Joel Barkan argues “The power and independence of district chairs has likewise been diluted as the president has created more and more districts” (2011: 8).

Finally, as several studies from Uganda and also Kenya show, creation of new units is quite popular with the citizens who reside in them, since new districts offer the promise of more proximate access to elected officials, service delivery points, and jobs (Green, 2010; Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Hassan, 2014; Kasara, 2006). Further, citizens in newly created districts reward the incumbent government in elections subsequent to district creation. Empirical analyses of Uganda find a strong positive relationship between whether an area recently became a district and incumbent President Museveni’s vote share in the subsequent election (Green, 2010; Grossman and Lewis, 2014). In sum, district creation appears to have increased the president’s popularity, especially in the predominantly rural areas where districts are created, further strengthening political centralization in Uganda.

Security Centralization

In addition to the above standard dimensions of intergovernmental relations, administrative unit proliferation has also contributed to centralization of security affairs in Uganda, increasing the centre’s monitoring ability and claim to a monopoly on legitimate violence. As a Ugandan research organization argues, “the increase in the number of districts has undoubtedly helped the state to extend its presence and therefore its control” (Nsamba, 2009: 6). In particular, while Uganda’s LC system has been widely scrutinized as a system of governance and local public goods provision, almost entirely unappreciated in existing scholarship on Uganda is the importance of the LCs to the centre’s domestic intelligence apparatus.
Yet from the early years of NRM rule, the intelligence role that the LCs would play has been public knowledge in Uganda. President Museveni explained of the LCs (then RCs) in his swearing in address: “These committees we have set up in these zones have a lot of power ... they should serve as a citizens’ intelligence system.” In the late 1980s, the initial leadership core of each LC—all of whom were selected by an appointee of the centre, prior to decentralization reforms—was responsible for identifying all individuals in the area who had served in a military or intelligence capacity for the former regime. They also screened and monitored these individuals, offering them a position in the new national military or police if they were found to be sufficiently skilled and loyal to the new regime. As a chief architect of the LC system explained of its inception during the Bush War: “We wanted a sure source of intelligence about the enemy ... We needed allies from within ... We needed information on where and how many soldiers (the enemy) had.”

Today, the LCs continue to be the primary channel through which the central government stays systematically apprised of emerging security threats, especially in rural areas. The lead Ugandan civil intelligence body that oversees the intelligence function of the LC system, the Internal Security Organization (ISO), is tasked with detecting all security threats emanating from within Uganda. Along with the RDC, the district information security officer (DISO), another centrally appointed position stationed at each district, plays a crucial role in collecting information locally and sending it upwards to Kampala. He is responsible for identifying and clearing all foreign visitors to a district and oversees all security affairs in his district in coordination with the RDC, including managing ISO employees stationed at the lower LC levels. Expanding the number of districts therefore increases the quantity of officials who directly report to the centre on the ground in outlying areas, allowing for more direct central monitoring of the local intelligence apparatus.

The increase over time in the rural penetration of Uganda’s civil intelligence apparatus coincided with a remarkable decline in organized political violence within Uganda. Despite being a failed state in the early 1980s and facing numerous rebel groups forming and operating on its territory since 1986, the frequency with which rebel groups have formed in Uganda has declined over time, with no groups forming on its territory since 2001. Uganda has not experienced rebel-related violence on its territory since 2005, when the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), was pushed out to neighbouring states. This stability since the mid-2000s has been a bright spot in a region that is elsewhere still plagued by extensive violence due to conflict involving myriad non-state armed groups, particularly in bordering Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, and nearby Central Africa Republic. Especially given its post-independence history of state decay and civil war, Uganda’s substantial progress in attaining stability and economic growth has prompted extensive international commendation, including Paul Collier heralding Uganda as “the main example of successful African post-conflict recovery” (Collier, 1999: 1).

Throughout the Ugandan government today—among individuals in military and civilian institutions, in the NRM and opposition, and at central and local levels of government—there exists a common belief that Uganda’s civil intelligence structures help to protect the country from a resumption of violence. For example, when asked why the government had defeated nascent rebellions with increasing frequency since 1986,
an intelligence officer replied, “Because of government vigilance, up to the village level... today, rebels may attempt to form again, but they will not survive.” He argued that “local leaders” are more important than the police in providing local security.22 Similarly, a senior military officer explained, “People appreciate stability... the population acts as our intelligence. So now it’s not so easy to start a rebellion. The population will end them.”23 This assessment was shared by local officials stationed across the country. For example, a local official in eastern Uganda said: “Rebellion can’t happen here today. The LC system is too strong.”24

Rather remarkably, this attribution of Uganda’s lack of rebel challengers today to the government’s domestic intelligence apparatus is shared by several former Ugandan rebel leaders. For example, when asked why a rebel group has not formed in Uganda in recent years, a former rebel leader replied, “Intelligence for the government is somehow more strong today... people would be reluctant to get involved.”25 Similarly, a former rebel leader of a different group explained: “no, [starting a new rebel group] can’t happen today. The government is too strong... it is too easy for them to pick information.”26 While it is difficult to systematically study administrative unit proliferation’s influence on would-be rebel leaders’ calculations and the central state’s ability to detect emergent rebel groups, this evidence is clearly consistent with the existence of this relationship.

**Conclusion**

This article has argued that administrative unit proliferation—an increasingly common phenomenon in developing countries that have undertaken decentralization reforms, particularly in Africa—creates a set of conditions that allows for recentralization of intergovernmental power. It has also illustrated how this occurred in Uganda, showing that as administrative unit proliferation unfolded, the balance of power between the centre and localities there has increasingly favoured the centre. Additional research is needed to probe the argument’s external validity; however, there is suggestive evidence that the argument is relevant in several states throughout Africa. For example, Green (2008: 436) argues that the central government strategy of using decentralization to consolidate political power in rural localities occurred in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe; similarly, Fessha and Kirkby (2008: 248) argue that the centre in some of these states, plus Malawi, Senegal, and South Africa, has “clawed back” power after previously decentralizing. Strikingly, all of these states also have undertaken extensive subnational administrative unit creation since the 1990s.

Does this pattern warrant concern? On the one hand, given the international donor community’s substantial investment in decentralization reforms in Africa, evidence that countries like Uganda are recentralizing is discouraging—particularly given that many scholars attribute Africa’s political and economic disappointments in the 1960s and 1970s to overly centralized governance (Wunsch and Olowu, 1995). Furthermore, recentralization can exacerbate the authoritarian tendencies of hybrid regimes. Given the increasingly weak and fragmented nature of opposition parties in Uganda, as well as the central government’s increasing use of the state to limit protests and suspend media outlets that they perceive to be fomenting instability,
recentralization there may be reason for grave concern. Donors have increasingly halted funding to Uganda due to democratic backsliding there, and a prominent African politics expert warns that Uganda’s recent recentralization diminishes the likelihood of a politically stable future (Barkan, 2011: 8). On the other hand, other prominent works argue that a deficit of centralization has been a primary cause of instability and lack of rule of law in numerous African states, holding back economic growth there (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). Consistent with this reasoning, a growing body of econometric analysis suggests that areas of Africa with higher levels of pre-colonial political centralization are more likely to have higher levels of economic development and public goods provision today (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2003).

The analysis presented in this article suggests that future theory and policy on decentralization should take seriously the possibility that subnational unit increases (or decreases) contribute to shifts in the intergovernmental balance of power—and thus may fundamentally alter states’ prospects for attaining outcomes that motivate decentralization reforms. A promising area for future empirical research is to develop reliable, cross-national measures of decentralization and centralization over time in African states, which would allow scholars to test whether a more general correlation exists between subnational unit creation and the centralization of state power. Such cross national analyses will also help to shed light on how intergovernmental aspects of recent statebuilding trajectories in Africa relate to other, broader patterns of democratization and economic development on the continent.

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Notes

1The author conducted fieldwork throughout Uganda—primarily interviews with national, local, and military officials as well as civil society leaders and former rebel leaders who had received amnesty from the Ugandan government—for over a year cumulatively between 2007 and 2011. The interviews are cited directly in this article only in reference to Uganda’s security centralization; however, observations from this fieldwork inform the entire empirical section of the article.
2The countries that have done so are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
3I conceptualize decentralization simply as the delegation of authority to local branches of government. The degree to which the central government devolves authority and resources to lower levels of government determines the extent of decentralization; the subsequent reversal of such devolution is recentralization.
4See Wibbels (2006: 169–177) for a helpful discussion of several reasons surfaced in this literature for decentralization’s shortcomings, with a focus on why the assumptions held by the body of research that advocated decentralization are rarely met in practice.

5This article focuses on temporal variation in intergovernmental relations; it does not examine local spatial variation in the extent of recentralization. For a seminal analysis on the endogenous causes of spatial variation in intergovernmental relations within West African states, see Boone (2003).

6An exception is the substantial body of work on decentralization’s potential for accommodating ethnic difference and thus diminishing ethnic conflict, e.g. Bakke and Wibbels (2006) and Brancati (2006).

7This section provides a brief background on Uganda’s decentralization efforts. For more complete accounts, I refer the reader to Francis and James (2003) and Lambright (2011).

8The ‘movement’ was initially the political wing of the armed rebel group, the National Resistance Army (NRA), which overthrew the prior government. For simplicity, in this article I refer to both the political party and the rebel group as the NRM.


15For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to this change, see Manyak and Katono (2009: 7–9).


19Author’s interview with senior NRM official who designed the LC system, Kampala, November 2009.

20The two other primary intelligence institutions in Uganda are the External Security Organization (ESO), which deals with threats from foreign territories, and the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), which conducts military intelligence.

21I base this assertion on fieldwork in Uganda described above; for additional information, see Lewis (2012).

22Author’s interview with intelligence official, Kampala, March 2009.

23Author’s interview with senior military officer, Bombo Barracks, Luwero district, February 2009.

24Author’s interview with local official, Busia district, November 2009.

25Author’s interview with former rebel leader, Kampala, February 2011.

26Author’s interview with former rebel leader, Kampala, April 2009.

References


